



# Global Movements, National Grievances

Mobilizing for "Real Democracy" and Social Justice

Benjamín TEJERINA and Ignacia PERUGORRÍA (Editors)

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## Foreword

In the ashes of political and socio-economic collapse, social movements sometimes rise like a phoenix. Little more than a year has passed since the Tunisian uprisings, the spark that ignited a series of “mobilizations of the indignant” that spread like wildfire around the world. Many observers have reported on these unprecedented global protests. They have portrayed citizens who declare feeling marginalized if not scapegoated, and who reject the increasing inequalities between rich and poor, the declining mobility of most, and the “disclassment” of many. They have shown, as well, massive protests against governments and politicians that are perceived as indifferent at best, duplicitous at worst, and in any event as blatantly closed to popular concerns. Many journalists have indeed asked what took so long for people to protest given this fatal combination. For the social scientist, however, the questions of who, why and how mobilizes are not so simple. There are specific problematics of mediation between structure, culture and individual or collective agency that need to be addressed.

This edited volume compiles some of the best papers to be presented at the panels and joint sessions organized by the Research Committee on Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change (RC48) of the International Sociological Association (ISA) in the context of the Second ISA Forum of Sociology. Convened under the motto “Social Justice and Democratization,” the Forum will take place during the early days of August 2012 and will be hosted by the University of Buenos Aires, in the capital city of Argentina. Benjamín Tejerina, Debal Singharoy and Ignacia Perugorria officiated as the RC48’s program coordinators, and Tova Benski, Jorge Cadena Roa, Helena Flam, James Goodman, Lauren Langman and Markus Schulz integrated the program committee. We would like to thank them and our session chairs and organizers for their hard work and intellectual courage in preparing what promises to be an exciting conference.

Borrowing from the slogans displayed in recent demonstrations around the world, the nineteen sessions organized by the RC48 under the slogan “Global Movements, National Grievances. Mobilizing for ‘Real Democracy’ and Social Justice” pursued a dual objective. On the one hand, we wanted to foster theoretical reflections and to present empirical findings on the mobilizations that have recently sprung all around the world. On the second hand, we intended to engage in a necessary and enriching debate about the continuities and discontinuities established between these mobilizations and previous social movements in terms of their contexts, organization, repertoires, and identity work. In doing this, our sessions will delve into two major analytical threads: first, mobilizations that demand political reforms to initiate or deepen ongoing processes of democratization, and second, massive displays of discontent regarding the political mismanagement of socio-economic crises and the erosion of the Welfare State. In addition, our sessions will analyze the interrelation between these political and socio-economic demands at both the local and global levels. The theme proposed by the program coordinators was inspired by the vibrant discussions



held during the international conference "From Social to Political. New Forms of Mobilization and Globalization," co-organized by ISA's RC47 and RC48 and held in Bilbao (Spain) in February 2012.

The current volume includes more than thirty conference papers in both English and Spanish, official languages of the International Sociological Association together with French. All papers submitted in due time and format were accepted for publication, and we have arranged the papers following the simplest of all criteria: the alphabetical order of the authors' last names. The edition and publication of this volume in both electronic and paper format were funded by the Collective Identity Research Center (Department of Sociology 2, University of the Basque Country, Spain); the Center has been the base of our Research Committee since 2010. The final conference program, including the titles of RC48-organized sessions and of papers that are not included in this volume can be found in page 655. If you click on the titles you will be directed to the Forum's webpage, where you will find further details about the sessions and the paper abstracts.

Bringing these papers together and publishing them has involved a first stage of international collaboration. We expect this will pay off in a most successful endeavor of academic community-building across national borders and disciplinary frontiers. We hope this volume will help foster a world-wide debate among sociologists specialized in social movements, collective action and social change as to how we can contribute to address the pressing issues of our vivid times while bolstering our field of study and multiplying its social impact. We trust the Second ISA Forum in Buenos Aires will be a privileged breeding ground for this crucial dialogue.

Benjamín Tejerina and Ignacia Perugorría  
Bilbao, July 2012

# Globalizaciones y nuevas diplomacias en las Américas. La implementación de políticas públicas para la inclusión de sociedades civiles en las agendas de política exterior, política internacional y agendas globales en Argentina y México

Antonio Alejo Jaime

**Resumen:** Este paper se enmarca en los estudios globales y analiza un conjunto de transformaciones en los procesos de acción colectiva en las Américas. Aquí, se identifica la emergencia de “ventanas de oportunidades” para la inclusión de actores de sociedades civiles en temas de política exterior, política internacional y agendas globales en Argentina y México. El análisis entre globalización y sociedad civil en las Américas, suele centrarse, mayoritariamente, en cómo lo global impacta en las sociedades civiles. Los estudios donde las prácticas de los actores de sociedades civiles forman parte de la constitución de lo global son todavía poco desarrollados. Este análisis se centra en la dimensión política de las globalizaciones e identifica cómo dentro de los Estados, los gobiernos y las sociedades en las Américas se están adaptando a un marco global. En este sentido, el estudio de la acción colectiva en las Américas no se limita a mostrar cómo los actores de sociedades civiles “resisten” o “protestan”. El enfoque analítico desde la acción colectiva [estructura de oportunidades políticas, estructuras de movilización y análisis de marcos] busca evidenciar cómo las sociedades civiles en las Américas contribuyen a la construcción de nuevas instituciones y redefinen la relación sociedades civiles y gobiernos. Aquí, en términos de oportunidades políticas en lo global, los gobiernos se readaptan y rediseñan las políticas públicas que contribuyen a la democratización de lo público. Con las Nuevas Diplomacias se retrata un espacio de interacción donde gobiernos y sociedades civiles desarrollan transformaciones sociopolíticas innovadoras. En este sentido, a través de la implementación de políticas públicas en las cancillerías argentina y mexicana se exponen los desarrollos incipientes de políticas globales como ejercicios de democratización en las Américas.

**Palabras clave:** Globalizaciones, Nuevas Diplomacias, Política Exterior, Sociedad Civil, Américas

## 1. Introducción

Los Estados no desaparecen con la globalización. Al contrario, éstos se readaptan y se rediseñan para una mejor organización de las sociedades. En este sentido, los

gobiernos se reestructuran y generan acciones con miras a responder de manera eficiente las demandas sociales y políticas. Estas transformaciones van tomando forma de manera distinta en diferentes partes del mundo. Es así como en las Américas se observan procesos de este tipo como parte de una política global que se construye desde los Estados.

En este análisis se estudian dichos fenómenos en las cancillerías de Argentina y México, respectivamente. Profundizo sobre la implementación de una política pública dirigida a involucrar y acercar a los actores de sociedad civil a las agendas de política internacional, política exterior y temas globales en esos países. La pregunta que orienta este trabajo es: ¿Qué condiciones institucionales existen para el fomento de las prácticas transnacionales entre actores de sociedades civiles en las Américas?

A partir del concepto de nuevas diplomacias hago una interpretación de los procesos de democratización en las Américas que se expresa en un área tradicionalmente cerrada para actores no gubernamentales como lo es la política exterior o internacional de un país. La existencia de estas oficinas en cancillerías, para este análisis, representan una "ventana de oportunidad" para la promoción e inserción de los actores de sociedades civiles en las agendas mencionadas en un contexto de globalización.

El contenido del artículo consta de tres partes. La primera es un acercamiento teórico: Globalización, Nuevas Diplomacias y Oportunidades Políticas en las Américas. La segunda es el análisis de la Políticas Públicas y las Entidades de Asuntos Exteriores en Argentina y México y finalmente una conclusiones en torno a la idea de nuevas diplomacias.

## 2. Globalización, nuevas diplomacias y oportunidades políticas en las Américas

El estudio de la globalización, alrededor del mundo, esta tomando diferentes desarrollos académicos. Se han generado distintos e intensos debates sobre las definiciones, conceptos, alcances, relevancia y efectividad de la perspectiva global para el análisis y la explicación del mundo contemporáneo desde las Ciencias Sociales. De esta manera, en términos de perspectivas académicas, el progreso de los estudios globales ha establecido diversas teorías, procesos y dimensiones (Jones, 2007, 2010; Beck, 1998; Held, McGrew, 2007, 2007a; Sloterdijk, 2007; Ritzer, Atalay, 2010; Rossi, 2008; Sassen, 2007; Giddens, 2002; Heine, Thakur; 2011; Bisley, 2007; Scholte, 2005). En este estudio me centro en la dimensión política de la globalización y asumo que el Estado, sus instituciones y sus sociedades están cambiando dentro de un gran marco global (Sassen, 2007). En este análisis, para observar cómo las globalizaciones operan en diferentes escalas, lo global se entiende como: *"un proceso (o conjunto de procesos) que crean flujos y redes transcontinentales y regionales de actividades, interacciones y un nuevo marco de formuladores de políticas multinivel por actores públicos y privados, lo cual implica y trasciende los regímenes de políticas nacionales, internacionales y transnacionales"* (Global Policy, 2010).

Bajo esta idea de lo global, a través del concepto de nuevas diplomacias, analicé las transformaciones sociopolíticas en las Américas. Con el concepto de nuevas diplomacias estudié la estructura de oportunidades políticas expresadas en condiciones institucionales que promueven una política global desde los estados. Cuando hablo aquí de nuevas diplomacias no pienso en un fenómeno innovador creado por la globalización. Académicamente, el concepto de nuevas diplomacias es usado, frecuentemente, para mostrar las transformaciones históricas de la diplomacia así como dar cuenta de los nuevos retos a los que se enfrentan las relaciones entre Estados. Para los estudiosos de la diplomacia, los cambios profundos deben ser atendidos tanto en sus instituciones, prácticas, administraciones y teorías (Hamilton, Langhorne: 2011; Riordan; 2004; Cooper, Hocking, Maley: 2008; Moomaw: 2010; Muldoon, et alt: 2011). La idea de nuevas diplomacias tiene relación con el desplazamiento del poder. En este desplazamiento se dan cambios en las formas de gobernar. Una de esas transformaciones contemporáneas se observa en la apertura de espacios y mecanismos para que actores de sociedades civiles intenten incidir en política internacional, política exterior y agendas globales en sus estados o en los mecanismos multilaterales.

Tradicionalmente, La diplomacia y la política exterior forman parte de las agendas nacionales y son los gobiernos quienes llevan la representación de dichos Estados en las relaciones internacionales y en la política exterior. Bajo este modelo de política internacional tradicional han existido espacios de consulta y diálogo con actores interesados en temas de alcance internacional. Empresarios, académicos, consultores y partidos políticos forman parte de este circuito de la política que opina, reflexiona, influye e incluso decide sobre diversas agendas y estrategias de política internacional ya sea en ámbitos económicos, culturales, cooperación o diplomáticos. En ese sentido, la política exterior representa y refleja, legítimamente, los intereses del Estado. De acuerdo al enfoque de esta investigación esta perspectiva cambia de manera lenta pero permanentemente. En las sociedades de países desarrollados observamos mecanismos de participación para actores de sociedades civiles en los asuntos internacionales de sus países. Las redes de actores de sociedades civiles desde los Estados, hacen cooperación internacional, monitorean políticas económicas o ambientales en países en desarrollo; observan y denuncian la violación de derechos humanos alrededor del mundo. El activismo transnacional en las sociedades desarrolladas ha sido abordado desde diversos enfoques (Della Porta, 2007, 2006; Della Porta, et al 2006; Tarrow, 2005).

Por lo que toca a las sociedades civiles en las Américas observo una emergencia en este sentido. En términos de oportunidades políticas en las globalización política, doy cuenta de las adaptaciones de las cancillerías de Argentina y de México para la promoción e inclusión de actores de sociedades civiles en un entramado de política global. De este modo, a través del análisis de la implementación de una política pública para la promoción e inclusión de actores de sociedades civiles en temas globales, internacionales ó de política exterior, expongo los cambios institucionales que en estas entidades gubernamentales se han dado.

En este análisis se tiene presente una mirada combinada y equilibrada de las dimensiones de la acción colectiva. Así, doy cuenta del grado de complejidad que el fenómeno estudiado representa. En este sentido, destaco la interconexión, la retroalimentación y la complementariedad entre la estructura de oportunidades políticas, estructura de movilización y marco interpretativo. Se dice que *"acción y contexto institucional, movilización y estructura de oportunidad política constituyen aspectos interconectados y en permanente retroalimentación"* (Maíz; 2003: 195-204). Esta interconexión se logra a través de la identidad pues *"la complementariedad que contribuye al nexo entre estructura de oportunidad política y estrategia la da el discurso político"*. (Maíz, 2007: 132). Para dar sentido a esta idea, es necesario reconocer que la estructura de oportunidad política no es sólo un dato *"objetivo"* y *"autoevidente"* para los actores. Los actores tienen *"oportunidades percibidas"* (Maíz, 2007: 132). Hay una conexión entre la estructura política y la interpretación que el actor tenga de dicha estructura lo cual, lleva a las aperturas u obstáculos que los propios actores perciben o construyen ante las oportunidades políticas. De esta manera, las estrategias son influenciadas y, a la vez, refuerzan o inhiben ciertas prácticas de los actores que pueden llevar a metas exitosas o fracasadas en los objetivos que dicen buscar. Considero que los esfuerzos para movilizar recursos no son independientes de las oportunidades políticas que ofrecen el contexto social e institucional. En este sentido, cuando la estructura de oportunidades políticas está abierta, hay creación de nuevos espacios y se incluyen nuevos actores. De esta manera, se dan opciones creadas para hacer alianzas y mejorar las capacidades de los estados (Leiras, 2007).

Para desarrollar esta perspectiva sobre la relación entre acción colectiva e instituciones me apoye en la siguiente reflexión sobre los estudios de la acción colectiva: *"los nuevos debates teóricos se producirán acerca de la manera en que pensemos estos nuevos espacios de acción en términos de formas culturales e institucionales. El nuevo culturalismo y el nuevo institucionalismo pueden ser el nuevo campo de batalla teórico"* (Eder, 1998: 344). Reflexionar en la formalización o en la institucionalización de las movilizaciones sociales o de sus organizaciones no implica que estos procesos desaparezcan. Lo que se busca analizar es su conexión pues los actores se van pero las instituciones permanecen (Eder, 1998: 357).

En este trabajo, me enfoqué en los espacios institucionalizados para la participación de actores de sociedad civil en Argentina y México. En este sentido, me preocupé por las posibilidades efectivas para que estas organizaciones de sociedad civil logren incidir en dichos espacios; observé lo que estos mecanismos formales ofrecen a las organizaciones no gubernamentales para jugar en espacios donde se discuten y deciden agendas globales, internacionales o política exterior. Estas políticas públicas las entendí como expresiones constitutivas de lo global dentro de los Estados que a la vez generan e innovan en la relación entre gobiernos y actores de sociedades civiles dando cuenta de las transformaciones del Estado y su relación con el exterior. Comparto la idea de que las políticas nacionales no pueden ser entendidas independientemente de su contexto transnacional (Smith, 2008: 41). En la relación entre actores de sociedades civiles y gobiernos es necesario observar los espacios que se generan en las instancias de gobierno para acercar a los actores no gubernamen-

tales que quieren formar parte de los debates públicos y buscan incidir en procesos de política pública como ejercicios de democratización de lo público. En este sentido, veo relevante la relación entre acciones colectivas y creación de instituciones.

Con esta base analítica, estudié en Argentina al Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, y en México, la Dirección General de Vinculación con Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. En este trabajo, no desarrollo un análisis de un proceso de política pública. Me limito a exponer su etapa de implementación identificando los programas que llevan a cabo y las actividades que realizan para promover el acercamiento e inclusión de actores de sociedades civiles que se interesan por estas agendas. Al revisar estas políticas busqué evidenciar la emergencia de condiciones políticas para la promoción de actores de sociedades civiles en sociedades de las Américas que desarrollan prácticas transnacionales. Entiendo que con estas políticas públicas el activismo con prácticas transnacionales en el ámbito estatal, encuentra una “ventana de oportunidad” para que actores no gubernamentales se interesen, se involucren y busquen incidir en agendas internacionales y de política exterior en sus países. Con estos casos muestro unos procesos que se desarrollan dentro de los Estados en las Américas que están emergiendo, de manera parcial, para la inclusión de sus ciudadanos a través de actores de sociedades civiles en un mundo globalizado y que contribuyen a la conformación de nuevas diplomacias.

### **3. Políticas públicas y entidades de asuntos exteriores en Argentina y México**

Con el enfoque analítico propuesto, analicé cómo la diplomacia se enfrenta a retos de nuevas agendas y actores que quieren involucrarse en los debates y buscan incidir en las agendas de política exterior, política internacional y temas globales. El hecho de acercarse a la idea de nuevas diplomacias (Mommaw, 2010; Cooper, Hocking, Maley, 2008; Riordan, 2003; Youngblood, 2008) implica considerar nuevas agendas (derechos humanos, asistencia humanitaria, derechos laborales, asuntos del medio ambiente global, tratados de libre comercio, entre otros) y a otros actores con relevancia internacional (corporaciones privadas, ONG, otros) (Mommaw, 2010). Estas ideas se enfrenta a la vieja escuela de la política internacional donde dichos actores no estaban contemplados como interlocutores válidos o que tuvieran algún tipo de autoridad para opinar e intentar incidir en la política internacional o exterior de un país. Las nuevas diplomacias en las Américas forma parte de un entramado institucional y, a la vez, no formal, los cuales se caracterizan por su complejidad en torno a la globalización. Las dos oficinas, en las respectivas cancillerías, han sido diseñadas para ser puentes entre el gobierno y los actores de sociedades civiles en cada país con sus respectivas agendas internacionales y de política exterior. La implementación de estas políticas públicas son expresiones de las transformaciones de los estados y la adaptación de los gobiernos para una incipiente infraestructura de los estados globalizados dentro de las Américas.

### **3.1. Consejo consultivo de sociedad civil (CCSC). Ministerio de relaciones exteriores, comercio internacional y culto**

#### **3.1.1. Implementación del CCSC**

El CCSC de la Cancillería de Argentina surgió en el marco del Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur). Dentro de la iniciativa regional de Somos Mercosur se han creado oficinas nacionales con el objetivo de que sean canales para la participación y vinculación de los actores de las sociedades civiles en los países involucrados con el proceso regional.

Este marco institucional en Argentina tomó forma con la Representación Especial para la Integración y la Participación Social (REIPS). Dicha representación está circunscrita a la Subsecretaría de Integración Económica Americana y Mercosur (SUBIE) del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto. La REIPS se creó en noviembre del año 2003 y sus atribuciones principales son las de coordinar las actividades del CCSC así como articular el Programa Regional Somos Mercosur. También busca ser un canal con los gobiernos regionales a través de los puntos focales de Somos Mercosur. Tiene, además, la tarea de mantener relaciones con diferentes instituciones como la Comisión de Representantes Permanentes del Mercosur (CRPM); la Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta (CPC) o el Foro Consultivo Económico y Social (FCES).

El Consejo fue según el primer coordinador de la REIPS: *"un esfuerzo impulsado por diversas organizaciones sociales argentinas que han buscado involucrarse de manera más decidida dentro del proceso de integración regional que se da en el Cono Sur"* (Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil, Boletín 1: 2005). Durante el segundo aniversario del CCSC, el entonces canciller argentino, refrendó la perspectiva de que el gobierno cuenta con una sensibilidad social con la que dicho ministerio trabaja acorde a las maneras en que debe reformularse la política exterior en el marco de la globalización. El ex-canciller se refirió al Consejo como una política de apertura en *"donde la participación implica el reconocimiento del otro, a través del ejercicio legítimo del diálogo"* (Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil, Boletín 8: 2005). Como parte de estos nuevos tiempos en la diplomacia argentina (Tussie, Deciancio; 2009), el entonces coordinador del CCSC habló de una nueva perspectiva de la política que va más allá de las fronteras nacionales y en donde nuevos actores son incluidos en estos procesos marcados por la globalización; señaló que *"la labor del Consejo Consultivo de la Sociedad Civil provocó una transformación en la relación entre diplomáticos y dirigentes sociales"* (Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil, Boletín 8, 2005).

Para el actual representante de la REIPS, la creación del CCSC en Argentina debe reconocerse como *"un momento de propuesta de apertura que hace el gobierno argentino de inclusión a la sociedad civil frente a la problemática de la región"* (Entrevista a O. Laborde, 2008). En este sentido, se afirma que *"el rol de la sociedad civil en las instancias de integración debe ser mayor"* (Entrevista a O. Laborde, 2008). Para las autoridades del Consejo, no puede observarse la existencia de esta oficina sin una

perspectiva regional y del actual proceso de cambio político que sucede en América del Sur: *“El Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil no es sólo de Argentina, sino es un proceso que incluye a los países de la región. El Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil es producto de la consecuencia del momento histórico que se está viviendo de los nuevos gobiernos populares en el Mercosur y en la zona. Se tiene ahora otra concepción de Mercosur”* (Entrevista a E. Laborde, 2008). El CCSC representa para el gobierno de Argentina un cambio en la manera en que hoy se hace la política internacional pues de acuerdo al excanciller, les planteó un cambio en la política internacional:

*“La política internacional ha dejado de ser monopolio de los Estados. Hoy todas las organizaciones de la sociedad hacen política internacional, sean empresas, sindicatos, cámaras empresariales, partidos políticos, organizaciones de defensa del medio ambiente, iglesias o medios de comunicación. Tenemos que articular todo cuanto sea posible esa vastísima red de iniciativas que atraviesa sistemáticamente las fronteras de los países. Debemos escuchar, informar, explicar y debatir; hacer política con la sociedad civil”* (Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil. Boletín 13. 5 de octubre de 2005).

Según el actual coordinador del Consejo hay *“una convicción del gobierno argentino a una apuesta de la región. En un mundo multi-polar, la región debe transformarse en un polo... hay un polo fuerte de Norte América, un polo fuerte en Europa, un polo en el sudeste asiático y Sudamérica debe ser un polo y eso es en lo que estamos trabajando, fuertemente, el gobierno argentino”* (Entrevista a O. Laborde, 2008). De esta manera, su propósito es adoptar un enfoque regional para el trabajo, desde el gobierno con la sociedad civil, donde sean *“un polo económico de referencia, un polo energético, un polo de propuestas políticas...y terminar con esa idea de un vínculo bilateral con un imperio y convencernos de que esa relación debe ser en conjunto... la relación con el resto de los países del mundo debe ser desde la región”* (Entrevista a O. Laborde, 2008). Desde dicha Coordinación se *“intenta estimular, totalmente la participación, aumentar el protagonismo, dar lugar a que realmente se vaya consolidando... no hay integración verdadera si no se logra integrar a los pueblos en todo el proceso”* (Entrevista a E. Laborde, 2008). Esta participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior debe llegar *“hasta donde se pueda... porque la integración se producirá cuando los pueblos consideren que esa integración es suya y que tiene un beneficio en su vida cotidiana, no sólo económica...”* (Entrevista a O. Laborde, 2008).

De acuerdo a la Coordinación Ejecutiva del CCSC, las principales intenciones del trabajo responden a un contexto político regional concreto: *“...a partir de los gobiernos del Mercosur se da este proyecto. Es consecuencia del momento histórico que se está viviendo y del surgimiento de los nuevos gobiernos populares dentro del Mercosur y de la zona”* (Entrevista Elsa Laborde, 2008). Por ejemplo, con la Cumbre del Mar del Plata del año 2005, según la Coordinación del Consejo Consultivo *“se expresaron grandes movimientos de organizaciones sociales. Esto también hizo reflexionar en las cancillerías que se necesitaba este tipo de ámbitos. La relación entre países del Mercosur se ha dado con diferentes diseños para la relación entre cancillería y sociedad civil”* (Entrevista Elsa Laborde, 2008).



### 3.1.2. Agenda del CCSC

La REIPS busca “*generar un fluido intercambio de información entre funcionarios y representantes de la sociedad civil*”. La representación funge como enlace entre las organizaciones de la sociedad civil que se vinculan a este consejo de la cancillería. Las organizaciones que se involucran en este proceso lo hacen a través de comisiones temáticas. La Representación promueve la creación de comisiones pero son las organizaciones interesadas las que operan y estructuran las mismas. En el CCSC se realizan diversas actividades en el ámbito del diálogo entre gobiernos y actores de sociedades civiles. La REIPS realiza reuniones periódicas con las diferentes comisiones que forman parte del CCSC. Éstas pueden ser para atender temas concretos de las comisiones o relacionadas con las cumbres sociales de preparación o evaluación de las mismas. Desde la REIPS se promueven actividades realizadas en nombre del Consejo Consultivo. Estas actividades suelen ser desarrolladas por otras instancias de cancillería o por otra área del gobierno. De esta manera, el Consejo Consultivo vincula diferentes áreas de cancillería o del gobierno federal con las organizaciones involucradas en el Consejo Consultivo. Las organizaciones del Consejo han asistido a las Cumbres Sociales desde Salvador de Bahía (2008, 1º semestre). Estas cumbres les han permitido a las organizaciones civiles de Argentina tener reuniones con la presidenta del gobierno de Argentina, así como con diferentes miembros del gobierno argentino tanto para mantener comunicación y diálogo como para informarse de las acciones del mismo (Ministros de Cancillería, Desarrollo Social, del Interior). Otro espacio formal donde actores de sociedades civiles argentinas en Mercosur opinan y buscan incidir en el proceso regional es el Foro Económico y Social. (Entrevista O. Laborde, 2008)

El Consejo Consultivo da seguimiento y difunde la agenda de política exterior e internacional de Argentina; se pronunció contra las políticas de retorno de la Unión Europea y ha formado parte de los actos de apoyo al presidente de Bolivia en la ciudad de Buenos Aires. También se pronuncia de manera directa contra las acciones de Gran Bretaña sobre las Malvinas. El coordinador de la REIPS atiende diferentes actos internacionales como el realizado en México sobre “Experiencias significativas en la relación gobierno-organizaciones de sociedad civil. También dan seguimiento a las participaciones de algunas actividades de la Presidencia de la Nación o la Cancillería argentinas en el exterior como la realizada en la Cumbre Unión Europea-América Latina en Lima (2008) y Madrid (2010); en la Cumbre de la Alimentación (FAO) en Roma; diálogos regionales como con el presidente de Brasil; la participación de la presidenta en la firma del Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas o el Plan de Cooperación para Haití en conjunto con Canadá.

Las diferentes comisiones que forman parte de este Consejo Consultivo encuentran en la cancillería argentina un espacio para promover y desarrollar actividades así como hacer propuestas del proyecto de nación o de región a la que aspiran. Entre estas actividades se encuentran: la conmemoración del “Día Internacional de Lucha contra la Discriminación”, promovido por la asociación “África y su Diáspora”, en donde buscaron debatir el aporte de los afro-descendientes en la construcción de la na-

ción argentina. Dentro de la Comisión de Educación se realizó el encuentro de “Vamos Andar” donde se presentaron proyectos alternativos de educación popular. Una actividad conjunta entre comisiones como Salud, Vivienda y Hábitat, Cambio Climático, Ciencia y Tecnología y Soberanía Alimentaria, realizaron el Encuentro: “En defensa de la Tierra y de la Vida en el Bicentenario de la Patria”. Por su parte, la Comisión de Comunicación formó parte del encuentro “Comunicación Social del Mercosur”. Por su lado, la Comisión de Pensamiento Latinoamericano realizó el encuentro “El neocolonialismo del siglo XXI” como parte de los debates sobre las Malvinas. También, algunas organizaciones de la sociedad civil promueven también sus actividades por medio del Consejo Consultivo como la Asociación Promotora de Naciones Unidas con un curso de “Formación de Formadores para promotores de los Objetivos del Milenio” o la comisión de Pueblos Originarios con un seminario sobre “Educación intercultural bilingüe en el Abya Yala”.

## **3.2. Dirección general de vinculación con organizaciones de la sociedad civil. Secretaría de relaciones exteriores de México**

### **3.2.1. Implementación de la DGVOSC**

Fue en el año 2003 cuando se creó la instancia especializada para la atención a organizaciones sociales, dependiente de las oficina del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores (Pría, 2007: 2). La política de participación social que impulsó la Cancillería se construyó según la Unidad de Atención de Organizaciones Sociales, a partir de una visión transversal que permitiera facilitar la interlocución entre los funcionarios de la cancillería y los actores sociales. El proceso de implementación de esta política pública en la cancillería mexicana, ha contado con tres etapas que muestran su evolución. Primero, se creó una Unidad de Atención a Organizaciones Sociales (UAOS), posteriormente hubo una Oficina de Vinculación y, finalmente, esta la Dirección General de Vinculación con Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (DGVOSC). La creación de la UAOS se llevó a cabo en el marco de la alternancia en la Presidencia de la República en México. Para la UAOS, México *“atravesaba un periodo clave para establecer una política exterior que contara con la participación social de acuerdo a las circunstancias que exigía el momento nacional como internacional”* (Informe de Participación Social en Política Exterior, 2007: 3). El gobierno de la alternancia estaba interesado en promover la institucionalización del diálogo con las organizaciones de la sociedad civil de México en asuntos internacionales incluyendo los tratados comerciales (Icaza, 2006: 497). Para la UAOS el tema del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) marcó la relación entre sociedad civil y el gobierno (Entrevista a M. Pría, 2007). Esto también impactó en la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Entre los años 1994 y 1995 se estableció una oficina temporal dentro de la cancillería mexicana para atender demandas de información a organizaciones no gubernamentales nacionales e internacionales sobre la situación en Chiapas. Dicha oficina desapareció (Icaza, 2006: 504).

El actual Director General de la DGVOSC señaló que este espacio de vinculación debe observarse de acuerdo al *"momento que ha tocado vivir en la oficina. Ha habido muchas modificaciones en la administración pública en general en la relación entre gobierno y sociedad civil. Lo que hace esta oficina en la cancillería no es aislado ni autónomo, no es fuera de un contexto nacional ni internacional. México se trata de poner al día en la búsqueda de espacios de interlocución entre gobierno y sociedad civil"* (Entrevista a M. Díaz, 2008). Para la cancillería de México las organizaciones sociales defienden intereses, demandas y posiciones ideológicas específicas que buscan influir en las decisiones de gobierno y en la formulación de políticas públicas (Informe de Participación Social en Política Exterior, 2007:1). Esto se ha debido, dice la cancillería, a una expansión de los mecanismos de participación democrática en el mundo; al rápido avance de las tecnologías de la información; el surgimiento de nuevos contenidos, enfoques y temas para la agenda internacional y por el reconocimiento por parte de los organismos internacionales, así como las movilizaciones sociales que han generado espacios y foros para su actuación (Informe de Participación Social en Política Exterior, 2007: 2).

De acuerdo al actual Director General de la DGVOSC, el trabajo que se realiza desde cancillería con estas organizaciones es de permanente construcción. Esto debe observarse de esta manera pues hay una construcción de una *"cultura de dialogo"*, hay *"una incorporación de nuevos actores"* con los que *"tradicionalmente"* no se construía política exterior. Se debe ubicar el papel de la sociedad civil en *"su justa dimensión"* como un sector muy importante de la sociedad porque es la sociedad organizada (ONG, sindicatos, empresarios y recientemente académicos). Hay desde el gobierno una voluntad de informar, invitar al diálogo, al debate y eventualmente a la consulta y a la participación de la sociedad civil (Entrevista a M. Díaz, 2008). Para esta oficina la participación de la sociedad civil en política exterior debe llegar hasta donde las condiciones del desarrollo de la sociedad civil estén interesadas, propiciando este crecimiento por parte del gobierno (Entrevista a M. Díaz, 2008).

En el año 2009 se estableció la DGVOSC. Las razones por las que se creó está dirección general dirigida a promover la participación de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil en política exterior en México están establecidas en los *"Lineamientos para la participación de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil en política exterior"*. Estos lineamientos establecen los criterios para la participación de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil de México en política exterior. Entre las consideraciones de estos lineamientos destacó el siguiente pues permite ver la actualización del gobierno mexicano a los cambios sociopolíticos mundiales: *"Que la política exterior del país requiere aprovechar estos nuevos movimientos y tendencias internacionales a favor de los intereses de México y sus connacionales, desarrollando los mecanismos internos y externos que contribuyan a fortalecer la participación social en política exterior"* (Acuerdo por el que se establecen los lineamientos para la participación de la sociedad civil en política exterior, 2005).

### 3.2.2. Agenda de la DGVOSC

La DGVOSC trabaja con la sociedad civil a partir de cuatro canales: Información, Diálogo, Consulta y Participación. Con estos canales, la DGVOSC promueve y organiza diferentes programas y actividades de diálogo entre gobierno y actores de sociedad civil, entre los mismos actores de sociedad civil, entre actores de sociedad civil e instancias internacionales y relaciones interinstitucionales gubernamentales. La DGVOSC ha buscado realizar actividades que vinculen las actividades de la Dirección con organizaciones de sociedad civil que no sean sólo de la Ciudad de México (Entrevista M. Díaz, 2008). Han realizado reuniones con organizaciones y oficinas de cancillería y de los estados en Chihuahua y Nuevo León. También la DGVOSC ha participado en foros con organizaciones y universidades como el Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente. . Como parte de la Subsecretaría para Asuntos Multilaterales y Derechos Humanos forma parte de representación institucional ante la Comisión de Fomento para Actividades de Organizaciones de Sociedad Civil.

A nivel nacional, la DGVOSC, ha promovido espacios para mantener el diálogo entre gobierno y actores de sociedades civiles. En este nivel esta el Programa de Evaluación del Trámite de Expedición de Pasaporte Ordinario y el espacio de Diálogo Social para una Política Exterior de Largo Plazo y ha impulsado un programa de voluntariado "Voluntariado Internacional para el Desarrollo Sustentable en México". Por ejemplo, el "Espacio de Diálogo para una Política Exterior de Largo Plazo" fue una iniciativa conjunta entre la cancillería y algunas organizaciones de sociedad civil para mantener una relación con esta oficina de cancillería desde que inició este proceso en el año 2001. Financiado por la cancillería pretendió ser un espacio independiente que reflexionara, debatiera, opinara y propusiera ideas sobre la política exterior de México. Este espacio de encuentro entre los miembros del Diálogo, sin participación del gobierno, tuvo una agenda de acuerdo a la política exterior mexicana y buscó contribuir al diseño de la misma (Diálogo Social para una Política de Estado en Materia de Política Exterior, 2006). El espacio se concluyó en el año 2010. En su trabajo intergubernamental, la DGVOSC da seguimiento a las actividades del Instituto de Mexicanos en el Exterior. En este tema le da seguimiento al Consejo Consultivo del Instituto.

A nivel regional, la DGVOSC da seguimiento a dos mecanismos de diálogo: uno es la Iniciativa Mérida y otro, el Acuerdo de Seguridad para América del Norte (ASPAN). A nivel continental, la DGVOSC mantiene vínculos con la Organización de Estados Americanos y promueve la participación de actores de sociedad civil mexicana en la Cumbre de las Américas así como organiza reuniones preparatorias con actores de sociedad civil con miras a reflexionar sobre la participación mexicana en dichas cumbres. En temas birregionales la DGVOSC fomenta la participación en los espacios para sociedad civil en las Cumbres Iberoamericanas y las Cumbres Unión Europea, América Latina y el Caribe. Concretamente, la DGVOSC organiza, de manera conjunta, con el Consejo Económico y Social Europeo los diálogos bianuales entre gobiernos y sociedades civiles de la Unión Europea y México. Se han realizado cuatro foros de diálogo. El quinto será organizado en Bruselas a finales de 2012.

Respecto a agendas globales, la DGVOSC ha generado espacios para invitar a las organizaciones de sociedad civil mexicana para que reflexionen y opinen sobre diferentes agendas. Menciono su rol de coorganizador del AIDS 2008 y la Conferencia Mundial sobre Voluntariado realizadas en México. A finales del año 2009 esta oficina fue la responsable de organizar la 62ª Conferencia Anual del Departamento de Información Pública-ONG de Naciones Unidas con el tema "*Trabajamos por la Paz y el Desarrollo ¡Desarme Ahora!*". En la Conferencia de Cambio Climático en Cancún (Diciembre 2010) esta oficina llevó la logística de la "Villa del Cambio Climático". Esta villa fue el espacio formal para las actividades de los actores de sociedades civiles en dicha cumbre. A la vez, estuvieron a cargo de las negociaciones con los diferentes actores que promovieron los espacios alternativos en Cancún. En el marco de la Presidencia de México en el G20, esta oficina se ha hecho cargo de la organización de la sociedad civil en los espacios formales y negocia los espacios para los movimientos alternativos que participan entorno al G20.

#### 4. Conclusiones

Al hablar de agendas globales los actores no gubernamentales suelen ser mencionadas como un actor relevante e indispensable en el diseño de la gobernanza global. Sin embargo, no es igual cuando se habla de política internacional o política exterior de un país. En este sentido, esta investigación ha puesto atención en las políticas públicas implementadas por gobiernos en las Américas para la inclusión de actores no gubernamentales en las cancillerías respectivas. Estas políticas son significativas porque representan una manifestación de las transformaciones que se están produciendo para incluir y acercar a los actores no gubernamentales a las tareas de los gobiernos en el ámbito de sus relaciones con el exterior. De esta manera, a partir del estudio de la implementación de estas políticas públicas en las cancillerías argentina y mexicana seleccionadas para nuestro análisis, mostramos cómo los estados readaptan sus estructuras para construir procesos de globalización desde los gobiernos y sus respectivas sociedades.

Ambos casos nos dejan ver un reconocimiento de una relación formal entre actores de sociedades civiles y gobiernos. Observo que, de manera incipiente, estas políticas son una muestra de una relación que ya no se basa en la confrontación directa sino que se buscan mecanismos de incidencia por parte de los actores de sociedades civiles en políticas públicas con perspectivas globales. Esta revisión de las dos oficinas permite una reflexión importante: el peso que tiene la presencia del Estado en el mundo y como a través de sus gobiernos se amplían las oportunidades para que actores de sociedades civiles se involucren en temas de política internacional o exterior.

Siguiendo con el análisis de la relación sociedad civil y gobierno en estas conclusiones doy cuenta de reflexiones de actores de sociedad civil sobre este tipo de oficinas. Como señalé, la idea de oportunidades percibidas, frente a la estructura de oportunidades políticas, permite conocer cómo los actores entienden el contexto en el que se mueven lo cual va ligado a las estrategias que desarrollan a la hora de llevar a cabo sus activida-

des. En las organizaciones mexicanas hay un reconocimiento a que se haya establecido esta oficina la cual, de acuerdo a los entrevistados, ha respondido a una coyuntura del cambio político que se dio en este país en el año 2000 y al trabajo de las organizaciones mexicanas que han trabajado estos temas internacionales así como que en el gobierno de la alternancia se contaron con funcionarios con fuerte relación con organizaciones no gubernamentales (Entrevista H. Villaseñor, 2008) (Entrevista A. Sandoval, 2008). Sin embargo, para otras opiniones este espacio de diálogo entre actores de sociedades civiles y gobierno carece de mecanismos de incidencia (Entrevista Becerra, 2008). Se dice que la falta de una cultura política para el diálogo y la interlocución entre gobiernos y actores de sociedades civiles no permiten incidir. En ese sentido, *“las organizaciones pueden opinar... se les puede consultar pero como fue el caso del Grupo Asesor del canciller, creado al inicio de esta oficina, no se puede hablar de asesorías ni de participaciones determinantes por parte de las organizaciones en algún tema de política internacional”* (Entrevista C. Heredia, 2008).

El Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) señala que la incidencia en la política exterior argentina es fundamental para reforzar el trabajo de derechos humanos a la vez que de manera natural..., influir en la agenda de derechos humanos en los posicionamientos de Argentina en el exterior (Entrevista A. Pochak, 2008). Sin embargo, el CCSC es un espacio que se conoce pero no se frecuenta ni se recurre a él para vincularse con la cancillería argentina. Para algunas organizaciones, la incidencia en política exterior en Argentina debe ser integral y debe considerar la política de derechos humanos en los países. Buscan que el gobierno incorpore en su política exterior la perspectiva de derechos humanos. Algunas organizaciones monitorean las posiciones del Estado argentino en discusiones internacionales y regionales sobre temas relacionados con derechos humanos; buscan incidir en que el Estado argentino tenga posiciones positivas desde la perspectiva de protección y que eso mismo sirva para cobrarle al Estado argentino internamente sus posiciones afuera (...) se busca influir en las posiciones de la Argentina hacia fuera, y a la vez, sobre los tomadores de decisiones hacia dentro como es el Poder Judicial, pues es un actor clave para la incorporación de tratados internacionales al ámbito interno (Entrevista G. Chiller, 2008). Las organizaciones consideran que el trabajo de incidencia, en cancillería, puede ser mejor articulado; pueden mejorarse estos espacios en Argentina de manera tal que no dependan de la voluntad de los funcionarios de cancillería. Debe tenerse una discusión más política e institucional para que involucre al Congreso y al Poder Ejecutivo para saber cuál debe ser la posición de política exterior en materia de derechos humanos (Entrevista G. Chiller, 2008). Los gobiernos son conscientes de que desde la sociedad civil hay una resistencia a vincularse con el Estado. *“Hay desconfianza por ser utilizados por el Estado. Se genera una sospecha por estar cerca del Estado”* (Entrevista a O. Laborde, 2008).

He dado cuenta de la implementación de políticas innovadoras en dos cancillerías en las Américas. Con mecanismos diferentes para la relación con actores de sociedades civiles y con alcances distintos en cuanto a agendas, prioridades temáticas, preocupaciones nacionales y esferas de acción de los países revisados, Argentina y México, muestran una perspectiva común: la consideración de un entorno global para el redi-

seño de sus instituciones de gobierno y cómo considerar una mejor coordinación para la gobernanza de las sociedades. Aquí, las dos políticas públicas analizadas, han permitido ilustrar la formación de políticas globales desde el Estado. Y aunque se pudiera pensar que siendo las cancillerías, espacios habituales, para el desarrollo de dinámicas y procesos con relación hacia el exterior, aquí doy cuenta de una emergencia incipiente de una perspectiva global donde además de la transformación de las instancias de gobierno, se consideran nuevos espacios para la inclusión de nuevos actores más allá de los tradicionales dentro de un entorno enmarcado por procesos de globalización.

De este modo, las nuevas diplomacias, en tanto ampliación y extensión de espacios para la participación de nuevos actores en agendas de política internacional, política exterior y agendas globales dentro y fuera de un Estado, se construyen desde los gobiernos dando una nueva fisonomía al ejercicio de gobernanza y, al mismo tiempo, muestran una transformación en la relación entre gobiernos y actores de sociedades civiles interesados en incidir en las agendas de las cancillerías. Sin embargo, no puedo dejar de lado el reconocimiento de la debilidad institucional que estas instancias muestran en una etapa de implementación, aunque también se muestran los avances en la creación de estas oficinas y los logros que obtienen con las agendas que atienden.

Con este análisis busqué mostrar los grados de apertura política en las transformaciones del Estado, sus instituciones y las relaciones entre las instituciones de los gobiernos y las sociedades en contextos sociopolíticos globalizados. De esta manera, vemos cómo se transforman los gobiernos y así reconocer que *"las organizaciones públicas no son actores monolíticos, sino que buscan cumplir mandatos diversos y ambiguos, expresados desde arenas políticas diversas y por actores, externos e internos a las organizaciones, que se disputan la hegemonía sobre los medios y los fines, en un campo de batalla legal, retórico y organizativo"* (Arellano, 2010: 68). Sin embargo, se plantea también que en los contextos globales actuales, los movimientos sociales que quieran incidir en las decisiones y en las políticas que emanan de los espacios multilaterales y en las agendas de los gobiernos tienen grandes retos por delante pues *"más allá de la participación de sectores empresariales en las negociaciones de acuerdos comerciales"*, la sociedad civil, puede ser vista como la *"gran ausente"* en las organizaciones multilaterales emergentes o en los procesos para la definición de políticas públicas. Esto puede deberse a *"su diversidad, heterogeneidad y fragmentación"* (Servín, 2010) o por la falta de efectividad de los mecanismos de participación institucionalizada existentes y la no promoción ni creación de nuevos espacios. Cierró citando a Falk quien afirma que *"nos encontramos en un momento en el cual los Estados todavía se muestran mal equipados para enfrentar los retos que plantea la globalización"* (Falk, 2010: 137). Este reto está presente en todos los procesos políticos globales y es fundamental recuperar la relevancia y centralidad de la política como espacio público para dotar a los actores e instituciones de condiciones efectivamente democráticas.

## Abreviaturas

<b>AIDS</b>	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>ASPAN</b>	Acuerdo de Seguridad para América del Norte
<b>CCSC</b>	Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil
<b>CELS</b>	Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales
<b>CPC</b>	Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta
<b>CRPM</b>	Comisión de Representantes Permanentes del Mercosur
<b>DGVOSC</b>	Dirección General de Vinculación con Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil
<b>EZLN</b>	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
<b>FCES</b>	Foro Consultivo Económico y Social
<b>MERCOSUR</b>	Mercado Común del Sur
<b>REIPS</b>	Representación Especial para la Integración y la Participación Social
<b>SUBIE</b>	Subsecretaría de Integración Económica Americana y Mercosur
<b>UAOS</b>	Unidad de Atención a Organizaciones Sociales

## Apéndice metodológico

El estudio de la Implementación de Políticas Públicas para la Inclusión de Sociedades Civiles en las Agendas de Política Exterior, Política Internacional y Agendas Globales en Argentina y México forma parte de los resultados de la tesis doctoral *Globalizaciones y sociedades civiles en las Américas, Nuevas Diplomacias en Argentina y México*, defendida en la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, España en octubre de 2011.

Desde el enfoque analítico de la acción colectiva, desarrollé análisis de estructura de oportunidades política, de estructuras de movilización y marcos interpretativos. El estudio fue de tipo cualitativo

A partir del estudio de casos múltiples puse a prueba la hipótesis a la vez que me permitió proponer una tipología de diplomacia de ONG's de las Américas a partir de los casos seleccionados.

Las oficinas estudiadas fueron dos entidades en cancillerías de Argentina y México:

La Dirección General de Vinculación con Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México.

El Consejo Consultivo de Sociedad Civil del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto

Las técnicas de investigación fueron de gabinete y trabajo de campo. Realice estancias en México y en Argentina en el año 2008 donde realice entrevistas a los responsables de las oficinas y recopile información primaria. Durante las estancias asistí a algunos eventos realizados por dichas oficinas para conocer cómo operaba la relación entre sociedades civiles y gobiernos.

La información primaria documental fueron informes, boletines, publicaciones, comunicados de prensa y las páginas electrónicas de las respectivas oficinas. De fuentes secundarias recupere algunos artículos y una tesis de licenciatura del caso mexicano. Del caso argentino no identifiqué fuentes secundarias.



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## Índice de temas

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Américas  
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Globalizaciones  
Nuevas Diplomacias  
Organizaciones No Gubernamentales  
Política Exterior  
Política Internacional  
Política Pública  
Sociedad Civil

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## Resistencia e integración al gobierno Kirchnerista. Un estudio de caso de la Organización Barrial Tupac Amaru

Pilar Alzina

**Resumen:** Esta ponencia<sup>1</sup> se propone reflexionar sobre los principales argumentos planteados por la teoría de los movimientos sociales con respecto a la relación que ha entablado el gobierno de Néstor (2003-2007) y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2008-2011) con los mismos. Para enriquecer este debate académico se incorpora en este análisis la relación entablada entre la Organización Barrial Tupac Amaru (MBTA) y dichos gobiernos. Por último y para profundizar dicho análisis se incorpora otra dimensión de análisis no abordada hasta ahora en los debates sobre la cooptación de los movimientos sociales: los procesos de construcción identitaria, individuales y colectivos de la Organización Barrial Tupac Amaru. Dichos objetivos son abordados desde una metodología cualitativa y cuantitativa. Como parte de mi investigación de doctorado, se recopiló y analizaron 416 notas del semanario on-line de la Organización Barrial Tupac Amaru (OBTA), correspondientes al cuarto cuatrimestre del 2009-el año 2010 y primer trimestre del 2011. Los avances y desarrollos realizados en este trabajo proponen analizar las demandas principales que la Organización Barrial Tupac Amaru (OBTA) realiza a través de su prensa digital, con el objetivo de analizar los principales enunciados que estructuran sus discursos y principales acciones. A partir del mismo, se podrá dar cuenta de las identidades que se ponen en juego en el acto de la narración que la organización realiza de sí misma, del tipo de relación que la misma construye con los distintos actores con los que dialoga y de acuerdo a las distintas acciones que la organización emprende para expresar su posición frente a determinados sucesos políticos, económicos, sociales, culturales y étnicos de la realidad nacional.

**Palabras clave:** Movimientos sociales, gobierno Kirchnerista, Estado e identidades políticas.

### 1. Introducción

A partir de la crisis del modelo Fordista, el Estado de Bienestar y el triunfo del modelo neoliberal que comenzó en la década del 70, adquirió fuerza durante el período democrático y su pleno desarrollo en la década del 90, se comenzaron a incorporar nuevas tecnologías y cambios organizacionales orientados a realizar transformaciones en los procesos de producción y a flexibilizar la relación entre el capital y el trabajo. Las sucesivas reformas en la legislación, redujeron las restricciones y costos derivados del contrato de trabajo, ocasionando un creciente debilitamiento de los sindicatos (Battistini, 2009).

En el marco de las políticas de ajuste estructural implementadas por el Consenso de Washington en América Latina, en Argentina el proceso transición entre el modelo de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones y el modelo de apertura a las reformas estructurales, modernización y reestructuración productiva, ocasionó la reducción de personal en muchas empresas. Entre las décadas del setenta y noventa el proceso de reformas laborales fue acompañado de transformaciones en el sector industrial evidenciándose una disminución en el peso relativo en el empleo que fue del 25% en 1980 a 23% 1990. El empleo agropecuario continuó perdiendo importancia relativa aumentando la relevancia del sector terciario, con predominio de las actividades informales. En este período, el desequilibrio en el mercado de trabajo se manifestó por la preponderancia del sector informal en América Latina y la desocupación pasó a ser el indicador más preocupante del mercado laboral regional (ver cuadro N° 1). Desde de la década del 70 al 2000, en América Latina, los procesos de modernización y reestructuración fueron deteriorando el trabajo formal, estable, regulado por leyes y convenios colectivos y transformando las relaciones laborales en precarias, temporales e inseguras (Muñiz Terra, 2009). Según las estadísticas de la CEPAL los altos índices de desocupación en América Latina (6.2%) y en particular en Argentina (2.6) comienzan a aumentar a partir de la década del 80, alcanzando en 1990 el 5,8% en América Latina y el 7,4% en Argentina (Cepal)<sup>2</sup>. Por dicha razón también comienzan a crecer los índices de subocupación, informalidad y aumento de la precarización laboral (Alzina, 2012:3).

A comienzos de los 90, algunos sindicatos (la Corriente Clasista y Combativa -CCC-, ATE, entre otros) empiezan a enfrentarse a las políticas neoliberales, fundamentalmente contra las privatizaciones. Frente a la masiva destrucción de los puestos de trabajo se expresan el Santiagueñazo (1993), el jujeñazo (1997), etc. La desarticulación de las organizaciones sindicales que los nucleaban propicia la organización y resolución de necesidades en un ámbito más cercano a lo cotidiano, en el ámbito local y barrial. Luego de un proceso de sucesivos encuentros de organizaciones y dirigentes en búsqueda de un nuevo modelo sindical abierto e inclusivo a todos los trabajadores, se realiza, en noviembre de 1992, el Congreso de los Trabajadores Argentinos y la redacción de un estatuto. En el mismo se promovió la afiliación directa de los trabajadores, desocupados, jubilados, de los trabajadores autónomos. De este modo, luego del Congreso nacional de delegados realizado en 1996, se constituye la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA), planteándose como una alternativa sindical (Battistini, 2010:12). Aunque la CTA se nutre de experiencias sindicales previas (especialmente del sindicalismo combativo y del clasismo), reformula aspectos claves: busca ampliar su representación en clases populares en proceso de pauperización (desocupados, inquilinos,) y en las clases medias, promoviendo la democracia interna, defendiendo el pluralismo de las identidades políticas y con un discurso muy crítico frente al modelo de exclusión social. Mediante el debate en la agenda pública, promoción mediática, y apoyo a los nuevos conflictos sociales la CTA se posicionó de forma protagónica en los conflictos frente al Menemismo y las políticas neoliberales (Gómez, 2009).

A partir de entonces, el campo sindical se va a diferenciar de acuerdo a su apoyo al gobierno de Carlos Saúl Menem (1995-1999). El apoyo de los sindicatos adheridos a la CGT a este gobierno estuvo acompañado de un alto grado de conflictividad de parte de FSTM (municipales), UPCN (estatales), UOCRA (construcción), SMATA (mecánicos) y FATSA (sanidad). Los gremios que no desarrollaron estrategias de organización colectiva terminaron debilitando gran parte de su poder sindical y su capacidad de intervención (Gómez, 2009). Desde el período 1997-2001 las protestas alcanzaron un total de 7263 protestas [25%]. El 39% de ellas fueron sindicales, el 40% civiles y el 9% representa a las protestas del movimiento piquetero (Natalucci, 2011).

En el 2001, la desocupación afectaba a todos los grupos etarios, sin distinción de género ni de calificación y había ascendido en el conjunto de los conglomerados urbanos al 18,3%. La desocupación llegaba al 18 %, con una variación del 22%, excepto para quienes habían alcanzado la educación terciaria. En este caso la desocupación alcanzaba el 7% de la población económicamente activa (Beccaria 2003:26). Entre los jóvenes de 15 y 24 años, la desocupación alcanzaba, en ese momento, hasta el 32%, mientras que, para el resto del grupo etario se registraron valores de entre el 13 y el 18% (Beccaria 2003:26).

En ese contexto, el crecimiento del empleo precario fue una de las características centrales de la situación laboral en el 2001; el 21% de los empleados se encontraba desarrollando actividades informales y ocupaciones precarias. Esta inestabilidad en parte fue posibilitada por la ley N° 24.465 de "Régimen de contrato de trabajo", que legitimaba los contratos flexibles a partir de 1995, e incorporaba un período de prueba de 3 a 6 meses, que acentuó, en buena parte, esa inestabilidad. Un sector importante de la población experimentó una situación laboral inestable, con recurrentes ciclos de desocupación y empleos precarios sin cobertura social (Beccaria 2003: 31, 10).

Entre el 14 y 17 de diciembre del 2001 surgió el Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza FRENAPO, una propuesta Plesbicitaria que se propuso como objetivo un seguro de empleo de \$380 y una Asignación por hijo de \$60 por cada menor y para todos los Jefes de hogar y \$65 para cada persona que no perciba ninguna jubilación, \$150 para los Jefes de Hogar. Esta propuesta impulsada por la CTA fue votada por que más de 3 millones de argentinos unos días antes de la rebelión expresada el 19 y 20 de diciembre ante la corrida bancaria, el corralito y el anuncio de "Estado de Sitio" del entonces presidente De la Rúa<sup>3</sup> (Abal Medina, Gorbán y Battistini, 2002; Delamata 2007:52; Paredes, 2008). A partir de este acontecimiento, desde las plazas de los distintos barrios, los vecinos comenzaron a recuperar aquellos espacios públicos de encuentro que el terrorismo de Estado les había prohibido durante la década del 70 y comienzos del 80. Mediante las prácticas asamblearias, los asambleístas comenzaron a decidir por sí mismos los temas que los afectaba. Así, se fue construyendo otro tipo de representación política, diferente a la que hasta entonces practicaba la dirigencia tradicional del sindicalismo argentino.

## 2. “El Kirchnerismo en el poder”: ¿La cooptación de los movimientos sociales?

Luego de la asunción de Néstor Kirchner como presidente de los argentinos y de los cambios ocurridos en la relación entablada entre los MS y el incipiente gobierno, al interior de la academia se inició un debate entre los investigadores especializados en movimientos sociales. Por un lado, algunos plantearon que los mismos han cambiado sus proyectos, discursos y formas de acción a partir de un proceso de estatización<sup>4</sup> (Svampa, 2008) y que el gobierno nacional a través de políticas de ayuda social ha incorporado a los MS para canalizar y reconducir la protesta social. Dentro de esta misma lectura se considera que se produciría una articulación entre redes clientelares y redes de protesta (Rodríguez Blanco, 2011). Este enfoque, propio de los medios y algunos autores de la academia, considera que la incorporación de los MS al Estado implica la pérdida de sus espacios de autonomía y supone que los mismos han sido cooptados<sup>5</sup>, divididos. Es decir se han alineados a la política del gobierno a cambio de recompensas a sus bases y a sus cuadros (Petras y Veltmeyer, 2005; Borón, 2005). Desde una perspectiva similar, se ha afirmado que las “estrategia disímiles y combinadas” del gobierno de Néstor Kirchner de incorporación de los MS de desocupados ha implicado la fragmentación y descenso del movimiento piquetero, la reducción en su capacidad de movilización y la pérdida de su imaginario piquetero (Pereyra, 2008; Schuster, 2008; Fornillo 2008; Svampa 2008; Causa y Ojam, 2008).

Por otro lado, algunos autores han caracterizado este proceso como institucionalización<sup>6</sup> (Masseti, 2009; Cortez, 2010) y se manifiestan críticos de aquella caracterización clientelista entre el Estado y los MS (Gómez y Massetti, 2009; Boyanovsky, 2010). Sí bien afirman que algunos MS se han incorporado al Estado, dan cuenta de la valoración de sus dirigentes a partir de su incorporación en la gestión de viviendas, trabajo autogestivo y educación en sus territorios. Estos autores también destacan la falta de incidencia de los MS y organizaciones sociales en las decisiones estructurales de la política del Estado y en el armado electoral. En la misma perspectiva, Eduardo Moreno (2010) realiza un análisis interesante sobre la concepción de Estado que tiene cada uno de los MS y organizaciones políticas<sup>7</sup>, de acuerdo a su concepción ideológica. Con respecto a los MS nacionales y populares que fueron incorporados al Estado: Barrios de Pie-Libres del Sur (BP) y Movimiento de Unidad Popular (MUP). Para los referentes del primer movimiento el concepto de Estado aparece clasificado como un espacio al que hay que incorporarse no para mimetizarse, sino para disputar y transformar. De forma similar, el segundo movimiento también considera que el Estado es una herramienta, un actor político que puede estar asociado con unos u otros sujetos para una transformación social a favor de los sectores más desposeídos. El análisis que Moreno realiza sobre la concepción que cada MS y organización política expresa sobre el Estado nos permite comprender por qué algunos MS se han incorporado al gobierno kirchnerista y por qué éste hizo esta propuesta sólo a los MS que conciben que las transformaciones se pueden realizar formando parte dentro del Estado.

De ahí, que aquellas organizaciones que adhieren al marxismo-leninismo (PO, la CCC-PCR y MTR) y que consideran al Estado como una herramienta de la clase dominante



para mantener el dominio de la clase trabajadora supongan que hay que destruirlo para construir otro que elimine las clases y sus desigualdades. En cambio, los MS que se podrían ubicar dentro de la izquierda heterodoxa (FPDS y MTD AV), aunque sus concepciones provengan del marxismo, buscan alejarse de los elementos rígidos de la misma y de las posturas nacionales populares. A partir de las experiencias de Venezuela y Bolivia modifican su concepción de Estado y conciben que es necesario incorporarse al mismo para aprovechar y resignificar los recursos del mismo (Moreno, 2010).

Otros investigadores, prefieren plantear este debate no sobre el eje de la posición radical de los MS antes del 2003 y su posterior cooptación luego de la asunción de Néstor Kirchner, sino sobre los de conceptos heteronomía<sup>8</sup> y autonomía<sup>9</sup> que adoptarían los MS en su trayectoria política y cómo sus estrategias darían cuenta de cambios en sus proyectos políticos, en sus alianzas, discursos, acciones e identidades (Natalucci, 2010: 90-108).

Con respecto a los primeros enfoques que centran su caracterización sobre la cooptación de los MS por parte del gobierno y Estado al servicio de la "clase dominante" y sus "redes clientelistas", se considera que no sólo minimizan los cambios en el bloque dominante y sus consecuencias en el modo de acumulación y distribución, sino que además de reducir la compleja relación dialéctica que los MS establecen con el gobierno kirchnerista, se privan de analizar cómo la incorporación al Estado produce en los cuadros y en los militantes de los MS contradicciones y resignificaciones en sus concepciones y en sus identidades individuales, así como también en la identidad de sus organizaciones. En este sentido, investigaciones como la que realiza Perelmiter (2010) reflexionan sobre el ingreso de militantes del Movimiento Barrios de Pie (MBP) y la Federación de tierra y vivienda (FTV) al Estado y cómo a partir de ello, se transforma el rol al interior de sus organizaciones, su accionar en ellas y su forma de concebirlo. Ahora, se trataría de territorializar al Estado, de subir sus problemáticas y de bajar el Estado al barrio, instituyendo un puente entre el gobierno y las comunidades locales. En este espacio de ambigüedades y contradicciones los movimientos, lejos de perder sus identidades, resignifican concepciones y las reeligen desde su nuevo espacio de interlocución con distintos actores sociales. En una perspectiva similar Cortez (2010) analiza cómo el ingreso del Movimiento Barrios de Pie al Estado no implica su pérdida de autonomía sino que ésta se da en los márgenes de oscilación entre la iniciativa propia y la adscripción al gobierno donde intervienen las relaciones de fuerza de la organización, y es allí donde este movimiento se plantea crecer para disputar estos espacios dentro del Estado para representar a los sectores populares.

En el caso de la OBTA es necesario aclarar, que a diferencia de otros MS, esta organización no se plantea como estrategia de construcción la institucionalización dentro del Estado sino el desarrollo de cooperativas de trabajo que le permitan por un lado, alcanzar un grado de desarrollo económico que le posibilite a la organización resolver mediante sus medios la satisfacción de las necesidades de sus integrantes, y por el otro, lograr desde afuera del Estado, el poder suficiente para seguir conservando la capacidad de organización, movilización y demanda ante aquellas injusticias que la OBTA proclama a partir de sus despachos semanales y acciones de protesta (Alzina, 2010; 2012).

A continuación se analizará las principales acciones que la OBTA destaca en sus despachos semanales, sus demandas centrales y los actores sociales con los cuales interactúa y construye su identidad.

### **3. Los Movimientos sociales y la protesta social**

Se considera oportuno analizar las condiciones estructurales en las que se organiza la marcha de los pueblos originarios. La cual fue organizada por más de 30 comunidades en el contexto de la festividad del Bicentenario de la Revolución del 25 de mayo de 1810 y con el objetivo de expresar sus demandas históricas. Por condiciones estructurales se entiende tanto las condiciones sociales, económicas, y culturales, como las organizativas que son centrales para emprender una acción colectiva que posibilite la movilización de los recursos necesarios (Schuster, 2005).

Este trabajo retoma los conceptos principales que los expertos en MS de diversos países, de distintas tradiciones teóricas, destacan a la hora de analizar el surgimiento y desarrollo de los mismos: 1) oportunidades políticas, 2) estructuras de movilización y 3) procesos enmarcadores (McAdam; Mayer; Zald 1999). Para guiar el análisis sobre el desarrollo y cambios de los MS, se pensarán las estrategias, las acciones colectivas y las interpretaciones que los sujetos les dan a partir de los conceptos teóricos mencionados.

Las oportunidades políticas refieren a cómo los cambios en algún aspecto del sistema político crean nuevas posibilidades para la acción colectiva (McAdam; Mayer; Zald 1999, Tarrow, 2004).

La estructura de movilización que poseen los movimientos sociales está relacionada con sus habilidades desarrolladas para diseñar tácticas innovadoras y disruptivas como de la eficacia de éstas en la protesta. Este es uno de los problemas que enfrentan los MS tanto para su surgimiento como para su evolución.

Los procesos enmarcadores son las interpretaciones y significaciones que constituye la ideología, el discurso del grupo. Remiten a las emociones, sensaciones de los integrantes que emprenden la acción colectiva (McAdam; Mayer; Zald 1999). Los MS surgen como respuesta a condiciones de injusticia y desigualdad en un momento histórico determinado, su surgimiento y desarrollo estará relacionado entonces con las oportunidades políticas, los procesos enmarcadores y la dinámica organizativa.

Desde el 21 hasta el 25 de mayo el Gobierno Nacional realiza el festejo del Bicentenario para rememorar los 200 años de la Revolución de mayo de 1810, la destitución del virrey español Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros y la creación de una Junta de gobierno conformada por destacados representantes del pueblo de Buenos Aires, que dió lugar al primer gobierno patrio de la Argentina y al surgimiento del Estado Argentino. Esta festividad en tanto es uno de los grandes símbolos del gobierno Kirchnerista abre una oportunidad política para que el conjunto de comunidades originarias exprese

unos días antes de esta festividad una interpretación distinta de los hechos históricos. Resulta entonces atractivo comenzar a analizar el lugar y los significados que éste acontecimiento y otros hechos tienen relevancia en la prensa digital de la OBTA.

### 3.1. Análisis de la prensa de la Tupac Amaru: Actividades y reclamos

Para realizar este trabajo se recopilaron los despachos semanales y las comunicaciones que la Organización difunde entre sus militantes de la OBTA y simpatizantes. Se analizaron todas las notas que la organización emitió desde el inicio del semanario on-line: en el cuarto trimestre del 2009, durante el año 2010 y el primer trimestre del 2011. Se eligió recopilar y analizar todos los comunicados on-line y los 77 despachos semanales que publicó el departamento de prensa de la OBTA, con un promedio de 5,44 notas por despacho. Del proceso de análisis de las notas surgieron categorías y tendencias: del universo de 416 notas, el 32,21% (134) hacen referencia a las actividades que realiza la OBTA, entre ellas: la difusión de las obras construidas por las cooperativas en las distintas provincias del país,<sup>10</sup> entrevistas a sus referentes<sup>11</sup>, acuerdos realizados con ministros para concretar la implementación de tecnicaturas<sup>12</sup>, festejos realizados por la OBTA<sup>13</sup>, entre otros.

Otro 31,01% (129) remite a las actividades relacionadas con la marcha de los pueblos originarios, a su reclamo histórico de reconocimiento de sus tierras<sup>14</sup>, reconocimiento de su cultura<sup>15</sup>, y de su identidad<sup>16</sup>. Mientras el 6,50% (27) de las notas hacen referencia a los reclamos de justicia relacionados con: el pedido de juicio y castigo a los militares<sup>17</sup>, a los asesinos de los militantes sociales como Mariano Ferreira<sup>18</sup>- militante del Partido Obrero- o luchadores como Javier Chocobar -de la comunidad diaguita perteneciente a los pueblos originarios de la provincia de Tucumán o como el docente Carlos Fuentealba<sup>19</sup>. Estas notas también denuncian el enriquecimiento de grupos económicos a costa del medio ambiente y de su población<sup>20</sup>.

Otro 6,50 %, (27) de las notas hacen referencia a los reclamos que la OBTA realizó a los gobiernos provinciales. En ellas predominan los reclamos de tierras que realizan las comunidades originarias con las que tiene relación la organización (Quom<sup>21</sup>, mapuche<sup>22</sup>, Formosa etc...) <sup>23</sup>. En la misma línea, se le reclama a los distintos gobiernos provinciales el juicio y castigo a los asesinos del indígena Javier Chocobar, miembro de un pueblo originario, que se opuso al dominio de las tierras<sup>24</sup> de la oligarquía. Las notas también denuncian la represión y detención de militantes y vecinos que realizaron una toma de tierras en la provincia de Córdoba. En las mismas notas se denuncia la ausencia de una ley de parte del gobierno que posibilite el derecho a acceder a la tierra y su negativa a abrir una línea de crédito para que trabajadores o desocupados puedan ir construyendo un futuro para sus vidas<sup>25</sup>.

El 5,31% (24) de las notas de la prensa digital de la OBTA están relacionadas con marchas, actividades y pronunciamientos a favor de las medidas implementadas por el gobierno. Entre ellas la Ley N° 26.522<sup>26</sup> de Medios<sup>27</sup> y contra el "golpe mediático" realizado-fundamentalmente Clarín- para evitar su aprobación<sup>28</sup>.

Un 5,20% (20 notas) denuncian la campaña y la manipulación que realizan los medios -entre ellos Clarín, La Nación, y Perfil- para desprestigiar a la líder Milagro Sala y su organización<sup>29</sup>. La organización también se vale de su prensa para desmentir la versión de Editorial Perfil sobre su intención de disputar cargos políticos electorales en la Matanza<sup>30</sup>, así como de denunciar las intenciones de este diario de cuestionar el por qué Milagro y su marido se van a veranear a Punta del Este<sup>31</sup>.

El 0,48% (2) de las notas emitidas en el mes de marzo y abril del 2011, en los despachos semanales N° 76 y 77, la OBTA expresó el apoyo a la campaña electoral de Cristina Kirchner. En ellas se visualiza un claro posicionamiento por la campaña de la Presidenta. En la nota se titula: "Milagro Sala hace campaña por la reelección de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner"<sup>32</sup> y se aclara que van a realizar una "campaña bien intensiva por las 17 provincias, barrio por barrio, villa por villa", "sin pedir nada a cambio", "ni candidaturas ni cargos en el gobierno". También se afirma que Milagro Sala no se postulará a candidata a gobernadora de Jujuy argumentando que "no serviría de nada si allí va a estar sola". Otra nota titula: "Milagro vino a Mendoza a militar por la reelección de Cristina".

El 3,13%,(13) de las notas se clasificaron en otros, en ellas se hace referencia a entrevistas que se realizaron a algunos referentes y militantes de la organización para que comenten sus apreciaciones a partir de su trayectoria en la Organización<sup>33</sup>, así como también se ubicaron dentro de esta categoría las notas que comunican la decisión de la Tupac Amaru de irse de la CTA y el porqué<sup>34</sup>.

#### **4. Las estrategias disruptivas de la OBTA: La marcha de los pueblos originarios**

En el contexto del festejo del Bicentenario organizado por el Gobierno Nacional, "La unión de los Pueblos de la Nación Diaguita" en conjunto con la Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén, la Organización Kolla Qullamarka y el Consejo de autoridades de Formosa, junto a la OBTA convocaron a la marcha de los pueblos originarios y se pronunciaron por "el camino de la Verdad, hacia un Estado Plurinacional". Este acontecimiento expresa una interpretación distinta a la del Bicentenario: para estas organizaciones el mismo significó "la opresión de las culturas y naciones (en territorios) preexistentes a la conformación del Estado". A partir de esta interpretación, las comunidades de los pueblos originarios organizaron una marcha para "exigirle a la Presidenta de la Nación una respuesta ante cada una de las propuestas planteadas sobre un símbolo de poder instalado hace más de 200 años".

Para comprender esta movilización, es necesario visualizar la alianza construida por las comunidades originarias contra los grupos económicos que invaden sus territorios<sup>35</sup>. El itinerario de la movilización permite analizar su estrategia, la organización, la difusión de actividades y por último sus principales demandas.

La Tupac Amaru invirtió 6 meses para organizar dicho acontecimiento, focalizó todos

los recursos humanos, técnicos y le destinó en su despacho semanal 87 notas a la marcha de los pueblos originario (20,91%) más aquellas 42 notas (10,10%), relacionadas con el tema originario (su cultura, creencias, demandas), sumando así un total de 129 notas (31,01%). Es notorio aclarar que desde el 10 hasta el 20 mayo, fecha en que se comenzó a realizar el itinerario de la marcha el despacho semanal se publicó todos los días. El día 17 y 18 de mayo salieron dos despachos –el N° 40 y 41 y el N° 42 y 43. A partir del análisis de las mismas y de una selección de los significados centrales que expusieron distintos representantes de las comunidades de los pueblos originarios, se describen sus principales experiencias y demandas.

Alejandro Salvatierra, líder poblador de la comunidad Wichí compuesta por 300 originarios: "En esta marcha nosotros peleamos por nuestros derechos, por nuestras costumbres, por nuestra cultura, nuestra salud, el futuro de nuestros hijos. Y es histórica porque la comunidad wichí nunca ha participado en marchas provinciales, ni tampoco marchas nacionales<sup>36</sup>".

Kuruf Nahue, Juventud Mapuche: "Para nosotros los jóvenes, es muy importante formar parte de los pueblos originarios que, además de tener una población importante, tiene una sabiduría única en el mundo" (...). "Los derechos fundamentales parten de nuestra cultura ancestral; nosotros no podemos concebir la vida sin el territorio, es muy difícil para cualquier Pueblo Originario imaginar su futuro sin el territorio. El derecho que nosotros reivindicamos sobre el territorio es sobre un "todo", al formar parte de la naturaleza nosotros somos parte y no dueños. Por eso cuando contaminan un río nos lo hacen a nosotros. Cuando asesinan a un bosque nos asesinan a nosotros también. Por otro lado, el derecho desarrollar nuestra identidad es algo que, en esta Argentina del 2010, se nos sigue privando. Hay cientos de niños mapuches recién nacidos a los que a sus padres les cuesta mucho inscribirlos de acuerdo a la cultura Mapuche, porque hay un Estado que dice que acá somos todos iguales: cristianos y argentinos, y no es así. Eso se podía entender en 1810 o en 1880, pero hoy no puede seguir funcionando un Estado racista monocultural. Por eso todos los días defendemos nuestro derecho a la identidad y a nuestro idioma; es necesario que se nos reconozca como cultura milenaria<sup>37</sup>".

Rosa Ñanco, Mapuche de Ingeniero Huergo-Río Negro: " (...) Los pueblos originarios hemos resistido contra tanta maldad y tanto tiempo, eso de ser humillado, explotado, nuestras mujeres solo para ser sirvienta o el hambre. Nuestros hijos sin tener trabajo. Hemos resistido y eso ha sido lo bueno. Un saludo grande, creo que cuando llegemos a Buenos Aires, en lo profundo de nosotros, los originarios se habrán cumplido un sueño profundo: ser y que nos vean. Existimos<sup>38</sup>".

Rubén Lacori-Mocoví-de Villa Angela, Chaco: "Hay todo eso que nos viene del pasado. Yo digo que tenemos una vida sufrida, pero nuestros abuelos y todavía los más antes, cuando el ejército nos venía y nos mataba para sacar-

nos la tierra. O venían los grandes propietarios y había que trabajar por nada, la comida, sin derecho al estudio, sin derechos. Hay que ver lo que ha sido la vida de nuestros ancestros” (...). “ (...)Vamos a ponernos frente al gobierno y decirle que hay que respetar a los hermanos, que hay que darle tierra, que hay que respetar nuestra cultura, nuestra lengua. Que las escuelas tienen que ser en nuestra lengua. Eso. Ser escuchados. Va a ser muy bueno. Y le agradezco que hable conmigo. Soy Mocoví<sup>39</sup>”.

Isidro canteros: “Sí, sobrevivimos como pueblo por eso que viene en la sangre. Alguna vez vamos a poder escribir esto nosotros. Desde nosotros. Y esta Marcha de los Pueblos Originarios la vivimos como una oportunidad. Vamos a ir todos, mi familia, todos: abuelos, hermanos, tíos, tías, mujer. Es una oportunidad que tenemos. Nuestros ancestros tenían esta idea. No es que ahora, nuevita que tenemos esta idea de derecho. Pero hemos sido maltratados, hemos sido vencidos por la violencia contra los ancestros. Por eso consideramos que vamos por un paso más, que vamos para lograr un objetivo para nuestra familia, nuestros hermanos. No solo tobas, sino wichis, pilagás, los hermanos de las montañas, los kollas y sabemos que hay mapuches, sí todos juntos vamos a ser muchos. Eso pone mucha fuerza, esperanza en que nosotros mismos podamos ganarnos un lugar. Nadie nos va a regalar. Tenemos que ganarlo. Eso, creo, significa marchar junto todos los originarios<sup>40</sup>”.

Jorge Nahuen, referente de la Confederación Mapuche Neuquina: “(...)fieles al significado del Mapudungun y en una cantidad que supera los cientos, hablaremos con la tierra junto al Río Limay para entrar en contacto con la madre naturaleza. Así, sentimos obtener la fuerza y energía del río a lo largo de la travesía histórica que significa la marcha hacia Capital Federal en busca de restablecer la relación entre las comunidades originarias, el Estado y la sociedad argentina”.

Del análisis de dichos testimonios y de las categorías de análisis expresadas en las notas referidas a la marcha de los pueblos originarios se destacan sus principales demandas:

- a)** Reconocimiento de sus tierras, su cultura y sus creencias.
- b)** La solicitud de un estado plurinacional que reconozca las culturas y las diversas identidades<sup>41</sup>.
- c)** La mensura y titulación de todos los territorios comunitarios indígenas que estableció el “Programa de Relevamiento Territorial – Ley 26.160 y 26.554.
- d)** El relevamiento territorial de la situación dominial de las tierras ocupadas por las comunidades indígenas originarias del país, para la instrumentación del reconocimiento constitucional de la posesión y propiedad comunitaria.
- e)** El rechazo a industrias extractivas (minería metálica, las petroleras, empresas sojeras)
- g)** Justicia frente a los atropellos cometidos en el pasado (a sus ancestros) y del presente (exterminio de vidas, cultura e identidades)<sup>42</sup>.

Esta última consigna está orientada al reclamo de reconocimiento de tierras que la OBTA expresó durante el 2010 a distintos gobiernos provinciales (Córdoba, Formosa, Neuquén) aliados a la oligarquía y responsable de la represión y asesinato de miembros de los pueblos originarios que les reclamaban el reconocimiento de sus tierras.

El acontecimiento de la marcha de los pueblos originarios crea una novedad y un quiebre con las medidas de protestas que la OBTA venía desarrollando a lo largo de la gestión de Néstor kirchner y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. La novedad, el cambio radica en realizar una movilización itinerante desde distintos puntos cardinales de la geografía Argentina (ver Figura 1), mientras la continuidad de dicho acontecimiento reside en retomar la lucha que emprendieron sus antepasados y no lograron alcanzar. En ellas están objetivadas: una historia común, creencias, valores y ritos, como lo representa la Pachamama y el Inti Raymi para los pueblos originarios<sup>43</sup>.



**Figura 1.** Itinerario de la marcha de los pueblos Originarios del 12 al 20 de mayo de 2010.

## 5. Sobre la cooptación y la falta de autonomía de los MS en los gobiernos Kirchneristas

Respecto al debate en torno a la institucionalización de los MS y la cooptación de los mismos y, en relación al estudio de caso de la OBTA donde se elige tomar como dimensión de análisis su prensa digital y sus acciones, se ha podido observar que las notas que expresan su apoyo al gobierno nacional representan solamente el 5,31%, mientras que las notas que proclaman la candidatura de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner expresan el 0,48%; las que remiten al fallecimiento del ex presidente Néstor Kirchner como una pérdida representan el 5,31%, las actividades de reclamo de Justicia 6,50%- entre ellas los asesinatos a integrantes de las comunidades originarias pero también el enjuiciamiento a los militares-; el reclamo de tierra a los gobiernos provinciales el 6,50% y por último, el reclamo de tierra, cultura e identidad de las comunidades originarias y la aplicación de las leyes implementadas durante de Néstor Kirchner, representan un 20,91%. De este modo, si se analiza los principales temas que difunde la organización en su prensa, se observa que la mayoría de sus notas, el 32,21%, son sobre las actividades que la OBTA organiza y las actividades relacionadas con la marcha de los pueblos originarios 20,91%, así como las notas relacionadas con los temas centrales de la cultura originaria 10,10%, sumando el 31,01%. Esta cantidad de acciones organizativas relacionadas con lo originario dan cuenta cómo esta dimensión ética o racial es un referente identitario muy importante de la OBTA (Tarrow, 2004).

Luego, la OBTA ha centrado su reclamo al Gobierno Provincial 6,5%, al gobierno Nacional 1,4%, en su denuncia a las calumbias de que realizaron los medios de comunicación 5,02%, y contra los ajustes y políticas implementadas por el Gobernador de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, 3,13%.

Total	Actividades OBTA	Apoyo al Gobierno Nacional	Campaña K	Contra los medios	Muerte de Néstor Kirchner	Originario	Reclamo al Gobierno Nacional	Reclamo de justicia	Otros	Contra Mauricio Macri	Reclamo al Gobierno Provincial	Total de notas
	134	22	2	20	22	129	5	27	13	13	27	416
%	32,21	5,31 (22)	0,48	5,02	5,31	31,01	1,4	6,50	3,13	3,13	6,50	100%

**Figura 2.** Clasificaciones de las notas de la prensa digital del MBTA.

Fuente de datos de la prensa digital del MBTA: Elaboración propia.

Entonces, en relación a la interpretación que han realizado algunos investigadores con respecto a la cooptación y falta de autonomía de los MS desde la asunción el 25 de mayo de 2003 del gobierno Kirchnerista, es necesario primero, resaltar los temas que dicha organización festejó y aquellos reclamos que realizan. Así como la OBTA apoyó al gobierno de Cristina Kirchner cuando impulsó las retenciones a los productores



o la ley de servicios de comunicación oficial, también formó parte de la organización de la marcha de los pueblos originarios para presionar y reclamar al gobierno que reconozca su derecho a las tierras, culturales y étnicos. De este modo, la OBTA al mismo tiempo que apoya muchas de las medidas del gobierno kirchnerista exige y presiona cuando considera que el Estado no cubre las necesidades de una parte de la población. Incluso esta tendencia de apoyo y reclamo también se puede visualizar en las 32 notas (6,50%) que hacen referencia a las actividades que la organización realiza en reclamo de justicia con respecto al pedido de juicio y castigo a los militares<sup>44</sup>, a los asesinatos de los militantes sociales como Mariano Ferreira<sup>45</sup>- militante del Partido Obrero- o luchadores como Javier Chocobar –de la comunidad diaguita perteneciente a los pueblos originarios de la provincia de Tucumán o como el docente Carlos Fuentelba<sup>46</sup>. O al enriquecimiento de grupos económicos-entre ellos Clarín- a costa del medio ambiente y de su población<sup>47</sup> (Alzina, 2010).



Figura 3. Estadísticas del Despacho semanal de la OBTA.

Con respecto al proceso de institucionalización de los MS, el caso de la OBTA es un caso peculiar. En primer lugar, La OBTA, a diferencia de otros MS que centran su reclamo en una mayor participación en las decisiones políticas y en las listas electorales, se propone la institucionalización, pero este proceso no está relacionado con la incorporación al Estado, sino con ser parte del proceso de la creación de escuelas, tecnicaturas, donde la OBTA, no sólo garantiza su expansión sino que además soluciona las necesidades donde el Estado no logra llegar.

## 6. Movimientos sociales, acción colectiva e identidades

Se parte de la concepción que la identidad de un movimiento se establece durante la acción misma, y es durante ella que se afirman o reeligen sus creencias y se recrea su identidad. Si bien la macha de los pueblos originarios estuvo integrada por una diversidad de pueblos originarios, un conjunto de significantes aglutinó sus demandas in-

satisfechas (Laclau, 1996) acumuladas durante siglos de injusticia: el reconocimiento de su cultura, étnicas, sus tierras y sus identidades.

Retomando una de las dimensiones más importantes que han analizado los especialistas de MS, las identidades que se construyen allí, se retomará la doble dimensión de la identidad que propone Schuster: la social y la que emerge del conflicto, de la acción colectiva, la praxis (2005: 59-60).

En primer lugar, el Itinerario de la marcha de los pueblos originarios expresa la presencia de 30 comunidades que han logrado sobrevivir y que han decidido demostrarle a la sociedad Argentina su existencia. Su movilización desde las distintas provincias de la periferia hacia el centro de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, da cuenta de la intención de mostrar una relación de fuerza. Pero además, hay un conjunto de símbolos de su movilización que es necesario analizar para dar cuenta de las identidades que se expresan en este acontecimiento (Gravano, 1998; Dri, 2003, 2007).

**1.** Su vestimenta, música, bailes, alimento, creencias y ritos fueron exhibidos a lo largo del itinerario. Éstos operan como referentes identitarios (Dubar; 2000; Busso, 2009), marcas que nos permiten distinguir fundamentalmente las identificaciones con personas, valores, ideologías, momentos históricos. En los relatos de los testimonios entrevistados por la prensa de la OBTA las tradiciones de los antepasados asume un lugar destacado. A partir de ellas eligen diferenciarse de aquellos parámetros que circulan en la oferta cultural y de las identificaciones con los estereotipos de las clases dominantes. El conjunto de los símbolos y actividades desarrolladas por las comunidades originarias, en estado de movilización hacia el centro del poder: la casa Rosada, que representa la Nación Argentina, da cuenta de las relaciones de poder existentes.

Otro tema importante extraído en los relatos de los distintos testimonios de las diversas comunidades, es la pertenencia a determinado territorio donde nació, vivió y luchó toda su familia. Éstos son referenciales compartidos por su comunidad y mediante los cuales afirman ser parte de un nosotros. La fuerza que adquieren las diferentes identificaciones en el proceso de construcción identitario expresa, por un lado, un acto de rebelión ante los grupos hegemónicos y por el otro, la demostración de que aunque se haya exterminado a la mayoría de su población, sus tradiciones están vivas. En esta marcha itinerante, 30 comunidades se han movilizado para demostrar que sus cosmovisiones siguen vivas en cada uno de ellos.

**2.** La demanda de un Estado Plurinacional, en muchas de las notas referentes a la marcha de los pueblos originarios, daría cuenta de dos dimensiones relacionadas entre sí: Por un lado, dicha exigencia expresaría la necesidad y el deseo de reconocimiento (Taylor, 1999) de las comunidades originarias para ser legitimados como cultura, étnica, raza. En las declaraciones de los referentes de las comunidades originarias están presentes sus creencias sobre el cuidado de la naturaleza, el medio ambiente, es decir, las tradiciones de sus antepasados. La lealtad con ellos forma parte de las formas de pertenencias históricas.

**3.** Por otro lado, los reclamos expresados por la prensa digital de la OBTA sobre la necesidad de instituir un estado plurinacional, da cuenta de cómo ha influido en

sus reclamos el proceso de integración de los todos los movimientos sociales, y nacionalidades en el Estado de Bolivia. Sin embargo, la fuerte presencia de notas asociadas al reconocimiento de las tierras de sus antepasados pareciera expresar que sus demandas no estarían orientadas a iniciar un proceso de institucionalización en el Estado, como en Bolivia, donde asumen cargos en el congreso, sino al reconocimiento de las diversas nacionalidades que existen en él.

De esta forma, el lugar que la OBTA le otorga en su prensa digital tanto a la marcha de los pueblos originarios, como al tema originario, permite dimensionar la importancia que asume en sus discursos la lucha de sus antepasados. Rememorar su historia permite delimitar su proyecto en el presente y en el futuro de la organización, con gran influencia en poblaciones con antepasados originarios. La exhibición de sus ropas, bailes, músicas y alimentos son símbolos, referenciales identitarios que dan cuenta de las reivindicaciones étnicas, nacionales y culturaes que están dispuestos a defender. Para la gran mayoría de los integrantes movilizados su reconocimiento pasa por la defensa del Estado Nación y/o de su comunidad cultural que no lograron instituir sus antepasados (Dubar 2000:36).

## **7. Actividades de la OBTA**

Para hablar de un movimiento social (MS) es necesaria la existencia de una identidad colectiva que tenga continuidad en el tiempo y en el espacio, en las acciones y en sus formas organizativas (Schuster, 2005). La identidad de un MS se establece sobre la acción misma, es allí donde se constituyen valores, creencias, ritos, rutinas, etc.

Si analizamos otra de las tendencias que surgen del despacho semanal de la OBTA, se observa que las actividades que realiza (32,21%) asumen un lugar central en el relato que la organización construye sobre sí misma. A partir de la difusión de sus actividades, la organización legitima su capacidad de construir más obras: viviendas, fábricas, hospitales, barrios, iglesias, pero también a través de ellas difunde los acuerdos que logra con los funcionarios del gobierno para implementar tecnicaturas. En este sentido, volviendo al debate anteriormente planteado, el proceso de institucionalización de la OBTA no está relacionado con la cooptación, ni con la falta de autonomía de la misma, sino con profundizar la capacidad de gestión, de resolución de necesidades. En relación a las demandas de la población jujeña, el Instituto de Educación Superior Tupac Amaru implementa tecnicaturas con áreas específicas de la organización: *"el cuidado preventivo de la salud, la puesta en marcha de proyectos productivos asociativos, el trabajo de la Cooperativa Textil, la creación de espacios para el uso del tiempo libre y el esparcimiento con sentido social, y el rescate de la identidad a través del cuidado de las culturas aborígenes y el sostenimiento de sus proyectos"*<sup>48</sup>. De este modo, la OBTA va construyendo y gestionando una serie de instituciones y así se garantiza el crecimiento de su organización. En ese proceso, se enfrenta con distintos actores que disputan recursos, tierras, es decir con los poderes en pugna. Entre ellos se encuentran algunos de los gobiernos provinciales que se aliaron con la oligarquía terrateniente y reprimieron a

integrantes de las comunidades originarias, o a trabajadores (como en la provincia de Córdoba, Formosa, Neuquén<sup>49</sup>).

Del mismo modo, aunque con un porcentaje menor, la OBTA a partir de las acusaciones de los medios ha fortalecido su identidad a partir de la movilización, asistencia a programas oficialistas (6, 7 8), y mediante la difusión de su prensa<sup>50</sup>.

Por último, las notas de prensa relacionadas con políticas de ajuste presupuestario implementadas por el Jefe de Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires<sup>51</sup>, es otro de los actores con los que construye su otredad, reafirmando así sus diversos referenciales identitarios.

La acusación de clientelismo, portación de armas y participación en el narcotráfico que realizaron los medios de comunicación (La Nación<sup>52</sup>, Perfil<sup>53</sup>, Clarín<sup>54</sup>) interpela la construcción identitaria de los MS, en este caso del OBTA (Alzina, 2010). A partir de su prensa digital y de sus acciones de protesta, la OBTA se diferencia de esos estereotipos asignados por los medios de comunicación (Goffman, 2001). De esta forma, lo que los otros dicen que es Milagro y la OBTA, es confrontado con lo que la dirigente, su organización y algunos intelectuales afines dicen que son<sup>55</sup>. Es en la relación con el otro y lo que ese otro cree de mí, el sujeto reactualiza su identidad. A partir de la identidad para sí que la líder y la organización, mediante su prensa, hace de sí misma, se contruye la identidad para el otro. Así, el para sí, se va a descubrir a través de lo que el otro dice sobre mí. De esta manera, la idea de mí se va a confrontar<sup>56</sup> con lo que el otro diga sobre mí. Por eso, en la medida que siempre hay una mediación con el otro, la identidad se encuentra en proceso, en construcción, entre la identidad para otro y la identidad para sí (Dubar, 2000; Gravano 1991, 1998; Dri, 1993, 2003, 2007).

En relación a las protestas realizadas por la OBTA se pueden distinguir necesidades, creencias, proyectos e ideales. A través de su clasificación se pueden analizar las dimensiones de las identidades que se juegan allí.

Partiendo de la concepción de que la identidad se expresa en los momentos de ruptura del orden social, cuando emerge el conflicto y se produce un quiebre entre lo que creo que soy, poseo y lo que visualizo (Schuster, 2005:59-60). En esos momentos de crisis, los referenciales identitarios en los que los sujetos se identifica son centrales en la construcción de la identidad política. La marcha de los pueblos originarios, las movilizaciones de la OBTA contra la campaña de demonización de la líder Milagro Sala emprendida por los medios, o contra la represión de sus compañeros, son acontecimientos que en la medida que impulsen a la acción del MS refuerzan los procesos de pertenencia a los mismos. No obstante, las trayectorias e identidades políticas son contingentes (Melucci, 1998). Se expresan de forma diversas e incluso contradictorias. En este sentido, el hecho de que la OBTA elija construir un barrio al que le llama el "cantri de la Tupac" donde conviven a pocos metros: la Iglesia con el templo a la Puerta del Sol y de la Luna, donde celebran el Inti Raymi, el año nuevo de los pueblos originarios. Esta cercanía de ambos templos, es una expresión de la coexistencia de creencias clasistas y étnicas contrapuestas y de grupos de pertenencia diversos.

## 8. Conclusiones

El análisis de las acciones colectivas, sus reclamos y significados difundidos en las notas de la prensa digital de la OBTA han aportado otras dimensiones de análisis y por consiguiente éstas han permitido problematizar las interpretaciones originadas en el campo académico: el surgimiento de los MS durante la crisis del 2001 y su desarrollo frente al nuevo contexto iniciado a partir de la asunción de Néstor Kirchner y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Las acciones y los discursos de la OBTA dan cuenta de la diversidad de referentes identitarios que se ponen en juego en ellas. Por un lado, la dimensión ética o racial presente en sus narrativas da cuenta del conjunto de significantes que se ponen en juego en sus identidades. Por otro lado, sus pertenencias territoriales, ideológicas y sus trayectorias políticas, también han posibilitado que sus acciones de protesta se embanderen detrás de un movimiento social. De ahí, la complejidad de pensar los procesos de construcción de la identidad de los militantes y referentes de dicha organización.

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## Notas

- 1 Este trabajo es parte de un proceso de investigación de mi tesis de doctorado y los primeros resultados presentados en el Seminario Internacional de Movilidad y cambio social en América Latina. Universidad de Mar del Plata bajo el título La Tupac se para arriba (2011, Noviembre).
- 2 Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe. Cepal.
- 3 Paredes, Carmelo (30 de julio de 2008) Del FRENAPO a la Constituyente Social. La CTA busca una salida. Revista ZOOM Política Sociedad y Foco. Recuperado el (29 de diciembre de 2011): <http://revista-zoom.com.ar/articulo2496.html>
- 4 El término de estatalización es usado de forma peyorativa para expresar cómo los MS a partir de la incorporarse al Estado en pos de formar parte de la administración y gestión de sus recursos habrían reemplazado los índices de protesta ejercidos con anterioridad a la asunción de Néstor Kirchner.
- 5 El concepto tradicional de cooptación presupone necesariamente un alineamiento político motivado por ventajas para sus organizaciones y sus cuadros a cambio de la aceptación, de la no concesión de las demandas mediatas o inmediatas a sus bases. Gómez Marcelo (2010) Acerca del protagonismo político y la participación estatal de los movimientos sociales populares: juicio al paradigma normal de análisis. En Movilizaciones, protestas e identidades políticas en la Argentina del Bicentenario. Buenos Aires: Nueva Trilce.
- 6 La institucionalización remite a la canalización de las demandas mediante los procedimientos y las instancias pautadas por el orden público legal.
- 7 Tomando como estudio de caso sobre organizaciones políticas y MS: El Polo Obrero (PO), la Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC-PCR); Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados "Aníbal Verón" (MTD-AV), el Movimiento de Unidad Popular (MUP), Barrios de Pie (BP-LS), Movimiento Patriótico Revolucionario-Quebracho (MPR-QR).
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## De la confrontación a la cooperación. Los cambios en las estrategias y marcos interpretativos del Movimiento de derechos humanos de Argentina frente al "kirchnerismo" (2003-2011)

Enrique Andriotti Romanin

**Resumen:** El 24 de marzo de 2011 se realizaron en Argentina distintos actos al cumplirse treinta y cinco años del golpe militar. El acto principal se realizó en la histórica Plaza de Mayo y durante el mismo las distintas organizaciones del Movimiento de Derechos Humanos (MDHs) expresaron distintas posturas frente al gobierno nacional. Por un lado, un grupo de organismos encabezados por la Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo manifestaron su identificación política con el gobierno y su defensa irrestricta respecto a las políticas gubernamentales. Frente a estos los organismos nucleados en el Encuentro Verdad, Memoria y Justicia expresaron su rechazo a estas políticas, y calificaron la adhesión a las mismas como una "traición", una "cooptación". A su vez, una tercera postura sostenida por Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, HIJOS y Madres de Plaza de Mayo – línea fundadora- se manifestó a favor de los avances realizados mientras exigían la profundización de los mismos. Estas posiciones expresan dos rasgos característicos del MDHs en la Argentina contemporánea: por un lado, la existencia de un fuerte conflicto en relación a las maneras de entender el proceso político inaugurado en 2003 y, por otra parte, la decisión de incorporarse al mismo, mediante su participación en distintas instancias gubernamentales, de una parte importante de los organismos de derechos humanos. Tomando esto como punto de partida, en el trabajo que aquí propongo, me centraré en analizar algunos aspectos de los cambios en las estrategias, marcos de acción colectiva y claves interpretativas acerca del Estado y la política que elaboraron algunos organismos del MDHs durante el periodo 2003-2011 con el objetivo de comprender los factores que explican el pasaje de una estrategia dominante de confrontación a una de integración al Estado por parte de distintos integrantes de organismos de DDHH de Argentina.

**Palabras clave:** Derechos Humanos, Marcos interpretativos, Política

### 1. Introducción

El 24 de marzo de 2011 se realizaron en Argentina distintos actos al cumplirse treinta años del golpe militar. El acto principal se realizó en la histórica Plaza de Mayo y durante el mismo las organizaciones del Movimiento de Derechos Humanos (en adelante MDHs) manifestaron sus distintas posturas frente al gobierno nacional. Por

un lado, un grupo de organismos encabezados por la Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo (en adelante Las MPM) manifestaron su identificación política con el gobierno y su defensa respecto a las políticas gubernamentales. En la vereda de enfrente, los organismos nucleados en el Encuentro Verdad, Memoria y Justicia (en adelante EVMJ) expresaron su rechazo a estas políticas, mientras calificaron la adhesión a las mismas como una “traición”, denunciaron la “cooptación” y acusaron al gobierno de “callar las voces que lo cuestionan”. En una tercera postura las organizaciones encabezadas por Madres de Plaza de Mayo – línea fundadora- e *Hijos e Hijas* por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio (en adelante HIJOS), se manifestaron a favor de los avances realizados mientras exigían la profundización de los mismos.

En realidad, estas posturas expresan un rasgo característico del MDHs de Argentina a comienzos del siglo XXI: la existencia de un fuerte conflicto en relación a las maneras de entender el proceso político inaugurado en 2003 con la llegada a la presidencia de Néstor Kirchner y que continuó tras su muerte su esposa Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Tomando esto como punto de partida, en la reflexión que aquí propongo, me centraré en analizar algunos aspectos de los cambios en la estructura de oportunidades políticas y su incidencia en las claves interpretativas acerca del Estado y la política que elaboraron algunos organismos del MDHs, en especial aquellos afines a las políticas del gobierno nacional.

El objetivo que orienta este trabajo consiste en comprender cómo algunos organismos del MDHs que durante décadas confrontaron con el Estado protagonizan desde 2003 una etapa de institucionalización e incorporación al mismo marcada por su adhesión y reivindicación política del gobierno.

Este trabajo está organizado en tres secciones. En una primera sección revisaremos algunos aportes teóricos que han pensado la relación entre MDHs y Estado. A continuación nos adentraremos en los cambios operados en las claves interpretativas por parte de algunos organismos de derechos humanos en los últimos años y las posiciones resultantes al interior del MDHs. Por último, establecemos conclusiones y planteamos algunas líneas provisorias de trabajo.

## **2. Pensando la articulación entre el MDHs y el Estado**

Casi desde su aparición en Argentina, el MDHs ha sido objeto de numerosas investigaciones desarrolladas en el país y el exterior. Estas han permitido caracterizar las diferencias entre organizaciones de “afectados directos”, “no afectados” y Organismos No Gubernamentales de derechos humanos, entre “institucionalistas y autonomistas” o “históricos y recientes” (Jelin, 1985, 1995, y 2005; Sonderegger, 1985; Vega, 1985; Gonzalez Bombal y Sonderegger, 1987; Garcia Delgado y Palermo, 1989), así como sus estrategias y legados (Jelin, 1995, Levovich y Bisquert, 2008; Pereira, 2005) o los diferentes posicionamientos referidos a la Democracia, al Poder Ejecutivo y a las políticas estatales (Jelin, 1985, 1995 y 2005; Leis, 1989; Brysk, 1994; Sikkink, 1996).

En lo referido a la vinculación entre MDHs y Estado, en términos generales, y aun a riesgo de una simplificación excesiva, podemos indicar que la mayoría de las investigaciones han abordado esta relación a partir de dos enfoques. El primero se centró en establecer el "modelo de vinculación" y el segundo en realizar un "análisis de las interacciones" entre ambos. Estos enfoques han generado importantes resultados. Los trabajos que han privilegiado la perspectiva del "modelo de vinculación" han permitido establecer, a la manera de un tipo ideal weberiano, dos modos genéricos de vinculación: la confrontación y la cooperación. El primero de ellos da cuenta de una dinámica ideal de conflicto definida por una fuerte divergencia entre el MDHs y el Estado, en relación a los objetivos perseguidos por ambos. Este conflicto se expresa en un escaso o nulo reconocimiento del Estado de las demandas del MDHs y conduce a una variedad de respuestas que oscilan desde la movilización a la disputa jurídica nacional e internacional por parte de este último. En cambio, el segundo modo, da cuenta de la existencia de una relación en términos diferentes, definidos por la relativa correspondencia entre los objetivos del MDHs y el Estado. Aquí el modo de vinculación presenta una situación de aceptación, en mayor o menor grado, de las demandas del primero por parte del segundo. El grado de intensidad de esta aceptación puede variar y expresarse en la adopción de políticas parciales hasta la satisfacción plena de las demandas que en la práctica implican la aceptación de la interlocución y el reconocimiento de la legitimidad del MDHs. La utilización de estos dos modos, en cierta forma extremos, ha permitido poner de relieve la existencia de una dinámica altamente cambiante, de ningún modo unívoca, en las modalidades históricas de vinculación y ha planteado la importancia de analizar empíricamente distintas escalas sub-nacionales y niveles institucionales donde se despliegan tanto la cooperación como la confrontación. En esta sintonía los trabajos que se privilegian el análisis de las interacciones entre Estado y los organismos del MDHs han realizado importantes aportes. Por un lado, han permitido reconocer la existencia de una alta gradación empírica entre las posibilidades de vinculación entre ambos, a partir del estudio de coyunturas políticas específicas que permiten visualizar formas múltiples y cambiantes de vinculación histórica, las estrategias y la negociación entre ambos. En este aspecto han avanzado hacia una caracterización de las luchas políticas del MDHs y con Estado a fin de distinguir la combinación de lógicas duales de confrontación y cooperación, en distintos niveles y escalas.

Sin negar relevancia de ninguno de estos enfoques en lo que sigue pretendemos llamar la atención acerca de un aspecto poco abordado por ambos, acerca de la relación entre el MDHs y el Estado. Nos referimos a los cambios ocurridos en los marcos de la acción colectiva y las claves interpretativas en relación al Estado, la Política y el gobierno por parte de un sector del MDHs, en especial, a partir de la presidencia de Kirchner. Consideramos que incorporar una perspectiva centrada en los actores y en los procesos de construcción de marcos de acción colectiva, permitirá aportar a un conocimiento más acabado de las modalidades de vinculación entre MDHs y el Estado, al enfatizar los procesos de decisión presentes en la acción colectiva y también a reivindicar la agencia frente a las interpretaciones simplistas que reducen la vinculación entre MDHs y el Estado a un fenómeno de cooptación.

Antes de avanzar es necesario realizar algunas precisiones conceptuales. El concepto de *marco* comenzó a ser usado a partir de la definición postulada por Erving Goffman (2006). Este autor propuso el concepto de *marco de referencia primario* a fin de dar cuenta de los esquemas de interpretación de los individuos que le permiten ubicar, percibir e identificar los acontecimientos de su vida cotidiana en un mundo más amplio. En este sentido, en simultáneo, una de las tareas principales en su análisis consistía en pensar las claves *interpretativas* (Goffmann, 2006:46) considerando que las mismas constituyen un proceso activo de construcción cultural, que desarrollan los individuos a fin de otorgarle sentido a su experiencia. El análisis de marcos y claves interpretativas ha conducido a otros autores a visualizar los distintos esquemas interpretativos de la realidad que inspiran y legitiman las actividades y campañas ya no de un individuo sino de distintos movimientos sociales. En esta línea algunos han postulado la importancia de pensar los marcos de la acción colectiva (Gamson, 1992; Snow y Benford, 1992; Tarrow, 1997) como un producto tanto de los esquemas y sentimientos preexistentes en una población dada como trabajo de significación realizado por los promotores de las acciones. El análisis de los marcos de acción colectiva nos permite visualizar cómo los integrantes de un movimiento social procesan los cambios de una estructura determinada de oportunidades culturales y políticas (Mac Adam, 1982; Zald, 1996) y definen los cursos de acción elegidos. Tarrow ha indicado que la estructura de oportunidades se refiere a las dimensiones congruentes del entorno político que ofrecen incentivos para que la gente participe en acciones colectivas al afectar sus expectativas de éxito o fracaso (Tarrow, 1997:115). En este sentido, las oportunidades políticas no son solo percibidas y aprovechadas por los actores sino también implican un proceso de creación de nuevas oportunidades por parte de los actores en una temporalidad de largo plazo. En esta línea consideramos que la incidencia de los cambios de marcos no puede ser pensada como efectos únicamente de un cambio abrupto de las oportunidades políticas sino más bien como un proceso donde también se modifican culturalmente las claves de interpretación. Como veremos a continuación, estos cambios nos permitirán visualizar algunas de las características del proceso político inaugurado en 2003 y su impacto en una parte del MDHs de Argentina.

### **3. La era Kirchner... ¿Nuevas oportunidades o más de lo mismo?**

En 2003, tras una intensa campaña electoral, resultó electo como nuevo presidente de Argentina el Dr. Néstor Kirchner. Con apenas un 22,5 % de los votos el nuevo presidente recurrió a distinta estrategia para lograr construir un consenso que permitiera dejar atrás la débil legitimidad de origen.

Aunque este no presentaba antecedentes en materia de lucha por los Derechos Humanos desde un comienzo el pasado dictatorial ocupó un lugar en sus intervenciones públicas (Andriotti Romanin, 2010). El discurso de Kirchner presentó una fuerte orientación hacia los familiares, a “los militantes” y “los compañeros” y, aunque implicó un alto grado de exclusión de otras voces, fue bien recibido por las organizaciones del MDHs. Estas últimas, que en su gran mayoría habían enfrentado a las políticas estatales respecto a la revisión del pasado dictatorial promovidas por las distintas gestiones



gubernamentales tras el retorno democrático en 1983, ocuparon un lugar especial en la atención del nuevo presidente que durante los primeros meses de su gestión convocó a sus principales referentes en numerosas ocasiones.

En simultáneo, el nuevo gobierno tomó una serie de medidas de importancia tendientes a mostrar su diferencia con las anteriores gestiones presidenciales en relación a los Derechos Humanos. En una de sus primeras acciones de gobierno Kirchner dispuso el desplazamiento y pase a retiro de militares que habían estado vinculados con la represión. Pocos meses después tomó otra medida concreta de diferenciación derogando el decreto 1581/01 que impedía las extradiciones de militares involucrados en procesos de lesa humanidad y se pronunció a favor que la Justicia Nacional sea la que resuelva el destino de cada militar acusado de violar los derechos humanos. Esto significó otro cambio concreto respecto a las medidas adoptadas por las anteriores gestiones presidenciales. En años posteriores esta serie de medidas continuaron de manera ininterrumpida: la ratificación de la convención sobre la Imprescriptibilidad de los crímenes de guerra y de lesa humanidad, el nombramiento de un abogado identificado con la lucha por los Derechos Humanos al frente de la Secretaría de Derechos Humanos de la Nación, la cesión de los terrenos donde funcionara la Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada (popularmente conocida por sus siglas como la ESMA), el impulso a la derogación de las leyes de Obediencia Debida y Punto Final o la creación del banco de datos genético son algunos ejemplos de las iniciativas gubernamental en estos años.

Las medidas adoptadas recogieron demandas históricas del MDHs y permitieron que algunos organismos comenzaran a identificarse con la nueva política gubernamental. Pero también implicaron una creciente toma de posiciones al interior del MDHs respecto de un gobierno que construía una parte de su legitimidad mediante la concreción de sus demandas y reivindicando sus consignas y mediante la apelación a un imaginario nacional y popular como fundamento de sus políticas económicas y sociales.

En conjunto la nueva situación condujo a algunas de las organizaciones del MDHs a redefinir sus claves interpretativas en especial en lo referido a sus antagonismos, sus estrategias y su vinculación con el Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y el Estado, donde este había ocupado históricamente el lugar de la confrontación. Este cambio de clave permitió la emergencia un nuevo marco de acción, que provisoriamente denominaremos de post-impunidad. Aunque esto último no constituyó un proceso lineal ni sencillo y tampoco involucró a la totalidad de las organizaciones, significó, al menos, un cambio en tres aspectos de la clave interpretativa de la mayoría de los organismos del MDHs: **1)** la evaluación respecto a etapa histórica **2)** el lugar otorgado a la política y **3)** el rol del Estado.

#### **4. Desde la Resistencia al Estado**

La etapa inaugurada en 2003 fue interpretada por algunos organismos una modificación en la estructura de sus oportunidades políticas. Representados por MPM y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (en adelante AB), más allá de las diferencias existentes entre estas, el nuevo gobierno comenzó a ser entendido como una oportunidad política de avanzar con-

tra la impunidad. En su marco de acción la impunidad había definido su interpretación (al igual que la mayoría de los organismos del MDHs) respecto a la etapa abierta con posterioridad a la sanción de las leyes de Obediencia Debida y Punto Final durante el gobierno de Raul Alfonsín (1983-1989), posteriormente con los indultos durante el gobierno de Carlos Saul Menem (1989 -1999) y finalmente con la continuidad de la políticas de clausura del pasado por parte de la administración de Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001). Esta noción sintetizó y, en cierta forma, organizó su marco de acción colectiva, sus esquemas interpretativos, su experiencia y las estrategias de acción del MDHs. A su vez, posibilitó que aun en un contexto de divisiones y conflictos entre los organismos, la lucha contra ésta actuara muchas veces como un factor de unidad, como un catalizador común, de las demandas, estrategias y tácticas disimiles de los organismos del MDHs.

Tras las primeras reuniones con MPM y AB, el presidente Kirchner se comprometió a terminar con la impunidad (Brawslavsky, 2009). Al mismo tiempo las medidas adoptadas por el nuevo gobierno generaron un cúmulo de expectativas y la creencia de asistir a un quiebre en la continuidad de la impunidad. Hebe de Bonafibi, presidenta de MPM sintetizó la nueva lectura de la situación al expresar: *“es diferente a lo que habíamos creído. Ha empezado a hacer algunas cosas con las que todos estuvimos soñando desde hace mucho tiempo”* (Pagina 12, 4/6/03). La característica de “lo diferente” asignada al nuevo gobierno expresó los elementos intervinientes en la nueva definición de la etapa: la posibilidad de *crear* y *hacer*. Esto percepción constituyó la base para una redefinición radical de la experiencia de vinculación con el nuevo gobierno y permitió el reencantamiento de un vínculo con la política que para muchos se había roto desde hacía mucho tiempo o directamente nunca había existido.

Pero la nueva gestión gubernamental no fue interpretada simplemente como una oportunidad de ruptura de la impunidad. Al involucrar una dimensión de movilización afectiva, a partir de una reivindicación de un pasado militante, esta se transformó en “la” oportunidad. La nueva interpretación acerca del gobierno fue acompañada por la movilización de estructuras de sentimientos hacia la figura del presidente a partir de inscribir a este como el continuador de un proyecto nacional y popular inconcluso. Decimos *un* proyecto porque esto implicó una operación de interpretación selectiva del pasado basada, curiosamente, en la aceptación acrítica del discurso promovido por propio gobierno de Kirchner. Como hemos señalado en otro trabajo (Andriotti Romanin 2011), este se presentó como continuador de un proyecto que, aun sin conocerse demasiadas precisiones, se transformó en significativo para muchas de las organizaciones integrantes del MDHs. Este proyecto se caracterizó por **1)** presentarse en una clave generacional que incluyó también a quienes no estaban, los desaparecidos y **2)** por una apelación a una tradición pasada de la política nacional y popular. En reiteradas ocasiones Kirchner se ocupó de presentar su inscripción política en *un* pasado que no había pasado. Así, por ejemplo, el 25 de mayo de 2003 Kirchner afirmó:

*“La vida y la historia a uno lo pone siempre ante instancias que nunca creyó que las podía volver a revivir. Y como ustedes, que me acompañan hoy acá, con Cristina, con lágrimas en mano, cuando salimos del Congreso de la Nación y volvimos a ver gente esperanzada en la calle, me hizo recordar también que hace 30 años*

*yo también estuve en la Plaza acompañando a un Gobierno constitucional, en el cual puse toda mi esperanza. Por eso, les quiero decir que vamos a trabajar con muchísimas ganas, fieles a nuestros ideales."* (Discurso Néstor Kirchner, 2003).

Y dos años después sostuvo:

*"Hace 33 años yo estaba allí abajo, el 25 de mayo de 1973, como hoy, creyendo y jugándome por mis convicciones de que un nuevo país comenzaba, y en estos miles de rostros veo los rostros de los 30 mil compañeros desaparecidos, pero igual veo la Plaza de Mayo de la mano de todos nosotros"* (Discurso Néstor Kirchner, 2006).

La apelación a un pasado idealizado revitalizado actuó como un anclaje político que le permitió presentarse como continuador de la tradición democrática expresada en el gobierno del ex presidente Héctor Campora (1973) identificado con las organizaciones de la Tendencia Revolucionaria del Peronismo (TRP), y de los "30000 compañeros que no están" (Kirchner, 2006). Aunque esta lectura del pasado, era en cierta forma paradójica y selectiva, pues mientras clausuró la posibilidad de revisar algunos aspectos del mismo permitió la apertura y recuperación de otros, restringió el significado político del proceso al identificar a los 30000 compañeros con este proyecto. Mediante esta operación y de la mano de esta apelación a los desaparecidos como inscriptos en su proyecto, Kirchner interpeló ideológicamente a las organizaciones del MDH y las obligó a adoptar una posición frente a su gobierno.

La apelación a la continuidad de un proyecto nacional y popular operó preparar las condiciones para la aceptación de la política gubernamental en relación a los derechos humanos o su radical rechazo. En suma, el cambio en la clave interpretativa acerca de la definición de la etapa combinó la idea de una ruptura con la impunidad y la recuperación de un proyecto histórico de la TRP que era identificado con el nuevo proyecto del gobierno.

En este sentido, hubo otro cambio de clave interpretativa respecto al proceso político que acompañó al que mencionamos anteriormente. Este consistió en una redefinición del lugar asignado al Poder Ejecutivo y, en términos más amplios, al Estado. Durante la etapa posterior a la sanción de las leyes de impunidad, el Estado fue situado como el garante de la impunidad política constituyéndose en el principal antagonista de las organizaciones del MDH. El Estado nacional, en sus distintos niveles y poderes era el culpable de los sufrimientos y de la impunidad. Era el "otro" antagónico que definió la lucha del MDH. En términos más amplios, esta interpretación se deslizó también a la política partidaria y a los políticos, dando lugar a un desprecio general por la actividad política formal resaltando en oposición a la militancia social. Para los familiares y sobrevivientes que integraban los organismos de derechos humanos el Estado, el Poder Ejecutivo y el Poder Legislativo eran situados como parte de un engranaje que buscaba consagrar la impunidad política y jurídica para los responsables del Terrorismo de Estado. En consecuencia frente a este universo binario, la una opción posible era la confrontación.

Las posibilidades de apertura que ofreció el Poder Ejecutivo al MDHs, permitieron que algunos de los organismos del MDHs comenzar a visualizar al Estado como un espacio abierto, pero también como un espacio de disputa. Los cambios operados desde el gobierno exigieron repensar el rol asignado y redefinir un nuevo rol. La nueva clave interpretativa del Estado se caracterizó por transcurrir en dos niveles: uno instrumental y otro en tanto posibilidad de construcción. En el primero de los casos, este comenzó a ser interpretado como la posibilidad de nuevos recursos para las tareas y para los organismos, en tanto el apoyo al gobierno nacional garantizaba un acompañamiento económico e institucional en sus iniciativas, nunca antes obtenido. Pero también significó vislumbrar al Estado como un espacio de conquista permitiendo la posibilidad de avanzar a un nivel de vinculación con el mismo nunca antes alcanzado. Esto último, se manifestó en una manera de concebir la vinculación con el Estado como parte de un proyecto político estratégico de largo plazo, desde donde fortalecer la lucha política contra un modelo de país y de sociedad, asociado a la idea de impunidad. Al interior de algunos de los organismos del MDHs implicó una discusión acerca de la estrategia histórica de las organizaciones y revisar un postulado identitario asociado a la idea de autonomía del Estado y de los partidos políticos. Los organismos que se orientaron hacia la aceptación de la participación en el Estado adoptaron una clave de interpretación donde según sus palabras “militar en el Estado” se volvió la consigna que expresó el nuevo espíritu de transformar un espacio representado como negativo, en una plataforma desde donde desarrollar actividades tendientes a avanzar en lucha por la memoria y contra la impunidad. En algunos casos esto se manifestó en un conflicto identitario en donde el deslizamiento de la doble militancia en el MDHs y en el Estado generó fuertes tensiones. En su conjunto, el acercamiento al Estado implicó un aumento en la intensidad de los vínculos de los militantes de organismos MDHs con la política institucional y la burocracia del Estado a fin de lograr la gestión de los distintos proyectos. Por otra parte, permitió el desarrollo de una compleja red de interacciones por parte de miembros de los organismos de Derechos Humanos con integrantes del Estado a fin de poder satisfacer las exigencias del trabajo institucional

Sin embargo, no todos los organismos de derechos humanos interpretaron de la misma manera al nuevo gobierno y sus políticas. Algunos organismos, especialmente los identificados con organizaciones y partidos políticos de izquierda, nucleados en el EVMJ priorizaron una lectura ideológica y promovieron un creciente enfrentamiento con el gobierno al que acusaban de apropiarse de la bandera de los derechos humanos. La diferencia entre los organismos del MDHs se hizo pública en 24 de marzo de 2006. Allí, ante más de 50.000 personas, la lectura de un documento del EVMJ que contenía fuertes críticas al gobierno<sup>1</sup> generó una serie de disputas en el palco principal que culminaron con el abandono del mismo por parte de AB, MPM e HIJOS, el cuestionamiento público de la titular de Abuelas y una solicitada<sup>2</sup> de algunos organismos señalando la negativa a adherir al documento<sup>3</sup> que fue publicada en los días posteriores en diarios de circulación nacional. Durante los años posteriores el EVMJ intensificó sus demandas y planteó la continuidad del gobierno de Kirchner con otros como si fuera “más de los mismo”.

Luego de una década de gobierno Kirchnerista se pueden distinguir tres posiciones al interior del Movimiento de derechos humanos. En primer lugar, lo que llamaremos el

grupo de "*los aliados*". Está conformado por algunos organismos fuertemente comprometidos con el programa de gobierno, que reivindican a ultranza la figura política del ex presidente Kirchner y apoyan la gestión de Cristina Fernandez. En simultáneo, consideran estratégico maximizar los beneficios políticos de su adhesión al proyecto. Entre estos se destaca la Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo que ofreció desde 2006 su respaldo sin reservas al gobierno incluso integrándose en las estructuras institucionales del Estado, y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo. Un elemento que los define es el apoyo activo a las políticas del gobierno más allá de las estrictamente referidas a derechos humanos y su identificación política con el mismo. En segundo lugar, se encuentran otros organismos que si bien comparten en general una mirada positiva acerca de las políticas de derechos humanos impulsadas desde 2003, sin embargo, muestran cautela a pronunciarse a favor de las políticas más generales propuestas por gobierno y también deslizaban algunas críticas. Este grupo, que denominaremos *los colaboradores*, es representado por Madres de Plaza de Mayo - línea Fundadora-, APDH y CELS, y presenta una estrategia dual frente al gobierno: por un lado, mantienen una política de acompañamiento a las iniciativas estatales en derechos humanos aunque se reservaban el derecho a cuestionar y a confrontar si fuese necesario en otras áreas. Los organismos que conforman este grupo pretenden preservar cierta autonomía frente al gobierno pues para la mayoría existía un límite que no están dispuestos a traspasar, consistente en su integración política al gobierno. Por último, encontramos el grupo de *los adversarios*: aquí se nuclean los organismos que estaban decididos a oponerse y confrontar a las políticas del gobierno. La mayoría de los organismos de este grupo presentan tradiciones e inscripciones ideológicas asociadas a la izquierda, como la Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre o La CORREPI, entre otros. Su principal nucleamiento es el EVMJ y se identificaban con agrupaciones y partidos políticos opositores al gobierno. En líneas generales, su posicionamiento frente al gobierno se caracteriza por una crítica a lo que consideraban una utilización de los derechos humanos mientras denuncian el carácter de anti popular de las políticas económicas y sociales de este. Si bien estas posiciones muestran ambivalencias, su carácter relativamente estable permite vislumbrar en cierto modo el éxito de la interpelación gubernamental a la hora de lograr la adhesión de actores sociales que históricamente habían sido acérrimos opositores a las políticas estatales y permiten formular una incógnita respecto a cuál será el futuro del MDHs y cómo impactará su "institucionalización" en la idea misma de derechos humanos sostenida por estos.

## 5. Todos los caminos conducen a...?

A lo largo de estas páginas hemos pretendido presentar algunos aspectos de lo que consideramos constituye un cambio interpretativo decisivo operado en una parte de algunos de los organismos del MDHs de Argentina, a partir de periodo político inaugurado en 2003. En este sentido pudimos observar que la aparición de un gobierno que reivindicó como propias las demandas del MDHs y tomó decisiones al respecto, impactó de diversos modos. Esto generó un cambio en la evaluación de la etapa y sus oportunidades políticas para una parte de las organizaciones del MDHs.

Para algunos organismos el nuevo gobierno significó una apertura de sus oportunidades políticas. La posibilidad de creer y hacer se fue interpretada como una característica política asociada al nuevo gobierno; así, la política fue interpretada como el ámbito donde podían volverse factibles sus demandas y, en consecuencia, se orientaron al Estado. La nueva clave interpretativa del Estado se caracterizó por transcurrir en dos niveles: uno instrumental y otro como posibilidad de construcción. En el primero de los casos, este comenzó a ser interpretado como la posibilidad de nuevos recursos para las tareas y para los organismos, en tanto el apoyo al gobierno nacional garantizaba un acompañamiento económico e institucional en sus iniciativas, nunca antes obtenido. Pero también significó vislumbrar al Estado como un espacio de conquista permitiendo la posibilidad de avanzar a un nivel de vinculación con el mismo nunca antes alcanzado. Esto último, se manifestó en una manera de concebir la vinculación con el Estado como parte de un proyecto político estratégico de largo plazo, desde donde fortalecer la lucha política contra un modelo de país y de sociedad, asociado a la idea de impunidad. Progresivamente comenzaron a evaluar la etapa como el comienzo de la post impunidad y lentamente fueron conformando el grupo de "los aliados". Entre estos se destacó la Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo y, en menor medida, la organización Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo.

Otro aspecto de importancia que hemos observado, radica en que para los organismos que decidieron comenzar a acompañar el gobierno además de una evaluación de las oportunidades políticas primó una lógica de acción afectiva en términos de sentimientos en torno a la acción y figura presidencial. Tempranamente en torno a la figura de Nestor Kirchner se articuló un entramado de sentimientos en torno a la política del presente y del pasado, al ser este identificado con los militantes de la década de los 70'. En cierto modo, como resultante del discurso Kirchnerista, pero no solo por ello, se produjo una identificación más amplia de las políticas gubernamentales con un difuso ideario "nacional y popular", mientras el nuevo gobierno también lograba una creciente identificación afectiva de parte de algunos organismos de derechos humanos. La combinación de afectividad y adhesión ideológica se combinó fortaleciendo la decisión de acompañar políticamente al gobierno, pero también se expresó en el rechazo de otros organismos al mismo. De este modo la comprensión de la vinculación entre MDHs y el Estado nos plantea la problemática tarea de visualizar los mecanismos de identificación que intervienen en la relación entre los actores políticos y los actores del movimiento social.

La reflexión que presentamos aquí no busca de ningún modo cerrar otras líneas posteriores que deberán avanzar en distintos aspectos acerca de los cambios en la modalidad de vinculación entre el Estado y el MDHs. En este sentido, nos parece importante señalar algunos aspectos a considerar en una futura agenda de trabajo acerca de los cambios en el MDHs de Argentina. Por un lado, es necesario avanzar a una línea de análisis que pueda abordar la manera en que se insertaron los organismos de derechos humanos en la gestión pública y que cambios produjo esto al interior de las organizaciones. Las nuevas tareas de gestión y la vinculación con las burocracias estatales significó un desafío para los organismos de derechos humanos que debieron re-estructurar sus pautas organizativas a fin de poder cumplimentar las nuevas

tareas e implicó una especialización de funciones a su interior. En este aspecto, la vinculación con el Estado y su incorporación a sus estructuras pudo haber significado una burocratización de las tareas y rutinas con efectos que aun no han sido estudiados. Asimismo la vinculación con el Estado permitió nuevas vías de acción para los organismos del MDHS y fuentes de financiamiento para nuevos emprendimientos sobre los cuales se conoce aun bastante poco. Consideramos necesario indagar en los modos organizativos que adoptaron los nuevos emprendimientos desplegados por los organismos y cómo se expresó en ellos el vínculo con la política. Por último, también es clave considerar cómo incidió esta institucionalización en la elaboración de las políticas de Estado acerca de derechos humanos, y si esto tuvo como resultado una ampliación de la noción de derechos humanos o, por el contrario, reforzó un sentido de esta noción restringiéndola únicamente a las violaciones a los derechos humanos durante la última dictadura militar. Consideramos que preguntarnos por estas cuestiones es algo más que un mero ejercicio de investigación. Es preguntarnos bajo qué condiciones se da la lucha contra la impunidad en la Argentina y en ello, también, radica su importancia.

## Abreviaturas

**AB** Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo. Es una asociación formada durante el último gobierno militar de la República Argentina integrada por Madres de detenidos desaparecidos, con el fin de recuperar los niños de los desaparecidos apropiados por civiles, militares y miembros de Fuerzas de Seguridad.

**APDH** Asamblea Permanente por los derechos humanos. La Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (APDH) es una organización de derechos humanos de la Argentina fundada en 1975.

**CELS** Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales. Es una organización no gubernamental argentina con sede en Buenos Aires, fundada en 1979, orientada a la promoción y defensa de los derechos humanos y el fortalecimiento del sistema democrático.

**CORREPI** Coordinadora Contra la Represión Policial e Institucional. De orientación ideológica de izquierda, es una organización política que activa en el campo de los Derechos Humanos

**EVMJ** Encuentro Verdad, Memoria y Justicia. Es un espacio de organizaciones sociales y de derechos humanos identificadas con posiciones de izquierda.

**HIJOS** Hijos e Hijas por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio. Es una organización de derechos humanos que existe en varios puntos de la Argentina y tiene además regionales en varias ciudades del extranjero. Está integrada por hijos de desaparecidos, asesinados, presos políticos y exiliados durante la dictadura militar y sus años anteriores, y por personas que adhieren a los principios de la organización.

**MDHs** Movimiento de derechos humanos.

**MPM** Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo. Es una asociación formada durante el último gobierno militar de la República Argentina integrada por Madres de detenidos desaparecidos, con el fin de recuperar con vida a los detenidos desaparecidos, inicialmente, y luego establecer quiénes fueron los responsables de los crímenes

de lesa humanidad y promover su enjuiciamiento. Es la agrupación de familiares más emblemática y desde 1986 se encuentran divididas en dos grupos: el grupo mayoritario, denominado «Madres de Plaza de Mayo», y las «Madres de Plaza de Mayo Línea Fundadora».

**TRP** Tendencia Revolucionaria del Peronismo. Se conoce como “Tendencia revolucionaria del peronismo” al conjunto de las organizaciones armadas asociadas a la izquierda del peronismo en los años 70’.

## Apéndice metodológico

Los resultados que aquí se presentan forman parte de una investigación más amplia en curso orientada en establecer los modos de vinculación entre los organismos del Movimiento de derechos humanos y el Estado en la Argentina contemporánea.

El análisis de la historia de los actores, los conflictos al interior del Movimiento de derechos humanos, las luchas políticas y las estrategias desarrolladas frente al Estado fue abordado de dos maneras: Por una parte, mediante bibliografía disponible acerca de los organismos del Movimiento de derechos humanos acerca de la historia de los organismos y sus posicionamientos generales. Por otra parte, a partir de visualizar distintos acontecimientos y coyunturas políticas, ante las cuales los organismos del Movimiento de derechos humanos se manifestaron públicamente acompañando o haciendo frente a decisiones Políticas estatales en el periodo en cuestión.

En este trabajo utilizamos como fuente de información primaria los documentos de las organizaciones del MDHs, entrevistas a organismos del Movimiento de derechos humanos y discursos presidenciales. Para acceder a los primeros nos remitimos a distintos archivos existentes de los organismos integrantes del Movimiento de derechos de humanos (Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, Familiares de Desaparecidos y Detenidos por Razones Políticas, Madres de Plaza de Mayo - Línea Fundadora y Memoria Abierta). Para acceder a los segundos utilizamos principalmente al archivo Oral de Memoria Abierta y, de manera complementaria, el archivo de Historia Oral del Programa de Historia Política del Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Los discursos presidenciales los obtuvimos del Archivo general de la Nación y la biblioteca del Congreso de la Nación Argentina. Además utilizamos otras fuentes de información secundaria consistente en periódicos y revistas de alcance nacional.

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## Notas

Este trabajo forma parte de una investigación en curso orientada a conocer las modalidades de vinculación entre los organismo del Movimiento de derechos humanos de Argentina y el Estado en distintos niveles durante el periodo 1983 - 2011. Dicha investigación forma parte de mi proyecto como investigador del CONICET, que se encuentra radicado en el grupo de Estudios Socio Históricos y Políticos de la Facultad de Humanidades de la Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Argentina. Deseo agradecer a los miembros del Grupo de Estudios Socio Históricos y Políticos, en especial a Oscar Aelo y Germán Perez, por los comentarios a este trabajo. Las consultas o comentarios acerca de este trabajo pueden comunicarse a con el autor a la siguiente dirección de e-mail: [romanin@mdp.edu.ar](mailto:romanin@mdp.edu.ar).

- 1 Véase "24 de marzo de 2006: 30.000 razones para seguir luchando" disponible en [http://30anios.org.ar/wordpress/?page\\_id=6](http://30anios.org.ar/wordpress/?page_id=6)
- 2 Cuando se leía el documento las Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo mostraron su desagrado por las consignas en contra del Gobierno y se levantaron para irse. Al día siguiente en el diario Clarín, Estela Carlotto explicó la postura adoptada. "Me parece injusto hablar contra el Gobierno en estas circunstancias. Nosotros no firmamos el documento, no es grato para nada", "Yo no quiero hablar, yo quiero gente unida, pero parece que no se entiende". Esto generó la respuesta de algunos organismos nucleados en el Encuentro que señalaron que las acusaciones esgrimidas eran "una mentira y un burdo intento de esconder una maniobra perfectamente orquestada destinada a evitar que se leyera un documento que señala críticas al Gobierno".
- 3 La solicitada fue publicada el 27/3/06 en Página 12 con las firmas de Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, APDH, Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Madres de Plaza de Mayo - línea fundadora-, Familiares de desaparecidos y detenidos por razones políticas, SERPAJ y Herman@s.

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Andriotti Romanin, Enrique (2011). *"La verdad como justicia. Justicia y creación de oportunidades en el Juicio por la Verdad de Mar del Plata, Argentina"*, Revista *Asian Journal of Latinoamerican Studies*, Latin American Studies Association of Korea, Seoul, Vol 24 N° 4, pag. 1-15.

Andriotti Romanin, Enrique (2011). *"Nosotros los del 73... Memoria y política en la Argentina post-2001."*, *Revista Nómadas*, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España. Serie monográfica N° 1 América Latina.

## The Effects of Affect: the place of emotions in the mobilizations of 2011

Tova Benski and Lauren Langman

**Abstract:** Throughout the world we have seen the proliferation of a variety of progressive, democratic social movements in which vast numbers of people have challenged neo liberal globalization. In this paper we offer a theoretical frame for the analysis of the most recent challenges posed to neo liberal social and economic policies as they were shaped in late capitalism. We focus on the emotional aspect that is vital to mobilization. We lean on Habermas' thesis of the crisis of Legitimacy at the Macro and Micro levels, translating the cognitive processes into their emotional counterparts. To do this we draw on theoretical frames from the Sociology of Social Movements and the sociology of emotions. More particularly we see the process of "emotional liberation" as the equivalent of McAdam's "cognitive liberation" and both as part of the process of subjectivation as put forward by Touraine. These formulations have led up to look for the emotions that tie people to authorities in order to understand which are the emotions that need to evolve in order to liberate people from their loyalty to authorities. We found a constellation of non – congruent emotions such as distrust and disrespect of authorities/elites or their perceived agents, indignation and righteous anger, humiliation and hope. The value of our proposed structure of argumentation is in the powerful combination of macro and micro processes and the combination of cognition and emotions.

**Keywords:** legitimation crisis, emotional liberation, protest, social movements, young adults, neo-liberal ideology, greedy capitalism

### 1. Introduction

Throughout the world we have recently witnessed the proliferation of counter hegemonic, democratic mobilizations in which vast numbers of people have challenged neo liberal capitalist ideology and practices, and the legitimacy of the elites whose self-interested loyalties to transnational capital ill served the majorities. Most recently these include Arab Spring, the Spanish M15, the Greek, Portuguese, Israeli Summer, and the Occupy movements, to mention just a number of these mobilizations around the world.

While each of these movements is somewhat unique, each shaped by local cultures, values and organizations, they do have some common characteristics namely the adverse impacts of neoliberalism with its growing inequality, growing unemployment, privatization, etc. The first to mobilize in many places were the young adults aged

20-35 both employed, underemployed, underpaid or unemployed. Many of them normative tax paying citizens who have been in one way or another adversely affected by late capitalism neo liberal practices. In many of these mobilization women are very prominent both among the protesters and the leading figures of these "leaderless" mobilizations.

During the past year we have also witnessed a proliferation of local and international teams of researchers and of studies of these mobilizations that are still in progress and they are being presented at a large numbers of conferences, both local and international. So this wave of mobilizations has invigorated the academic field of the study of social movements and has encouraged a critical reappraisal of our theories and new empirical studies. The paper on which this presentation is based is part of this new wave of theoretical and empirical upsurge.

The paper offers a theoretical frame for the understanding of both democratic and authoritarian directions in the most recent waves of mobilization. The presentation today is focused on one aspect of the democratic mobilizations. It turns attention to the emotional processes that are an integral aspect of these mobilizations. These processes have not been given enough attention in previous analyses of social movements and protest cycles.

Why is it important to study the emotions of protest and to theoretically locate their place within the study of mobilization? The answer is simple. Even though emotions have been absent from sociological accounts of protest and social movements for decades (mainly due to the traditional duality of emotion vs. rationality), during the past twenty years, with the emergence to prominence of the sociology of emotions, it has been recognized that emotions are present in every aspect of life, including protests (Jasper 2011). Emotions motivate people to mobilize (Flam 2005; Benski 2011), are generated through and during protests and mobilizations (Benski 2011; Jasper 2011) and shape the goals of the movement. Emotions can be both a means (Mobilizing through manipulating emotions) and an end (Yang 2006?). As such, the study of emotions is highly instructive in any attempt at understanding both present day and past mobilizations.

This presentation has three parts. First we begin with a critical examination of the place of emotions in social movements' theories. We will then present the general outline of our theoretical argument concerning the place of emotions in present mobilizations and finally, I will present the process of emotional detachment from feeling loyalty to authorities. Based on the premise that there is no cognition without emotions (Melucci 1995) and following McAdam's (1982) "cognitive liberation" concept, we present the notion of "emotional liberation" processes, which we further link to ... process of subjectivization It is on the bases of these theoretical arguments by former colleagues that that we claim that is a "must" for the most recent mobilizations as it is for any process of mobilization. The content might be different in different mobilizations but according to our present theoretical know ledge and reasoning, the principle is identical.

## 2. Rethinking the Paradigms: Social movements and emotions

Theorizing social movements first began by considering defining them as "mass behavior" which consisted of "emotional" driven "irrational" crowds going berserk (Le Bon 1960). The masses, the dangerous classes were seen as out of control and/or duped by unscrupulous leaders. Thus, for a number of reasons, the affective was considered irrational and unworthy of study. This line of thought dominated the social sciences till the 1960s (Smelser 1961) and even early social scientists like Weber, Durkheim, Freud, and Smelser, accepted the basic notion of Le Bon's conceptualization (Goodwin and Jasper 2006).

Since the 1970's 1980s, thinking about social movements has fallen into two broad camps, resource mobilization (RM), and new social movement theory (NSM) that attempt to explain the mediation processes between structural conditions and possible mobilizations.

Whereas CB theorists have portrayed protestors as emotional to demonstrate their irrationality, RM theorists demonstrated their rationality by denying their emotions. RM theorists depicted shrewd entrepreneurs, rational actors coolly calculating the costs and benefits of participation, and people mobilized by incentives rather than by passionate anger or righteous indignation. The cognitive emphasis is visible in the political process theory as well and is articulated in the "cognitive liberation" theme, even though McAdam (1982) went a step further and acknowledge the importance of grievances to the development of the definition of the situation as unjust.

Even the cultural turn in the study of social movements, that has evolved into the NSMs theories in Europe and Framing approaches in the US, has retained the cognitive focus (with the notable exception of feminist studies of movements). Thus, Melucci (1995) incorporated the emotional element in the form of "emotional investment" of participants and stated that "there is no cognition without feeling" (p. 45). Yet his view of collective identity emphasizes its cognitive components (Goodwin and Jasper 2006). Gamson (1992:32) whose experiments gave a push to framing theories and studies, argued that "the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul." Is an "must" for social mobilization to get started.

Despite these comments by Gamson and Melucci, , In the 1990s, 'culture' was perceived as made up of "customs, beliefs, values, artifacts, symbols, and rituals" (Johnston and Klandermans 1995:3), "ideas and beliefs" (Mueller 1992:13), and "ideas, ideology, [and] identity" (McAdam 1994:36). Thus, Culture was perceived as exerting an influence on potential members through shaping their cognitions rather than their emotions.


**We hold that both RM and NSMs perspectives fail to address the important role of emotions and feelings in the emergence and functioning of social movements. We join the efforts of Flam (2005), Jasper (1998; 2011), Goodwin, Poletta and Jasper (2001), and Goodwin and Jasper (2006) in the attempt at readdressing the issue of emotions in analyses of social movements and apply these to the analysis of the most recent mobilizations in particular.**

### **3. A Road Map of the analysis of the most recent mobilizations**

In this paper we argue that to understand these mobilizations requires considerations of both objective/structural conditions, contradictions and multiple crises, as well as considerations of the subjective/microsocial aspects of self, identity and emotions.

At the objective/structural level we would suggest that global capitalism which has led to the centralization of wealth and power that has fostered greater inequality and economic retrenchments for the majorities that in turn has had devastating consequences for many, but more so to young adults in the Middle East, in Europe, the United States and Israel. These macro processes have interfered, at the micro level, with the ability of the young adult generation to sustain themselves and fulfill the modern dream of independence, controlling one's own life and the ability to lead a life that is self-sustaining, fulfilling and productive economically, socially and culturally. As a result, many of the economically distressed see themselves politically marginalized and their interests disenfranchised ignored by elites.

At the same time, the neo-liberal logic of global capital has fostered State retrenchments in providing various entitlements, together with the privatization of government services. This in turn has eroded the socio-political contract between the State and its citizens and left the individual on his/her own to cope with various adversities. As a result of these macro and micro social aspects of the political economy- legitimization crises and emotional processes have occurred particularly among those in economically vulnerable social locations who became disposed to mobilization, and through interpersonal networks and/or access to alternative sources of media and information, the proliferation of new framings of the situation in terms of both cognitive (new citizenship claims) and affective (humiliation and pride) eventually have mobilized in vast numbers. These claims are presented in the figure below



We will now turn our focus to the place of emotions in the whole structure that has led to the most recent mobilizations, the central box of the figure above. We will focus on the crises of legitimacy in late capitalist societies and their micro level counterparts.

#### 4. Legitimation Crises – or when Capitalism Hits the FAN!!!

For Habermas (1975) legitimation crises take place when there is a failure of the "steering mechanisms" of advanced capitalism. These evolve at both the macro and the micro levels. The objective aspects which are macro level evolve at the economy, State and Cultural system. The subjective moments, of these macro level crises evolve within **the life world** of individuals where motivated identities are experienced and performed. Economic crises as structural problems such as contradictions and implosions of the economy that create unemployment or underemployment, sudden price hikes—especially of basic commodities (food, oil, utilities), retrenchments of entitlements etc, that threaten survival or maintenance of living standards, or social status, undermine the legitimacy of political leadership and legitimating ideologies. But at the same time, these macro conditions impact the "life world", the micro level of feelings, identities and values.

**Legitimation crises lead to crises of meaning (culture). They migrate into individual 'life worlds', they migrate to and affect motivation and identity, as people withdraw commitment from the social order creating spaces for alternative views and understandings.** What is overlooked in Habermas' analysis is that system crises elicit not only cognitive reactions but also emotional reactions.

The migration of system crises into the life worlds in the forms of rising prices, stagnant or declining incomes, or for many, often educated youth, no incomes at all,



means individual actors experience distress –And in face of these realities there've been a number of emotional reactions of anger and fear, anxiety and despair and often hopelessness.

People generally seek to avoid or alleviate unpleasant emotions (fear, anxiety anger which are usually the emotions that accompany crises among most people) and generally instead choose more pleasant emotional states (love, joy, surprise, recognition [self-esteem]). Crises, especially crises that affect people daily lives, sometimes in ways that often denigrates the self, lead to strong emotions of the "anger-hate" family which form **powerful motives to seek amelioration.**

Accepting Melucci's warning that we need to remember that "there is no cognition without feeling" (Melucci 1995:45) our first and most basic argument is that **cognitive processes that we can identify are also in effect, emotional, or involve not only cognition but also emotions.** This assumption underlies our presentation. In view of this, this paper represents an endeavor to locate the emotional processes that accompany the withdrawal of commitment from authorities.

The second point: we adopt the most recent insight that emotions tend to appear in "constellations" rather than as a single emotion at a time. Hence we suggest the concept of "constellations of emotions" to deal with the complex nature of the emotional dimension (For further discussion see Benski 2011). .

Third, Following Westen (2007), Lakkoff ( 2008), Ekman (1999), Barbalet (1998), Flam (1995), Jasper (1998) and others, emotions and feelings unpin a variety of thoughts and actions-and most importantly, help us understand motivation and identity and as we will argue dispositions toward mobilizing. Thus we claim that people generally seek positive emotional feelings and seek to avoid fear, anxiety, anger, shame, disgust, humiliation or depression. More specifically, we suggest that there are four basic desires to experience certain emotional states that help us understand the hows and whys of social life in general and social mobilization in particular. People need

- 1) Attachments to others, a sense of belonging, and attempt to avoid loneliness and the family of sad feelings that accompany loneliness (Berezin 2001; jasper 2011; Kemper 2001)
  - 2) A sense of agency/empowerment, and attempt to avoid helplessness and a sense of powerlessness (Kemper 2001).
  - 3) Recognition and esteem and attempt to avoid feelings of humiliation and worthlessness (Kemper 2001)
- And the
- 4) Alleviation of anxiety and uncertainty.

Every culture, and/or subculture provides different cues and codes that arouse/evoke certain feelings. It is clear from former studies that economic and political crises (perhaps economic more than pol) are experienced by many as anxieties that impinge on one's livelihood, identity, status and self esteem. Given strong emotional responses

from fear and anxiety about survival, to feeling humiliated by actions of authorities and/or anger toward the structure of the society and/or the nature of its leadership has led many to rethink the nature of citizenship and civil participation-especially as it has changed from passive support of the Nation, and loyalty and acceptance if not obedience to its leaders, to more active critiques and mobilizations of elite power that resist, challenge and even transform nations and change leaders. All this is highly evident in the slogan that was chanted all over the world starting with Tahrir sq. , Madrid, Us and Israel : "The People Demand Social Justice".

## 5. Getting there – Bringing emotions back into focus

### 5.1 Emotional liberation/detachment processes and their constellations of emotions

As we turn to look for the emotional equivalent of the cognitive process of the withdrawal of commitment from authorities that according to Habermas occurs at times of crises of legitimacy, scanning the literature of cognitive processes that are seen as necessary for mobilization, McAdam's political process theory that presented the idea of "cognitive liberation" seems to be the central concept to start with. This line of thought postulates that in order for movements to mobilize and people to become social movements actors, some changes need to occur. For McAdam (1982), these changes are cognitive. In his analysis of the civil rights movement, McAdam(1982) suggested that a process of "cognitive Liberation" was a precondition for mobilization into oppositional movements. He claimed that "*Before collective protest can get under way, people must collectively define their situation as unjust and subject to change through group action*" (1982:51). These cognitions were used instrumentally to interpret cues from authorities to the protesting group, and there was no discussion of the meaning of "liberation". Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2001) claim that whereas the word 'liberation' hints at emotion, the word "cognitive" immediately denies it. Furthermore, the question of 'what is one liberated from' was not raised and therefore never dealt with.

To deal with this issue of 'what is one liberated of?' we turn to Touraine's *thesis of the SUBJECT* (individual and collective).

Touraine (1995) claims that in order to become a **subject** (an agent of change-a social movement) in late modernity, individuals and groups have to undergo processes of **subjectivation**. To become a subject capable of change - agency, individuals and collectivities have to free themselves of the social norms and roles that constrain them; in some measure, to de-integrate themselves personally, socially and culturally. The ability to become a subject is pending on one's ability to problematize internalized reality and to inhabit the space that is the seam line between, commitment and non-commitment.

*"It is the gesture of refusal, of resistance, that creates the subject. It is the more restricted ability to stand aside from our own social roles, our non-belonging and our need to protest that allows each of us to live as a subject. And subjectivation is always the antithesis of socialization, of adaptation to a social role or statu." (Touraine 1995, 274).*

Bridging these two different cognitive theoretical formulations, one can claim that 'cognitive detachment/liberation' is actually part of this process of subjectivation, of the de-integration spelt out by Touraine (1995), and in terms of content, it means the liberation of the individual and groups from his/their total commitment to the social system and the roles and rules that it imposes on them. However, both of these formulations restrict their analyses to cognitive aspects of reality. Yet as Melucci and other scholars of the sociology of emotions (Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta 2001) argued, cognition and emotions are intertwined. Hence it follows that this process of cognitive liberation from roles and commitments is accompanied by a process of 'emotional liberation/detachment' as suggested by Flam, which means liberation from emotions that tie us to the system. "One's emotional transformation, relaxation and cutting off the old emotional attachments, and the construction of new emotional bonds" (Flam 2005, 31-32).

What are the emotions that tie us to the system and why are they so important?

To begin with, the system in democratic societies cannot function without inputs from and the support and loyalty of the people. This support forges relationships among the individual, society and the polity. These are expressed in terms of the social contract which specifies the rights and obligations that are at the bases of trust between the individual and authorities and define their duties and expectations as citizens in a democratic society. Jasper (1998: 402, 406) discusses trust and respect as examples of basic affects that have an important political function. Trust in and respect for authorities has a dampening effect on protest. Flam (2005: 21), following Simmel, discusses Loyalty and gratitude as the two emotions that cement and bind people and social relations. Loyalty in particular is considered by Max Weber as the key emotion which links the powerless to the powerful. On the other hand disrespect, distrust, anger and hope, when they appear together promote political activism and movement mobilization or mobilization to movements.

This can now be linked back to Habermas' structural/system crises 'migrating' to life worlds at the micro level with 'emotional liberation/detachment' forming an important manifestation of crisis of legitimacy, leading to movement mobilization. Thus, these emotional processes can not only weaken commitment to the social order, but as people experience strong emotions in face of system dysfunction, hegemonic ideologies anchored within collective identities become subject to contestation and re-negotiation.

To sum up, what can be inferred from all of this is that the constellation of emotions that are salient at the first stages of mobilization is what I labeled in a different place

"constellation of non-congruent" emotions (Benski 2011), such as: distrust and disrespect of authorities/elites or their perceived agents, indignation and righteous anger, humiliation and hope (jasper 2011). As framing processes diagnose the situation and promote injustice frames that name its enemies, villains and the "good guys", so are emotions evolving towards each of these categories, as well as to the "self" that is being trampled on by authorities, They refuse to pay the price for what they believe are irresponsible government practices and global financial misconduct by financial agents supported by authorities in what is called "greedy Capitalism" and they feel very strongly about it, as can be seen in the picture taken from a demonstration in Tel-Aviv. The man in the picture is holding a sign that says: "When the government is against the people, the people are against the government".



## 6. Concluding remarks

While this has been a theoretical presentation, the value of our proposed structure of argumentation is in the powerful combination of macro and micro processes and the combination of cognition and emotions. It is not enough to understand that the situation or actions of authority are unjust. One must be motivated to act, and this motivation usually comes through emotional processes which accompany this cognition particularly among those who are adversely affected by the crisis in ways that negate one's basic emotional needs as specified on pages 79-81 of this presentation.

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## Biographical Notes

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## Chile 2011, desde el largo letargo a la acción colectiva

Leonardo Cancino Pérez

**Resumen:** Durante el año 2011, la imagen de cientos de miles de personas movilizadas en las calles de distintas ciudades de Chile, dio la vuelta al mundo. Y si bien, las demandas explícitas de los movimientos sociales lograban explicar el contenido de dichas movilizaciones, quedaba rondando la pregunta sobre ¿por qué ahora ocurre este fenómeno? Ya que muchas de las causas que las originaban, se venían arrastrando desde la caída de la dictadura militar (1990). Esto es lo que se abordará en la presente reflexión y se hará, aplicando nociones provenientes desde las teorías de los movimientos sociales, entre ellas: ciclo de movilización, alineamiento de marcos, oportunidades políticas e identidad colectiva. Dichas nociones nos permitirán diferentes aproximaciones a las movilizaciones referidas. Concluiremos nuestra presentación con una propuesta sobre las consecuencias teóricas y políticas del actual ciclo de movilización chileno.

**Palabras clave:** Movimientos sociales, alineamiento de marcos, oportunidades políticas, identidad colectiva, Chile.

### 1. Introducción

La historia, según Ortega y Gasset (1947), tiende a cubrir con un velo misterioso los comienzos y los finales de las civilizaciones. Guardando las proporciones, un velo similar envuelve los ciclos de acción colectiva. No queda claro, cuándo comienzan y terminan, qué es aquello novedoso y aquello que transfiere una carga de pasado.

Al parecer, lo de *viejos movimientos en nuevos contextos* (Reichmann y Fernández 1994; Mess 1997) intenta otorgar una salida elegante y consensuada a esta cuestión. Más allá de las críticas que puede reportar este adagio de la movimientología académica, recoge la potencia dialéctica del accionar colectivo, transformación y continuidad se dan a la vez, sin que ninguno de ellos, por sí sólo, abarque la totalidad del fenómeno.

Tal es el caso del reciente ciclo de movilización en Chile. Donde la continuidad está dado por factores estructurales, como la desigual distribución de ingresos que se arrastra desde que existen mediciones y que llevan hoy día a que, según Andrés Zähler (2011), el 60% de la población chilena obtenga ingresos promedio peores que Angola o las propias demandas que han sostenido desde hace tiempo los movimientos ecologistas, de minorías sexuales, estudiantiles o del pueblo mapuche. Dado esto, no podemos encontrar en estos factores una explicación sobre por qué desde mayo del 2011 y no antes se activa masivamente la acción colectiva. Para ello debemos

observar que es aquello que cambia en el escenario social, es decir, la dimensión de la transformación, de la ruptura.

## 2. Ciclo de movilización

Tarrow entiende por *ciclo de acción colectiva*:

*Una fase de intensificación de los conflictos y la confrontación en el sistema social, que incluye una rápida difusión de la acción colectiva de los sectores más movilizados a los menos movilizados, un ritmo de innovación acelerado en las formas de confrontación, marcos nuevos o transformados para la acción colectiva, una combinación de participación organizada y no organizada y una secuencia de interacción intensificada entre disidentes y autoridades. (2004: 202–03).*

Esta fase acelerada, es posible situarla para el caso chileno a partir de mayo del 2011, con las primeras movilizaciones masivas de ecologistas y estudiantes. Entonces cabe preguntarse, ¿Qué paso con anterioridad a este ciclo?, ¿Qué hizo posible que en condiciones estructurales estables, los personas decidieran ocupar masivamente las calles para expresar sus demandas?

Y la respuesta, a mi juicio, la encontramos por una parte en tres movilizaciones específicas que logran producir un cambio en las creencias respecto a los efectos de la movilización, y por otra parte, en las oportunidades políticas provocadas por el cambio de gobierno.

## 3. Alineamiento de marcos cognitivos

El *proceso enarmarcador*, según McAdam, McCarthy y Zald, refiere a los “significados compartidos y conceptos por medio de los cuales la gente tiende a definir la situación” (1999: 26) y mediaría, según los mismos autores, la oportunidad, la organización y la acción.

En este sentido, el alineamiento de marcos cognitivos, permitiría a las activistas cogniciones comunes a la hora de actuar. Existen múltiples tipos de marcos, de diagnóstico, pronóstico, movilización, maestros, de injusticia (Chihu 1999). Más allá de las disquisiciones conceptuales en torno a ellos, me parece que se da un proceso de apertura en la creencia colectiva sobre los efectos del acto de movilizarse, al que denominaré provisoriamente *marco de posibilidad* y este proceso se configura en tres momentos de articulación, que como ya he mencionado, preceden al ciclo de mayor visibilidad.

Veamos. El primero, de tipo asincrónico, lo constituye la Revolución Pingüina<sup>1</sup> del año 2006, donde miles de jóvenes ocupan calles y colegios, con una incipiente diversificación de los repertorios de protestas, junto al apoyo masivo de amplios sectores de la



población. Cuestión que se vuelve fundamental para que los actores colectivos logren avanzar en aquello que anhelan. A propósito de esto, gustaría de relatarles una anécdota ocurrida en el transcurso de aquellas movilizaciones.

Nos encontrábamos varios amigos, que en aquel tiempo militábamos en el movimiento humanista, en una casa en Santiago Centro donde se ubicaba la ONG en que trabajábamos. Mientras uno de ellos colgaba un lienzo hacia la calle en apoyo a los estudiantes, vimos algunos centenares de pingüinos correr hacia nuestras oficinas perseguidos por Carabineros, incluyendo una carro lanza agua; de inmediato, alguien bajó hasta el primer piso para abrir la puerta y protegerlos de la persecución policial. En ese momento, los vecinos del sector comenzaron a imitarnos, algunos escondían unos pocos estudiantes; otros, algunas decenas, el mayor número de ellos fue acogido por trabajadores de la construcción que edificaban una torre, de esas que inundan el centro de la ciudad. Ahí quedó Carabineros, solos en las calle, estorbando con sus vehículos antidisturbios el tránsito; en fin, dislocados, al parecer no lograban comprender por qué los vecinos de un barrio acogían en sus casas y oficinas a estos estudiantes.

Creo que este hecho logra transmitir en parte el clima de complicidad de amplios sectores de la ciudadanía con el movimiento estudiantil, y si bien buena parte de las reivindicaciones de la época se diluyeron entre la burocracia concertacionista y la farandulización periodística, dejaron latentes demandas que han vuelto a retomarse con fuerza a propósito de las actuales movilizaciones; legaron también, el germen de que la acción colectiva podría generar frutos o al menos romper el largo inmovilismo que se arrastraba desde el gobierno de Aylwin. La primera generación que se movilizaba masivamente en los años post dictatoriales, daba una lección al conjunto de la sociedad civil e insinuaba su potencial de cambio.

El segundo momento de articulación, lo marcan las movilizaciones en torno a la termoeléctrica de Barrancones en Punta de Choros a mediados del año 2010. En este caso los repertorios de protestas fueron más amplios, incluyeron: documentales, carnavales, marchas y movilizaciones que abarcaron transversalmente clases, géneros, edades y zonas geográficas. Rápidamente el gobierno reaccionó paralizando el proyecto, para lo cual tuvo que sobrepasar la institucionalidad legal. La movilización social logró detener el proyecto de Barrancones, amplió el cerco de lo posible e instaló, por primera vez -desde la post dictadura- al movimiento social como un actor relevante. Lo que la Revolución Pingüina dejó latente, acá se sedimentó. La sociedad civil cayó en cuenta que la vía de la movilización social podía torcerle la mano al gobierno.

El tercer momento en el proceso de configuración del marco de posibilidad, se da en las protestas ocurridas en la Región de Magallanes, en el extremo sur de Chile, a propósito del alza del gas. Dichas protestas ocurrieron durante enero del año 2011, la ciudad se vio paralizada, hasta que el gobierno debió pedir la renuncia al ministro de energía y llegar a acuerdo con la ciudadanía, el alza que un principio rondaba un 16% se dejó finalmente en un 3%; además se otorgaron una serie de subsidios a los habitantes de la región. Ya no se trataba de un movimiento social específico, sino de una región que se ponía en marcha, la ciudadanía en sus barrios, también tenían algo que decir.

Desde aquel momento se han sucedido una tras otra las movilizaciones, abarcando progresivamente a un mayor número de actores, demandas y repertorios.

Estos son algunos de los hechos que con más fuerza explica, el por qué desde mayo del 2011 y no antes, cientos de miles de personas se movilizan en Chile. El horizonte de posibilidad se amplió gracias a la movilización social y hoy día, los movimientos sociales quieren y estiman, que pueden avanzar en la resolución de sus demandas.

#### 4. Estructura de oportunidades políticas

Otra vía de análisis y que complementa la explicación anterior, es lo que ha sido denominado como: *estructura de oportunidades políticas*, y en términos amplios es entendida como "el grado de posibilidades que los grupos tienen de acceder al poder e influir sobre el sistema político" (Eisinger cit. en McAdam 1999: 49-50), Y que Doug McAdam (1999) ha resumido en cuatro dimensiones:

- a. El grado de apertura relativo del sistema político institucionalizado.
- b. La estabilidad o inestabilidad de las alineaciones entre las élites.
- c. La presencia o ausencia de aliados entre las élites.
- d. Capacidad del Estado y su propensión a la represión.

Los tres primeros puntos, con énfasis en el segundo y tercero, se ven modificados en su permeabilidad, por la salida de la Concertación (socialdemocracia) y el ingreso de la Alianza (derecha) al gobierno.

Bien sabemos que tanto los temas estudiantiles como ecológicos contra los que reclaman los activistas, fueron implementados y profundizados por la Concertación. Al mismo tiempo esta coalición logró ocupar el espacio simbólico del progresismo. El gobierno de Ricardo Lagos reabrió La Moneda a los transeúntes, mientras era celebrado por los gremios empresariales por sus políticas neoliberales. Dicha coalición autorizó cientos de proyectos altamente contaminantes y, paralelamente, creó un Ministerio del Medio Ambiente con atribuciones paupérrimas. Aumentaron el aporte estatal a la educación y, en un mismo movimiento, entregaron su administración y gestión a la banca privada. Pero por sobre todo lo anterior, la Concertación desmovilizó, lo aprendió a hacer durante el gobierno de Aylwin y continuó haciéndolo en los años posteriores. Se configuró en un dique a las transformaciones sociales que no comulgaran con el neoliberalismo. Prohibieron manifestaciones en las principales calles de la ciudad, crearon una suerte de manifestódromos donde las protestas fueran invisibilizadas; invirtieron cada vez mayores recursos en represión policial; cooptaron dirigentes estudiantiles, sindicales, vecinales con políticas clientelistas; en fin, los ejemplos suman y siguen. La ilusión provocada por este gatopardismo -en palabras de Tomás Moulián (1997)- se desvaneció con su salida del gobierno, el dique se fragmentó, permitiendo que por sus intersticios fluyeran otros imaginarios, otra comprensión de los acontecimientos y otros sujetos sociales.

En este contexto -y gracias a él- asume el gobierno de derecha de Sebastián Piñera, que en lo fundamental expande el mismo modelo de desarrollo pero sin las habilidades sociales de la Concertación. Lo que ha redundado en dos tácticas erradas para enfrentar el conflicto.

La primera, el intento majadero de trasladar la responsabilidad de los sucesos actuales a los gobiernos concertacionistas. Es cierto que pocos pueden dudar, tal como ya lo mencionamos, de la responsabilidad de la Concertación en los conflictos actuales. Pero si ésta coalición se equivocó ¿por qué entonces se continúa en la misma senda?, ¿Es tan nefasto, por ejemplo, el proyecto de HidroAysén, que deben culpar a otros de haberlo permitido? El gobierno de Piñera queda en una situación extraña, por decir lo menos, cuando responsabiliza al gobierno anterior sobre cuestiones que él mismo profundiza. Por otra parte, y si nos ubicamos en una lógica bastante elemental, ¿no está, acaso, en la médula del cambio de la coalición gobernante la expectativa de que no hagan más de lo mismo?

La segunda táctica, ha sido la criminalización de la protesta, la vieja táctica de los nuevos tiempos. Se criminaliza, mientras se arremete con violencia. Táctica que ha funcionado en más de una ocasión y en la que se entrenaron los dirigentes de derecha durante la dictadura de Pinochet. Sin embargo, ha ido fracasando por varios motivos. Los cientos de miles de personas que se han movilizado a lo largo del país; el discurso no violento de los activistas; decenas de videos que circulan por Internet y que muestran no sólo el espíritu de carnaval que ha permeado las manifestaciones, sino que también, la excesiva violencia policial; la ampliación de los repertorios de protesta, que incluyen performance de todo tipo, documentales, videos de apoyo de reconocidos actores, etc. y que en su conjunto ha sido denominado irónicamente como "la nueva forma de protestar", en directa alusión a "la nueva forma de gobernar" que prometió Piñera. Influyen también en contener los efectos de la criminalización de la protesta, la existencia de garantías mínimas de un estado de derecho y un pequeño grupo de parlamentarios que aparecieron como uno de los fragmentos que la descomposición de la Concertación arrojó hacia la izquierda y que han denunciado los atropellos en que ha incurrido el gobierno.

Así las cosas, las elites, se han visto fragmentadas en su apoyo a la expansión del modelo neoliberal y los movimientos sociales han comenzado a encontrar interlocutores y aliados circunstanciales en algunos de sus agentes. La caída del consenso neoliberal descrita por Svampa (2009) para distintos países latinoamericanos ha comenzado a tocar suelo chileno.

## 5. Identidad Colectiva

Me he referido hasta acá, fundamentalmente a los aspectos más visibles o estratégicos del ciclo de movilización. Otra dimensión no menos importante, es la referida a las redes identitarias que van configurando el sustrato cultural desde el que se nutre el movimiento social ampliado.

Para ilustrar lo anterior, quiero recurrir a los sucesos acontecidos el 4 de agosto de 2011, día en que, como ya era habitual todas las semanas, las distintas organizaciones estudiantiles convocan a una jornada de movilización a nivel nacional; en la capital, la movilización partiría en Plaza Italia, para desplazarse posteriormente por la Alameda –principal avenida de la ciudad–. La Intendencia Metropolitana no autoriza dicha actividad y conjuntamente traslada cientos de efectivos policiales para obstaculizarla. De facto se impide el tránsito de vehículos y personas por dicha avenida y las calles circundantes. No fue posible marchar, debido a la gran cantidad de gases lacrimógenos, carros lanza aguas y detenidos. A las pocas horas comienza una jornada de *cacerolazos* en distintos barrios de la capital, en la que los vecinos comenzaron a hacer sonar ollas, sartenes y otros artefactos; primero, desde las casas; luego, desde las calles y finalmente, situándose en las plazas y esquinas principales de los diversos barrios, todo en apoyo al movimiento estudiantil y en rechazo a la inusitada represión policial. Las movilizaciones ya no eran solo protagonizadas por estudiantes y ecologistas, sino que también por los vecinos en sus barrios.

No creo casuales a los barrios que acompañaron dicha jornada y las posteriores, corresponden a aquellos lugares en que desde hace tiempo se reestructura el tejido social, siendo más proclives a asociaciones comunitarias y espacios de encuentro vecinales y juveniles.<sup>2</sup>

Otro antecedente importante en este sentido, lo constituyen las redes de solidaridad tejidas con posterioridad al terremoto de febrero del año 2010, muchos vecinos se reconocieron a partir de este hecho y miles de estudiantes voluntarios recorrieron el país colaborando con las comunidades afectadas, Julio Sarmiento, ex presidente de la FECH, señaló al respecto:

*En la Fech teníamos 10 mil voluntarios inscritos para ser convocados a cualquier parte. Eso significó un esfuerzo de organización y descentralización importantísimo para todos nosotros. Surgieron liderazgos locales, nos acercamos a federaciones que nunca habían sido parte de la organización estudiantil y que empezaron a entender que organizadamente se lograban objetivos y eso fue un caldo de cultivo extraordinario. (Saleh 2012)*

Son dichos espacios de convivencia cotidiana los que permiten a los activistas ampliar sus bases de apoyo, vínculos y redes. En la materialidad del territorio se encarnan los saberes de la emancipación (Porto-Gonçalves 2008), dichos espacios de socialización, permiten el surgimiento de nuevas subjetividades, que luego se harán visibles masivamente en las movilizaciones.

Estas redes, que como lo recuerda Melucci (1994), operan con momentos de latencia y visibilidad, poseen registros identitarios muy distintos a la lógica del gobierno.

Al parecer el gobierno de Sebastián Piñera no logra comprender lo que sucede. En su lógica, que las proyecciones de crecimiento oscilen entre un 4% y 6% en un escenario de crisis internacional, que las cifras de cesantía aparentemente bajen y que cuente

con una serie de indicadores que avalen la gestión del gobierno, debería redundar en apoyo ciudadano, sin embargo, las cifras parecen indicar otra cosa. En la serie de encuestas CEP sobre aprobación del gobierno, viene descendiendo el porcentaje de aprobación y aumentando la desaprobación desde el rescate de los 33 mineros, alcanzando en la encuesta de abril del año 2012, un 23% de aprobación y 61% de rechazo a la conducción presidencial, marcando con esto los niveles más adversos para un presidente desde la dictadura.

Algo no les calza y parecen no comprender que su aspiración de un Chile con altos niveles de crecimiento, a costa de la depredación social y ambiental, no le hace sentido a gran parte de la población. No es que el gobierno carezca de relato, éste, más bien, no es compartido por el Chile actual. La pérdida de referencias ocasionada por la caída del mito del desarrollo contrasta con la fuerza identitaria que genera la rearticulación del tejido social.

El otro Chile que no logran comprender, está en los barrios, calles y universidades y ahí es otra la sensación. Se comienza a percibir una oleada democrática, una valoración del proyecto colectivo; de que la respuesta la damos entre muchos o no la da nadie; que al final, no hay beneficiados si sólo se benefician unos pocos.

## 6. Conclusiones

A partir de lo señalado anteriormente sostendré algunas consecuencias teóricas y políticas:

El alineamiento de marcos cognitivos con que han operado los movimientos sociales, se ha visto retroalimentado con una serie de logros; ya sean los resultados favorables de Punta de Choros o de Magallanes, las altas convocatorias a las movilizaciones, las caídas de ministros o el recambio de los dirigentes estudiantiles manteniendo un alto nivel de apoyo, han servido para que la ciudadanía considere a la movilización social como un recurso eficaz para lograr transformaciones institucionales.

Si lo que he denominado *Marcos de posibilidad*, con su carga de motivación para la movilización, se ha encontrado –y se encuentra– efectivamente abierto; una de las tácticas del gobierno para disminuir su intensidad o cerrarlo definitivamente, ha sido y probablemente será, no negociar con los grupos movilizados. Esta táctica se probó con fuerza durante las movilizaciones del año 2012 en Aysén, se reprimió con excesiva violencia, al punto que se discutió públicamente una acusación constitucional contra el Ministro del Interior, Rodrigo Hinzpeter, y se negó toda posibilidad de negociación mientras las carreteras regionales se encontraban cerradas. Misma táctica se aplicó con anterioridad respecto de las tomas de liceos y universidades. Mientras ellas continuaran, amenazó el gobierno, las puertas de La Moneda estarían cerradas –aunque en este caso, la amenaza no llegó a cumplirse del todo–. Sin embargo, lo descrito hasta aquí opera en un nivel más explícito, la esfera implícita y por cierto, de mayor importancia, es la defensa del modelo neoliberal. Hernán Larraín, senador y ex

presidente de la UDI, señaló, a propósito del rechazo de su partido al fin del lucro en educación que:

*Nos parece que el principio es francamente peligroso, porque si se aplicara rigurosamente se debería extender a la salud y, por lo tanto, el Plan Auge se vería amenazado ya que cuando se derivan de Fonasa a clínicas privadas no podría hacerlo por este mismo concepto. (La Tercera 2012)*

Es decir, no se detiene el lucro en educación, no porque sea regresivo, como han argumentado los distintos ministros de educación del actual gobierno (la regresión es marginal debido a la desigual distribución del ingreso); sino porque al hacerlo se pone en tela de juicio los sistemas de ISAPREs y AFPs, corazón del modelo neoliberal chileno. Por tanto, para sus defensores, las expectativas y la motivación para movilizarse de los ciudadanos, deben detenerse antes que sea tarde, esto es, antes de que las movilizaciones se efectúen para cuestionar las instituciones centrales del modelo económico chileno.

Respecto a la estructura de oportunidades políticas, se puede sostener que con el gobierno de Sebastián Piñera y la consecuente fragmentación de los grupos de poder que sostienen el modelo económico chileno, ha aumentado la permeabilidad de las dimensiones que la componen, fundamentalmente en lo que respecta a la inestabilidad de las alineaciones entre la elite y la presencia de aliados en ella por parte de los movimientos sociales. En este sentido ha sido más favorable para potenciación de los movimientos sociales el gobierno de derecha que los gobiernos socialdemócratas o si se prefiere, socialcristianos, anteriores. Con respecto al grado de apertura del sistema político, será interesante observar lo que suceda con la posible modificación del sistema electoral y con las consecuencias de la inscripción automática y voto voluntario, que si bien distan mucho de formas de democracia directa, al menos, aumentan la permeabilidad del sistema en su conjunto.

Por último, creo importante enfatizar en el análisis, conjuntamente, las dimensiones estratégicas e identitarias; si sólo nos quedamos con la primera, el movimiento social tenderá a aumentar las alianzas cupulares entre los actores sociales (gremios, partidos, organizaciones) alejándose paulatinamente de su base de apoyo; por el contrario, si sólo se opera en la dimensión identitaria, se corre el riesgo de despolitizar y desmovilizar a la ciudadanía, trasladando sus aspiraciones a las esferas de lo íntimo y lo local.

A ambas dimensiones le corresponden ciertas tácticas, y ambas poseen defensores y detractores que nos recuerdan tensiones habituales en la izquierda, que en un acto de simplificación, llamaremos: sectores institucionalistas y autonomistas. Ellos se contaminan y se necesitan recíprocamente, y ninguno existe en términos puros. La potenciación de ambas dimensiones y el entendimiento de sus sectores, permitirá mayores posibilidades de éxito para las aspiraciones del Movimiento Social chileno.

## Abreviaturas

**AFP:** Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones, sistema previsional privado que administra bienes públicos.

**Alianza:** Alianza por Chile, coalición gobernante de derecha.

**CEP:** Centro de Estudios Públicos.

**Concertación:** Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, oposición, compuesta por partidos de centro y socialdemócratas.

**FECH:** Federación estudiantil de la Universidad de Chile.

**FONASA:** Fondo Nacional de Salud, sistema público.

**ISAPRE:** Institución de Salud Previsional, sistema privado.

**UDI:** Unión Demócrata Independiente, partido conservador de derecha.

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## Notas

- 1 Pinguino es la denominación que reciben los estudiantes chilenos de de los niveles básico y medio, debido al tipo de uniforme que ocupan.
- 2 Sobre organización vecinal reciente en barrios de Santiago ver "Las agrupaciones vecinales en defensa de los barrios. La construcción política desde lo local" de Eduardo Canteros (2011)

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Entre sus publicaciones recientes se encuentran:

2011. "Aportes de la noción de imaginario social para el estudio de los movimientos sociales" *Revista Polis*, Editorial de la Universidad Bolivariana, 28(10): 69-83.

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Líneas de investigación: Movimientos Sociales e Imaginarios Sociales

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## Fuegos cruzados. Sentidos en disputas y protesta en torno a un estallido social en la provincia de Buenos Aires

Evangelina Caravaca

**Resumen:** Esta ponencia se propone dar cuenta de los repertorios de sentidos producidos y reproducidos por los actores sociales en la definición de los conceptos de violencia y justicia en la ciudad argentina de Baradero a partir de un episodio de violencia colectiva contra el Estado. Para ello, nos focalizamos en las formas en que tres actores diversos conciben, y por lo tanto construyen, los términos de violencia y de justicia. Entendiendo que al desentrañar ambos conceptos es posible evidenciar ciertos aspectos del complejo universo de sentidos que organizan las relaciones sociales de este espacio social en un contexto mayor. Asimismo, hemos optado por suscribir nuestra mirada en tres actores sociales locales: familiares de víctimas, jóvenes de sectores populares y, por último, sectores medios (en particular periodistas y políticos).

**Palabras clave:** Violencias, Protesta Social, Memorias Sociales, Miedos, Espacio

### 1. Introducción. De lo global, de lo local y de las violencias en el orden hegemónico actual

Para comenzar, nos preguntamos ¿Cómo pensar los procesos de reorganización hegemónica en la región latinoamericana y su relación con las violencias de estado pos- autoritarias? P. Calveiro inicia su artículo "*Los Usos políticos de la memoria*" sosteniendo que "*Las reconfiguraciones del poder en América Latina se inscriben en una reorganización de la hegemonía mundial*" (Calveiro, 2006: 359). Ubicamos además, estas reconfiguraciones hegemónicas en un proceso socio histórico que sostenemos se inicia en nuestra región, en los años '70, en concordancia y sintonía con la instauración de dictaduras institucionales de las fuerzas armadas. Entendemos así que resulta imprescindible situar las denominadas *dictaduras latinoamericanas* en un contexto sociopolítico internacional particular, que nos

La autora recurre a una noción de hegemonía en tanto articulación entre la capacidad coercitiva y la posibilidad de establecer consensos, visiones y formas "aceptables" de ser y estar en el mundo social. De esta forma, la hegemonía influye de manera decisiva en las visiones del mundo aceptables y aceptadas por la sociedad, o al menos, por sectores de la misma (Calveiro, 2006). Siguiendo la línea de la autora, indagar en las formas de reconfiguración hegemónica en nuestra región del mundo involucra

también, pensar en las transformaciones en las percepciones y los imaginarios sociales. Y estos procesos de transformación, no son exclusiva propiedad de los centros y actores de los poderes globales, nacionales y locales, sino que también, en la sociedad en que estos se sustentan y configuran (Calveiro, 2006)<sup>1</sup>

Pensar las violencias, pensar las violencias de estado, es al fin de cuentas, acercarnos a las formas específicas que asumen éstas en correspondencia con las formas de organización del poder político, las representaciones sociales y los valores vigentes que la hacen aceptables (Calveiro, 2006)

Por otro lado, tomamos los aportes de Zygmunt Bauman, quien nos brinda elementos para pensar los profundos vínculos e interconexiones globales, nacionales y locales en los procesos de reconfiguración hegemónica. En su trabajo *"La Globalización. Consecuencias humanas"* (1999), nos invita a pensar que las nuevas polarizaciones sociales de las condiciones sociales en el orden hegemónico actual se sustentan mayoritariamente en la movilidad y en la ausencia de la misma. Bauman, en sintonía con otros sociólogos contemporáneos, nos presenta una preocupación, tanto teórica, como también política, sobre las formas del confinamiento en el orden hegemónico actual<sup>2</sup>. Sostiene que la cárcel es la forma más próxima y más drástica de restricción espacial y entiende que la separación espacial reduce, estrecha y comprime la visión del otro social (Bauman, 1999).

*"La consecuencia mas general de todo esto es la autopropulsión del miedo. La preocupación por la protección personal, inflada y recargada de significados que la desbordan debido a los afluentes de inseguridad existencial e incertidumbre psicológica, se alza sobre los miedos expresados y hunde los demás motivos de ansiedad en una sombra cada vez más profunda"* (Bauman, 1999: 154)

En relación a esta última cita de Bauman, resultan pertinentes para profundizar la mirada sobre los miedos sociales, los aportes de la antropóloga Rossana Reguillo. En su artículo *"Los miedos: sus laberintos, sus monstruos, sus conjuros. Una lectura socio antropológica"* la autora nos invita a pensar como los miedos conforman los límites territoriales, es decir, como se conforman ideas de territorios seguros o inseguros, constituyendo zonas de riesgo cero (representación que muestra el imaginario) y zonas de alto riesgo, en general, aquellas habitadas por los sectores populares. Reguillo sostiene que el miedo es un lugar para pensar la articulación entre lo individual y lo social, entre lo subjetivo y lo objetivo y entiende que los miedos son individualmente experimentados, socialmente contruidos y culturalmente compartidos (Reguillo, 2006: 51).

Ahora bien, ¿Quién/es forma/n, consolidan y dinamizan estas representaciones sobre el miedo, sobre lo que se construye como peligroso, como seguro, como deseable o indeseable en el orden hegemónico actual? Reguillo le otorga una importancia central en este orden social, pero claramente no única, a los medios de comunicación masivos, como reproductores y canalizadores de ciertas figuras asociadas al miedo

y al crimen. Pero advierte que estos medios nos trabajan en un vacío social. Por el contrario se afianzan y nutren en imaginarios sociales dinámicos, que son al mismo tiempo constitutivos y constituyentes del orden social. Entonces, podemos pensar que la trama de poderes se ve en cómo y quién define los espacios como seguros o peligrosos. Esta es la pregunta por el poder pero también es la pregunta por la trama de relaciones sociales. Entendemos así, que la pregunta por el miedo es la pregunta por el modelo socioeconómico, político y cultural, que nos hemos dado, es la pregunta por los efectos en el cuerpo individual y social de la exclusión, del desdibujamiento de las instituciones (Reguillo, 2006: 62).

Por último, Reguillo sostiene que hay dos formas en que el miedo se vincula al territorio<sup>3</sup>: por un lado lo que denomina especialización, es decir, dotar a un espacio y caracterizarlo como peligroso, circunscribir el miedo sobre un lugar. La otra forma de representar miedos en el espacio es lo que la autora denomina Antropoformización, es decir, dar al peligro una forma de ser, un cuerpo. Demonizar al otro y afirmar la propia identidad. Los miedos al otro distinto, a la contaminación construyen categorías sociales que funcionan para el control social. Estos dos puntos nos muestran la espacialización del miedo; una espacialización que genera mapas. Los miedos organizan un "mapa" que precede al territorio, un "mapa" que proyecta en el espacio los imaginarios.

En relación al control social, resultan pertinentes los aportes de G. Rodríguez Fernández (2010) cuando sostiene que en un proceso que se ha agudizado luego del 11 de septiembre de 2001, pero que se inicia bastante tiempo antes, la cotidianidad de los habitantes del mundo tiende mucho más a ser una existencia legislada, disciplinada y regulada (Rodríguez Fernández, 2010). La autora vuelve sobre una idea, que si bien es recurrente, no deja de ser central para pensar el orden actual: la introducción de las tecnologías y las comunicaciones para el control de las poblaciones ha modificado no solamente la forma en que controla, sino también los temas sobre los cuales discurre la lógica del control, los sujetos controlados y los sujetos controladores (Rodríguez Fernández 2010). La autora retoma una preocupación sociológica contemporánea cuando recurre a la noción de riesgo y su centralidad para a través de ella ejemplificar el cambio en la noción de seguridad y como este cambio produjo un fuerte impacto en la gestión de la vida cotidiana. De esta forma, la denominada gestión del riesgo aparece como la contra cara de la inseguridad. Rodríguez Fernández sostiene que *"Estar seguro ya no es un status, sino un perfil que se corresponde a una actividad: comporta a la vez que pertenecer al grupo de quienes pueden ser parte normalizada del mercado de consumo de bienes de seguridad (...) y ser un sujeto que participa de las actividades que favorecen la creación de bases de datos al servicio del control"* (Rodríguez Fernández, 2010: 43).

A partir de lo expuesto, ¿Qué queda entonces en el vasto margen de lo que este orden social consagra como inseguro? En este punto, se cruzan los aportes de Rodríguez Fernández con lo expuesto anteriormente de Reguillo: en el margen de lo inseguro, se encuentran la parte no normalizada por el mercado, son justamente aquellos que son definidos como los peligrosos, un conjunto heterogéneo de rostros y comporta-

mientos que dan forma a los que Reguillo describe como el miedo antropomorfizado. Y la inclusión de ciertos sujetos en este grupo de riesgo es dada, no a partir de una infracción y/o actitud en particular, sino por la pertenencia a ciertos grupos construidos como riesgosos creados con base en indicadores estadísticos. En un mismo sentido *"La lógica de lo controlable/perseguido se relaciona así doblemente con lo numérico: se es sujeto de riesgo si así lo dice la estadística y se es perseguido si se supera el límite de utilidad de la presencia-ausencia"* (Rodríguez Fernández, 2010: 44).

Nos permitimos pensar entonces, las políticas estatales en el marco de instancias globales, que desnudan un entramado difuso, y muchas veces no aparente, de interconexiones globales, nacionales y locales. ¿Cuál sería el rol e importancia de las policías y las fuerzas armadas en estas nuevas re organizaciones hegemónicas?

En el caso argentino en particular, contamos con innumerables registros sobre las violencias de estado, registros que se establecen en el marco del florecimiento de un conjunto de movimientos<sup>4</sup> de defensa de los derechos humanos. Muchos de estos movimientos han sido reconocidos internacionalmente y a partir de su accionar se han articulado experiencias de denuncia y demandas de justicia a nivel regional. Son justamente estos movimientos lo que han llevado adelante experiencias de lucha y resistencia que dieron lugar, aún con discrepancias internas, a un colectivo de carácter político, consolidando una identidad que genéricamente podría denominarse el movimiento de derechos humanos de Argentina (Pita, 2010). En el marco del amplio abanico de los movimientos de derechos humanos de la Argentina, las *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* se convirtieron en un emblema de este tipo de lucha. Este grupo de mujeres, en su mayoría sin actividad política previa, reclamaban por la vida de sus hijos y parientes cercanos; exigían además, por información precisa sobre su paradero, luchando por sus derechos y por el acceso a la justicia. Esta agrupación se constituyó desde finales de los años '70 en una suerte de símbolo de la lucha por los derechos humanos en la región, consolidándose en la resistencia, en el reclamo y en la protesta, enfrentando el riesgo de la cárcel, la tortura y la desaparición. Así, agrupaciones con características similares a la mencionada proliferaron y crecieron exponencialmente de manera heterogénea e inorgánica desde mediados de los años '70. *Heterogénea* por su disímil conglomerado de ideologías, aspiraciones y coagulados por un interés original; muchas veces con matices contradictorios entre los mismos intereses. *Inorgánico* pues carecen en la mayoría de los casos de formas organizativas comunes (Isla, Caravaca, 2010).

A diferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas<sup>5</sup>, las instituciones policiales no han sido objeto de transformaciones profundas en el período que se inicia con la democracia argentina. La necesidad de reformar la institución policial, con el fin de subordinarla al Estado de derecho, no fue uno de los objetivos más urgentes de los nuevos gobiernos democráticos. En tanto entendemos que *"la policía no es simplemente una institución del estado, sino siempre de un determinado estado"* (Elbert en Tedesco, 2002) deducimos que la institución policial, sería entonces, un tipo de aparato represivo funcional con el Estado-contrato social que surge en las transiciones a la democracia desde los años ochenta, ya que responde, y de una forma eficiente, al nuevo tipo de violencia

política que surge en las décadas del ochenta y noventa. De esta forma, los Estados pos-autoritarios latinoamericanos, se caracterizarían por producir un Estado-contrato social que se basa en relaciones sociales formalmente democráticas, pero en su práctica, éstas son profundamente desiguales (Tedesco, 2002). Por último y en referencia a la violencia institucional retomamos los aportes de María Pita cuando sugiere que ésta no es una desviación y/o una anomalía dentro de los patrones de desempeño democrático de las instituciones. Muy por el contrario, entendemos que en el caso argentino, el ejercicio de la violencia de Estado presenta un carácter estructural, esto es, se trata de un patrón o modalidad propia de las formas de acción y desempeño de las fuerzas de seguridad de la región. (Pita, 2010).

Nos proponemos así, pensar la policía en un carácter planetario: como centro de un modelo particular y no otro. Como organización moderna, como organización de ejercicio de un poder particular. Por su parte, W. Benjamin analiza el rol ambiguo de la policía y la relación entre violencia y derecho. Sostiene que en las democracias, la policía ilustra la mayor degeneración de la violencia.

Por otro lado, M. Taussig nos ayuda a pensar en el lugar en la violencia en la construcción sociológica del estado. Su reflexión sobre el problema de la violencia, en las tensiones de lo legítimo e ilegítimo nos permite sostener que en el estado moderno, la relación entre burocracias, violencias y estados es inescindible. Taussig nos recuerda, que el estado, aún con el riesgo de caer en la repetición, no es una unidad, y se encuentra atravesado siempre por disputas, tensiones y luchas que constituyen y dinamizan su funcionamiento.

Por último, entendemos que en este orden hegemónico actual, las violencias aparecen deslegitimando cualquier forma de protesta. Y este movimiento coadyuva al proceso de deslegitimación de cualquier forma de protesta social.

## **2. Violencias institucionales y protesta social: movilización y resistencia en la era democrática**

Es sabido que la sociología argentina ha prestado especial atención en llevar adelante empresas de investigación encargadas de analizar el variado abanico de lo que entendemos y definimos como protesta social desde las ciencias sociales. Se destaca así una basta tradición que ha analizado el surgimiento y desenvolvimiento de los movimientos obreros (Germani 1964, Murmis y Portantiero 1971), el devenir de los movimientos de mujeres (Barrancos 2007), el surgimiento y consolidación de las agrupaciones piqueteras (Iñigo Carrera 2003, Svampa y Pereyra 2003), entre otros. A su vez, en los últimos veinte años, el campo científico de la sociología ha sido testigo de un conjunto heterogéneo de trabajos que ha ahondado en el fenómeno de lo que analíticamente se define como pueblada, levantamiento o estallido. Los trabajos de A. Scribano (1999) sobre los levantamientos de Catamarca, las investigaciones de M. Farinetti (1999, 2009) a propósito del Santiagoñazo, el análisis de J. Auyero (2007) sobre los disturbios y saqueos de alimentos en 2001, la recopilación y análisis de J.

Rebón y V. Pérez (2011) sobre los estallidos y protestas de usuario de trenes urbanos son un claro ejemplo de la proliferación de esta mirada. Por su parte el sociólogo D. Merklen arroja luz en dos recientes trabajos (Merklen, 2006, 2010) cuando reflexiona sobre la quema de bibliotecas en Francia en los disturbios de 2005 y 200

Desde finales de los años ochenta y en un marco de transición y posterior consolidación democrática, se fue constituyendo un movimiento de familiares de víctimas de la violencia institucional, nucleando particularmente a las víctimas de la violencia policial. Siguiendo a S. Pereyra, son dos las características fundamentales que han acompañado el desarrollo de estas formas de protesta social en los últimos veinte años: por un lado, son los familiares de las víctimas los que motorizan las acciones de protesta y que fundamentan su reclamo en razón de su lazo de la o las víctimas. Además, estos familiares suelen liderar sus acciones de protesta sin recurrir a los actores sociales más tradicionalmente ligados a la protesta social (como los partidos políticos, organismos de derechos humanos, sindicatos entre otros). Por otro lado, las demandas y protestas se organizan en torno de reclamos de justicia cuyo principal interlocutor es el Poder Judicial (Pereyra, 2008).

Así, las muertes por brutalidad policial dieron lugar a la aparición en la arena pública de una nueva demanda de justicia, ganando popularidad bajo la denominación de "*víctimas del gatillo fácil*". (Pita, 2010). Como lo sugiere Pita, el hecho de que se trate de víctimas de violencia policial, agrega una particularidad: el estado no aparece como árbitro o mediador del proceso judicial de resolución de un conflicto entre particulares, esto es en tanto administrador de justicia, sino que es él, quien aparece como una de las partes del litigio, en tanto en los casos de violencia policial se encuentra involucrado el propio estado en figura de la agencia policial, uno de los segmentos del sistema penal. Serán entonces los familiares de estas víctimas, quienes en el marco de organizaciones de familiares y/o organizaciones de la sociedad civil, se conviertan en portavoces de una lucha que coloca al estado como responsable directo de estas muertes (Pita, 2010).

En su trabajo "Formas de morir y formas de vivir. El activismo contra la violencia policial" María Victoria Pita analiza las diferentes formas a través de las cuales los familiares de las víctimas de violencia policial se organizan para impugnar, denunciar y para demandar justicia. Particularmente, este trabajo busca dar cuenta de las formas en que, quienes devienen familiares de víctimas, han ido construyendo un campo de protesta contra la violencia policial, contra la violencia de estado y al hacerlo, han politizado estas muertes. Así, el proceso de politización de estas muertes, llevado adelante por los familiares de víctimas, es nodal en su argumento.

Su tesis central sostiene que el activismo de los familiares consiste en develar el estado de nuda vida de las víctimas a expensas del poder soberano. Poniendo en juego una batería de conceptos, herederos de la obra de Giorgio Agamben, Pita sostiene que en el caso de las víctimas del gatillo fácil no se trata de muertes de activistas políticos, de sujetos que hayan perdido la vida confrontando, resistiendo al poder soberano. Se trata de jóvenes, hombres en su mayoría, provenientes de los sectores populares,

con escasa o nula actividad política. De esta forma, se trataría de vidas no políticas, a quienes se les ha sustraído la elección de morir. Así, Pita sostiene que no sus vidas, sino sus muertes son políticas. Cómo telón de fondo de esta argumentación, resalta el concepto de *Homo Sacer*, en tanto su especificidad es la de ser un ser matable, frente a cuya muerte hay impunidad, un ser a quien cualquiera puede darle muerte pero sobre cuya vida rige la prohibición del sacrificio. En la misma dirección, Pita alega que el reclamo de los familiares se destaca por resaltar la sacralidad de la vida humana, en una búsqueda de restituir humanidad a quienes han sido muertos, desde la perspectiva de los familiares, como animales. La autora se concentra así, en los procesos de politización y en las búsquedas de sentido que los familiares construyen en torno a estas muertes, sus denuncias y sus búsquedas de justicia.

Ahora bien, ¿En qué marco suscribe la autora al tipo de protesta llevado adelante por los familiares de víctimas del gatillo fácil? Muchos autores colocan a este tipo de activismo en el mapa de protesta social heredera de la lucha por los Derechos Humanos. Si bien Pita considera que enmarcarlo en este tipo de herencia colabora en la tarea de pensar a estos grupos en relación a otros colectivos de protesta, esta delimitación no contribuye en la búsqueda de un conocimiento de los atributos propios de los grupos de familiares de víctimas del gatillo fácil. Entiende que este activismo ha generado un campo de protesta social, que si bien comparte parámetros con el movimiento de Derechos Humanos argentino, no es incorporado a éste, desplegando una identidad propia.

En los últimos veinte años, casos como lo de “La masacre de Ingeniero Budge”, el “caso Bulacio” y el “caso Schiavini” han dado visibilidad al activismo contra la violencia policial. Si bien la ocurrencia de hechos de violencia policial posee una larga historia en la Argentina, resulta relativamente reciente su estatus de cuestión socialmente problematizada. El devenir de la cuestión de la violencia policial en asunto de agencia pública es entendido como el resultado de la confluencia de organismos de Derechos Humanos y organizaciones anti-represivas, junto a importantes colectivos sociales (aquí encontramos la Comisión de Familiares de Víctimas Indefensas de la Violencia Social y el Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales entre otros).

Así, el campo de la protesta contra la violencia policial se ha ido consolidando como un movimiento con entidad propia desde principios de los años noventa, conformando un espacio de lucha contra la violencia de estado a la vez que consagra la centralidad de las figuras de los familiares como activistas.

Pita y Pereyra sostienen que la noción de familiar puede pensarse como una entidad moral, como una esfera de acción social, como un espacio ético dotado de positividad y capaz de despertar emociones, sentimientos, reacciones, y por tanto, de toda una serie de deberes, obligaciones y prohibiciones (Pita, 2010: 19). Entendemos la noción de familiar principalmente, como una categoría política. Su énfasis se ajusta a considerar las dimensiones morales puestas en juego en las diversas formas de protesta contra la violencia policial. En el mundo moral de los familiares, los muertos adquieren un valor central. De esta forma, los muertos cobran centralidad, en tanto, los relatos de sus familiares nos hablan acerca de las relaciones entre los vivos.



Las distintas actividades que involucran las protestas y el activismo de los familiares implican para éstos una compleja y manifiesta intención de re-escribir la muerte de los jóvenes y este movimiento es acompañado por una re-escritura de la vida de éstos. De esta forma, a través de la denuncia de una forma de morir, los familiares buscan restituir el estatus perdido de las vidas de víctimas del gatillo fácil. Tomando como eje las impugnaciones desplegadas sobre las formas de morir, Pita analiza los significados que los familiares asignan a la vida, a la muerte y al reclamo de justicia. En este sentido, cobran protagonismo las narrativas de los familiares en su búsqueda de re-escribir las formas de vivir, en donde se exhiben universos de valores positivos sobre las víctimas. Mundos morales sobre la amistad, la solidaridad, la lealtad y la inocencia de estos jóvenes atraviesan y dan sentido a las narrativas de los familiares.

### **3. Una ciudad, una plaza: tres postales**

Para poner en juego algunas de las categorías volcadas en la parte inicial de la ponencia, hemos decidido reponer sucintamente tres relatos etnográficos, tres postales, sobre las protestas sociales y tensiones a partir de un estallido social en la ciudad argentina de Baradero<sup>6</sup>. Adentrándonos además, en los terrenos de debate que movilizaron estas acciones.

¿Por qué elegimos esta ciudad? Los hechos acontecidos y observados en la ciudad en cuestión, nos permiten ver un panorama complejo del heterogéneo repertorio de acción en el espacio urbano. Asimismo, el caso en cuestión engloba un conjunto diverso de acciones directas e indirectas sobre el espacio: Estallidos, marchas, peregrinaciones, grafiti entre otros.

### **4. La plaza de los fuegos: 21 de marzo de 2010**

El domingo 21 de marzo de 2010 la ciudad de Santiago de Baradero amanece en un escenario inusual: un grupo no menor a tres mil manifestantes, reunidos en la plaza central de la ciudad (Plaza Mitre), se encuentra quemando el Palacio Municipal, el registro civil de la ciudad, oficinas pertenecientes a la Obra Social IOMA y por último, atacando el edificio de la Radio FM Baradero. La envergadura de los destrozos es tal que la situación es catalogada de desastre. La pérdida de documentos históricos, oficiales y particulares de la administración municipal es casi total. Unas pocas horas después, el fuego sería controlado por los bomberos locales, quienes en un principio serían impedidos de llegar a la zona. Ahora bien, ¿Cuáles serían los desencadenantes de una acción inédita y compleja en esta ciudad que no contempla en toda su historia un hecho de esta magnitud?



\* Esta fotografía fue tomada en la jornada del 21 de marzo de 2010 por un fotógrafo local. En la misma podemos ver a representantes de la administración de gobierno local frente al Palacio Municipal, el cual ya se encontraba prácticamente destruido.

Sólo pocas horas antes de las acciones de violencia, tenía lugar un hecho que involucra directamente a dos empleados municipales. Los jóvenes Miguel Portugal y Giuliana Giménez, ambos de dieciséis años, se dirigían en moto por el centro de la ciudad. Ninguno de ellos usaba casco. Según testigos, los jóvenes advierten que la camioneta municipal de Control de Tránsito se dirige hacia ellos. Pocos minutos después se provoca el accidente en donde mueren, casi en el acto, los dos jóvenes.

En la plaza, sede inequívoca de las salidas nocturnas de los jóvenes de la ciudad, testigos aseguran que la camioneta municipal se encontraba realizando una persecución a Miguel Portugal y Giuliana Giménez. Así, nuestros entrevistados mencionan el humo que se extendía por cuadras, transformando radicalmente la fisonomía local. Un entrevistado lo describe una "Una gran nube que se había apoderado de la ciudad", mientras el fuego del edificio municipal es descrito como incontrolable. Un concejal local se posiciona frente al edificio municipal y pide a los presentes que paren los destrozos. La imagen, que recorrerá los medios locales y nacionales, es contundente: el concejal recibe una piedra en la cabeza y se retira.

## 5. Primer aniversario: la plaza de las marchas y las memorias sociales

El primer aniversario de la muerte de Miguel Portugal y Giuliana Giménez, familiares y amigos organizaron un acto que contemplaba una marcha por los últimos lugares que habían transitado los jóvenes. Desde la terminal de ómnibus local, llegando hasta la plaza central (Plaza Colón) se podían ver carteles con fotos de los jóvenes y la siguiente leyenda: "Ya un año y sus asesinos siguen sueltos. No se olviden de nosotros Baradero. Danos Paz. Danos justicia. El Portu y Giuliana". Frente al edificio municipal, se encontraba un pasacalle que contiene la siguiente leyenda: "Porque la memoria también es justicia". El acto buscaba, según palabras de las madres, recordar a los jóvenes y reclamar justicia. Remeras con las fotos de los jóvenes y banderas con alusión a su muerte comenzaron a llegar en manos de compañeros y amigos, mayoritariamente de la Escuela Industrial. También participaron familiares y amigos de Lucas Rótel, asesinado por un policía local en febrero 2011.



\*Esta fotografía fue tomada por un fotógrafo del portal [www.radioe99.com](http://www.radioe99.com) en la marcha del 21 de marzo de 2011 al cumplirse un año de la muerte de los jóvenes.

Con una concurrencia no mayor a las quinientas personas y mayoritariamente adolescente, comenzó la marcha desde la Plaza Mitre. Se recorrieron en silencio unas doce cuadras, pasando por el lugar del accidente. El edificio municipal se encontraba cerrado y custodiado por policías locales. Un aplauso cerrado dio lugar al grito de un joven que se encontraba sosteniendo una bandera: "¡Miguel, Giuliana y Lucas, Presente!". Seguidamente un nuevo aplauso. La marcha toma nuevamente su destino hacia la plaza Mitre. Momentos previos a que comenzara la marcha, pregunté a Margarita (madre de Miguel Portugal) cuáles eran sus expectativas con la marcha y el acto que habían organizado, Margarita dice:

*“Queremos demostrar lo que somos, lo que eran nuestros chicos. Es un día de dolor, pero es también de memoria. Queremos mirar a la cara al Municipio, tenemos al frente en alto, ellos son los responsables y andan sueltos”* (Margarita, 21/3/2010 notas de campo)

La noción de mirar a la cara al municipio, al Estado, con la frente en alto y reconociendo en él el culpable de la muerte de sus hijos es central para los padres. Resalta el uso político de la memoria en el discurso de Margarita: memoria como ejercicio político y como herramienta de lucha. Grafiti escritos en las bocacalles hacen alusión a este tópico: *“La memoria vence la impunidad”* 3.

Al llegar a la Plaza Colón, en el pequeño anfiteatro de la misma, los padres de los jóvenes dicen unas pocas palabras. Sin un tono político determinado explícitamente, los cuatro padres agradecen la concurrencia, y piden justicia. La segunda parte del acto contempla la proyección de un video realizado por cuatro amigos cercanos a los jóvenes. El video proyectado es resultado de un concurso del Ministerio de Educación Provincial, cuya consigna hace alusión a la *“Represión y autoritarismo en la Argentina reciente”*. Este concurso es convertido en una oportunidad para construir un relato con su versión de los hechos. El video comienza con fotos de los jóvenes desde su niñez. Las narradoras, Amalia y Belén, ambas de 17 años, describen los acontecimientos previos a la muerte de los jóvenes. Se narra la última salida y se describe la vida de los jóvenes despolitizadamente. Al momento de describir los acontecimientos del 21 de marzo, mencionan:

*“Mientras familiares y amigos de los chicos estábamos en el hospital, se cometieron en la ciudad destrozos injustificados, oportunistas que de ninguna manera debían ocurrir”*

La fuerte condena a los hechos de violencia, que aparece explícito en el video, es confirmado por una docente que es entrevistada para el video. Allí, la docente condena enfáticamente el uso de la violencia como recurso de protesta y menos aún como noción de justicia. La politización del discurso montado en el video va creciendo a medida que transcurren los minutos. Si bien se narra a los jóvenes como seres apolíticos, en la plenitud de su vida, su muerte es politizada. Belén lee una carta enviada al Consejo Deliberante local, en el cual responsabilizan a las autoridades municipales por la muerte de los jóvenes, a la vez que exigen la renuncia del intendente. Llegando al final del video y en referencia al concurso que dió origen al mismo, se lee la siguiente leyenda:

*“Cómo en la dictadura, se perseguía y mataba a jóvenes por pensar, hoy en Baradero sufrimos lo mismo. Exigimos justicia. Justicia Baradero”.*

Esta fuerte noción de continuidad autoritaria plasmada en una suerte de analogía con los crímenes cometidos por el Estado argentino en última dictadura militar, toman protagonismo finalizando el video. Estas apreciaciones son reafirmadas por los jóvenes a través de una carta que es leída por Amalia en el acto:

*"La corrupción y la especulación se apoderaron de nuestras calles, Baradero es hoy la continuidad de la etapa represiva. Soportamos el favoritismo, la desigualdad y la decadencia de los Derechos Humanos, en su gestión, señor intendente, fomentó el abuso y el descontrol a través de quienes deberían haber desempeñado una función netamente preventiva. Hoy, los jóvenes de Baradero nos preguntamos si son tan fuertes los intereses políticos, en qué escala de valores se coloca la vida. Por qué el municipio no se pone a disposición del dolor de las familias de Giuliana y Miguel y si buscó su propia protección. ¿Es necesario que la ciudad pida justicia?, no queremos vivir en una ciudad tirana, basta de muertes, el silencio también es complicidad.*

*La comunidad está de luto, mientras los involucrados en el caso se lavan las manos manchadas y si no es así ¿Por qué se generaron tantas dudas? ¿Por qué ocupan otros cargos en el municipio y hoy, a un año de la pérdida de Giuliana y Miguel, no tenemos una respuesta? Nosotros no tenemos experiencia, no tenemos edad para tomar decisiones, pero tenemos memoria y somos todo un pueblo que no va a dejar de reclamar justicia hasta que el último de los amigos de Giuliana y Miguel dejemos de existir. Pudieron callar sus voces hasta dejarlos sin vida, pero el amor que ellos sembraron seguirá latente para impulsarnos en esta cruzada de justicia. Justicia Baradero."* (Amalia, 17 años)

El testimonio de la carta resalta por su posicionamiento político: nuevamente ubican la muerte de los jóvenes como un ejemplo de lo que enuncian como continuidad autoritaria a la vez que describe una decadencia de los Derechos Humanos. Al igual que las madres, pero desde una lectura profundamente más politizada, la memoria<sup>7</sup> aparece como herramienta de lucha, la memoria como estrategia para vencer la impunidad. Por último, se hace explícita una lectura del abuso de autoridad, sosteniendo además que el municipio actúa impidiendo el accionar de la justicia.

Así, en ocasión del primer aniversario de la muerte de los dos jóvenes, familiares y amigos llevaron adelante una serie de actividades que contemplaban marchas por la ciudad, lectura de cartas y proyección de videos. Estas actividades además, fueron acompañadas por pintadas y panfletos en gran parte de la ciudad. Pudimos así, observar un tipo de apropiación y toma del espacio público que puso en juego un factor central: el recorrido de la marcha del primer aniversario supuso un paso por todos los lugares que familiares y amigos consideraban bien *escena del crimen* o aquellos espacios que representan al poder local. Este recorrido además, ponía de manifiesto, al menos para el observador externo, que lugar específico del espacio social era elegido para tomar la palabra.

Si bien la primera parte de la manifestación toma lugar en la plaza central frente al Palacio Municipal, este fue concebido como un lugar de marcha, y porque no, de peregrinación. Se recorrieron las calles centrales en silencio, ante la mirada curiosa de vecinos y comerciantes. El paso frente al Palacio Municipal conllevó un aplauso y algunos cánticos. Luego la marcha continuó su rumbo hacia la plaza Colón, que si bien se encuentra a escasas cinco cuadras del Palacio Municipal, es entendida y vivida

como un *espacio de la gente*, un espacio de expresión.

## 6. La plaza del segundo aniversario: entre la peregrinación y el silencio

Las actividades llevadas a cabo por familiares y amigos en el segundo aniversario de la muerte de los jóvenes nos permiten presenciar y analizar nuevas aristas en el caso elegido.

La mañana del 21 de marzo de 2012 es elegida para realizar un homenaje, con atributos y características claramente diferentes al año anterior. Los padres de los dos jóvenes optan por realizar una misa en el lugar exacto en el que fallecen sus hijos, y deciden que la misma se lleve a cabo por la mañana. A diferencia del año anterior, en el segundo aniversario los jóvenes no toman la palabra y es retomado un discurso que se refuerza en el *imaginario política como corrupción y fines impuros*. Cabe aclarar que este desgano hacia la política y hacia ciertas formas de militancia se inscribe en el discurso de los padres en el cansancio y rechazo a lo que ellos denominan *utilización de la muerte de sus hijos* en ciertas actividades políticas.



\*Esta fotografía fue tomada el 21 de marzo de 2012 por un fotógrafo del portal [www.baderoteinforma.com.ar](http://www.baderoteinforma.com.ar). En la misma podemos observar al grupo de familiares y amigos reunidos junto al sacerdote en el momento de la misa en homenaje a los jóvenes.

Resulta notable además la elección del ritual religioso como conmemoración y el explícito rechazo a las formas de manifestación desplegadas el año anterior. Rechazo que es justificado por la negación de los padres a la *utilización de estas muertes* en el arco político.

En este punto, resulta útil analizar la elaboración que un periodista local Darío J. F. vuelca en la nota titulada *"21 de marzo: día por la memoria, la verdad y la justicia"*<sup>8</sup>. En un movimiento análogo al que llevan adelante los jóvenes firmantes de la carta que fuera leída en el primer aniversario (2011) el autor de la nota ilustra aspectos centrales de la última dictadura militar argentina. Seguidamente menciona la muerte de los jóvenes, las *confusas* y *desordenadas* horas que rodean la muerte de los jóvenes. Y finalmente anuncia:

*"Yo propongo que Baradero tenga su propio día de la memoria, la verdad y la justicia, y que sea el 21 de marzo"* (Darío J. F., 2012)

Al retomar en su nota los tres elementos aglutinantes que definen (Memoria, verdad y justicia) a la lucha de los movimientos de defensa de Derechos Humanos en relación a los crímenes de la última dictadura militar, el autor suscribe estas muertes en el marco de las violencias de Estado desplegando al mismo tiempo otro movimiento: posiciona su explicación y demanda de justicia en el marco del amplio y dinámico espacio de las memorias sociales. Nuevamente, las memorias, sus evocaciones movilizan y suscriben al mismo tiempo, un conjunto de tensiones, que exceden claramente los límites de la jornada del 21 de marzo de 2010. Por otro lado, y acercándonos, al menos parcialmente, a la recepción de dicho artículo, resulta interesante la cantidad de comentarios volcados en el mismo. Encontramos por una parte, comentarios que abonan la visión del autor, suscribiendo la mirada en la lógica de las memorias sociales y en el reclamo de justicia.

*"Muy buena nota de un triste y lamentable suceso. Todo aún continúa impune, desgraciadamente. Memoria, verdad, justicia y nunca más"* (Alberto)

Ahora bien, esta visión moviliza tensiones *en y de* la ciudad. Como hemos visto en referencia a los debates y espacios que ciertos actores que entendemos desde aquí componen esta suerte de voz autorizada han integrado, llama nuestra atención como nuevamente se activan las tensiones y disputas en torno a los hechos de violencia de la jornada del 21 de marzo de 2010:

*"Las personas que destruyeron la municipalidad son delincuentes!!! No tienen respeto por nada"* (Anónimo)

*"Hoy el tiempo le tapa la boca a muchos oportunistas que usaron la muerte de Miguel y Giuliana con fines políticos. Pueblada? Espontánea? Qué alguien me diga de donde salió espontáneamente tanto combustible para prender fuego la municipalidad?"* (Mario)

El artículo logra movilizar, a través de las lecturas, comentarios e intercambios de usuarios, una parte sustancial de las representaciones sociales sobre las violencias, poniendo nuevamente en escena un complejo mapa de tensiones sociales. En este punto, resulta provechoso para el análisis el intercambio que un grupo de usuarios realiza a partir de la nota *"Dolor y pedido de justicia al cumplirse dos años de la muerte de Giuliana y Miguel"*. Un usuario comenta:

*“Toda la culpa es de los demás. Nadie hace una autocrítica de que los chicos iban sin casco y alcoholizados?” (Oscar)*

*“es una lástima por eso siempre hay que cuidar a los hijos siempre no cuando no están” (Dani)*

Para un observador de las ciencias sociales es posible encontrar en los breves fragmentos seleccionados una importante cantidad de preguntas o inquietudes posibles, pero elegimos destacar al menos dos aspectos, que entendemos son centrales para nuestras preguntas. Por un lado, resulta interesante el traslado de responsabilidad hacia los jóvenes y en este movimiento, la responsabilidad de sus propias muertes. Las elecciones de estos jóvenes (conducir sin casco y beber alcohol) jugarían así un rol explicativo y decisivo para la jornada. En oposición a la despolitizada imagen llevada adelante por familiares y amigos, estos fragmentos movilizan representaciones sobre estos jóvenes, que los sitúa por un lado como irresponsables en sus actitudes y por otro, como artífices en el desenlace.

Por último, el último comentario citado remite directamente a la autoridad adulta, o en tal caso, a la falta de ella. El extenso intercambio de comentarios surgidos a partir de la lectura de la nota tomaba como uno de los ejes centrales esta problemática: el rol de los padres y la ausencia de educación como explicación nodal. Los repertorios morales sobre las formas de ser y estar en familia se movilizan en este punto, y no sólo se impugna una ausencia o un permiso familiar (en este caso el propio uso de la motocicleta) sino que se profundiza y lo que se cuestiona es la propia forma familiar, y en este caso particular, una forma familiar y relacional de los sectores populares.

## 7. Conclusiones

En esta ponencia nos propusimos pensar como las protestas sociales toman lugar en determinados lugares/*nichos* del espacio social (particularmente en el caso de estudio elegido tomando como blanco edificios y espacios tradicionalmente vinculados a los sectores dominantes locales) y al territorializarse éstas ponen en escena la lucha por el propio espacio social, el cuál se encuentra atravesado por disputas sociales y es por lo tanto, objeto de tensiones, luchas y resistencias.

Por su parte, los aportes del sociólogo D. Merklen (Merklen, 2006, 2010) nos permiten pensar, desde su análisis sobre la quema de bibliotecas en Francia en los disturbios de 2005 y 2007, en las profundas implicancias de las violencias y su relación con las protestas sociales. En sus trabajos, Merklen apuesta a generar una lectura política de estas violencias, resituando así los episodios de estallidos y revueltas en una economía de intercambios conflictivos y cotidianos. En sintonía con el autor, buscamos resituar un acontecimiento espectacular en un contexto de más larga duración, dentro de un marco conflictivo menos excepcional (Merklen, 2010) para de esta forma *“inscribir esa violencia en el marco de una racionalidad que nos permita aprehender las producciones de sentido que acompañan esos actos”* (Merklen, 2010:58). Así, elegimos



pensar las violencias de la sociedad civil, sus expresiones, repercusiones y tensiones, en tanto relacionales y en el marco de economías de intercambios conflictivos y cotidianos. Finalmente, sostenemos que una reflexión sobre los episodios de violencia colectiva contra espacios y figuras de autoridad estatal no deberían prescindir del análisis de las tensiones entre las formas legítimas e ilegítimas que adoptan las violencias junto al relato social acerca de su efectividad - ineficacia como práctica de protesta (Pérez y Rebón, 2011)

El caso elegido propone una serie de aristas que lo tornan novedoso para el análisis: Por un lado, pone en escena las disputas morales frente a lo que se entiende como abuso institucional, pero también nos permite analizar las profundas tensiones que movilizan las protestas con uso de violencia. Nuestra etnografía ha recogido una diversidad de voces locales, jóvenes de los sectores populares, familiares de víctimas y sectores medios (particularmente periodistas y políticos locales), quienes han desplegado, desde diversas actividades, un diálogo tenso en la categorización y definición de la jornada en cuestión y de sus implicancias morales. Así, entendemos que los conceptos de violencia y justicia, en tanto términos morales, son espacios de negociación y renegociación permanente. Por otro lado, un posterior caso de *gatillo fácil* en la ciudad despierta, a la vez que complejiza, las tensiones mencionadas previamente. Así las disputas en torno a la delimitación moral de una muerte justa o injusta ó una forma de protesta ilegal pero efectiva, son nuevamente movilizadas. Asimismo, el caso elegido nos permite analizar un aspecto novedoso para el enfoque, en tanto brinda elementos para pensar las formas en que se espacializan las problemáticas sociales. Si entendemos que el espacio público es un campo de disputas, podemos pensar a las marchas, peregrinaciones y acciones violentas directas también como formas de apropiación del espacio público. Así, la configuración de los límites espaciales y los propios usos del espacio público desnudan las disputas por las visiones legítimas e ilegítimas del espacio y los usos *permitidos o prohibidos* del mismo. Por último, resalta en el caso elegido la importancia analítica de las memorias sociales, en tanto éstas son entendidas por ciertos actores sociales como fuentes legitimadoras de la lucha social.

Tratamos en última instancia, de correr nos de la pregunta que indaga en la génesis del porqué de los hechos de violencia, para sumergirnos en el mapa de tensiones y sentidos que de diversas formas *explota, estalla e irrumpe* en el escenario social de las protestas en cuestión.

## **Anexo metodológico**

En tanto nos interesa captar la perspectiva de los actores sobre los temas a estudiar, el abordaje que se lleva adelante en nuestra investigación es principalmente cualitativo. Nos proponemos estudiar una compleja red de relaciones en una población específica, por tal motivo consideramos importante llevar adelante metodologías que permitan comprender en profundidad las interpretaciones que los actores hacen sobre los hechos que transcurren en el lugar. Desde marzo de 2010 se han realizado un total de treinta entrevistas en profundidad, situaciones conversacionales, observacio-

nes participantes (en marchas, peregrinaciones, espacios de debate y programas de radio) y se llevó adelante el fichado de fuentes secundarias (se han sistematizado las notas periodísticas de los dos principales diarios locales en relación a nuestra problemática entre las fechas de 21/03/2010 y 22/03/2012).

Se ha realizado hasta el momento un total de tres meses de trabajo de campo. Actualmente se está llevando a cabo la última etapa del trabajo de campo que consiste, principalmente, en la realización de entrevistas en profundidad (pero también en la observación participante) a actores locales. Las entrevistas son realizadas de acuerdo a una guía de pautas. En tanto nuestros universos de análisis e indagación se encuentran ya definidos, se trabaja con informantes conocidos.

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## Notas

- 1 Pensar las hegemonías y sus reconfiguraciones nos conducen a los aportes de A. Gramsci quien albergó entre sus mayores inquietudes la pregunta sobre la hegemonía y el estado moderno. Partiendo del concepto de "bloque histórico", en el cual se relacionan dialécticamente estructura y superestructura, momentos sólo separables analíticamente, A. Gramsci distingue a la sociedad política (aparato de Estado para el marxismo clásico; en Gramsci, sucesivamente dominio directo y gobierno jurídico, coerción económica y jurídica) de la sociedad civil (dirección intelectual y moral de la sociedad, contenido ético de la sociedad política) en el marco de la superestructura. En este sentido es posible entender al estado como totalidad orgánica de dos momentos a veces contradictorios (dictadura y hegemonía, dominación y dirección). Así, estado es para A. Gramsci todo el complejo de actividades prácticas y teóricas con las cuales la clase dirigente no sólo justifica y mantiene su dominio sino también logra obtener el consenso activo de los gobernados, es decir, estado como hegemonía, como dirección política, como ordenamiento moral e intelectual.
- 2 En una misma línea, Bauman sostiene que nueva estructura mundial de poder actúa merced a las oposiciones entre movilidad y sedentariedad, contingencia y rutina, rareza y densidad de restricciones. De esta forma, la ligereza y la volatilidad han remplazado a la presencia pesada y ominosa como principal medio de dominación. Así y en virtud de las nuevas técnicas de desconexión, no-compromiso, evasión y escapatoria a disposición de las elites, se puede ejercer efectivos métodos de control en los sectores subalternos. Entendemos así que la precariedad es en este orden un elemento esencial de la jerarquía mundial del poder y una de las principales técnicas de control social.
- 3 Aquí la autora hace referencia a por un lado los territorios asociados a la falta de valores convencionales: zonas rojas, lugares donde se vende la droga. Espacios que articulan asco y tentación. Y por otro lado menciona el miedo a los espacios asociados a la pobreza, a los

inmigrantes, a los indígenas como expresión del pasado, del fracaso de la modernidad.

- 4 Entre estos movimientos de defensa de los Derechos Humanos se destacan los aportes de Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, la agrupación de H.I.J.O.S, la agrupación de Familiares de desaparecidos y detenidos por razones políticas y la Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos entre otros.
- 5 Por otro lado, en el caso argentino, la relación entre la sociedad civil y las Fuerzas Armadas se ha desarrollado históricamente de manera compleja y conflictiva (Mancini, 2004). Consideramos que son las relaciones entre civiles y militares, una de las primeras reconfiguraciones que atraviesa la incipiente democracia argentina, transformando no solo rol de las Fuerzas Armadas, sino el vínculo de estas con el sociedad civil. (Tedesco, 2002) El retorno de la democracia en 1983, significó, entre otras cosas, un cuestionamiento de buena parte de la sociedad civil sobre los años de última dictadura militar. En 1985 toma lugar el denominado Juicio a las Juntas, en el cual se condena a las cúpulas militares que habían tomado el poder y comandado los actos de terrorismo de estado. En 1986 se sanciona la ley de punto final que establecía un límite para la presentación de denuncias por violación de derechos humanos ocurridas durante el gobierno de facto (Mancini, 2004).
- 6 La ciudad de Santiago de Baradero, ubicada en la provincia de Buenos Aires en la costa del río Paraná, fue fundada en 1615, convirtiéndose en la ciudad más antigua de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Se encuentra rodeada por los municipios de San Pedro, Zarate y San Antonio de Areco. Posee una población estimada de 31.000 habitantes. El municipio contempla grandes extensiones de tierra productiva, lo que la convierte en un enclave agro-pecuario importante de la zona. Además, es sede de importantes refinerías industriales de alimentos. Asimismo, entre la ciudad de Baradero y el Municipio de Campana, se encuentra un extenso cordón industrial, que contempla la producción automotriz y alimenticia entre otros. El Dr. Aldo Carossi, perteneciente al Frente Para la Victoria, preside la administración municipal de la ciudad desde 2005. Su familia se encuentra tradicionalmente ligada a la administración de gobierno local, habiendo sido su padre, Pedro Carrossi, intendente de la ciudad en varias oportunidades.
- 7 En tanto en la Argentina, la problemática de la memoria social emergió con fuerza en estrecha relación con la enorme cantidad de crímenes cometidos en la última dictadura militar y que golpearon la conciencia colectiva, llamando a algún tipo de acción o reparación por parte de la sociedad. En la incipiente democracia argentina se fue conformando un núcleo propiamente formador del pasado reciente: aquí ubicamos el Nunca Más junto a las repercusiones del Juicio a las Juntas. (Vezzetti, 2009). Entiendo así que las memorias son fundamentales para la formación de la identidad de cualquier pueblo, nación, Estado; el trabajo de la memoria fabrica las identidades sociales, enunciando tanto lazos de pertenencia como relaciones de diferenciación. De esta forma, entendemos las memorias en su carácter social y colectivo (Catela, 2008). Concibiendo que los procesos de construcción de memorias son siempre abiertos y nunca acabados, así el pasado cobra sentido en un enlace con el presente en el acto de recordar-olvidar. Esto ubica directamente el sentido del pasado en un presente particular y en función de un futuro deseado. (Jelin, 2007) Continuando con el planteo de Jelin, se torna necesario abordar los procesos ligados a las memorias en escenarios políticos de disputas. Siguiendo esta línea, Traverso sostiene que “la memoria se declina siempre en presente y éste determina sus modalidades: la selección de acontecimientos que el recuerdo debe guardar, su lectura, sus lecciones”. (Traverso: 2007: 71)
- 8 Dicha nota se encuentra publicada en el diario online [www.baraderoteinforma.com.ar](http://www.baraderoteinforma.com.ar)

## **Índice de temas**

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## Injustice and Exclusion Revealed through Photos (1898-1908)<sup>1</sup>

Rosa Cláudia Cerqueira Pereira and Rosane de Oliveira Martins  
Maia

**Abstract:** The theme of injustice and exclusion represented through photographs proposes an analysis that was based on visual documents that served as propaganda of the government in the last decade of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The photograph, which reveals, among other aspects of the city, people left out the long process of modernization, which made the day labor the ticket in the modern world. Therefore, shoe shiners, street vendors, porters, workers stole stowages not posing for composing scenarios that have shaped and composed the instruments of propaganda and dissemination of the “beautiful era” in the state capital. The visual language allows us to show how individuals were represented in urban settings, giving visibility to social types that were subtly caught by cameras at the service of government propaganda that aimed to promote a modern city, showing the intensity and speed with he wanted to achieve modernity, notice the record of another city that reminds us of the living spaces of different realities. The contribution of this study is anchored in the use of photography as the primary document analysis, understanding that photography is a witness who “speaks” of the past.

**Keywords:** Century XIX e XX, Excluded, Photos, Representation

### 1. Introduction

The photograph, the fruit of the nineteenth century was a means of communication and information that pointed and accompanied the urban transformations caused by the modernization of Brazil’s major cities. The photographs reveal the intensity and speed of how it happened. The icons of modernity, introduced with the dynamism of the rubber in the Amazon region from the second half of the nineteenth century, become visible in the photographs through the records of the towering buildings and a wooded area with its green areas parallel to the streets or avenues, which graced the public roads, public buildings and private, the public parks and urban facilities.

The production of the visual image of Belem published between the years 1898 to 1908 presented with features that highlighted the process of modernization of the city according to the notions of progress at the time. The small image of the city print and broadcast mainly through the postcards and albums propaganda of governments can have multiple cities and suggest different spaces and times.

The photographer found himself surrounded by aspects of society which he belonged,

to produce the currently visible in this photographic representation, because the city is "seen", recorded and immortalized by the eye of the photographer at that time. So the reality printed on the photograph is questionable, in that, according to Boris Kossoy (1999:41-42), the "process of building the representation" involves diverse elements and possessing their own stories. The author also claims that the photographic productions are designed according to the purpose built and materialized with the particular vision of the world Photographer.

For this paper, we address the question of injustice and social exclusion through the photographs produced mainly in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The photograph as document, itself preserves a memory of scenes, characters and events of the past life. Whereas at the same time that certain photographs betray an aspect of the city organized show other people that represented part of the "window" of the city. The city of Belem was a privileged place in the exposure of social types in which the photographers through their subjectivity, recorded, leaving evidence of a city which moved under the "chords" of the modernization of urban spaces.

In this context, the city, from the productions of the photographers, was displayed through postcards, albums, magazines, newspapers, where the starting points is the landscape and its figuration, and then highlight the ways in which people were portrayed. It is understood that these people do not occupy urban space in the same way, since this constitutes a symbolic representation of power relations. Streets, squares, markets, theaters are arranged in different ways and usually hierarchical.

## **2. The Representation of the City through Photographs**

At the time of renewal of urban space modernizing the administration of Antonio Lemos, the publication of an album in 1902 and seven Municipal Reports, in which all the works of the present mayor Antonio Lemos, between 1897 and 1908. The reports represent a valuable source of information about that period, addressing issues relating to the city, including sanitation, transport, health, education, leisure, buildings, among others.

The main topics addressed in these reports were concerned to display the achievements of municipal management, recording the major changes related to aspects of urban improvements, such as reforms of public administration buildings, educational institutions and commercial establishments, parks, avenues and streets, in short, everything that represented the idea of the modern city, urban and orderly.

The increasing production of records and reports, which had as its theme the discussions about the city, possible to construct a visual model in accordance with the interests of the rulers. This model, by means of photographic representation, praised the political, economic, social and cultural rights, in other words, the performance of administrators, business activities, products offered and the social groups present in the area of leisure, it is possible from the photo, build a favorite image to be displayed. In this context,

*"(...) the photograph, while recording an impressive urban landscape, architectural and social processes of mutation, we see used by the media printed at the time, and the extent to which these images reflect the aspirations of modernity that elite. There, in those early years of the new scheme, an imperative need of exaltation of the symbolic content of order and progress" (KOSSOY, 1993:18)<sup>2</sup>.*

It can be seen that, while the actors of the Republic wanted to promote the spirit of "order", it was necessary to propagate the image of a new mentality that formed in relation to "progress", reflected through the urban reforms. The photograph, with different purposes - commercial, political, institutional, among others - accounted between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century's, one of the mechanisms of dissemination through the albums of the city, postcards, press, especially, illustrated magazines of the time.

Photographers and Studios in Belem, chose scenes of various kinds of images that represented the city every day. Among the photographers who, in one way or another, were part of the visual production highlighted by the names that appear in photographs located in the municipal reports<sup>3</sup>, such as: Felipe Augusto Fidanza<sup>4</sup>, José A. Girard<sup>5</sup>, Antonio Oliveira<sup>6</sup>, Bastos<sup>7</sup>, Julio Augusto Siza<sup>8</sup>, B. Max Burkhardt<sup>9</sup> e George Huebner & Amaral<sup>10</sup>.

In relation to photographs taken on the urban landscape, it was a service and propagation of a product whose initiative depended exclusively on the photographer, since the choice of setting up the composition of the details that embellish the picture. Thus, images of a city that surrounds us and fascinates content transmitted urban social, cultural and architectural.

### **3. The Representation of Social Actors in the Scenario of Photographs**

Most of the photographs call attention to scenes that depict the daily life. Passers-in markets, squares and avenues in are usually people belonging to lower classes, although there are photographs that totally excluded the presence of human or sometimes appear as details in the foreground of the photograph. In this sense, the photographs produced by Fidanza, Girard, Siza, among others, allow us to claim that the photographer was aware of human presence, even when it appears as a mere detail of the scenario. The landscapes, frozen by the subjectivity of photographers, children, women, men in their work uniforms, teamsters, and other social groups occupy the foreground of photos with the attributes that is lost on the comparative analysis of working conditions and costumes of people who appear in the documents.

In landscapes, selected by the photographers, have children in the labor market, such as shoeshine boys, coachmen, hawkers and other social groups occupy the foreground of photos, as well as the elite of rubber, in an allusion to equal the long awaited Republic; attribute that is lost on the comparative analysis of working conditions and



costumes of the subjects highlighted. The individual economic humble origin has not been placed outside the photographic records. Such individuals, urban workers and vendors, are influenced by romanticism and realism that later exercised a preponderant role for the establishment of street photography, which shall be constituted in the window of all these types of individuals that travel in the city.



**Figure 1.** Felipe Fidanza, *Rua de Belém*. (12,0 x 16,5 cm). *Album do Pará em 1899*, p 114. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR.

The photo "Street Belem" (Figure 1), among others, records one of many city streets, in which photographers have directed the focus to the streetcar tracks, highlighting social types that circulated daily in these spaces. In the analysis of documentary photographic body, it becomes clear how social groups have become the theme of professionals that have circulated in Belem of "belle époque". The images, chosen here depict aspects of the city and are part of a project that aimed to select scenes of modernity, to be displayed by the instruments of propaganda between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century's.

Accordingly, through the pictures you can examine what are the styles and attitudes of photographers when they select the scenes that made up the surface of photo paper. All the actors reveal visually documented forms of social exclusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The vast majority of documentation is the use of different spaces and their environment are distinguished visually different ways people present themselves in front of the lens of photographers.

This scenario, like others, was part of the records and reports used as instruments of dissemination and propaganda of Belem. The selected area of photography by photographers did witness<sup>11</sup> way of seeing and thinking about the city, showing the daily practices of those who were part of the urban scene. In this sense, the photographs of Philip Fidanza, among others, reveal the existence of social subjects that were excluded from adjusting to modernity, becoming characters in the main streets of the city of Belem. Fidanza was one of the professionals who gave more visibility the social types subtly caught by cameras at the service of government propaganda intended to promote a modern city.



**Figure 2.** Felipe Fidanza, *Republic Square - taken from the east* (14,0 x 20,5 cm). *Álbum de Belém*. 15 de novembro de 1902. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR

In the photograph "Republic Square - taken from the east" (Figure 2), the Teatro da Paz appears only as one of the details of the scenario of the square. In the foreground, a group of people who frequented the plaza and who, voluntarily or not, accepted to this view, then it comes to scenes of everyday life, probably in an environment that is defined as a place characterized by the regular residence of the individuals in it involved, street vendors or simply bystanders.

While commenting on the Teatro da Paz, the indoor records were also subjected to the photographers. These environments provide details related to the arts, as can be seen in the photograph of the hall, the *foyer*<sup>12</sup> (Figure 3). In the composition of these photographs, the photographer presents information that is on the ceiling with the original

paint<sup>13</sup> Domenico de Angelis e Giovanni Capranesi<sup>14</sup> and chandeliers positioned on the horizontal part of the hall, the finish of the windows, doors, floors and chairs providing an impression of organization and beauty to the environment.



**Figure 3.** Felipe Fidanza, *Salão nobre do Theatro da Paz* (13,0 x 17,5 cm). *Album do Pará em 1899*, p 27. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR

The Fidanza's photograph of *Salon do Theatre of Peace* (Figure 3), unlike other photographers, presents something quite unique to the time of registration. When composing the scenes of the way they did, Fidanza humanizes the scene photographed because it includes people at the time of registration, showing a more "naturalized" one of the cultural spaces of the theater. The references suggest that these people were photographed a family group symbolizing the social elite in Belém.

For a reflection on the use of different spaces, it is assumed that the inside of the theater was designed for the elite. Therefore, Fidanza, these photographs, set, possibly, the characters that should be part of the outer and inner space of the Theatre of Peace People photographed in the foyer of the *Theatre* (Figure 3) are dressed in clothes that reflect the social group representative local gentry. The female dress, both the woman and girl, show the standards of the time for people of higher economic order.

While the external environment near the theater was represented by another social group, particularly focusing on people belonging to the poor consigned to or worked nearby, as reported by Fidanza (Figure 2) which represents one of the environments, which could be part of all strata social, where he was allowed regular access to all people, thus defining the public use of the space of the square.

Note carefully that individuals (Figure 2), seized by the lens of the artist, represent a small group of vendors who worked over there. Poor people are the middle years of the centuries nineteenth and twentieth. This group is in the foreground of the photograph, one certainly can't say whether this was the intention of the photographer, but one can't rule that out. Maybe they are there by chance, but their presence is part of a bigger picture: the Republic Square with its imposing monuments to the bottom, right side of the *Theatre of Peace* and across the Mariana monument recently inaugurated.

The photographers, with their different looks, entered and announced the importance of the Theatre of Peace had to the city of Belem, even if it has already spent a decade of photographs taken between 1890 and 1908, for the spaces that were remained photographed are disclosed at the time.

You can see that on some pictures, although the most outstanding public buildings are administrative, people are also part of this scenario even a small print (Figure 4). Seemingly insignificant details can't be disregarded in this case the scene of the shooting of the Government Palace of George Huebner & L. Amaral, for example, two men working in the cleaning of streets. It appears that the choice of the spatial area seeks to highlight the magnificence of the building, where the buildings, monuments are portrayed against a backdrop of a city along with their "caretakers" of public spaces. What can conclude that, according to Kossoy (2007:32) that "every photograph is the result of a process of creation, throughout this process, the image is developed, built technical, cultural, aesthetic and ideologically. It is a system that must be disassembled to understand how this development takes place".



**Figure 4.** George Huebner & L. Amaral, *Palácio do Governo* (20 x 30 cm). *Album do Estado do Pará*. 1908, p. 40. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR

In this context, we must consider that the transition from imperial to Republican did, in fact, very quickly. The headquarters of the government under the new regime did not have their own physiognomy to reflect the change from the previous period. For the architect Maria Pace Chiavari, who studied the image of the city, from the photographic representation, some buildings "were built in many pensioners to use this in obedience to the eclectic tastes of the era characterized by the coexistence of different styles 'historical' where the decoration prevails on the structure" (CHIAVARI, 2004:363).

The photographs that reveal the social workers representing the group of low income, in most cases, they appear as "characters" that are part of the scenario that demonstrates how there is the maintenance of the spaces to get sorted and cleaned. Such photographs were widely circulated in the municipal reports 1905, 1906 and 1907 and the Para's Album 1899, allowing you to view people as extras, now working (Figure 5), sometimes only posing (Figure 6).



**Figure 5.** Felipe Fidanza, *Palácio Estadual* (14 x 18 cm). *Album do Pará em 1899*, p 50.  
Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR

The photographic record of people working in public places can be interpreted as a desire to inform the maintenance of an ordered space and clean, because the type of activity that people are exercising reveals the gardening service (Figure 5), workers, employees probably of stewardship. The act of posing was very present in the environments of the squares. In the case of photographs that depict the Theatre of Peace in Republic Square (Figure 6)



**Figure 6.** Felipe Fidanza, *Theatre of Peace Paz and part of the garden of the Republic* (13,5 x 17,5 cm). *Album do Pará em 1899*, p 103. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR



**Figure 7.** Felipe Fidanza, *Republic Square. Part of the Garden* (13,0 x 17,5 cm). *Album do Pará em 1899*, p. 119. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves"

Beyond the employees who were retreated, there are other types of records in which the main focus was directed to representatives of the middle classes and elites of Belém, as seen in the picture written by Fidanza, whose theme is Republic Square. - Part of the Garden (Figure 7), as evidenced in the costumes of the extras that appear on the left. This photograph shows an image of the emphatic manner of dress of persons walking in the square. The extras in this scenario are depicted in two more pictures that are part of the composition of the Para's Album of 1899.

The modernization project with the remodeling of public spaces such as parks, gardens, avenues and streets, was certainly an incentive for people to wander through these locations, for example, the República Avenue<sup>15</sup> (Figure 8), an access space unrestricted, ends by conditioning the human bodies transited through there. The movement consists portrayed by the presence of representatives of the elite, the middle class and poor at the same time they were photographed types of transport available at the time, especially horse-drawn trams that trafegavam the tracks, recorded always at the forefront of photographs of streets. This also can be viewed in other places such as Nazareth Avenue, Independence Avenue<sup>16</sup> and Jerome Avenue<sup>17</sup>.



**Figure 8.** Felipe Fidanza, *Avenida da República (Vista do Centro)* (14,0 x 20,5 cm). *Álbum de Belém*. 15 de novembro de 1902.. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR.

The title of *Republic Avenue view of the west* (Figure 9) refers to the everyday scene, and the movement of pedestrians, Fidanza portrayed the tram passing by Avenue. The camera becomes inaccessible places, captures situations that are within the limits

of what can be photographed, and even within the limits of what is interesting. In the foreground, the picture is that the post was highlighted and serves as the dividing line of the sidewalk to the street, followed by the hoses. The impression that passes through this photographic image is a small flow in these areas of the city. One of the well documented by local photographers refers to a particular image on the drive on the boulevard, common to members of the elite, the middle classes and the poor.

In detail, the photographs reveal a face of the city, whose focus turns to the everyday. The squares and streets are evoking the feeling that the days are wrapped in a relaxed atmosphere. The image is marked by the movement of people (Figure 10 Detail A, Fig. 9) that are transiting the sidewalk from the Republic Square, which types of clothing, probably identifies them as members of the elite or middle classes, as well as the poor. It is likely that the photographic image, according to Boris Kossoy (2007:39), "we find evidence, whether voluntary or involuntary, materialized through a system of visual representation that has become feasible in the first decades of the nineteenth century", because the photographic document, image object allows you to check a residue of the past through a visual fragment of reality selected for a particular season.



**Figure 9.** Felipe Fianza, *Republic Avenue view of the w.* (Avenida de República. Vista do Poente) (14,0 x 20,5 cm). *Álbum de Belém*. 15 de novembro de 1902. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves" CENTUR.





**Figure 10.** Detalhe A-Figura 9



**Figure 11.** José Girard, *Mercado de Ferro* (12 x 16 cm). O Município de Belém - 1904. Relatório apresentado ao Conselho Municipal de Belém na sessão de 15/11/1904. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves"

It can be seen that, besides the issues mentioned (architecture, squares, monuments), also served as inspiration to photographers scenes of daily passersby in public places in the city of Belém. Selected clips they show the circularity of the photographers mainline flow of business activity in the city center. These are, respectively, of the *Republic Boulevard Avenue*<sup>18</sup>, *November 16 Street*, *November 15 Street*, *Conselheiro João Alfredo Street*.

Understand that the images are evidence of a photographer's reverence inevitable over the highlighted object in the foreground, which identifies an option photographer José Girard, in his adopted city, its inhabitants revealed in scenes of everyday life and sought to portray in their photographs passersby in places that characterize the movement of people and transport available at the time. One of these selected sites is the *Mercado de Ferro* (Figure 11), photograph taken in time that shows a movement of people.

The perspective adopted by the photographer suggests a meeting between commerce and movement the cars and people in the *Republic Boulevard Avenue*. In this photographic image (Figure 11), Girard prefers the snapshot without attitude. Nobody seems to notice your camera; people involved in the rhythm of day-to-day failed to notice the photographer. The building of the *Iron Market*, part of the complex *Ver-O-Peso*, inaugurated by mayor Antonio Lemos, on occasion, represents the central focus of the lens of the photographer, giving importance to the street, marked by the tracks where trams passed.



**Figure 12.** José Girard, *Os parques e praças* (12 x 18 cm)<sup>19</sup>. O Município de Belém - 1906. Relatório apresentado ao Conselho Municipal de Belém na sessão de 15/11/1906. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves"

Beyond the photographic productions of everyday scenes, José Girard, under the caption on the photo *The Park and squares* (Figure 12), portrays the places where the characters appear to compose the picture posing. These characters can be used as an indicator of scenes that have a kind of social conflict, with people of different economic situations passing through the square. In the foreground, is someone "ragged", dressed in "rustic" looking at the pose of the well-dressed men, more or less young, belonging to the social group of a better life. The two people with fine apparel have shown that knowledge about the presence of the photographer, as shown in a pose for the professional; their costumes characterize a way of dressing that represents groups of the middle class.

The photographer's eye is contemplative and exhausts itself in the aesthetic assessment of poverty in contrast with the wealth, the individual highlight of the left side and two, in a suit and hat has a place in the square of differentiated identity. Share the same space, but the way it was portrayed suggests a separate appropriation and use. The characters in a suit and hat are stopped to pose, while the other alone, just watching them curiously. Thus, this image indicates a dialogue of different social groups identified in the photograph, frozen at the same instant. The sight of these images even leads to reflections that seek the causes and possible solutions to poverty. What remains is the generic and stereotypical view of the existence of two universes. Kossoy suggests an interpretation for this type of scenario in which "these two broad categories of beings, the nobles of social life and natural life of the poor were, in one form or another, well represented in the histories of photography" (KOSSOY, 2007:69).

Importantly, the picture is also a producer of visual awareness and specific, in that it reveals other elements that are part of the composition of the physiognomy of the city. If I may say, becomes a space "democratic" as regards the use of the square. With regard to photography, parks and squares, whose record of the place was determined by how they were portrayed individuals, regardless of social conditions, had some spaces marked by the photographer's lens.

Felipe Fidanza also produced several types of photographs, not limited in photographing urban changes, but records the daily lives of people. In the photographs selected to compose the album<sup>20</sup>, a reality show more compatible with the urban movement, in a city that appears in the modernization of public spaces at the same time, visualize yourself doing the people of this context, not only social groups the oligarchy, but mostly people from lower classes (Figure 13). In this sense, Fidanza captured the image of the individual simple, ordinary people, anonymous history, their faces, contributing to the collection of documents on the history of the State in which he participated.



**Figure 13.** Felipe Fianza, Avenida Independência “tomada em frente ao mercado da V. Teta” (14,0 x 20,5 cm). Álbum de Belém. Pará 15 de novembro de 1902.. Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural “Tancredo Neves”

The photographic representations contains in itself a source for research and interpretation of all sciences, since it identifies waste or brands of the past that can represent the movement of the street, architectural structures of buildings, the facades of the establishments and, in particular, that is related to photographs that Felipe Fianza recorded in the foreground, the clothing of passers-by, the trail located on *Independence Avenue*<sup>21</sup> (Figure 13), the background, there is a tram<sup>22</sup> that is being awaited by a group of people. Invading the public space, trams marked a new use and a greater appreciation for the places he went. Allowing faster connections between distant places, public transport provided the division between residential areas and work areas. The first type was opened to the lines of steam trams in 1869 and the following year the first streetcar lines with animal attraction. In 1883 there were already 30 km lines between trams steam or with animal traction. These indications are valuable contributions to the recovery of information in the document its importance.

Another detail observed in the same picture shows that some people have noted the presence of the photographer while others seem to be “reckless.” A man next to the trail bends down to pick up some object near it, a dog sniffs the ground. In this photo, the children are accompanied by their parents. Note the photographer’s attention to the social status of individuals, that the clothing and the physical position of the bodies betray their poor condition. To Kossoy:

*“The link to the actual sustains indexical status of photography. However, the results of the photographic image creation process of the photographer is*

*always built, and also full of codes. We must not lose sight of the evidence shows that the photographic image on the subject were recorded by a system of visual representation (...). Is the dimension of representation: an ambiguous experience, involving receptors, because depending on the object portrayed, slips between information and emotion" (KOSSOY, 2007:42)<sup>23</sup>*

Returning to the question of road where the trams passed, the space was disputed by street vendors and pedestrians, *Independence Avenue*, during the day, was involved from their vendors not allowing free transit of pedestrians. One can see that people are involved in their activities and not worry about the photographer who is instantly recorded this time.

In this excerpt, the *Independence Avenue* (Figure 14) was recorded unpaved. The eye of the photographer remains in the space of the street where the tracks appear. The movement is marked by people walking along the sidewalk, where, at the time of registration a child stared at the photographer and other possibly expect the tram, two cyclists, a cart and a man pushing the wheelbarrow. The condition of the street seems unfinished, and the lamp posts, a little more distant.



**Figure 14.** Felipe Fidanza, *Avenida da Independência "tomada da Companhia Urbana de Viação"* (14, x 20,5 cm). *Álbum de Belém. Pará 15 de novembro de 1902.* Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves"

**Figure 15.** Felipe Fidana, *Igreja das Mercês* (20,5 x 14,0 cm). *Álbum de Belém. Pará 15 de novembro de 1902.* Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves"



There are no specified dates, on which these photographs (Figure 15) were taken, which occur in these images is how to portray Fidanza together segments of the poor in social spaces of Independence Avenue. Also depicted in other streets, as evidenced in the *Street of Industry*<sup>24</sup>, where people come walking representing the group of workers.

Fidanza also sought to show a great city, where the people appear in front of small buildings that mark a new era of humanity. His role on the one hand, suggests the human dimension as a scale to exalt the grandeur of the buildings and on the other, their customs qualify the social group to which this part of town belongs. In the foreground there is the record of a cart toward the *street on November 15* led by a man. The tracks suggest traffic trams passing by *Industry Street* toward *November 16 Avenue*<sup>25</sup> and *Republic Avenue*<sup>26</sup>. On the pavement of the Mercy's Church, only one woman, the other advantage from the shadow of *Viscount of Rio Branch's Square*<sup>27</sup>. This photograph was taken by the morning due to light falling on the walls of the cathedral, where they appear in everyday life, people who were caught without realizing the presence of the photographer.



**Figure 16.** Felipe Fidanza, Av. Tito Franco do Marco da Légua (14,0 x 20,5 cm). *Álbum de Belém. Pará 15 de novembro de 1902.* Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves"

**Figure 17.** Felipe Fidanza, *Capella do Cemitério S. Izabel* (10,5 x 7,0 cm). *Álbum de Belém. Pará 15 de novembro de 1902.* Acervo da Seção de Obras Raras da Fundação Cultural "Tancredo Neves"





Most of the boards that are part of *Belem's Album-1902*, calling attention to scenes that depict the daily life. Passers-in markets, squares and avenues are usually the people belonging to lower classes, although there are photographs that totally excluded the presence of human or sometimes appear as details in the foreground of the photograph. In this sense, the photographs produced by Fidanza allow us to claim that the photographer was aware of human presence, even when it appears as a detail of the scenario (Figures 16 and 17). Susan Sontag (2004:22-23) suggests that the photographer using a camera is a form of participation, even though the "camera is an observation post; the act of photographing is more than a passive observation." In order to take a picture "is to have an interest in things as they are the permanence of the *status quo* and being in complicity with whatever makes an interesting topic".

At the time Fidanza photographed the train (Figure 16), there is the registration of a person presumably belonging to the layers popular that most often, part of a detail, at first, be thought accidental not be main focus of the lens of the photographer. In this picture, look professional is to train, an icon of modernity, which is going through the *Franco Tito Avenue*<sup>28</sup>. Giving the idea of moving image due to the smoke that appears in the recorded picture. Someone is watching this trend carefully and did not give importance to the presence of the photographer at the moment frozen. The photograph of *Cappela Cemetery Santa Izabel* (Figure 17), in which the "detail" was also recorded on the right side, the photographed is aware of the moment depicted, because it had an attitude pose for the photographer. It was probably one of the officials who made the maintenance of the cemetery.

During the imperial period, the social groups were depicted only on the condition of "Typo human", have become issues in the second half of the nineteenth century, many of *carte de visit*. Fidanza was one of the photographers who marketed the "human typos" that were subject to disclosure of the picturesque side of imperial society. The Republic makes this picture, photographers began to portray the social groups of the poor, who circled the city, though not the main themes of the photographs selected as instruments of propaganda, were not hidden from urban areas. It is evident that most were portrayed in environments related to the main roads for commercial activities or intense flows of the city.

This situation corresponds to the institution of the Republic and the strategies undertaken by it on the redefinition of a national memory through "teaching tools" such as celebrations, monuments, publications, and others. "This redefinition of memory involves the redefinition of the city by the new visuality of its spaces and the establishment of new points of reference" (Gonçalves, 2004:161). In the case of Belem, the city published a picture showing the different social groups within a modernized, could be the proposal of the Mayor.

## 4. Conclusions

The set of photos analyzed consisted basically of urban landscapes that demonstrate everyday scenes and scenery of a city recorded by several photographers who left marked his way of seeing the city. Most pictures are in black and white, produced on the threshold of the twentieth century, with many being turned into postcards<sup>29</sup>.

The images, especially the urban landscapes play a key role here. The photograph is not used as the sole source of history search. Along with other documents, these images allow us to make arguments that allow the understanding of a city that has suffered from the photographic records.

The city is like a workshop for photographers, moreover, is a speech imagery representing a symbolic dimension of the transformations. The look and the very meaning of the city are presented in different forms for the elite, workers, artists and photographers. What can be overlooked is that the photographs were part of the propaganda mechanisms that met the interests of the government and part of a particular segment of society belenense, while they survive the time, impressing also future generations.

These photographs were used as one of the privileged sources to build the story of the life of the city of Belem, taking care to observe, in these photographs, which is visible and what is outside the frame, as incidental detail in a photo that was registered. In line with this ideology of progress and modernization, the photograph is itself a condition for the identification of a modern city.

According to Peter Burke (2004:34-35), "record the pictures, not so much a social reality, but social illusions, not ordinary life, but special performances, they provide invaluable evidence to anyone interested in the history of hopes, values and attitudes ever-changing. "The photo can appreciate the uniqueness with which the optical image of the city is formed and is connected to the mental world of the author who produced it. A comparison of photographs of Antonio Oliveira and Jose Girard demonstrates how, for the latter, the movement of the streets and the presence of the population are important factors related to their own experiences, in which people interact with the city.

The set of "views" played by photographers replaced the royal city for its photographic image, using the illusory objectivity of new techniques. The Belem presented is the product of the modernization process. In this context, the picture develops the role of communication, means of dissemination of ideas and at the same time, stands as a project anticipates the city that its true construction.

The urban landscapes over Bethlehem highlight the multiple aspects of the city, extolling the monumentality of institutional buildings (Government Palace, City Palace, Educational Institutions: Instituto Lauro Sodre and Paes de Carvalho), the current cultural icons (Public Library, *Theatre of Peace*), the spaces flow of business activities

(docks and *Boulevard of the Republic Avenue*), the avenues newly built or under construction, the new look of the old parks and, finally, the friendliness of leisure places (Republic Square, Square Batista Campos, Independence Square).

We believe that analyzing the photographs as a source for history, allows us to go beyond what is visible. While the document, the photograph displays the daily movement of the city, being imbued with sociocultural content. Marked by aspects of an era, the photograph shows at length that verbal language does not give account. As the historical record, the image reveals one of the richest, if not exhausting in itself, since there is always more to be understood.

So, photography is an interpretation of the past, laden with subjectivity. I believe that in every picture there is a load of information, intentions and memories that allow us to build the hypothesis that every image is exciting for research because it awakens the sparks of the past and the evocation of the everyday and the sociability of different social groups.

The boards referenced herein serve to illustrate the way in which the instruments of propaganda met the interests of public power needed to consolidate the image of progress of the city, and even if the photographs do not represent the "whole", subtitles drove the reader to the desired focus, aiming to promote the efficiency of local government<sup>30</sup>. Therefore, it was possible, as it linked notions that sought to qualify the city built under the management of the directors, as the ideal, modern, and planned as possibilities for understanding the spaces polysemic.

The analysis of the body of documents used in the production of this research allowed to "see" the city through the lens of photographers who lived in a period contemporary to the time of production. These professionals filtered information about Belem, representing about testimony offered by the images that convey the ways of seeing and thinking the past. The photographs produced by Fidanza, Siza, Girard, among others, bear witness to his intense work in the State of Para, from the second mid-nineteenth century which had its culmination in the first decade of the twentieth century and remain today, thanks to private collectors and commemorative albums of public managers. These photographs show scenes and characters, especially the city of Bethlehem, at a time when urban space was undergoing improvements, influencing the economic, social and political.

Several studies can be performed from the use of photography as a document, and you can raise other issues related to the numerous details in the photographs. Therefore, notes that this assessment does not want a full awareness or actions to reverse the social exclusion, because the analysis is guided in the aesthetic of photography as the referent itself. For these visual documents, we can conceive the importance of documents in the production of a photographic memory of Belem.

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## Notes

- 1 This article is part of the reflections contained in the Master's thesis entitled "Paisagens urbanas: fotografias e modernidades na cidade de Belém (1846-1908)" espoused by Rosa Cláudia Cerqueira Pereira, september 2006 to obtain a Master's Degree in History from PPHIST / UFPA, and guided by Prof. Professor Dr. Maria de Nazaré dos Santos Sarges.
- 2 Translation: "a fotografia, enquanto registro expressivo de um cenário urbano, arquitetônico e social em processo de mutação, se vê utilizada pelos meios de comunicação impressa na época, e em que medida se refletirá nessas imagens os anseios de modernidade daquela elite. Existe, nesses primeiros anos do novo regime, uma necessidade imperiosa de exaltação do conteúdo simbólico de ordem e progresso".
- 3 Reports which show the names of the photographers in the photo are printed volumes III, IV, V e VI. Only the volume VII that is the photographs were unidentified producer.
- 4 Felipe Fidanza, Portuguese photographer, came to Brazil and became the ultimate expression of photography in Pará On his arrival in Brazil, specifically in Bethlehem, there is no record, and however the ads of their activities began to appear in the year 1867. He exercised the art of photography until 1903.
- 5 José Girard, Ceará paternity French, had a peculiar and distinctive path. As a photographer and painter, he excelled by producing portraits and cityscapes. According to reports in newspapers Folha do Norte, emphasizing the fact of being a painter potential. Girard was one of the photographers who worked with Fidanza, in moments of his absence to Europe. Cf. Folha do Norte, 08 jul. 1908 p.1.

- 6 Information about the photographer Para Antonio de Oliveira is very narrow, because during the research were identified through advertisements in newspapers about the services they rendered to society belenense, portrayed the elite Para special ceremonies, and such information, presented his photographic productions of the report city of Belém did not have information about his life and professional performance in more detail.
- 7 Owner Photographia Bastos in 1902 was located at Aristides Lobos Street, 60, and in 1907 at Paes de Carvalho Street, 18
- 8 Júlio Siza was Portuguese, born in Braga in 1841. Siza's career in Brazil begins in 1897, when he arrived at Para, but its history in the business of photography had started since the 1860s in Portugal. As a young man has perfected the photographic activity working at various studios, which allowed to leave their art in the photography world. The main countries in which he developed his professional career as a photographer were Portugal, Guyana and Brazil.
- 9 Owner Photographia Allemã, localizad at Santo Antonio Street nº 12, in the high Store Águia de Ouro. (1903 - 1906)
- 10 George Hubner e Libanio Amaral are the new owners of Photographia Fianza which was reopened in 1906 and stayed until the year 1910. They were also owners of Photographia Allemã in Manaus. The two workshops "were in the National Exhibition of 1908 in Rio de Janeiro, Grand Prix and gold medals". Cf. Folha do Amazonas, 20 ago.1910, p. 3. Apud. KOSSOY, Boris. Dicionário Histórico – Fotográfico Brasileiro Fotógrafos e ofício da fotografia no Brasil (1833-1910). Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Moreira Salles, 2002, p. 183.
- 11 On the subject photograph as a document view: KOSSOY, Boris. Fotografia e História. São Paulo: Ática, 1990. KOSSOY, Boris. Os Tempos da Fotografia. O Efêmero e o Perpétuo. Cotia, SP: Ateliê Editorial, 2007.
- 12 O foyer heatre of Peace was often used for exhibitions of the most significant painters of Brazil during the heyday of the context of the rubber, including the exhibits were announced painters: Parreiras, Aurélio Figueredo , Benedicto Calixto , Fernadez Machado, Francisco Estrada e Carlo de Servi.
- 13 In the Noble salon, Domenico de Angelis painted the ceiling on wood that over time his work was damaged and was replaced by the work of Armando Bolloni.
- 14 The Italian painter Domenico de Angelis and Giovani Capranesi studied at the Academia di San Luca. In 1887 he was hired by the provincial government to initially decorating the ceiling of the concert hall of the Teatro da Paz in 1890 opened the famous curtain, which celebrates the Republic and the assertion of positivism in Para panel titled Allegory of the Republic brings together representatives of Pará, Indians, mestizos and Lusitanian, courting the new times..
- 15 Actually Presidente Vargas Avenue.
- 16 Actually Magalhães Barata Avenue
- 17 Actually Governador José Malcher Avenue
- 18 Actually Boulevard Castilho França Avenue
- 19 Esta praça é a Independência, atualmente a Praça D. Pedro II.
- 20 Álbum do Pará em 1898 e Álbum de Belém de 1902.
- 21 Actually Magalhães Barata Avenue.
- 22 The inauguration of the tramway system was the responsibility of the company Pará Electric Railways and Lighting Company who initiated the installation of the system in August 15, 1906 and opened the following year, in the old station of Independence, with the presence of the steward Antonio Lemos, Governor Augusto Montenegro, and dozens of other

officials. From the opening, other lines were created, considering that besides being one of the inventions of modernity, this service came about because of the basic needs of a city that developed and dinamizava. Cf. SARGES, Maria de Nazaré. Belém: Riquezas produzindo a Belle-Époque (1870-1912). Belém: Paka-Tatu, 2002. p. 107-108.

- 23** Original "O vínculo com o real sustenta o status indicial da fotografia. No entanto, a imagem fotográfica resulta do processo de criação do fotógrafo: é sempre construída; e também plena de códigos. Não podemos perder de vista os indícios que a imagem fotográfica apresenta relativamente ao tema, foram gravados por um sistema de representação visual (...). É a dimensão da representação: uma experiência ambígua, que envolvem receptores, pois, dependendo do objeto retratado, desliza entre a informação e a emoção"
- 24** Actually Gaspar Viana Street, first calling Açougue Street.
- 25** Actually the Portugal Avenue
- 26** Today Presidente Vargas Avenue.
- 27** Today Largo das Mercês.
- 28** Actually Almirante Barroso Avenue.
- 29** Several photographs were released by albums are part of collections of postcards, published recently in the book Belém da Saudade.
- 30** Checked during the Stewardship Lemos (1897-1911) and of Augusto Montenegro (1903-1909)

# A Specter Haunts the Neoliberal Globe: Reworking the Communist Hypothesis through the Chilean Student Movement

Gabriel Chouhy

**Abstract:** Two crucial aspects make the Chilean student movement particularly interesting. First, its demands point at the legacies of the Pinochet's dictatorship. The student are calling into question not only profit in education but also the socioeconomic model inherited from dictatorship and institutionalized due to the political arrangements of the democratic transition. Only after considering these historical events can we fully grasp students' demands for a new constitution, a participatory democracy, and a tax reform aimed at transforming the neoliberal state. Second, unlike the Arab revolutionaries, the European *indignados* or the Wall Street's occupiers, which publicly reject every past form of institutional politics, have no clear leadership, and resemble anarchist practices; the Chilean movement shows a high influence of old communist politics and revolves around the preaching of notorious leaders. Instead of growing in complete estrangement from traditional organizations, the students combine spontaneous and creative participation with old left-wing politics, highly institutionalized and markedly permeated by Leninist practices and communist rhetoric. This paper analyzes these two distinctive characteristics. I argue that the links among neoliberalism, military rule and democratization are crucial to understanding the significance of the student movement. I state that the students' demands receive such an important level of support because they aim at removing the legacies of Pinochet's regime that transition to democracy left untouched. I also stress that the movement's irruption comes along with a rebirth of traditional leftism, and that this resurgence plays a key role in framing the strategic development of the movement. At least in Chile, old vanguard politics (like communism or its detractors) seem to be helpful for an increasingly autonomous civil society to reject institutional politics and pose universal hypotheses around which alternatives to the neoliberal hegemony may be formulated.

**Keywords:** Social Movements, democratization, neoliberalism

## 1. Introduction

Camila Vallejo is a 24-year-old student in geography at the University of Chile. Until last December 2011, she was the president of the Chilean Federation of Students (FECH, *Federación de Estudiantes de Chile*), de oldest and largest student organiza-

tion in the country. Camila has been the most visible leader of the massive student protests that have shaken up the hitherto quiet political stage in Chile. She also belongs to the Chilean Communist Party. When asked about that, instead of dodging the point, she proudly confesses her political inclinations.

Continually hounded by the press, and acclaimed by thousands of her national and international followers, for several months Camila has been entirely devoted to explain with detail the reasons why thousands of Chilean students have gone to strike and occupied high schools and universities throughout the country. In her words:

*"We do not want to improve the actual system; we want a profound change – to stop seeing education as a consumer good, to see education as a right where the state provides a guarantee. Why do we need education? To make profits. To make a business? Or to develop the country and have social integration and development? Those are the issues in dispute."* (The Guardian, Aug-24-2011)

So removing the neoliberal matrix within which the education system is currently organized is an explicit goal the students have made public again and again. They think education must be conceived as a right for all. It means, they argue, that the state and the schools must give up treating the students and their families as clients that are only to seek maximization of human capital investments. Rather, to be treated as subjects of rights, they want more state involvement in founding public institutions and less bankers and businessmen profiting from education. They demand laws and institutions seriously regulating and controlling the quality of the education provided by private schools. More conceptually, they stand for education not to be treated as a commodity, but as a crucial component of the "common good". And for education to be part of an enlarged commonwealth, private interests must not rule anymore. Unlike neoliberals, they conceive of public education as a collective, human patrimony that needs be preserved through more state intervention, to the detriment of an unlimited market colonizing all domains of human affairs.

But if the students' protests have become a matter of interest worldwide, there are two crucial aspects that make the Chilean case particularly interesting for the study of contemporary social movements. First, the massive demonstrations make a clear and explicit reference to the legacies of the military dictatorship that ruled Chile between 1973 and 1990. Moreover, the specific type of transition to democracy operated in Chile appears to be the background of the citizens' indignation, and this fact nourishes and confers legitimacy to the student movement. As we will see, the irruption of the student movement is not only about education. It means the awakening of a civil society calling into question the very socioeconomic foundations of a regime of government that, though set up during dictatorship, turned out to be deeply ingrained due to the political arrangements processed during transition to democracy. Only after looking at these historical events concerning dictatorship and democratic transition can we fully grasp students' demands for a new constitution, a more participatory democracy, and a tax reform aimed at transforming the role of the contemporary neoliberal state.



The wide political scope and retrospective projection the movement shows come along with a second fundamental characteristic: unlike other movements that have recently emerged worldwide, which publicly reject every past form of institutional politics, have no clear leadership, and resemble non-partisan practices; the Chilean movement does not deviate from traditional left-wing forms of organized politics, at least in the way it has evolved both ideologically and organizationally. Specifically, it shows a high influence of old socialist (and even communist) politics and revolves around the preaching of notorious leaders that do not hide their ideological and political partisanship. And these are facts that deserve specific consideration. Like the Arab revolutionaries, the European *indignados*, and the Wall Street's occupiers in the US, the Chilean students reject mainstream politics, denounce the unrepresentative character of an elitist political system, and stress the pervasive collusion between state incumbents and economic elites. For all of them, the state and the politicians who manage it have become widely illegitimate. Yet unlike all its contemporaneous movements, the Chilean student movement, if deeply rooted in a booming civil society exercising participatory democracy, is nevertheless headed by historic organizations of the left, which are highly institutionalized and markedly permeated by vanguard-like practices and socialist rhetoric. Proof of this is that the FECH presided by Camila Vallejo was founded in 1906. As such, this organization participated in the major political events throughout the twentieth century, reaching its peak of mobilization in the late 1960s, when "the specter" of communism "haunted" Latin America – and this is especially true for Chile during the Allende's presidency<sup>1</sup>. This is to say that, instead of growing in complete estrangement from traditional politics, the "framing process alignment" of the student movement entails a virtuous mixture of creative organizational innovation and the anew activated networks of traditional left-wing politics.

These two distinctive characteristics of the Chilean case –the pervasiveness of dictatorship's legacies and the rebirth of traditional leftism– constitute the chief points at issue in this paper. In short, I argue that the linkage among neoliberalism, military rule and democratization in Chile is crucial to understanding the significance of the current student movement. Roughly speaking, the students' demands receive such an important level of support from civil society because they aim at removing the most pernicious outcomes of Pinochet's regime that transition to democracy left unresolved. I also state that the fact that the resurgence of socialist practices and rhetoric have significantly framed (and will continue to frame) the strategic development of the movement may be seen as another proof that traditional left-wing politics, unlike in other parts of the globe, are still in force in contemporary Latin America. In other words, I stress that left-wing politics, including the appeal to old-fashion and nowadays heretical communism, still fulfills fundamental regulatory functions when articulating emancipatory politics within civil society vis-a-vis political institutions. More specifically, just as the massiveness and wide support for the student movement lies in an increasingly autonomous civil society deploying creative forms of contention and mobilization against political institutions, so does old leftist vanguards (be they communist or its typical detractors within the left) seem to be relevant to establishing and working out universal hypothesis around which counterhegemonic alternatives to neoliberalism may be formulated.

The paper organizes as follows: First, I will place the Chilean case in a historical framework, evidencing the paramount role the military regime played in the making of the ongoing neoliberal hegemony. Second, I will address the specificity of the Chilean transition to democracy and its legacies in Chile's contemporary politics. Third, I will conceptualize neoliberalism not as a bureaucratic phenomenon (that is, as an array of policies and institutions) but as an entire regime of government involving specific modes of exercising political power and thus producing certain forms political subjectivities. All this to argue that commodification in education is at the core of the making of the neoliberal citizenship and, consequently, that demands for de-commodification in education are key in contemporary struggles against neoliberalism. Fourth, I will briefly review the preaching of the student's leaders so as to show how old leftist politics permeates the framing process of the movement.

## 2. Military Rule and Neoliberal Hegemony

In the Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay), during the 70s and the 80s, furious military dictatorships attempted to destroy the transformative energies that had sprung up in civil society. By the early 1970s, important sectors of the youth, the intellectuals, working class organizations and guerrilla movements demanded profound changes in society. In the context of economic concentration, the influx of the Cold War, guerrilla movements inspired in the Cuban revolution, and the growing intervention of the US government in internal affairs, an increasingly contentious polity experienced the rise of demands for redistribution of wealth, radical democratization and rejection of US' imperialism. In order to preclude the aggravation of widespread political conflict, the national armed forces, safeguarding the interests of economic elites, intervened decisively to eradicate the causes of such an explosive juncture. Thus, operating coordinately throughout the region, the militaries managed to torture, kill and/or exile thousands of citizens. As Paul Buchanan points out, the systematic application of repression "cleaned the state of the militant counterhegemonic projects voiced by increasingly empowered organizations of subordinate groups (workers, students, revolutionary guerrillas) during the 1960 and early 1970s" (Buchanan 1996:282).

Still, to extirpate the so-called "scourge of communism" from society, other kind of fine works had to be undertaken by dictatorships. Ideologically, it was urgent to force civil society and defiant political parties from the left to desist from its collectivistic and autonomous inclinations aimed at questioning social hierarchies and, more generally, putting the most regressive forms of capital accumulation at risk. Thus, repression of every form of contesting politics and the widespread fear it engendered sought "the forcible disarticulation of networks of subordinate groups", resulting in "the decomposition of collective identities into what amounted to an authoritarian 'vacuum'" (Buchanan 1996:282)

Economically, to provide business profits with sustainability, it was urgent to undergo an aggressive restructuring of the capital accumulation regime so as to suppress the relatively solidary forms of national capitalism that have been built during the

century. Attracted by the novel ideas emanated from renowned US Universities, "foreign-trained architects of economic policy sought to restructure national economies to make them internationally competitive under the guidance of new "power blocks" made up of international finance capital allied with transnationalized domestic entrepreneurial sectors" (Buchanan 1996:283). Free market reforms, privatization and labor deregulation constituted the basic toolbox at hand of this new generation of local technocrats, the so-called "Chicago Boys"<sup>2</sup>.

Chile was especially speedy and effective in implementing neoliberal reforms. In 1975, two years after the military coup that overthrew the first socialist government in Latin America elected by democratic means, and once he had finally managed to concentrate all the power in his hands, General Pinochet quickly embraced the neoliberal orthodoxy. Unlike his neighboring dictators, Pinochet's implementation of reforms was expedited, incisive and far-reaching (Biglaiser 1999). The economy gained relative stability and grew at high rates for several years. It suffered the effects of the debt crisis that affected almost all South American countries in the early 1980s, but recovered and grew almost uninterruptedly then on. Despite it reinforced the pervasive inequalities that had long pervaded the Chilean society, international economic institutions like the World Bank or the IMF labeled the Chilean model as a "miracle", as though it were the panacea for the chronic problems of South American development.

The education system was not alien to the influx of neoliberal reforms. According to Donayre and Inga (2011), the legal framework designed by the military government consecrated freedom of teaching as freedom to conduct educational institutions as private businesses under free market rules, that is, with little, weak regulation. On the supply side, the state transferred the management of both elementary and secondary schools to local governments (Municipalities), increased subsidies to private universities and shrank direct funding for public institutions to a minimum. This led both public schools and universities to follow strict market rules, that is, to enter into savage competition to survival. On the demand side, though families –turned into clients– were granted freedom to choose education for their children, the great majority of them found no other choice than affording tuition by their own or by getting expensive loans from the banking system (Garreton, 2007). Not surprisingly, it became normal to find devout businessmen managing universities and high schools, or solidary bankers making profits from usurious interest rates.

When democracy was restored in the early 1990s, a coalition of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Socialist parties, *La Concertación*, took office and ruled the country until 2010. Successive governments declared their intention to fix the most regressive aspects of the socioeconomic model inherited from dictatorship. Issues of social justice were continually at the top of the political agenda; however, strong inequalities persisted during the period and the basic architecture of the neoliberal state formation consolidated. With respect to education, no significant changes were introduced until 2009, when, in response to the massive high-school student's protests that took place in 2006 –the so-called Penguin Revolution (*Revolución Pingüina*)–, the two main parties in the Congress agreed to pass a law reforming the legal frame-

work that the military regime had adopted to regulate the system (Donayre and Inga 2011). Anyway, the structuring principles of the education system –based on market mechanisms, founding through student loans, and the expansion of a unregulated private supply– remained practically untouched, as the students have persistently denounced. If nowadays the great majority of the Chilean youth graduates from high school and a significant number gets university degrees, the quality gap among institutions is remarkable. Not only that: the worst universities are those which recruit the poorest students and, paradoxically, those with the highest tuition. Overall, families are highly indebted, and job opportunities differ notably depending on the institution attended. For a great proportion of students (especially those coming from the most disadvantaged families), the access to higher education supposes a heavy financial burden; nevertheless it allows them little social mobility, reinforcing the intergenerational transmission of class inequalities (OECD 2010).

Why despite efforts to face these widely acknowledged problems in the Chilean education system does the situation seem to remain generally unchanged? How is it possible that, in spite of the claims systematically posed by the students, successive governments have been reluctant to go further in educational reform? More specifically, why is the neoliberal matrix of the Chilean education so hard to remove? Put another way, what had to happen for the neoliberal legacy to become so deeply ingrained in the post-Pinochet era? To shed light on these questions, it is necessary to look at the democratic transition and the issues that remained outstanding for the subsequent democratic consolidation.

### **3. From a Neoliberal Dictatorship to a Neoliberal Democracy**

Scholars of state formation and democratization have consistently agreed on the Chilean exceptionality in the Latin American context. According to Centeno (2002), Chile is the Latin American country that better approximates the European patterns of state formation described by Charles Tilly et al. (1975) – the Prussian pattern in particular. Unlike the great majority of weak states that emerged from decolonization wars, the brand new Chilean republic that came out of the independence revolution did not engage in corrosive caudillo wars as much as did the rest of the continent during the nineteenth century. Instead, the Chilean state was internally monolithic in the administration of violence, and insistently bellicose with its neighbors. The few but successful international wars it fought allowed state-makers to consolidate central power earlier than their counterparts, leaving a well-organized central army that, if militarily uncontested, remained completely subordinate to civil rule (Centeno 2002).

It is not clear what factors might explain Chile's precocity and success in state formation. Both Centeno (2002) and Valenzuela (2001) suggest that the relative homogeneity of political and economic elites might have led them to work cohesively and engage early in political compromises that eased the process of state making and facilitated the subsequent democratization. Naturally, the civil control of a centralized military is generally stressed by the literature as a fundamental precondition for the

emergence of stable liberal democracies in Latin America (López-Alves 2000). But propensity to elite pacts in the context of an early unified polity makes the Chilean case even more especial. In fact, the way democratization occurred in Chile calls into question the classical Barrington Moore's thesis according to which for a democracy to emerge, the political hegemony of the landed class must be undermined. That was not case in Chile, where big landowners, organized around the Conservative Party, were the most decisive supporters of democratization (around 1890), inasmuch as democracy was seen as the only means to preserve the Catholic character of the state via the electoral inclusion of the rural population (Valenzuela 2001).

In any case, no matter the reasons behind the democratic inclinations of recalcitrant elites, the point is that democracy in Chile resulted from a concerted process in which the dominant groups, at early stages in the process of state formation and democratization, converged into consensual procedures as an ordinary means to settle differences. In other words, the Chilean elites were able to consolidate not only a strong state with a military subordinate to civil rule but also a liberal democracy wherein even the most reactionary class agreed to commit to the rules of democratic game *provided that* these elite pacts based on a "politics of compromise" prevailed as the basic procedure of conflict resolution.

Thus, for a long time, elite consensus on the virtuosity of the democratic game provided Chile with one of the most stable liberal democracies of the twentieth century. Yet, as I have mentioned, this founding aspect of the normalized procedures of institutional politics begun to be under question in the second half of the century, once non-elite sectors gained relative autonomy from political elites and political conflict mushroomed throughout the polity. Somehow, the military coup of 1973 came to remove the threats that increasingly contentious forms political participation, underpinned by a highly competitive, fragmented and ideologically polarized political system, were posing to traditional modes of institutional politics (Frazier 2007). It is then not surprising that the type of transition adopted after several years of a bloody "state of exception" characterized by retaking the old "politics of compromise" that used to function as the golden rule among the elites before the outbreak of political conflict.

If this tradition of elite pacts provided the repertoire for democratic consolidation, there are other factors directly associated with the intrinsic character of the authoritarian regime that matter significantly. In that sense, according to O'Donnell (1992), Pinochet's dictatorship characterized by having been highly repressive but economically successful. In this type of regime, "thanks to the periods of strong economic expansion important sectors of the entrepreneurial and middle classes are products of the authoritarian regime", so they "harbor more positive memories of the authoritarian regime than in the cases of strong repression and economic destruction" (O'Donnell 1992:26). Consequently, the armed forces maintains significant levels of support and prestige that allow them to enjoy a better position to shape transition's pacts and control the process's pace and agenda. When that is the case, the long persistence of authoritarian enclaves is almost inevitable. Actually, Chile is a very illustrative case of how a tightly controlled transition from authoritarian rule can long af-

fect the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. Here is important to make a distinction between transition to democracy –the process that leads to the installation of a democratic government– and democratic consolidation –the process that leads to the complete removal of the authoritarian legacies and ends with the unrestricted functioning of a liberal democracy (O’Donnell 1992:26). Naturally, we expect the former to set conditions to the latter, for the conditions the military imposes on the path to democratic elections determines the degree of leeway given to the elected government as to move towards a consolidated democracy.

In that sense, nowhere in South America has the relationship between the two processes (transition and consolidation) been as marked and problematic as has been in Chile. In Valenzuela’s typology, Chile is indeed the extreme case (Valenzuela 1992), for transition to democracy occurred without breaking the rules of the old regime. Through a fraudulent plebiscite (Garretón 2010), Pinochet managed to enact a new Constitution in 1980 that would set not only the institutional framework of the neoliberal state project but also the timing and mechanism through which future democratization would take place. Envisioning that social claims for democratization would generalize sooner or later, the Constitution provided for a national referendum in 1988 to decide on Pinochet’s continuity. For the democratic opposition, the opportunity to beat the regime through the polls was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it was seen as the only option to definitely undermine the regime’s pretensions to indefinite perpetuation. On the other hand, it tacitly implied the recognition of 1980’s Constitution. The opposition finally entered the contest, bargaining minimum guarantees so as to avoid fraud and make sure that results would be respected. Pinochet was defeated in the polls, an event that opened up a so-called “transition through reform”. Now democracy might be restored but at the cost of legitimizing the rules of the game of a *protected democracy* that Pinochet had carefully anticipated. Henceforth, “the Concertación accepted the major features of the authoritarian political order as the price of a peaceful transition to elected government and did its best to extract limited constitutional reforms from the military government” (Pastor 2004:42).

The consequences of this type of transitions should not be overlooked. That transition to democracy undergoes through a concerted reform tightly controlled by pro-regime partisans “permits a great deal of continuity in the political elites and state officials who remain in place from the authoritarian regime to the democratic situation” (Valenzuela 1992:78). Considering that such elites only accept democratization conditionally, “the transition through reform allows them the capacity to create formal (i.e., legally based) institutions and the organizational basis for exerting tutelage and for reserving domains while ceding the way to what then becomes a highly bounded transition” (Valenzuela 1992:78). And if one looks at its outcomes, one easily finds that this path to democracy was seriously pernicious for the subsequent democratic consolidation. According to Valenzuela, three elements are to be removed for democracy to consolidate. First, there must not be any residue of tutelary powers, that is, actual but not elected powers exercising broad oversight of government’s policies. Second, there must not remain any domain of authority and policy making removed from elected officials. Third, any discrimination in the electoral processes that enables sectors sympathetic

with the military to be overrepresented has to be reversed (Valenzuela 1992). However, the 1980's Constitution provided the military with tutelary competences, commanding the National Security Council and the so-called Political-Strategic Advisory Committee. In addition, the Constitution ensured the military a portion of the revenues obtained from copper sales (the most profitable business in Chile), without mediation of governmental budgeting and a flagrant inexistence of any mechanism of accountability. The government was also forbidden from decisions concerning the military budget, promotions and appointments. Other domains of policy remained totally or partially out of governmental control, such as the monetary policy (in chair of an autonomous Central Bank), radio and television programming and licensing, or the appointment of Supreme Court's members. Last but not least, "the electoral law was deliberately and successfully crafted to furnish the right with the largest possible contingent of members of Congress in both houses" (Valenzuela 1992:68), providing a minority with veto power over any attempt to recast the rules of the game.

Now the relationship between democratization and neoliberalism becomes quite transparent. For Garreton (2007), the institutional arrangements inherited from dictatorship were thought to secure the perpetuation of the neoliberal socioeconomic matrix by providing the "civil arm" of the regime (the economic elites) with an inflated political representation in the state and veto power over both constitutional and organic laws (like that which organizes education). This prompted left-wing governments to leave both the socioeconomic model and political institutions untouched. When necessary, they hardly introduced timid corrections (Garreton 2007:109).

In sum, rather than a radical rupture with the authoritarian past, one might state that both the military dictatorship and the democratic governments that followed belong to the same state project. This is because, as Frazier (2007) clearly argues, "both regimes were encompassed by overarching process of state formation: the building up to and implementation of the 1980 Constitution and the restructuring of the Chilean political economy around neoliberal principles of a free-market economy facilitated by a laissez-faire state" (Frazier 2007:42)

#### **4. The Art of Governing a Neoliberal Citizenship**

Sociologically speaking, the main legacy that the military dictatorship left to democracy was the consecration of a neoliberal citizenship, now defined with regard to a collection of individual freedoms that under the neoliberal hegemony came to be reduced to radical individualism, consumerism and competition (Garreton 2007:54). Insofar as the new conceptualization of citizenship revolved around the production of individual subjects, civil society evolved into atomized interests preoccupied only with their own demands, without any intent to negotiate with others a minimal collective understanding of the common good (Garreton 2007:93). Fragmentation and depoliticization of civil society were the inevitable corollary.

In other words, the neoliberal project undertook a radical recasting of the way political

power is exercised throughout society and, thus, the parameters upon which citizenship is delimited. Ultimately, in its deepest meaning, neoliberalism is, according to Rose & Miller (2010), a way of governing “at a distance”, a device to exercising political power beyond the state that is widely prevalent in advanced societies. Under this contemporary form of rule,

“A sphere of freedom is to be (re-)established, where autonomous agents make their decisions, pursue their preferences and seek to maximize the quality of their lives. For neo-liberalism the political subject is less a social citizen with powers and obligations deriving from membership of a collective body, than an individual whose citizenship is active. This citizenship is to be manifested not in the receipt of public largesse, but in the energetic pursuit of personal fulfillment and the incessant calculations that are to enable this to be achieved” (Rose and Miller 2010: 82).

It follows that neoliberalism manifests not only in the bureaucratic or institutional field; it must not be reduced to a handful of pro-market reforms, nor may be solely associated to the making of a minimum state reluctant to intervene upon the economy. Rather, its hegemonic character lies, above all, in its ability to produce a certain type of subjectivity. And commodification of education plays a paramount role with this regard.

Foucault clearly saw this point in his genealogic analysis of American neoliberalism. He was particularly interested in Gary Becker’s theory of human capital, and considered it in the context of the development of the new art of government, or *governmentality*, that characterizes Western liberal democracies in the twentieth century. For Foucault (2010), neoliberalism conceived of civil society as constituted by individuals acting as enterprises in a free market economy and guided by an instrumental rationality. But to produce the kind of subject endowed with the ability to economic calculation that is assumed by the neoliberal *governmentality*, specific power-knowledge technologies are to be deployed. Here is when neoliberalism takes distance from the classic liberal political economy. The point of discrepancy lies in whether labor is treated as an object or as a subject. Classic political economy reduced labor to a quantity of abstract labor power, measured in time. Even Marx –a lapidary critic of liberalism– considered that labor, under capitalist relations, assumes the form of an internally undifferentiated commodity. Neoliberals, with the theory of human capital, however, bring labor back into economic analysis in order to introduce variation in its quality. What matters most for them is the economic calculation of those who work, the way individuals, following a principle of strategic rationality, invest in their skills, increase their human capital, and thus obtain specific economic outcomes, namely, an income. In the neoliberal thought, for the first time “the worker is not present in the economic analysis as an object –the object of supply and demand in the form of labor power– but as an active economic subject” (Foucault 2010:223).

As its name indicates, the theory of human capital transforms labor into a capital, a machine that has a lifespan, a length of time in which it can be used to produce a stream of earnings, and that finally becomes obsolete. More importantly, it is a capital



inseparable from the person who possesses it, so it cannot be alienated as labor power. Rather than her labor, it is her whole subjectivity that functions as capital, her own existence as living being becomes subjected to a power-knowledge regime —hence the notion of biopolitics. And under this regime, instead of alienation, we had better speak of incorporation, of capitalization of the entire living body. To treat subjects as capital means that they can be subjected to the same regime of economic calculation to which every capital is subjected. This regime supposes a particular type of human rationality so as to make human behavior legible, and this is done by treating the subjects as *homo economicus*, as entrepreneurs. And by doing so, neoliberalism renders human behavior completely legible. In Foucault's words, "the generalization of the economic form of the market beyond monetary exchanges functions in American neo-liberalism as a principle of intelligibility and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behavior" (Foucault 2010:243).

Summing up, neoliberalism as an art of government deploys a set of technologies aimed at creating not only a legible individual behavior but also the type of subjectivity that conforms to a type of behavior that is expected to be economically rational. It does not mean that every form of subjectivity has to be reduced to the rationality of the *homo economicus*, but that this economic principle becomes the only grid of intelligibility and, thus, the only means by which subjects can be governed in a fully-developed market economy. Put it differently, it implies that "the individual becomes governmen-talizable, that power gets a hold on him to the extent, and only to the extent, that he is a *homo economicus*. That is to say, (...) *homo economicus* is the interface of government and the individual" (Foucault 2010:252-253).

In the light of Foucault's demonstration of how the theory of human capital works for the sake of a neoliberal form of government, students' demands for decommodification of education seem quite self-evident. Under this perspective, the penetration of market mechanisms into education, an undeniable fact in the Chilean case, becomes central to the perpetuation of contemporary forms of political domination. So, what is at stake in struggles for eradicating profit from education is not only the right to education, but the disarticulation of a political *dispositif* upon neoliberalism ultimately rests. Put another way, what is at stake is the perpetuation of a politics of subordination or, rather, the possibility of a politics of emancipation. The following section explores this second option.

## 5. The Rebirth of Leftist Politics

Massive demonstrations against neoliberalism are not a novelty in South America. Indeed, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the subcontinent experienced a huge wave of social movement mobilizations that brought about the sunset of the so-called Washington consensus, which had enjoyed almost uncontested hegemony since the 1980s. Yet the Chilean case seems to have specific and quite distinctive features. As I have shown, Chile embraced neoliberalism earlier than did the rest of the region; however, it was one of the last South American countries to get rid of the military rule.

As a result, democracy inherited the institutional settings upon which the neoliberalism would rest and consolidate over time. Unlike its South American neighbors, neither the Chilean society nor its political institutions noticed very much the social outburst that, triggered by the economic collapse, spread throughout the region at the turn of the century. Unlike in the rest of the continent, neoliberalism remained hardly contested until the irruption of the student movement. When that occurred, the historical roots of the problem became rapidly evident. Somehow, the student movement came to condense a long trend of accumulation of political discontent over the authoritarian inheritance that democracy left unresolved.

But how is it possible that a movement that originally stood in front of the political system to demand for particular issues (free education) turned out to be so widely representative of a general critic of the neoliberal democracy? In the previous sections I have argued that there are ample reasons for this operation to occur. I have shown that the failures of the education system can be traced back to the legacies of the military dictatorship. I have also stressed, in agreement with the students, that commodification of education constitutes a cornerstone in the production of the neoliberal hegemony. Still, structural factors and grievances are necessary but never sufficient conditions for a movement to constitute itself in a condensing point of a broader sentiment of general indignation that ends up raising a radical critic to democracy. There is always a framing process at work, an interpretative task specifically political. So the crucial questions to be addressed are: What are the mediations that had to operate so that to place the Chilean student movement in a broader sequence of emancipatory politics? What accounts for the movement's ability to connect the educational crisis of the Chilean society with a deeper interpretation of its causes and solutions, an interpretation that in turn involves a radical refusal of both the "recent past" (dictatorship) and the official narrative of the "Chilean miracle"? How were the students able to carry out the positive affirmation of alternatives to the contemporary neoliberal democracy?

A possible response to these questions is that the massiveness (in terms of huge social support) and radicalism (regarding the deepness and scope of the issues at stake) reached by the students have to do with the decisive intervention of old vanguard politics, communist politics among others. As historian Eric Hobsbawm points out, Latin America "remains the one part of the world where people still talk and conduct their politics in the old language, in the 19th- and 20th-century language of socialism, communism and Marxism" (The Guardian, Jan-15-2011). If Hobsbawm is right, it is then not surprising that the political projection of the student movement be accompanied by a reactivation of this "old language". In that sense, leftist politics (and the Leninist language it evokes) fulfills a strategic regulatory function, by exalting the historical status of the students' struggles and locating them within a broader movement for social change. Let us go back to Camila's words to illustrate this point:

*We, the communist, believe that great transformations, the structural and social changes that are needed to overcome inequalities, require the empowerment of the most dispossessed from the power. (...) The left has to finish*

*sectarianism, and forge the conditions for the strengthening of organizations so that they really build an alternative project. We don't want to fight against and demand to authorities only. We need empowerment to claim 'look, this is a representative alternative'. Thus, through a program that is not merely opposition but alternative we can get there. (...) One sees some people that participate in the process arguing that we need to abolish the state, but there isn't an understanding of the norms and processes that we can live. There's a lack of a political project, which is one of the responsibilities of the most organized sectors, of collectives and assemblies. A responsibility we haven't truly assumed. There isn't a strengthening of the social fabric to support what we posit as an alternative, because it is not easy to reconstruct the social fabric that has eroded during decades. It requires a much more meticulous process, a cautious and conscious work undertaken from a unifying perspective, without sectarianisms. There's not yet the relational and organizational capital we need. (...) The task is not to say with beautiful words that we're going to make the revolution and overthrow capitalism. The great processes of transformation do not happen overnight. They require a durable work in the long run. (Camila Vallejo, Conference at the CEP. My translation)*

Vanguard language is easily recognizable in this quote. Camila's preaching argue for the unification of the left in what might be a "Popular Front" against neoliberalism. The formation of a counterhegemonic block in civil society (the social fabric) is clearly at issue in her speech, resembling the classic Gramscian theses about hegemony and political struggle. Moreover, the responsibility for conducting the political alliances –we might want use the more postmodern term "networking" as a substitute of this vanguard term– that are necessary for an alternative "political project", of course, lies in the traditional social organizations of the left. And, last but not least, there is also the never-ending critic to anarchism: no revolution takes place spontaneously, because for the capitalist state to be abolished we need a long and highly organized struggle for political emancipation.

Still, it could be argued that this leftist rhetoric belongs only to communist militants within the student movement, and that it does not represent the student's ideological framework. Actually, the involvement of the Chilean Communist Party (CCP) within the student movement has been widely criticized by other groupings also aligned with the left. It is actually on this point that Creating Left [Creando Izquierda], the group that won the internal elections for the presidency of the FECH last December, based its campaign of opposition to Vallejo's group. In a statement launched in November, Creating Left criticized the communists for promoting a "new governability pact", that would mean legitimizing "the current political class" and the "Chilean institutional machinery". For this group, following the communists' strategy "would entail maintaining the exclusion of the great majorities from making decisions, at the cost of entering into the institutional scaffolding with forces that, like the Communist Party, does not seem to want to change the founding structures of the sociopolitical system currently in force in Chile" (Creando Izquierda, Gabriel Boric's Blog. My translation)

But despite these differences in political strategy, it seems that the socialist rhetoric that characterizes Camila's speech permeates the other groups too. Speaking of the student movement's strategy, Gabriel Boric, the student leader of Creating Left and current president of the FECH, argues:

*One of the Federation's main goals is to start creating new social actors with vocation of power in order to contest the political monopoly that the Concertation [Concertación] and the Alliance [Alianza] have had in this 20 years. Enough of delegating our concerns and problems to the same politicians as usual; it's time for us to take charge. (...) The emergence of these actors is urgent; the polls show that politicians and institutions are the worst assessed in the country, while people take the street and manifest. This must be expressed politically; it can't be just an inorganic discontent. (Interview with Gabriel Boric, El Ciudadano. My translation)*

Again, we see this idea of the FECH understood as the vanguard of a broader movement contesting political power with actual democratic institutions. We also see the strategic importance of articulating social actors in civil society to channelize political discontent and thus organize an alternative political hegemony. In other words, the same reliance on a way of understanding both politics and the role of social movements within it that is ineluctably framed by certain traditional leftism. True, if one can smell that the Chilean revolution is not around the corner, at least one can see that the reappearance of this socialist rhetoric does result exceptionally relevant to posing and developing universal hypothesis around which alternatives to neoliberal hegemony are formulated. Ultimately, no matter whether the movement's leaders declares to belong to the Community Party (like Camila Vallejo) or stand in overt opposition to the communists' strategy (like Gabriel Boric), they have been able to frame the struggles for free education into a broader political strategy that goes far beyond the actual conjuncture and transcends education-specific demands.

Conceptually, what these leaders express through their speeches is just a small sample of the general "frame alignment process" of the student movement. Frame alignment is here understood as an interpretative work undertaken in order to link the movement's activities, goals and ideology with individuals' interests, values and beliefs (Snow et al. 1986). According to this analytic perspective, there are different processes of frame alignment. One of them consists of "frame transformation", a process by which "[d]omain-specific experiences, both past and present, that were formerly bracketed and interpreted in one or more ways are now given new meaning and rearranged, frequently in ways that previously were inconceivable, in accordance with the new master frame." (Snow et al. 1986:475)

In the case of the Chilean student movement, this new master frame lies precisely in a traditional leftist perspective that a) connects students' grievances with the neoliberal character of the Chilean state, b) traces the origins of this neoliberal democracy back to the authoritarian enclaves that democracy inherited from the military dictatorship, and c) proposes building a massive unified front within civil society in order to con-

test neoliberal hegemony. It follows that traditional leftism works as a key interpretative framework that connects the past, the present and the future in the coherent sequence of emancipatory politics, providing the movement with a sense of historicity. Memory building is then a fundamental component of this framing process. For denouncing the continuity in the neoliberal project during the post-dictatorship era and the political elites' connivance with this project implies challenging the hegemonic interpretation of the Chilean recent history. Under this new interpretation, the positivity of the official history that stresses the virtues of the concerted, stable, prosperous neoliberal democracy is turned into the negativity of a critical history that sees in the death blow that dictatorship delivered to the Chilean socialist project the ultimate origins of contemporary social problems.

And this interpretative work can be done because Chile not only represented a model worldwide due to the precocity, celerity and ferocity with which the country embraced neoliberalism in the mid-1970s. Chile also experimented with a democratic path to socialism that was violently interrupted by dictatorship. Indeed, as the name of Allende's Popular Front indicates, this path to socialism was inspired in a far-reaching strategy followed by communist parties all around the world consisting of building broad political coalition with all the left so as to take over state power without necessarily breaking with the rules of liberal democracy (Frazier 2007). It is then not surprising that this autochthonous leftist tradition remains somehow alive within society, especially among the most active and rebellious sectors (like the students). Just as dictatorship's legacies strongly conditioned the subsequent process of democratic consolidation, so did this socialist experiment affect contemporary struggles against neoliberalism. And inasmuch as this tradition contributes to the process of frame alignment, we could see the Chilean student movement not only as an interesting experience in contemporary struggles against neoliberal globalization, but also as the resurgence of an old form of politics that, adopting its classic spectral form, haunts the globe endowed with universal pretensions.

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## Notes

- 1 Salvador Allende, the first Marxist president elected by free elections in the Western Hemisphere, initiated his political career in the student movement, and even held the vice-presidency of the FECH in 1930.
- 2 For a detailed history about the influence of economic ideas in Latin American politics, see Montesinos and Markoff (2001). On the Chicago Boys in Chile, see Petras (1983). On the Latin American political economy after the Washington consensus, see Panizza (2009)

## Moral Judgments and Mobilizations for Social Justice Regarding the Access to Assisted Reproductive Techniques in Situations of Vulnerability in Democratic Societies: Gay Couples and Chronically Ill People

Catarina Delaunay

**Abstract:** In this paper we intend to analyze the process of emergence of infertility as a public health problem, as well as its social construction as a disease, internationally recognized by supra-state organizations such as the World Health Organization. However, how infertility is defined and publically constructed - i.e., in biological, physiological, psychological or social terms - determines the type of social actors that appear in the public arena defending a fairer distribution of the *common good* that health is, for example in terms of public reproductive health policies. Criticisms and complaints about unfairness in what concerns the access to and the reimbursement of fertility treatments, as well as demands for recognition among the political communities that face the downtrodden status in relation to a common humanity (gay couples and chronically ill people) is a fertile ground for studying disputes related to ethical and socio-technical controversies, such as the access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies. The current context of widespread financial and economic crisis throughout Europe is questioning and challenging the ability to maintain conventionalized social rights such as access to fertility treatments and medication reimbursed by the state itself, as it has happened in previous economic cycles of growth and greater prosperity. This corresponds to the decline of the welfare state, particularly the changes in the Portuguese context, by reference to access to public health care provided by an institution of contemporary democratic societies, the Hospital. Based on the two main principles that constitute the *imagined project of modernity* (Wagner 1996) - freedom and discipline - I seek to enhance the possible potential dissonances that, nowadays, may occur between the autonomy in the construction of individual fertility projects and the institutional constraints that limit the reproductive freedom of people. Building upon my post-doctoral research, I will approach this problem theoretically and through data analysis (such as reports from ethical committees, legislation and media articles).

**Keywords:** Assisted Reproductive Technologies, controversies, vulnerability, responsibility, recognition



## 1. Introduction

In this paper we aim to discuss how the international recognition of infertility as a public health problem, as well as the legal framework of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART)<sup>1</sup>, have determined who goes to the public sphere demanding access to public health policies (as in the case of claims of lesbian couples) and who has not that capacity to raise his claims (chronically ill people).

The critical actions of actors, who engage in multiple mobilizations in public spaces, such as petitions, street demonstrations or other forms of intervention (e.g., through patient organizations or social solidarity), are an excellent angle of analysis when we propose to address the numerous controversies and disputes, especially when we are dealing with categories associated with states of vulnerability, such as chronically ill patients.

In the context of human reproduction, people with chronic diseases - especially HIV-positive people, diabetics and cancer patients - are very particular cases in what concerns the access to reproductive technologies. In the first case, there is a risk of transmission of an infectious disease, whether to the sexual partner or to the child conceived if reproduction results from the natural method. In the second case, the realization of the desire to have a child can, in some cases, be compromised by physiological or anatomical constraints of the ill body at the fertilization process or by the high risk to life and health associated with an eventual pregnancy. While in others, we seek to preserve the reproductive tissue of patients undergoing cancer treatments, which may undermine their fertility in the future.

Experts authorized by the state (members of bioethics committees) elaborate moral prescriptions and normative guidance from the political principles of equal opportunities in access to Medically Assisted Conception (MAC) techniques and the right to reproductive health as a *public good* and *good in itself* (Dodier 2005).

The building, affirmation and consolidation of the *imagined project of modernity* (Wagner 1996), from the eighteenth century onwards, especially since the transition from *organized modernity* towards *extended liberal modernity*, forwards us to the possibility of extending political rights and social benefits to people previously deprived of them. An example are the public health policies, imposed by political power, to ensure access of all people - even the most vulnerable groups and those deprived of financial resources - to health care, such as fertility treatments. In the context of (re) configuration of the welfare state, the creation of the National Health Service has, however, suffered various advances and retreats, according to the different socio-economic contexts, at a national level, but sometimes also conditioned by global macroeconomic trends.

It should be noted the decline of the welfare state (Rosanvallon 1981), in particular the changes in Portugal, related to access to public health care provided by one of the institutions of contemporary democratic societies, the Hospital. The current context of wide-spread financial and economic crisis across Europe, questions and challenges the sustainability of certain agreed social rights such as the access to fertility treatments (and medication) reimbursed by the state itself, as has happened in previous economic cycles of

growth and greater prosperity.

The work of *investments of forms* (Thévenot 1986), performed by one of the central and emblematic institutions of the welfare state - the Hospital - has stimulated, in different contexts and forms, the analysis of concepts such as action and actor, as agent and individual. This notion of *investment of form* reveals the cognitive ability of the material tools and institutional arrangements.

However, the rise of critical voices and the emergence of disputes reflect the questioning of the validity of the measure used in the classification and categorization process between who is entitled or not to access the devices of assisted procreation. In other words, the principle used to make equivalences among beings facing infertility problems in the framework of inclusion in public health policies is denied.

In a context of controversy, the modern rule of law by regulating<sup>2</sup>, through their legal and political systems, the exercise of positive liberty (the right of access to public reproductive health care) according to certain criteria, assumes, among other things, the safeguarding of the welfare, rights and interests of the unborn child, for example through the imposition of heterosexuality in access to ART.

On the one hand, we have actors who are able to publicize controversies, whether individually or by collective action; on the other, there are other actors who have a reduced capacity and whose disputes are set out by interposed persons or groups, patients associations for instance (as in the case of chronic diseases such as HIV-positive, cancer and diabetes). In the case of individuals infected by AIDS, beyond their complaints and stories of discrimination in the family, at work or in public transport, they have claims to get access to ART.

Based on the two main types of narrative that constitute the aforementioned *imagined project of modernity* (Wagner 1996) - the principle of freedom and the principle of discipline - we seek to highlight, in this paper, the possible dissonance and potential differences that, in present times, are likely to occur between, on the one hand, the autonomy in the construction of the individual projects of fertility and, in the other, the institutional constraints that limit the reproductive freedom of individuals. The process of subjectification, which is a central element of any policy of living together in the world, should quell tensions arising from the contradictory demands of personal emancipation and integration into a common order, according to the specific requirements of a grammar of autonomy and responsibility (Pattaroni 2007).

## 2. Infertility: as a Public Health Problem and as a Disease

In medical and scientific terms, infertility is the result of organ failure due to a dysfunction of the reproductive organs, the gametes and the conceptus. A couple is infertile when it does not reach the desired pregnancy after one year of continuous sexual life without contraception. It is also considered infertile a couple who has recurrent miscarriages ( $\geq 3$  consecutive).

The medical diagnosis, by assigning a name and a meaning to a particular health condition - the condition of the infertile body - is crucial in terms of social construction of that particular condition, giving it thus existence and legitimacy (for example, defining its beneficiaries and regulating access to available treatments).

Only recently has infertility been considered a public health problem by the World Health Organization. This act of public recognition by a supranational organization that infertility is a treatable disease was reflected in the definition and implementation of standards and regulations in relation to technical and medical procedures that can be applied - *governing life by standards* (Thévenot 2009) applied in this context to ART - on their application contexts, as well as the criteria that people must meet to be accepted as beneficiaries.

Moreover, recent demographic trends, combining the increase in life expectancy with low fertility and birth rates result in the reversal of the age pyramid. Against this backdrop, where the number of births is insufficient to guarantee the renewal of generations, the state itself develops policy measures to promote birth rates through the financial support for couples who want to have (more) children. Among these social benefits, the state assumes the reimbursement of part of fertility treatments, given the high financial costs associated with them<sup>3</sup>.

When it was announced, on November 29, 2007, the adoption, by the Council of Ministers, of the Decree that regulates the use of reproductive technologies in Portugal, it was stressed by the Portuguese government the expectations to be capable of attenuating the downward trend of births: "to make 6250 treatment cycles, which may result in more 1400 pregnancies and, predictably, more than 1750 newborns" (Council of Ministers 2007).

It should be noted the intention announced by the Portuguese government in late 2007 to expand the access to Medically Assisted Procreation by an increase in public funding, approved by the State Budget for 2008. The financial burden to be supported by the state, from the year 2008, included three cycles of intrauterine insemination and one treatment of *in vitro* fertilization (IVF) or intracytoplasmic sperm injection, both in public hospitals and in agreed private centers (Campos 2008:194-196).

Nevertheless, those financial aids were only partially substantiated from mid 2009. By the end of May that year, the share of the state in medication purchased in pharmacies by couples was 37%, because, according to statements by the then Health Minister Correia de Campos, "medication is important, but not to save a life [...], nor essential for acute treatment" (Carneiro and Domingues 2007). This system of reimbursement of some of the medication used in fertility treatments was subsequently amended, up to 69% with effect from June 1, 2009. The purpose was to make the access to medication for fertility treatment "less dependent on the socio-economic status of couples" (Order No. 10910/2009).

However, given the current context of economic crisis at a national level - within a

broader context of crisis at an European and global level - restrictions were introduced due to lack of funding (budget cuts), which have aggravated the difficulties of beneficiaries to have access to ART in public centers.

While the state budget, in 2011, provided 12 million Euros for supporting ART, this share decreased to 8 million Euros in 2012 (a 25% reduction). On addition, it only included two treatment cycles, compared with the three cycles originally planned. This change has made this situation worse because more couples have been unable to have access to fertility treatments.

Even the National Council for Medically Assisted Procreation (CNPMA, *Conselho Nacional de Procriação Medicamente Assistida*) has clarified that *infertility* is a disease, i.e., that “beyond the legal content that the expression may have, it involves a technical-scientific nature which can not be exceeded by the legislator, for being universally defined, in particular by the World Health Organization” (in *Diário de Notícias*, of June 19, 2010).

The changes in biomedical sciences have impact on medical and scientific intervention, as well as on the very definitions of disease. In addition, concurrently with these changes, a process for the regulation of assisted conception techniques took place, with the consequent production of normative precepts relating to biomedical practices.

### 3. A Decent Society Regarding ART?

We use here the concept of *Decent Society* (Margalit 2007), which is a prerequisite for the promotion of fundamental human rights that must be respected in all circumstances. This analysis of decent society initially delineates the outline of a theory of social justice - or a just society - and a discussion of the increasing levels of solidarity, in particular civic solidarity, in short, about the very dimensions of citizenship.

But later, the ideal of a just society, a concept based on the balance between the notions of freedom and equality, is considered unreachable, and thus it is preferable to establish a decent society. The perspective goes well beyond the theory of justice based on the equality rule (Rawls 1993).

A fraternal society is a fair and decent society whose institutions do not humiliate its members, i.e. the persons subject to its authority, and whose citizens do not humiliate each other (reciprocity and mutual recognition); a society which enables living together with dignity and without humiliation (Margalit 2007). In contrast to the humiliation, we find the dignity agreed to all people that extends itself to the group of citizens, while giving the respect that each person has about himself.

The methodological approach is pragmatic because in the definition of ethics or decency in relation to a specific domain, i.e., in the enunciation of the constitutive elements of a potentially decent society, it targets behaviors to avoid or eradicate, as well as what should be refused. It seeks a normative definition of humiliation, elabo-

rating an objective concept, based on the actions and omissions committed by people in social and institutional life (*ibidem*).

However, the concept of human dignity is not limited to the normativity expressed by a political and legislative framework. The interpretation and application of legal rules should not therefore conflict with other values and higher principles, which define that we all belong to a common humanity, as is the case for the recognition and protection of human dignity.

Among the various forms of humiliation that mistreat people by hurting their respectability or respect about themselves, causing pain and suffering on the victim, we can emphasize the discrimination, the inequality of treatment and rights violations.

To better illustrate this, we can give two examples. On the one hand, in 2009, the recognition of a stable union between persons of the same sex as a family or at least a marriage raises the question of claim of parental rights for homosexual couples, not only in terms of access to adoption but also to ART. Thus, the legal approval of same-sex civil marriages had not a corresponding political acceptance of homosexual parenting.

On the other, in 2004, the advice against the use of sperm washing as a way to avoid transmission of HIV and AIDS raised the issue of discrimination in respect of the claim of parental rights by the HIV-positive patients, in terms of access to assisted conception<sup>4</sup>.

The possibility of interference with individual autonomy and freedom, particularly in what concerns the life project in terms of parenthood, raises questions about the limits of state intervention in the private dimension of people's existence, as highlighted by those who feel discriminated against or harmed in their rights.

The feeling of compassion for those who suffer, for those who are victims of injustice or humiliation, is associated to the feeling of indignation when we put ourselves in the other's place and understand the other's pain. This ethic of compassionate justice is not compatible with the acceptance of intolerance or discrimination situations based on age, life expectancy, marital status or sexual orientation.

#### **4. The Moral Dimension of the Recognition and the Guarantee of Citizenship Rights**

The idea of *recognition* - of individual capacities - has a privileged relationship with identity at a societal level (Ricoeur 2006). The boundaries, tensions and paradoxes around the recognition of an identity, be it gender, parental or sexual orientation, or in terms of claiming a state of chronic disease, is critical in the assignment and warranty of citizenship rights by the state, materialized in access to social policies, as well as public health services and equipment, namely the reproductive techniques and procedures.

In this context, the proposal of a *pluralist concept of justice* (Honneth 2004) encompasses three different spheres of social recognition, necessary for the person to achieve a sense of personal identity and to avoid the humiliation and the contempt. These domains are love (emotional care), legal equality (equal rights) and social esteem (worth). The different social relations of mutual recognition are regulated and guaranteed by their normative principles of social justice, that is to say, the needs (love relationships), equal treatment before the law (legal relationships) and the achievements and contributions to society (cooperative relationships).

The ideals of equality and freedom - as the result of social changes that occurred in eighteenth-century Europe from the liberal revolutions and the French Revolution in particular - is in close interrelation with the universal rights of humanity as a whole and of each particular individual that belongs to this collective. However, the issue of basic rights of citizenship in terms of defining its content (system of meaning) and ensuring its implementation (set of practices), does not cross all cultures and societies, but is defined according to specific socio-cultural contexts, which refer to different moral values and principles.

The principles of justice and solidarity - in juxtaposition with those of freedom and equality - can not be analyzed without resorting to the dimension of the recognition of human dignity. The lack of recognition as an individual - including acts of humiliation, disrespect or moral insult - legitimizes the allocation of differentiated rights or even the lack of any rights, thus determining unequal treatment.

This is because sometimes the notion of citizenship is guided by concepts and hierarchical relationships of inequality, distinguishing individuals who can access certain rights and those who are excluded from them, according to different criteria such as marital status, life expectancy or sexual orientation.

The principle or model of liberal democracy and the demands for recognition, respect, dignity, authenticity and individual autonomy, in terms of defining modern identity (individual and collective dimensions), are central issues in the analysis of conflicts and controversies that enliven the contemporary public debate.

These controversies also emerge in the field of assisted conception by means of establishing the criteria for access to medical techniques and procedures, or even related to its financial contribution and to the provision of a network of public and private services.

Regarding ART, these techniques "are an auxiliary method to procreation and not an alternative one" (according to No. 1 of article 4 of the Law No. 32/2006 of July 26). According to No. 2 of the same article, there is another requirement, namely, "ART can only be used upon a diagnosis of infertility or even, where appropriate, for treatment of serious illness or risk transmission of genetic diseases, infectious or other." According to this therapeutic approach in the law, a couple is required to demonstrate their fertility problems in order to acquire the status of citizen-beneficiaries of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies.

In what concerns the access to Medically Assisted Reproduction in Portugal, the "legal, political and medical governance of *adequate patients*" is nevertheless based on criteria that define this possibility and that may well enhance the (re) production of multiple forms of social inequality, with risk of non-fulfillment of sexual and reproductive rights (Silva and Machado 2010).

## **5. Law, Parental Rights and Social Conflict: the Demands of Same-Sex Couples**

The right to human reproduction is in close connection with other political rights recognized both nationally (fundamental constitutional rights) and internationally (human rights). On the one hand, reproductive rights relate to the right to free development of personality, including the freedom of action, individual autonomy and self-determination in achieving their own life project (see Article 26 of the Portuguese Constitution and the Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 288/98, April 17, 1998), as well as to rights of personal fulfillment and the pursuit of individual happiness.

On the other, the right to conception relates to the right to found a family (Article 1576 of the Civil Code), which is not limited to the right to have offspring genetically linked, but it encompasses the various possibilities for the establishment of family relationships and kinship ties, such as marriage, cohabitation or adoption. To these rights mentioned above, we can also refer the right to health care and the right to dispose of the own body.

The democratic, egalitarian and inclusive purposes prevail, thus demanding equal inalienable rights under the law as a condition of human dignity, in what concerns the use of reproductive technologies.

However, the legal framework of reproductive rights does not include new entities such as the oocytes donor, the sperm donor or the *surrogate mother*, but instead the partner of the woman inseminated through heterologous fertilization or the woman making use of surrogate motherhood<sup>5</sup>.

Moreover, the production of the law is based on social conflict. The legislative drafting - in terms of the emergence of new laws or the change of existing ones - results from the coordination between various conflict social relations (social contradictions), which are constitutive of a specific social context (Guibentif 1993).

Take, for example, the public debate over civil marriage for same sex couples and, after its legal approval (social contract), the discussion about these couples' claim for parental rights. We can see the extent to which social tensions around institutions and constructs such as gender, sexuality, marital procreation, parenting and kinship, animate public controversies and question the (un) equal rights (Almeida 2006).

The social forces and socialized actors into confrontation or competition - homosexual

couples, state, church officials, expert committees - contribute in their own way, and through different forms of action, to the process of publicizing the controversies regarding an (in) equality access to the institution of marriage, regardless of sex of the spouses. The public recognition of same-sex marriage created new scenarios for the public controversy about the right to raise a family.

In the Portuguese context, the social changes occurred in recent years, both in representations and practices, have resulted in increasing positive public visibility, recognition and social acceptance of new forms of marital relationships and new kinds of family, including same-sex relationships. Hence the legislator, oriented by democratic, egalitarian and inclusive purposes, demanding equal inalienable rights under the law as a condition of human dignity - as opposed to discrimination based on sexual orientation - has reformed the legal framework that regulates the access to civil marriage.

In Portugal, the controversy around the access of same-sex couples to the Medically Assisted Procreation arose as a consequence of the parliamentary approval of same-sex marriage and its subsequent legal framework (Law No. 9/2010 of May 31). In fact, the Portuguese legislation has some ambivalence and uncertainty in terms of establishing the use of ART, particularly because gender differentiation is only clearly stipulated in relation to cohabitations and not to marriages. Currently, in Portugal, according to the specific law, the beneficiaries of ART will be "married people who are not legally separate from people or property or in fact separated or the ones of different sex and living in conditions similar to those of spouses for at least two years" (Law No. 32/2006 of July 26, Article 6). There was a "lack of predictability of the legislator", according to the President of the National Council for Medically Assisted Procreation (CNPMA, *Conselho Nacional de Procriação Medicamente Assistida*), because the law expressly says for those living in cohabitation that they can only be beneficiaries if they are of "different sex", but does not say the same for married people. Moreover, the law makes no specific reference to the type of infertility that motivates the use of these techniques, not being necessarily from a pathological cause.

Same-sex couples are *sterile* because they are unable to reproduce themselves, that is to say, they are unable to conceive a child only through their own gametes and genetic contributions (besides reproductive cloning) and thus the process of procreation requires the intervention of a third element, the anonymous gamete donor.

After the approval of same-sex marriage, and during the 11<sup>th</sup> LGBT Pride March, held in Lisbon on June 19, 2010, some lesbian couples publicly claimed the right to access to reproductive technologies, including the heterologous fertilization because the law admits the possibility of using ART by infertile couples through third-party gamete donation (sperm in this case).

Concomitantly, and anticipating any claims that might arise, the directors of ART centers have requested a non-binding opinion from CNPMA, which was later sent to the Parliamentary Committee on Health. The opinion issued by CNPMA on this matter



concluded that "notwithstanding the provisions of Law No. 9/2010 of May 31, currently the access to ART is still legally barred for same-sex couples and this prohibition will be maintained if not produced any legislative amendment, by the way constitutionally provided" to the law that regulates ART (*Jornal de Notícias* newspaper, published on June 19, 2010, online version).

Despite the need for law revision referred by the Council in order to cover all possible scenarios in society (same-sex couples and single women), it was recognized by the experts consulted at the time that legal requirements were not in place to proceed, at that moment, with the response to ART for same-sex couples. Regarding the establishment of priorities in terms of measures and proposals to amend the law, the CNPMA claimed to the Portuguese government the urgent installation of a public centre for the collection, storage and cryopreservation of donor gametes, the end of the ban on surrogacy, the establishment of centers for the preservation of the reproductive tissue of patients undergoing cancer therapies, as well as what to do with the surplus embryos for which there is no parental or research project.

Expert committees mandated by the state, such as the CNPMA, must discuss ethical, social and legal issues - as in the case of assisted conception - formulating recommendations considered relevant regarding legislative changes needed to adapt biomedical practices that assist human reproduction to the scientific, technological, cultural and social progress. In addition to this Council - whose scope of action was previously the National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences (CNECV, *Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida*) - there is also the Parliamentary Committee on Health and the Committee on Constitutional Liberties and Guarantees.

However, the filter of financial support will always condition the implementation of those recommendations, apart from the legal issue. This is related to the hierarchical construction of political and social priorities (such as the cultural principle of heterosexuality), decided by the public health service, since resources are not unlimited and ART are expensive. The opinion was stressed at the time both by a member of the CNPMA, Carlos Calhaz Jorge, and a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Health, the Socialist Antonia Almeida Santos (statements made to *Journal i* newspaper, published on June 15, 2010, online version).

The idea of not ensuring the sustainability of the National Health System, expressed recently by the Portuguese government in the context of cost containment measures, has already led to the reduction of the budget for the support of infertile couples. Moreover, the announced closure of the Alfredo da Costa Maternity corresponds well to the end of the health care provided by the service of infertility and reproductive technologies, created in 1998<sup>6</sup>.

The legal approval of equal access to civil marriage thus corresponds to the extension of the liberal and democratic rights towards the domain of sexual orientation in the sense that same-sex couples no longer feel "remote and strange people", but members of a *decent society* (Almeida 2006), as referred in Zapatero's speech, for the Spanish case.

This political recognition, by the legitimate power, of same-sex marriage, now covered and regulated in terms of social contract and, as such, subject to supervision by the state, raises questions about the subsequent aspirations to create family or kinship ties, not only in the case of adoption but also by means of using assisted conception techniques. The acquisition of a legitimized identity by the state allows the assumption of new social roles, such as father and mother.

Parenthood is presented as a source of personal fulfillment and (re) configuration of identity, but always intersected with discussions focusing on the social figure of the child. In fact, several specialized areas of knowledge - such as psychology or medicine - are called upon to comment on issues concerning the welfare of children in situations of same-sex marriages and homosexual parenting. This question brings up, in a more objective and pressing way, the distinction between social and biological kinship ties, as well as the relationship between emotional bonds (affection) and genetic links (biology).

For these reasons, in the balance between rights and duties, the legal equality before marriage requires a particularized application of other rules regarding access to parental rights by same-sex couples, either by adoption or by using ART, because the institutional imposition of the heterosexual marriage norm and the biparental principle still prevails.

## 6. Chronic Diseases in Portugal: Some Statistics

On the one hand, according to a recent report by the National Diabetes Observatory, entitled *Diabetes: Facts and Figures 2010 (Diabetes: Factos e números 2010)*, there is in Portugal a tendency for an increase in the number of cases of people with diabetes, similarly to what happens in other developed countries. In 2009, there were 571 000 new cases of this chronic disease per hundred thousand inhabitants, affecting 12.3% of the Portuguese population with ages between 20 and 79 years. In the age groups of children and young people the incidence of type 1 diabetes has also been increasing significantly over the past ten years.

On the other hand, according to what is stated in the National Health Plan 2004-2010 (*Plano Nacional de Saúde 2004-2010*), cancer is among the top three causes of death in Portugal and there has been a progressive increase of its proportional weight. The overall mortality from cancer in Portugal, has stabilized, but there was only one compilation of data from Cancer Registries until 1998 and was still a clear trend of increased mortality in men. However, according to the latest data available from the National Institute of Statistics, more than 22,200 people died from cancer in Portugal, which indicates a decrease of 2.25 percent of deaths between 2005 and 2006.

Finally, regarding AIDS<sup>7</sup>, since the first case in Portugal was detected in 1983, the estimate of UNAIDS (AIDS epidemic update, UNAIDS, [www.unaids.org](http://www.unaids.org)) points to some 42,000 people infected in Portugal (which corresponds to approximately 0.4% of its

population). In Portugal, the rates of new diagnoses of HIV infection are the largest in Europe, and the total number of cases reported till December 31, 2005 was 28,370 cases of infection. By that date, 7,399 people had died with HIV infection. Since 2000 there has been a proportional increase in the number of cases of heterosexual transmission and a proportional reduction of cases associated with drug addiction. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2005, 52.7% of reported cases belonged to the first category. We can also observe that, since 1999, cases of AIDS in the older age group, i.e., above 45 years, are most commonly reported. In Portugal, until December 31, 2005, the cumulative total of AIDS cases was 12,702.

However, despite the statistics mentioned above, and thanks to advances in medicine, people diagnosed with these three chronic diseases have now a greater life expectancy and a higher quality of life and hence the opportunity to have healthy offspring and to play fully and indefinitely their parental role.

## 7. Vulnerable Human Beings: the Debate over Assisted Reproductive Technologies

According to the specific legislation in force (Law No. 32/2006, of July 26, Article 4/2), the techniques of Medically Assisted Procreation were intended to be used in cases where there is a diagnosis of infertility and/or risk of transmission of serious genetic or infectious disease or malformation to the offspring if fertilization occurs by natural means, i.e. by sexual intercourse.

In the specific case of HIV-positive patients, the possibility of HIV and AIDS transmission to the embryo and the risk of contagion of the uninfected partner, if fertilization occurs through coital activity, is a major issue, especially since it is a syndrome with no cure yet, despite advances in medicine in terms of antiretroviral drugs and antibiotics, which have prolonged longevity and increased quality of life. Thus, assisted conception, including IVF, allows patients with HIV to conceive healthy children without passing on the disease. The process called *sperm washing* (sperm is separated from the seminal fluid) of HIV-positive patients, and then occasionally complemented with intracytoplasmic sperm injection (due to the loss of mobility of the spermatozoa) to carry out fertilization, allows men with HIV or AIDS to be parents without risk of disease transmission to offspring or to the female partner.

However, in 2004, according to the report attached to the opinion 44/CNECV/04, the National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences (CNECV, *Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida*) has argued that the subsidiary principle for the use of reproductive techniques thus prevented, for ethical reasons and by various kinds of risks involved, that artificial insemination *in vivo* and *in vitro* were used by people who did not suffer the problem of infertility or sterility. Under the ethical underpinnings of the system of subsidiarity, along with their therapeutic purpose, the precautionary principle prevailed in situations of risk.

The CNECV disapproved the use of assisted reproduction as a way to prevent HIV transmission, because of the “risk of early orphaning or free programming of the coming of children with sick parents”, according to the principle of best interest of the child, who thus would be deprived “at birth of the benefits available to children with healthy parents” (See paragraph 3.3.5, p. 44 from the same Report). Individuals infected with HIV, which is a contagious infectious disease that can be transmitted, would thus not be covered by the law, namely because there was not any problem of sterility or infertility. This prohibition of access to reproductive technologies thus correspond to a form of discriminatory practice of this group in the context of sexual and reproductive lives, thus promoting an implicit distinction between those who should reproduce and who should not be reproduced.

However, individual health is neither granted, nor other patients with limited life expectancies, such as those suffering from severe carcinomas, are objectively denied to reproduce themselves through sexual intercourse or the use of reproductive technologies (Raposo undated). As such, this principle may perhaps find an explanation on a negative value judgment against certain lifestyles that are still erroneously associated with the disease, such as homosexuality, promiscuity or drug addiction (*ibidem*).

Regarding the techniques of cryopreservation of ovarian tissue of patients with cancer, they are intended for women who may be without ovarian, reproductive and endocrine function after chemotherapy and radiation therapy, thereby allowing them to become pregnant in the future. If one of the priority criteria to the appointment of a fertility consultation - whose usual waiting time is around six to eight months in the human reproduction unit of the Santa Maria Hospital in Lisbon - is to be a healthy person and not very old, how to match the demands of the chronically ill cancer patients? Especially since there are still no specialized centers engaged in this type of collection and that medical procedure is performed within the network of public and private centers referenced for ART, characterized by long waiting lists (more or less two years). Currently, there are 1863 couples on waiting lists, which are even greater in the Lisbon area due to the lack of public centers of ART in the south of Portugal, so couples are forwarded to Garcia de Orta Hospital, on the outskirts of the capital city.

Moreover, certain endocrine disorders such as diabetes, which affects an increasing percentage of the population, even in younger age groups, are associated with situations of infertility (although not always sterility) motivated by physiological causes. On the one hand, younger men with type 1 diabetes may have retrograde ejaculation and, on the other, there may be a life-threatening pregnancy in some women of reproductive age carrying the same disease. These are two clinical cases in which the use of assisted conception - such as sperm harvesting through testicular biopsy or surrogate motherhood - may be the miracle solution to overcome this impossibility of conceiving a biological child. In these clinical cases, the only way the individual can realize their desire for parenthood is the access to assisted reproductive techniques.

However, surrogate motherhood - benevolent or paid - is still forbidden by Portuguese law<sup>8</sup>, despite this divisive matter of Portuguese society has been discussed in

early 2012, in a plenary debate in the parliament. Four proposals and draft laws were then presented by the Socialist Party (PS, *Partido Socialista*), the Social Democratic Party (PSD, *Partido Social Democrata*), the Socialist Youth (JS, *Juventude Socialista*) and the Left Bloc (BE, *Bloco de Esquerda*) aiming its legalization only for medical purposes, i.e. for couples where the woman is demonstrably prevented from becoming pregnant, for reasons of health or physiological inability (cases of absence of uterus and of injury or disease in the organ and even clinical situations that may justify). Within the parliamentary debate of the various draft laws, it was stressed the need to establish altruism and gratuitous relationships in the context of possible use of surrogate motherhood, condemning any kind of underground business or economic agreement, thus rejecting any mercantilist principle.

Despite the need for legislative review, previously announced by the CNPMA, the Members of Parliament recognized that necessary legal requirements were not yet in place to proceed with the lifting of the ban on the use of surrogate motherhood. In fact, surrogacy raises doubts, uncertainties and ethical issues. We emphasize the problems associated with the establishment of affiliation ties (biological motherhood) and the risk of commoditization of the body and human life. Moreover, since this technique is legalized in other countries, under other ethical and legal frameworks, it can be accessible to couples with greater economic resources, giving rise to what is known as *procreative tourism*.

Chronic endocrine disorders, such as diabetes, have mainly been analyzed from the focus on individual and social patterns of healthy lifestyle, namely specific behaviors or attitudes in terms of diet, physical exercise, habits and daily routines. However, it is also essential to consider how this endocrine disease affects the life projects of patients, under the dimension of recognition, linking social esteem and self-realization at the reproductive level, since it can be an obstacle to the desire for parenthood.

As we tried to demonstrate, the fragile and vulnerable human conditions are sometimes faced with the intrusion of the state intervention on the private lives of citizens, in their process of search for self authenticity, safeguarding the principle of autonomy.

## **8. Responsibility as political grammar of extended liberal modernity**

Responsibility is analyzed in the second modernity, under a conjunctive interpretation between accountability and irresponsibility, between autonomy and heteronomy, between assertiveness and concern for the other, between enablement and lack of power over oneself (e.g. in terms of personal choice) - unlike the disjunctive interpretation, which largely dominated the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century (Genard 1999). The capacities of beings thus lose the objectifying status, appearing in a procedural line as resources, skills and potential capacities, which can be mobilized depending on situations, though being fragile and precarious (Genard and Cantelli 2008).

The contractual agreement, in the legal form of the contract, appears as a relevant institutional arrangement within the framework of decision making congruent with the ideal of individual autonomy, in which the individual is forced to decide within strict regulatory parameters, from their capabilities and personal skills (Genard 1999). Thus, the legal equipment of the contract assigns a performative force to the autonomy of the individual since it ensures a real power of choice, making wills and attributing responsibilities (e.g., filling in the forms of informed consent in the use of ART).

Along their paths of life, chronic patients - such as cancer, diabetics and HIV patients - are, on the one hand, fragile and vulnerable human beings and, on the other, enabling human beings whom must take a grammar of responsibility (Genard 1999), towards the adoption of active behaviors of self-control. This ambivalence and transitory dimension from one state to another - from the enabling state to vulnerable state or vice versa - leads us to the exchanges of solidarity between donor and recipient of the good *capability*, considered as an enabling capacity (Resende undated).

The precautionary principle is linked to the principle of responsibility when HIV patients were forbidden to use assisted reproduction techniques as a way to avoid the transmission of the disease, given the "risk of early orphaning" of the offspring, or when cancer patients, undergoing cancer therapies, are provided with the option of preserving their reproductive tissue. The risk dimension (Beck [1992] 1997) and the uncertainty are essential within this kind of precautionary public action.

Moreover, diagnosis of genetic risk for hereditary diseases - such as cancer, diabetes or hemophilia - detected as probability or predisposition to develop this illness from the analysis of a sample of DNA, based on the possibilities afforded by the development of genetic tests, thus leads us to the emergence of the concept of *anticipated future* as a calculable and predictable future (Mendes 2004a, 2004b, 2007).

The value of responsibility in the individuals' health - from use of genetic technology as a support of medicine - based on the philosophy of Enlightenment refers to the freedom of choice. The option for rational choices thus represents a greater autonomy in everyday life, while being imposed as a duty - and not just as a right. The result is the culpability of those who excuse themselves from this responsibility, for the consequences on themselves and on the very future of humanity (Mendes 2004b).

In ambivalent and uncertain times, the non-recognition of the right to have access to a fertility treatment can cause feelings of humiliation and discrimination (lack of respect or dignity) in some patients with chronic disease such as HIV. This refusal was due to a fragile and uncertain state of health, for the impossibility of ensuring a long life according to the average, despite the fulfillment of the requirements established by rule or law (to avoid the transmission of infectious disease).

It should be noted, similarly, that the assessment of the likely *capabilities* and *skills* to parenthood of individuals or couples wishing to conceive through reproductive technologies can limit the access to these procedures. Capacities (power) and skills

(knowledge) that qualify human beings, are relate to the actual exercise of citizenship, in political and social terms, from attributes such as freedom or autonomous will.

In the definition of *capable and competent beings* (Genard and Cantelli 2008) and in the analysis of public controversies and disputes, it is essential to take into consideration the moral and cognitive skills of the actors, the plurality of their engagements with the world, and their capacity to make judgments in a certain situation, according to several grammars and arrangements, as proposed by the Pragmatic sociology (Boltanski 1990; Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Thévenot 2006).

Taking into account the possibility of composing a plural society, whose individuals are multiple and assume different *forms of engagement in action*, public policies must also provide that diversity, rather than crush them in a single figure of *good subjectivity* (Pattaroni 2007:218). In addition to the respect for individual subjectivity, the dimension of solidarity, care, attention and hospitality is crucial when we are dealing with fragile and vulnerable human beings.

## **9. Conclusions**

Although sexual reproduction remains the main method of human procreation, when this option is not possible, the law provides for the use of subsidiary methods such as ART. Among the reasons set out legally, there are the cases where the infertility of one or both partners prevents them from conceiving a child, and situations where the non-control of the genetic contributions increases the probability that offspring may have a disease or malformation. Out of the legal framework, there are cases of lack of access to gametes of the opposite sex that are essential to the fertilization process (e.g., homosexual couples or single people).

The research field on ART is thus strongly linked to the area of democracy and social rights, since it examines the issue of criteria for access to - or exclusion from - certain reproductive health services, namely fertility treatments, based on factors such as age, health status, sexual orientation, civil status and socio-economic inequalities.

When we analyze the regulation and application of the procedures of Medically Assisted Procreation, we must direct the focus to the construction of normative moral, social, political and legal systems regarding not only the definition and nature of human reproduction, as well as the different domains of biomedical intervention.

Similarly, it is essential to observe the processes of legal regulation and government intervention associated with this new dynamic in contemporary societies, namely after infertility was considered a public health problem by the World Health Organization.

However, social norms and cultural values define an idealized normative profile of the citizen-beneficiaries of the reproductive techniques, reinforced by the inability of the public health system to fully respond to the needs and demands for fertility treat-

ments, in terms of resources, infrastructure and equipment (as evidenced by long waiting lists for the first infertility consultation), together with the privatization trend in terms of health care provision<sup>9</sup>.

The dimension of vulnerability, in groups or categories of individuals who may or may not resort to assisted reproductive technologies, are related to the most cherished human values - justice, freedom, autonomy and dignity - and with the socio-cultural models of marriage and parenting. But it is also connected with the ethical and legal attitudes regarding the limits of technological intervention in human reproduction, as well as public actions of official bodies in relation to the controversies over rights and duties.

Transversely, there are other horizons of action, namely the liability of a grammar or ethics of individual responsibility and the pursuit of personal recognition in a decent society. These aspects gain another dimension when we are dealing with fragile and vulnerable human beings, which are not always able to mobilize their skills and competencies in order to raise their voice in public and claim their rights.

## Abbreviations

**ART:** Assisted Reproductive Technologies

**BE:** Left Bloc (*Bloco de Esquerda*)

**CNECV:** National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences (*Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida*)

**CNPMA:** National Council for Medically Assisted Procreation (*Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida*)

**IVF:** In vitro fertilization

**JS:** Socialist Youth (*Juventude Socialista*)

**MAC:** Medically Assisted Conception

**PS:** Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*)

**PSD:** Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democrata*)

## Methodological Appendix

This paper is a foray into the subject of a post-doctoral research on the controversies, tensions and constraints regarding heterologous fertilization. The research design will be based on qualitative and quantitative primary data collection methods, namely semi-directive interviews (doctors, experts and patients), questionnaires based on scenarios (a diversified sample) as well as secondary data sources such as content analysis of specific documentation namely from the media, the law and the bioethics. For this paper, besides theory, we only based our study on analysis of content (thematic categorical analysis of meanings) of data from different sources, such as reports from ethical committees, specific legislation, newspaper articles, television news and parliamentary debates.



## Data Sources

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Decree No. 5/2008, dated February 11 (Regulates the 5<sup>th</sup> article and number 2 of the 16<sup>th</sup> article of the Law No. 32/2006, dated July 26 that regulates the use of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies)

Judgment of the Constitutional Court, No. 288/98, April 17, 1998

Law No. 32/2006, dated July 26 (Regulates the use of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies)

Law No. 9/2010, dated May 31 (Allows civil marriage between same-sex partners)

Ministerial Order No. 10910/2009 (Office of the Secretary of State and Health)

The Portuguese Civil Code

The Portuguese Constitution

Uniform Parentage Act

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Opinion on Medically assisted reproduction (3/CNECV/93)

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## Notes

- 1 According to article 1, section 104, No. 2 of the *Uniform Parentage Act*, elaborated and approved in 2000 - and subsequently changed in 2002 - by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Law, "Assisted reproduction means a method of causing a pregnancy other than sexual intercourse."
- 2 The Portuguese Constitution assigns to the State, among other functions, the regulation of the ART, as stated specifically in article 67/2/3.
- 3 The cost of fertility treatments can reach four thousand Euros per attempt, plus 800 Euros for drugs purchased by couples in pharmacies (Diário de Notícias newspaper, No. 51109 of March, 11 2009:4).
- 4 However, at present, HIV-positive patients are already seen as potential beneficiaries of Assisted Reproductive Techniques. For example, since 2010 the Alfredo da Costa Maternity offers a service for couples infected with HIV (or hepatitis). This structure receives couples from all over the country and has laboratories and specific spaces to reduce the risk of virus transmission between the couple and the baby.
- 5 However, according No. 3 of article 8 of Law No. 32/2006 of July 26, "the woman who carries a surrogacy is regarded for all legal purposes, as the mother of child to be born."
- 6 Currently, there are between 7,000 and 9,000 consultations for infertile couples per year (in 2011 the number decreased from the previous year due to a reduction of clinical staff of the Hospital), and 500 registered to fertility treatments. In 2011, 1,708 new couples entered the service and were performed 392 in vitro fertilization cycles, compared to 477 in 2010 (See *Diário de Notícias* newspaper, No. 52231, of April 12, 2012:14).
- 7 Source: HIV infection / AIDS - The situation in Portugal on December 31, 2005. National Health Institute Dr. Ricardo Jorge, Centre for Epidemiological Surveillance of Contagious Diseases. (<http://www.insarj.pt>)
- 8 According to No. 1 of Article 8 of the Law No. 32/2006 of July 26, "are null the legal business, free or paid, of surrogacy", understood in No. 2 as "any situation in which the woman is willing to support a pregnancy for another and to deliver the child after birth, resigning to the powers and duties of motherhood."
- 9 In Portugal, in late 2009, most centers that provide ART were from the private sector (twenty one private units compared with ten government units), according to data from the Portuguese Society of Reproductive Medicine and the Association of Portuguese Fertility.

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## Biographical Note

Catarina Delaunay is currently a postdoctoral researcher in Sociology, CESNova - Centro de Estudos de Sociologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal) and Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale-EHESS (France). She also works as a consultant at Mário Soares Foundation. Her master degree on the gender division of household finance and consumption within the couple has been awarded the Woman Research Prize 2001 Carolina Michaëlis de Vasconcelos and published in a book. Her PhD was on time management among emergency physicians and presently her postdoctoral project is on the controversies on assisted reproduction. Her most recent publications are "Practical Knowledge, Autonomy in Learning and Responsibility at Work: The Incomplete and Fragile Identity of Interns and Residents", in *The Crisis of Schooling? Learning, Knowledge and Competencies in Modern Societies*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2009), "Gender differentiation and new trends concerning the division of household labor within couples: the case of emergency physicians", *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology* (2010) and "The beginning of life at the laboratory: the challenges of a technological future for human reproduction", in *Future Moves: Markets, Politics, and Publics in Global and Comparative Perspective*, ISA RC07 Futures Research Publication (forthcoming). Her current research interests are Sociology of Health and Medicine, Sociology of Science and Technology and Sociology of Action (namely the regimes of engagement as well as the controversies and disputes in the public and private space).

## Cuerpos, camisetas e identidades como estrategias de protesta

Begonya Enguix

**Resumen:** A partir de la generalización del uso de camisetas reivindicativas como estrategia de protesta y denuncia en distintas manifestaciones y otros foros públicos, pretendemos interrogarnos sobre el papel del cuerpo en la acción colectiva y la protesta. Para ello, rastreamos los elementos que intervienen en la construcción del cuerpo humano como soporte, signo y símbolo de la protesta y en su definición como mensaje en sí mismo o como medio. Analizaremos la semiótica visual de los cuerpos activistas desde su consideración como cuerpos políticos y sociales e inscribiendo las prácticas corporales en las estrategias de categorización, estereotipificación y control social. Con ello, el cuerpo como protesta será enmarcado en la discusión sobre la construcción de las identidades personales y colectivas. Las intersecciones entre cuerpos particulares, los estereotipos sociales y las tensiones existentes en los movimientos sociales quintesencialmente identitarios (como el LGTB) entre unidad /diversidad, identidad y estrategia, serán también un eje de este trabajo. Nos basaremos fundamentalmente en el análisis de las manifestaciones estatales del Orgullo LGTB<sup>1</sup> que tienen lugar en torno al 28 de junio en Madrid aunque utilizaremos como contrapunto otros casos, como el de la diputada valenciana Mònica Oltra, conocida como "lady camiseta". Esta propuesta está basada en el trabajo de campo etnográfico sobre las manifestaciones del Orgullo LGTB en España –y particularmente en Madrid- que la autora inició en 2008 y combina técnicas de la antropología visual con entrevistas en profundidad y observación participante además de otras técnicas de investigación.

**Palabras clave:** Cuerpo, protesta, identidad, mensaje, estrategias

### 1. Introducción

El "caso Gürtel" la disparó al estrellato. Mònica Oltra Jarque (Neuss, Alemania 1966) exhibió en mayo de 2009 una de sus famosas camisetas de manga corta y leyenda al frente con el lema más ofensivo que encontró: el rostro del entonces presidente de la Generalitat Valenciana, Francisco Camps, junto a las palabras serigrafadas propias de los carteles del Lejano oeste, "Wanted. Only Alive (Se busca. Solo vivo)"... El gesto estético levantó tal polvareda que, mientras desataba las iras de los populares en Las Cortes Valencianas, se convertía en una especie de Juana de Arco para otros, de modo que se imprimieron camisetas y se vendieron "como churros". Pronto se la conoció popularmente como "lady samarreta" (camiseta en valenciano)<sup>2</sup>.

Decir que el cuerpo es soporte de la protesta no es decir nada nuevo. Desde las primeras movilizaciones obreras del siglo XIX hasta la reciente convocatoria de huelga general del 29 de marzo 2012 en España, el cuerpo, por presencia o ausencia en la acción colectiva, ha sido y es significativo ubicuo de la protesta. La ocupación del espacio público por cuerpos significantes es básica para el activismo. Puesto que la mayoría de protestas políticas se llevan a cabo mediante el cuerpo –desde las marchas al teatro político, al encadenamiento a un edificio o a un árbol– el cuerpo es la herramienta por excelencia de la protesta y fácilmente deviene símbolo o texto con significado político (Sutton, 2007: 143). El cuerpo puede contener el mensaje, ser soporte del mensaje, o ser él mismo el mensaje, ya que en el cuerpo se produce y articula la ideología política (Sasson-Levy y Rapoport, 2003. 379).

La visibilidad de los cuerpos-protesta puede cuestionar los significados sociales, poner en marcha demandas sociales y dar forma a imaginarios sociales sobre la protesta y quienes protestan. Los cuerpos no median la protesta, se erigen en protesta. Son protesta.

En este trabajo creemos necesario establecer una primera diferenciación entre el cuerpo, considerado como conjunto social y socialmente dotado de significado, y el vestido, considerado como aquellos complementos significantes para los que el cuerpo actúa como soporte. Tanto el cuerpo como el vestido están interseccionados por las identidades y las ideologías. Puesto que nos vamos a mover en el campo de las identidades sexuales y de género, estas intersecciones desde las que aquí interpelaremos lo corporal son particularmente significantes.

Si utilizamos lo que podríamos denominar análisis estratigráfico encontraríamos distintos niveles de análisis que, conjunta o aisladamente, sitúan al cuerpo en el centro de la acción social. Un primer nivel de análisis sería el que se basa en la incorporación al atuendo de una prenda distintiva que nos ubica y categoriza como pertenecientes a una clase particular de personas y/o ideología particular. De igual modo que un cuerpo desnudo puede ser un elemento erótico o un elemento para/de protesta (véase Sutton, 2007) dependiendo tanto del contexto como de la mirada que conforma el cuerpo y le dota de significado (Berger 1972), también el contexto y las miradas reconfiguran los cuerpos vestidos de forma distinta, y en relación con las matrices cuerpo-poder. Los nazis estigmatizaban a los homosexuales mediante un triángulo rosa en sus pijamas de rayas: ese mismo triángulo es ahora utilizado en el Orgullo como símbolo de la opresión, represión y estigma y su significado ha sido revertido. Un mismo elemento adquiere sentido en relación con el contexto sociohistórico e ideológico en el que se enmarca.

En este sentido, la agencia, la apropiación por los sujetos de una prenda distintiva, puede convertir esa prenda en elemento significativo de la protesta. El ejemplo más claro que nos viene a la cabeza es el pañuelo blanco en la cabeza de las Madres de Mayo. Este pañuelo (hecho en un principio con tela de los pañales que se usaban para bebés, representando así a los hijos) las constituye como miembros de un grupo particular de personas que han vivido y experimentado una situación particular que quieren dar a conocer y solucionar<sup>3</sup>. Un trozo de tela se convierte en un símbolo reconocido globalmente.



**Figura 1.** Madres de Mayo (Fuente: Wikipedia - [http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madres\\_de\\_Plaza\\_de\\_Mayo](http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madres_de_Plaza_de_Mayo), consulta 14 mayo 2012)

Otro ejemplo sería el kufiyya (pañuelo palestino) que siempre lleva el diputado andaluz de IU Juan Manuel Sanchez Gordillo. Esta prenda se interpreta como elemento de expresión de su solidaridad con un pueblo oprimido y como símbolo de pertenencia a un colectivo particular. En este caso, se toma prestado un elemento que, sacado de su contexto, es recontextualizado y resignificado en un nuevo contexto.

Generalmente estas prendas o señales se sitúan en la parte superior del cuerpo, en la línea de visión, ya que tienen por objeto visibilizar aquello de lo que se convierten en símbolo. También la parte superior del cuerpo es el lugar en el que se sienten las emociones (Scribano, 2012). Los ejemplos de esta estrategia de identificación y/o protesta son innumerables y van desde el brazalete masculino que se utiliza(ba) en España como señal de luto o como rasgo identitario (caso de los judíos en la Europa nazi) hasta los marcadores diacríticos de la identidad (una txapela, por ejemplo).

El segundo nivel lo constituiría no llevar, sino "vestir" algún tipo de prenda (generalmente camisetas) con mensajes de protesta y/o reivindicativas. La diferencia entre "llevar" y "vestir", aunque sutil, es importante puesto que lo que se lleva es más fácil de quitar que lo que se viste. Existe un matiz de incorporación e inscripción corporal mayor en lo vestido que en lo llevado. Desde hace algunos años, se ha generalizado el uso de camisetas "customizadas" con mensajes claramente ideológicos. Los ejemplos también son múltiples y van de las camisetas amarillas en defensa de la enseñanza

pública con el texto “SOS ensenyament públic de qualitat” mostradas en Barcelona por funcionarios docentes en la manifestación del día 29 de mayo de 2012 a las camisetas personalizadas que algunos participantes llevan en las celebraciones del Orgullo. No obstante, el caso de Mónica Oltra con el que iniciábamos este texto se ha convertido en paradigmático, por convertir claramente el cuerpo en medio de comunicación mediante su uso como soporte de mensajes de texto.



**Figura 2.** Manifestación del Orgullo LGTB Barcelona 2008. (Fotografía: B. Enguix)



**Figura 3.** Día 20 Marzo 2012, Barcelona. (Fotografía: B. Enguix)

El tercer nivel analíticamente relevante lo constituye lo que podemos llamar “camisetas identificadoras”, que aquí vamos a distinguir de las anteriores. En la manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB que tiene lugar en Madrid cada año en torno al 28 de junio (en 2012 tendrá lugar el 30 de junio) se pueden distinguir claramente tres secciones. Como hemos descrito en otros lugares<sup>4</sup> la primera sección la forman los miembros de asociaciones LGTB procedentes de todo el territorio español; la segunda sección está formada por ciudadanos que participan en la marcha a nivel individual, y la tercera por las 35 carrozas, muchas de ellas esponsorizadas por empresas, que aportan la música, el baile y buena parte del componente festivo de la marcha. En un contexto marcado por el debate entre la reivindicación y la fiesta, sobre los modos apropiados de reivindicar y sobre la creciente comercialización e instrumentalización del evento –fundamentalmente por su rentabilidad en ingresos turísticos– los miembros de las asociaciones marchan portando camisetas de colores identificativas de su pertenencia a una asociación.

Existe un último nivel que enlaza el cuerpo con la protesta desde la perspectiva que aquí estamos desarrollando. Lo constituyen aquellos cuerpos que por sí mismos, y en virtud



de los procesos sociales de categorización y estereotipificación, se constituyen, vestidos o desvestidos, en símbolos de identidades particulares generalmente estigmatizadas<sup>5</sup>. Recientemente en España estamos asistiendo a un renacimiento de la discusión acerca del origen de la homosexualidad y a su vinculación con identidades particulares, que igual que en los debates decimonónicos, se estructura como un debate fuertemente medicalizado (discutiendo si la homosexualidad se puede o no curar)<sup>6</sup> y estereotipado. Esas identidades tienen en lo corporal su máxima expresión considerándose que las identidades sexuales y de género particulares se inscriben en cuerpos particulares y particularizables. Como "el orden social más ligado al cuerpo es el del sexo" (Pedraza, 2003: 21), el cuerpo es uno de los principales dispositivos, si no el principal, de las disposiciones de género y de sexualidad (Skeggs, 1997: 16).

Los cuerpos, en tanto construcciones sociohistóricas informan y son informados por las distintas configuraciones del sistema simbólico sexo/género/sexualidad vehiculando y performando identidades. Así, los cuerpos fueron decisivos cuando se consideraba que los homosexuales eran "hermafroditas" (Trumbach, 1993); cuando se buscaron en el cuerpo señales de travestismo u homosexualidad (siglos XVII y XVIII) y cuando el primer movimiento homosexual (creado en Alemania por Hirschfeld y Ulrichs en 1897) consideró que los homosexuales eran "un alma de mujer en cuerpo de hombre". Los cuerpos son también centrales para la constitución de las identidades fluidas y performadas *queer*.

*El cuerpo no es un "ser", sino un límite variable, una superficie cuya permeabilidad es regulada políticamente, una práctica significativa en el campo cultural de la jerarquía de género y la heterosexualidad.* (Butler 1990: 189)<sup>7</sup>.

Las intersecciones entre cuerpo, género, sexualidad e identidad evidenciadas en las marchas reivindicativas del Orgullo LGTB son relevantes para analizar cómo unos cuerpos, con su mera presencia en un contexto determinado, pueden convertirse en significantes de la protesta y en qué términos lo harán. En este caso, se trata, además, de una protesta con raíces fuertemente identitarias y profundamente corporales.

En este trabajo nos vamos a centrar especialmente en el segundo y tercer nivel, en el uso de determinadas prendas de vestir como vehículo de la protesta teniendo en cuenta que, en el caso de las asociaciones LGTB, la incorporación de la prenda no sólo significa la pertenencia a una asociación sino que tiene un componente identitario más fuerte que debe de ser leído en relación con el contexto en el que ocurre (el movimiento LGTB y las manifestaciones por el Orgullo)<sup>8</sup>. Como apunta Tejerina (2010: p.111 y ss) para algunos movimientos las cuestiones identitarias tienen más peso que para otros, tanto entre los miembros del movimiento como en sus relaciones hacia el exterior, porque juegan tanto con categorías de adscripción como con categorías de identificación que remiten a los conceptos de categorización social y de autocategorización y nos ilustran sobre los procesos de construcción de las identidades personales y colectivas. Es el caso del movimiento feminista y también del movimiento LGTB. Por eso, esos cuerpos atravesados por géneros y sexualidades que reivindican su igualdad en términos orgullosos, serán el eje en torno al que gire este texto.

## 2. Cuerpos vestidos: camisetas y protesta

El día 15 de febrero de 2012 Juan Cotino, presidente de las Cortes Valencianas, expulsó a la diputada de la coalición Compromís Mónica Oltra por llevar una camiseta que rezaba “no nos falta dinero: nos sobran chorizos”<sup>9</sup>. Este hecho guarda muchos paralelismos con la detención, en 2003 (justo antes de la segunda guerra contra Iraq) en un centro comercial de Albany (Nueva York), del abogado Stephen Downs por llevar una camiseta antibelicista que se había customizado en el propio centro comercial. La camiseta por su parte delantera rezaba “Peace on Earth” y por detrás “Give Peace a Chance” (Newman, 2004: 213). Estos dos hechos, apuntan a las posibilidades y limitaciones del activismo político en relación con el consumo de masas como Cohen apunta para el caso americano (Cohen, 2003). Ella utiliza ese caso para mostrar cómo los americanos pueden entender el consumo en términos políticos y han utilizado tácticas basadas en el consumo para luchar por derechos políticos.

En su página web (<http://www.monicaoltra.com/>)<sup>10</sup>, esta diputada de la tercera fuerza política en la Comunidad Valenciana, con seis diputados en las Cortes Valencianas, tiene una pestaña llamada “camisetas” en la que se despliegan los distintos modelos que ha utilizado en sus “shirt-ins” (Cohen, 2003)<sup>11</sup>. Desde 2009 hace uso de este recurso como denuncia de lo que ella considera como un estado de corrupción generalizada<sup>12</sup>.

Cuando se la pregunta al respecto<sup>13</sup> argumenta que lucir camisetas con mensajes de denuncia es “una manera de resistencia pacífica ante el atropello democrático”, (en *Eco-Diario.es.*) y que cree que esta forma de resistencia “sí sirve y los hemos puesto de los nervios”. En la charla que mantuvo online con *publico.es*, los numerosos comentarios a esta noticia tienen colores muy distintos y, por ejemplo, un comentario del 17/2/12 habla de esta estrategia como una “pantuflada”, “bobería absurda” y, además, “injusta”.



**Figura 4.** Mónica Oltra expulsada de las Cortes Valencianas. (Fuente: <http://ecodiario.economista.es/politica/noticias/3754496/02/12/Monica-Oltra-La-corrupcion-generalizada-en-Valencia-no-es-un-sambenito-injusto.html>, consulta 10 Mayo 2012)

El gesto de vestir una camiseta reivindicativa, o "camisetas denuncia" como se las denomina en el periódico valenciano *Las Provincias*, es un gesto, ante todo, de visibilidad. No obstante, no se trata de una estrategia política nueva.

Penney (2009) toma como punto de partida de este fenómeno en su fase actual la campaña presidencial del presidente Obama en 2008 pero vincula las camisetas con otros elementos reivindicativos (chapas, adhesivos, etc) que se han utilizado como presentaciones visuales de campañas políticas. En su trabajo, comenta que ya en 1948 se hicieron camisetas políticas pero sólo en talla de niño porque no se consideraba apropiado que un adulto las vistiera. La camiseta más antigua de la *Smithsonian Collection*, data de la campaña de Dewey (1948) y es infantil, igual que las pertenecientes a las campañas de Eisenhower (1952), Kennedy (1960) y Johnson (1964).

Para que la camiseta y sus imágenes se conviertan en medios de expresión social y política es necesario que las camisetas se conviertan en un elemento habitual del vestuario masculino adulto, por una parte, y que evolucione la industria de la impresión de tejidos, por otra. Eso ocurre de forma generalizada, según este autor, en los años setenta. También en esa década diseñadoras como las británicas Vivienne Westwood –icono punk– o Katherine Hammet (a inicios de los ochenta) produjeron camisetas con mensajes transgresores y subversivos (referencias ofensivas a la monarquía, o a la anarquía, a la homosexualidad). Desde los años ochenta, las camisetas políticas han ganado notoriedad.

No obstante fue durante la campaña de Obama 2008 cuando adquirieron una importancia desmesurada, probablemente por la emergencia de un candidato a la manera de una estrella del rock (Penny, 2009: 3). Pero hay mucho más:

*La apropiación de un bien de consumo como medio para los mensajes políticos no solo se dió en la campaña Presidencial de 2008 ni es propio sólo de los jóvenes: como afirmo en este ensayo, es parte de una cultura política moderna emergente inscrita en la lógica capitalista de la publicidad y el consumo... (que se inscribe) en las tensiones entre la necesidad de una esfera pública Habermasiana activa y el ascenso de un capitalismo de consumo potencialmente pasivo (Penney, 2009: 3).*

La combinación de consumo y exhibición (¿exhibicionismo?) que esta estrategia política presenta apunta a algunos de los rasgos fundamentales de la cultura norteamericana contemporánea, dominada por los medios, la publicidad, el consumo y una esfera pública democrática (Penney: 2009:7).

En el caso de Oltra se trata más de exhibición que de consumo: la originalidad de la estrategia desplegada en alguien de su posición en las Cortes le garantiza una presencia en los medios que su posición minoritaria (e izquierdista) en la política valenciana actual le niega. De ese modo, puede posicionarse y denunciar públicamente. No obstante, reconoce que con frecuencia le preguntan dónde se compra las camisetas y en alguna ocasión su Coalición las ha comercializado. Se trata de un producto relati-

vamente barato, con un altísimo poder de reclamo, que la ciudadanía, desencantada con la política formal, está incorporando cada vez más como estrategia de protesta a partir de unas estrategias muy similares a las utilizadas por el marketing viral y por la comunicación persuasiva en general (Penney, 2009).

En este sentido, las camisetas-denuncia serían elementos de empoderamiento, en la línea que apunta Daniel Miller. Para este autor, el consumo permite que la gente se piense como sujetos sociales y controle su propia realidad reapropiándose del mundo de los objetos materiales de nuevas maneras. Su concepto de “consumo positivo” parte de lo material para conferirle un nuevo significado, como es el caso. Esto rompe la relación binaria entre consumidor-productor además de personalizar los bienes (Miller, 1987 y Miller, 2008).

La cuestión a plantear sería hasta qué punto esta apropiación de los bienes facilita la acción social: aunque Miller, Cohen y Newman, consideran que sí la facilita, aún no sabemos con certeza qué nos traerán estas nuevas estrategias. Como Penney apunta (2009: 25):

*Claramente la apropiación de prácticas consumistas y de marketing supone riesgos para los fines políticos, por ejemplo la posible trivialización de lo político y la facilidad con que mensajes socialmente problemáticos se expongan en público. A pesar de sus inconvenientes las camisetas políticas han surgido en la campaña de 2008 como un medio de comunicación democrático y aunque su rol preciso sea ambiguo, su anclaje en los comportamientos socioculturales parece indicar que su uso crecerá en el futuro como un elemento clave de la vida política y cultural americana.*

### **3. Otras camisetas, otros cuerpos, otras identidades**

Las nuevas identidades colectivas (como la LGTB) han posicionado el cuerpo como un actor de importancia para entender los movimientos sociales (Sasson y Rapoport 2003: 379). En estos movimientos, los cuerpos son sujeto de la protesta y no solo portadores de la protesta y pueden llegar a minar o modificar algunas estructuras sociales y culturales. Es el caso, por ejemplo, del matrimonio homosexual.

El movimiento LGTB es considerado como la quintaesencia de los movimientos identitarios (Melucci, Duyvendak y Giugni en Bernstein, 1997: 532). Estos movimientos, según Mary Bernstein se definen tanto por los objetivos que persiguen y las estrategias que adoptan como por el hecho de compartir un rasgo como la etnicidad o el sexo. Según teóricos como Touraine, Cohen y Melucci, pretenden transformar los patrones culturales dominantes y/o ganar reconocimiento para las nuevas identidades sociales empleando estrategias expresivas (Bernstein, 1997: 533).

Las manifestaciones del orgullo son las máximas expresiones del activismo LGTB. Estas manifestaciones son consideradas como expresión de poder (Israel, 2006),

como parodia y reverso (Toscani, 2005), como ritual de inversión (Enguix, 2009) y son parte de complejos procesos de globalización y transnacionalización de lo identitario (Altman, 1996). Esta fiesta para afirmar el derecho a existir ha modificado la definición tradicional de la política como antes hizo el movimiento feminista (Eribon, 2000: 31).

Estas manifestaciones, entendidas como "acciones colectivas resultado de la redefinición del espacio público operado entre expresiones y episodios del conflicto" (Scribano, 2003: 85) ocupan las zonas centrales de las ciudades españolas donde se celebran y en el caso de Madrid, un espacio emblemático que va desde la Puerta de Alcalá hasta la plaza de España. La ocupación de este espacio por la marcha supone una suspensión del funcionamiento cotidiano que transgrede normas no articuladas, y desnaturaliza la heterosexualidad del espacio público (Johnston, 2001: 190).

La Manifestación Estatal del orgullo LGTB que cada año se celebra en Madrid se organiza en torno a tres ejes caracterizados por distintas "densidades significativas" de la acción colectiva que revalorizan el cuerpo en tanto modo primario de reconocimiento y autoreconocimiento (Scribano, 2003: 68).

El primer eje lo componen los miembros de las asociaciones LGTB de todo el Estado Español que acuden a esta convocatoria unitaria. En primer lugar marchan los miembros de COGAM<sup>14</sup> por ser la asociación anfitriona. El hecho de que las asociaciones LGTB marchen en primer lugar, tras la pancarta con el lema oficial que se ha consensuado en las reuniones previas de los miembros de la FELGTB<sup>15</sup> (reuniones a las que todas las asociaciones están invitadas –sean miembros o no) tiene una clara intencionalidad: la visibilización de las asociaciones tras un lema pretende dejar clara la voluntad política de la marcha. Los últimos lemas tras los que se ha marchado han sido: 2008 "Por la Visibilidad Lésbica"; 2009 " Por una Escuela sin armarios"; 2010 "Por la Igualdad Trans"; 2011 "Salud e Igualdad por Derecho". Tras la pancarta con el lema, portada por los presidentes de las asociaciones más importantes, líderes sindicales y políticos y hasta 2010 por la ministra de Igualdad, marcha una segunda pancarta contra el recurso del Partido Popular al matrimonio. A partir de ese momento, marchan las asociaciones, tras sus pancartas, y generalmente portando banderas identificativas del lugar del que proceden. Los miembros de cada asociación se se suelen vestir con una camiseta con un color de los que componen el arcoiris, que como es sabido, es el símbolo LGTB.

El segundo eje de la marcha son los participantes individuales: aquí se engloban desde paseantes hasta *drags*, que pueden o no portar (y ser) mensajes reivindicativos.

El tercer eje de la manifestación lo forman las aproximadamente 35 carrozas patrocinadas comercialmente que condensan los elementos más festivos de la marcha: música, baile y cuerpos espectaculares son los elementos más recurrentes.

Para entender la complejidad de esta manifestación identitaria con un cariz tan lúdico, es necesario poner en relación estos tres ejes con los organizadores de la manifestación. Desde hace algunos años en el Orgullo de Madrid (MADO), que concentra

numerosos actos, colaboran dos entidades activistas, COGAM y la FELGTB y una empresarial, AEGAL<sup>16</sup>. Aunque son los activistas los responsables de la manifestación Estatal, la presencia de los empresarios –y de las carrozas sponsorizadas- es objeto de fuertes críticas por los sectores más radicales del activismo LGTB-Q (como por ejemplo, La Acera del Frente)<sup>17</sup>.



**Figura 5.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011) (Foto: B. Enguix)



**Figura 6.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB. (2 julio 2011) (Foto: B. Enguix)

El juego de intersecciones entre unidad y diversidad, identidad (es) y estrategia (s), estereotipos y cuerpos, y visibilidad y ocultación está a su vez inscrito en un contexto de creciente comercialización, producción y consumo identitario. Todos estos elementos confieren a esta marcha su carácter como un “lugar complejo de protesta” (Kates, 2003: 6) al tiempo que se conjugan distintas densidades de significado que nos llevan a interrogarnos, como Ghaziani, sobre el papel de los conflictos internos en los movimientos sociales (2008).

El uso de camisetas reivindicativas no puede ser explicado independientemente de estas intersecciones ni de este contexto.

#### **4. El orgullo LGTB: cuerpos y visibilidad en el espacio público**

Mientras algunos dan por hecho que las marchas del Orgullo han evolucionado hacia lo carnavalesco y el espectáculo para heterosexuales, aguijoneadas fuertemente por el estímulo que suponen para el turismo internacional (véase Markwell, 2009; Johnston, 2005; Blidon, 2009; Kates, 2001 et al.) y que lo que antes era una marcha subversiva, ahora parece ser una manifestación festiva que mueve a un público heterogéneo (Blidon 2009: 3) los activistas españoles marchan con sus camisetas de colores<sup>18</sup>.

Para comprender las dinámicas de categorización y acción social que tienen lugar en estas manifestaciones es necesario superar la fácil dicotomización de sentidos que son con frecuencia presentados como contradictorios e incompatibles (lo festivo no es ni puede ser reivindicativo y a la inversa). Estas dinámicas siempre atravesadas por lo corporal y por los marcadores visuales que los cuerpos utilizan.



**Figura 7.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011) (Foto: B. Enguix)

Si comparamos la figura 7, con las figuras 5 y 6 que muestran a miembros de asociaciones, lo primero que nos viene a la cabeza es que los participantes aparecen uniformados. Igual que los miembros del Col.lectiu Lambda van todos con una camiseta de color rojo, los participantes en la carroza esponsorizada por el establecimiento comercial Medaigual van todos de blanco. No obstante, ni su posición en la marcha es la misma, ni su actitud corporal es la misma, ni aparentemente el significado de su acción es el mismo. Todos comparten un espacio, ocupan un espacio con un objetivo identitario: reivindicar el orgullo de ser o el derecho a la diversidad. Este punto de confluencia es común a todos los participantes en la Manifestación, independientemente de su atuendo, posición, filiación política, género, sexo, edad o clase, ya que, todos ellos, con su presencia, con sus cuerpos en un espacio determinado, un tiempo concreto y una significación concreta, actúan el "poder" LGTB al que tan frecuentemente aluden los líderes de las asociaciones<sup>19</sup>. A partir de este nudo gordiano, se empiezan a desarrollar múltiples ramificaciones que no son fáciles de desentrañar.

Una de ellas es lo que podríamos llamar el “privilegio histórico”: igual que los activistas marchan en primer lugar, también las carrozas esponsorizadas por negocios LGTB del barrio tienen prioridad ante otras para salir en la marcha. La importancia del activismo en la categorización interna y en la posición que se confiere a los grupos en la marcha, deja clara la intencionalidad y la historia de la Manifestación: por eso las camisetas de los activistas no son como las camisetas de Medaigual. Su densidad significativa es mucho mayor.

Portar camisetas del mismo color uniformiza a los manifestantes al tiempo que los empodera visibilizándolos. Esto es importante si tenemos en cuenta que en comparación con otros grupos, los activistas vestidos con camisetas monocromáticas son una minoría. Las tensiones entre lo individual y lo colectivo desaparecen aquí en aras de algo más importante, porque el objetivo básico de esta estrategia es visibilizar la “auténtica” racionalidad que hay tras la Manifestación: visibilizar el activismo LGTB y visibilizar las asociaciones, que pueden quedar ocultas tras lo festivo. Esa lógica se entiende como compatible con otras expresiones múltiples: de hecho, en todas las entrevistas realizadas, los discursos enfatizaban tanto el poder que se expresa mediante la manifestación como la diversidad.

Conklin, en un texto destacable, analiza cómo los activistas amazónicos analizados recurren al exotismo como estrategia de visibilización y de “autenticidad” de sus demandas, puesto que el exotismo es lo que se espera de ellos:

*Los nativos amazónicos que tanto sufrieron un día para ocultar los signos externos de su identidad indígena tras ropas occidentales producidas en cadena ahora proclaman su diferencia cultural con tocados, pintura corporal, cuentas y plumas. Muchos antropólogos han interpretado este revival del traje nativo como una expresión de afirmación política y renovado orgullo de ser indio (Turner 1992b:299). Y lo es. Pero también parece claro que este giro no sólo obedece a valores indígenas y dinámicas sociales internas, sino también a ideas foráneas, estéticas y expectativas sobre los indios. Algunos nativos sudamericanos han aprendido bien el discurso medioambiental occidental y reconceptualizan sus sistemas cosmológicos y ecológicos en términos occidentales como “respeto por la Madre Tierra”, “estar cercano a la naturaleza” y “proteger la diversidad de la biosfera” de igual modo que también han aprendido a usar códigos visuales occidentales para posicionarse políticamente (Conklin, 1997: 712)*

Los activistas en las manifestaciones LGTB adoptan justamente la estrategia contraria: puesto que las expectativas sobre ellos, relacionadas con los estereotipos sociales sobre la homosexualidad, apuntarían a la transgresión de género, lo espectacular, y lo festivo, adoptan una indumentaria muy neutra, que les une a su grupo al tiempo que les diferencia de los otros grupos participantes.

Que esta estrategia se vehicule mediante una prenda de vestir no es extraño: Langman considera que la identidad individual comienza en el género, la etnia y la localización del cuerpo en el sistema de estatus por edad pero que también la moda, el



vestido y los adornos son importantes para la identidad ya que ubican al actor dentro o fuera de un grupo particular (Langman, 2003: 226). La filósofa Elizabeth Grosz, a su vez, considera que marcar el cuerpo mediante el vestido, la ornamentación, el maquillaje o distintas prótesis inscribe al cuerpo en lógicas sociales particulares tanto como el músculo (Grosz, 1994, p. 144) puesto que las inscripciones físicas y sociales en la superficie del cuerpo dan unidad y coherencia a esa organización de la carne concreta y animada a la que llamamos cuerpo (Grosz, 1995, p. 104).

La importancia del vestido para la identidad por su capacidad de expresión de la resistencia, la subversión, el juego, y/o lo carnavalesco se encarna como en ningún otro lugar en las Manifestaciones del Orgullo de Madrid. El contraste entre activistas "uniformados" (que marchan también festivamente acompañados de globos, tambores y banderas), drags, personas anónimas vestidas de calle, disfraces y carrozas con cuerpos esculturales ejemplifica a la perfección la centralidad del cuerpo en la protesta, para la protesta y como protesta. Una protesta que se quiere hacer presente también en la sección más comercial (y más criticada) de la marcha, la de las carrozas. En 2011 desfiló por primera vez una carroza no esponsorizada por ningún establecimiento comercial, sino autogestionada por las llamadas "100 lesbianas visibles". Esta carroza llamaba la atención en primer lugar, porque rompía la abrumadora mayoría de participantes masculinos que hay en las carrozas; y, en segundo lugar, porque estaba cubierta casi en su totalidad, con mensajes textuales reivindicativos.

Mensajes como "Soy visible por las que no pudieron serlo", "soy lesbiana aunque no lo parezca", "Soy mujer en paro y lesbiana en activo" o "nuestro apoyo a las lesbianas de Uganda", junto con el uso generalizado de camisetas de color rosa, rompen la dicotómica brecha entre secciones reivindicativas (las primeras) y festivas de la marcha (las últimas) al introducir con fuerza elementos activistas en las carrozas que van más allá de la propia presencia de cuerpos particulares en la manifestación.



**Figura 8.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011). (Foto: B. Enguix)



**Figura 9.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011). (Foto: B. Enguix)

Los distintos modos de expresión y presentación mostrados en la Manifestación nos llevan a interrogarnos acerca de la pluralidad de estrategias de visibilización y a cuestionar las afirmaciones de Cover (2004:81), que considera que estas manifestaciones basadas en la visibilidad están vinculadas con estereotipos reconocibles por todos que fijan las imágenes corporales a ideas, atributos, comportamientos (sobre todo la inversión de género) o disposiciones. Añade que los mecanismos de identificación establecen un paralelismo entre imagen e idea y cuerpo y acción por el que se espera que un cuerpo dado, identificable y reconocible se comporte de modos particulares (Cover, 2004: 84). No obstante, en estas manifestaciones la pluralidad de imágenes (y por tanto de ideas, atributos y comportamientos) es abrumadora y precisamente con su presentación, los activistas pretenden romper las ideas estereotipadas. Aún así, los medios de comunicación suelen incidir en aquellas imágenes que más se adecúan a los estereotipos sociales. la diversidad .

En consecuencia, hay que inscribir las prácticas activistas de usar camisetas como elemento de uniformidad/diferencia en un contexto de construcciones identitarias fuertemente estereotipadas, tanto a nivel social como LGTB pero también en un contexto marcado por las tensiones entre asimilacionistas y radicales que han jalonado el recorrido de los movimientos LGTB a lo largo de su historia.

## 5. Cuerpos en tensión

Las tensiones entre los ejes formados por el continuo unidad y diversidad, identidad y estrategia, y asimilacionismo y radicalidad, permean lo corporal en su calidad de constituyente y expresión de lo identitario. Aunque los conflictos internos no destruyen los movimientos sociales, como Gamsón creía (Ghaziani, 2008) la expresión corporal de los conflictos se manifiesta también en el Orgullo. Hemos de volver a recordar la posición de los cuerpos en la marcha (inicial, media o final), sus posicionamientos corporales (portando banderas con una camiseta monocromática, o moviéndose al ritmo de la música) pero la forma de su propia corporalidad. Cada uno de los participantes configura de forma individual, pero también colectiva, la relación entre sujeto, espacio, discurso y sentido (Scribano, 2003).

Como apuntábamos, estas tensiones están relacionadas con los estereotipos, y con su reafirmación o su subversión. En el mundo occidental durante largos periodos de tiempo se consideró que la homosexualidad suponía una inversión del género –hombres afeminados y mujeres masculinas. Aunque según Altman, el movimiento gay moderno rompió esos esquemas a principios de los años 70 del pasado siglo, las *drags* actúan como recordatorio de la idea de que la subversión sexual es también subversión de género (Altman, 1996: 82).

Por esta razón, otros cuerpos presentes en el Orgullo también son significantes de la protesta: son cuerpos que reafirman al tiempo que transgreden las diferencias heteronormativas entre cuerpo, sexo, género y deseo (como los de las figuras 10 y 11) pero también cuerpos que llevan las fronteras entre los sexos, los géneros y los deseos

hasta sus límites performando cuerpos –y quizá identidades- radicales y rompiendo las categorizaciones sociales.



**Figura 10.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011). (Foto: B. Enguix)



**Figura 11.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011). (Foto: B. Enguix)

La multitud de cuerpos –aproximadamente un millón y medio en la convocatoria de 2011- visibilizando a veces la identidad con el otro y a veces la diferencia está atravesada por una paradoja intrínseca a la politización de las identidades. La dialéctica entre identidad y asimilación, entre unidad y diferencia es extremadamente compleja. Aunque algunas teóricas del movimiento gay en EE.UU como Elizabeth Armstrong consideran que este movimiento se caracteriza por haber construido la unidad a partir de la diferencia (Armstrong , 2002; Ghaziani, 2008), las tensiones entre ambos polos han permeado en todos los países el movimiento LGTB, que debe moverse entre el asimilacionismo (apelando a los derechos civiles de la ciudadanía en su condición de iguales) y el cuestionamiento revolucionario de las categorizaciones sociales (Arditi y Hequembourg, 1999; Bernstein, 1997; Epstein, 1987). Como Bourdieu apuntaba, la política de la sexualidad

*se condena a encerrarse en una de las antinomias más trágicas de la dominación simbólica: ¿cómo rebelarse contra una categorización socialmente impuesta si no es organizándose en una categoría construida de acuerdo con dicha categorización, y haciendo existir de ese modo las clasificaciones y restricciones a las que pretende resistirse (en lugar de, por ejemplo, combatir a favor de un nuevo orden sexual en el que la distinción entre los diferentes estatutos sexuales fuese indiferente)? (Bourdieu 2005: 145).*



**Figura 12.** Barcelona, Manifestación del Orgullo 2008



**Figura 13.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011). (Foto: B. Enguix)

En nuestro país, estas tensiones se manifiestan mediante la convocatoria de actos alternativos a lo que podríamos llamar “celebraciones oficialistas del Orgullo” amparadas por las asociaciones que forman parte de la FELGTB. Estas asociaciones ejemplifican lo que Bernstein llama el “abandono del énfasis en la diferencia respecto a la mayoría heterosexual a favor de una política moderada que enfatiza las similitudes con la mayoría heterosexual” (Bernstein, 1997: 532).

En Barcelona, el Orgullo siempre tuvo un tamiz radical hasta que en 2009 la organización de empresarios LGTB ACEGAL (junto con 27 asociaciones), organizó el Pride. Hasta 2011, y previsiblemente en el futuro, se mantiene en esta ciudad una manifestación que enlaza con el pasado junto con la manifestación del Pride (en distintos días). En Madrid, en 2010 y 2011, hubo manifestaciones alternativas por parte de las asociaciones que conforman el llamado Orgullo Crítico: estas asociaciones también participan en la marcha Estatal portando pancartas que denuncian la creciente mercantilización de las identidades<sup>20</sup> y dan cabida a las identidades queer y otras disidencias que cuestionan los paradigmas esencialistas:

*bisexuales y transgénero representan una amenaza no solo a las categorías identitarias que han sostenido las solidaridades gay y lesbiana, sino también a las agendas de derechos civiles que les han otorgado credibilidad en los sindicatos y otras esferas (Humphrey 1999: 224).*

No obstante, cabe preguntarse, igual que hizo uno de nuestros entrevistados, qué es más radical: ¿afirmar las identidades queer o luchar por el matrimonio igualitario? Ya en 1987, Epstein (1987: 46) consideraba necesario superar las distinciones fáciles entre estrategias reformistas y revolucionarias. Citando a Omi y Winant, afirmaba

que los movimientos por los derechos civiles tienen una dimensión inherentemente radical ya que al aseverar que la sociedad niega a las minorías sus derechos como grupos, cuestionan la legitimidad del orden social hegemónico.

En este contexto, portar camisetas monocromáticas que le identifican a uno como miembro de una asociación perteneciente a las organizaciones convocantes también le ubica respecto a las políticas de gestión de lo identitario y a las estrategias de acción.

## **6. Cuerpos, camisetas y movimiento: consideraciones finales**

A través de este recorrido por los cuerpos-protesta hemos analizado los cuerpos como entidades complejas insertas en contextos de significación que van de lo estereotipado a lo político, de lo individual a lo social, de la fiesta a la denuncia. Las manifestaciones del Orgullo LGTB son manifestaciones complejas y polisémicas en las que se evidencian las fronteras entre "objeto/sujeto, visibilidad/invisibilidad, gay/heterosexual, público/privado" (Van der Wal en Blidon, 2009: 12).

A partir de estos cuerpos concretos, y en particular de los cuerpos -protesta se articulan las demandas políticas, las estrategias de visibilización y los límites de las fronteras entre sexo-género y deseo, profundamente corporeizadas. La inscripción de esos cuerpos -desnudos o con camisetas- en contextos de significación concretos les otorga una densidad significativa en clave de protesta: les convierte en cuerpo-señal y cuerpo-signo. Pero si a ese contexto le sumamos la pertenencia a un grupo fuertemente marcado por lo identitario y por una tradición de estigma y categorización negativa, ese cuerpo-signo fácilmente se erige en cuerpo-símbolo. Esa sutil diferencia la muestran los ejemplos de los que aquí hemos hablado: las camisetas reivindicativas portadas por Mónica Oltra, activistas diversos y simpatizantes políticos se distinguen, en nuestra opinión, de aquellas otras portadas por activistas LGTB que les distinguen como activistas pero también como miembros de lo que antes se consideraba una "clase" especial de personas.

James Fernández (en Cruces, 1998: 233) considera que las manifestaciones son "argumentos de imágenes". En las manifestaciones del Orgullo, como hemos visto, entre esas imágenes encontramos objetos (camisetas), colores, expresiones verbales, acciones simbólicas clave (como entrar y salir de un armario, representación que tuvo lugar en el Orgullo de Barcelona en 2008) y, sobre todo, una utilización del cuerpo como mediador ideológico y reivindicativo. Esos cuerpos se pueden presentar como iguales o como diferentes respecto a los otros cuerpos participantes en la marcha y respecto a los cuerpos que no participan. Expresan así las tensiones entre los procesos de unidad y de diferencia interna y externa.

Según nuestros informantes, el uso de camisetas monocromáticas por parte de los activistas LGTB obedece al deseo de visibilizar (favoreciendo la identificación) y dar uniformidad a los miembros de asociaciones y funciona como un recordatorio de la

finalidad "real" de la Manifestación del Orgullo dando una imagen de unidad. Los índices y símbolos relacionados con la propia identidad sexual y con el posicionamiento ideológico producen imágenes "densas" que se refieren, confirman, cuestionan y subvierten las concepciones sociales y subjetivas sobre las identidades personales.

Tanto la propia estructura de la marcha (que prioriza el activismo en las posiciones espaciales que ocupan sujetos y carrozas y por tanto también en los tempos) como los procesos de control de la propia re/presentación de una comunidad difícilmente definida o identificada/identificable convierten al Orgullo en un contexto privilegiado para el análisis de las intersecciones entre identidades, ideologías y cuerpos. Además, los procesos múltiples de visibilización que allí tienen lugar inciden en los modos de categorización social y en el logro de las demandas.

No obstante, la pluralidad de estrategias de presentación, las tensiones y la diversidad, (palabra recurrentemente citada en las entrevistas como el verdadero motivo de la celebración del Orgullo), también nos muestran que los movimientos no son actores unitarios sino que la unidad es el resultado del intercambio, la negociación, la decisión y el conflicto (Scribano, 2003: 80): la construcción de un "nosotros" donde reconocerse y ser reconocido en el proceso de constitución de la identidad colectiva es permanente. En estas negociaciones sobre los objetivos y los medios a utilizar para conseguirlos, la utilización de camisetas identificativas se erige como el marcador de activismo LGTB más destacado a nivel individual: se trata de una estrategia que, puesta en contexto, revela y condensa las tensiones, contradicciones, oportunidades, metas y deseos de los cuerpos-protesta y de las identidades individuales y colectivas que los atraviesan.



**Figura 14.** Madrid, Manifestación Estatal del Orgullo LGTB (2 julio 2011) (Foto: B. Enquix)

## Apéndice metodológico

El presente trabajo es parte de un proyecto de investigación sobre las celebraciones del Orgullo LGTB en España. Con el fin de triangular los datos y partiendo de metodologías etnográficas, el trabajo se basa en distintas técnicas cualitativas de análisis como las entrevistas en profundidad y la observación participante. Desde 2008 se están realizando entrevistas tanto a los líderes y militantes de asociaciones LGTB como a líderes de asociaciones empresariales LGTB y a responsables políticos, puesto que estos son los tres ejes en torno a los que gravita la organización del Orgullo. Hasta el momento he entrevistado a doce personas, algunas de ellas en tres ocasiones. También se han realizado diez entrevistas a hombres y mujeres gays (tanto militantes como no militantes, y participantes como no participantes en las celebraciones del Orgullo). Desde 2008 hasta 2011 he presenciado –y en ocasiones participado– en las manifestaciones de Madrid, Barcelona y Sevilla y documentado mediante técnicas propias de la antropología visual (fotografía y vídeo) estos eventos en los que he mantenido también numerosas charlas formales e informales con participantes y público. El análisis de contenido de las noticias publicadas sobre el tema en los medios de comunicación masivos y en los new media también ha sido utilizado como técnica de obtención de datos. Se han analizado también los manifiestos y otros documentos internos de las organizaciones objeto de estudio y la literatura disponible sobre el tema.

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## Notas

- 1 Lesbianas, Gays, Transexuales y bisexuales.
- 2 <http://www.abc.es/20120217/espana/abci-monica-oltra-camisetas-201202161636.html>  
"Mónica Oltra, los dardos de "lady samarreta" Consulta 16 abril 2012
- 3 Este es el primer caso moderno de uso de un atuendo particular como protesta. El comienzo del reclamo nació como una iniciativa de madres de detenidos y desaparecidos el 30 de abril de 1977 en Buenos Aires. Su objetivo inicial era poder tener una audiencia con el presidente de facto argentino Jorge Rafael Videla. Para ello se reunieron en la Plaza de Mayo y efectuaron una manifestación pública pacífica pidiendo saber el paradero de sus hijos. La elección de la Plaza de Mayo se debe a que está situada frente a la Casa Rosada, sede de la Presidencia y lugar donde tradicionalmente se han efectuado manifestaciones políticas. (de la wikipedia)
- 4 véase Enguix, 2009 y Enguix, 2011.
- 5 Introducimos aquí una distinción entre los términos "desvestido" y "desnudo" que sigue a la que hace Reyero en su texto sobre el tema del desnudo en el arte:  
"El término desvestidas no indica sólo la existencia de un cuerpo, sino, sobre todo, incide en la circunstancia que ha llevado hasta él; subraya el hecho de haber prescindido intencionada y circunstancialmente del vestido, un elemento consustancial al ser humano en su contexto social y cultural. Frente a la plenitud del desnudo se revela la intencionalidad de quien se encuentra desvestida. En esa transformación se generan todas las preguntas" (2009: 29).
- 6 Véase [http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/04/07/actualidad/1333805578\\_322427.html](http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/04/07/actualidad/1333805578_322427.html) (consulta 5 de mayo 2012) y <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20120416/54284529778/obispo-alcala-la-homosexualidad-puede-resolverse-con-terapia-apropiada.html> (consulta 5 mayo 2012) [http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2010/06/23/actualidad/1277244002\\_850215.html](http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2010/06/23/actualidad/1277244002_850215.html) [http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/10/24/actualidad/1319461581\\_932182.html](http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/10/24/actualidad/1319461581_932182.html) (todas consultadas el 5 mayo 2012)
- 7 Las traducciones son de la autora.
- 8 Aunque aquí no vamos a desarrollar este tema no podemos dejar de señalar cuán interesante es la presencia de cuerpos transgénero y transexuales en las manifestaciones del Orgullo en relación con el cuerpo como signo (y no sólo símbolo) de la protesta).
- 9 Véase <http://ecodiario.eleconomista.es/politica/noticias/3754496/02/12/Monica-Oltra-La-corrupcion-generalizada-en-Valencia-no-es-un-sambenito-injusto.html> (consulta 16 abril 2012) y <http://www.lasprovincias.es/20120215/mas-actualidad/politica/camisetola-corts-monica-201202151339.html> (consulta 16 abril 2012)
- 10 consultada el 8 de mayo 2012
- 11 En Internet existen numerosas entradas sobre esta diputada. De hecho, buena parte de su fama se debe a la utilización de medios alternativos de información. Así, en youtube se pueden consultar las entrevistas que se le hicieron en el programa de Andreu Buenafuente <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BP-vvnc-9Tw> y en el programa Salvados, de la Sexta <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BP-vvnc-9Tw> (consultadas el 16 abril 2012)
- 12 Algunas fuentes que pueden consultarse sobre el tema son:
  1. "Mónica Oltra, los dardos de "lady samarreta"  
<http://www.abc.es/20120217/espana/abci-monica-oltra-camisetas-201202161636.html>  
(Consulta 16 abril 2012)

2. Galería de fotos de camisetas en la web del periódico valenciano Levante (consulta 16 abril 2012) <http://comunidad.levante-emv.com/galeria-multimedia/Comunitat-Valenciana/camisetas-Monica-Oltra/15222/11.html>
3. El periódico valenciano Las Provincias habla de las camisetas denuncia y ofrece también una galería de fotos <http://www.lasprovincias.es/multimedia/fotos/ultimos/93192-monica-oltra-camisetas-denuncia-0.html> (consulta 16 abril 2012)
- 13** Véase <http://ecodiario.eleconomista.es/politica/noticias/3754496/02/12/Monica-Oltra-La-corrupcion-generalizada-en-Valencia-no-es-un-sambenito-injusto.html> (consulta 16 abril 2012) y <http://charlas.publico.es/monica-oltra-2012-03-23> (consulta 8 mayo 2012)
- 14** Colectivo de Lesbianas, Gays, Transexuales y bisexuales de Madrid.
- 15** Federación Estatal de Lesbianas, Gays, Transexuales y bisexuales.
- 16** Asociación de Empresarios y Profesionales para Gays y Lesbianas de Madrid y su comunidad.
- 17** <http://aceradelfrente.blogspot.com.es/> (consulta 15 Mayo 2012)
- 18** Cabe aclarar que no todos los activistas marchan con su asociación, aunque sí todos los que marchan con su asociación y uniformados con la camiseta son activistas. Muchos activistas van a la marcha en grupos de amigos, o tras la carroza de su establecimiento favorito.
- 19** Durante los últimos años he realizado entrevistas a Toni Poveda (ahora vicepresidente y antes presidente de la FELGTB), Miguel Angel Gonzalez (presidente de COGAM cuando le entrevisté), Mar Cambrollé (presidenta de GIRASOL) y Pedro Zerolo (concejal en el Ayto de Madrid) entre otros.
- 20** Para Markwell y Waitt (2009: 146) "una vez que un festival incorpora un enfoque empresarial destinado a animar a la gente a gastar dinero, el sentimiento de identidad colectiva puede devenir ilusorio, o como mucho, un ejercicio de relaciones públicas".

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Reivindicación  
Vestido

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## “Gender Technology” And “Self-Technologies”: An Analysis of Discourses and Practices of Contemporary Self-Help

Lara Facioli

**Abstract:** This paper is the result of a wider research, developed in my master degree course, sponsored by Foundation for Research Support of São Paulo (Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa Do Estado de São Paulo). In this paper, I intend to understand the dynamic of subjectivity existing in the contemporaneous phenomenon called Self-Help, directly towards to women, keeping in mind that this is an effective “gender technology” since it is an instrument of cultural imposition with the objective of maintaining the unequal gender relationship. I will have a brief analysis considering my lines of research: the discourse present in the top five books sold in Brazil about this subject; the debate forums of one of the researched websites – *Woman’s Purse* (Bolsa Mulher); and the follow-up interviews with the users of the previously mentioned website. Among the main objectives, I would highlight the critical mapping offered by contemporaneous Self-Help to people that use it and by ethnography, explore in what ways these people make use of these “Self-Technologies”. Testimonials of important historical aspects of the interviewed people were collected with the objective of understanding how and when these discourses have become part of their lives and what role these discourses have to their process of subjectivity (re)elaboration. This is also about bringing to debate the specific characteristics the therapeutic discourse assumes nationwide with the advent of technologies such as the internet and also within the network dynamics, since they create unprecedented possibilities of sociability in what concerns to the Self and the affections. I have in mind that these “subjectivity management discourses” can move together with de development of capitalism and a possible individuality mercantilization.

**Keywords:** Self-Help, Gender Technology, emotions

### 1. Introduction

The contemporaneous self-help discourse has been the focus, at least in last ten years, of several researches conducted both in Brazil<sup>1</sup> – the researcher’s country of origin – and in other specific contexts such as the American<sup>2</sup> and the Japanese society<sup>3</sup>. Although the of this subject has shown to be wide in an environment that goes beyond the national borders, after almost two years working in this thematic, It was possible to notice the importance of observing these discourses’ particularities

in every specific context, what permits a more focused analysis in the sense of the subjects' actions and less in the structures of denomination that would superimpose on them. The sociological debate on the subject–structure relation deserves to be retaken within this research, in order to introduce my problematic.

After delimiting a research question and search for an area in which I could conduct an effective ethnographic work, I looked into some texts that approach the contemporaneous phenomenon of self-help. One of the present theorists, well liked by the canonical Sociology who talks about this thematic is Anthony Giddens. The author does not have a specific work about this subject, however, he sets self-help as an index that permits measuring the modernity's reflexivity – a key concept in his research line: "Not only scientific studies, but all kind of manuals, therapeutical and self help works contribute to the modernity's reflexivity" (Giddens, 1997:10). According to the author, talking about this thematic does not indicate that the traditions are fading away, but just the opposite, "the concept refers to a social order in which the tradition change its status. In global cosmopolitan context, the traditions need to defend themselves, since they are continually being contested. It is particularly important, in this sense, the fact that the "modernity's hidden substrate involving traditions that affect the genders, the family, the local communities and other aspects of daily social life, has been exposed and submitted to public discussion." (Giddens, 1997:8).

The reflexivity process reaches the most elementary level in the social life, the intimacy, represented by Giddens by what he calls "pure relationship": a pure relationship has nothing to do with sexual purity, being a more restrictive concept than merely descriptive. "It refers to a situation in which the subject enters a social relation only because of the relation itself, due to what can be derived from each person in the maintenance of the association with each other, and that only continues while both parts consider they are extracting enough satisfaction from this relation individually, in order to remain in it." (Giddens, 1993:69)

So in this sense in order to think over the high level of the modernity's reflexivity in the privacy circle, Giddens points that in opposition to the traditional arranged marriages, the pure relation would be the one in which the individuals would be able to think about their course, as to maintain it only until the moment the marriage would stop corresponding to their interests. One of the examples of the reflective actions would be the self-help books and groups, instruments that would permit the subject a reflection over his life and past, in order to provide him/her with tools that would make it possible to (re)think and modify the present action in his affective life as well – it is the tradition put in check in the light of constant renewed information.

Another line of thought, which approaches the same theme, points to a partially or totally opposed view to that of Giddens, that means to a non-reflective subject or a less reflective subject, that would be under the control of these discourses and practices. Such texts end up approaching in a very simplistic way the complexity of dealing with cultural products, such as these manuals "the seductive and fascinating discourse of the authors expresses a wonderful world and full of achievements, this way, this

discourse acts directly in the subjects' imaginary [...] the readers, once seduced by the persuasive discourse, usually present a casuist behavior by auto-alienation (auto-alienation desire), in detriment of the thought's critical (Chagas, 2002:152). Another author that discuss about the issue though not in a so fixed way as mentioned above is Francisco Rüdiger, who identifies a general movement in the modern culture, through which the "seek for salvation within a group gave place to the lonely seek for the satisfaction of the self-interest". (Rüdiger, 1995:238).

When I first accessed the search field on a website that is part of my project – *Woman's Purse* – and when I started to establish contact and conversation with the users, I could notice that the relations established were far more complex than the theories which were possible to fit in; the structures are not so rigid and the discourses are not followed strictly and neither are the subjects are so reflective. So, how to manipulate the available theory in order to deal with such a complex reality? "If traditionally, Sociology request us to exert our sagacity and our surveillance in the art of distinction (between the daily world's life and the daily word's colonization), the challenge that lies ahead is to exert the same surveillance in a social world that systematically disarticulates these distinctions." (Illouz, 2011:156)

In this text, I intend to carry out the exercise of discussing with the literature that has been produced on this topic, pointing out the particularities of the approached context as well as the main markers that appear in it. Furthermore, I attempt to show how are the gender issues mobilized within selected area to perform the ethnography, since I noticed that the mobilization of these differences is central to this topic. Finally, dare to show how these discourses of "management of subjectivity" can walk linked to the development of capitalism and of possible mercantilization of individuality. I will do this through an approach that always seeks to problematize the boundaries of the subject's actions in the face of structures.

## **2. "In *Woman's Purse* it is possible to keep Lots of Things" Social Class, Religion and Private Life**

I first accessed the *Woman's Purse* in January 2011 and what struck me on the site is the constant possibility of establishing contact with the users of the platform. Besides having as objective the promotion of an analysis of self-help books, I established as a prerequisite of my work, the contact with people who consumed this material, and the Internet has proved to be a favorable environment for such an approach. Only by follow up conversations, by MSN (Messenger) and Facebook, I could observe the specific discourses of self-help, mutual-help or "self care", which are mobilized in a platform: first, clearly directed and composed by a female public, second, strongly supported within the sphere of what we can call lower middle class, unlikely what point researched carried out with public of other countries, and third, that it is located in a country like Brazil and this way, permits the approach of particular characteristics. Now I will briefly speak about the markers, which show the characteristic of the consuming public in the context of these discourses analyzed.

## 2.1. Social Class, Profession, Financial Dependency/Independency

Regarding social class, although my questions about the individual and family income were not so direct, data on occupation, activities of relatives with whom they live with, and presence or absence of financial problems, allowed me to have contact with the economic situation of my collaborators.

The survey of the Moroccan sociologist Eva Illouz points out that:

*“When we face the feelings as central characters in the history of capitalism and modernity, the conventional division between a public sphere devoid of affection and a private sphere saturated of them begins to dissolve, as it starts to become evident that, throughout the twentieth century, men and women of the middle class were taken to focus intensely on their affective lives, both at work and family, using similar techniques to bring the self and their relationships with others to the forefront”.* (Illouz, 2011:11)

The author makes clear in the course of her work context of the collected data: Illouz (Illouz, 2008) carried out an intense field research among people coming from the North American upper-middle class, especially in business and within the university environment. In *Saving the Modern Soul - Therapy, Emotions and the Culture of Self-help*, she establishes an interesting parallel between the working class and upper-middle class, so that it shows that they lack a common language of the self-organization, and that the first, does not carry a therapeutic ethos.

In my work, specifically, I could notice that the discourse of self-help and mutual-help is so widespread, that it has a corresponding weight in the popular classes that have accessed the internet in the last years<sup>4</sup> in Brazil. Among the interviewed people, none of them can be considered upper-middle class. This is not to the class concept addressed in Illouz's work of, but rather to bring out the data that will permit to think about the financial situation of these people, in the environment of this research.

By all the conversations I have had so far, I notice that although many of my respondents have college degrees and are employed, the low family income, the need for help at home or even pay for college, does not guarantee them full autonomy and neither an excellent financial status. As a consequence, the nuclear family has just been constituted as a space where it is possible to join the incomes and ensure the family's livelihood.

Many have reported me to exercise paid work since the age allowed for that, due to the low family income. Among younger women, between 20 and 25 years, some are already mothers and saw in the marriage the possibility of leaving the parental home. Those who have completed higher education, in their majority, graduated from private colleges, which highlights some difficulty in dedicating exclusively to the studies. Among the housewives, I noticed on their part an attempt to explain to me why such a condition, or even an attempt to show that they are happy with the housework. When



asked what they did, I just heard "I am a happy housewife" or "I am a housewife, because I didn't want to put my kids in daycare."

It is interesting to notice that, a considerable number of people interviewed so far spends most of his days on the Internet, even on working hours. The fact of working in administration, with a computer, facilitates the continued use of social networks, and some reported having started to use the Internet in their workplace. Women who stay home - for example, Rita, who has health problems - and who chose to care for the children, uses the Internet as one of the only possible distractions in everyday household: *The first PC I had in my house is fifteen years, I only played "patience", it was for my children. I just started to use it after I got sick, to relax, this was three years ago. Today I find it 'unbelievable' (laughs). (Rita)*

It is noticeable that in the researched space, the participation of my interlocutors in debate forums with mutual-help constantly occurs. There are many forums on exposure of personal problems, love, or even loving professionals and such debates render a great variety of advices. Thus, the therapeutic ethos in Brazil is not something restricted to the upper classes, and not even is the ability to establish reflexivity about everyday problems.

Besides the problematic issues of class, it is about questioning the relation established between the discourses of self-help - as examples of reflexivity - and the advance of modernity, as did Giddens and even Illouz. The application of these theories, in the case of this research proves to be quite problematic in a context such as the Brazilian one, where the development process were not similar to that of European and American countries. As stated by Sergio Costa:

*"The first objection is raised to this operation is of a methodological nature and concerns the way Giddens associates reflexivity to the high modernity, without taking the care of examining the extent to which the same type of reflective rationality could emerge in contexts that, in the author's read cannot be treated as the high modernity" (Costa, 2006:71)*

Thus, it does not exist, at least in the context of the research presented here, the possibility of establishing generalizations and implement a plan of a transnational sociology because "one of the central marks of the contemporaneous global transformation is precisely the expansion of non-Western forms of modernity" (Costa, 2006:79). Such abstraction allows us to think, empirically, the necessity of providing data that address the particularity of reflective processes in non-European or American countries, being the self-help consumed and produced in Brazil, one of the exemplars of this specificity. The fact of evidencing that the therapeutic ethos, in Brazil, is present in the discourse of lower-middle classes, already shows a criticism of the universalizing formats of sociological theory, specifically in Giddens, leaving aside the contextualization of his theory and its concepts.

## 2.2. Religion and Therapeutic Discourse

One aspect that is evident to whom approaches the personal lives of the people of *Woman's Purse* is the strong religious attachment. Among the respondents, only one of them said to be in doubt about the existence of God. A large portion is practicing Christian fellowship and some left for not agreeing with the doctrine imposed by the church, however, continue to attend the meetings and act in the youth group. Among those with stronger belief, some have reported that they've had some unusual experiences with God in a difficult time in life and have been alert to the call to a religious mission of helping others.

The point to be emphasized here is that the self-help and mutual-help discourse in which are embedded in the website or away from it (many of them have the habit of reading self-help books, though not classify them as such), is not unrelated to the religious discourse as shown in some studies already mentioned in the text<sup>5</sup>. Rather, the discourse of the subject who help the self, that is responsible for the own happiness, lives in harmony with the appeal for God's power. The self-help read by these people, contrary to that assumed in my research, does not consist mainly of relationship manuals (though these have been mentioned during some conversations), the most commented books were written by Augusto Cury.

Cury is a psychiatrist, physician and psychotherapist, has sold over 10 million books in Brazil and is translated around the world. The author's books, most often cited by those who are part of the website: *From Mad genius and everyone has a little bit and Fascinating Construction of the self*, both containing metaphors that would aid in understanding the human mind and train it for a better life. Cury also makes constant use of religious metaphors, including those related to the image of Jesus Christ; on his website, when making comments of the book *The Secret of the Our Father* (O Segredo do Pai Nosso) it appears the following text:

*"I investigated the personality of Jesus as a researcher in psychology and the most skeptical of the atheists. I expected to find an imaginary person, a bearer of smaller ideas or a religious hero manufactured in the minds of some Galileans. But I was amazed at this man, the human intellect is impossible to manufacture it. Jesus oxygenated his emotions and relaxed in extremely tense situations. He could think before acting on any environments in which any intellectual would react instinctively and aggressively. As the Master Teacher, he was able to offer life and stimulate the art of thinking even when the world collapsed on him. The result of this research was the collection "Christ's Intelligence Analysis".*

Perhaps mixing a scientific discourse coming from his formation in psychiatric medicine, with that collected through the analysis of Christian religious materials, his books are so popular among the university and religious users of the website. They also showed an interesting coherence between what they believe to be the usefulness of therapeutic discourse and that stemming from the religious appeal. The therapy,

would be responsible for the support to the practical problems of self-esteem and lack of understanding of reality that surrounds us, since religion and contact with God, would be responsible to solve the spiritual dilemmas that are impossible to be recognized by humans. By what was told by one of the interlocutors, it is possible to clarify the contributions that each of the speeches gives to the subjectivity processes, which includes the users of the website:

*What causes much confusion, most of times, is the lack of knowledge and the alienation of some religious that think there are no psychological problems and that they are all spiritual. The spiritual problems are, most of times, impossible to be recognized by human eyes. When everything seems to go wrong, as closed financial doors and you enter your room and find the strength to overcome through faith [...], and the psychological, which the self-help books help are when you're down with some relationship, sometimes nothing goes right, you cannot get a boyfriend, for example, and think the problem is with you. And your self-esteem goes down, then you take a self-help book and realize that the problem is not with you, that the problem is that men are very different from us women and that if it did not work yet, it is because the right person has not showed up yet. So, your ego, your psychological as well as your self-esteem go up. (Leticia)*

It is observed, therefore, that there is no conflict between a rational subject, responsible for his life and that helps himself, to one who would be under the reins of the divine will. God, in this discourse, appears as greater force, able to contribute to the resolution of spiritual issues and as support for an individual who has already set his path rationally.

### 2.3. Intimate Life

Among the respondents, a significant part of them date or have been married for some time and have children. Among those who date, almost all want to marry and have children; one of them told me about the preparations for her wedding to take place later this year and said that always wished to be a good wife and mother, searching for ways to improve for the day that would have the opportunity to realize his dream:

*There are so many things that can turn a person into a good woman. I try to first consider behavior, attitudes and then useful knowledge [...] I think a good wife has to know to take good care of her husband, she needs great wisdom, besides knowledge to be a good wife. The Holy Bible itself teaches us that the wisdom woman builds his house but the foolish, with her own hands destroy it. So I think the woman is the family foundation. (Leticia)*

Only two of them reported the desire not to have children, for not having the profile of caring for a child and due to living conditions during childhood, culminating in the end the desire for motherhood. Childhood is something constantly taken up by them when

they talk about their love lives. Today's problems are justified by past events. Such speech is the clear result of the popularization of therapeutic practices and statements, or even psychoanalytic.

Something interesting to be exposed, regarding the aspect of relationships, whether they are developed within the dating or marriage refers to the reduction of the circle of friends by women. Many of them reported having few friends who they go out and talk about personal matters. The ones that are dating reported to have as friends only those that are common to the boyfriend, and when they fight or break up, they have to fight hard in order to recover the friends from the times of single or make new friends. It is frequent the complaint about the self-effacement during the early dating and, regarding this subject, they showed moments of great reflexivity about how they wish to conduct the future relationships so that that does not happen. It is noteworthy that even single women told me about their restricted circle of friends, being the web site a space where they made more friends than on the personal sphere.

Among married women with children, it is common to both the ones that work outside the home, and those who are housewives, to claim that the care of their children's education is their role. Women still appear as those who are responsible for the transmission of values. Some reported serious family problems which they preferred to settle on their own without the participation of their husbands, because they were busy with work or traveling, and also due to the lack of understanding, which they judged to be part of the universe of partners: *in the beginning I faced this fight alone, my husband worked in Sao Paulo and would not let him concerned about the situation at home (Andreia), I could not talk to my husband yet, there is always something preventing me to do so, I know that my husband will go against it, it will not be easy to convince him, Men are clueless! (Julia)*<sup>6</sup>.

In this context, it is possible to note the opposite of what Giddens would call confluent love. This would be based on "equality in emotional giving and receiving and the more it is this way, any bond of love approaches much to the prototype of pure relationship" (Giddens, 1993:73). Thus, love would grow without the burden of tradition reaching the time when both would have equal profit from their relationship. According to Giddens, "a good relationship is also the one in which those involved are equal and autonomous, the topics are discussed, rather than set aside and there is no violence" (Giddens 1998: 125). In the context of this research, although the women interviewed have been very thoughtful about their relationships, they still find some difficulty in developing an effective dialogue with their partners. Thus, it is to understand the need to approach the gender markers in the intimate sphere without establishing, as did Giddens, generalizations of any kind. So, I return to Sergio Costa and his criticism to Giddens methodology regarding how the latter observes the sphere of intimacy, among other things:

*From the normative political standpoint, the author's analysis are also problematic since they geographically situate the advance of reflexivity in the North Atlantic societies, attributing to these societies, implicitly, the monopoly on the definition of what is good life. That is, as the author defines "good relationship"*

*and "good policy" from particular historical experiences, he ranks the cultural ways of life, incurring an evolutionist theory in which an accurately and decisively way he condemned in his theory of structuration. So in this sense, it surpasses a contingent sequence of transformations of particular societies, to a historical scale, in which, the tradition follows the modernity, and this, the high modernity. (Costa, 2006:72)*

The development of reflexivity in the sphere of intimacy outlined by Giddens, is presented as inseparable from a particular history. Such reflexivity is part of the northern European middle-class, situated within the context of the sixties and seventies. It is, therefore, asking in which other context the individual autonomy or egalitarian couples deserve the same emphasis? And from this issue, we focus on the markers of gender and sexuality, which are mobilized in these specific contexts.

### 3. Subjectivity and Gender in the Discourses of Self-Help

When accessing the website *Woman's Purse* on the Internet, not only the mission<sup>7</sup>, its name and logo, but also its colors and subjects are clearly targeted to a specific audience, women. Among the highlighted issues on the website we name: loving relationships, fashion, cooking, makeup and hair, family and motherhood. On the other hand, areas with male content, proved to be quite different from the ones on *Womans Purse*, that is, they are less focused on the emotional counseling and are less focused on the issues of love relationships and affection. I mention below the quotation from the presentation of a masculine website, "Papo de Homem" Men's Talk, popular space with considerable number of access and comments on posts:

*We talk about beer, impotence, ties, whiskey, piercing, video games, cholesterol, leadership, truco (Brazilian card game), guitars, orgasm, caipirinha (a typical Brazilian cocktail), classic cars, rice, ballroom dancing, coffee and meditation [...] we deviate from the obvious, We aim above. If everybody talks about slapping the butt during sex, we talk about slapping in the face; if describing the preliminary and list the 69 positions for "warming the relationship", we criticize these two myths. While some suggest positive thinking and ambition, we accept the failures.<sup>8</sup>*

We can notice, by the speech mentioned above and by what has been said on the *Woman's Purse* those that are described as trapped in an emotional universe, needing guidance to control feelings are women. Thesis that is proven with the analysis of some books<sup>9</sup> classified as self-help and directed to a female audience. I could notice at first that, despite the central concern of the books in pointing to the seek and maintenance of a serious lasting and relationship between heterosexual couples, the starting point is what some researches carried out in other countries call "love yourself," that is, self-esteem and "the love for yourself" are the basis for a successful relationships with men. Therefore, I agree with Rebecca Hazleden:

*"Despite the claims of the books to be concerned with enabling the reader to find a partner and/or sustain a romantic relationship, most of the material contained within them is concerned not with love, nor with meeting and attracting potential partners, but with the care for, and nurturance of, the self."* (HAZLEDEN, 2003:415)

Phrases like "belittling yourself prevents a healthy relationship", "know your strengths and weaknesses and like your own company" (Argov, 2009:8) and "a woman who has recovered from loving too much is protective of herself and her well-being" (NORWOOD, 2009:289), are often seen in works mentioned before. It is observed so far that this self-care, although it reflects the attempt to suppress any desire that would prejudice the self and which would cause suffering, it is, entirely, directed towards an adequation to what is expected by the partner, "men need a mental challenge" (Argov, 2009:14) and such challenge has nothing to do with specialized knowledge and rational, but with the behavior of not allowing the man to take over the control of her partner's life. We also notice, as remarkable characteristic of printed self-help, the exposition of an essentialist vision of what is to be a man or woman, being the latter those that remain linked to the emotional aspects of personality - the "nice ones" - and that need to take the reins of their own existence becoming powerful women - the bitches.

The self-help, therefore, consists of a significant representative of the construction of female subjectivity view, through the time, as likely to receive fitness, advices since the universe to which women are judged to belong to, is the one facing the emotional aspects of subjectivity, intuition, feelings and therefore they are more likely to "lose their heads":

*The reader (presumably) purchases a relationship manual because she has concerns about her relationship (or lack thereof), but the authors commonly 'shape up' the issue (Hodges, 2001), and begin by providing the reader with a new problem. The reader is therefore provided with a new ethical identity: where she had mistakenly thought that her relationship was the problem, she is persuaded that it is her identity as an authentic self that is the issue, and that she has an ethical obligation to this self [...] the acquisition of self-knowledge are the work to be performed, in order to create a new ethical identity, new patterns of behaviour and more appropriate emotional responses.* (HAZLEDEN, 2003:416)

The discussion of gender markers, proved to be fundamental both in the midst of self-help books, and speeches among the website's users. We understand "gender" here as "the result of various social technologies, discourses and everyday practices and not a property of bodies existing a priori in humans [...] it consists of self-representations produced in the subjects due to practices, discourses and socio-cultural institutions dedicated to the production of men and women" (LAURETIS, 1994:229). The self-help discourses, as proponents of the development of a feminine subjectivity process based on given cultural patterns and naturalized, lead us to use the con-

cept "technology of gender" as a technology itself, since it permits the understanding of the representation that women have of themselves. Such approach, however, does not fix the subjects within pre-established structures, but allows for an analysis of ruptures and continuities regarding the mobilization of gender differences within this universe.

Although the website as well as self-help books, seem to be very strict when addressing the women's image they try to build, the users articulate discourses much more complex and detailed, as I show in the following examples, which expose a text taken from a blog announced by the website – Letters to a Needy Woman (Cartas a Uma Mulher Carente) written by Ney, doctor, businessman and writer - and excerpts of conversations I had with my interlocutors:

*Obviously, the female brain is also extremely sensitive to all kinds of stimuli, but with a bias quite different from the male brain. He instinctively responds to any stimulus that reflects risk to his family. This is the priority. The female brain was structured to ensure the survival of the species at any price and any woman who has children will agree to it without much difficulty. The other stimuli, including sex, that lead men to commit blunders that can quickly destroy what they have built up over a lifetime, must be in the background for women absolutely negligible.<sup>10</sup>*

Although many of my interlocutors consume the self-help discourse, not only from the website, but also by reading books, the reflection about what these texts bear is quite intense. It is not simply a product of intense consumption of Cultural Industry, as would say some Frankfurtians; it's an interesting dynamic of reflexivity where thinking about gender roles is possible and desirable.

*Lara says: You and your boyfriend argue sometimes as you told me before... Can you notice any practical difference when you fight... or even in the way you solve your problems?*

*Tatiane says: Yes. I am much more understanding and he is much more agitated and nervous. To solve the problems, I have to think a lot in how will I act, what does not happen when we are drinking, both of us get extremely angry... what most of the times leads to a break up. Our most serious problems only get solved after a fight and a momentary break up. That is when he misses me and think over what happened, then we talk, and as he really likes me and is afraid of being without me he gives in a little too. Apart from that, to solve any problem, I must be very cautious and smart in order to bypass the situations so we can stay well.ot*

*Lara Says: So, he is more stubborn? You are the one who thinks? Or both reflect a lot about the relationship?*

*Tatiane says: yes he is a lot more. He will just think over when he sees the possibility of not having me anymore... than he gets frightened and stop to think.*

*Lara Says: Why do you think we are different from them in this respect?*

*Tatiane says: I think that's because men were not born to think much, since young, they are educated to be practical and solve situations immediately, without being sen-*

timental. For example, when a little boy falls off bike, in most cases, parents say “get up, try again you are a man, it did not hurt anything.” But if the situation is with a girl, the parents run up to her and ask if she is well, if she got injured, they take her on lap, say that it will pass. Parents mostly educate the boys to be tough and practical and girls as fragile, which make them more sentimental.

Lara says: Do you agree that there are differences between men’s and women’s behavior in a love relationship?

Liliane says: Funnily enough, yesterday I watched that Brazilian movie *Small Loving Dictionary* (*Pequeno Dicionário Amoroso*) and earlier today I was talking with a friend about this, and what I commented on a topic on *Woman’s Purse* about this topic. I am kind of lazy about certain things that people point in romantic relationships, like: it is the man’s fault when it comes to the routine, accommodation and others. The genders actually behave differently, but this is caused by a bad education that we have through the life.

Lara says: And have you ever had any kind of problem or argument in relationships that point to this bad education?

Liliane says: of course ... when I dated I didn’t see it this way, I lived the ignorance, without knowing how to deal with the situation, letting the other to define things the relationship ended, and after long years after the end, I could understand a lot of things. What I have sinned in the relationship, the attitudes I provoked... as time passed I started rethinking things, the actions and reactions of everything, I have that in my mind [...] and even today I evaluate situations in which I advice in this way, looking at both the side and behavior of each, what led to such consequences.

Lara says: And what kind of attitude have you mistakenly taken?

Liliane say: I nullified myself<sup>1</sup>

While there is an appeal to justify cultural differences by biologizing discourses on the blog, users reflect on their relationships as a result of social relations that maintain gender inequalities. Although the first user pointed, initially to discourse based on biological justifications – *I think that’s because men were not born to think too much* – she then presents a fruitful discussion on how she considers that such differences are constructed.

#### **4. In a *Woman’s Purse*, there is Room for Lots of Money**

It took me a while to understand all aspects and stages of production of this kind of website, perhaps by simple ingenuity, since the users themselves understand its dynamics and summarize – *we give them a lot of money*. Giving the answer to feminine “problems” proved to be quite profitable as I will show now.

Below is the introduction given on the website towards the company responsible for the *Woman’s Purse*:

*Ran by ideasnet - single venture capital<sup>12</sup> firm listed on the Bovespa (São Paulo’s State Stock Exchange) – Woman’s Purse is the largest group of female digital media in Latin America. Leader in Brazil (source: IBOPE NetRatings) and*



*with presence in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, the group holds 16 properties, which together account for 9.5 million registered users and 14 million unique visitors per month, which represents approximately 30% of all women online in the country. Over the last three years, the Woman's Purse had net revenue CAGR<sup>13</sup> of 363%, far exceeding the growth of its main revenue source - digital advertising - in the country. From a simple female portal, it became the largest group of female communication platform in Latin America. Over 250 major brands pass through our website every year.*

I cannot say with conviction the website's real profit. I tried to contact people from production, but I got no answer. However, by observing obstinately the website, I could notice the sponsors' dynamics and, one day, while looking for further information about their maintenance, their profits and investors I found a link explaining how to advertise in the "Woman's Purse", which consisted of a real advertising material to sponsors and also pointed to the supposed positive aspects of the sponsorship. I will rapidly stick to some of these points, because I believe it is essential to pay attention to how the website is presented to its future advertisers, both to understand the economic relations that are placed, as well as to understand how women are exposed as a promising public in the sense of the mass consumption of a variety of products.

Among the products offered by the website, that are part of this advertising material, some are free, such as access to TV Purse (*Bolsa TV*), where it is possible to watch videos on various subjects - gourmet, fashion, home and family, love and sex, etc. - and the Women's University that offers courses in finance, food, fashion, beauty, photography, decoration and relationships, sponsored and defined together with the advertiser. However, others are paid, such as the Guide Star (*Estrela Guia*), in which in order to consume the products integrally, the user has to pay a fee of R\$ 44.70 for a three month subscription. According to the website's propaganda, with the Guide Star, the person would have access to "astrology, self-knowledge and esotericism" which would help her "get the answer to the most relevant questions in her life."

Then, the file displays a table of all the sponsors of the website. Altogether, around 70 sponsorships were accounted ranging from manufacturers of beauty products, to bank institutions and auto industries. Further, to confirm the profitability of investing in the female audience, it is launched a series of data gathered from the Harvard Business Review, of 2009, which points the annual consumption of the world's women: they annually spend 20 trillion dollars in shopping and may spend 28 trillion in five years.

I found the material used by producers of the website which leads the reader to think that women need specific products, produced only for them, which emphasizes gender inequality also in the field of consumption. The delineation of a well-established female identity, as that represented by the "Wonder Woman", able to develop an un-numbered set of activities as working outside home, engaging in business and still have time to take care of the body and the family, ensures the development of profitable niche markets and the company has just to have eyes on what this promising

audience wishes:

*Companies continue to offer them poorly conceived products and services and outdated marketing narratives that promote female stereotypes. Look at the automotive industry. Cars are designed for speed—not utility, which is what really matters to women.<sup>14</sup>*

By what I could observe while finding online news about the group responsible for *Woman's Purse*, the profitability data tends to only increase. In the news published on the Exame Magazine, by Editora Abril (important Brazilian publisher, responsible for publishing innumerous famous magazines) it is stated that after the merge of *Woman's Purse* with E-Media, a company that owns sites as Women Vila (Vila Mulher), Cyber Cook and Cyber Diet, it is expected to increase the audience of the site in 40% as well as the increase of its revenue to 40 million reais<sup>15</sup> until 2013.

In discussing the relationship between capitalism and emotions, I adopt the following theoretical perspective:

*The contemporary poststructuralist theories have done much to innovate, methodologically, creating new epistemes to a complexity that requires more fluid conceptions, nuanced and multifaceted of the social relationships, challenging some of binomials and dichotomies that have played such an important role in the "classic" moment (and structuralist) of our disciplines and allowing us to get closer to the dynamics of life that has always run a few steps ahead of our efforts to capture them. (Adelman, 2011:119)*

One of the dichotomies disrupted by these theories, which I am particularly interested in this work, is the one which opposes market and emotions and that states the economic interests as a constant threat to the affective sphere, whether grounded in love relationships or friendship. Within what we call "affective sphere," we can insert the *Woman's Purse*, since the basis of discourses developed on the website is to consolidate relations of affectivity with people that are there. The website is responsible for a clear process of sociability underpinned by the exchange of experiences around emotional issues, such as problems in the sphere of love relationships. The self-help and mutual-help discourses, of emotional and psychological support, as not only texts, but as concrete social practice, also exercised daily by website's users, deal with advertisements for the sale of the car, but also with advertisements for beauty products, bank accounts and motor vehicles. People who frequent this space are daily facing the possibility of exercising their purchasing power with just one click and a credit card, and the products purchased are not only material things, are also "spiritual goods".

The author Eva Illouz, based on empirical research already mentioned in this text has found that "capitalism walked alongside with the creation of an affective culture intensely specialized, and that when we focus on this dimension - their feelings, so to say - we may find ourselves in a position to reveal another order in the social organization of capitalism" (Illouz, 2011:12).

My goal in this text has also been questioning the discourse that separates the sphere of the affections and emotions in its surroundings, as have done authors like Sergio Costa (2005) in the elaboration of his discussion on romantic love. Costa recovers an interpretation on the issue claiming it as private form of communication that outlines and detaches lovers from the context in which they are involved. To the author, what defines love interaction is not the "consumption of romantic rituals, as stated by critical theory and cultural studies, but the singular sense that lovers attribute to their relationship and shared activities" (Costa, 2005: 73), this way, it does not matter if lovers are bombarded by such services and ideologies of the market, the experience of love would not be irreducible to this sphere. Disagreeing with Costa does not mean doing the opposite, in other words, to reduce the sphere of emotions to the market logic, it is about sharing the reflections of those who think critically the interrelationships between these two spheres. In this sense I regard the term of Affective Capitalism of Illouz:

*A culture in which the affective discourses and practices and economic shape each other, thereby producing what I see as a broad and comprehensive movement in which affection becomes an essential aspect of the economic behavior, and in which the emotional life - especially the middle class - follows the logic of economic relations and trade (Illouz, 2011:12)*

As shown, we can understand much better the relations established in the *Woman's Purse* and it is not strange anymore, if the strangeness may be possible, the selling products that we call "emotional", claiming to guarantee a solution to the issues of life and feelings. We can also understand how the harmonic coexistence takes place between market and the process of socialization based on affectivity.

## 5. Conclusions

I tried to approach in this text the discourses and practices of self-help, establishing agreements and disagreements with what is being produced within the contemporary sociology on this topic. I chose to expose the particularities of my research field, using them to establish a criticism of the methodologies and theories that assume the claim to universality, ignoring the context in which they are produced. I showed how these discourses are presented as effective technologies of gender, which, however, are not imposed to subjects unconditionally and thus, brought the debate some of the interlocutors' statements that point to a break with the fixity of the analyzed website or even with self-help books, heavily consumed in this space.

The range of the discussion shows the relevance of studying a phenomenon such as self-help, which in addition to bringing up old sociological dilemmas as the subject- structure matter and make clear the need for questioning the consolidation of a transnational sociology, European and Eurocentric, allows us think about how the development of capitalism cannot be discussed without considering the consolidation of a particular affective culture.

## Methodological Appendix

I started my fieldwork on the Internet in January 2011, where I found a dozen sites that would allow me contact with the self-help discourse. However, since I intended to an analysis of books with such content, I thought it would be important to establish contact with readers of such works. Therefore, before choosing the internet, I assiduously attended bookstores in my area of study and housing, where I noticed to be difficult to establish contact with the consuming public. One of my informants, the seller of a huge library in São Paulo, with whom I could establish a more intense dialogue, told me that part of the public who wishes to buy such books, does so in a hidden and discreet, and added, "It must be due to the embarrassment for taking a self-help book" (Seller). That is, I should seek other means to access these people, so I could guarantee greater secrecy about their identities.

So in this sense, *Woman's Purse* appeared by chance in one of my searches on the Internet, and what caught my attention was the fact that on the platform, there were spaces for debates among users as well as the possibility of creating personal web pages, with profiles, photos and diaries. This way, I made my profile with some basic information and began to establish contacts, calling people to chat via Instant Messengers, where I presented the research objectives.

I decided not to conduct interviews with these people, although I had with me a basic script of questions that would guide me. The dialogues established, I called "follow-up conversations," since they happened several times and, at times, free of research demands. I have always sought to make clear the confidentiality of the research, saying I would not mention my collaborators' real name, so the names that appear in this text are fictitious.

Between the months of December and March 2012, I intensified the establishment of contact with the website's users due to the establishment, on Facebook, of a group of people at the site. The group kept the name *Woman's Purse*, and counts with the participation of 60 people, of whom I spoke directly with 24.

To keep the work on the Internet tried to think that the role of the researcher in online researches is to keep in mind that these are "performances of identity, in which the internet users are just one moment of the performance [...] so, it is noticed that, not establishing a face to face contact, besides adding new analytical points for the researcher, allows a field deepening different from that in which physical presence is involved." (PARREIRAS, 2008: 37).

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## Notes

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- 1 Francisco Rüdger (1995), Arnaldo Chagas (2002)
- 2 Eva Illouz (2011)
- 3 Arlie Russell Hochschild, Kazuko Tanaka (2003)
- 4 When I say “last year”, I think specifically in the last decade. A considerable part of my interlocutors entered the Internet in the year two thousand.
- 5 I speak here specifically of researches such as Rüdger Francisco (1995), Arnaldo Chagas (2002) and Eva Illouz (2011). The first two point how self-help gains strength in a context of individualism and of a collapse of religious and group values. As Illouz, does not speak about the subject of religion among the American middle class searched, which she researches; let us assume that in such ambient, these discourses don't have the strength that they have when we talk about Brazil and lower-middle class.
- 6 Both told me about a problem they face, respectively, with a teenager son and stepson, who I preferred not to expose in this work
- 7 Make the women's life easier and happier. We always need to listen to their wishes and understand their needs, so that we can offer a solution.
- 8 <http://papodehomem.com.br/>
- 9 They Are: Why men love bitches and Women Who Love Too Much.
- 10 <http://blog.Bolsademulher.com/neymario/>
- 11 dialogues by Messenger (MSN)
- 12 Looking for the meaning of venture capital Company, I found on a government website ([http://www.venturecapital.gov.br/fm/cadastro\\_empreededores.asp](http://www.venturecapital.gov.br/fm/cadastro_empreededores.asp)) the simplest definition: Venture capital is a type private investment, through which they purchase shareholding in companies that present opportunities for exponential growth. Investors participate directly in the risks as well as in the leverage of the business, adding value through further administrative guidance, commercial and financial. After the company's cycle of expansion, the investor disposes of its interest in the business, selling it to other investors or companies.
- 13 The acronym means CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate
- 14 <http://hbr.org/2009/09/the-female-economy/ar/1>
- 15 Brazilian currency

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# New Actors on Stage: Analysis of the Emergent Forms of Collective Action in the European Context

Dora Fonseca<sup>1</sup>

**Summary:** In this article our focus will be on the civil society's responses triggered by the imposition of the societies of austerity. The analysis will be centred on an emergent collective actor – the *indignados* –, the conditions that fostered its conformation and the processes involved in the construction of its identity. To accomplish this task we retrieved Ernesto Laclau's political logic of *populism* and the concept of *political* developed by Chantal Mouffe and applied them to the construction of the *indignados*' identity. This process is conceived in terms of the constitution of antagonistic frontiers which divide the *social* into two opposing fields. This conception allows us to develop an analysis based on the notion of social conflict, as well as the reflection about the potentialities embodied by this new social actor, despite their presentation by the dominant discourse as utopic and, therefore, impossible. In this proposal, it is our aim to provide a better understanding of what is at stake when talking about the *indignados* and a clearer perception of the political dimension of both struggle and resistance.

**Keywords:** antagonism, antagonistic frontier, civil society, conflict, crisis, State.

## 1. Introduction

The European context has, over the last year, been a privileged stage of emergence of new collective actors. These show distinctive features, both in what concerns the modes of action adopted and the distance kept from the institutional dynamics. Their constitution takes place within a context of profound changes that reveals the difficulties of contemporary societies in accommodating a number of processes of modernization. The unstoppable growth of unemployment, the dismantling of the welfare state, the "dictatorship" of markets, the segmentation of labor markets, among other things, are imposing on societies transformations which have clear consequences on social relations and on previously constructed solidarities.

The European context (meaning the European Union countries) and its welfare state tradition are being affected by the proliferation of the market ideologies and new production policies. The first, based on the imposition of an ever rising profit rates, subsumes all human production to profitability goals, ignoring and trying to overcome the ontological dimension of work as a human activity. The second, sustained by the reduction of the work force by means of new technological solutions and by decentralization policies directed at lowering the costs of production (the relocation of produc-



tion in areas of the globe with more flexible or almost non-existent labor legislation that allows a substantial lowering of production costs and therefore a higher profit margin), has strongly affected the job structure that had prevailed in these countries through the last quarter of the century.

Another tendency that can be easily identified nowadays, and of key importance given its centrality to the structure of European societies, is the "shrinking" of the welfare state. Even though this tendency isn't exactly new (it has begun in the 1970's), now it presents itself with a renewed impetus and a clearer goal: reduce the State to its minimum. The challenges posed by the "new order" are difficult to overcome, as well as undesirable, and represent a civilizational regression. The necessity of alternatives is urgent and competes with the idea of inevitability installed. The institutional responses to the crisis are clearly insufficient, lack credibility and face a set of limitations imposed by the recent labour reforms and by the austerity's logic. The new regime moves apace to establish itself as a rule.

Despite the widespread idea that the ongoing changes are inevitable – a re-edition of the thatcherian maxim "there's no alternative" –, the civil society, or at least a part of it, does not conform to the fatalism of this political discourse aligned with the neo-liberal project, and has been giving proofs of an increasing dynamism and capacity of self-organization. The European territory is becoming more and more the *locus* of emergence of political actors and processes of contentious dynamics.

The collective actor we are referring to arises in the specific context of the *society of austerity*. Ferreira (2012) defines austerity as an *action - word* that means the process of implementation of political and economic measures that lead to discipline and economic, social and cultural restraint. The application of this concept is inseparable from the idea of *inevitability*. What is unique about austerity is the recognition and acceptance of the idea that it is through individuals and their objective and subjective deprivation that the solutions to the crisis can be found, despite the fact that the causes can be placed at the level of the functioning of financial markets, public debt and the economic and social models adopted over the past year.

The crisis is being used as argument and instrument of subordination of workers, governments and even entire societies to the will of global capitalism markets. According to the author, whose views we share, the austerity measures implemented have as consequence the deepening of labour precarity and fragility. In this context, the responsibility to "pay" for the crisis lies within the individuals and their families. Citizens are urged to compromise, to commit themselves to a proactive attitude and to accept sacrifices. It seems that the responsibility to pay for the crisis lies first and foremost on the individual, through the application of austerity measures, whether by means of wage and social benefits cuts or by both the suppression of conflict forms and labour rights (Serrano and Chafa, 2011 cit in Ferreira, 2012). This situation has triggered a reaction by civil society.

## 2. Civil Society and Crisis

In line with what has been mentioned in the previous section, our focus will be on the way the civil society responds to the emergence and spread of the multifaceted crisis. This context has also triggered numerous solidarity expressions all around the world<sup>2</sup>. Before starting to analyse more profoundly the reaction displayed, it is pertinent to explain what we mean by civil society. For that we will rely on the theoretical approach developed by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (2000).

The concept of civil society defines a field threatened by the logic of administrative and market mechanisms and at the same time provides the main area of potential expansion of democracy under the so-called democratic – liberal regimes. Before going any further in the argument, we must clarify to what we are referring to when this concept is used. The authors mentioned above emphasize the importance of differentiating civil society from political society of parties, political organizations, public policy (eg, parliaments), and from an economic society composed of organizations of production and distribution.

In general, the political and economic society arise from the civil society and share with it some of their forms of organization and communication, and “constitutes itself by means of institutionalized rights (in particular, political and property rights), which are a continuation of the fabric of rights that ensure modern civil society” (idem, 2010: 9). What distinguishes civil society actors from political and economic actors is, first of all, the fact that the latter participate directly in state power and economic production, trying to control them.

According to the authors, the forces of capitalist market economy can pose as much danger for social solidarity, social justice and empowerment of citizens, as for the administrative power. However, they safeguard that, in the context of liberal democracies, it would be a mistake to consider from the outset the opposition of civil society to the state and the economy. The antagonistic relationship of civil society, or of its actors, with the economy or the State only arises when the mediations between them fail or when political and economic institutions act in order to isolate both the decision making processes and who decides the degree of influence of organizations and social initiatives, as well as forms of public discussion.

The concreteness of the “threat” is visible in the case of the countries that are being intervened by the triad IMF, ECB and European Commission (that is the case of Portugal), or where this possibility arises in the near future (the case of Spain which is currently experiencing cuts in public expenses as a way of avoiding an intervention of that type). The countries that asked for external assistance are being forced to carry out a set of structural changes in return for financial support and most of the times, if not always, this has as consequence a substantial loss of national autonomy in what concerns political and economical matters. This is the context in which the *antagonism* opposing civil society, state and markets is drawn – that is, an antagonistic relation between the civil society and a societal-oriented neoliberal project – and where takes place the emergence of the collective actors under study: the *indignados*<sup>3</sup>.

What we want to point out, in order to open the discussion for the following sections, is that the "resurgence" of civil society - understood as the emergence of new collective actors, which operates through the establishment of an antagonism towards the economic and political society - is a direct response to the application of a new logic of governance aimed at the establishment of a *society of austerity*. At the centre of the debate are the oppositions defined by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato: representative democracy vs. participative democracy, and welfare state defence vs. anti-neo-conservative statism.

### 3. The *Indignados*

In the previous sections was given a general account of the context in which emerge the *indignados*. The countries where its presence is acknowledged are those whose societies are being transformed into *societies of austerity*. In Europe, the more accurate examples are those of Portugal and Spain.

The *indignados* arise in Spain with the protest on the 15<sup>th</sup> May 2011, convened in more than 50 Spanish cities, and are directly or indirectly influenced by the Portuguese example of the 12<sup>th</sup> March of the same year, when hundreds of thousands of people poured onto the streets in protest in several Portuguese cities. They were led by their dissatisfaction with the political class, the successive Plans of Stability and Growth imposed by the government, in short, they reclaimed their future and refused the lack of perspectives. The protest became known as *Geração À Rasca*, which is an expression that means something in between *generation without future* and *generation with problems*. It was joined by all those who identified themselves with the idea of a generation that is facing a compromised future and therefore sees its perspectives being limited.

In general, the *indignados'* protest is directed against the system and, in particular, against its political institutions and actors as they consider that it doesn't represent citizens' interests. The *indignados* believe they are excluded by the system. The central themes are the limits of the representative democratic system, the rising unemployment, the labor reform, the adjustment plans and their relation with poverty increase. All together, these problems work on to frustrate the constructed expectations about the future, especially those of social mobility. Young people, with levels of education and cultural capital higher than those of their father's generation, strongly believe that they are destined to achieve a higher place on the social pyramid. So, the current situation represents the ultimate contradiction in what concerns the expectations they had and which were thought to be an unshaken truth. Actually, they are facing the possibility of a downgrading of both social status and life conditions. We believe this contradiction between the objective and subjective positions to be at the core centre of the reasons for mobilization

The *indignados* present themselves as being anti - political parties. They are sceptical about the way democracy functions nowadays and, therefore, put under hard surveillance the action of both political institutions and their actors. They claim to be

promoters of a democracy largely based on the direct participation of citizens at the decision making level, and, simultaneously proclaim the “citizens’ right to the streets” (“the street is ours!”). Public spaces’ occupation is seen as an important strategy of “struggle and organized resistance against the system”, thus integrated in their *repertoire*. We could almost refer to this form of action as a materialized image of the collective actor as such given that the *indignados* become *it* by means of their action. The appropriation of public spaces – by means of protests and *popular assemblies* – re-creates the concept of *agora* and establishes the connection between the recuperation of public spaces by the citizens and the very *essence* of democracy.

The Spanish mobilization, its traces and timing, were strongly influenced by the events that had taken place in Portugal shortly before. It is perceptible a kind of contagion effect, suggesting what we later on will refer to as the modular character of the mobilization. Many young people were enthusiastic about the audacity of the Spanish *indignados*, who, against police repression, persisted on occupying a number of *plazas* (Spanish expression for squares) all around the country, being the most important occupation the one of *Plaza del Sol* in Madrid. It didn’t take long for the Portuguese to follow this example and a few days later it took place the occupation of Rossio – an important *plaza* in the Portuguese capital city, Lisbon. These *plazas*’ occupations became known as *acampadas*, that is, a kind of urban camping which recovers and actualizes a well known form of public protest: the *sit in*.

In both countries, the *acampadas* played a central role. They attracted more and more people to the sphere of influence of the *indignados*, all curious about the form the protest acquired as it assumed distinctive features from the traditional forms of action displayed by actors such as the trade unions. The *acampada* of Rossio provided the base for the conformation of movements’ platforms, mostly inspired by the Spanish example and its claim of “real democracy, now!”. The goals and forms of organization are similar in both cases, so we see no need to particularize neither the Spanish nor the Portuguese case, given what is aimed at this work.

In what concerns the organization and composition of the *indignados*, some aspects are central to their understanding. The *indignados* follow collective action’s contemporary tendencies, which are visible in the amplification of horizontal networks, the reticular form and in a strong reliance on the use of new technologies as a means of communication (phone, internet and social networks). Thus, cyberactivism is central component to their action, in such a way that it has enabled *indignation*’s territorial widespread, putting in evidence its modular character, which is in line with contemporary tendencies (Melucci, 1996; Tarrow, 1998).

The composition of this collective actor is strongly influenced by the new organization of work marked by trends of reorganization of the work process guided by flexibility requirements, encompassing mainly young people, women, immigrants, unemployed and those who are somehow affected by market’s refusal of rigidity<sup>4</sup>. It is not unreasonable to say that middle classes are the sector inside which indignation arises mostly. In that sense, it would be appropriate to consider the *indignados* in their re-

lation with this sector of the population. According to Estanque (2012: 97), "the new sectors of precarious workers and unemployed highly qualified that have participation in the current *indignados* movement" are "fighting against a system that frustrates their perspectives of stabilization in a middle class life pattern". This is connected with what Klaus Eder (1993) refers to when he identifies the new social movements with an expression of the *petite bourgeoisie*. For him,

*"this type of collective protest is based on an objective structure which is characteristic of the petite bourgeoisie (...) it falls between all stools. It is not the upper class, neither the cultural class which represents the 'high' society nor the economic upper class. It is objectively locked out from the top, because it does not have the power to make its needs socially accepted and legitimate. (...) On the other hand, thanks to its control over the means of production and its state-guaranteed jobs, it did not become part of the proletariat. On the contrary, it can set itself apart from the bottom end of the class scale by condemning the instrumentalism of the lower classes and establishing its own needs as the true needs"* (Eder, 1993: 145).

He links this ambiguity concerning the objective structure to the *habitus* of the new middle classes which is determined by its situation in between the upper and the lower classes. According to this reasoning, the *habitus* of this middle class subject is objectively determined by the defence of individualization, which is imposed upon him by the status system. He defines the dilemma of the *petit-bourgeoisie habitus* as consisting in the incapacity of identification with either the objective position or the collective identity of the (upper) bourgeoisie; or with the objective position or the collective identity of the proletariat. In parts of the middle classes are taking place downgrading processes which are bringing the status position of these groups closer to that of the proletariat. The author connects this situation with the emergence of forms of *petit-bourgeois radicalism* such as the *political pressure group* which stems from problems connected with the crisis of the welfare state, the frustration and disillusionment with the party system and with bureaucratization. This set of problems can be easily identified in between the demands voiced by the *indignados* but, in spite of that, the *indignados* go well beyond being a political pressure group as they incorporate other sets of questions concerning the production and reproduction of society.

#### 4. Indignation, the Construction of a *People* and Antagonism

Until now we have tried to draw a brief and general picture of the *indignados* and the conditions underlying their emergence. As mentioned, our goal is to understand the way the identity of *indignados* is constructed and to establish to what extent it can be considered a political actor. To undertake this task we rely on the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who have treated this subject in depth.

The *indignados* are a complex object of analysis. Nevertheless, at first glance, it might look like that we're dealing with a set of very different people that are protesting against

very different things. Despite their complexity, the *indignados*' demands seem to be too vague, and many times are understood as mere positioning against the system without proposing any solutions whatsoever. In this analysis we try to contradict this kind of simplistic vision, which is very common and reduces both the *indignados* and indignation to mere expressions of discontent and revolt. We intent to accomplish this task by demonstrating the process underlying the constitution of the collective actor in question and its meaning taking into account the specific context within which it occurs.

In its analysis of populism, Ernesto Laclau (2005) relies on three core categories in order to assess the construction of a *people* (*pueblo* in the original): *discourse*, *empty signifiers* and *hegemony*, and *rhetoric*. Even though when we speak of the *indignados* we are not speaking of a case of populism in the sense handled by Laclau, we consider these categories to be adequate for the analysis of our object. The first category is *discourse*, which is defined as the primary field of objectivity's construction and is conceived as a complex of elements within which relations play a constitutive role. This means that the elements do not precede the relational complex, instead they are built through it; therefore *relations* play a central role. Consequently, the construction of the actor *indignados* cannot be dissociated neither from the relational context within which it takes place - *the society of austerity* - nor from the actors which act in it - the State, the markets and the international institutions.

The second category - *empty signifiers and hegemony* - requires a complex exercise. First, in order to understand conceptually a *totality* is necessary to differentiate it from *other thing* distinct from it, and this *other thing* can only be a difference that fails in accomplishing its totalizing role, as it is *internal* rather than *external*. The only way to constitute a true exterior will be if the *outside* is an excluded one (something the *totality* expels from within it in order to constitute itself). Given that equivalence is what subverts difference, all identity is constructed within the tension between the logics of equivalence and difference. The *totality* is always a failed one, impossible and necessary at the same time.

The *indignados* formation takes place by means of their differentiation from the dominant discourse, which is here understood as the institutions and practices that convey the austerity discourse, being the last intimately associated with the idea of *inevitability*. If they represent a *difference*, that means the *indignados* and the *austerity discourse* coexist inside the same system - the difference is *internal* -, and therefore the *totalizing* isn't fulfilled. For the formation of an identity to take place it is required the constitution of an *exterior* which will only be a true one if it is excluded from the previous system, that is, the dominant one. However, in our specific case, and given what we know about the *indignados*, it is difficult to determine their interiority / externality in relation to the dominant system. Contradictory views coexist: on one hand, while some claim to be anti - system, others decline this position because, on the contrary, it is the system that is "anti - they"; on the other hand, many demand another system because they consider the current doesn't serve the citizens' interests but instead those of the markets and the capital. Therefore, it becomes fairly evident that the *indignados*'s identity is constructed within a constant tension between the two logics mentioned.

There exists the possibility of a difference - without ceasing to be a particular difference - to assume the representation of an incommensurable totality. This operation is particularly important for the analysis. The author calls it *hegemony*. As the totality involved when talking about *hegemony* is conceived as an impossible or unattainable object, the hegemonic identity is an *empty signifier* that transforms its uniqueness in a totality that is unattainable, but nevertheless a possible horizon. The concept of hegemony can be applied to the *indignados* (the specific group that emerged in Spain on the 15<sup>th</sup> May, and in Portugal with the *acampada* of Rossio) assume the representation of all those who are affected by system's neoliberal functioning logic (the incommensurable totality): the *people*, the "99%".

The third category - *rhetoric* - is related with rhetorical displacements, which occur whenever a literal term is replaced by figurative one. It is used the notion of catachresis - recovered from classical rhetoric - which means the impossibility of replacing a figurative term by a literal one. This figure is applied to the notions of *hegemony* and *empty signifiers*.

The accumulation of unsatisfied demands and the increasing inability of the institutional field in incorporating them in differential way lead to the establishment of equivalential relations between them. This situation would involve the constitution of an internal frontier - that is, the dichotomization of the political field by means of the emergence of a chain of equivalences of unsatisfied demands - and, through this operation, the conversion of the initial petitions in demands. We must, in this context, clarify what we mean by *political*. To do this we will draw on Chantal Mouffe (2007: 15-16), who conceives of the *political* not as "a multitude of practices of conventional politics" (which she identifies with *politics*), but instead as the way society is instituted. The *political* is understood as a space of antagonism and conflict, because the society's institution involves necessarily the drawing of an antagonistic frontier based on the logic of equivalences.

Laclau provides an elucidative example in this respect: a society that has as its horizon the welfare state. In this case, the logic of the differences would be the only legitimate form of constructing the *social*. In a society like this, any kind of social need would be satisfied in a differential form and, in that sense, there would be no basis for the establishment of an internal frontier by means of a *condensation* operation, that is, some privileged *signifiers* condense around them the meaning of an antagonistic field. However, what happens is that the obstacles that one would expect to find in the process of institution of a society of this kind force its proponents to identify an enemy and to reintroduce the discourse of social division based on the logic of equivalence. Thus, it is possible the emergence of collective actors around the purpose of defending the welfare state.

*Popular demands* are - differently from *democratic demands* that are likely to be incorporated by hegemonic formation in expansion - the ones that challenge the hegemonic formation. The constitution of the first depends on the presence of an antago-

nism and on the drawing of an antagonist frontier. The last one has as its function to conceive society as two irreconcilable fields, structured around two incompatible equivalential chains. In this sense, the antagonism is a constitutive one and requires the existence of a *fractured space*. This fracture - which is closely related to the experiencing of a *lack* - essential to the emergence of popular identities, represents a rupture in the continuity of the *social*, and without this initial rupture of the social order the emergence of an antagonism isn't possible. It is important to include in the equation those responsible for the frustration of the demand, to who are the claims addressed as they are always directed at someone or something. Consequently, we find ourselves face to face with a dichotomous division between, on one hand, unfulfilled social demands and, on the other, the power that ignores the demands presented. This has often translation in the exclusion of the elements identified with the power and, accordingly, their illegitimacy, as in the case of the *indignados*. They don't feel represented by the political power and therefore don't recognize it as having legitimacy to make decisions, especially in what concerns the austerity measures' implementation.

## 5. Conflict and the Emergence of a New Political Subject

The emergence of the collective actor *indignados* is a reaction to the offensive displayed towards the welfare state, carried out, objectively, through a set of structural reforms and subjectively, by the active construction of a consensus based on acceptance and fear. Alain Touraine (1981, 1984) establishes as the three dimensions that constitute social movements the identification of an opponent, identity and totality (the reasons for the conflict - a common set of values). The last one of the three impels us to recognize the necessity of taking into account other set of concepts and in particular the notion of *conflict*. We're going to lean ourselves on that. For him, the *programmed society* (which would be the one we are living at the present moment) is necessarily a society of protest, imagination, utopia, because it is crossed by both a social conflict between those who have the capacity and power of programming, and a call for creativity and constant happiness which are threatened by the logics of the apparatuses mentioned. For him, the most important aspect of a *conflict* is the clear definition of an adversary or opponent, and its non-negotiable character as it is defined on the grounds of shared cultural values by both opponents, who struggle about their appropriation. So, for the author, in a conflict we have actors who oppose each other on the grounds of the relations of domination and conflict, and these actors share the same cultural orientations and struggle for the social control of cultural resources and values.

We agree with Melucci when he says that "without a distinction between conflict and crisis it would be impossible to make sense of many historical and recent forms of collective action" (1995: 22). He correctly makes his point by giving the example of working class struggles: in the case of being mere reactions, as soon as the goals were accomplished the outcome would be subsequent demobilization. This evaluation stresses that the conflictual character of the workers movement has to do with



a struggle against the very logic of the unequal power relation between capital and labour. Thus, it can't be classified as a mere reaction. According to him, the appearance of collective action has often been linked to a *crisis* in the system, which would be the expression of a breakdown of the functional and integrative mechanisms of a given set of social relations. This argument implies considering collective action as pathology of the social system, giving it a negative sense. Differently, a *conflict* is defined by a struggle between two actors seeking to appropriate resources regarded by each as valuable. The actors in a conflict join battle in a shared field for control of same resources. For an event to constitute a conflict, the actors must be definable in terms of a common reference system, and there must be something at stake to which them both, implicitly or explicitly, refer.

A conflict may be brought to the surface by particular situations of crisis internal to the system itself. But when a collective actor by its action makes visible a conflict which is antagonistic in nature, this should not be confused with a simple reaction. There is more to it than that. A crisis provokes disintegration and the subsequent reaction of those who seek to redress the balance, whereas an antagonistic conflict makes manifest a clash over the control and allocation of crucial resource (Collins, 1975). The distinction between a crisis and an antagonistic conflict is an important one. It is not at all unusual the tendency for the dominant groups to define social movements as mere reactions to crisis or, in another words, to reduce them to a dysfunctional mechanism of the system. This kind of classification underlines a negative content and, as Melucci (1996) puts it, prevents these very groups from recognizing the existence of collective demands that challenge the legitimacy of power and the current deployment of social resources.

The social relations conformed within the society of austerity's framework are perceived as a *damage*. According to Rancière (1996), a social demand corresponds to a subjective production from elements not previously identified and whose identification is concomitant with a new form of representation of the field experience. This new form of representation is involved in the questioning of the dominant meanings fostered by the emergence of new demands. We come face to face with a new political subject, predisposed to action by the restructuring of meanings and by the expansion of the spaces of struggle for hegemony.

The emergence of this political subject results from the formation of an internal frontier due to the existence of an antagonism that separates the *people* from power. The construction of the *people* - the *indignados* - depends on the existence of an *equivocal articulation* that puts together previously isolated demands. In this sense, the *indignados* are not only those who claim the right to a decent work, or even the right to have a job, but also those who, for instance, are concerned about the housing problem (which is a central preoccupation in the case of the Spanish *indignados*) or free education. Once mobilization had reached its highest level, the different demands were unified in a stable system of signification and were extended to other sectors or social groups - that initially didn't think about these demands as theirs. In that sense, to be an *indignado* is to reject the ongoing changes as well as all sorts of inequalities, and

to have as an ambition a better and more egalitarian future for everyone. The unification in a stable system of signification allows a sector of the population to identify itself with the *indignados*, as it expresses certain demands even though it isn't directly concerned by the issues at stake. The housing issue is a good example: we can't say for sure that all those that identify themselves with the *indignados* are affected by the housing problem, nevertheless this a central issue for them as a collective actor.

We have applied the categories of populism to our analysis because, as a political logic (the way Laclau conceives it), it is a useful analytical tool, suitable for the decomposition of the dynamics involved in the conformation of our collective actor. The political logic is related to the process of institution of the *social* that derives from the existence of social demands and is inherent to any process of social transformation which takes place through the articulation between equivalences and differences. The equivalential momentum presupposes the constitution of a global political subject that brings together a variety of social demands. This implies, as previously mentioned, the building of internal frontiers and the identification of the institutionalized *other*.

## 6. The Political Dimension of Struggle and Resistance

The structural transformations that foster the formation of new collective actors force us to rethink the validity of a form of politics in which "the social division into two antagonistic fields is the original point of departure", requiring then "a transition towards a new situation, characterized by the essential instability of the political spaces in which the identity of the forces involved is subject to constant displacements and requires a process of continual redefinition" (Laclau and Mouffe, 2010: 193). In this context, the emergence of any collective identity depends on the process of generalization of the *hegemonic form of politics*, since the articulation practices – defined as one kind of hegemonic practice – determine the principle of the division of the social. The plurality and indeterminacy of the *social* is then mandatory, and therefore the points of rupture and conflict multiply themselves.

As mentioned above, the *political* requires the establishment of antagonistic frontiers within the social field and summons new subjects of social transformation, and this involves the production of *empty signifiers* that allow the unification of the multiplicity of demands in heterogeneous chains of equivalences. It is required the presence of a certain kind of equivalence in a discourse for it to be considered *political*. Laclau and Mouffe (2010) argue that resistance only arises as being *political* within a particular historical context, and as it ceases to be opposed to a specific instance of domination and starts being directed towards the goal of making disappear the whole structure of subordination.

According to this argument, politicized resistance is discursively constructed, and the discourse of resistance only becomes politicized to the extent that the meaning of the democratic revolution is re-appropriated and redefined under certain historical conditions, combining the introduction of new meanings with the preservation of a

non essentialist conception of previous articulations. Thus, the more normalized submission forms can now be seen as illegitimate and the elimination of subordination can be imagined by social actors. The *indignation*, and its expression embodied in the *indignados*, is the vehicle of a critique and of a rejection of the liberal democracy's system and of its domination system.

This collective actor's discourse reflects the identification of the limits and contradictions of the same system that claims to be based on an egalitarian conception and on the self - determination of the individuals, though it promotes simultaneously a social order based on social inequalities, within which the meaning of democracy is distorted as it serves the capitalist interests identified with those of the dominant classes. There is, in the current system, an unsolvable conflict between egalitarianism and domination and, given that, for the individual to fulfil his desire of self - realization the relations of exploitation and oppression must be completely dismantled, which implies both a new social order and new system. This matches the formulations of authors such as Habermas (1984, 1987), who consider that the market-oriented decision making in Western countries is extending itself to more and more spheres of human interaction and in a way that it conflicts with democratic principles.

The possibility of thinking the division of the social in terms of political frontiers emerges only once social division is no longer thought of as determined by a pre-existing objective space. According to Norval (1994: 120), "thinking social division in terms of political frontiers thus becomes increasingly important in situations where the political identities, emerging as result of the division of the social, do not correspond naturalistically to predesignated elements, but can clearly be seen to emerge as a result of a particular project's attempt to construct social and political identities in a specific manner". Therefore, in this reading, political and social identities are subject to *political* contestation and construction. In what concerns the *indignados*, it is unquestionable the political dimension assumed by both struggle and resistance as they contest vehemently the current social order and demand an alternative.

The construction of an alternative is central to our subject and it is through it that the *indignados* make their critique to the system. For Marcuse (2002), contemporary industrial society demonstrates that it has reached the stage at which it can no longer be adequately defined in the traditional terms of economic, political, and intellectual liberties, stressing the need for new modes of realization, corresponding to the new capabilities of society. The freedoms linked to each one of the referred domains can no longer be defined within the current social system, and therefore the new modes can be referred to only in negative terms they would amount to the negation of the prevailing modes. This reasoning can be directly applied to the *indignados*. They are widely criticized by dominant powers on the grounds of both the absence of concrete proposals directed at social change and of the presence of an ideological void as they refuse any kind of identification with the *left - right* dichotomic conception of politics.

The first critique can be easily turned down by acknowledging the presence of the idea of a necessity of coming out with a new system. As pointed out by Marcuse (idem: 6)

in his reflexion about the meanings of freedom in this context, "(...) economic freedom would mean freedom *from* the economy – from being controlled by economic forces and relationships; freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from earning a living" and "political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals *from* politics over which they have no effective control". The utopic character that is ascribed by dominant discourse to these proposals is, as rightly underlined by Marcuse, not indicative of their unrealistic character, but of the strength of the forces which prevent their realization. In our case, the last would be the actors that are imposing the institution of the *society of austerity*. The role the *indignados* play in the deconstruction of the dominant discourse is, therefore, essential. They deal with processes that present all contradictions as irrational and all counteraction as impossible. In that sense, a re-signification, a subversion of the dominant meanings is necessary and is established as the primary task.

## 7. Conclusions

The context the *societies of austerity* and the emergence of the *indignados* are, as we had the opportunity to see, intrinsically linked. The last are shaped as a reaction to the imposition of the first and require the construction of an alternative, not yielding to the widespread idea of inevitability. They represent the civil society's response not only to the economic crisis, but also to the political one, which effects can be felt across Europe and all over the world.

The collective actor analyzed leads us to the recognition of civil society as the privileged field of expansion of democracy within the framework of liberal democratic regimes. It is in this sense that we talk about a resurgence of civil society, here identified with the emergence of new actors and dynamics. Overall, the analysis has led us to see that the spaces of conflict multiply at an accelerated rate, representing a trend in the current context. In fact, everything points to the intensification of reactions and responses to the imposition of the "new order". In this process, becomes increasingly evident the outline of an antagonism which opposes the civil society to the State which accepts and applies the austerity measures and the markets and financial institutions.

It is the configuration of this antagonism that shapes the *indignados*. The processes involved in the construction of the collective actor and in the identity formation lead us to conclude that, despite what the dominant discourse would want us to believe, the *indignados* are more than a mere expression of discontent with no political grounds. On the contrary, they are formed by means of a political logic - populism -, they act on the *political* field and give shape to a political resistance and struggle. Obviously, many valid questions can be asked about their structure and its consequences on the development of meaningful strategies and action. The *indignados* follow collective action's contemporary trends, which are characterized by flexibility, horizontal structures and loose leaderships. In this respect, we can identify both advantages and disadvantages: movements with these characteristics are more prone to organizational and goal dispersion and this can have compromising effects on the action. However, it were these

same characteristics that allowed and even promoted the construction of solidarities at national, regional and even at transnational levels, and that, simultaneously, captured the *media* attention, strengthening their action.

The application of the political logic of populism to the *indignados* allowed us the identification of some important aspects. In the first place, it outlined our subject's importance on the deconstruction of the austerity and inevitability's discourse. Second, its conformation allows the delineation of an antagonistic frontier that divides the social and opposes the civil society opposed to those who are responsible for the institution of the *society of austerity* (the state and the external institutions - IMF, ECB and the European Commission), making the space for the proliferation of the areas of conflict. Third, the application of the logics of equivalence and difference demonstrates that the difficulty in defining who or what are the *indignados* stems from the fact that the significant *indignados* condenses a plurality of meanings in a stable system of signification and that it encompasses a equivalential chain of plural demands which are directed at a same opponent - the society of austerity and its institutions.

These aspects, as well as the political dimension of struggle and resistance they embody, shouldn't be disregarded. We admit, of course, the existence of a number of restrictions with respect to the *indignados'* action. However, in the future and for the reasons mentioned, their importance as political subjects should not be overlooked, though it depends largely on the way crisis evolves, both in Europe and in other areas of the globe. But, and in spite of that, the *indignados* are, unquestionably, vehicles of a critique of the system which has as horizon the construction of an alternative.

## Abbreviations

**ECB:** European Central Bank

**EE:** European Union

**IMF:** International Monetary Found

## Methodological Appendix

This research has been conducted following the participant observation methodology and documental research. The data analysed has been collected through observation and interviews, as well as analysis of websites and media products (eg. news and television documentaries). The field work as been conducted since March 2011 till the present time.

### Data Sources

#### Websites

Acampada Lisboa (<http://acampadalisboa.wordpress.com/>)

Asamblea Popular de Madrid (<http://madrid.tomalosbarrios.net/>)

Democracia Real Ya! (<http://www.democraciarealya.es/>)  
 Juventud Sin Futuro (<http://www.juventudsinfuturo.net/>)  
 Movimento 12 de Março (<http://www.movimento12m.org/>)  
 Plataforma 15 de Outubro (<http://www.15deoutubro.net/>)  
 Toma La Plaza # Spanishrevolution (<http://tomalaplaza.net/>)

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## Notes



- 1
- 2 Concerning this matter, it is important to refer, besides other expressions, the recent wave of Occupy movements and the decentralized Global Spring mobilizations that, from 12<sup>th</sup> till 15<sup>th</sup> May 2012, took place in a number of cities all around the world.
- 3 The expression *indignados* could be translated as the outraged.
- 4 In this respect and in what concerns the *indignados*' discourse, we can easily identify in it the idea that the precarious workers of the XXI century have no place in fordist institutions as the trade unions.

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## Enfoques teóricos y metodológicos para el estudio de la acción colectiva en el resurgimiento de los movimientos sociales en Chile: el aporte de la sociología analítica

Mauricio García Ojeda

**Resumen:** Desde un enfoque normativo, la acción colectiva que viabiliza movimientos sociales es muy relevante porque promueve la justicia social y económica. Por ello, es importante profundizar en el plano positivo el conocimiento sobre las condiciones que favorecen su creación y desarrollo. Es en este sentido que la ponencia presenta aportes teóricos y metodológicos provenientes desde la sociología analítica, útiles para el estudio de la acción colectiva en el resurgimiento de los movimientos sociales en Chile. Para este fin, en primer lugar, se enuncia el problema fundamental desde el cual explicar la acción colectiva: cómo surge la acción colectiva concebida como un bien público a partir de la cooperación de los actores, quienes cooperarán con otros considerando sus motivaciones en contextos de interacción estratégica. En segundo lugar, se caracterizan los enfoques teóricos y metodológicos disponibles desde la sociología analítica para formular explicaciones frente al problema señalado. En este marco, se presenta el elemento central del enfoque de la sociología analítica para el estudio de la acción colectiva: análisis de las transiciones *macro-micro-macro* desde la explicación causal intencional a través mecanismos sociales. A partir de lo anterior, como enfoques teóricos se hace referencia a una tipología sobre el pluralismo motivacional, a la teoría de juegos y a la teoría de redes sociales. Como enfoques metodológicos se revisan las narrativas analíticas, los experimentos de laboratorio y la simulación social basada en agentes.

**Palabras clave:** acción colectiva, movimientos sociales, sociología analítica.

### 1. Introducción

En una conferencia realizada en la Universidad de La Frontera durante 2009, un año antes de la irrupción de las movilizaciones estudiantiles por la educación, el historiador Gabriel Salazar afirmó que las acciones de protesta social logrará poder político si, por una parte, cada uno de los grupos movilizados, como los estudiantes y los trabajadores, logra producir una acción colectiva sostenida, y por otra, si estos grupos se unen y persiguen objetivos políticos comunes. Este año 2012, cuando la movilización estudiantil ya logró posicionamiento en la esfera pública, Salazar se planteó en los mismos términos en una entrevista en CNN. Señaló que el empoderamiento ciudadano se producirá por dos vías: "(...) *la vía de los actores sociales tipo corporativo*

*gremial, como la CONFECH, la ANEF, la CONFUSAM, que están movilizándose, que están articulándose y por otro lado, las asambleas territoriales de la ciudadanía, o sea es un movimiento en pinza, dos movimientos sociales que van en la misma dirección".* En Diciembre de 2011 el sociólogo Alberto Mayol declaró en *Punto Final*: "Este el momento en que necesitamos asambleas territoriales que puedan discutir los temas de cambio". Ambos apelan de forma directa a la acción colectiva como condición indispensable no sólo para lograr que las demandas sean atendidas, sino sobre todo, para generar un cambio político. Parece que ha quedado bastante establecida la relevancia estratégica y también normativa de la acción colectiva ciudadana, no obstante, falta esclarecer las condiciones específicas bajo las cuáles ésta se produce. Aquí hay pues, una tarea pendiente para la ciencia social. En esta ponencia exploramos el utillaje teórico y metodológico que al respecto puede ofrecer la aproximación analítica de las ciencias sociales, que tiene su expresión sociológica en la sociología analítica.

## **2. Movimientos sociales y acción colectiva. Desde lo normativo hacia lo explicativo**

La acción colectiva es relevante normativamente porque puede promover la justicia social y política. Principios como la libertad como no dominación (Pettit, 1999), la igualdad radical de oportunidades (Roemer, 1998), defendidas desde perspectivas como el republicanismo y el marxismo analítico, y que se sitúan en el plano de lo *deseable*, requieren, siguiendo la distinción de Erik Olin Wright (2006), no sólo ser defendidos desde teorías de la justicia distributiva, sino además ser promovidos, partiendo, para ello, desde interrogantes como *¿son factibles?* y *¿son viables?* La primera interrogante se refiere a si los cambios generados, producto de la transformación de las estructuras sociales existentes, produce los resultados esperados y considerados *deseables* en términos normativos. La *factibilidad* así concebida puede evaluarse al responder la interrogante *¿es más justa social y económicamente la sociedad producto de los cambios emancipadores logrados?* La segunda interrogante dice relación con las condiciones para que los cambios esperados efectivamente se produzcan. La *viabilidad* puede evaluarse desde la respuesta a la pregunta *¿es efectivamente posible concretar los cambios pretendidos?*

Las respuestas a las preguntas sobre lo *viable* o lo *factible* se sitúan en el nivel empírico y se refieren a *hechos* que es relevante estudiar por su interés para la consecución de *valores*. En este marco, el papel de una ciencia social emancipadora, en los términos de Wright, es formular teorías positivas o descriptivas para explicar cuáles son las condiciones para que los cambios se produzcan y generen los resultados esperados, de acuerdo a lo estipulado en teorías normativas o prescriptivas. Dicho esto, si, como señalamos, lo que nos interesan son los frutos de la acción colectiva, la pregunta es, en términos de *factibilidad*, *¿cuáles son las condiciones que favorecen la generación de la acción colectiva?* Esta es una pregunta teórica que tiene consecuencias para la movilización ciudadana y en este marco, repetimos, la interrogante es: *¿cuáles son las condiciones que favorecen la generación de la acción colectiva?* Para abordarla, en primer lugar es necesario hacer referencia a la clásica respuesta al problema de la acción colectiva vinculado a la provisión de un bien público.

### **3. Los beneficios de la acción colectiva como un bien público. El problema teórico fundamental para el surgimiento de la acción colectiva**

Desde el aporte teórico seminal de Olson (1992) se postula que la acción colectiva no siempre se produce, sino que deben concurrir ciertas condiciones específicas para que sea posible. La lógica es la siguiente: (1) los individuos en forma recurrente se encuentran frente a dilemas sociales, definidos como: a) en las interacciones estratégicas las decisiones estratégicas son tomadas por cada actor en forma autónoma y simultáneamente (en el mismo tiempo); b) todos los participantes tienen conocimiento común de la estructura de situación exógenamente fijada y de los pagos (costes y beneficios) que recibirán todos los individuos bajo todas las combinaciones de estrategias, y; c) no existe un actor externo que obligue a los participantes respecto a sus decisiones (Ostrom (2007: 1-2); (2) si se parte del supuesto teórico de que los individuos son autointeresados y maximizadores, puestos frente a un dilema social no internalizan en costos para la generación de un bien público esperando que otros lo hagan o incurren en menos costos que los otros y de esta forma los primeros acceden a los beneficios de la acción colectiva emprendida por los otros; (3) dado lo anterior, los frutos de la acción colectiva son un bien público que tiene las siguientes características: a) oferta conjunta: todos disponen simultáneamente de él; b) libre acceso: nadie puede ser excluido de su consumo (Aguar, 1991); (4) si cada individuo buscando su interés propio espera obtener beneficios gracias a los costos en los que otros incurren en la acción colectiva, cada uno de ellos, en consecuencia, o bien no emprenderá la acción colectiva o bien lo hará pero incurriendo en costos muy bajos. Si todos tienen el mismo razonamiento, ninguno se implicará en la acción colectiva y el bien público no será provisto (García, 2000).

Dicho esto, desde una perspectiva teórica ¿cuáles son las condiciones bajo las cuales se produce la acción colectiva? En esta ponencia como indicamos, postulamos que la sociología analítica realiza aportes teóricos y metodológicos para dar respuestas a esta interrogante.

### **4. Aportes teóricos y metodológicos de la sociología analítica para la investigación sobre la acción colectiva**

Para el fin señalado, primero, presentamos una breve caracterización de la sociología analítica, segundo, expondremos aportes teóricos de este enfoque, y tercero, y en complemento, haremos referencia a los aportes metodológicos.

#### **4.1. Sociología analítica. Breve caracterización**

Presentamos una caracterización esquemática de la sociología analítica. Identificaremos dos elementos distintivos: a) su concepción sobre la ciencia social; b) análisis de las transiciones *macro-micro-macro* desde la explicación causal intencional a través mecanismos sociales.

**a)** Concepción sobre la ciencia social: la sociología analítica constituye un enfoque sobre cómo hacer sociología que tiene como punto en común una concepción sobre qué es hacer ciencia social. Tiene como rasgo distintivo el “*buscar explicar causalmente procesos sociales complejos diseccionándolos cuidadosamente para estudiar sus componentes fundamentales*” (Aguilar, De Francisco y Noguera, 2009: 441): la tarea de la ciencia social es generar teorías que aporten explicaciones sobre fenómenos sociales. Explicar un hecho empírico implica responder a la pregunta *por qué X*. Esta explicación debe satisfacer una condición de *causalidad*: especificar una relación causal entre un explanans (causa) y el explanandum (efecto) y además, una condición de *inteligibilidad*: aportar un mecanismo causal que explique cómo la causa genera el efecto (De Francisco, 1997). Se trata entonces, de explicar la acción colectiva como explanans o efecto de un explanans (causa) y de los mecanismos causales que explican el *por qué*. Aquí, es necesario especificar qué tipo de mecanismos resultan plausibles para las explicaciones en ciencias sociales. Reconociendo la existencia de fenómenos de nivel *macro* y de nivel *micro*, se postula, desde un punto de vista individualista metodológico, que los fenómenos sociales de nivel *macro*, son explicables como fenómenos emergentes de nivel *micro* (Noguera, 2003).

Los fenómenos *macro* se hacen inteligibles desde mecanismos de nivel *micro* situados desde la intencionalidad de los individuos, es decir, en base estados mentales intencionales: específicamente, sus deseos y creencias. Si antes indicamos que los fenómenos *macro* son causados por fenómenos a nivel *micro*, estos fenómenos son causados por acciones sociales de individuos y estas acciones son inteligibles si buscamos los deseos y creencias de los individuos que causan la acción. Desde aquí tenemos una vía para explicar las acciones a través de los deseos y creencias que tienen los individuos y que constituyen las razones que ellos tienen que dan sentido a sus acciones. Así podemos comprender la acción de un individuo y además, explicarla causal-intencionalmente.

Para ello, resultan valiosas dos teorías: la teoría de la acción racional y la teoría BDO. La primera postula que una acción es racional cuando es causada por los deseos, creencias de los individuos y por las creencias específicas sobre el conjunto o estructura de oportunidad que tienen para lograr sus propósitos y, además postula que los deseos y creencias son consistentes entre sí. La segunda, la teoría BDO, sitúa a los individuos racionales en interacción estratégica con otros, en concreto, articula deseos (desires), creencias (beliefs) y oportunidades (opportunities), para explicar la acción de un individuo (Hedström, 2010): las creencias de un individuo en un contexto de interacción estratégica pueden ser creencias sobre las creencias, deseos, oportunidades y acciones de otro(s) y también sobre la consideración del propio conjunto de oportunidad, en específico, los posibles cursos de acción que tiene y además, las creencias sobre las consecuencias de sus propias acciones, consecuencias que incluyen el cómo éstas afectan las creencias, deseos y el conjunto de oportunidad de otro(s). En este sentido, la acción social de un individuo racional no sólo se explica a partir de su conjunto BDO, si no que ese conjunto se define en torno a la interacción estratégica frente a otros individuos racionales en el sentido señalado.

**b)** Análisis de las transiciones *macro-micro-macro* desde la explicación causal intencional a través mecanismos sociales. La acción social de un individuo está situada en la interacción con otros, conformándose un sistema de acción social en un nivel *micro*. No obstante, la acción social de éstos siempre está situada en un contexto social determinado que define el conjunto de oportunidad de ambos y que constriñe sus decisiones. Estas contricciones estructurales influyen en las orientaciones de los actores y por ello, en el sistema interactivo *micro*. Se trata de un nivel situacional que permite responder *¿cómo lo macro incide en lo micro?* Aquí es necesario analizar la "lógica de la situación": las decisiones de los individuos (basada en sus deseos y creencias) están enmarcadas por elementos "externos" a él y que definen su conjunto de oportunidad.

Un segundo nivel es el *cognitivo* o de formación de la acción: aquí la interrogante es *¿cómo la decisión del individuo considerando la "lógica de la situación" y sus estados mentales intencionales (deseos y creencias) incide en su acción.* Aquí hay un tránsito *micro-micro*: desde las decisiones en un sistema interactivo constreñido por propiedades *macro*, hacia la conducta individual (conducta económica o política, por ejemplo). Un tercer nivel es el *transformacional* o *relacional*, en el cual es necesario responder a la interrogante *¿cómo lo micro incide en lo macro?, ¿cómo la acción de individuos incide en la "estructura social".* Aquí es necesario explicar cómo se producen, desde un determinado mecanismo de composición, los efectos de agregación y los fenómenos emergentes. Aquí ocurre la transición *micro-macro* en el que la acción individual situada en un sistema interactivo produce propiedades emergentes en el nivel *macro* intencionadamente o no.

En el caso del análisis de la acción colectiva, esta se sitúa en el nivel el *cognitivo* o de *formación de la acción*. Específicamente, fruto de las decisiones de variados individuos en su sistema de acción o interactivo, se produce la acción de cada uno de ellos. Esta es la acción colectiva situada desde un tránsito *micro-micro* y concebida como una acción cooperativa configurada como resultado de las interacciones interdependientes y por ello estratégicas de individuos en un sistema de interacción o sistema de acción social definido desde una lógica de acción determinada. Si bien estos resultados pueden ser normativamente deseables por sus consecuencias ético-políticas, pueden no ser viables en los términos antes señalados porque toman la forma de bienes públicos. Entonces, el desafío teórico es analizar cuáles son las condiciones bajo las cuales es posible que surja la acción colectiva y cuáles son aquellas condiciones que causan su fracaso. Para este propósito, a continuación exploraremos los aportes teóricos y metodológicos de la sociología analítica, aportes que si bien en algunos casos son realizados desde otras disciplinas de las ciencias sociales, si comparten el núcleo de la perspectiva analítica antes descrita, esto es, la explicación causal-intencional y la explicación desde transiciones *macro-micro-macro*. Los aportes disponibles desde estos enfoques teóricos y metodológicos se sitúan fundamentalmente en el nivel cognitivo o de formación de la acción (*micro-micro*) aunque se establecerán las necesarias relaciones con los niveles situacional o contextual (*macro-micro*) y transformacional o relacional (*micro-macro*).

## 4.2. Aportes teóricos de la sociología analítica

En relación a los aportes teóricos, presentamos una breve caracterización de la tipología sobre el pluralismo motivacional, la teoría de juegos y la teoría de redes sociales.

### 4.2.1. Tipología sobre el pluralismo motivacional

El análisis de las motivaciones para la acción social es fundamental en una teoría de la acción que otorgue relevancia a la agencia individual. Las motivaciones se vinculan con los deseos de los individuos y se pueden referir a los fines o propósitos que persiguen y también a elementos de la estructura social que definen la lógica de la situación que orienta sus acciones. A continuación identificamos las motivaciones que orientan la acción y además señalaremos bajo cuáles condiciones propician la acción colectiva.

**a) Interés propio.** El interés propio o egoísmo es una de las fuentes motivacionales de más antiguo linaje en la teoría social. Considera sólo el bienestar propio en la función de utilidad del *homo economicus* quien optará por aquellas alternativas que le reporten el mayor bienestar y además será indiferente ante el bienestar de los demás. La citada obra de Olson parte del supuesto motivacional del interés propio y en este marco, la primera preferencia de cada individuo será no cooperar con los otros a fin de que éstos asuman los costos de la acción colectiva y él solo internalizará los beneficios del bien público producido sin su esfuerzo. Si, como señalamos, esta la lógica del *free-rider* es aplicada por todos los individuos, ninguna se implicará en la acción colectiva, pues esperará extraer ventajas de que otros lo hagan.

**b) Altruismo.** El altruismo supone que los individuos se interesan por procurar en primer lugar el bienestar de otros. Un subtipo de este tipo de motivación es el altruismo incondicional que orienta a los individuos a favorecer los intereses y preferencias de los demás, independientemente de que éstos actúen o no en forma recíproca. En torno al altruismo se distingue además, el altruismo perfecto, que se sustenta en la creencia de la igualdad entre los hombres, la solidaridad, referida a actuar de forma altruista para beneficiar a un grupo específico y la *aversión a la inequidad*, relacionada con acciones altruistas para favorecer a los más desposeídos, con el fin de lograr una distribución más igualitaria de los bienes (Tena, 2010). La aversión a la inequidad y otras motivaciones prosociales vinculadas, por ejemplo, a la búsqueda de aprobación social (como una forma de recompensa social que se puede complementar con incentivos materiales que expresen reconocimiento social) y a las motivaciones intrínsecas centradas en los procesos (y no sólo en los resultados) pueden promover la cooperación más allá de la búsqueda del interés propio (Fehr y Gintis, 2007).

Si los individuos tienen motivaciones altruistas, frente a la decisión de implicarse en la acción colectiva considerando los costos que deben asumir, siempre lo harán pues buscan que otros accedan a los beneficios del bien público provisto. Esto sobre todo es claro en el caso de aversión a la inequidad que impulsaría a individuos a implicarse

en la acción colectiva en favor de aquellos con posiciones sociales más desventajosas aunque ellos no la sufran directamente.

**c) Reciprocidad fuerte.** Se trata de la motivación más relevante en términos cuantitativos en la especie humana. Originalmente propuesta por Bowles y Gintis, se refiere (a diferencia de la reciprocidad débil fundada en el interés propio y que antes fue comentada) a la motivación de cooperar con otros en forma condicional y además de incurrir, de forma incondicional o altruista en costos para sancionar las conductas no cooperativas de los *free-riders* (Bowles y Gintis (2001). Respecto a esta motivación, una condición que favorece la acción colectiva es que los individuos tienen incentivos en implicarse en la acción colectiva no sólo porque promueve que los otros lo hagan, sino que además porque o bien, están dispuestos a castigar a los que no lo hacen, aunque sea costoso, o bien, porque prefieren evitar el castigo que otros le infringirán si actúan como un *free-rider*.

**d) Identidad social.** La identidad se concibe como "el conjunto de creencias de una persona sobre sí misma cuando en la formación de esas creencias intervengan, entre otros factores, creencias sociales de los demás sobre esa persona y sus creencias sobre el mundo" (Aguar y De Francisco, 2007: 77-78). Individuos que actúan en base a la identidad social forman sus preferencias en el marco de un *nosotros*, por lo que al menos optarán por la cooperación condicional y podrán además orientarse por el altruismo incondicional. Este es un escenario claramente propicio para la acción colectiva.

**e) Normas sociales.** Las normas sociales toman la forma lógica *haz X o no hagas Y*. Son incondicionales al cumplimiento y a la presencia y observabilidad de los otros y se siguen porque quien lo hace considera correcto su contenido y además, porque genera en el transgresor emociones asociadas a la vergüenza (Elster, 1991). Las normas cuasi morales son condicionales a la conducta cooperativa de los otros, es decir al cumplimiento multilateral. Las normas sociales, por su parte, son condicionales a la presencia de otros, que pueden tener información sobre las infracciones y desde ello, sancionar los incumplimientos de los *free-riders*, favoreciendo por ello, la acción colectiva.

**f) Virtudes cívicas.** Otra vía para favorecer el surgimiento de la acción colectiva son las virtudes cívicas. Siguiendo la distinción planteada por Tena (2010), la concepción de la virtud como motivación postula que estas son motivaciones causalmente eficientes hacia la acción públicamente orientada, es decir, para que los individuos consideren el interés por lo público, pues su interés es el de la *polis*, de la comunidad política. Entre estas virtudes se cuentan la justicia (Aristóteles), la beneficencia (Cicerón), el espíritu público y la benevolencia (Adam Smith), la disposición al compromiso (Montesquieu) y el desinterés generoso (Kant).

Bien, pero ¿cómo la virtud cívica promueve la acción colectiva? Existe una distinción entre dos tipos de virtuosos implicados en la provisión del bien público: el virtuoso incondicional y el virtuoso condicional. La primera es la concepción del virtuoso

kantiano, según la cual un ciudadano debe ser virtuoso, procurando el bien común, independientemente de lo que hagan los demás. La segunda es referida al virtuoso tocquevilliano, quien lo será siempre que lo otros también lo sean (Herrerros, 2000). Diremos, según la tipología de fuentes motivacionales antes presentada, que la motivación virtuosa públicamente orientada en Kant, es el altruismo perfecto o el altruismo puro: busca el bienestar general, es incondicional, es indiferente a las preferencias de los otros e implica la disposición a asumir costos por la promoción del bien común aunque esto implique no recibir beneficios. Por su parte, el virtuoso tocquevilliano busca el interés propio entendido, aquel que si bien es condicional, pues es sensible al concurso de la cooperación de los otros, no es cortoplacista, pues puede, gracias a su auto-control y capacidad de posponer las gratificaciones, suspender el logro de beneficios de corto plazo, pues el cooperar con otros en busca del bien común es racional porque la cooperación le permite lograr beneficios propios en el largo plazo (Elster, 2009).

El problema para la virtud cívica como vía para la acción colectiva que se desprende de la obra del pensador francés es que el virtuoso necesita tener la seguridad de que los demás también lo serán. Si es un cooperador condicional su primera preferencia es cooperar, basada en la expectativa de los otros también lo harán y luego, dado que puede observar las estrategias de los otros individuos y la interacción es repetida, reciprocará utilizando *tit-for-tat* de acuerdo a la estrategia de los otros individuos. Por ello, si en una población de individuos hay algunos que actúan en forma oportunista y estos comportamientos son de conocimiento común, el individuo virtuoso puede, para no hacer de "primo", dejar de guiarse orientado hacia el bien común concebido como bien público y, por ello, actuar también en forma oportunista, no cooperando en la provisión del bien público y si esta es la decisión de un número suficiente de individuos al observar la conducta cooperativa de los otros, la opción será no implicarse en la acción colectiva y el bien público no será provisto.

#### 4.2.2. Teoría de juegos

La teoría de juegos es una herramienta analítica que permite, a partir de la elaboración de modelos formales, analizar teóricamente interacciones estratégicas entre actores a quienes se atribuye racionalidad en el sentido antes señalado. Un juego es cualquier situación de decisión caracterizada por una interdependencia estratégica, gobernada por reglas y con un resultado definido. Lo que nos interesa analizar brevemente son las respuestas que otorga la teoría de juegos ante las interrogante ¿bajo que condiciones se produce la cooperación? y ¿cómo inducir a los actores a actuar de tal forma que se generen bienes públicos a partir de la acción colectiva?

Identificamos tres tipos de juegos de acuerdo a las preferencias que tienen los jugadores y desde ello especificaremos para cada caso bajo qué condiciones puede surgir la acción colectiva. Estos tres tipos de juegos son el dilema del prisionero, el juego de seguridad o de coordinación y el juego de compromiso (Aguiar, 1991). Si consideramos la situación en la cual dos jugadores deben elegir entre dos estrategias que son:



C=Cooperar (cooperar con el otro) o D=Defraudar (defraudar al otro, no cooperar con él), podemos para cada jugadores identificar cuatro preferencias y ordenarlas transitivamente, donde  $4 > 3 > 2 > 1$  y, desde ello, distinguir cada uno de los tipos de juegos antes señalados:

**a) Dilema del prisionero.** Orden de preferencias:  $DC=4 > CC=3 > DD=2 > CD=1$ , donde DC (defraudar y que el otro coopere); CC (cooperar y que el otro coopere); DD (defraudar y que el otro defraude); CD (cooperar y que el otro defraude).

En el caso de este juego, cada jugador tiene como primera preferencia la estrategia  $DC=4$  y en consecuencia, ambos prefieren no cooperar y que el otro coopere. Esta es la lógica del problema de la acción colectiva propuesto por Olson y que fue antes comentado y según la cual, individuos racionales y egoístas prefieren que el otro coopere: "que el otro incurra en los costos (que el otro vaya a la reunión, huelga, etc. y que logre beneficios para mí, aunque yo no participe)". Así la acción colectiva no se produce y el bien público no es provisto.

No obstante, bajo determinadas condiciones puede surgir a acción colectiva. Esto ya fue establecido por Axelrod (1986): ¿Cómo es posible la cooperación entre egoístas? Este politólogo postuló que si los jugadores aplican la estrategia *tit-for-tat*, es decir, pagar con la misma moneda o cooperar, ello puede favorecer el aprendizaje y la generación de la reciprocidad como base para la cooperación. Sin embargo, esta estrategia de cooperación condicional no basta para asegurar un equilibrio cooperativo debido a que en juegos iterados de  $n$  jugadores se requiere que todos los jugadores cooperen en la primera ronda y en las posteriores cooperar sólo en el caso de que los otros cooperaran en las rondas anteriores. Además del problema de la unanimidad de cooperadores está el referido a la dificultad de los cooperadores de sancionar efectivamente a los no cooperadores (De Francisco y Herreros, 2001).

**b) Juego de seguridad (juego de coordinación).** Orden de preferencias:  $CC=4 > DC=3 > DD=2 > CD=1$ , donde CC (cooperar y que el otro coopere); DC (defraudar y que el otro coopere); DD (defraudar y que el otro defraude); CD (cooperar y que el otro defraude). En este juego, la mejor estrategia de cada jugador no será NC, si no C, porque tienen la expectativa de que el otro también lo hará. En términos de la teoría de juegos, si ambos prefieren cooperar, el equilibrio de Nash para el juego es C,C y se puede expresar como "yo coopero contigo, pero espero que tu también lo hagas. Si tu lo haces, yo cooperaré contigo, yo participaré en la reunión, huelga, siempre que los otros lo hagan."

Con información completa los jugadores tienen conocimiento sobre sus preferencias y las de los otros y por tanto saben que las facultades que comparten les harán ser recíprocos. La convergencia de expectativas e intereses genera un equilibrio cooperativo estable (los jugadores no tiene incentivos para cambiar sus estrategias), la estructura de interacciones entre los individuos toma la forma de un *juego de la seguridad* en el cual los jugadores se tienen *simpatía* mutua dado que se interesan por el bienestar de los otros en tanto afecta al propio (Aguar, 1991). Esto es posible

dado que los jugadores tienen la seguridad de que los otros cooperaran, es decir, que incurrirán en costos propios para generar el bien público derivado de los beneficios de hacer efectivos los principios de justicia.

Interacciones estratégicas que tienen la estructura de un juego de coordinación pueden surgir a partir de individuos que tienen como motivación para la acción la identidad social. Un ejemplo de cooperación condicional para la acción colectiva está disponible desde el estudio de Chong (1991) del movimiento por los derechos civiles en Estados Unidos durante la década de los sesenta. En los procesos analizados, Chong muestra cómo los incentivos sociales positivos incrustados en relaciones sociales favorecen la coordinación necesaria para que los individuos se impliquen en acciones colectivas de protesta.

**c) Juego del compromiso.** Orden de preferencias:  $CC=4 > CD=3 > DC=2 > DD=1$ , donde CC (cooperar y que el otro coopere); CD (cooperar y que el otro defraude); DC (defraudar y que el otro coopere); DD (defraudar y que el otro defraude). En este juego, la mejor estrategia de cada jugador será C, pero no de forma condicional, como en el juego de seguridad, sino en forma incondicional: "Yo participaré en la reunión, huelga, aunque todos actúen como *free-rider*." En este tipo de juego los jugadores pueden tener motivaciones altruistas y en este sentido como cooperadores pueden ser virtuosos kantianos en el sentido antes señalado. Si todos los individuos implicados en la acción colectiva son cooperadores de este tipo, la acción colectiva está asegurada.

#### 4.2.3. Teoría de redes sociales

Si consideramos a los movimientos sociales como grupos de interés articulados entre sí, éstos tienen una dimensión reticular, es decir, se articulan a partir de redes de relaciones sociales, y por tanto, pueden ser concebidos como redes autoorganizadas de acción colectiva (Diani, 2003). La teoría de redes sociales estudia cómo se configuran estructuras de redes que surgen como nivel emergente a partir de los vínculos entre los actores que las integran y además, identifica las propiedades o consecuencias de estas estructuras de las redes. Entre estas propiedades describiremos tres que, teóricamente podrían favorecer el surgimiento de la acción colectiva ciudadana frente a asuntos ambientales: cierre de red, agujeros estructurales y *mundo pequeño*. La tesis principal sobre las redes sociales es que la estructura que poseen activan mecanismos de interdependencia y por ello constituyen el espacio microsocioal de influencia y contagio mutuo en el cual se generan las decisiones y acciones (exponen a las personas frente a las ideas y preferencias de los otros, inciden en la evaluación de costos y beneficios) y de este modo, generan incentivos para que sus miembros participen en la acción colectiva. Aquí entenderemos, siguiendo a González (2007:1), que existe interdependencia cuando "*las acciones de unos individuos influyen en las decisiones de otros individuos*". A continuación revisamos cada una de las propiedades indicadas.

**a) Cierre de redes.** Fue Coleman (1988, 2011), quien en el marco del desarrollo de la teoría del capital social propuso que uno de los recursos de capital social es el efecto sancionador de las normas sociales, efecto que será efectivo si las redes sociales


tienen suficiente cierre. Coleman concibe el capital social como recursos disponibles para los individuos a partir de su inserción en redes sociales. Los recursos de capital social, es decir, la información, las obligaciones de reciprocidad y el efecto control de las normas sociales tendrán efectos dependiendo de la estructura de la red en la cual circulan estos recursos y la propiedad de red es aquí el cierre de red. Una red tiene cierre cuando todos o la mayoría de los vínculos entre los individuos efectivamente existen, es decir, en términos de la teoría de redes sociales, cuando existen suficientes vínculos directos entre los nodos, por lo que la red tienen una alta densidad.

Teniendo claro el concepto de cierre de red podemos indicar sobre la relación entre estructura de red e información que la estructura que tenga la red incide en la formación y acceso de los recursos de capital social. La información circulará en las redes si existen suficientes canales de distribución representados por las relaciones sociales y las normas sociales tendrán un efecto de control social si las redes de observación mutua de los individuos tienen el suficiente cierre, es decir, si todos los individuos están directamente conectados entre sí, ya que todos tienen acceso a la información sobre el potencial comportamiento oportunista de uno de los miembros de la red, este finalmente no tendrá incentivos para defraudar a otro(s). Así, un efecto del cierre de redes es que favorece el efecto control de las normas sociales. Si una red tiene suficiente cierre, la información circula en forma rápida y homogénea entre sus integrantes y así se constituye un sistema reticular como un dispositivo multilateral de observación, en que cada uno puede saber cuáles han sido las conductas de los otros. En esta lógica de la situación cada uno tiene incentivos en fomentar su reputación de cooperador que se suma a la acción colectiva y además, es más probable que se sancione a los *free-riders*, pues todos tienen la información de la no cooperación de éstos y pueden coordinar sus acciones para sancionarlo.

**b) Agujeros estructurales.** Los agujeros estructurales fueron propuestos por Burt (1992) para referirse a la ausencia de vínculos entre dos redes o secciones de una red desconectada y potencialmente vinculable, lo que efectivamente es posible gracias a los nodos situados *al borde* de estos agujeros, quienes mantienen vínculos débiles entre sí. En la figura N<sup>o</sup>2 que se presenta luego, se ilustra el concepto de agujero estructural: las redes (a) y (b) tienen alta cohesión interna y entre ellas hay un agujero estructural, un punto de desconexión que si se elimina podría vincularse indirectamente a todos los integrantes de (a) y (b). Esto sucederá si los nodos F y A se vinculan entre sí y su vínculo opera como puente entre (a) y (b).

Dada su posición estructural F y A cuentan con un gran acervo de capital social a su favor, pues, desde la posición estratégica que ocupan, tienen la posibilidad de controlar (acceder, difundir e intermediar) recursos como la información. Pueden existir dos subgrupos de interés, cada uno con alta densidad interna, lo que permite la circulación de información y favorece la acción colectiva desde la interdependencia de sus integrantes. Sin embargo, cada uno de estos subgrupos podría estar desconectados, pero podrían vincularse si existen agujeros estructurales y si los nodos (integrantes de los subgrupos) que están "al borde" de ellos se vinculan entre sí.

La noción de agujero estructural es graficada en la siguiente figura.



Los agujeros estructurales tienen la siguiente incidencia para la acción colectiva: si dos grupos de interés u organizaciones se movilizan frente a un conflicto pero entre ellas no existe conexión, pero luego esta se produce gracias al vínculo entre dos de sus integrantes, se forma un puente entre las dos redes y la conexión de todos sus integrantes permite intercambiar información útil para la acción colectiva, pudiendo unirse en torno a ella. De esta forma, la información que está dispersa en las redes puede ser compartida entre diversas redes que antes eran segmentos reticulares distintos y distantes entre sí.

Una breve ilustración es la acción colectiva entre grupos que se unían entre sí para movilizarse y protestar para producir el cambio político en Alemania durante 1989:

*“Sabemos por el diario de uno de los manifestantes regulares que pequeños grupos de amigos típicamente se encontraban los Lunes por la tarde en el centro de la ciudad, donde se habrían de sumarse a los grupos religiosos y a otros grupos extraños para formar la manifestación. Después procedían a lo largo de la Ringstrasse, que rodea el centro de la ciudad, recogiendo a gente adicional a lo largo del trayecto” (González, 2007:7).*

Podemos suponer que algunos miembros de cada grupo establecieron contactos con miembros de otros grupos y gracias a esos puentes tendidos la acción colectiva secuencial y agregada fue posible.

**c) “Mundo pequeño”.** El “mundo pequeño” es una propiedad formalizada por Watts (1999) para indicar que las redes tienen una alta densidad o agrupamiento local y

una corta distancia o longitud global entre dos pares de nodos cualesquiera que las integran, es decir, en sí mismas combinan las propiedades de cohesión y puentes conectores. Esta propiedad hace posible que la información circule rápidamente a través de los nodos directa o indirectamente conectados entre sí por pocos pasos. En las redes "mundo pequeño" la información sobre el comportamiento de los individuos puede circular a través de los nodos conectados por pocos pasos y a través de ellos, a todos quienes integran las redes locales a las que pertenecen. De esta forma las redes que tienen este atributo estructural son eficientes, pues permiten que la información circule en forma rápida y a grandes distancias e incurriendo en bajos costos, es decir, como se señaló, conectando a través de pocos pasos (y gracias a pocos nodos conectores que aseguran la conectividad global) a nodos no directamente vinculados entre sí.

Tres ejemplos: uno, son las movilizaciones realizadas en Barcelona y Madrid durante 2003 para protestar contra la guerra de Irak. Los ciudadanos lograron hacer efectiva la coordinación descentralizada de cientos de miles de personas en pocas horas sólo pasándose por los teléfonos celulares el mensaje del día, hora y motivo de la protesta. Otro ejemplo es el de la protesta realizada en Manila, Filipinas, durante 2001: los ciudadanos se pasaron el mensaje "Ve a EDSA, Viste de negro" y el resultado fue que en el transcurso de cuatro días más de un millón de ciudadanos se unieron para mostrar su oposición al gobierno de Joseph Estrada, quien dimitió en menos de dos semanas luego de iniciada la acción colectiva (Tilly, 2005). Un tercer ejemplo es la movilización gracias internet de 45.000 personas que pusieron en jaque la seguridad policial y llamaron la atención mundial por sus protestas en 1999 en Seattle, contra la Organización Mundial de Comercio (González, 2007). En estos casos, esta conectividad global y consecuente el poder de la red fue posible en la práctica porque cada ciudadano pasó el mensaje a sus conocidos y estos conocidos a su vez a sus conocidos. Aquí la estructura de la red se suma a las posibilidades de las TICs para superar las tradicionales limitaciones tiempo y espacio (de las relaciones cara a cara) de la acción colectiva.

La propiedad del "mundo pequeño" aporta a las teorías de *masa crítica* (Marwell y Oliver, 1993) que explican la acción colectiva. En estas, las decisiones se toman en forma secuencial y los individuos implicados evalúan sumarse considerando cuántos ya se han sumado previamente a la acción colectiva. Cuando se sobrepasa un umbral existirá *masa crítica* y más individuos secuencial y aceleradamente se suman y cada individuo se sumará más tarde o temprano dependiendo de su umbral y el de aquellos con que esté conectado. Es decir, un individuo observa sus vínculos directos, examina su perímetro o "vecindario" inmediato y los otros se han sumado a la acción colectiva, tendrán la creencia de que es beneficioso (seguro) sumarse, pues muchos lo han hecho y no estará sólo y por ello, serán más los beneficios que los costos al participar. Así, mientras más contactos tiene un individuo movilizado, mayor número de individuos que directamente observan su acción se sumarán y finalmente cada individuo contribuye y la acción colectiva como bien público es provista. Esto explica los procesos de contagio, imitación racional y la velocidad de la movilización.

### 4.3. Aportes metodológicos de la sociología analítica

Como enfoques metodológicos revisamos las narrativas analíticas, los experimentos de laboratorio y la simulación social basada en agentes.

#### 4.3.1. Narrativas analíticas

Una narrativa es un enfoque metodológico para realizar estudios de caso que, a partir de un análisis de los sucesos acontecidos, busca formular explicaciones de las acciones de individuos desde la comprensión del contexto en que se producen. Este enfoque propone que es necesario ir más allá de la descripción de hechos y para ello, en base a la teoría de elección racional, se busca realizar explicaciones sobre fenómenos sociales a través de la provisión de mecanismos causales intencionales. Por ello, resulta interesante este enfoque metodológico para el estudio de casos basados en datos cualitativos y registros históricos que, como primera aproximación, son analíticas porque utilizan un marco teórico para el análisis de los hechos y son narrativas porque utilizan la evidencia cualitativa disponible desde los hechos ocurridos en un tiempo específico y en un contexto específico (Caballero, 2008).

En términos de proceso, la construcción de una narrativa analítica implica primero, identificar a los actores insertos, sus deseos y preferencias, sus creencias, la información que disponen, la evaluación de sus alternativas de acción, las reglas del juego que constriñen sus decisiones y acciones. Desde estos elementos del caso se construye un modelo formal, fundamentalmente son útiles los juegos en forma extensiva, en los que además del necesario requisito de hacer explícitos los supuestos, se describen y analizan las interacciones estratégicas, se identifica el equilibrio que se produce, dadas ciertas condiciones específicas, y además se analizan las posibles rutas alternativas fuera del equilibrio, lo que permite comprender y explicar las razones de los actores por optar determinadas estrategias, y no por otras, que condujeron al equilibrio producido. A partir de ello, se formulan implicaciones contrastables del modelo e hipótesis observables y contrastables con la evidencia empírica disponible desde el caso (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal y Weingast, 1998: 12). Las narrativas analíticas han sido utilizadas básicamente como narrativas analíticas históricas, es decir, como estudios de casos históricos, para lo cual se configura la evidencia empírica desde fuentes históricas secundarias como cartas, crónicas y otros tipos de registros.

Un ejemplo: Linares (2001) estudió el conflicto ocurrido en la comarca de Cartagena-La Unión, en la región de Murcia, España, entre 1987 y 1991, producido por la decisión de la Sociedad Minera y Metalúrgica de Peñarroya de suspender las actividades extractivas mineras en el lugar. A partir de la revisión de documentos y el análisis de entrevistas, Linares analiza desde la teoría de juegos, las interacciones estratégicas entre el Gobierno regional, los vecinos del lugar (Llano del Beal) y los trabajadores contratados por Peñarroya. En específico, establece el orden de preferencias de cada actor en la interacción estratégica con los otros y desde ello, identifica los equilibrios de Nash que explican los resultados de las acciones el desenlace del conflicto entre

las partes. En este marco, sobre todo es interesante el análisis que realiza de la acción colectiva producida entre los trabajadores y que tenía como propósito defender sus intereses, específicamente, su fuente laboral. El autor analiza las condiciones bajo las cuales fue posible que la movilización vecinal de los vecinos que incluyeron, por entre otras, turnos de vigilancia y bloqueos en la carretera para impedir que realizaran sondeos mineros. Específicamente, Linares identifica y analiza las fases de la acción colectiva: la primera, la fase de inicio, fue explicada a través de la teoría de la *masa crítica* antes señalada; la segunda, la fase de consolidación, fue explicada a través del surgimiento de la cooperación condicional en base a la existencia de liderazgos confiables y con posiciones de alta centralidad de grado en las redes en que participaban, y además, la emergencia de normas sociales sustentadas en interacciones iteradas y de largo plazo, que hicieron posible sancionar a los no cooperadores.

#### 4.3.2. Experimentos de laboratorio

Los experimentos de laboratorio fueron inicialmente desarrollados por la economía, específicamente desde la *economía del comportamiento* y la *economía experimental*. Este enfoque metodológico para la investigación, ahora también utilizado en sociología, se utiliza con una orientación teórica: su objetivo es poner a prueba hipótesis, mecanismos y teorías y en este marco tienen como elemento constitutivo básico la formulación de hipótesis causales estudiadas a través de situaciones de contrastes que son controladas (Miller, 2006). En las situaciones controladas en el laboratorio los participantes se enfrentan a un problema determinado que implica una decisión determinada, para lo cual reciben instrucciones referidas a tratamientos en los que son situados, los que son definidos en el diseño del experimento (Brañas y Barreda, 2011).

Los resultados más interesantes logrados desde la evidencia experimental para el estudio de la acción colectiva son aquellos referidos a las motivaciones asociadas a la cooperación. A partir de los resultados logrados desde experimentos basados en la teoría de juegos (principalmente a partir del *juego del ultimátum* y el *juego del dictador*), diversos investigadores aportan evidencia que indica que los seres humanos tienen incorporadas tendencias hacia conductas cooperativas gatilladas por contextos sociales específicos. Además, se propone que los individuos pueden incurrir en acciones que son costosas para ellos orientadas a sancionar a quienes no practican la reciprocidad. Desde esta perspectiva, los individuos tienen nociones de equidad desarrolladas a través de procesos evolucionarios como especie. Esto último es también señalado por Bowles y Gintis (2000), quienes proponen el concepto de *Homo Reciprocans*: los humanos desarrollamos la antes mencionada *reciprocidad fuerte*, la que en base a la capacidad de seguir normas sociales es una tendencia a cooperar e intercambiar recursos con los que demuestran la misma disposición (reciprocidad positiva) y a castigar a quienes romper acuerdos y normas de cooperación e intercambio (reciprocidad negativa).

Tomando como base experimentos del mismo tipo que los realizados por Vernon Smith, Bowles y Gintis concluyen que comportamientos de *reciprocidad fuerte*,

coexisten con los comportamientos autointeresados del *Homo Economicus* y la variación y alternancia de estos comportamientos dependerá del contexto social en el que interactúe un individuo. La diferencia respecto al enfoque de la psicología evolucionaria de Cosmides y Tooby se refiere a que el tipo de cooperación desde el cual estos parten (altruismo recíproco propuesto por Trivers y el *toma y daca* recíproco destacado por Axelrod), es considerado por Bowles y Gintis como un comportamiento de “esto-por-aquello” que constituiría una *reciprocidad débil*. La *reciprocidad fuerte*, por el contrario, incluiría comportamientos que además de esperar (aunque sea en forma de reciprocidad difusa) un beneficio vinculado a un costo, considera aquellos comportamientos que pueden implicar un costo sin recibir beneficio y que se orienta sólo a sancionar a aquellos que no cumplen con normas de equidad en el intercambio social. La *reciprocidad fuerte* incorporaría una concepción de la equidad que se basa en que todos los individuos deben existir un equilibrio entre derechos y obligaciones que sean capaces de regular el intercambio social.

#### 4.3.3. Simulación social basada en agentes.

Es un tipo particular de modelación y en particular, es una técnica informática de análisis que permite, a través de la utilización de modelos, formular teorías para explicar fenómenos sociales (Gilbert y Troitzsch, 2006). En la simulación social basada en agentes se diseña, pone en funcionamiento y analiza los resultados producidos en un entorno de base o ambiente artificial sobre el cual se distribuyen y desplazan una multitud de agentes de diversos tipos. El elemento constitutivo de una simulación es un modelo concebido como una abstracción con alto grado de generalidad. Un modelo es una simplificación más pequeña, menos detallada, menos compleja de un sistema interactivo. En el modelo se representan las operaciones del sistema, en concreto, agentes ensamblados en conjunto en alguna interacción o interdependencia regular. Los agentes son concebidos como adaptivos y con racionalidad limitada: procesan información local desde su ambiente (otros agentes con sus reglas de interacción) y como respuesta emiten determinadas conductas a partir de ciertas reglas de actuación previamente programadas. No obstante lo anterior, ningún agente puede anticipar el estado final del sistema, de una estructura social simulada, pues este es un estado emergente, no lineal y complejo que se produce en forma autoorganizada y descentralizada y que tiene propiedades distintas a los agentes que las producen desde las interacciones locales masivamente paralelas en base a las reglas simples que siguen (González, 2010). Considerando lo anterior, la simulación social basada en agentes permiten escudriñar los mecanismos que se producen en las transiciones *macro-micro-macro* antes comentadas: permite el análisis del vínculo entre lo individual y lo social.

La simulación social basada en agentes ha sido utilizada para el estudio de condiciones que favorecen la cooperación y que por tanto, tienen utilidad para la comprensión de cómo surge y se estabiliza la acción colectiva. Un clásico en la materia son las investigaciones pioneras de Axelrod (2004) sobre estrategias evolutivas en base a *tit-for-tat*, la emergencia de normas sociales y metanormas. Otro ejemplo es un estudio



reciente sobre normas sociales utilizando la simulación es el realizado por Linares (2012) quien establece que para la emergencia de las normas sociales es necesario complementar la existencia de expectativas mutuas sobre el comportamiento socialmente considerado adecuado y la sanción efectiva por incumplimiento y además postula que se requiere un número reducido de integrantes que conformen una *masa crítica* gracias a la alta densidad de la red entre los actores. Un tercer ejemplo es el aportado por González (2010), quien a través de experimentos de simulación identifica mecanismos específicos a partir de los cuales formula explicaciones teóricas sobre cómo dadas propiedades de las redes sociales (densidad, distancia y agrupación) se generan determinados procesos la circulación de información, que a su vez favorecen determinados efectos atribuidos al capital social como la cooperación.

## 5. Conclusiones

En esta ponencia exploramos el potencial del acervo teórico y metodológico de la aproximación analítica en ciencias sociales, aproximación desarrollada en sociología por la sociología analítica, para formular explicaciones sobre la acción colectiva. Considerando no sólo el interés científico de analizar la acción colectiva, sino además, la relevancia normativa de sus resultados, solo queda esbozar una sentencia para un futuro programa de investigación en la materia: existe convergencia entre las herramientas metodológicas y las fuentes teóricas reseñadas y gracias a ellas es posible explicar la acción individual desde la cual, dada una lógica de la situación *micro*, surge la acción colectiva como la agregación de interacciones cooperativas y esta acción colectiva tiene propiedades emergentes que generan determinados cursos de acción y determinado poder político que puede, dadas ciertas condiciones, viabilizar los resultados esperados por quienes se movilizan. Hay suficiente evidencia empírica para emprender la tarea y así formular teorías plausibles y además, elaborar tecnologías de la acción colectiva eficaces, a fin de reducir la brecha entre *deseabilidad*, *viabilidad* y *factibilidad*.

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# The Fear Management Process in Antiauthoritarian and Democratic Movements

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**Abstract:** This essay is a theoretical exploration of fear management among oppositional and democratic activists in repressive regimes. It draws upon a wide range of contemporary examples of protest in China and the Middle East, plus several the author's empirical field studies of the democratic opposition in Spain, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe to suggest a robust model of *fear reduction* mechanisms in states where protest activism carries high risks. There is a large body of research that takes risk as the key variable the repression-mobilization nexus. In contrast, this paper assumes that perceptions of risk and how they are weighed against perceived opportunities and payoffs are colored by emotional states, most notably fear. Drawing on a mechanisms-and-process approach that stresses the relational and dynamic aspects of political contention, this essay offers a two-step model of *fear reduction* processes: (1) Initial steps to transcend preference falsification among a fearful public in repressive states. Mechanisms of the first step comprise what I label, the resistant repertoire. (2) Managing fear of the police and security apparatus during protest events that increasingly take on elements of the standard modular repertoire. This occurs as fear among the public decreases and participation in the opposition grows. Elements of the model in both stages include anonymity, solidarity, duplicity, and tactical creativity.

**Keywords:** Repression, Authoritarian regimes, democratic movements, opposition movements, Fear management, Dynamics of contention

## 1. Introduction

This study focuses on the emotion of fear, and its experience by protesters in democratic movements against repressive regimes. Authoritarian states thrive on fear, but as a democratic opposition gains momentum, this fear, while not completely disappearing, gets managed and transcended such that increasingly larger protest actions can proceed. In Egypt, when mass protests erupted in January 2011, participants had to break out of their fear of the police and security forces to join others at Tahrir Square. This paper seeks to probe what had changed for for hundreds of thousands of citizens, and to ponder whether social science can generalize some robust mechanisms whereby fear is overcome to feed protests in repressive regimes, as in Egypt in 2011, or the Iranian Green movement in 2009, or in Syria today, or in China.

To guide these inquiries, I draw upon two recent currents of theory in the field of protest studies. (1) There has been renewed interest in emotional aspects of collective action, a theoretical critique which has threaded through the field for the past decade (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2004; Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Pfaff 2001; Jasper 1998; Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Polletta 1998; 2002; Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Flam and King 2005). (2) A focus on the dynamic and relational aspects of collective action has recently emerged, specifically the quest to identify general mechanisms and processes (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam and Tarrow 2011; Alimi, Bosi, and Giugni 2012). This too is a perspective that has coursed through the field of protest studies for the past decade. Neither, however, would be characterized as paradigmatic, although, as I will suggest, together, both are central to understanding mobilization processes in authoritarian regimes for two fundamental reasons.

First, as we saw in the words of our young respondent, fear is a basic determinant of protest mobilization in the repressive state: fear of the police and security forces, of beatings, of arbitrary detentions, and of the numerous small ways that the authoritarian state can make life difficult for noncompliant citizens. Second, because there are always some citizens who tolerate higher levels of fear and because the authoritarian state is not a hermetically sealed monolith of social control, there is always a dynamic interplay of activists and security personnel, each affecting the response of the other. This most apparently occurs when a demonstration unfolds and the cat-and-mouse game between the protesters and the police begins. But also, as I will discuss, it also occurs on an everyday level, before mass protests develop, when activists seek to avoid state surveillance and seek to push the limits of the regime's tolerance. This too is a cat-and-mouse game.

Drawing on a broad spectrum of empirical examples both from current events in the Middle East, China, and Russia, and from my own field research in Spain and Eastern Europe, I will suggest a preliminary model for the management of fear under repressive conditions: mechanisms of *fear reduction*. If successfully described, it will be sufficiently robust to explain how protest mobilization unfolds in repressive settings as diverse as Egypt, Syria, Libya, China, Russia, and states with levels of repression and social control that lie in between.

## 2. Emotional Dynamics in Mobilization

Researchers in the field of protest studies have shown renewed interest in the role of emotions. This interest is not a recycling of "moments of madness" in social movements and revolutions (Zolberg 1972), but rather reflects a rediscovery of elements that have always been present in social movements but largely neglected because of paradigmatic shifts in the field toward interest-based and structural foci over the past thirty years (Jasper 1998).

Beginning in the 1990s, a body of research on the feminist movement also began to emphasize the emotional dimension of women's organizations (Taylor 1989; 1995;

1996; Taylor and Whittier 1996). Then, linked with the cultural turn in sociology generally, several scholars of emotion, working separately and in collaboration, began to elaborate the emotional dimensions of different social movements, ranging from the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, to animal rights protests, to the U.S. civil rights movement (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2004; Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Pfaff 2001; Jasper 1998; Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Polletta 1998; 2002; Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Flam and King 2005).

These studies tended to focus on the cultural construction and positive channeling of emotions for mobilization (Gould 2002; 2009; Flam and King 2005), and, as such, yielded insights into the mechanisms by which emotions are manifested in collective action. These studies, however, did not take up the kinds of robust causal mechanisms that McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) had in mind in their dynamic approach. Nor did they explore the negative link between the emotions and the repression of collective action. Many focused on anger, outrage, and grief, but were mute on the role of fear as an emotion, which is the prevailing emotion in confrontations with security forces in repressive states.

I propose that the role of emotions is especially relevant in repressive contexts, and that it is useful to consider identifying key mechanisms associated with their management and channeling in episodes of contention. These are mechanisms that would seem to occupy an important place in a dynamic approach to collective action, but which were absent from McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's catalogue of mechanisms (2001). While emotions are individually experienced, the mechanisms of which I speak are complex mid-level chains of interaction. They may partly play out in real-time street confrontations, but also tend to work out their fullness in the long term, especially in everyday forms of contentious politics that can mitigate and redefine them. As a first step in such an approach, I will focus on the emotion of fear, which is especially salient in nondemocratic regimes where the army and security forces violently repress protests, and where regime thugs pursue activists. While anger has been considered in movements as varied as Three-Mile Island and anti-AIDS mobilizations (Jaspers 1998; Gould 2002, 2009), regarding fear, one encounters mostly silence or the assumption that there is a straightforward and noncontroversial one-to-one relationship between levels of fear and the rising costs of activism.

### **3. Fear, Costs, and Mobilization**

From a rationalist perspective, high costs rather than fear are the primary barriers to participation. These costs can be offset by changing calculations of benefits and their probabilities when political contexts change, for example if huge numbers of protesters fill the streets, offering protection to individual participants and making repression is unlikely. What is missing from this reasoning is that fear is an emotional state that has influence on cognitive processes and affects the perception and interpretation of the situation. This means that there is not necessarily a straightforward linear relationship between costs of participation and fear—the

assumption that the higher the costs the greater the fear. I suggest that analysts disregard one (fear) in favor of the other (costs) only at the risk of losing an essential element in the dynamics of repression and mobilization. Low cost actions can create great fear for some participants, while others can be fearless in the face of high-cost threats. Also, by focusing strictly on costs, the analyst misses the social construction of emotional experience and its antecedent effects on perception. As Jasper observed regarding the Three Mile Island crisis (1978), emotions can change the assessments of costs and lead to their transcendence. Collectively experienced fear can inflate the perceptions costs, closing down tightly opportunities of activism. But also, fear can be managed collectively and its effects regarding mobilization greatly reduced, even though the high costs (rationally) remain.

To bring these various effects together, I have in mind a general process of *fear reduction* as essential in the development of antiauthoritarian oppositions and democratic movements. Moreover, following the DOC approach, the general process is made up several mechanisms and submechanisms that are common and play a critical role at key junctures in mobilization across different authoritarian regimes. The process of *fear reduction* is a temporal process that occurs in the long term, and runs parallel with contentious actions occurring on an increasingly more public scale and in increasingly oppositional and challenging forms. The notions of "losing your fear" or "fear being dispelled" were widely reported in media accounts of protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. In authoritarian regimes, the mechanisms of *fear reduction* would seem to play key roles in movements of democratic opposition.

That fear and its management have not been factored into a theory of the repression-mobilization nexus may partly account for the wide variability of empirical results regarding the effects of repression on mobilization. In Lichbach's words, "Why have scholars theorized and reported that all possible curves fit the impact of repression on dissent?" (1987: 293). Part of the answer is that two kinds of fear are conflated into one general measure of costs of participation as reflected in the variable "level of repression." First, there is a general, pervasive fear that is instilled by the ubiquity of security forces and surveillance that imposes silence on political issues and fosters the superficial appearance of implied legitimacy of the regime and its policies. I have in mind Kuran's (1995) concept of *preference falsification*, which operates during periods of protest quiescence to stifle communication about regime dissatisfaction. Kuran suggests that fear of reprisals imparts a veil of silence that keeps most citizens from voicing their true attitudes about the regime and its leaders, which fosters the belief that they are alone in their grievances. This *pervasive fear* must be broken as a first step in the mobilization of protest in repressive regimes. How this is accomplished is one of the key *fear reduction* mechanisms.

Second, there is a more specific fear that occurs as protesters take to the street: fear of bodily injury, arrest, torture, disappearance, and even death when security forces fire on protesters. This fear is managed in part by the collective perception of safety in numbers, by the persistence and support of other protesters that imparts feelings of collective solidarity, and by the apparent inability of the forces of social control

to contain the increasing number of protesters. I suggest that these mechanisms combine to indicate a point where fear of injury or arrest is placed aside through collective redefinition. We can see these mechanisms at work in the following statement, which I collected during my initial fieldwork in authoritarian settings, when I interviewed anti-Franco activists after the fall of the old regime in Spain (Johnston 1991). I present a segment from an interview conducted with a middle-class family man—a mid-level manager, Catholic, and Socialist Party member—who was not an activist or anti-Francoist dissident. The statement is an exemplary statement that helps approximate this dual quality in the process of *fear reduction*. Although the events he reports are long past, his recollections remain relevant in their description of a two-step process of *fear reduction* as he was drawn to join the protests against Spanish authoritarianism.

*[ . . . ] For the first time in Barcelona, seventy, eighty thousand people went into the streets, hounded by the police, still, still, struck by the police, and some detained. It was, all of Barcelona, was a battle during the entire morning for two consecutive Sundays. The police couldn't do anything! They ran around a lot and at times they'd arrive at a spot in a jeep and get down and find some isolated people.*

*Interviewer: Did you go out?*

*Respondent: Eh? Yes, yes, of course, Evidently. In these cases you have to go. You can't stop.*

*Respondent: There were two impressive demonstrations in February of 1976.*

*Interviewer: Why was that?*

*Respondent: Because we thought it was necessary at that time. Come on! These mobilizations, uh, come on! I couldn't have stayed in the house [laugh], evidently, nor could any of my family either.*

*Interviewer: But, let's say, five years earlier, would you have gone into the streets?*

*Respondent: Well, it's that, during the period of Franco, the things were much more serious. Then, too, we went, but with much fear, and the demonstrations were small. There was one on May 1 [1974], a small thing, but, well, with a lot of fear and much caution. But these two demonstrations [in 1976] were the first in which the people massively risked to go out into the streets, because they thought . . . the gentlemen in Madrid, saw that we were serious, that it wasn't a minority, because to send police to repress seventy, eighty thousand people, you pay a high price. Because there's many more who think the same. And it was . . . Come on! It was marvelous for us to be in the street. Calle Aragon, you know it, filled from one end to the other, and people came from Grand Via. In each neighborhood, there was a small gathering, which, when they arrived in the center of Barcelona, made a mass of people.*

In this interview segment, one finds the two steps of the *fear reduction* process present in different protest mobilizations, one occurring in 1974 before the death of Franco, and the other in 1976, shortly after his death, when mass demonstrations of about 70,000 protesters occurred. Fear limited the size of the first, as one would expect:




"demonstrations were small," and there was "much fear," and "great caution." For scholars of regimes and opposition, there is little that is new here except for the respondent's poignant words confirming how fear constrains participation.

Yet, in order for the second protest to have occurred, the fear that imposed preference falsification in Spain and silenced protests prior to 1974 had to be transcended. The first protests were attended by people with a higher threshold of fear, fewer in number, but who saw that voicing their discontent publicly was critical for the movement's development, despite the small circle of believers. Early protests did not send a message to "the gentlemen in Madrid . . . that we were serious," (as the larger ones did) but—and this is crucial to the mechanism—were intended for fellow citizens as the primary audience. These were people who no doubt were more timid than those in the streets, and the protests were intended to break the preference falsification spiral by offering affirmation that there are those who are dissatisfied were not alone.

Two years later, another dynamic was at work. He states, "You have to go," and, "In these cases you can't stop." Not that fear was absent, for he opens the statement with a description of how the police were still being beaten people, and that "it was a battle." Both the size of the protest and the stalwart presence of the mass of other protesters were the two key factors, I suggest, in this second step of *fear reduction*. At the end of the segment, his words emphasize collective presence of others, not in terms of sheer numbers but in terms of their motives: "Because there's many more who think the same." And then he expresses with emotion: "Come on! It was marvelous for us to be in the street." Here he speaks of a well-known phenomenon, namely, the collective solidarity and enthusiasm that are palpable in some protest events—when fear is redirected into a celebration of the collectivity. The social-psychological basis of this has been established experimentally: the experience of voice—of standing up to be heard as part of a collectivity—has the effect of raising the social basis of one's identity, which produces a shared sense of well being and enjoyment (Tajfel 1981).

Like many other of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's mechanisms (2001, see also McAdam and Tarrow 2011), *fear reduction* embodies collective assessments and reassessments that resituate the group vis-à-vis the immediate context in an ongoing and recursive social process. Figure one graphically lays out the argument in the pages that follow, presenting the *fear reduction* process as occurring in two steps or mechanisms. The first is precipitated by what I call early-riser activists who have a higher fear threshold (they tolerate a higher level of fear). Their actions break the reign of preference falsification that undergirds the regime, and leads to the second step of progressively larger collective-action events that have the recursive effect of diminishing fear levels and fear distribution even more.



#### 4. Early Risers and Symbolic Actions

Kuran's analysis underestimated the role of those people who were willing to endure high risks and subordinate fear of imprisonment to make public statements in opposition to the regime. He laid stress on the effect of international developments—the rise of Polish Solidarity movement, for example, or the fall of the Berlin Wall—to account for how citizen quiescence breaks down (but not how fear is transcended).

Although international trends can play a role—as is seen in how protest diffused in the Arab Spring—under conditions of widespread preference falsification, two groups stand out in the internal mitigation of pervasive fear: (1) well-know dissidents and their circles of followers, and (2) students and youthful activists, who, although aware of the risks, undertake symbolic actions. These actions are important not so much in the challenge they pose to the regime—for the actual direct threat is very low—but rather the in the public resonance their actions have in proclaiming that there is an opposition. To put it another way, such actions communicate that if you privately harbor antiregime sentiments, you are not alone, and, indeed, there are others who are willing to endure fear of repression to publicly voice those sentiments.

These actions serve the purpose of "triggering" a change in the prevailing discourse, a central concept in Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina's (1982) classic analysis of how quiescence is transformed into collective action. Triggering is a parallel concept to the classical social-psychological concept of risky shift (see Myers 1982 for a summary), which traces how the surface tension of group conformity can be broken by open discussion as opposed to conformist pressures fueled by silence. For the shift to occur, often the outspokenness of just one or two members is sufficient. Gamson, Fireman and Rytina's (1982) focus-group exercises demonstrated that outspoken group members are critical to fomenting rebellion in small group settings. Applied to repressive contexts, early-riser groups play a triggering role in breaking the norm of quiescence that prevails in preference falsification, which slowly brings more participants into these kinds of early, symbolic collective actions.

#### 4.1. Dissidents

A thorn in the side of almost all repressive regimes and a common denominator in democratic opposition movements is the activism of dissidents in early stages of the opposition's development. Dissidents "*openly proclaim dissent and demonstrate it in one way or another to compatriots and the state*" (Medevyev 1980: 1, italics mine). This is the key: dissidents are voices in the wilderness criticizing the state regime, and it is crucial that make their voices be made public somehow. Because dissidents are a miniscule proportion of a country's total citizenry, these writers, scientists, lawyers, artists, poets, and the occasional common citizen who attracts the international media spotlight because of their principled stance against the state, play roles that are often discounted by political sociology as individual rather than collective actions. While there is certainly a lone-wolf quality to the dissidence of the most notorious figures in China, Russia, and the Middle East, it would be incorrect to label dissidence an individual phenomenon. First, the dissident pronouncements are important in *fear reduction* because they diffuse and resonate among the more quiescent public. Their statements and manifestos, as well as their arrests and trials, are talked about by wider circles and assume their importance in their public diffusion. Second, there is a strong collective quality to dissidence. Well-know dissident voices are typically embedded in activist networks that make their work possible by disseminating information under adverse conditions (Joppke 1995; Flam 1998).

It is plausible that in any given population there is a normal distribution of fear tolerance and risk aversion, which means that there are outliers at the high end of curve who are willing to endure intense fear and endure a great deal of risk for their principles. Why some people are like this (and most are not) is a question that has an answer that probably lies as much in individual psychology than in social processes. However, because many dissidents are intellectuals, artists, writers, lawyers, and journalists, the atmosphere of state censorship and the unjust and unequal application of the law are especially stifling of their creativity and principles. The repressive state strangles the creative activities that shape their lives. This partly explains why dissidence clusters in these groups.

Ai Weiwei is one of a renowned group of Chinese dissidents who speak out against corruption, injustice, and the lack of freedom and democracy. He is perhaps best known for his defense of the families that lost children in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Liu Xiaobo is another, a Nobel laureate because of his part in writing Charter 2008, which called for increased democratic freedoms in China, and for which he paid the price of an eleven-year prison sentence. As I write these words, blind lawyer, Cheng Guangcheng is in the news because of his daring escape from heavy police confinement in his home village and his arrival in the US. His cause was defending rural families against the one-child law and making public its inconsistent application.

As with these three, it is common that dissidents gain international notoriety. During the Soviet period in Russia, Andre Sakarov and Alexander Solzhenitzyn achieved this status, in Poland, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron, in the former Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel. Many of these figures played major, sometimes heroic, roles in the transition from communism, but studies of dissident activities in Eastern Europe have shown that, rather than fearless lone eagles, prominent dissidents are usually part of larger networks comprised of individuals from intellectual, artistic and scientific communities (Joppke 1995: 13; Flam 1998). They gather in private homes periodically to discuss, ideologize, and strategize challenges to regime policies. In repressive states, this is obviously risky behavior. In some cases well-known dissidents can draw upon international reputations for shelter because the regime wants to avoid the media attention that their arrests would surely attract. However, it is important to note that there are many others who are members of dissident networks who cannot rely on their notoriety for protection and often are at great risk. As of this writing, the circle that aided the escape from house detention of blind lawyer Cheng Guancheng has been harassed, beaten, an arrested on dubious charges. One member has disappeared with no word to his family members of his whereabouts. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, leader of the Iran's Green movement remains free, but thousands of green-movement activists are in jail. Mousavi's nephew was shot to death.

Dissident activities were especially characteristic of "mature socialism" in the Soviet bloc, but dissident circles can be identified in Latin American various authoritarianisms, and I was able to identify dissident circles in Catalonia and Euzkadi during my fieldwork on the anti-Francoist opposition in Spain (Johnston 1991). Typical activities were the drafting of open letters and petitions—Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and

Charter 2008 in China—defending activists' actions, disseminating information about arrests and illegal police activities, proposing new laws and democratic reforms, challenging official history and economic theory, and passing information to foreign media or giving interviews. Twenty-five years ago, samizdat publication (underground dissident newspapers and journals) was important because dissident activity could only assume political importance in so far as it was disseminated to the larger public. Today, in China, Russia, and Syria, where public mass media is mostly controlled by the state, it is through blogs and social media that dissident information is spread. These public qualities of dissident activities make them good measures of regime illegitimacy under conditions of preference falsification.

#### 4.2. Symbolic Actions

In addition to high-visibility dissidents, there is second tier of oppositional activists who also are found among the more fear-tolerant groups in the population. Based on my own research (Johnston 2005, 2006, 2011a; Johnston and Aarelaid 2000; Johnston and Mueller 2001), there seems to be in this group a strong overrepresentation of students (high school and university) and youth (sometimes unemployed). This generational pattern is probably because of cognitive orientations characteristic of young adults (Johnston 2011) and for reasons of social location and freedom from family responsibilities. These activists are noteworthy because they take great risks to perpetrate seemingly small symbolic acts of defiance against the regime. Like the proclamations and manifestos of well-known dissidents, their actions break the political quiescence that characterizes repressive regimes.

For a poignant example, I return to my research on the waning years of Soviet power and the rise of nationalist oppositions in minority-national republics. There was a story that circulated widely of how a group of students assaulted a statue of Lenin in the central plaza of Kaunas, in the Lithuanian SSR. The statue portrayed Lenin's iconic monumental pose: a determined countenance looking out upon the horizon, an outstretched hand beckoning to the working classes, and his other hand behind his back. The students' clandestine raid in the early morning gave the pose new meaning. They placed a mound of excrement in Lenin's outstretched hand, and a loaf of bread in his hand behind his back. The symbolism was clear: communist ideology is a load of sh\_t, and it does not even deliver on the bare necessities of life. Needless to say it did not take long for the police (and sanitation workers) to bring the statue back to "normal," but not before thousands saw it on their way to work in the morning. Maybe even some photos were taken to be shown to friends.

It is difficult to gauge the impact of these actions relative to the manifestos and press interviews of well-known dissidents, but symbolic actions have similar functions. They remind the broader population that (1) there is an opposition out there that is willing to take risks; and (2) with guile and creativity, oppositional statements can be made public. In authoritarian regimes, the repertoire of symbolic actions can take numerous forms: the placement of flowers, flags, crosses, candles, and so on,

in symbolic locations. For example, flowers appeared at the gates of the Gdansk shipyard to commemorate the anniversary of the deaths of striking workers, and in Tallinn, Estonia, flowers appeared on the anniversary of the republic at the site of a statue of a national hero, which was demolished by the Soviets in 1940. The painting of political graffiti is also a display of opposition. Political graffiti were common sights in Latin American authoritarian regimes, in Egypt during the Arab Spring, in the Iranian democracy movement in 2009, and in recent times, Syria. But painting graffiti is not entirely without risk. Recall that in March 2011, escalation of the Syrian conflict had its epicenter in Dara'a, a town in the south of Syria. Several students were detained for painting anti-regime graffiti, and beaten in custody, which set off protests that spread throughout the country (Shadid 2011).

These examples take advantage of public locations, many of which have symbolic meaning for the democratic opposition, but symbolic acts of opposition can also take different forms using different media. To take one example, China has sought to erase from collective memory the brutal repression of the students' democracy movement in 1989. Recently, a classified advertisement appearing in the *Chengdu Evening News* paid homage to the mothers who lost children in the Tiananmen Square massacre. The meaning of the ad slipped by the staff: "Saluting the strong mothers of victims of 64" was its cryptic text. Six-four is common shorthand for the repression on June 4 (6-4), 1989, when hundreds—perhaps thousands—of students were killed by the People's Liberation Army. The advertisement referred to those few mothers who, despite an absolute ban on speaking of the massacre, have continued to call for an investigation. It seems that the young woman who accepted the ad was unaware of the significance of the "64" reference, and was told it was the date of a mining disaster when she asked the person placing the ad. News of the defiant ad went viral on the internet before censors were able to intervene.

## 5. Strategies of Fear Reduction

The examples listed above, with the exception of dissidence, all ride on a fundamental fear-reduction strategy in repressive states: *anonymity*. It is the same strategy that fuels quiescence among the majority of the population: don't make waves and keep your head down. For both activists and ordinary citizens, if the probability of getting caught (or harassed by security forces) remains low, it is likely that levels of fear stay low also. Clandestine actions insure anonymity, and as long repression is intense, anonymity will be a fundamental strategy of fear management. Moreover, it will remain operative along with other strategies as the opposition develops to help bring into participation less fear-tolerant segments of the population.

A second strategy of fear reduction derives from the collective nature of many of symbolic actions: the *solidarity* that develops among the participants. A strong bond develops among those who endure risks and share the thrill of successful operations. Also, a well-established social-psychological concept, the principle of divided impact, helps explain the importance of the collectivity for fear reduction. As the number

of people in a group increases, the impact of a message directed at them—in this case, the message of fear and repression—decreases at a decreasing rate (Latané 1981: 349; see also Jackson and Latané 1981). This means that adding the first few participants to a clandestine group—a political-slogan painting spree, or a midnight graffiti brigade, for example—mitigates the fear significantly. It also means that, later, as the number of participants gets significantly larger in protest demonstrations, the regime's repression threat becomes increasingly diffuse and less effective—more on this in section five. Recognizing the triggering effect of these actions, we must acknowledge that individual actions alone can communicate powerful messages about the opposition, as in dissident statements or—more extreme—self-immolations by Buddhist monks to protest Chinese occupation in the Tibetan region, or Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, which precipitated the mass mobilizations that toppled the Ben Ali regime. However, most people are not so heroic, and the presence of others is an important element of fear reduction via the diffusion of the repressive threat.

### 5.1. Duplicity

Another strategy of fear reduction is duplicity, which, in many ways, is a proxy for anonymity because cloaking your actions by portraying them as something else is another way to remain anonymous. The key difference is that duplicitous strategies, at least in early phases of an opposition's development, limit the public expression of opposition, which limits fear reduction among the wider population. In the course of my past research on democratic oppositions (Johnston 2005, 2006), I have analyzed how duplicity permeates public discourse in repressive regimes. A frequent statement from respondents is that there is a "double-mindedness" to talk at work and in official functions such as neighborhood, school, or party meetings. One learns not to speak one's mind publicly, but to guard one's words and monitor reactions. However, among trusted friends and in circles of acquaintances considered safe, with careful vigilance to who is participating, one can "speak the truth."

This double-mindedness can permeate select official organizations such that their legal status serves as an excuse to carve out centers of oppositional speech. Members gather, talk, and sometimes take part in activities that push the limits of what the regime may define as acceptable. These groups use public buildings, file official budgets and political reports, but their activities frequently have an implicit oppositional character. People who are private opponents of the regime flock to these activities as locales where quiescence can be transcended. The key point is that, although not numerous, such groups and organizations occur throughout repressive states as free spaces of guarded oppositional talk. The regime's double-mindedness is suspended temporarily in such settings. These findings also indicate that Kuran's concept of preference falsification requires an important qualification, namely, that it is the prevailing rule for public discourse for most of the population, but not there is a sizeable segment of the population for whom it is not.

In my fieldwork in several former authoritarian regimes, respondents had no trouble identifying groups and organizations known for their veiled oppositional milieu. Social and recreational groups sometimes perform this role (folk-dancing groups, ethnographic study groups, folk music groups, local historical societies, and drama clubs). It is also common that religious organizations are covert centers of veiled political activity (churches in the Philippines, South Korea, El Salvador, Nicaragua, GDR, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and, of course, in Poland, where the Roman Catholic Church played a central role in the development of the Solidarity movement; Buddhist temples Tibet and Myanmar; Sufi orders in Chechnya, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's current transition, and in Syrian violence in 2000). Finally, intellectual and artistic groups are often sites of political discussion (jazz circles, literary salons, book clubs, theater groups, cinema societies, and language study groups). Like dissident networks, they cluster here because members' creativity and/or inquisitiveness are stifled by the authoritarian state.

## 5.2. Creativity

Many symbolic protest actions in authoritarian settings stand out by virtue of their creativity. Movement leaders strategically select tactics that can reduce the fear of participants. There are numerous examples: in 2011 the authoritarian regime of Belarus was had difficulty breaking up protest actions by students who gathered publicly to clap or set their mobile phones to go off simultaneously. The cacophony of ring tones said nothing overtly about political protest, but that it was organized and pulled off despite police presence was enough of a political statement. Like the examples mentioned earlier, such an action will not bring down the regime, but rather its importance lies in how it communicates broadly that participants are unwilling to remain quiet. Also, the use of mobile phones and microblogs for coordination point to how activists can stay one step ahead of the security forces through technical competence and innovation, something that the police and security forces—typically low-paid and uneducated—would not be expected to be at the cutting edge.

In China, the state recognizes the oppositional potential of the internet, social media, microblogs, as well as the sophistication of high-tech activists in circumventing the Great Firewall that the state has thrown up around the internet, search engines, and microblog platforms. Such restrictions were the root cause for Google pulling out of China in early 2010, and the banning of Twitter and Facebook in 2009, all to be replaced by homegrown alternatives that are easier to control. As a result, one dissident's first post on the Chinese platform, Shou, was purged within five minutes (Ansfield 2010). That same year, the entire region of Xinjiang, where riots occurred in July, had its internet service completely blacked out for more than six months. Even so, with creativity and guile, activists can challenge the censor-state.

In early 2009 a YouTube children's song about a mythical "grass-mud horse" went viral in China (see figure 2). A fictional nature documentary about the creature did too, and blogs about the grass-mud horse's struggle against the evil river crab spread across



the internet. In Chinese, “grass-mud horse” sounds very similar to an especially foul obscenity, and the spread of these postings in a country that monitors the internet closely reflected a creative and harmless—bordering on the nonpolitical—way to make a statement against the regime’s censorship policies. Normally, such language would be immediately censored to “maintain social harmony,” but government algorithms did not detect it because it is written in different characters. Moreover, the claim that the postings are children’s stories gives their creators additional protection and reduces fear of retribution. “Scenes of alpaca-like creatures romping to Disney-style sounds of a children’s chorus quickly turn shocking—then, to many Chinese, hilarious—as it becomes clear that the songs fairly burst with disgusting language.” [. . .] The grass-mud horse has become an icon of resistance to censorship (Wines 2009).



Figure 2. The Grass-Mud Horse on the Internet.

Creativity is fundamental to what the analyst might designate as a *resistant repertoire*, that is, a configuration of strategies that are used in the first stage of fear reduction. It is a thread that ties together many of the cases that I have discussed so far. If the reader remains unconvinced, let me list a few more highly innovative tactics that have comprised the resistant repertoire in various opposition movements, all of which foster the public expression of protest in the face of state repression, which at early stages of the opposition is the point.

- In Iran, heavy police presence, surveillance, and militia violence drove the the 2009 Green movement into dormancy. Fear returned, but not enough to prevent Tehranians from gathering on rooftops during summer nights in 2009 to call out antiregime slogans and songs that echoed throughout the city's night air. Obviously, this is a tactic that is difficult for the police to control.

- Also in Iran, there is a traditional celebration held on March 16 called the Feast of Fire, which had been banned by the ayatollahs because of its non-Islamic roots in Zoroastrianism. In 2010 police were sent out in response to activist calls to celebrate the holiday as a protest. Nevertheless, in almost all of Tehran's neighborhoods, bonfires, music and dancing were held. It was reported that about fifty arrests occurred (Fathi 2010a).

- In China, on the Tiananmen anniversary this year (indeed, as I write this paper), the Shanghai Stock Exchange fell 64.89 points, that is, 6-4-89, the date of the massacre. And the next day, the stock index opened at 2346.98, a figure that marked the date written backwards, plus 23 for the twenty-third anniversary. (Bradsher 2011: A6). Exactly how this highly creative stunt was accomplished—whether an inside job from the technical staff of the exchange or by outside hackers, remains unknown, but the damage was done as news of the prank spread quickly via coded emails and microblogs.

- Following on this example, in 2012 the analyst might speak of Creativity 2.0 as part of the resistant repertoire. I refer to how protesters stay several steps ahead of security forces and police by using the latest advances in web and digital technology. In Iran's Green movement, activists learned that mobile phones could be connected by Bluetooth, leading to the creation of, a new verb, "to Bluetooth" that described the coordination of protest crowds that way. In Syria, satellite-fed internet connections are used to upload pictures and reports of the al-Assad's regime's violence against the uprising. In the wake of Iranian repression, satellite connections are used to download the protest music, such as that of Shahin Najafi, an Iranian rapper living in Germany. The government actively seeks to close all access to such "resistance music," as it is known in Iran. A Revolutionary-Guard-based "Iranian Cyber Army" has shut down Najafi's website, and hacked Iranians' twitter accounts. But Iranians have also learned to bypass the web altogether, sharing music and video files via cell phones (Fathi 2010b), Activists also create home-made montages of protest pictures set to music that they share this way. Finally, cyberactivists' creativity to circumvent the Chinese state's Great Firewall , which seeks to censor internet information, is well-known (Pierson 2010).

## 6. Fear Reduction and Modular Protest

The resistant repertoire as a whole is characteristic of higher levels of fear, higher risk of getting caught, and higher levels of citizen trepidation about participation. Its key elements of creativity, duplicity, anonymity and solidarity are precisely there to

mitigate fear socially (that is, via social processes) among those stalwart soles who, despite higher levels of fear tolerance, may hesitate as they weigh risk and emotions individually. The theme of this section is that in the development of broad democratic oppositions, there necessarily comes a crucial moment when the incapacitating quality of fear is broken for wider segments of the population. This is the second stage of the fear reduction process (see figure 1). At this point, oppositional protests assume more familiar forms of the modular social movement repertoire. But let me be clear: I am not referring to mass mobilizations such as Tahrir Square in Egypt 2011, or the Iranian green movement in 2009, or the four weeks in Tunisia at the end of 2010 that brought down the Ben Ali regime. Rather, I am referring to the common pattern that, prior to such broad mobilizations, there are usually sequences of public protests in the modular repertoire that represent the first, tentative ventures into transcending the strategic principle of anonymity.

Such mobilizations are typically focused on specific issues—environmental, labor, corruption, neighborhood NIMBY grievances, and women's claims—rather than the broader antiregime mobilizations of the Arab Spring mobilizations of 2011 or the 2012 anti-Putin protests in Russia. It is typical that they are characterized by a tension with the repressive state. This occurs in part at the policy level because, by permitting public protests to occur, the regime acknowledges—at least to a minimal degree—popular sovereignty. This tension is also manifested in the streets, because security apparatuses not accustomed to moderation and restraint, even though there is often a strong self-limiting quality to the public demonstrations. At the policy level, the party and/or state may choose not to unleash the police and security apparatus for ideological reasons, for reasons of international politics, or to provide a safety valve to reduce more direct antiregime protests. Other times repression can be swift, which means the brutality of the state enters into future calculations of fear, that another emotion enters the equation: anger that the regime has crossed the line of proportionality in dealing with protests. State response is a contingency that any model of fear reduction processes must factor in, not only because it increases fear but can activate other emotional responses.

Whereas anonymity can no longer be relied upon to reduce fear in these actions, duplicity sometimes remains as a carryover from the resistant repertoire. For example, in a coastal city of Xiamen in Southern China, a focused NIMBY campaign mobilized to protest the construction of a petrochemical plant close to the city center. In 2007 a group of experts first expressed safety concerns about the plant at the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a institutional state channel designed to give voice to citizen's claims and complaints. Thereafter many residents of Xiamen began to discuss suspension of the plant's construction via blogs and social web media. Street demonstrations however represent a significant step beyond the contained strategy of voicing concern about policy issues in town meetings or via microblogs—within limits. Public protests are perilous undertakings where participants risk detention, harassment, and beatings by police, but organizers in Xiamen devised a duplicitous cover for their protest by issuing a call to action—via internet and microblogs—for a "weekend stroll" where participants can discuss

the issue of petrochemical plant (Carnesecca 2012). The stroll, of course, would be recognized anywhere else as a street demonstration.

The following quote is from a blog by Xiamen activist Lian Yue calling for action. The text replicated below represents the first several lines of his call for participation in the “stroll.” It makes clear that fear was a prevailing emotion.

1. *First off, don't be afraid. Discussing top proposals put forth at the CPPCC is not a crime, you won't be arrested.*
2. *If you have a blog or frequent online forums, please spread this news article: 'The controversy over the Xiamen chemical factory worth billions'; distribution of news from newspapers legally distributed within the country is not a crime, you will not be arrested.*
3. *If you're still afraid, during this time meet more often with friends, family and colleagues to discuss this matter—they might not have all the details.*
4. *If you're still scared, then try just talking to your best friends and immediate family.*
5. *If you're not afraid, you ought to tell your friends in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, they're in as much danger as you are. (Global Voices Online 2007, quoted in Carnesecca 2012: 16).*

Lian Yue's words make clear that fear has not disappeared under the cloak of “being out on a weekend stroll.” His first point addresses these concerns directly: “You won't be arrested,” an assertion made not without a little disingenuity. As it turned out, the stroll on June 1, 2007 drew about 10,000 participants, signs and vocal chords in abundance. Police were present in force. It was a demonstration, not a stroll. No one was fooled—neither participants nor security forces—but both got cover by the tactic. The police did not have to weigh in with truncheons and risk escalation, and the participants were buoyed by seeing the throng drawn by the duplicity of the tactic. As Carnesecca's study (2012) observes, the stroll tactic was used in several subsequent protests: most notably in May 2008 on another NIMBY issue, namely, opposition to a megalev train planned to cut through the city of Shanghai; then a few months later in Chengdu, again in opposition to a petrochemical plant there as well. Later, in 2011, internet calls for a Jasmine revolution in China modeled after the Arab Spring also used the stroll tactic. American ambassador John Huntsman showed up that same day, “coincidentally” on the same avenue where hundreds of others gathered too. When accused of provocation by the Chinese government, his defense, predictably, was that he was only out for a Sunday stroll.

At this second step in the fear-management process, the basic logic of duplicity—using one type of event as a cover for protest, continues to mitigate fear. But the above example suggests that other elements enter in for further fear mitigation. First, rather than the clandestine anonymity of the symbolic events from step one, increasing numbers accords a degree of numerical anonymity in step two. The role of increasing numbers has been recognized by analysts who plot the tipping points in collective action, but such calculations subsume under the concept of risk

reduction the mitigating effect of numbers on fear reduction. also missing is how increasing numbers makes the policing of mass protests less certain, less efficient, and apparently more haphazard, as our Spanish socialist responded earlier, "The police couldn't do anything!" Second, with increasing numbers a developing sense of collective solidarity also enters the equation. Normative and emotional currents develop collectively, captured in the Spaniard's words, "It was marvelous to be there." To interpret such statements solely as reflections of "solidarity incentives" (Olsen 1962) misses their emotional content, and the strong degree to which the immediate experience of the moment can drive the trajectory of events in the street.

It is not surprising then that using public events, which are ostensibly convened for one purpose but serve as opportunities to briefly and quickly assert broad oppositional claims are common in the early stages of democratic movements. One frequent tactic is to exploit the funerals of activists and martyrs for the cause as opportunities for protest. Another common tactic is to sing prohibited songs or engage in oppositional chants at mass public events such as concerts and football matches. The presumption is that as others see the safety accorded by the number of participants. Fear decreases exponentially, transforming the occasion into a mass statement of protest. For example, at the Baltic Nights festival in Tallinn, militants began to sing the prohibited anthem of the independent republic, people in the audience joined in and the police could do nothing. The prohibited Polish anthem, *Pose cos Polska* (God, Who Saves Poland) was often heard during the millennium celebrations in 1966. A football match between the USSR and Czechoslovakia, held in Tallinn after the 1968 Soviet invasion to quash the Prague Spring, invoked especially strong support for the Czechs. Similarly, matches between Russian teams and other national teams in the Eastern bloc sometimes were seized this way.

These examples represent a shift in the repressive repertoire toward more public and collective forms of action. They change the perception of political opportunity in repressive states by suggesting openings for hundreds—sometimes thousands—of citizens who witness them or spontaneously participate. As they mount, the quiescence characteristic of authoritarian polities is broken, bridging the gap between "private truths and public lies"—to use Kuran's phrase. For all these reasons, the more the state tolerates these forms of protests, the more it runs the risk of more public and broadly supported protest actions down the road. They are the seeds of democratic oppositions.

## 7. Conclusions

The examples mentioned above are boundary-spanning mechanisms in that begin to bridge the resistant repertoire and the modular social movement repertoire by cloaking oppositional claims in other events or activities. They occupy a gray-area between the two repertoires because they continue to manage the fear yet still move contentious claims against the regime to the public arena. Such boundary-spanning events and movements are common in the waning years of authoritarian systems.

Indeed, I would suggest that their frequency is a measure that an authoritarian state is in its death throes. Environmental movements, women's movements, peace movements, language-rights movements, AIDS-support movements, to name just a few, take advantage of limited-but-tolerated spheres of protest accorded by the regime to make broader antiregime statements. These are *symbolic movements* in the sense that they are ostensibly about one theme—a theme or claim permitted by the state—but for many participants carry a subplot of antiregime opposition (Johnston 2006). They are important because they teach participants “how to test the unknown gray zone between the allowed and the forbidden in a way that allows for tactical retreat but also unexpected advances. They focus on one specific issue at a time. [Participants] discover that many others share their secret yearnings, while outwardly all of them had gone through the same pro-regime motions” (Taagepera 1993: 124).

My focus in these pages has been on those active and creative tactics used by oppositional activists that mitigate fear among participants. In the background, however, is the looming presence of state policymakers, security apparatus, and police in responding to these actions. They can crush protesters, as occurred in Tiananmen Square in 1989 or in Iran 2009, pushing the democratic movement back to the resistant repertoire where it may remain dormant for years. Or regimes may grant small spheres of freedom for modular protest as a means to diffuse broader oppositional sentiments and to conserve the political and social capital that would be lost in a concerted campaign of repression.

While the causal mechanisms of state response comprise a topic that requires another paper, we close by noting that state response has two dimensions: policy at the national level, or the “prevailing strategy of repression” (Koopmans and Kriesi 1998) and the unfolding interaction of police and protesters in the streets (Earl and Soule 2006). Figure one captures how both are manifested in step one and step two of the fear reduction process. In step one, the resistant repertoire recognizes that high-capacity authoritarian regimes are complex institutional structures, which means that social control can never be complete and encompassing. Free spaces always exist, creatively carved out by activists, as I have discussed (see also Scott 1985, 1990; Polletta 1999). For those early fear-tolerant activists, their symbolic actions of opposition are cat-and-mouse games with the police, with the police sometimes looking foolish and incompetent, and activists daring and heroic. This is an act of social construction of the enemy that is typical in repressive regimes, and which works to raise the threshold of fear by diverting it with another emotion—much like laughter masks nervousness. This is not to underestimate the brutality and thuggishness of the security forces, as torture, rape, and killings in Egypt, Syria, and Iran demonstrated during the recent mobilizations there. However, it is not uncommon that as an additional submechanism to diffuse risk and tension, the *mukhabarat* and *shabiha* militiamen in those countries are also—paradoxically—portrayed as incompetent and brutish fools, unable to contain symbolic protests, and who miss the subtleties of oppositional symbolism.

In the second stage of fear reduction, perceptions of *incomplete repression* may also be at work, but in a slightly different way. As crowds get larger, protesters pose threats

to the police, and may even hold their own in clashes and confrontations. Sometimes protesters win the engagements as police retreat, creating euphoria. In such critical moments, it is common that regime falters in its response, unsure of how to negotiate the "dictators dilemma" (Francisco 2007). This refers to the choice between draconian repression and the outrage it sparks versus reigning in the police and letting the protests gain momentum—a process apparent in the Assad regime's response to Syrian protests in the spring and summer of 2011. Equivocation of police response is a key cause of reduced fear and increased protest momentum.

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# Building Schools and Futures with Utopian Social Movements in Buenos Aires<sup>1</sup>

Meghan Krausch

**Abstract:** In December 2001, after more than a decade of neoliberal governance, Argentina was in a severe political, economic and social crisis. The extreme levels of poverty and unemployment led some desperately frustrated Argentines to organize themselves into movements of unemployed workers (MTDs) while others recovered their former workplaces. Buenos Aires has continued to be the site of intense theorizing, debate, and experimentation in forms of radical democracy that are fundamentally utopian in origin. These movements are *utopian* in the sense that they bring their radical vision of the future into the present through attempted immediate transformation of both material conditions and social relationships. The key aspects of this utopian future/present are consensus-based decision making and leaderless institutional structures. This paper examines the experience of one such experiment, an MTD-run adult education program known as a people's high school (*bachillerato popular*). The school—part of a larger trend among MTDs—is run collectively by teachers and students working together to construct popular education that is more responsive to the needs of the community it serves. This paper draws on 11 months of participant observation and interviews to examine how the school's utopian goals affect teachers, students, and the larger society. I argue that as a utopian social movement, the school already is social change.

**Keywords:** Utopianism; Social Movements; Social Change; Argentina; Education

## 1. Introduction

In 2001, Argentina collapsed. Poverty and misery were widespread. The percentage of the population below the poverty line was at 38.3% (rising to over 50% in May 2002), and official unemployment was at 18% (INDEC n.d.a, n.d.b). Driven in part by their desperation, people organized themselves. The rising unemployment and poverty caused by the neoliberal policies of the 1990s had led to the first roadblock at Cutral-co in 1996 (see Auyero 2003 for a detailed account) and the formation of movements of unemployed people around the country (see Garay 2007 for a careful analysis of protest activity in this period). In December of that year, the world watched as thousands of angry Argentines took to the streets of Buenos Aires banging pots and pans and demanding “They all must go!” (“*¡Que se vayan todos!*”). This large-scale protest was captivating in its sheer size and effect—five presidents passed through office in 2 weeks as Argentines continued to protest their worsening plight because of neoliberal economic policies.

It was in this environment that the roadblock became commonplace and Argentina became something of a laboratory for experiments in egalitarian social change. The social movements that dominated the Argentine political landscape in late 2001 and throughout 2002 took many forms. One of the most common types were the unemployed workers' movements (MTDs, *movimientos de trabajadores desocupados*). The MTDs are large poor people's movements that are generally organized by neighborhood. Many began as groups of protestors picketing major roadways for some state relief from the massive unemployment.

Consequently, a big focus of these movements was embracing the identity of unemployed workers and blockaders (*piqueteros*). Another focus was organizing to meet the needs of the community, which were not being met by the neoliberal regime of the 90s (and claiming an identity of long-term unemployment was a way of owning this marginalization and maybe signaling its construction by neoliberalism too). MTDs often operate a range of mutual aid-style social programs as well as small cooperative businesses aimed at self-sufficiency. These projects include adult education programs, cooperatively run bakeries, organic gardening, art classes for poor children, function as community centers, editorial collectives, and produce crafts or other small products for sale.

Finally, perhaps also as a reaction to neoliberalism, these movements embraced non-hierarchical ideas about power and non-traditional political solutions. These forms of mobilization marked a distinct change from earlier clientelist forms of popular political engagement, and occurred less than twenty-five years after the significant military repression of the Dirty War. More interesting yet, the road blockades and other forms of ad-hoc organizing (i.e., barter clubs, community soup kitchens, neighborhood assemblies, and factory take-overs) claimed no explicit leadership and were largely unaligned with political parties. This movement toward an egalitarian society did not arise overnight, seemingly from nowhere, but neither is it easy to see the antecedents for this mass mobilization against unemployment, poverty, and politics in general in recent Argentine history.

These elements combined to create a class of what I call *utopian social movements*: movements focused on bringing their vision of the future into the present. In other words, they seek immediate transformation of the present, and they hold an uncompromising view of the society they want (one with full participation, equality, and autonomy/self-determination). Another common term for these utopian social movements is *horizontalism*. These movements are categorically similar to forms of collective action known variously as radical or direct democracy (e.g., Polletta 2002; Maeckelbergh 2009), anarchism or direct action (e.g., Sheehan 2003; Graeber 2009), *autonomia* (e.g., Grindon 2007; Gautney 2009), and *zapatismo* (e.g., Holloway 2005; Ross 2000). In fact, activists who work under all of these labels often engage directly in networks together. In my fieldwork I discovered that "anarchist" (which is embraced by similar groups in the U.S.) and "autonomist" (a term derived from Italian Marxism) are avoided by most activists and often (but not always) understood as pejorative. I have chosen, then, to follow Sitrin (2006) and use the term horizontalism. Many other

authors have referred to these movements simply as the movements of December 2001 or as blockaders movements. The former is simply too vague, while blockader has become inaccurate.<sup>2</sup> There are subtle differences as well between the movements I studied and self-identified horizontal groups in Buenos Aires, but it is fair to say the practices involved—consensus-based decision making, non-hierarchical structure, and a general orientation toward the process of decision-making and movement-building rather than the outcome—reflect a modified application of horizontalism.

This paper examines how an institution created within one such movement on principles of non-hierarchy (a variation of the horizontalism described by Sitrin [2006] with some subtle differences) makes this social transformation a reality by creating the experience of an alternative society. Using the case of a people's high school (*bachillerato popular*) in Buenos Aires, I show how the school creates a utopian future-present by constructing the experience of an alternative future.

On one level, the school fills the gap left by neoliberalism by providing opportunities for secondary school completion to marginalized adults. Furthermore, the school and MTD do so with specific attention to race, class, and gender. But the school is also more than simply community education. It serves a double purpose as a transformative political project—a real utopia.

This study uses ethnography and in-depth interviews<sup>3</sup> within a utopian social movement—a movement of unemployed workers (MTD)—in Buenos Aires. I show how the MTD Barracas, part of a larger organization called the National Assembly, is a case of already existing radical social change.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. On the Concept of Utopian Social Movements

At play here are some issues about the meaning of utopianism, in contrast to other definitions of social movements. By *utopian*, I do not mean to be pejorative or dismissive. Rather, I mean to signal the movements' emphasis on immediate—rather than gradual—transformation, and their focus on both material conditions and social relationships. These movements bring a radical vision of the future into the present, and in so doing have a lot in common with our historical idea of utopian communities, like those described by Kanter's (1972) study of nineteenth century intentional communities in the United States.

As the paradigmatic work on utopia in sociology, Kanter's study has spawned a tradition of research on utopianism in sociology that follows her very closely with a focus on communes (e.g., McCord 1992; Smith 1996; Holden and Schrock 2007). However, it's also clear that utopianism is not only the marginal phenomenon of communes, but is actually central to movement projects. Erik Olin Wright states that "The idea of 'real utopias' embraces this tension between dreams and practice. It is grounded in the belief that what is pragmatically possible is not fixed independently of our imaginations, but is itself shaped by our visions" (2010:6). This may be especially true within margin-

alized communities. Kelley (2002), for example, argues that what he calls "freedom dreams" have always been central to black liberation projects. Other scholars also point to utopianism or ideas bearing it a striking similarity as possible avenues for racial justice (e.g., Lowe 1996; Guinier and Torres 2002; Price, Nonini, and Fox Tree 2008), and there is a long tradition of utopianism in feminist theory (see Polletta 2002; Evans 2003; Mohanty 2003; and Graeber 2009).

However, utopian movements often do not fit easily into conventional sociology of social movements. Price, Nonini and Fox Tree (2008) argue that contemporary utopianism may most often present itself as an epistemology open to many possibilities and alternative ways of living rather than a despotic insistence on the one true way that is popularly associated with utopian communities of the past. Price et al.'s argument develops the concept of *grounded utopian movements*, a class of social movements that they argue have been excluded from the U.S. literature on social movements, but which can substantially strengthen that literature. They describe grounded utopian movements as "movements that do not aspire to gain political power within the modern state or to challenge capitalism—but whose internal identity-work transforms the lives of their members, and even the social setting around them, as they seek to bring about a more satisfying world"(133) and offer the Rastafarian movement, the Ghost Dance movement in the U.S., and the Maya Movement of Guatemala as paradigms. Grounded utopian movements, according to Price and his co-authors, make "innovative use of cultural resources such as religious beliefs, the creation of new cultural formations and meanings, and the manifestation of culturally-embedded movement practices"(128). They are utopian in that they "point to an ideal place," but "grounded" because of their actual existence in reality, and especially the ways they are informed by non-imaginary people, places, and daily interactions.

This uneasy fit between utopianism and conventional studies of social movements stems in part from the disruption to the timeline of organizing within given present conditions moving toward a more liberatory future. Sitrin (2006), Poletta (2002), and others refer to such movements as prefigurative, noting that the movements' orientation toward the process of decision making is meant to prefigure the alternative world that these movements are trying to build. Though Poletta has reservations about the term (mainly that it implies a non-strategic nature), her analysis of conventional ideas about success in social movements versus success in radical democratic movements implies the same temporal shift. In other words, if in "traditional" social movements the main goal is to see a change accomplished in the future, then in utopian or prefigurative social movements the future is understood to be changed by making a shift in the present.

Maeckelbergh offers a reflection on the meaning of *prefigurative* that fits my own experience as an activist and as an ethnographer:

*"In my experience as an activist, practising prefiguration has meant always trying to make the processes we use to achieve our immediate goals an embodiment of our ultimate goals, so that there is no distinction between how we*

*fight and what we fight for, at least not where the ultimate goal of a radically different society is concerned. In this sense, practicing prefigurative politics means removing the temporal distinction between the struggle in the present towards a goal in the future; instead, the struggle and the goal, the real and the ideal, become one in the present. Prefiguration is a practice through which movement actors create a conflation of their ends with their means. It is an enactment of the ultimate values of an ideal society within the very means of struggle for that society”(2009:66-67).*

Thus, prefiguration is an important aspect of utopianism, meant to capture a particular outlook on social change. Where conventional social movements look toward a better future, utopian social movements look to create that future in the present.

### **3. The People’s High School**

#### **3.1. The MTD Barracas**

The data for this paper was collected at the people’s high school of the MTD Barracas, in Buenos Aires. The people’s high school is a secondary school for adults; it is a three-year program for adults to receive their high school diplomas run entirely by the social movement. Classes are held Monday through Friday from 5:30 to 9 pm, and each night of the week a different subject is taught. The subjects are Language and Communication, Mathematics, Social Sciences, Natural Sciences, and Cooperativism, which alternates weekly with skills workshops like foreign languages, construction, and computing. Every subject is taken together as a group by the first, second, or third year students, and each subject is taught by a different pair of teachers. For example on Monday nights there are three different language classes going on taught by a total of six teachers, and on Tuesday the three groups of students would remain constant but six other teachers would be there to teach mathematics.

This school is part of a self-proclaimed movement for social change. It is one project of a larger MTD. This particular MTD, MTD Barracas, is part of a larger national organization and network of MTDs and other projects (unlike many MTDs which are stand-alone organizations). This larger organization, the National Assembly, is characterized by a shared ideology among its constituent groups, which consist of MTDs, student groups, and other kinds of projects, like publishing collectives or other media groups. These groups are united by their similar political beliefs and especially their shared assumptions about social change, though it makes more sense to say these are diffused and developed across the organization in a back and forth process, rather than imposed from the top down. The structure of the organization is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1.

The shared assumptions of the National Assembly are adherence to a modified version of horizontalism: making decisions in an assembly of equals, avoiding hierarchical leadership structures, and a rejection of contemporary electoral politics. The assemblies operate on consensus, meaning that no voting takes place but rather any issues or decisions are discussed until every person present is comfortable with the decision or course of action. This is an idea now made more familiar by Occupy Wall Street and the 15M movement in Spain, but it has other historical referents including radical democracy in the U.S. student and women's movements of the 1960s and 1970s, zapatismo in Mexico, and anarchism. In practice at the school, this means that

instead of a director, the highest authority at the school is the assembly, where teachers and students participate as equals.

Activists enter the MTD in a variety of ways. Some come to the soup kitchen to eat, begin working there, and then enroll in the school, while others make the opposite journey. Some activists come to the MTD because they are excited by its political vision, while others show up at the doors to enroll in the school knowing only that the school is less strict about paperwork than other schools in the neighborhood. Some teachers come to a recruitment meeting familiar with the National Assembly, while others show up to the first meeting interested only in helping educate the poor.

### **3.2. Student-activists and Teacher-activists**

Women make up the overwhelming majority of students at the school, which is consistent with the larger MTD Barracas and characteristic of MTDs in general. At the beginning of the 2011 school year, for example, in a class of about 40 students only 4 were male. The students were also overwhelmingly immigrants from neighboring Paraguay, with a few Bolivian students and a few native born Argentine students. Many of the Paraguayan students spoke some Guaraní (an indigenous language that is now the second official language of Paraguay), although most were also native Spanish speakers.

All of the students except one or two lived in precarious conditions in the misery village (*villa miseria*<sup>5</sup>) neighboring the school. While some students lived in their own houses made of brick and mortar, others lived in shacks made of corrugated tin. The majority of students lived in cramped conditions shared with other families. Even those with their own homes, however, were subject to instability because of the informal, unregulated nature of life in the misery village where electricity is likely to be cut suddenly and sanitation problems are common. The lack of legal titles to the squatted land makes it difficult to enforce tenants' leases or ownership over houses once purchased, although it's also worth noting that the squatted neighborhood still seems very stable from a U.S. point of view, where people in similar economic circumstances would certainly be homeless in the shelter system or outright living on the street.

Most of the students were long-term unemployed, perhaps never having held—nor even experienced the possibility of holding—a job in the formal sector with minimum wage and other employment benefits. Memorably, in one class exercise we asked a group of 5 or so students to role-play as factory workers, beginning with envisioning the lifestyle of the working class. Unlike the groups playing the bosses and the unemployed, the group of workers found it nearly impossible to imagine where and how they might live. In fact, when my co-teacher told them the legal minimum salary in Argentina their eyes grew wide with disbelief at the large sum. Even armed with this information, the neighborhood they finally chose is one that most middle-class residents of Buenos Aires would consider a little dodgy.



In addition to the impossibility of formal, stable work, most students found it difficult to locate even temporary, part-time work in the informal sector. In the same classroom exercise, the students playing the unemployed workers wrote a poignant reflection on the difficulty of their condition, detailing the problems they encountered looking for work outside the neighborhood because of the discrimination that occurred at interviews when they gave their addresses.

The teachers are also majority female, but by a much smaller ratio than the student body (or the larger MTD). They ranged in age from about 19 to 50, with most teachers between 20 and 35. Along with me, there were a few other foreigners from elsewhere in Latin America. A lot of the teachers were undergraduate university students, while another group were graduate students, and a few of them enrolled in graduate programs in education after becoming involved with the people's high school. Other people were professionals in related careers, especially teachers, social workers, and other public sector bureaucrats. The teachers are mostly but not exclusively middle class, and many of them are active in other spaces within the movement. Finally, a few teachers were graduates of the school itself.

#### **4. The School as Educational Institution**

In this section, I present the first half of my argument: that the school is a grassroots development project to provide community-appropriate education where the state has failed to do so. On one level, the school's day to day functioning as a school was, in itself, a utopian political project. The people's high school is a clear example of a social movement attempting to meet a need traditionally thought of as the state's responsibility: free, accessible education. The school grew directly out of recognition that state-run public schools were not meeting the needs of movement members. It was founded several years after the MTD Barracas to which it belongs, as many movement members cited the lack of a high school diploma as a barrier to stable employment, and it represents a utopian effort to remedy this need directly and immediately.

In theory, the people's high school is not necessary. There are other adult high schools in the neighborhood that are run by the state. At the teacher recruitment session I attended as my first day of fieldwork at the school, another potential new teacher asked why the school was necessary given the existing public adult education system. One of the school's founding activists answered, saying that although the state was fulfilling this need on paper, the fact that students continued to seek out and attend this school implied that the people's high school is filling a gap left by the public system.

And it did not take long before I saw that fact for myself. The school educates in ways that indicate an understanding of the raced, classed, and gendered needs of its students that goes well beyond the public system. On my second day of fieldwork (a construction work party), I overheard several students coming to enroll. Many of the differences between this school and the public education system became immediately obvious. One woman came in with a baby, interested to learn that students with

children of any age could bring them to school and leave them in the nursery, unlike in the public system. Another potential student was having trouble understanding what paperwork was required for school enrollment and how to obtain it. Not only did she receive a lot of friendly help, but she also learned that this school was going to be more flexible about the paperwork than other schools.

As the school year began and I met the enrolled students, I realized that these were neither trivial nor uncommon concerns. Instead, both were symptoms of the marginalization of the people in the neighborhood as poor women migrants. Although the students' ages ranged from 15 to 60, most of them were between 15 and 23. With the exception of a handful of teens and two or three grandmothers, the students brought children with them to school each night. These children were cared for by another activist in the nursery during class, and the frequent interruptions for nursing or crying were accepted and dealt with as a reasonable accommodation, unlike in a more formal environment where the impossibility of such flexibility would have caused students to miss class entirely.

In the interviews I conducted with students, many of them repeatedly told me how an unexpected teen pregnancy was the primary reason they hadn't finished high school. They described teenaged rebellions that all seemed to end with the same words: "I ended up pregnant" ("*me quedé embarazada*"). Usually this was understood by the interviewee as the obvious end of the story, forcing me to clarify "Is that why you stopped going to school?" When I met them at the people's high school, many of these same women were in their early 20s with 2 or 3 children. Since their teens, they had not been without at least one very young child. In other words, at no point since their exit from the formal system could they have attended a night school that did not accommodate young children. Furthermore, given the young age of their children, these women were frequently absent due to children's illnesses, pregnancy, or the many other unplanned emergencies that often arise in such households. The flexible attendance policy was another way the people's high school differed from the public system.

The need for childcare and flexibility emerges as a gendered problem that is intimately related to the lack of a secondary school education. Girls shut out of the public school system by accidental pregnancy become women shut out of the workforce by lack of education. As the responsibilities of child care fall disproportionately on their shoulders, they are again shut out of the public system. A crucial difference, then, between the people's high school and the formal public system is its gendered assessment of the community's needs.

Finding the paperwork to enroll was also an extremely common barrier. It too was related to the particular needs of the community in the misery village, which was heavily populated by immigrants. Migration, in fact, made it difficult for students to turn in the required paperwork to enroll in school in multiple ways. First, it simply complicated their ability to obtain it. Unlike adults who last attended school in Buenos Aires, immigrants from Paraguay and Bolivia couldn't just go to their previous school and request their records.

This problem was compounded by the fact that educational requirements differ by country. Several students were enrolled in a primary school program supported by the MTD Barracas. Under this government program, a publicly-employed teacher came to the MTD site to teach primary school classes during the day, allowing adults to finish their primary school education in the course of a few months. Some of these students were immigrants who had completed primary school in their native countries. However in Paraguay, for example, primary school is one year shorter than in Argentina, so they are not eligible to enroll in adult high school in Argentina until getting the additional primary school certification.

Finally, many of the students had not been able to attend high school in their native countries or had only been able to do so intermittently because of the same conditions that forced them to migrate. This was the case with Julia, who told me that the lack of free education in Paraguay (e.g., the fees for uniforms and other school attendance costs that are a standard part of structural adjustment policies) meant that she was unable to attend school.

The people's high school was so much more flexible than other neighborhood schools that students recruited friends who were having enrollment problems at other schools, telling them the lack of paperwork would be no problem at this school. We even heard from some potential students that the local public school had referred them to the MTD when it was determined they did not have the appropriate paperwork to enroll in the formal system. While such comments sometimes made activists doing the administrative work at the school cringe (since the people's high school did in fact need to meet certain enrollment documentation requirements as well), they also point to the ways that the public system was not flexible enough to meet the particular needs of the misery village's adult learners.

The students at the people's high school were all individuals who had been failed by the public education system in one way or another. In fact, the school saw itself self-consciously as a place that accommodated those marginalized in other systems, an ethos that was not about charity but rather intertwined with its political analysis of the failed status quo. This analysis—and the services provided—is one that is attentive to the particular marginalization by ethnicity, gender, and poverty.

In this sense, the people's high school didn't just fill the education gap with more flexible admissions policies, but it also changed in a meaningful way the experience of school. Instead of setting criteria for failing students, we discussed as a group (students and teachers) each student's progress on a multitude of levels—commitment, effort, improvement, and solidarity with others. The people's high school isn't just providing an education for those left behind by the state, it is also providing a space for a community marginalized on the levels of class, ethnicity, and gender to come together and construct a source of power and support as an alternative to the state. In the following section, I build on this assertion to show how the experience of participation at the school is itself a form of social change.

## 5. The People's High School as Social Change

Above I argued that the people's high school of the MTD Barracas is a community response to their abandonment by the neoliberal state. Furthermore, an integral part of the success of this response is its attention to difference among those in need of secondary school education. In this section, I show how the utopian project of the school transforms this service project into a political one. I argue that while the school participates in traditional political activities, at its core, the school is about accomplishing social change through its everyday practice.

The movement engages in creating social change in multiple ways, some of them pretty familiar for any kind of movement, including traditional, party-centered ones. During my fieldwork, the movement (and I) participated, for example, in dozens of marches and protests. Many of these were in commemoration of activists who had been killed in protests over the last decade, while others were to demand an increase in benefits from social welfare programs. These protests often incorporated roadblocks of various sizes and severity (some within the neighborhood and others on central avenues of the city), and were more often than not organized in coalition with other movements.

What makes the school different, though, is how all activity is not directed toward outward activities like protests and marches, but rather most energy goes in to keeping the school running and in developing day to day relationships. In other words, most of the movement's energy is directed internally rather than externally. Instead of calling business-oriented meetings to plan particular events or actions, care goes in to ensuring that regular assemblies are held, for example. Marches and protests are important, but they are often only a small part of an agenda.

At the school, the internally-focused activities include a range that goes well beyond the explicit goal of providing consistent education. Not only is the energy directed internally, but there is a substantial self-conscious effort to form and maintain these internal relationships in particular ways. There is a long list of examples of how this effort is made, but here I provide a few. (1) Longtime activists make a point of greeting every person in a room when they arrive (this can sometimes mean going around a circle of up to fifty people and kissing each one both on arrival and departure).<sup>6</sup> (2) The circulation of yerba mate follows a similar pattern, traveling far more widely around the circle within the school than in other kinds of social gatherings.<sup>7</sup> (3) Activists are expected to treat each other not just with respectful indifference, but with compassion and in a spirit of mutual aid. Behaving in a spirit of solidarity (*compañerismo*) is a stated principle of the school and larger movement, and the word is invoked frequently. (4) In decision-making situations, each person's concerns must be resolved before a decision can be made, even if there is only one person who disagrees with the group. All of these are examples of how activists, both teachers and students, work to build relationships that differ from those outside the movement.

For example, a cornerstone of both the school and the broader MTD is the assembly. All decisions are made in the assembly, on the basis of consensus. Assemblies are held every 15 days during the second half of the class period. Attendance is expected of both teachers and students, although in many cases teachers from other nights of the week have difficulty attending. The agenda is made collectively at the beginning, so everybody has the ability to bring up a topic for discussion. Facilitation of the meeting is relatively informal, and everyone is encouraged to participate actively. More experienced activists tend to step forward with suggestions when things become too heated or too stymied, but if consensus cannot be reached the decision is delayed to the next assembly. More than decision-making, the assembly is a key space for collective reflection.

Regular teachers' meetings are also held once a month. While some time was spent at these meetings discussing much-needed clarifications and information sharing, this was not the sole emphasis of the meetings. In fact, to the frustration of some newer teachers, management of teaching duties was usually not even a main emphasis of the meetings. Instead, the meetings emphasized deepening our political engagement with what might otherwise be simple volunteerism as teachers. Instead of focusing on the tasks ahead of us and how to get through them (not a small goal in and of itself), we spent anywhere from 4 to 6 hours a month discussing and debating what one teacher I interviewed called our "politico-pedagogical, anti-hegemonic, emancipatory project." These meetings, and their subject matter, are an excellent example of the place of theorizing and especially the importance of praxis within the people's high school.

Within both the assemblies and the teachers' meetings, and spread throughout conversations, interactions, and daily practice at the school, there is also an emphasis on building student leadership and decentering teacher authority. One good example is the formation of the so-called people's secretariat (*secretaria popular*). During my fieldwork, the school faced an exponential increase in paperwork. At first, this additional burden was absorbed by the most engaged teachers, many of whom hold jobs as bureaucrats themselves. They were not only more familiar with the draconian bureaucratic procedures, but were also the activists who tended to be the most reliably committed and contactable because of their longer and more enthusiastic involvement with the movement. However, after the initial wave of paperwork was handled (albeit with many, many emails, crossed signals, near-missed deadlines, and stress), a people's secretariat open to willing students and teachers was created. There were several reasons given for the idea; not only did it spread the bureaucratic burden out more evenly so it did not fall so heavily on so few, but it encouraged the participation of students as equally responsible for the process.

This initiative came wholly from the teachers' desire to de-center their authority. Students, certainly, were not clamoring for inclusion in these unpleasant tasks. Nor was it more efficient to shift the burden away from experienced bureaucrats among the teachers in favor of a group process that could include students struggling with literacy levels. The secretariat, however, was an important form of encouraging participation and

involvement in the larger affairs of the school, and a key way of making sure that this authority and responsibility was shared by teachers and students.

These internally-focused, relationship building activities are light if not nonexistent in a traditional school environment. Given the time commitments involved in the assemblies, the teachers' meetings, the people's secretariat, and other things, building egalitarian relationships was not just the orientation of some teachers. Rather, it was the fabric of the school, the stuff that tied the whole project together and made it worth doing.

This emphasis on undergoing the process highlights what I argue is the main purpose and effect of all these inefficient activities, and perhaps the most important thing when we think of social change. What is actually happening is that activists are experiencing a totally different paradigm of society and social relationships. The ways that the movement allows people to actually experience different ways of interacting with one another is what makes it fundamentally utopian.

The participants of the people's high school are living in a future-present, experiencing the kind of post-revolutionary society they are working toward as they work toward it. The school is the future world, the "another world that is possible," brought out of the future and in to the present. It blends the idea of future and present worlds, the inherent temporal order of most social change schema by creating the revolution in the everyday. Not only or even necessarily as a step to something else, but as itself. As soon as the school is open, the future the school is working toward is already here.

This is fundamental to what I mean by utopianism. One element is the lack of compromise, the kind of radical edge that is central to movement projects that Kelley (2002) discusses, but another element is the disruption of the temporal order of most social change projects. Again in Maeckelbergh's (2009) words, "prefigurative politics means removing the temporal distinction between the struggle in the *present* towards a goal in the *future*; instead, the struggle and the goal, the real and the ideal, become one in the present" (66-67).

The key thing here is that activists are experiencing this way of doing things, not discussing it, learning about it, or envisioning it, but actually doing it. The idea is that if you want liberation you need to live it. And the point here is not just that you need to do so in order to avoid hypocrisy or in order to be logically consistent, but that actually you will not necessarily know liberation or how to practice it unless you start.

## 5.1. Transformation in Action

The experience of the school is what transforms people, what makes the model not just an isolated model of grassroots development, but one that can't help but interact with broader, bigger plans for social change. It's the process of people becoming aware, of changing how they (we) think about the world, how they interact with their neighbors, and even what they expect out of the world for themselves. Elizabeth de-

scribed this experience to me in a café on a rainy spring day toward the end of her first year as a student at the school. She said:

*"...and when we began [the school year], I began to like it. I began to like it because I began to learn a lot. And that's where my happiness began. It's a change in my whole life. In my person, in my head, in my thought. Tons of changes. I began to change in every sense. I really like what I'm doing. I'm happy for myself. I'm happy for myself for the decision I've made. ... I'm happy, Meg, I'm happy for myself, I'm saying because people tell me I'm changed. That I have a different way about me. In other words, I learned at the school, I learned a lot of things. To value myself. I didn't value myself. I thought that I wasn't good for anything, that I was only good for my kids, to be a wife, to be in the house, to clean... but no. People have shown me that I've changed, that I have a different way of interacting with people. I changed in my house, I changed with my husband. Until last year, or until March or April, we were at the point of separating. ... So I'm happy when I go to greet everyone, all the teachers... I feel—you know how I feel? Fulfilled with life. ... Having decided to complete high school, I feel fulfilled. I thought, 'How great. Now I'm going to finish my first year. I can't believe it.'"*

Elizabet's interview shows how the experience is transformative. She talks about the extent to which everything in her life has changed profoundly in her first year as a student involved with the movement. Her narrative weaves together the double function of the school seamlessly, emphasizing both how the education itself and the different ways that she sees society have changed her so profoundly that those around her have commented on it. This is despite the fact that Elizabet was not an activist who was deeply engaged in the MTD's more traditional moments of collective action. She came to events, she was enthusiastic, but she was not one of the students that became a total convert to the movement and started participating in every space. But by being at the school, she learned not only to "value herself"—a fact which was itself possible because of the school's utopian orientation toward the marginalized—but was also exposed to different ways of interacting with fellow students and teachers. The school is about learning to hope, but more than hope for or expect more, learning how to look for resolution and happiness in the collective and in cooperation, rather than to look for it individually or by competing within the marginalized.

Another way to think about it is what is interesting, different, or fundamentally utopian about the school is that it makes social change by just building it, and that it changes people's beliefs through experience. Not by trying to convince them that another way would be better in the future, but by instead simply creating that experience. It encourages people to want that experience, to want to deepen and replicate it. And people do — they bring their sisters, cousins, mothers, friends, and neighbors to the movement.

I argue that experiencing and participating in different types of social relationships already is change. By participating in the movement, activists are already changing the paradigms and assumptions they use to interact with other people. In my con-

versations and interviews with students who were new to the movement, like the one quoted above, they talked about how everything had changed in their lives since their involvement in the school. Elizabet tells me how she has changed, profoundly, though in other parts of her interview she details aspects of her life that are still very troubled and perhaps as bad as things were before she joined the movement. What is different is Elizabet.

Thus the school is a space organized differently than the society within which it is embedded. In this space, participants experience, practice, and live alternate principles--those of cooperation, mutual aid, respect, autonomy, and collectivity. All principles that challenge the fundamentals of the modern neoliberal state. But unlike the nineteenth century utopias of Kanter's study, these activists do not remain within the utopian space. They take the ideas, and more importantly the embodied experiences with which they are associated, with them beyond the school to their homes, their workplaces, and their neighborhood.

## 6. Conclusions

The people's high school arose as part of a sea change in Argentine politics in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. It was the next stage in an unemployed workers' movement: a necessary service for the marginalized poor who make up the bulk of the movement. The school provides educational opportunities that are attendant to the needs of activists in the MTD Barracas, particularly tailored to their status not only as poor people, but also as immigrants and as women.

The school, however, is a creative response to neoliberalism beyond the educational services it provides. The school is an oasis of collectivity and egalitarianism in an individualist and competitive neoliberal world. Mobilizing political theories about horizontalism, the school serves as an experiential laboratory. Assemblies, meetings, and micro-interactions all emphasize the importance of internal relationships, creating an environment where new activist teachers and students encounter a wider sense of possibility.

Maeckelbergh argues that "Prefiguration is, above all, something people *do*; it is not a theory of social change that first analyses the current state of affairs, then establishes an ideal goal and then sets out a five-year plan for achieving these goals"(2009:68). And in this, utopian social movements challenge conventional ideas about social movements. Here we see no linear process from recruitment, to agenda-setting, to goal achievement or cooptation, but rather all of the above collapsed in to one present-moment, laden with meaning and significance. Bringing the future into the present, utopian social movements already are social change.

My conceptualization of the people's high school as a utopian social movement owes much to Erik Olin Wright's (2010) real utopias project. However, unlike Wright, my approach is a context-dependent one. While I believe that social scientists and activists



globally have much to learn from the people's high school, I do not believe the experience is one that can be easily separated from the context from which it grew and replicated. On the contrary, I have found that the utopian experience of the school is deeply intertwined with the context in which it exists. The possibility of such a space occurs in the shadow of Argentina's last military dictatorship, in a country dominated by Peronism, in a neighborhood squatted by immigrants for decades, after an economic and political collapse, and amidst many other factors unlistable here.

The people's high school is only transformative because of the time and place in which it exists, but that doesn't mean it holds no lessons for those outside of that place and time. Like the real utopias that "nurtur[e] clear-sighted understandings of what it would take to create social institutions free of oppression" (Wright 2010:6), the people's high school gives us hope for social change. Not just the hope of what can someday be, but what already is.

## Abbreviations

**MTD:** unemployed workers' movement (*movimiento de trabajadores desocupados*)

## Methodological Appendix

This study uses ethnography and in-depth interviews within a utopian social movement – a movement of unemployed workers (MTD) – in Buenos Aires. I conducted eleven months of intensive, full-time fieldwork from January to December 2011 as a teacher-activist in the people's high school.

As a feminist ethnographer, I found it important to be an active participant at the school in addition to my role as a researcher. After some initial meetings and interactions with activists at the school, I found my role there as a social science co-teacher in the first year classroom. While I was initially hesitant about taking on such an overwhelming responsibility, as my fieldwork developed I found my participation at my fieldsite to be more and more valuable, not only in the simple terms of making increasing access possible but also in terms of pushing and enriching the ways that I understand my research and especially my role as a researcher in the larger political and social change project. I owe my understanding of the transformative experience of the school to my own experience as a movement newcomer.

In addition to my fieldwork, I also conducted 15 in-depth, loosely-structured interviews. The interviews lasted anywhere from 1 to 3 hours, and all of the interviewees were also participants in my field site. Conducting these interviews with people I already knew and had a relationship with outside of the interview allowed me to ask in more depth about key events that occurred at the school, and to explore different perspectives and assumptions about what the school does, how it does it, and why the activists are there.

Finally, I think it is important to mention that I am a non-native Spanish speaker, and that I am not Argentine, but rather a white North American. This is important to mention, because it not only reflects how participants reacted to me, but also my own understanding of my role at the school. In particular, I make sense of and interpret words and actions as a cultural and linguistic outsider. As an outsider, I am more attuned to cultural rules and practices that may be less visible to insiders, while on the other hand I may find novelty in terminology that cultural insiders may find commonplace or less meaning-laden.

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## Notes

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- 2 Many movements still self-identify as blockader movements, but this term no longer designates much about the politics of a movement other than that it is a poor people's movement. Over the last ten years many of these groups have affiliated with political parties and adopted more traditional organizational structures, unlike the horizontal groups. Furthermore, I am discussing a phenomenon that is broader than movements of unemployed workers and includes, for example, workers in cooperatively-owned factories.
- 3 See methodological appendix for details.
- 4 All movement and activist names are aliases.
- 5 Misery village is a common local term, used by residents and city officials alike, to describe several such squatted neighborhoods around Buenos Aires.
- 6 While it is common for Argentines to greet everyone individually, it's uncommon in the wider society to do so in larger groups or outside of one's own friend group. In fact, newer members to the movement often were not so inclusive, but more experienced or more enthusiastic activists were scrupulous about this practice.
- 7 Yerba mate is a hot drink consumed in Argentina on a daily basis or more. The hot water is poured by one person, who prepares each turn and passes it around as a social ritual.

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## Human Security and Emancipation: Measurements and Issues

Paulo Kuhlmann and Fabíola Faro

**Abstract:** The concept of human security, which has undergone a radical change in traditional security research through the change of the referent object to the individual from the State, has three dimensions: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to make their own decisions, signifying emancipation. Broadening this thinking, the idea of freeing people of fear and giving them freedom from want are prerequisites to achieve autonomy, this is not necessarily so, because in some situations emancipation comes before deprivation. The lack of consensus regarding the threats which cause Human Insecurity allows for growth in criticism, such as the debate surrounding the instrumental use of the term to justify 'humanitarian' intervention; on the one hand, strengthening the concept or weakening it, whilst on the other hand, acknowledging that the term has an extremely broad and adaptable meaning, transforming the academic and political discourse regarding Human Security into an innocuous analysis on that scenario. This work aims at verifying the existing methods of measuring Human Security, such as the index used by James Michel and King & Murray (Index of generalized poverty), who consider data related to underdevelopment; GECHS Index of Human Insecurity (*The Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project*) *Index of Human Insecurity* (IHI), which measures security in social, environmental, economic and institutional domains, the Human Security Report Index, which attempts to analyze Security through the number of death caused by crimes and conflicts, the human security audit and Human security mapping, the similarities and differences, weakness and disabilities of the methodologies, try to contribute to the academic debate about Human Security, in search of a better understanding of emancipation and empowerment of people, and as such aims to transform victimized individuals into empowered people.

**Keywords:** Human Security, Emancipation, Measurements, Issues, Freedom.

### 1. Introduction

The principal problem of this paper search to work is how that International Security research, mainly when modify the security referent object to the State to mankind, could contribute to the dynamic of insecurity regions, insecurity of people, and mainly to the discussion of emancipation, and measurement of human security. At the first time, or when the concept of Human Security was created, it had been work with two parameters: Freedom from Fear, and Freedom from Want (Kerr 2007).

Freedom from Fear corresponds on the narrow view, and focuses on political violence. There is a more pragmatic view, and treats violence with base on State action, or between social groups. On the other hand, Freedom from Want, considered the Broad School of Human Security, considers issues about underdevelopment and poor governance (Kerr 2007:95). In comparison with disease, It's possible to think that Freedom From Fear is similar to an acute disease, and that need of urgent actions to minimize the suffering and pain; while Freedom From Want as a chronic disease, need more profound and long term actions to correct problems.

Human Security, for instance, guards close proximity with Peace Research; Freedom from Fear guards similarity with Negative Peace, and Freedom from Want is near Positive Peace, concepts used, and building, by Galtung (1969), many time ago. It's important to highlight this because peace, violence, and security have been discussed by Galtung in a very close way of the concept of Human Security, created by United Nations Development Program Report in 1994.

Galtung treat Negative Peace as the opposite of direct violence, in other words, a condition when physical, or manifest threat there doesn't exist. Peace researchers search forms and manners that contain violence, according Galtung, there isn't the most important work of peace researchers.

Positive Peace treats about state of human fulfillment and corresponds to the opposite of Structural and Cultural Violence, that in many ways, can obstruct or limit, the human behavior, putting the human below their potential. Peace researchers have as principal goal the systematic search of human realization, and ways of construct Positive Peace, for propose, and implement, politics.

In some cases, however, there is more proximity between Freedom from Want with development, and therefore corresponds with liberal thought, not exactly with emancipation thought, that remains in Marxist thought. In considering Galtung ideas parallelism, the Broad School guards great proximity with social justice, what it is highlighted by others thinkers of Human Security (Hampson 2008:231).

Human Security received additions further after the first definition and division, as "freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment" (Commission on Human Security, 2003:4). But on the same Report, the strategies induce two bases of actions - protection and empowerment (Commission on Human Security, 2003:10) - ; the last guards great proximity, or are part of emancipation process. Instead life could to seen trough the triadic view: without privation (of food, home), afraid (many kinds of violence), and impossibility to choose (directions, projects, lifestyle, and dreams), protection and empowerment, together, could cover these fields of life.

## 2. Emancipation in Security Studies

The other great discussion in Security Studies is that Realism proposes the State as the referent object, and putting National Security above all, and international security refers the amount of states in anarchy. Critical Studies, that coined the term Utopian Realism, with path to construct different realities through thinking, put people in the center of the discussion about Security, and consider that world security trespass the international security, because the community of people is the center, without frontiers (Booth 1991: 317).

The Modern Political Philosophy thought was constructed for change the worst world that Philosophers lived. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, construct the bases of State as a form to diminishes security; Hobbes, mainly because his fear about religious crises in Europe, that causes a great insecurity at his time. In the same way Locke and Rousseau, those create the new logic about the power of people, did that as a form to put limits and barriers the absolute power of State. Their thinking considered that power was in many cases against citizens. The similar logic that Marx sought years after. Then, the proposition of Critical Security Studies is more than only reproduce the old thinkers, as Hobbes and Maquiavel, incorporates the Realism approach of in International Relations. The defenders of this approach seek as their principal goal, security and freedom, ideas presented in the first thinkers of Modern State.

In the same way, Booth supports his argument in Hobbes, when put the idea that security is something more than survival:

To confuse the existential condition of survival with the political and social instrumentally of security is a category error in security studies, but a common one. Here, critical security theory can appeal to the authority of Hobbes. Having declare that "*the safety of the people is the supreme law*", Hobbes wrote: 'By *safety* one should understand not mere survival in any condition, but a happy life so far as that is possible.' (Booth 2007:103)

Security, for Booth (2007:102), is more than survival; is further than the political use of the meaning of urgency to put one question above all agendas, give for this issue priority, according to the Buzan securitization concept (Booth 2007:109); Security is survival-plus, or Freedom from life, to make choices, include take risks on your own, not for others, and not forced, or restraint (Booth 2007:104).

Until this time, security is mixed with the idea of emancipation; actually this is the mainly argument of Booth. Emancipation, in his words (1991:319):

'Security' means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two

sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.

Emancipation, Booth said (1991:322), is a form to rescue the moral in International Relations, and the supplant dichotomies, and barriers, created in theoretical corpus of International Relations. If emancipation considers the reciprocity of rights, in this case, the domestic policy couldn't remain as a moral understanding of minimal reality. And emancipation presupposes the egalitarian concept of liberty (Booth 1991:322).

As an example, in Brazil, Paulo Cappelletti, a man who worked in a religious NGO with homeless, renamed the word condominium to 'condemonium', because it separates the rich people for the poor and 'pernicious' people, in a false perception of reality and security, because their employers are the same poor people separated and discriminated by this structure, but coexist with them. As nowadays Africans have been invaded Israel, and provokes xenophobes reactions, it's clear that isn't possible think emancipation and freedom only in individual level, or their own finality.

Therefore, there is the motif that critical security studies presuppose "common humanity rather than national sovereignty, and emancipation rather than power" (Booth 2007: 109).

Some points have fundamental importance for emancipation, as education level. Considering this issue, there is a difference in models of education, because it's possible educate to maintain the order and continuity of status, that is, the domination and oppression (Freire 1987); or educate for emancipation, provide critical thought. At first view, I think it's difficult to see how kind of education is provided by people, but the great level of education could be better for emancipation. It's common to imagine, at least, that alphabetization is the great first line of war against the alienation. Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator, worked think education, and alphabetization, as a tool for emancipation (Freire, 2002). One of the first principles of him is treat alumni not with the meaning of world, "without light", but people that know and unknown different things in relation with the educator. The education begins with basis on the common knowledge of alumni, not with distant reality, or phrases without meaning in relation that the indigenous reality. Instead of this, the preoccupation of Paulo Freire was to make possible to the alumni recognize their existence, reality, capacities and possibilities.

About "which came first, the chicken or the egg?", emancipation or development, emancipation or overcome deprivation, this is difficult to affirm, but in many cases, as suggest South Africa, with Mandela, Gandhi in India, and Luther King, in USA. Emancipation, or the empowerment of 'underdog', occurred before the freedom from fear and from want. This discussion are present in Asymmetric conflicts, when there are, logically, a situation of great difference of power and status between oppressed and oppressor, with clear advantages in favor of the 'top dog' (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2005:21).



Otherwise, development of many conditions of life, as example education, health, alimentation, dwelling, could product conditions to emancipation, although Marx and Engels don't like if workers have good conditions, because the workers revolution force can break with embourgeoisement.

Booth affirms that have many people who couldn't be heard, or rather, they are not given the opportunity to express themselves, questioning the reality. The point of emancipation in Critical Security Studies is search ways to put voice for the voiceless (Booth 2007: 104), when the mainstream of the International Relations gives all voices to the powerful countries. The Critical Studies tries, in this way, to create a different reality.

### 3. Measuring Human Security

#### 3.1. Human Security and Measurement Indexes: Criticisms and Defenses

Is it possible to measure human security? This is the kind of questioning researchers do about human security and if it is possible, it is a useful tool in the development of governmental policies? Would it have a real applicability? Discussing these possibilities is one of the axes of the arguments about measuring human security.

Human Security preconizes that the key to security is focused on the individual and not on the State as stated by the traditional concept of security, and that it is emancipation and not power which leads to a safer status as advocated by Ken Booth (1991). Although there is an agreement among researchers about who must be protected (people), their defendants disagree about what should be considered as a threat which can cause feelings of insecurity to people. So, there are the ones who advocate that the issues related to underdevelopment are in the center of this lack of security (Leaning, Alkire, Thakur, Axworthy, Bajpay, Hampson and Winslow & Eriksen in Owen 2004), and there are the ones who consider that the threats that occur from physical violence of wars and conflicts would be real threats to human life (Kerr, 2010; Krause, Mack and Macfarlane in Owen, 2004).

Those who have an extensive view of human security understand that in a globalized world, where interstate wars are less frequent than those lived enthusiastically in the twentieth century or real facts such as poverty, illnesses, oppression just to mention some, it emerges decisively in the view of the international community which sees these changes in the international scenery and takes as an initial sign the Cold War (Reveron & Mohoney-Norris 2011).

However, those who defend a narrower view strengthen their thoughts declaring that the true threat would be the one which comes from physical violence inflicted on men in the context of conflicts, wars, genocide, all old realities which are already manifested nowadays. Critics in favor of the extensive view refer to the countless amount

of threats which can be taken within the scope of underdevelopment, stating that the bigger the number of threats the less its degree is prioritized and consequently the degree of lack of security to human beings (Krause, Buzan, Macfarlane & Mack *in* Owen 2004).

And resizing thoughts about Human Security, new questionings are incorporated to the idea of how to protect, who to protect and from what. There is an agreement that people should be protected from threats that are linked to questions related to underdevelopment and/or physical violence determined by the conflicts. The difference would be in the way the observer of this reality considers the meaning of threat in a particular context and how a certain threat can or must be fought. And what if Human Security can be measured? And if it can, what is the use of it, and to whom? Human security is just kind of a guide to academic research, or its deepening or understanding would be good to guide the local public policies, either national or international with the intention to raise the degree of human security in people highly submitted to high levels of insecurity (Paris 2001)

Not without critics, the emergency in validating the idea of measuring human security is incorporated to the scope of the lack of consensus about that idea. Their supporters believe that due to the high numbers of threats to which people are exposed to, measuring the degree of human security of particular people would be highly positive to their social reality and besides, it would work as an identifying parameter to the number and degree of threats of the society being currently studied and thus, as a concrete and measurable point of orientation to those who develop governmental policies in this area (Owen 2008). Those who are decisive in their criticisms say that measuring human security would be meaningless once it would incur in the risk of biasing threats that do not represent a real danger to that population, besides simplifying the analysis which tended to incorporate a high degree of subjectivity (Owen 2008).

Taking into consideration criticisms and defenses referring to the measure of human security, researchers proposed to try to develop methodologies which could be useful to measure all threats to human beings. So, authors like Taylor Owen, King and Murray, Bajpai and the ones who devised the Human Security Report Index (University of British Columbia) tried to develop specific methodologies according to the particular view of each one about the meaning of threat and how to measure it in their search of how to find a common denominator in the need of measuring human security, had as objective to prove that data and threat indicators may be used by policymakers to try to diminish or eliminate the degree of insecurity to which the population is submitted. According to this, the indexes available in the literature will be studied and the methodology applied, the application in the case study, the differences and limitations referring to each index, a deep study and a discussion about the real applicability of measuring human security will be evaluated.

### **3.2. Human Security: Why measure it?**

In the scope of the analysis of Human Security approach, the idea of measuring the degree of insecurity to which people would be exposed emerged in the first decade of the twenty first century as a possibility to answer the criticism that human security would just be an academic approach. Taylor Owen, an expressive researcher about the subject, has been deepening not only the idea that measuring human security is possible but together with other researchers like Murray, King, Bajpai and others, they have been developing methodologies to measure human security through indexes, preconizing that they can be applied in any country.

At first, measuring human security through indexes may demystify two criticisms about human security: the first, as preconized by the critics of the broad view, refers to the fact that everything may be considered as a threat to human being. In this case, the existence of the indexes which can measure the degree of insecurity of a population, identifying which threat is the most relevant in the local, national or international context, could allow a specific approach channelized to fight it. The second consideration is directly related to the first, when assuming that human security is possible and the indexes would be an acceptable tool to direct more effective government policies and so, turn the fight against threats to some population group more efficient and effective.

Taking into consideration human security as an approach without a consensus, the idea of measuring it and the current methodologies developed within this scope, they also do without a consensus. The great questioning about measuring Human Security is still on the analytic use of its measurement.

Taylor Owen (2008) emphasizes reasons to measure human security as well as reasons which could avoid its efficacy. Taking into consideration that it is necessary to define first the meaning of measurement and what to measure, the next step would be to answer the question why measure human security and if the methodologies developed are or can be useful tools to *policymakers*. Based on these two questionings, the critics of the measurement emphasize that incorporating under the broad point of view a great number of threats, measuring human security is an impossible task once measuring all the sources of insecurity to human beings as well as finding a global measure which incorporate all threats would be impossible (Paris, 2001). Trying to avoid this undeniable truth, academics have been considering two qualifiers as a starting point of this study such as the researchers, and the data collected to the identification of threats to a particular population. Nevertheless, according to critics, the choice of these determinants lead to another problem, that is, determining what is or what is not a source of threat to people may be influenced by this subjectivity and besides there is a possibility that the data is not available when objective and subjective factors are involved (Owen, 2008).

Taking into consideration the opposite way, those academics like Taylor Owen (2008) who defend human security measurement say that this should be done in spite of

the critics mentioned above. Measuring the degree of human security of a population would help to define a concept whose ambiguity sometimes places it either within the scope of human rights or as another form of measuring human development once the indexes embody categories used to measure the HDI (Human Development Index). Measuring human security would somehow allow this “separation” of being considered a “concept” of Human Rights or an extension of the HDI once it would be used to view sources of threats to human beings which might not be identified, as well as identifying causative factors that would be interrelated and could not be measured or quantified. At last, measuring human safety can help policymakers in the political debate and as a way to find out answers to human insecurity questions identified in the studied population.

### **3.3. Human Security: Indexes and Applied Methodologies**

To begin a study about measuring Human Security it is necessary to know the indexes studied: 1. the index of generalized poverty by King and Murray; 2. the audit index of Human Security by Bajpai; 3. The GECHS/IHI (The Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project) Index of Human Insecurity (IHI); 4. Human Security Report at the Program for Human Security at the University of British Columbia and 5. Human Security Mapping, how each of them try to define the human safety concepts, which indicators they use to join and analyze the data obtained and which methodology they use to evaluate the data (Owen 2008)

#### **3.3.1. Index of Generalized Poverty**

This index was developed by Gary King and Christopher Murray in 2000 and according to Owen (2008), the definition of human insecurity is granted as a generalized state of poverty, that is, those considered insecure would be in a degree under the acceptable to what is considered as a minimum welfare of a person. At this level, the indicators do not overlap in importance and can punctuate between zero and one. King and Murray's indicators are organized in domains and indicators. In this sense, to the income domain it is used the measure of the Per Capita/Income of the country; to health, the quality of health scale is used; to education, the illiterate rate and the average years spent at school are used as measure; politics freedom is measured through the degree of political freedom of the individuals within the State and to democracy, the amount of adults who can vote. The Generalized Poverty Index does not include violence as a source of threat.

The methodology applied try to measure the years of human security of a person, namely it tries to measure the expectation of the years a person will stay out of the generalized poverty standard, and in this case, taking into consideration the age of people. The index also offers to evaluate the years of human security of the population taking into consideration the State as a whole, stating that it would be a useful tool to the development of safety policies from the government (Owen 2008).

### 3.3.2. The Human Security Audit

This index was developed by Kanti Bajpai in 2000 and it tries to find protection elements and welfare to people from direct and indirect threats (Owen 2008). The author develops his definition of Human Security from a comparative analysis between the definitions of the Canadian Report about Human Security and the definition used by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) to Human Security (Eldering 2010). To be accessible, the index had to measure the growth or the decrease of these threats to be found in a specific region and to a particular population. So, the use of the index would be used to evaluate the growth or decrease of the threat as well as the implementation of rules and policies from local to national ones (Bajpai 2000) and so, it could evaluate insecurity not only among countries but also inside the country itself.

The methodology applied requires qualitative and quantitative data collection to a matrix of potential direct and indirect threats. This index, according to Owen (2008), presents problems and limitations. The problem may be because it collects a great number of indicators, which can lead to an accuracy problem. Available, trustful data are problems in growing countries and besides, subjectivity is a factor considered as an obliquity in the exposition and compilation of data to analysis.

### 3.3.3. CECHS/ IHI (*The Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project Index of Human Insecurity (IHI)*)

The CECHS/IHI as it suggests, is focused in the environmental components and when it is associated to social issues it can lead vulnerable societies to a condition of human insecurity (Lonergan et al, 2000 in Owen, 2008). This index preconizes that human safety is achieved when and where people and communities have the option to adapt, mitigate or end up threats which make them vulnerable and when they are also able and have the freedom to practice these options and take active part to achieve them (Lonergan et al 2000). The authors attribute a close relationship between the environment and safety, and emphasize that the degradation of the environment as a responsible of insecurity may unleash other sources of insecurity to people. The development of the index uses four domains: social, environmental, economic and institutional with four indicators to each domain. The indicators are chosen based in standards such as: the relevance of the chosen situation to the determinants, the existence of an empirical and theoretical relation, the availability of the data, the possibility of measuring the data and the adequacy of the spatial covering of the data (Lonergan et al 2000).

In this sense, the CECHS/IHI is going to use to the social domain, the annual percentage of urban growth of the population, the percentage of young men between 0 and 14 years old, the maternal mortality rate (by 100.000 born alive) and life expectation in years. To the environmental domain, the indicators are going to evaluate the network of imported energy, that is, the percentage of energy spent commercially, the degradation of the soil (tons a year), the amount of drinking water (percentage of the population who has access to it), topsoil (hectares per person). To the economic domain,

the real per capita income, the growth of the gross national product/per capita (annual percentage), the rate of illiterate adults (percentage of the population over 15 years old) and the relation between import and export of goods and service (percentage of the gross domestic product - % GDP) will be analyzed. And at last, the institutional domain will evaluate the relation between the expense with defense and education (% GDP), the investment in the gross domestic product (%GDP), the degree of democratization of the country (in a scale from 1 to 7) and the index of human freedom (in a scale from 0 to 40) (Loneragan et al).

In the CECHS/IHI the authors collected the available data of all countries from 1970 to 1995 and when it was not possible to get it, a statistics estimation using linear regression or an interpolation of data was established. The data was standardized so that an indicator would not be more important than the other and so, the data to each indicator could be classified to each year separately in ten categories to groups of analysis. The countries received marks from 1 to 10 to each indicator with known value or an estimated value, and from this point on, the IHI were calculated to each country to each year of the study. In a general sample, the data to the IHI of 1995 demonstrated that the countries with higher index of human insecurity were in Africa, Afghanistan and Cambodia but they were also recalculated to each region of the world.

#### **3.3.4. Human Security Report Index**

This index was developed by the Human Security Program of British Columbia University and it uses the most restrictive way of measurements, taking into consideration deaths caused by armed conflicts and criminal violence. The number of deaths by 100.000 inhabitants which occurred from diseases, natural disasters may be incorporated to the collected data (Owen 2008).

According to Owen (2008) the first difficulty in relation to this index refers to the number of informed deaths, once the collected data are from death in armed conflicts which exceed an acceptable line to that conflict. As already mentioned, the applied methodology is concerned to a determinant, violence, two indicators, the number of deaths in armed conflicts and the number of murders.

Other difficulties refer to accuracy due to a lack of total reliability to the collected data, and besides the sub notification of the number of deaths referring to the studied place which are published years later and do not allow an annual index (Owen 2008).

#### **3.3.5. Human Security Mapping**

This index was developed by Taylor Owen and aims at measuring Human Security which tries to group the data, organization and the analysis of the data using a System of Geographic Information. It begins collecting local data to try to identify through the relation space/threat, areas with higher degree of insecurity to the population which according

Owen (2008) deviate the subjectivity factor of the selection and analysis of data.

The methodology applied is established from the beginning to identify the threats to the region or country which is going to be analyzed by the experts who work in close contact with what is considered a kind of threat by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) that is, those linked to the domain of safety<sup>1</sup>, health, economy, food, civil safety, politics and local environment which according to the author, makes Human Security a concept susceptible of measurement. After identifying the threats, the data are collected within a special dimension, selecting indicators which represent the threats to the researched place.

The local researchers would be professionals who live in this own area, non-governmental organizations in the community, Ministry of the government of the country at issue and International Organizations. The identified and collected data must have a spatial relation between geographical and local threat, what allows identifying the level of threat to that region. At the end of the methodology they are organized in a map with threats, local indicators of threat, degree of the threat so that it is possible a functional analysis of insecurity to some population, characterizing threat as low, average or high degree of insecurity.

Through this methodology, Owen (2008) tries to demonstrate that areas with high degree of insecurity may be identified using local data and that could reduce some strong criticism in relation to the subjectivity in the choice of indicators and the threats to some particular countries or regions. To the author, identifying where the high degree threats are located strengthen the idea that identifying the threat, government policies may be implemented in a more channelized way to fight against it. The relation between threat/space would also allow that the data collected could be easily shared with all professionals involved in the research, and in the direct or indirect fight against threats in some places.

#### **4. Index of Human Security: rhetoric or an applicability tool to governmental policies?**

One of the great challenges about the methods to measure Human security refers to the existence of applicability to the collected information. The big questioning is about the usefulness of measuring human security and if after measuring and identifying areas with high degree of insecurity, this information may be used by policymakers in the designing of public policies which would minimize threats, reduce it or even eradicate the degree of insecurity to which some population are exposed.

In a study done in 2010, Marije Eldering includes definitions and criticisms to Human Security exploring the methodologies most used to do so, and some of them are present in this article and each of them are applied as case study to the three States: Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand. The data available from each country were collected from the data available in international organizations such as the World Bank,

United Nation Agencies, local and international Non-governmental Organizations, Organizations such as Freedom House and the World Health Organization just to mention some, and this data was organized in a matrix analyze the data and among the data according to the indexes referring to each methodology.

The author concludes that there is variability in the results according to the methodology used to the three chosen countries, emphasizing that this variability happens mainly due to the focus used by the indicators to measure Human Security. The author points out the gaps which must be fulfilled so that the methods used to measure Human Security are more accurate, such as taking into consideration threats which are not measured (by including or excluding a threat area) and reevaluate the excessive need to use some forms of measurement (the use of the ordinal scale to national data which could also be used in other levels of the analysis).

Referring to *Human Security Mapping*, the method used by Owen (2008), the author observes that the use of local data grouped according to the context of the region provides what he names as "certain flexibility" to the analysis, although the waste of a number of professionals to the work of data collection as well as the lack of experience in the use of methodology might turn the application of it in a very hard if not impossible task.

The five methods described in this article use variable domains and indicators since the indexes which are closer to the seven dimensions of Human Security (economic, food, environmental, health, personal, community, politic) present in the Human Development Report (UNDP 1994) have a strong relation with the Human Development Index till the most restrictive ways such as the evaluation through the numbers of death caused by armed conflicts and criminal violence in the Human Security Index of the British Columbia University as well as in the Human Security Mapping designed by Owen (2008) which uses many details in his analysis and brings variable geographic spaces as an attempt to improve the accuracy of data to analysis.

The "empowerment" of people is approached as a centerpiece in the idea of Human Security. Ken Booth (1991) says that it is through emancipation and not through power that one can achieve security. So, providing human emancipation to people would also give people the empowerment which would collectively mean empowerment of the some particular population mainly those who live in poorer areas, attaining as their last goal Human Security.

The Human Development Report, 2011 says in its introduction:

Human development, which is about expanding people's choice, builds on shared natural resources. Promoting human development requires addressing sustainability – locally, nationally and globally – and this can and should be done in ways that are equitable and empowering

The *Human Development Report* (2011) reinforces the need to ensure sustainability



and fairness to all people in the global, national and local dimensions as a means to reach human development in a more equitable way, empowering people. In the report, equity, environmental equity and empowerment of people are intrinsically interconnected when it refers to allowing people make its own choice. The focus of the report is on people who are exposed to high degree of social deprivation and can be derived from environmental degradation which is manifested in the level of air and water pollution, inadequate sanitation and in the impossibility of the access to potable water. Intimately reacted to this condition in 2010, the Index of Multidimensional Poverty was developed to analyze deep deficits in health, education and standard of living which in the 2011 Report incorporate the influence of environmental deprivation to the degree of multidimensional poverty, translated in the index of multidimensional poverty.

Another index also used in the Human Development Report refers to the gender inequality index which demonstrate how the constraint to reproductive health contribute to gender inequality as well as it evaluates the role of women as *political decision-making*. The 2011 report brings to life the question of the environmental degradation as one of the closest factor related to the development or maintenance of the conditions of social inequity among people in the world, mainly the ones who live in areas affected by poverty. It also proposes the implementation of policies directed to promote better conditions of sustainability and equity so that people can reach higher degrees of human development. If human emancipation and empowerment of people are closely related, human security and human development are also intimately close and in the context of globalization identifying threats to people and try to solve questions to increase human security must be goals to be achieved either under security point of view or human development.

## 5. Conclusions

Within this scope of analysis, the answer to the question if measuring Human Security is valid or not, remains inconclusive. Would it be just more one rhetoric in the academy without the existence of a real applicability of the indexes of measurement of the degrees of human insecurity, or on the contrary, the indexes used would serve as recognized tools to the identification of the degrees of human insecurity to the studied population? Could the indexes be used and must be used as parameters to policy-makers develop together with the government of their countries, policies which try to minimize the negative impact of threats to which their population are exposed? Is the measurement of human security an analysis tool which can be used to do so? And do the results obtained through the indicators proposed by each method allow accuracy in the analysis of the data? These questionings have not presented a consensus in their answers yet.

The unavailability of data in some countries as well as the impossibility to collect a great number of it, are factors which influence an adequate design of a methodology that can be fully used to measure correctly and truly the degree of human insecurity of the population, however countries when there are correct data means a problem of

good governance, indirectly meaning of human insecurity.

Looking back at all the arguments defended by Owen (2008) about why measuring human security was important, mainly due to the defense of his ideas referring to the applicability of the data in the public policies to minimize or even eliminate the degree of human insecurity of some population, we finish the exposition of this debate using Elderling (2010) words at the end of his analysis which says: "human security remains till now as a disputable concept and will remain like that, till the gaps related to methodological questions about the ways of measuring human security are solved".

Human Security experiences the same indefiniteness that suffer the term Security, as mentioned by Buzan, in *Peoples, States and Fear*. However, all concepts in Social Sciences always suffer with discussion, contestation, as is regular, normal and frequent, and pointed by Booth (2007: 98), even in the vagueness of security pointed by Buzan, remain the liberal-realist view. Policymakers, and researchers, work of this view, product public policies, and think their actions through them. For Booth, security isn't an essentially contested concept; is a concept contested contingently (Booth 2007:99, 100). Then, it's possible to say that Human Security concept has been developed, and the contestation is part of Science, above all. But I think that relation - Human Security and emancipation could be more explored.

It's possible to say, as Mary Kaldor, that mankind has executed a great effort to protect himself, using guns and giant structures of war. There are great efforts to localize, maintain and identify the enemies, the invaders, and uses the top of technology to protect nations and States, possibly exaggerate on capacity and level of destruction in the top actual guns (Kaldor 2010: 197). But, as Booth said, it's possible to think in make use of technology, and intelligence, with others forms of measuring Human Security, or situations where humanity achieve emancipation. Results of how public polices developed, for example, through identifications of great displacement of people by satellite. The utilization of Antropologists, as human security intelligence, could provide better understand of reality of groups in conflict, and could achieve reconciliation (Kaldor 2010: 107-137).

The possible great problem with this article remain in it: how is possible use quantitative, or positivist methods, to measure Human Security, and mainly, emancipation as a principal part of Human Security, because we understand that emancipation is possible to achieve Freedom from Want, that is, development, and through emancipation it's possible to acquire security (Freedom from Fear), and the order of factors don't need seek the same way.

Then, it's possible to think this effort intend to transcend this questions, or at least, put a step in direction of Utopian Realism. Understanding that question is included in the title of this forum: *Social Justice and Democracy*, and recognize that International Relations is a subfield of Sociology research, we think is important to search interlocutors out of International Relations area, to analyze and put questions in our analyses and parameters.

## Abbreviations

Gross Domestic Product: **GDP**  
Human Development Index: **HDI**  
Index of Human Insecurity: **IHI**  
The Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project: **CECHS**

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## Notes

- 1 The communitarian concept in this context do not present itself as a category that fits within a concept that fulfills the requirements to be considered under the safety line (Owen 2008)

## Subject Index

Critical Security Studies  
 Emancipation  
 Freedom from Fear  
 Freedom from Want  
 Human Security  
 International Security  
 Negative Peace  
 Positive Peace  
 Security Studies

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# The Interface Between Digital Democracy and Public Policy the Challenges of Digital Inclusion in Brazil

Sayonara Leal

**Abstract:** This paper discusses the relationship among public policies, digital democracy and digital inclusion in Brazil as part of the political project against social inequalities during the Lula government. Internet access, instructional formation for the socio-cognitive network use, appropriation of ICTs and broadband are important pieces of achieving a social justice in line with digital democracy. This refers to the possibilities of providing the conditions that an open technology in regard with its purposes is made available to different people. Our object of analysis is to discuss the interface between distributive policies and actions of recognition of social and cultural differences, as pillars of the battle against the digital divide in the context of GESAC's Digital Inclusion Project integrated to the Policy for Science and Technology in Brazil. It discusses the advances and limitations of the process of digital inclusion in the country from three key variables: Brazilian citizens' access to instructional training; to computers and broadband and to appropriation of technologies. Minority communities are the target of public policy of digital inclusion and are the most exposed to the «fracture numérique» as polarization phenomenon with respect to the universal dimension called "information society." In Brazil we are faced with populations exposed to social injustices due to social or/and ethnic-racial origins, which is reflected in their access to material and symbolic goods. Such injustices transform differences in inequalities, which results in the stratification of access and appropriation of ICTs. The basis for the consolidation of a Science and Technology Policy in the country that not only relates to access of material resources but also to capacity-building of the telecenter user in dealing with new tools and specific ICTs languages. The following methodological resources are used: document analysis, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and focus groups with residents from five regions of Brazil.

**Keywords:** information society, digital democracy, public policy, digital inclusion, instructional training.

## 1. Introduction

This paper discusses the relationship among digital democracy, public policies and digital inclusion within the framework of the Digital Inclusion Program of the Federal Government in Brazil (GESAC Project), integrated to the National Policy for Science,

Technology and Innovation (PNCT&I, *Programa Nacional de Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação*). Our object of analysis is the interface between public policies in digital inclusion and the so-called digital democracy, taking into account the current challenges to include Brazilian citizens in the *information society*: internet access, instructional formation for socio-cognitive network use (buildup of information technology knowledge) and broadband access. The access to information and communication technologies has become a shaping factor in contemporary social relations, resulting in what Castells (1999, 2003a, 2003b) calls a *new social formation*, with the advent of ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies). However, to fulfill the republican and democratic purposes of digital inclusion, it will take more than the globalization of access to the means (computer) and to the connection (broadband).

The reach of digital democracy relates to the possibilities of providing the means for open technology – regarding its purposes (social technologies, digital innovations) – to be available to all, and that is where the State has a unique role (Ferreira, 2010). Digital inclusion is associated to factors that aim at enabling the growing and free access to ICTs, to the computerized world, especially to the poorer communities that would not have the possibility to purchase information and communication technologies otherwise. Digital inclusion entails social inclusion, that is, issues such as digital literacy, access to symbolic goods, to information and knowledge, as well as the creation of a support system for the citizen that should be on the agenda so as to foster human development, guarantee social freedom and generate knowledge (Maciel, 2007).

There is some kind of consensus in specialized literature as to digital inclusion not being restricted to access to a computer with Internet connection. The training of instructors and telecenter users to explore the range of possibilities in the realm of information technologies is directly related to their skill-building to deal reflectively and creatively with ICTs and their countless uses (Laipelt; Pereira; Moura; Caregnato; 2003). It is essential, therefore, to reflect about the technical and socio-cognitive realms of digital inclusion, always minding the necessary conditions to prepare individuals to actively use ICTs (Corrêa, 2007), following the globalization path that creates rights and strengthens citizenship.

Hence, what we have as premise are two pillars for democracy and digital inclusion: redistributive principles focusing on social policies (digital inclusion, ITC access and use, user instructional training) and the principle of emancipation and reflection, which refers to user's appropriation of ICTs and their sharing with one another knowledge and doubts regarding ICT use in their lives. The first principle relates to the social right of benefiting from riches, knowledge and technologies produced by and within society; and the second refers to the perspective of legitimizing technology through what Feenberg calls democratic rationalization (creativity). That is, democracy and digital inclusion are seen both in terms of access or technological possibilities, and also from the perspective of reducing social asymmetry, for we understand technology as what is proposed by Feenberg (2003), not only as the rational control of nature, but also as

a social buildup to benefit society. Therefore, in our point of view, *full digital inclusion* can only be reached within the framework we understand as digital democracy. When we study the binomial democracy and digital inclusion, we put into perspective the actions of the Brazilian Government to include the Brazilian citizen in the so-called information society, taking into account different forms of access to infra-structure and to socio-economic resources in our country.

The access to information and communication technologies in a global perspective of social equality and justice can only happen through the development and implementation of public policies. Within the framework of digital inclusion, emphasis should be given to programs to make computers cheaper, to donate computers, to train human resources, and to create internet access centers, the telecenters, in public schools and libraries, in community associations and other public areas.

Public policies for Digital Inclusion (DI) in Brazil are drafted on the national project of *Information Society* (Green Book), carried out by the Ministry of Science and Technology, together with the United Nations Development Programme (PNUD, Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento) (Takahashi, 2000); such project is based on guidelines coming from countries with pioneering experiences in integrating the society via digital networks. A decade after the launch of the guidelines to prepare the country to reach the demands of a *new social formation*, designed as an *information society*, we are faced with whole populations exposed to social injustices due to their social and/or ethnic-racial origins, which is reflected in their access to material and symbolic goods. Such injustices transform differences in inequalities, which result in the stratification of access and appropriation of information and communication technologies, especially the computer with Internet connection, mainly in places with remarkably low socio-economic indices, exposing the poverty level.

Poverty, in this sense, when it brings about deprivation of access to public services and to benefits and riches produced by society (such as ICTs) and demands assistance (via social policies), does not generate a socially excluded individual, but someone who is not included. According to Simmel (2008), "*The poor is an integral part of the whole of society, his exclusion from this whole is in his consciousness because poverty is a way to belong to society.*" (p. 18).

Within the context of the particular condition of being part of the whole of society, poverty does not define the social or digital excluded, but the one not included<sup>1</sup>. Thus, we would like to justify our rebuttal of the troublesome category of "social excluded" in its variant "digital excluded". It is important to point out that the present paper is not restricted to that share of the population living in poverty, but these are the ones more frequently served by the GESAC telecenters taken into account in this research.

We claim that the *digital not-included* participate in a singular way of the information society and need assistance, in this case free and qualified access to ICTs. Their social bearings refer epistemologically not to a relation of opposition between included x excluded, but it does reveal a systemic contradictory relation in which the dynamics

included and not-included regarding frequent and qualified access to ICTs, especially a computer with internet connection, mostly in a development stage of capitalist and democratic societies, where participating in a worldwide computer network translates into a distinctive sign and a social classification in terms of social stratification.

Our paper aims at assessing the experience of instructional formation for the GESAC Digital Inclusion Program, as part of the Brazilian Government's initiative to combat the digital divide in Brazil. We emphasize the socio-cognitive and reflexive point of view for instructional training in GESAC telecenters, whose aim is to enable users to deal with technical aspects and to actively use a computer with internet connection. The telecenters are important for our research for they are a pivotal public equipment to house all the processes involved in digital inclusion. Among the factors that enable DI, the training of telecenters instructors and users pose one of the greatest challenges for the program to be carried out.

This present study takes into account two dimensions of nationwide public policies for digital inclusion: the socio-cognitive and the reflexive dimensions. The GESAC Formation is an initiative of the Ministry of Communications, in partnership with the National Counsel of Technological and Scientific Development (CNPq, *Conselho Nacional para o Desenvolvimento da Ciência e da Tecnologia*), to teach instructors how to operate telecenters, such as: guide users in their basic needs, for example, internet access, network browsing, digital literacy, research. The instructional training provided by the GESAC Program to its digital inclusion agents (instructors) involves a complex structure of close institutional articulation (State, municipality, Federal Institute of Technology, local associations, non-governmental organizations) and human resources (professors, tutors, coaches, digital inclusion promoters – DIPs – public employees). The GESAC Digital Inclusion Project then becomes the key to focus on the importance of instructional training to increased digital inclusion.

In this study we are going to develop some issues regarding the interface between democracy, digital inclusion and public policies in Brazil, based on three core questions: Has the GESAC Project met the instructors' learning expectations for ICTs' social use? After the training, have instructors felt enabled to deal with computers and internet tools? What do the use and access of ICTs and governmental initiatives in digital inclusion mean to instructors and users at GESAC telecenters?

This paper is organized into three parts, besides this introduction and the final considerations. The first section presents some thoughts on the interface between the redistributive and reflexive dimensions of democracy and digital inclusion, vis-à-vis the social stratification regarding ICT access in Brazil and the challenges for the information technology appropriation for populations in poverty-stricken communities in the country. The second section establishes the context for the instructional training within the GESAC Program as a mechanism for improving governmental digital inclusion initiatives, in their socio-cognitive dimension. The third section discusses the experience of the Program according to the instructors, regarding cognitive and reflective (creative) traits of ICT use, as well as instructors' and users' assessment



of telecenters, the experience and the expectations in terms of digital inclusion. In both cases, the interviewees provided data that would enable us to update current digital inclusion indicators, reinforcing the social, affective, creative and cognitive dimensions of inclusion in relation to the technical/instrumental dimension.

## 2. Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks

### 2.1 Interfaces Between Redistributive and Reflexive Dimensions of Democracy and Digital Inclusion

In what regards the redistributive dimension of democracy and digital inclusion, internet access and instructional training are the focus of public policies that aim at fostering the creation of telecenters as spaces for free access to computers with internet connection. Instructors and users from communities of minorities are the main target of the digital inclusion public policy that is discussed in this paper. They are the ones exposed to the *fracture numérique* (digital divide) as a polarization phenomenon related to the universal dimension known as information society (Kiyindou, 2009). Material, infra-structure and socio-cognitive conditions figure as basic requirements for the fulfillment of the redistributive principle of equal access to knowledge and technologies produced by and within society; however, they are not distributed equitably.

The *fracture numérique* is a social fact that characterizes social formations where there is a significant degree of social inequality, such as the case of Brazil. Social, economic and cognitive conditions are important variables in order to visualize the map of social stratification and knowledge worldwide, which would make it easier to set the mapping for a social situation of "*different, unequal and not connected*" within the framework of a *selective modernization* (Canclini, 2007). In this context, we need to rethink internet access, socio-cognitive training to be able to use the web and quality of connection (an infra-structure issue). Thus, we emphasize the socio-cognitive dimension of digital inclusion, which refers to the information technology appropriation by ICT users as an important requirement to reflexivity and emancipation of the different social actors, within and through the handling of such technologies.

The underlying technical issue regarding both democracy and digital inclusion does not refer to ICT access only, but should also contemplate the problematization of its functional decomposition, concerning democratic rationalization (Feenberg, 2003). Technologies appear as one of the major sources of social power in contemporary societies, even if we consider a strong intersection between economic and imperative values. They are featured as a new legislative or decision power, whose social and political meaning is only realized through democratization. (Feenberg, 2003, 2004, 2005; Feenberg, Bakardjieva, 2002). Information technology capital establishes a bridge between technologies, socio-cognitive formation and creative use of ICTs, since it is a basic requirement for its appropriation.

By information technology capital we understand the theoretical-conceptual construct based on the Bourdieusian concept of *cultural capital*. This refers to the buildup of knowledge and information throughout the individual's school/instruction path (from the socialization processes), which may or may not be enough to enable him to perform specific activities that demand more instructional knowledge to reach a successful point in his cognitive and behavioral endeavors. This refers to the conditions that the individual acquires to own certain symbolic goods, which requires instruction/education. (Bourdieu, 1974, 1979, 1994, 2003; Freitas, 2004; Amaral, Figoli, Noronha, 2007).

According to Freitas (2004), this new set of acquired dispositions is composed of three basic elements: specific knowledge, the necessary material apparatus in order to put into practice the knowledge acquired, and the social, educational and cultural conditions that will enable the acquisition of knowledge to deal with new information technology. In this sense, the State intervention is extremely important so as to promote initiatives to reduce social disparities shown on the mapping of ICT access.

According to official datas, 27% of Brazilian domiciles have internet access; most of them are located in urban areas – 31% – with the Southern region concentrating 36% of homes connected to the World Wide Web. 86% of these families have an income higher than 10 minimum wages and 90% of the homes are families in the A class<sup>2</sup> (according to economic criteria to determine social class). (Cetic.br, 2010).

In the Brazilian case<sup>3</sup>, telecenters appear as public spaces created or supported by digital inclusion government programs, which, in general, work in partnership with state and municipal governments or with civil organizations, both local and national. The following resources are necessary for a telecenter to work properly: infrastructure, content, software, human resources and training of human resources and social resources (legitimacy and acting political power). From all the resources, those with instructional/cognitive aspects are oftentimes the most difficult to guarantee. According to Mori (2011):

*“Human resources and their capacity-building are the most complex aspect involved in digital inclusion public policies, and relate to the local appropriation of management of all kinds of resources. For the public attending telecenters to develop abilities to use the available technologies, it is essential that the telecenter provide training activities. The strategy might involve online distance learning, but rarely can it do without a face-to-face digital inclusion agent, qualified and willing to work with the public so that they can effectively acquire the ICTs.”* (Mori, 2011:135)

The digital inclusion agent (instructor) is an essential actor within the DI policy framework in order to fulfill the basic purposes of a digital inclusion state or association initiative. The instructor must be ready to provide guidelines in digital literacy to telecenter users. Hence, the use of this space will depend heavily on the instructional training of this agent, who must have access to updated content and

guidelines on how to deal with internet tools, and also adapt his teaching practices to the local socio-cultural context specificities. On this subject, during the focus groups carried out with users from 14 GESAC telecenters, not only technical training was mentioned, but also the emotional and communicative approach of instructors as a means to perform better as a digital inclusion agent.

In general, it is expected that the knowledge acquired during training will be passed on from instructors to users at internet access points, in a dynamics of multiplying agents. Actually, the users who were interviewed define the telecenter as a place beyond the techno-bureaucratic rationale of state structures and expect from this space more than simple internet access.

## **2.2. Instructional Training for the GESAC Program the Socio-cognitive and Reflexive Dimensions of the Digital Inclusion**

In this section we are going to discuss the results of the survey carried out with instructors and users of GESAC telecenters throughout the country. We shall address the stages and benefits of the instructional process, encompassing didactic material, infra-structure for both the face-to-face and distance phases and human resources for digital inclusion training.

Instructional training can be defined as a technology that involves a set of principles and prescriptions, composed of coordinated parts that operate as an organized structure and that offer efficient alternatives to possible training-related problems. Such technological principles and prescriptions are based on theoretical references from – mainly – instructional psychology and cognitive psychology. (Borges-Andrade, 1986). According to Borges-Andrade (1986), the instructional focus may be defined as the way through which teachers and instructors learn, understand and predict teaching and learning issues, as well as the changes in performance that are expected from an individual and how to accomplish these changes with instructional training.

Instruction has the purpose of leveraging an individual's cognitive conditions in order to achieve a change in skills, attitudes and abilities such as dispositions and behavioral and performance patterns, so that the individual will be able to perform in specific situations. In the specific case of this study on the capacity-building of telecenter instructors under the perspective of an instructional stage (socio-cognitive) of digital inclusion, the use of psychological contributions to deal with the cognitive competences encouraged in training, together with the sociological reasoning on the experience of said agents in the training for the use and handling of ICTs, can provide us with elements to reconsider the very idea of digital inclusion, given the expectations to achieve an information society in Brazil.

The GESAC Program offers internet access points with broadband, information and communication technology tools, digital resources and training to foster digital inclusion in the whole country through a platform of networks, services and applications. The

program draws on communication units (VSAT antennas and modems that enable high-speed internet connection, via satellite) operating in schools, military units and telecenters, with an average of seven computers per access point. It works on the 'presence points' and/or GESAC points scattered through several municipalities in the whole country. These points are located in public schools and institutions, unions, indigenous villages, quilombolas and riverside communities, rural areas, urban outskirts, community telecenters and remote border points, and non-governmental organizations, including those where there are other governmental digital inclusion projects.

There are GESAC telecenters in every Brazilian state. The main service offered by GESAC is free internet<sup>4</sup> access. Nowadays, the program is acting in more than 4.750 municipalities, with approximately 11.000 access points in full operation (GESAC Booklet, 2010).

GESAC telecenters must be linked to an institution (public or non-profitable private) that has signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Communications – MC, in order to receive the Program's resources and services. These telecenters are run by a group of people from the local community and from the beneficiary institution, who manage the access point. This is called the point management committee. In each of these points there is also the instructor, a person chosen within the community who shows interest in technical-pedagogical learning, in order to develop, implement and follow digital inclusion actions and give support to GESAC point users, with a focus on new ICT procedures. (Official Gazette from August 13, 2008, GESAC Program General Guidelines).

GESAC telecenters are located mostly in urban areas (52%) and 45% in rural areas, where service is provided for people from the community where the point is and from other places as well. Access to computers with internet happens solely in these telecenters. Indigenous and fishing communities also represent a significant percentage of service. Users of GESAC points are mostly young people under the age of 30, who look for an access point to do school work (86.8%).

According to participants in this recent survey, in the places where GESAC points are set up, these computers are the main free internet access points available. As one of the GESAC telecenter users – from an indigenous community in Cantá/RR – mentioned: *"The telecenter for us is like having the world in our community. For us, this telecenter was a breakthrough. It's like having the world in our indigenous community. It's the whole world in front of us!"*

The research revealed that 59.95% of the communities served by the GESAC do not have any other form of free internet access. Participants also mention that GESAC points are welcome by the communities (43%), 45% work seven days a week, from five to eight hours a day (49.53%) and have, in 75% of the points, a minimum of two volunteer instructors who do not receive any kind of pay.

The work of an instructor at a GESAC point is, most often, volunteer work, but there were a few cases of digital inclusion agents being paid by the city hall. In general, the involvement of an instructor with the digital inclusion initiative happens according to different degrees of commitment, according to Boltanski and Thevenot (1991). The reference to degrees of commitment made here is based on the writings of Boltanski and Thevenot (1991) regarding diversity of logical action in response to the social environment in which an individual lives and operates. These different action logics (opinionated, inspirational, civic, entrepreneurial) come from a universe of different degrees of commitment and show what kind of dedication each of the instructors will present regarding his participation in the training.

We understand the different action logics as the distinct guidelines that motivate the actions of each actor within the shared space of a telecenter, such as the instructors, who are linked to a telecenter as a volunteer or through some kind of contract (receiving a salary or a scholarship). These action logics can be civic, when associated to the interests of the community; entrepreneurial and industrial, when aimed at efficiency and professionalism regarding the performance of the digital inclusion agent; opinionated, when the instructor is encouraged by the possibility of personal recognition or wants to disseminate his ideas, such as the case when an instructor is chosen due to his connections with political or community leaders; or inspirational, when the instructor uses his information technology knowledge for the creative appropriation of ICTs. As one of the instructors said about his motivation to do the Training:

*"Motivation was necessity, wasn't it? Of digital inclusion, for nowadays the market wants this, isn't it so? Even so, taking into account that we're in the 21st century, there's still so much need for more comprehensive digital inclusion. This is an open door to citizenship; we're all going to be digitally included after the training, which will make us distinguished citizens."* (Instructor 3)

### **2.3. Assessment by Instructors on their Performance during Training: Competence, Skill, Attitude, Information Technology Capital**

Here we discuss the instructors' self-evaluation on their performance in the course and their satisfaction with the Training as a governmental initiative for digital inclusion. Besides, there are thoughts of both instructors and users on how ICTs and digital inclusion will make an impact on their lives, especially regarding inclusion in the so-called "information society" in the country.

The GESAC Training lasted for one year, with instruction time of 432 hours, offering technical education and fostering the development of skills aiming at providing digital inclusion for the communities. The training was composed of seven modules with specific content, in both face-to-face and online format. The capacity-building course reached 739 instructors for GESAC points, with the objective of preparing them to pass on knowledge of ICT use to at least three people in different institutions in their communities, such as: parishes, unions, residents' associations. These instructors or

multipliers were selected because they had no previous ICT training.

There were training centers, units with a teacher-facilitator and students-instructors linked to Federal Institutions in the five regions of the country, where the face-to-face training would take place. From the total number of instructors surveyed in this research, 75% had already taken some kind of basic course on computer use.

Participants on the training realized that the performance of the teacher/facilitator was extremely relevant for the general comprehension of the subjects studied (84.71%) and for the content-related question solving phase (82.11%).

Regarding the two-fold characteristic of the training, it is important to point out the preference of instructors for the face-to-face part of the course and the demand for more face-to-face encounters to gather digital inclusion agents, instructors and teachers. this phase was mentioned as a very significant part of the Training, not only because of the classroom dynamics, but also for the social and affective aspect involved, for many of them claimed that face-to-face meetings are an opportunity to establish and strengthen social bonds with the other instructors and actors involved in the training; besides, these meetings do not need internet access, which might be a problem in some telecenters.

*"Face-to-face meetings are much better, because we have internet access and it's not everywhere that we have this kind of connection. When we open our email and we see a message - "you're not accessing the platform" - there's no way, the internet is not fast enough, so face-to-face meetings are better than virtual meetings." (Instructor 2)*

*"It was good, wasn't it [referring to face-to-face mode], because we realize that people were learning, the group was getting along, this made everything easier, we had direct contact teacher-student and student-teacher, sometimes I couldn't even remember who I was talking to in the forums, I couldn't remember the person... and I would say: "Oh, my God, how am I going to answer to this person, there isn't a picture or anything..." I felt kind of insecure, but when you see the person, and there is this much integration and people are really being trained for this transformation process to pass on knowledge to other people that stayed back there on the access points." (Instructor 4)*

Regarding content acquisition, the facilitation of the learning process through didactic material and practical examples, participants assessed the performance of the teacher-facilitator as the most relevant.

In relation to didactic material, it was composed of printed booklets, digital didactic content (DDC) and interactive tools in the virtual learning environment. In the distance mode, printed material was one of the main means to share knowledge and guide the learning process, together with other media. According to Andrade (2003), one of the major challenges in Distance Learning or Distance Education - DE is to create didactic

material (DM) that will provoke or guarantee interactivity in the teaching-learning process. Chen (2005) points out that didactic material for DE must aim at being a learning tool that will effectively disseminate knowledge through two-mode courses, using the printed book as the integrating tool. The material should be presented in clear, objective and dialogical language, motivating the student to find new learning techniques.

The printed material distributed to instructors consisted of a set of six modules with content developed to build skills and to enable the support to users in telecenters. The content is organized in six modules, being module 1 about the introduction to distance learning, module 2 about education and citizenship, module 3 about education and communication, module 4 about methodologies, module 5 about hardware and software, and module 6 about networks.

The assessment criteria were the following: teaching objectives, suitability of teaching strategies, exercises, planning of activities, teaching sequencing, and information sources: bibliography and others, general information about the course. The teaching objectives were analyzed regarding the description of observable performance and precision in the choice of action verbs as far as expected behavior was concerned. The suitability of teaching strategies was determined by the relevance regarding the nature of the teaching objectives (affective, cognitive, psycho-motor); by the level of complexity of teaching objectives; by diversification; by providing clear and effective examples of the content at hand; by using tools to facilitate learning; by sticking to the learning/teaching resources; by compatibility of the language used in the course modules with the schooling level of participants, that is, accumulated cultural capital turned into information technology capital as an indicator of skill-building, ability and attitude regarding ICT use and appropriation.

The findings suggest that there was an impact in range, that is, the Training course in digital technology use had a significant effect, which can be seen in the favorable opinion of the content, the material used, the performance of instructors and teachers. Self-assessment from instructors points to the improvement of their abilities and skills to guide the actions in a telecenter, following the purposes of digital inclusion in its technical, human and social dimensions.

*"Well, with this [the course]... I have an understanding, let's say... general understanding, but in a more condensed way, of course... But there is theory and now we are practicing, but I'm enjoying it, I feel more secure in relation to the information that I have been learning, I think that it's happening to my colleagues as well, isn't it? Only better. I'm not having any kind of difficulty"*  
(Instructor 1)

*"We were talking about our difficulties, about what we needed to make this telecenter move forward... but when we talk about digital inclusion... We have to remember that this can only happen if there is real digital inclusion, isn't it? And then we start to realize that the content [of the training] is very technical..."*

*it is about the machine. And we have to work the person. The technical issue is important, of course. It will make things easier in the communities, but when you are working with PEOPLE, whose focus is this so-called digital inclusion, you will see that it's more of a social issue, the social view must be more important than the technical one. Especially for the community. While people do not wake up for this, while the youth does not wake up for this, the machine will be good for nothing... using a machine just for the sake of it is insufficient use. And there's not much for the community anyway.” (Instructor 6)*

The self-assessment statements regarding the impact of the Training in their performance as digital inclusion agents in the telecenters enabled us to draft a table (Table 1. **Distribution of Self-attributed Socio-cognitive Properties by Instructors in Relation to his Skill to Act as a Digital Inclusion in Telecenters**) referring to the analytical categories: competence, skill, attitude and information technology capital.

<b>Table 1. Distribution of Self-attributed Socio-cognitive Properties by Instructors in Relation to his Skill to Act as a Digital Inclusion in Telecenters</b>		
<b>Self-attributed socio-cognitive properties/ Instructors</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>%</b>
<p><b>Competence-related properties</b></p> <p>I feel more prepared to act in the telecenter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nowadays I feel that I'm able even/ as we have to teach... prepare three other students, I feel capable of helping and passing on the knowledge I acquired here.</li> <li>• So this course has opened... if I study, I'll be able to work with this (fixing machines)</li> <li>• I believe that from the start of the Training, each and every day, each module, I realize that's how we improve our knowledge.</li> <li>• Learn how to solve problems with machines</li> <li>• Knowing how to format a computer</li> <li>• Knowing how to develop content</li> </ul>	<b>7</b>	<b>25,93%</b>
<p><b>Skill-related properties</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify problems with the machines</li> <li>• Knowing how to teach others</li> <li>• Knowing how to develop a spreadsheet</li> <li>• Knowing how to guide an internet search</li> </ul>	<b>4</b>	<b>14,81%</b>



Self-attributed socio-cognitive properties/ Instructors	Number	%
<p><b>Attitude-related properties</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I want to be a multiplier and share all the knowledge I acquired during Training</li> <li>• We have to do it; we have to take what we have learned and, in a simple way, pass it on to our colleagues, in a simple way as well!</li> <li>• I’m eager to share this knowledge with users and other instructors</li> <li>• I’ll help the user as an instructor, teaching what I have learned</li> <li>• I’m willing to do some research when I don’t know how to guide the user</li> <li>• Keep taking other courses</li> </ul>	<b>6</b>	<b>22,22%</b>
<p><b>Information technology related properties</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We have learned</li> <li>• Very well-prepared no, because we always have something more to learn.</li> <li>• I feel that from the beginning of the Training, each and every day, every module, I realize that’s how we improve our knowledge.</li> <li>• So there was this relation of learning not only content from the GESAC training, but also knowledge about the activities in the points, exchange of contacts to keep the friendship...</li> <li>• Internet access</li> <li>• Computer handling</li> <li>• Computer access</li> <li>• I know free software</li> <li>• Exchange of knowledge during the Training</li> </ul>	<b>10</b>	<b>37,04%</b>

“Note: This table was elaborated by the author using the primary data from our field research. The percentages have been calculated from the total self-attributed socio-cognitive properties and not necessarily from the total number of instructors. We have approximately 27 self-evaluations from 12 focus groups with digital inclusion agents, and some have completed more than one self-evaluation.”

We noticed that instructors have great expectations in the sense of acquiring information technology capital by increasing their competence and skill to use ICTs, in order to make them more “secure” to develop digital inclusion functions; however, there are a few who stated that the Training was not enough to enable them to fully appropriate ICTs.

*"I still think that I have to study much more, to really grab these booklets... we have them now, so when I get back to my community, I'll try to study and pass on what I have learned in the best way I can... But I still have to study a lot because I'm not feeling really secure [with the Training]." (Instructor 7)*

It was also noticed that, among the instructors interviewed, many have the socio-cognitive properties that are necessary for working as digital inclusion agents in telecenters, but infra-structure limitations in GESAC telecenters – such as low internet connection – prevent them from doing the proper follow-up, according to the public policy dispositions. Infra-structure and socio-cognitive factors regarding the experience of instructors and users on digital inclusion influence their definition on the importance of ICT access.

Ordinarily, users who were interviewed said that digital inclusion is an opportunity to transcend their local physical environment, to access symbolic goods (download music, do social networking, research) to improve from the educational standpoint. The telecenter as a public space figures as an alternative to a possible feeling of social and/or territorial isolation. As a user in an indigenous reserve in Roraima put it: "The telecenter is the world inside my village..."

*Digital inclusion is the inclusion of a small society in the digital era... For DI would be free access for all, not only in this group... But also from poor schools, from slums... in the countryside communities that need it. Inclusion of the minor classes... (Indigenous Instructor)*

*"[Digital inclusion] ... well, it was something of a novelty for our community, wasn't it? Children were so enthusiastic, especially the children at my school. "Teacher, when are we going back to the telecenter? Teacher, I want to participate!" (Instructor 8, from quilombola, GO).*

*"It's pretty good to be updated about the things that are happening here and in the whole world. It's good for the children and it's good for everybody. The only thing lacking is a bit more interest so that people will really go there to learn." (Instructor 9, from quilombola, GO)*

According to instructors' experience, DI is an opportunity to get a better position in the job market and to help remote areas in their development. Teachers state that this is a great opportunity to foster education. For users, it's a given right, a way to fit in this globalized world. For all parties interviewed, digital inclusion emerges as a vector in the contemporaneity of local, human and social development. In this sense, the necessary social and cognitive resources for digital inclusion are essential to legitimize local digital inclusion actions, with full support of political forces. When DI is thought of as a right rather than a State grant or a civil society philanthropic action, it becomes an element of social cohesion, a vector of solidarity amidst the building of a new social formation, mediated by ICTs.

DI is often mentioned by the interviewees, emphatically, as a social value that refers to social justice principles, such as: redistribution of riches produced by and within society; recognition of social and cultural differences and specificities in the different communities (Flahault, 2004; Fraser, 2005); and creative appropriation of open technologies as an ethical model to combat social inequality. Digital inclusion is also defined in terms of access to plurality, to the diversity of life, clearly referring to the liberal and republican principles of such inclusion. We want to highlight that both instructors and users had a feeling of being more citizens just for being able to use a computer, though still not being able to perform much *creative appropriation* of ICTs, in the sense of reaching digital democracy, even though a few instructors claimed to know and handle applications of *free software*.

#### 4. Conclusions

The study of the relation among digital democracy, digital inclusion and public policies in the GESAC digital inclusion program from the Brazilian Government enabled us to highlight a few aspects of this experience that encompasses the rational-legal dimension (bureaucracy, program, project), the institutional dimension (agreements between civilian, federal, state and county actors), the technical dimension (computers, connection, speed), the didactic-pedagogical dimension (didactic material and tools), the socio-cognitive dimension (learning and appropriation), and the distributive dimension (social). Each one of these dimensions are distinct but interdependent, in the sense that each one reveals the hybrid nature between formal elements and those that escape control and predictability from the program's public management, such as relationship, affective, educational, political and creative aspects of digital inclusion.

The symbolic aspects of digital inclusion, regarding both instructors training and users social interactions, are quite relevant for the purpose of the paper, for they clearly show that the redistributive dimension of the public policy is not enough to carry out comprehensive digital inclusion. We realized that most often in our country, when digital inclusion projects are successful, the results point to a limited digital inclusion, which lies much more in the social non-inclusion of citizens in a productive society – with the stratification of access to education and work qualification programs – than in the limited access to computers and the internet.

Our final considerations address two basic themes: 1) the assessment of instructors of their own performance in the Training program, based on the categories: competence, skill, attitude and information technology capital (especially the social and affective dimension of this assessment) and 2) the definitions from different conceptions as to what ICTs and digital inclusion mean to instructors and users.

Our first reflection lies on the assessment that the instructors made of their own performance during the GESAC Training and the impacts of this training on the properties of these actors to develop actions in their respective telecenters and

replicate the knowledge acquired throughout the course. Instructors from GESAC telecenters who participated in the Training saw the course as an opportunity to improve their knowledge on ICTs, especially the computer with internet connection. As previously seen, their motivation to participate in the training program varies according to civic, opinionated, professional and inspirational logics. Despite being contradictory at first sight, these logics point to the complex task of having different guidelines for actions that may end up being encompassed in a single initiative.

The Training was constantly assessed by the instructors' focus groups in specific aspects: technical, didactic and social (human and symbolic). Regarding material resources and course infra-structure, there was heavy criticism because of the lack of machines in the face-to-face meetings to meet the needs of all the students. Also, when the course changed to online distance learning, the internet connection was seen as a limitation when it came to regular access to exercises and chats with teachers and other instructors. As for the didactic dimension of the training, tutors and teachers had their teaching methods and follow-up activities positively assessed by instructors. However, there were a few instances in which a tutor received complaints for not being available to monitor students, most of whom had no experience in online courses.

Finally, concerning the social and affective dimension of the Training, instructors were emphatic in highlighting the attention they received during the face-to-face stage of the course. Besides the social relations that would translate into affective relations among instructors, what is important here is the establishment of cohesion among the different profiles and cultures. Within the physical space of the Training course, there were different individuals of different ethnic origins (quilombolas, indigenous) and instructional and occupational levels (rural workers, computer technicians, public employees).

*"I was expecting much less than this! I never thought, like my colleagues here, I never thought that Jeannie and Aldi (Training tutors), among others, would treat us like this... there's so much confidence, isn't it? It's amazing that someone who doesn't know us, who doesn't know where we come from, who doesn't know anything about us can treat us so well, don't you think? We were so kindly welcomed! I wasn't expecting this! I'm really impressed! How can someone who doesn't know me treat me so well, with so much care..."* (Instructor 3).

Perception of content learning in terms of educommunication, skills regarding internet use, acquisition of basic concepts on hardware and software, all of this should be higher provided that there is enough motivation to share acquired knowledge, a very important input in digital inclusion.

This statement leads to a second development of our analysis, which refers to the need of a more comprehensive idea of digital inclusion, encompassing the association between the socio-cognitive, socio-affective and creative dimensions (technology appropriation), regarding digital democracy.

There is mention of digital inclusion in recent literature as a phenomenon that presupposes the individual's social inclusion in society, and not as a philanthropic or welfare mechanism, but as a right to access the riches and benefits produced by society. Digital inclusion is related to acquisition and fostering of specific knowledge to deal with information and communication technologies and also with the suitable machinery to browse the web. What we would like to propose is to rethink these DI indicators under the light of the socio-affective and creative dimension of inclusion, taking into consideration the perception that several technology regular users have about digital inclusion. In this sense, it seems interesting to visit communities of users with more or less access to public and collective equipment and to ICTs and study their needs, expectations and ICT appropriation levels regarding the so applauded digital inclusion.

Therefore, we can conclude from what has been discussed that governmental programs that foster digital inclusion correspond to social justice purposes, in a redistributive dimension, for they assist poverty-stricken populations that have restricted access to material and symbolic goods, thus becoming actions of redistribution of riches produced by and within society – such as technologies – and answer to demands from minorities that see in ICTs an important tool in their fight for recognition of social and cultural specificities, as well as for their own personal ambitions. Likewise, we would suggest that the Training program is an essential action in digital inclusion projects and its effectiveness depends on the articulation between different external actors (Government, teaching institutions, civil society) and internal actors (instructors, didactic material, teacher-facilitator), infra-structure (computer, connection and broadband) to reach a satisfactory outcome. Telecenter users should be considered in the assessment of the impact of instructional processes for instructors, to evaluate the suitability of the training offered to the staff of a telecenter and the repercussions of the appropriation of information and communication technologies by final users, in the context of digital democracy which, as one can notice, is restricted to those who know and master ICTs in all their functional and structural properties.

## Abbreviations

**CNPQ:** National Counsel of Technological and Scientific Development (*Conselho Nacional para o Desenvolvimento da Ciência e da Tecnologia*)

**GESAC:** Digital Inclusion Program of the Federal Government in Brazil

**PNUD:** United Nations Development Programme (*Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento*)

**PNCT&I:** National Policy for Science, Technology and Innovation (*Programa Nacional para Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação*)

## Methodological Appendix

This is a study which makes use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, such as questionnaires, focus groups and document analysis. We work with the categories of information technology resources (knowledge, competence, attitude and skill) on the one hand, and technology and digital inclusion on the other, to gather data that will allow for exact statements on the impact of training for both instructors and users and on how the ICT usage instructional process is suitable for the purposes of digital inclusion, regarding not only public policies, but also in the point of view of users and instructors.

For the purpose of this paper, we used data collected from a *Survey* with the application of four closed questionnaires (T0a, T0b, T1, T2 and T3) to instructors (739); to thirteen focus groups of instructors (120) and fourteen groups of users (150) from twelve different states. Regarding focus groups, they were carried out with people living in communities of “minorities”<sup>5</sup>, from the five regions in Brazil (communities: riverside, urban and rural settlements, indigenous, fishing, quilombola), served by GESAC telecenters. The material considered for the document analysis were: the printed didactic booklets and the digital didactic content available in the interactive tools in the virtual learning environment, all these used by monitors, the regulatory text for the GESAC Program and the Project for the Instructional Training to Digital Inclusion. The fieldwork was conducted between september 2010 and may 2011.

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## Notes

- 1 Simmel (2008) explains that the poor are "excluded" in terms of material goods, but are often considered socially disqualified. However, as a citizen and member of a political society, the poor are still included in the social whole.
- 2 The criterion used to classify takes into account the education level of the head of the family and the ownership of a series of household appliances, in a punctuation system. The sum of points per domicile is associated to a specific socioeconomic class (A, B, C, D, E). (CETIC.BR, 2010).
- 3 In the country there are, in average, 95 digital inclusion programs, from which 25 fall under the responsibility of the federal government. (ONID, 2011).
- 4 Satellite connection, broadband, is provided by Consórcio Conecta Brasil Cidadão, led by EMBRATEL, and the landlines by Oi (BRASIL TELECOM). The average nominal speed of GE-SAC connections is 512 Kbps.
- 5 The idea of minority in this paper relates to a social segment isolated from the "majority". It relates to minority groups that voice their opposition to the status quo, responding with reflexive and critical actions to the objective reality surrounding them. They oppose the established order in their social processes, thus forming a smaller instance quantitatively, but qualitatively important and active from a political point of view. As a "place" where demands common to a group and collective protests are generated, the minority plays a major role in actions with transforming intentions, especially social inclusion, respect and affection to one another (PAIVA, 2005 and SODRÉ, 2005).



## **Subject Index**

Attitude  
Competence  
Cultural Capital  
Digital Democracy  
Digital Inclusion  
Informational Technology Capital  
Instructional Formation  
Logical Actions  
Public Policy  
Skill  
Telecenter

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# Walking the Tightrope: Social Movements and their Relation with the Workers' Party in Brazil<sup>1</sup>

Charmain Levy

**Abstract:** This article contributes to the analysis of the role of political parties and society within the state – civil society dichotomy. Political society and more specifically political parties are an important intersection between civil society and the state and it is thus important to recognize the role of political parties as a point of mediation. Social movements position themselves before governments based on their collective identity as well as ideological and political affinities with the political parties that make up these governments and their opposition. Depending on their relationship with political parties, social movement can assume a more conciliatory or confrontational position with governments. This article emphasizes the political nature of social movements through their engagement in party politics. It proposes to analyze the relationship between social movements and political parties through a comparative study of three Brazilian social movements and their relationship with the Workers' Party, since this party gained power at the national level in 2003. It will describe how these social movements participate in party politics, how their political strategy relates to their overall movement goals and mission and how they interact with political parties during elections. We contend that social movement participation in institutional spaces throughout the 1990s and 2000s has not lead to movements abandoning collective mobilization and contention. Although social movements continue to work within the confines of the political and economic regimes they maintain their contention which has subsequently taken on new forms, new sites and new antagonists.

**Keywords:** Social movements, feminist, political society, political parties, democracy.

## 1. Introduction

Social science scholars principally study social movements in order to understand how their protest and contestation collective action leads to recognition and the advancement of their claims. However, in the past twenty five years, the same scholars (Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier, 1998) have also attempted to explain the institutionalization of social movements. It was assumed that as social movements gain institutionalized access to the political system, protest action fades away. More recently, several scholars studying social movements in the North and in the Global South have noted that many movements sustain both contentious and conciliatory collective action participating in both street and state actions suggesting that the relation

between movements and the state is made of both conflict and cooperation (Guigni & Passy, 1998:84). Moreover, Goldstone (2003:2) claims that social movements are an essential element of normal politics in modern societies and there is a fuzzy boundary between institutionalized and non institutionalized politics. Their repertoire of contentious action did not shift from protest to politics; rather it expanded to include both as social movement activity and conventional political activity are different but parallel approaches to influencing political outcomes, often drawing on the same actors, targeting the same bodies, and seeking the same goals (Goldstone, 2003:7-8).

Jenkins and Klandermans (1995:279) conceive of social movements as trying to bargain with the targets of their actions to achieve their ends. Initially, however, social movements cannot bargain as other organizations do, because they are powerless outsiders. So they must therefore increase their bargaining power through protest or other means if they are to succeed. In this sense, social movement efforts move from the street to the state when governments open up a political space where movements can present and negotiate their claims to more and better socio-economic resources in the form of public collective goods and services. Social movement activity and conventional political activity are different but parallel approaches to influencing political outcomes, often drawing on the same actors, targeting the same bodies, and seeking the same goals (Goldstone; 2003:8).

This article aims at contributing to reflection on political parties and political society within the context of a restructured state and an all important civil society. In general, political society and more specifically political parties are an important intersection between civil society and the state and it is thus important to recognize the role of political parties as a point of mediation. Social movements position themselves before governments based on their collective identity and ideological and political affinities with the political parties that make up these governments. Depending on their relationship with political parties, social movement can assume a more conciliatory or confrontational position with governments. Political parties can offer social movements more access to the state, its resources and its institutions or can use the state to repress opposition movements. This article thus contributes to the analysis of the role of political parties and society within the state – civil society dichotomy.

In Latin America, when left-leaning governments won power in the 2000s, the relation between social movements and the state changed. In Brazil, it meant change but also continuity as this has occurred at the municipal level since the early 1990s and for this reason, the study the relation between political parties and social movements is extremely pertinent in the Brazilian case. Brazilian social movements are fully recognized political actors at all levels of government (municipal, state and federal) and present distributive social claims that favour the working classes through their involvement in grassroots mobilization, community organization and participative democratic processes (participatory budget, social policy conferences and social management councils). Many of these movements have been the object of research since the late 1970s (Alvarez, 1990; Gohn, 1991; Doimo, 1995; Dagnino 1994; Marques-Perreira & Raes, 2005) which has focussed on their contribution to democ-

racy, citizenship and social change but have understated or ignored their implication in party politics since the 1980 and their relation with political parties – especially the Workers' Party (PT, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) which has evolved in time and is still a major part of social movement activity. The way social movements relate to the state depends on if they perceive the government as an opponent or ally and this depends on the political party in power. It is important to recognize this relation with political parties in order to understand the dynamics and trajectories of social movements. This is not a mechanical or linear relation, but must be understood as a complex interplay within movements and in movement – party alliances that creates tensions between government and social movements.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Workers' Party established a relationship with social movements that was considered ground breaking. Social movement leaders across Brazil took part in the creation and development of the party which guaranteed an organic and symbiotic relation between the two and subsequently broke with the traditional transmission belt model. The novelty of this grassroots, bottom up approach was that the PT was the political expression of social movements and served to make sure that their claims had a political vehicle into institutional politics. It is a relationship that PT activists describe as "organic" that is, without being "officially" linked to each other, each organization pursues goals that complement each other and reinforce each other's agenda (Guidry, 2003:92). The party's heterogeneity and formation from the *bottom-up* made it unique in the history of Brazilian parties (Keck, 1992). Hellman (1992:55) describes this as an example of the incorporation of geographically or thematically isolated movements into a broader political mobilization around a program for comprehensive and even radical change.

Since then, the PT has gained significant power at all levels of government and this, along with other contextual and structural factors, has transformed its relation with social movements. Successive turns in government, particularly local government, throughout the 1990s transformed the PT (Baiocchi, 2004:205). The PT governments integrated many of the movements' demands into their government programs especially where these programs strengthened their electoral chances and where they did not conflict with neoliberal macro-economic policy.

This article emphasizes the political nature of social movements through their engagement in party politics. It proposes to analyze the relationship between social movements and political parties through a comparative study of three Brazilian social movements and their relationship with the Workers' Party, since this party gained power at the national level in 2003. It will describe how these social movements participate in party politics, how their political strategy relates to their overall movement goals and mission and how they interact with political parties during elections. We contend that social movement participation in institutional spaces throughout the 1990s and 2000s has not lead to movements abandoning collective mobilization and contention as argued by Silva, Lima and Oliveira, (2010:141). Although social movements continue to work within the confines of the political and economic regimes they continue their contention which has taken on new forms, new sites and new antagonists.

Although recent studies (Vanden, 2007; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009; Fortes, 2009; Silva, Lima and Oliveira, 2010) of social movements and the PT federal government have focussed on the Landless Peasant Movement (MST, *Movimento dos Sem Terra*), which is considered by analysts as the most influential social movement in Brazil, we have decided to compare the MST with two other social movements: the housing movement and the women's movement as there are very few studies on the housing movement and practically no studies on the relation between the women's movement and political parties. In order to understand how each social movement has established its relation with the PT, we shall compare their interaction in the following areas of the party: internal structures, executive (when the PT is in power at a municipal, state or federal level), legislative (municipal councillors, state and federal deputies) and elections.

## 2. Conceptual Frame

Social movements are part of civil society which is not a sphere that is autonomous of the state, political society or the market (Chandoke, 2001:5). Tarrow (1994) and Goldstone (2003:2) argue that social movements are in constant interaction with the political system, both responding to it and altering it. The relation that social movements maintain with political parties is a central part of their existence as movements play a mediating role between communities and political parties, serving as a conduit for the direct expression of popular claims (Alvarez and Escobar, 1992:326-7). In the case of Brazilian social movements, there is a close integration between left leaning social movements and party politics. Both social movements and political parties are part of collective action networks (Von Bulow and Abers, 2011). Within this context, Escobar and Alvarez (1992:323) point out, movements weave between ideological autonomy and political pragmatism, resistance and accommodation, protest and negotiation. State institutions and parties are interpenetrated by social movements. The actors, the fates, and the structures of political parties and social movements are closely intertwined (Goldstone, 2003:2-3).

This relation can help them advance in certain material claims but also constrain their larger missions (social transformation, change in concentration of wealth, economic oppression, exclusion, marginalization) possibly limiting their autonomy. Although participation in party politics does not necessarily mean abandoning opposition or all forms of contentious action (Goldstone, 2003:4; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998:23), the stance taken by political parties towards social movements can determine the approach and fate of social movements (Della Porta and Rucht, 1995; Kriesi, 1995). Social movements are shaped by political and institutional context, (Foweraker 1995:64) and although leftist political parties do not directly control social movements, the former do have an important influence on movement strategy, goals, and activities. Political institutions can also significantly constrain, mediate and impact the alternative political spheres where social movements engage (Alvarez and Escobar, 1992:325). The type of relation a social movement maintains with a political party can alter the activities of that movement as well as at whom it aims

its claims. This relation can especially influence a movement's transition from transgressional contention to contained contention (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2002). We understand that this is not the sole factor influencing social movements, but point out that it is an important if not overlooked one.

Concerning the state, we distinguish between the state itself that attempts to enforce the institutionalized claim to a legitimate monopoly over the means of violence within a specified territory, the regime or the structure of rule and the legitimizing myths used to sustain that claim, and the government, that is, the personnel who actually make authoritative or binding decisions. This allows us to distinguish between social movements that challenge the government and its policies, those directed at the regime and its legitimizing myths, and those that adopt the more radical goal of reorganizing the state and its territorial claims (Jenkins; 1995:15). When analyzing social movement interaction in the political realm, we agree with Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998: 11), that politics is more than an ensemble of activities that occur in clearly delimited institutional spaces. It also encompasses power struggles enacted in a wide range of spaces among a configuration of actors. This configuration has three major components: protagonists or allies, antagonists or adversaries and bystanders (Hunt et al., 1994 in Kriesi, 2004). Actor configurations represent what we know of the set of actors at a given moment and the degree to which their interests are compatible or incompatible with each other (Kriesi, 2004:74). Analyzing the affinities and cleavages that exist between political actors within a specific context helps us understand how shifts in the configurations of political actors can create opportunities for mobilization and successful claims.

We will employ the *social movement* definition elaborated by Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam (2001) where dissatisfied and unrepresented social groups promoting change (social, political, cultural, economic) through collective action beyond conventional means; citizens collectively challenge the political reality (both the process and the outcome) and how its resources are employed and who decides on their use. The social movements we study represent the excluded and marginalized in terms of socio-economic resources and political representation and challenge both the actual political institutions, processes, elites and indirectly their political and economic model. The goals of social movement couple the making of public claims with the creation, assertion and political deployment of collective identities (Tilly, 1999:262). To pursue these goals, social movements create political spaces for excluded populations, neglected programs and unrecognized grievances (Tilly, 2003:250).

The study presented in this article contributes to reflection on political parties and political society within the context of a restructured state and an all important civil society. As with the state, *political society* is rooted in historical variables that give it the basis for its development and enhancement (Sonntag, 2001:129). Whereas the civil society contains institutions like neighbourhood associations, professional bodies, and organized religions, political society refers to a series of institutions and activities such as political parties, elections and legislatures (Bratton, 1994) whose role is to aggregate demands into public policy. Political society, defined as the arena in

which diverse societal interests and claims are aggregated and translated into public policy recommendations, [Ekiert and Kubik 1999:82] is distinct from civil society, but in many ways they overlap (Goldstone 2003:8; 2004:339).

Specifically, *political society* refers to the institutions through which social actors seek to win and exercise state power. The institutions of political society--which are located in society and not in the state--specialize in partisan political contestation and in the construction of governing coalitions (Bratton, 1994, 4). Parties are central to political society and the way the party system is comprised and institutionalized is important to both civil society and the state; they play a very important role in mediating the relationship between the population and the state. [Chatterjee, 2001:173].

### 3. Social Movements and the PT

#### 3.1. São Paulo Housing Movement

This movement is territorially based and organized into several federations. In the city of São Paulo we find four different federated organizations: The Union of Housing Movements (UMM, *União do Movimento de Moradia*), National federation of community associations (CONAM, *Confederação Nacional das Associações de Moradores*), Popular Struggle Front (FLP, *Frente de Lutas Populares*), and National Movement for the Struggle for Housing (MNLM, *Movimento Nacional de Luta pela Moradia*). These social movement organizations (SMO) aggregate the majority of housing and urbanization movements in the city. Our research concentrates the UMM, the biggest of the SMOs.

The UMM was founded in 1987 and is organized from the bottom up through community organizations in different neighbourhoods of the city, which make up a team in a sector of the city. Each sector elects a representative which represents it at the city level, which in turn elects a group of representatives at the state level which in turn elects a group of representatives at the national level. This movement receives funding from government sponsored housing projects it administrates, from foreign cooperation agencies and from dues collected from grassroots organizations. Its mission involves sustaining democratic and autonomous grassroots organizations in specific areas of the city that defend the right to decent housing, to the city, and to the democratic elaboration of public policies that involves citizenship building. Its specific goals include supporting grassroots housing movements, deepening relations with different spheres of government while representing grassroots interests, connecting with likeminded popular movements and organizations and contributing to urban reform networks (UMM website, <http://www.sp.unmp.org.br/> accessed on October 16, 2010).

This movement is based on two different grassroots movements around isolated struggles for water, for electricity and for access to land; and collective occupations and organized actions of community associations who demanded participation, au-

tonomy in negotiations, control over construction, and self-management of housing co-operatives. These movements did not exist separately but in interlocking fashion around the right to land, and for control over construction and administration of housing units (Doimo, 1995). The first corresponded to populations already established and struggling to defend their homes as a right. The second involved expelled populations dwelling in inner city slums, shantytowns or precarious housing. This movement traditionally uses four principal strategies to achieve their goals: physical occupation of lots and buildings, popular education<sup>2</sup>, and a mixture of political and legal recourse and popular demonstrations. To obtain more efficient results from the state and keep abreast of urban projects, at the end of the 1980s movement leaders concentrated their efforts on negotiating with city hall representatives, following up on projects for their neighbourhoods, and working with outside agents<sup>3</sup> who became ever more necessary in understanding governmental bureaucracy and legal procedures (Gohn, 1991).

As more time was spent negotiating and planning urban projects with the state, less time went into developing grassroots actions involving direct participation of members and sympathizers (Levy, 2005). Though the movement succeeded in strengthening its actual organization and presence in the social and institutional spheres, this change in resource allocation affected movement governance, which moved away from effective involvement in decision-making, as grassroots participation became more representative.

Many leaders became 'professionals' and they spent more time outside the community. The transition period saw the birth of a political space, wherein the movements were called upon to establish a far closer involvement with state powers. At this time, the UMM supported political parties, as well as the constitutional process, and these functions required not only mobilization but also a greater structuring as well as stronger theoretic and institutional support (Gohn, 1991). Within the elaboration of the new national Constitution in 1988<sup>4</sup>, which promoted the participation of civil society, popular movements began to focus on legal, political and universal propositions.

The São Paulo UMM has been involved in the PT's internal structures since its foundation and many of its leaders display a dual activism between the party and the movement. They traditionally support the dominant currents within the PT and are not close to the more radical ones. The election of PT administrations to municipal government was considered an important victory for most popular movements, but this situation also created challenges for the UMM. São Paulo, where the PT candidate Luiza Erundina was elected mayor in the 1989 election and Martha Suplicy was elected mayor in 2000 can serve as an illustration. Many of the social movement's best leaders and outside agents were hired by the municipal administrations. They applied their years of experience in social movements and implemented exemplary projects such as the community construction of housing units. However, this left an empty space and there remained few agents with the capabilities to take over from the previous ones (Tatagiba, 2009; Feltran, 2010). It also seriously limited the autonomy of the movement. Some of these leaders admit that the movement went through a period of cooptation



and as a result little was accomplished in terms of the construction of popular housing.<sup>5</sup> Leaders of this movement also held important positions in the Ministry of Cities created by the first Lula administration. Other than assuming government positions, the movement participates in urban management councils, thematic conferences and lobbies specific agencies and ministries to elaborate, implement and evaluate housing programs. In the 1988 PT São Paulo municipal administration and in the 2008 PT national program *Minha casa, minha vida* (My house, my Life) it has also been involved in the implementation of housing programs.

Concerning the relation with members of legislative branch, the housing movement supports specific candidates to run as PT candidates in elections and then campaigns for them in neighbourhoods where they have a grassroots following. Several movement leaders have also run as PT candidates at all levels of government, but as of yet none have been elected. Movement leaders also work for movement oriented deputies and city councillors in their cabinets once they are elected. Leaders consider that this is an important way to advance movement interest in government and to stay abreast of new developments concerning urban and housing affairs. These leaders receive a salary and in some cases the deputies or city councillors will contribute funds to the movement to pay its leaders' salaries. In general, there is an exchange between the movement and elected members of the legislative branch in terms of resources and representation of interests.

### 3.2. Women's Movement

As with the housing movement, the women's movement originated in the 1970s. It was influenced by the American feminist movement as well as the modernization of Brazilian society which created a new context for women of all classes. Many feminists began their activism in leftist and progressive Catholic groups and eventually formed their own groups when their claims around gender issues were not taken serious by their male comrades. However, contrary to their European and North American counterparts, the Brazilian women's movement did not completely sever their ties with popular leftist movements and political parties and maintained the goal of a broader social and cultural transformation that involved the rights of women (Molyneux, 2003:269). During the 1980s, middle class feminists began working with groups of working class women in community associations and other social movements claiming daycare and spearheading other material claims such as water, electricity, transportation and health services in outskirts neighbourhoods. The feminist movement proliferated through these popular groups bringing to the front new issues such as reproductive rights, violence against women and sexuality (Marques-Pereira and Raes, 2005). As with the other movements, the women's movement participated actively in the Constitution process as a lipstick lobby and through its female deputies of all parties managed to approve 80% of its claims (Soares, 1994). At this point, the women's movement was a consolidated force that diffused its ideals in society and wove relations with parties and other movements.

The return to electoral politics changed the dynamics of this movement as its leaders integrated themselves into political parties in order to advance their claims. During the 1980s the PT created a women's commission within the party that helped the party elaborate feminist platforms especially for election campaigns. An important part of the movement's agenda was used by the party. Many activists thus participate within movement structures as well as within their own organizations. However, different from other socialist parties, the PT feminists decided early on that the PT should not have its own women's organization outside the party (Godinho, 1998:19).

This movement began to see the state not as purely punitive and authoritarian but as a means to influence society through laws, social and economic policy and regulatory mechanisms concerning public culture and communication - all fundamental elements in the transformation of the feminine condition (Molyneux, 2003:68). Its leaders participate in PT administrations, but because this movement is more horizontal and dispersed than the housing movement, it does not imply an explicit cooptation of the movement. Interviews with feminist activists G and L reveal that the participation of leaders in government improves the movement's influence on public policies, but reduces room for critical debate. According to Godinho (1998:25) at the municipal level this influence rarely translated into a secretary to specifically deal with policies aimed at women.

During the 1990s and 2000s, the organization of this movement changed as its leaders became professionalized and many founded feminist NGOs in order to influence public policy and capture funds from international agencies. This also implied that the movement's organization became more top-down as it responded more to funding agencies than to its grassroots (Sarti, 2001). The movement was mainly organized from feminist NGOs who worked with women leaders in popular movements (urban, rural, trade union, health, education, Afro-Brazilian movement, etc.) through projects financed by international agencies.

It is interesting to note the difference in organizational structure between this *new social movement* and the other two material and territorial based social movements. All three movements are represented nationally in size and membership. Nonetheless, the women's movement can be characterized by a large number of small associations and NGOs with very diverse agendas, that in Molyneux's (1998:188, 223-4) opinion can in cumulative terms come to constitute a women's movement. This movement does not have to have a single organizational expression, and is characterized by a diversity of interests, forms of expression, and spatial location. It comprises a substantial majority of women if not exclusively made up of women. As it has no central co-ordination and no agreed agenda, the extent of participation and its overall significance suggest that the women's movement often takes a more diffuse and decentred form (Alvarez, 1990:23). Another type of organizational principle and a different conception of authority is expressed in what we could call associational forms in which relatively independent women's organizations with their own goals and institutional autonomy choose to form alliances with other political organizations with which they are in agreement on a range of issues. This can be an effective means of securing concrete

agendas for reform or change, however according to Molyneux (1998:228) it does run the risk of co-optation resulting in the loss of an agenda-setting capacity.

During the 2000s, the women's movement rebuilt its ties with the grassroots through the World Women's March. This organization attempted to reach out to women leaders in other social movements (including the two mentioned in this article) and mobilize women at the base of society around specifically women's claims, but also around contesting neoliberal macro-economics (Nobre and Farias, 2003). This organization attempted to link neoliberal politics to a degenerating socio-economic situation of working class women. Although this particular organization is more grassroots than many feminist NGOs, some of its leaders are members of the PT and others maintain ties to this party.

The women's movement also campaigns within the party to support feminist PT candidates and supports their campaigns. This movement has successfully influenced the PT into implementing both an internal and candidate quota for women and this created numerous women PT leaders and candidates in recent years. As with the housing movement, several movement activists work in deputy cabinets, but once again this does not subordinate the movement to the party, since it is dispersed in nature and there is no central coordination. Contrary to the housing movement, the movement organizations do not receive any resources. Movement leaders G and J believe that this interaction has strengthened the movement and integrated several of its claims into legislature.

### 3.3. MST

The MST began in the context of an important wave of peasant mobilizations during the early 1980s in the South of Brazil and through the organization of the Pastoral Land Commission, an organization dating back to the mid-1970s that belongs to the Brazilian Catholic Church. Its goals were 1) immediate access to land for landless families through nonviolent occupation of unproductive land; 2) national agrarian reform including both the redistribution of land and the creation of policies that would develop and sustain rural families (Fernandes, 2000). During this period, the MST saw the state and large landowners as its main adversaries and used land occupations and marches as its main repertoire to denounce police repression and neoliberal reform as an elitist anti-agrarian reform project (Galdino, 2005). The MST decided not to revolve around institutional politics, but expand its organization throughout the country in settlements and occupation camps. It invests heavily in building up its cooperatives and in educating its members technically and politically.

The MST is territorially organized around settlements which elect a coordination team. This team elects representatives to a regional team which in turn elects representatives to a state team which elects a representative to a national elected body. Each level also elects representatives for different sectors (education, health, gender, production, communication, etc.) The MST sees itself not simply as a political end, but

also as a cultural means and invests heavily in the training of its base and leadership to deal not only with institutional politics and technical knowledge, but also to foster socialist ideals. Through the establishment of rules and organizational mechanisms, the MST avoided perpetuating its leaders to power<sup>6</sup>, stimulating private ownership and the desire to become well off professionals at the cost of the people they represent.

The MST's prevailing mode of action is grounded on a distinct form of social conflict described as public activism which involves an organized, politicized, visible, autonomous, periodic and non-violent form of social conflict (Carter, 2009:25). Pressure tactics are usually preceded by a string of failed petitions and frustrated negotiations with public officials. These activities can take place at various levels of government. Another type of interaction with the Brazilian political system can be described as a loosely organized, non-hierarchical pattern of interest representation, offering various types of partnerships with the state. These associated networks involving movement and NGO activists, elected officials and government civil servants have facilitated different points of access to public resources and participation in selective policy-making bodies (Carter, 2009; Wolford, 2010). Over the years, the MST has signed a number of agreements with federal, state and local governments, to carry out a variety of development projects, notably in agriculture, education, culture and public health. In addition, MST representatives have participated in various government commissions and local administrations.

During the late 1990s, the MST no longer considered the PT as a force to agglutinate individual struggles around a strategy for social transformation and serve as the ideological engine to different popular movements across the country. It was also at this time that the MST became a leading force for all social movements as it organized mobilizations and demonstrations against the neoliberal politics of the federal government and was called upon by other social movement to participate in their mobilizations.<sup>7</sup>

Although many MST members have actively engaged in election campaigns and party politics since the mid 1980s they are generally not involved in internal PT politics. Early on in the movement's history the MST delineated the lines between party and movement activism. If MST leaders wish to assume positions within the PT or in any government, they must leave their position in the MST. Through these internal rules, the MST has been able to distinguish between its own mission and goals and that of the PT.<sup>8</sup> The MST does participate in the PT's National Agrarian Secretary as an autonomous organization. In addition, many of its allies from NGOs, the Church or academia have assumed positions at different levels of the Lula government and the MST has been called upon to contribute to policies. This has however created divisions between the national movement leadership and grassroots as the former has at times had to order the latter to "tone it down" and abandon transgressional contention.<sup>9</sup>

The MST campaigns for PT candidates who identify with its cause. In the late 1980s, the party created an Agrarian Nuclei of the Chamber of Deputies. In Rio Grande do

Sul, the MST elected a five-term PT federal deputy and a string of PT representatives to the state assembly. While both associations shared many members, they have historically run their organizations in an autonomous way. This offers a space for dialogue and policy formulation that brings together PT officials, MST representatives, rural trade union leaders, and spokespersons from other progressive civil society organizations. In times of need, PT officials have customarily provided support for MST activists (Carter, 2009, 28). They also defend the MST and agrarian reform in the deputies' chambers and keep the MST abreast of events concerning agrarian reform. MST leaders P and Q consider this interaction with PT essential in their struggle with large landowners and the agro-business sector which also have their own group of deputies. Different from the housing movement, the MST leaders do not work in deputies' cabinets nor does the movement receive any resources from deputies. In general, all movements consider their relation with deputies important given that they often represent the more leftist and pro-movement elements within the PT.

The MST in some ways holds a distinct position from the other two social movements. The PT's victory in the presidential election of 2002 and decision to uphold many of Cardoso's economic and rural policies led the MST to waver on its alliance with the PT. The movement's disappointment with Lula's policies were initially tempered by the MST's pragmatic decision to side with the PT's left and attack the government's neoliberal economic policies, while sparing President Lula himself (Carter, 2009). The MST has exercised what Vanden (2007) calls critical distance from the ruling PT national government during the first PT mandate. In addition, the MST does not participate in PT directories<sup>10</sup>, in their governments or in the cabinets of deputies and senators. But they do have close relationships with deputies and senators, and they do negotiate with the executive at all levels. Their relationship with elected officials is more strategic and instrumental than urban and women's movements who have more intense affinities with PT governments. Although relations between the two organizations at the local level are generally excellent, with overlapping affiliations, the national leaderships have remained separate and not always cordial (Fortes, 2009). While the MST has maintained a militant line with regard to the need to take over unused land and assert its agenda, much of the PT leadership has wanted to be more conciliatory (Vanden, 2007:28-9).

Although the MST has traditionally made a conscious effort to maintain its identity and independence, its relation with the PT government has still managed to polarize and divide the movement as demonstrated in an open letter written by several Via Campesina movement leaders who left the movement in October 2011.<sup>11</sup> Some MST activists feel that while the MST has achieved important subsidies from the federal government and repression has decreased (Chaguaceda, and Brancalone, 2010), many leaders are now more interested in administering government funded projects than organizing land occupations. In addition, the MST funding structure changed when in 2005 the movement decided that *assentados*<sup>12</sup> would no longer have to contribute part of their earnings to fund land occupations and instead the movement would use administrative fees in their government projects to fund the movement. This eventually backfired when in 2004 the agro-business lobby and their elected of-

ficials launched a campaign and official inquiries (Estadão, 2009) against the MST accusing them of misappropriation of government funds. The investigations that ensued paralyzed part of the movement's activities for at least 5 years.

### 3.4. Changes in Social Movements

Throughout the descriptions of these Brazilian social movements we witness an important trend that is their changing nature from contention to institutionalization during the past twenty years. Political and economic change in Brazil has encouraged many unions and social movements to adopt more pragmatic postures (Samuels, 2004:6) that involve negotiation of social public programmes with all types of government and reducing social protest and grassroots mobilization. Initial social movement growth led to expanded mobilization, which led to state response and greater interaction between movements and the state, and a subsequent decline in mass mobilization (Samuels, 2004, 7-8). Since the return to democracy, as Houtzager (2005) notes, at their foundational moment social movements held an oppositional stance toward the state, an emphasis on transgressive collective action, and a symbolic order structured by a prophetic utopian project. Since the early 1990s there has been a shift towards increased contact with the state, a focus on citizen participation, and a discourse built around the construction of citizenship and influencing public policy (Houtzager 2005:13-14). Today social movements are oriented towards possible struggles and claims either through contention or through institutionalization, both of which are defined by political and economic structures (Silva, Lima and Oliveira, 2010:152) and they way opportunities and threats are perceived by social movements.

Social movement discourse and action have moved beyond the sphere of civil society and into the state. As this approximation advanced and as the cycle of social mobilization evolved, social movements developed different repertoires of collective action that involved a much more pragmatic and instrumental approach to achieving their ends, while working within institutions to change those institutions (Samuels, 2004:8). Activists have been incorporated into state through positions in government throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. Feltran (2005) points out that the entry point of the activists he studied was through their activism in the PT. In terms of identity, many social movement activists understand the boundaries between social movements and parties, but also see them as part of the same struggle for social change. They thus identify themselves with their movement, the PT as a party and as a government. This is not based on personal survival or professional advancement, but on a personal conviction and a collective analysis that movement and party working hand in hand can advance the leftist causes more than radicalization.

Dagnino (1998) argues that social movements have advanced a conception of democracy that transcends the limits both of political institutions as traditionally conceived and of actually existing democracy. This does not imply a refusal of political institutionality and the state but rather a radical claim for their transformation. Social movements are characterized by a rupture in predominant strategies of political

organization of the popular sectors that include favoritism, clientalism and tutelage (Dagnino, 1998:47-49). Many social movements, (excluding the Via Campesina movements) believe that the most important way to work towards regime change is within the political system and for that reason they place most of their resources in either partnerships with allied governments or governance structures with those and other governments. Brazilian social movements introduced two principal innovations in this regard: movement leaders refused to be incorporated into the state structure in exchange for the acceptance of their demands; and they did not renounce independent forms of association and public presentation of demands in exchange for the acknowledgment of their demands (Avritzer, 2002:99).

Over the years, these movements have become integrated into the decisional, regulatory, and implementation phases of the political process as these activities are increasingly important and supplement, for these movements, the range of activities that characterizes them as a specific form of contentious politics. Thus, these movements intervene in the political process in two ways: by challenging existing or proposed policies and by helping to elaborate and enforce government policies. On the one hand, movements try to increase the chances to reach their political aims. by addressing their claims from inside (Giugni & Passy, 1998:82). The mode of interaction between social movements and the state is thus far from uniform – conflictive and/or cooperative, depending on time, place, and issue – amounting to what Giugni and Passy (1998) term *conflictual cooperation*. In other words, keeping one foot in the polity, the other in civil society, best allows social movement groups to both productively influence the state in policy deliberation, making, and implementation, and assure civil society vitality with minimal possible encumbrance of a movement decline through cooptation (Giugni and Passy, 1998).

According to interviews where movement leaders have described their relationship with different government, when the government is right wing, it is considered antagonist and the movement does not participate in programs or public policy forums; when they are dealing with a centre-right or centre-left government it is considered neither an ally or an enemy and the movement may participate in social projects and at times programs; when it is a *popular* or leftist government, it is considered an ally and the movements participate in projects, programs and consultations.

However, some argue that these movements have been co-opted by the PT governments. According to Petras and Veltmeyer (2009:215-17), the social movement – party dynamics changes especially when the latter rises to power: if in opposition the movements lead, dominate or share power with the centre-left political parties, when the latter comes to power the relation is invariably reversed; the politicians dictate the parameters of political and social action and the social movements adapt. As a result, social movements become subordinated to political parties and governments. They believe that this has occurred because of a shift of power relations. When the centre-left parties are out of power, their main power resource is a large mass of mobilized people, which strengthens the position of the movements relative to the electoral politicians. Once the latter gains power, it must adapt to political and state structures to

stay in power and the centre-left reverse the relation: the power resources are skewed in favour of the government and the social movement leaders become dependent on the former.

*Cooptation* can be explicit, where activists are given important positions and in return tone down their organization's contestation (Burton-Rose 1998: 9), or de facto, when new political elites invite organization leaders into their government but give them little actual power apart from consultation (Dryzek 1996). Under conditions of cooptation, incorporated challengers are forced to alter their demands and tactics so that these "can be pursued without disrupting the normal practice of politics" (Meyer and Tarrow 1998: 21). Dryzek (1996) proposes an additional requisite for movement institutionalization to gain from political democratization: the assimilation of movement demands with state imperatives. He argues that every society has an endemic state imperative such as capitalist development and accumulation or keeping social and political order which are subject to change in different contexts. If movement demands are not compatible with the binding state imperative, politically institutionalized movement organizations merely receive symbolic rewards that may lead to cooptation.

#### **4. Changes in the PT and in the Relationship during the 2003-2010 Period**

Most analyses of the relation between the PT and social movements focus on how the PT has changed subsequent to forming a government at the national level and how this has consequently changed its relation with civil society. There is a consensus that the PT has changed from a party with a mission of radical social transformation through democratic representation to a party which accepts and has integrated itself into the dominant political and economic regimes of the day (Anderson, 2011).

There is also some consensus around what made the PT change its nature and mission. Most agree that over twenty years of experience and practice in government - with over two hundred terms at the municipal level - has led the PT to abandon its socialist nature (Baiocchi, 2004:207). The need to provide "results" as opposed to merely criticizing the government as an opposition party in the legislature influenced PT party members and encouraged strategic moderation. Pressures to moderate the party's ideology and strategy increased on those who confronted not only the demands of electoral competition but also those who face the daily reality of dealing with public demands, of proving the party's *competence*, of governing (Samuels, 2004:12).<sup>13</sup> The years of experience in executive and legislative branches of the state, lead PT politicians to adapt to the norms of these political institutions and their political practices (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2009:218) as they adjusted to a political system and culture they once criticized and aimed at transforming.

Hunter goes even further to assert that the PT eventually succumbed to pressures stemming from two sources: the international political economy and Brazil's politi-



cal institutions (Hunter, 2007:442). During the 1980s, institutional action was seen as a means to strengthening the left in order to bring about social change. During the 1990s, within the PT, this became an end in itself (Silva, Lima and Oliveira, 2010:140) and as the PT lost its radical character, its evolution no longer depended primarily on this once central disposition (Samuels, 2004:16). Especially since its election to the federal government in 2003, the PT represents and mediates the claims of competing classes and groups and does not consider itself a workers' government.

Although there are notable differences between these social movements, they all consider that it is better to have an ally in power that concedes to some of their demands and dialogues with them than an antagonist which refuses any dialogue and marginalizes or even physically represses them. Despite the fact that social movement leaders occupy positions in the party and in government, Hunter (2007, 31) recognises that the party has ceased to provide the institutionalized mechanisms of political influence that it once did for various social movements and its political rise has led to a distancing between the party's governmental branch and its civil society allies. Social movements have little influence on PT government platforms, on the alliances that the PT constructs to succeed electorally and sustain its government and on macro-economic policy. The relations of reciprocity established during the 1980s between the party and popular movements were gradually replaced by more traditional relations where the popular movements were considered to be at the service of the party, now deemed to be the central actor of implementing change. The PT concentrates on its own political interests and less on those of popular movements and their grassroots. At the same time divisions between diverging ideological and political currents within the PT and the CUT, around the issue of institutionalization, become more visible.

Most agree that the changes that have taken place in the relationship between the PT and social movements dates back to the early 1990s when the PT began occupying more municipal governments and social movements became more institutionalized at the local level (Baiocchi, 2004). The PT's rise to executive office first at the local level and more recently at the national level facilitated many social movements' approximation to the state (Samuels, 2004:13) as many PT administrations have staffed themselves with social movement leaders. In turn, this permitted leaders to work within the government on issues they formerly tried to influence from outside. This recruitment offers both advantages and disadvantages to social movements. They are close to the center of power and able to make decisions, but also find themselves limited by budgetary and bureaucratic constraints that often divide them from those still outside (Hochstetler, 2004:11). In many cases, the migration of leaders to government also weakened the ranks and organizations of movements.

Kriesi et al. (1995:80) argue that the mobilization of social movements depends partly on when the left is in or out of power. When the government changes so do the site of claims, communication with the state and the means of achieving movement claims. The election of Lula as president was thought of as the turning point by social movements and the left in general when social transformation would take place at a more intensive pace. It was considered the apogee of 30 years of struggle and popular mobi-

lization (Silva, Lima and Oliveira, 2010:139). Throughout the period of democratic transition and consolidation, social movements prioritized building and supporting the PT's party organization, assuming that the party could and would carry their agenda forward if it could just reach national power (Hochstetler, 2008:34). Social movements and the Left in general had great expectations of this government: greater participation and influence in and on government and a socialist government programme that would accelerate social transformation.

Hochstetler describes in detail how during Lula's first term, social movement hopes gave way to a growing sense of disappointment and frustration with how the Lula and the PT governed Brazil (Hochstetler, 2008:33). She describes three phases of the PT government - civil society phase. First, civil society used its mobilizing power to support Lula and nudge him closer to their shared historical agenda. In this phase, social movements saw the PT government as a disputed space between the right/traditional ruling elite and the left/working classes and their strategy was to put pressure on the process of public policy decision making through a combination of institutional insertion and mobilization/contention. This insertion took place in three ways: accepting positions in government, taking part in participative processes put in place by the government around the formulation of public policy and the establishment of partnerships between movements and government around the formulation, operationalization and/or evaluation of public policies (Silva, Lima and Oliveira, 2010:141-2). Early on in the first PT mandate the Left split when PT deputies left the party to form a new party, the PSOL (*Partido Socialismo e Liberdade*).

During the second phase CSOs begin to separate from the PT organizationally and to express doubts about the value of participating in the administration's consultative processes. Following a wave of protests and both urban and rural occupations in June/July 2003, social movements and sectors of the CUT created the Coordination of Social Movements in August 2003, to pressure the government and strategize without the PT. This is considered a space to reiterate socialist ideals and coordinate collective actions and criticisms of the government. In 2005, during the third phase, CSOs, still reluctant to strong negative stands against the administration formulate new critiques of representative democracy and party politics<sup>14</sup>, but still support Lula (Hochstetler, 2008, 33-4; 49) and interact with the representative democratic sphere mixed with a profound scepticism of it (Hochstetler, 2008:51)<sup>15</sup>. The PT ruling alliance with certain sectors of the traditional elite and its continuing relationship with social movements have led to and change in their position towards government and the state.

Throughout the two mandates of the PT national government, social movements continued to support the PT and continued to put their faith in its procedural opportunities for participation in government. These were seen as additional channels for expressing citizen input that could supportively pressure the Lula government and thus overcome more elitist political forces (Hochstetler, 2008:42). Social movements worked on several fronts in relation to politics and to the PT (party and government). On some fronts (such as the Social Movement *Coordinadora*) they took a more oppositional and independent stance whereas on other fronts, (in the party, with deputies

and with the executive) they were more dependent, less vocal and more conciliatory. Most social movements continue to participate in party structures and support leftist candidates to congress, senate and executive positions. In general, social movements do not mobilize themselves against government policies when their allies are in power either because they participate directly or indirectly in these governments, or because that government is attending to the movement's claims. In addition, the movements want to avoid weakening their political allies who are faced with antagonist opponents and if back in power would use violence to repress the very same social movements.

All three movements support PT candidates (presidential, senate, governor and deputies) during the 2010 elections.<sup>16</sup> The housing and women's movement supported specific candidates who represent their causes. The MST supported several candidates because they consider it more strategic to spread their support out than only supported a limited number of candidates.<sup>17</sup> All three parties supported the PT presidential candidate in the 2010 elections in both rounds. Activists of the housing and women's movement took an active role in this campaign by rounding up the grassroots for public rallies and visits to poor neighbourhoods. Several MST leaders admitted that they would vote for the PSOL presidential candidate (in the first round), but would not campaign for him because the grassroots of the MST supported the PT candidate. Support given to PT candidates by social movements allows them to demand a redefinition of the relations they maintain with PT governments and the party itself. It also reinforces their position as a legitimate stakeholder of a leftist government through an electoral period of negotiations between social movements and the national government (Sa Vilas Boas 2010:70)

## 5. Conclusions

Party politics are a central part of many social movements and recognizing this can help us better comprehend the relations that social movement forge with the state. The relation that social movements establish with political parties depend on the political regime as well as their structure, goals and identity. Subsequently, social movement discourse and collective action can be influenced by their relation with political parties and governments. A movement can maintain a discourse of conflict at one level of government and one of conciliation at another level depending who is in government and the relation of the social movement with the party in government. This confirms Kriesi et al.'s (1995) hypothesis that the social movement mobilization depends, among other things, on whether their party allies are in or out of power.

An interpenetration exists between social movements and the PT (Sa Vilas Boas, 2010: 64). All three movements maintain relations with the PT at different levels and in different spaces. When in government, it opens institutional spaces to new actors who are considered legitimate representatives of historically excluded sectors of society. All three movements have benefited from PT governments in terms of influence on social public policies and programmes, but all have recognized that they

have no influence on macro-economic policy and there is little room for critical debate between social movements and the PT. They feel that they have won spaces of influence within the state through the PT and this has helped them elaborate and carry out policies and programmes in favour of the grassroots groups they represent. The housing and the women's movement are the most integrated into the PT, but this has a different effect on each movement because of their distinct organizational structures. In both cases however, because of dual activism the lines are at times blurred between the social movement and the party although there are no official ties between them. The MST is different from the other two movements in that the latter's relations with the PT is considered tactical in that it is a means to advance the movement's struggle. There is a certain awareness of the MST of this complex relation that simultaneously advances and constrains their struggle.

In some ways adopting electoral strategies, working within the framework of institutional politics and aligning with Centre-left regimes has weakened social movements and compromised their mission for social transformation (Petras and Veltmeyer 2009:215-17). However, participation in a political space does not necessarily mean abandoning opposition or all forms of contentious action (Goldstone 2003:4; Meyer and Tarrow 1998:23). It is also not the only means and thus social movements work towards creating new spaces to regroup Leftist movements and actors. The relations that social movements establish and maintain with political parties are complex and full of contradictions and tensions. Political parties can also polarize social movements. They offer material gains, but may contribute to movement institutionalization and demobilization. Having political allies in government can both advance and constrain social movement claims and mobilization. For example, the women's movement gained parity within the party, as well as a ministry in government, but lost out on reproductive and abortion issues; the MST gained government supported programs, but lost on government adoption of the agro-business model; the urban movement gained a national housing program, but lost on urban infrastructure issues.

Movement strategy and structure are determinant concerning social movement relations with the PT when it is in a government's executive. Social movements use a discourse of conflict and resistance when dealing with governments that are perceived as adversaries and one of cooperation and adhesion when dealing with a PT government. For example when an ally is a key ministry, the movement will not attack the minister, but other key government and market figures or regimes. Social movements still claim agrarian and urban reform, gender based public policy and laws, but the objects and means of contention change. Having an ally political party in government has also changed social movement strategy. Hoschstetler (2004) distinguishes between collective actions meant to pressure and those with the intention of mobilizing opposition. Concerning the former, social movements perceive their projects and those of the government as similar or the same and thus the demonstration of opposition is no longer the only form of collective action employed by social movements. There is a mixture of social movement support and contestation of PT governments. The movements in our study are walking a tightrope and simultaneously maintain two types of actions: conciliatory within the party and in alliance with government,

contestation within civil society and against the state and economic regimes. Finally, we must keep in mind that the actors involved are not homogenous, in that neither the PT nor the social movements themselves are monolithic entities and within them we find individuals and groups that differ in their views on social change.

## Abbreviations

**CONAM:** National federation of community associations (*Confederação Nacional das Associações de Moradores*)

**CSO:** Civil Society Organization

**FLP:** Popular Struggle Front (*Frente de Lutas Populares*)

**NGO:** Non Governmental Organization

**MNLM:** National Movement for the Struggle for Housing (*Movimento Nacional de Luta pela Moradia*)

**MST:** Landless Peasant Movement (*Movimento dos Sem Terra*)

**PSOL:** Socialism and Liberty Party (*Partido Socialismo e Liberdade*)

**PT:** Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*)

**SMO:** Social Movement Organizations

**UMM:** Union of Housing Movements (*União do Movimento de Moradia*)

## Methodological Appendix

This article is based on a comparative study of three social movements within the same time frame and covering the same territory. This design was chosen over a signal case study in order to understand the different endogenous factors that influence the social movement - political party relation within the same national context and timeframe. We chose these three movements because they are all national movements that originated during the same period, went through similar processes concerning their participation in politics; all three took part in the creation of the PT and are still active either directly or indirectly in its political campaigns and party organization. They all actively participate in politics at all three levels of government (municipal, state and national) and we thus interrogated their leaders about their relationship with the PT at all three levels.

We started with the question around how social movements relate to political parties and how this relation changes when allied parties are in government. An inductive approach was employed. The paper thus focuses on a description and qualitative content analysis of this relation in order to understand how it impacts on social movement strategies and mobilization. In order to describe this relation we rely on individuals in social movements, the political party and in different areas and levels of government (municipal, state, federal, congress, senate and the executive) who are directly involved in this relation for a minimum of ten years. Our objective was to arrive at a description of this relation from the accounts of the different parties involved and to also collect data on how this relation is perceived by the different actors thus taking

into account both objective and subjective conditions.

Data was gathered using semi-open qualitative interviews based on the life story of social movement and political activism of the interviewee, participant observation in

the 2010 presidential elections; field journal. Movement documents, news paper and magazine articles, articles by civil society organizations and government ministries

and agencies were used.

Social movement leaders at the municipal (Sao Paulo), state (Sao Paulo) and national level from each movement were identified and approached for interviews ranging from 60 to 90 minutes. We also asked these leaders to identify senators, deputies and councillors with whom their movement has a longstanding relation. We also contacted the Workers' Party responsible for social movement relations, urban gender issues at the municipal (Sao Paulo), state (Sao Paulo) and national (Brasilia) levels. Finally, we spoke to informants in the federal government who arranged for interviews with the Ministers of Agrarian Development, Women's Issues and Housing as well as the vice-minister of the president's general secretary. We also spoke to 10 second and third level bureaucrats in these ministries. All of the interviews took place in their offices and an ethics certificate was obtained from my institution in order to carry out these

interviews. A total of 52 interviews were carried out.

The fieldwork as conducted during September 2010 and December 2011.

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## Notes

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Research for this article was made possible thanks to a new researcher grant from the Fonds Québécois de Recherche Société et Culture (FQRSC).
- 2 It consisted of popular education about city living conditions and behaviour. It served to change the habits of individuals in order to create a collective understanding of city living and a sense of citizenship, as opposed to the individualistic ethic of survival that usually develops in large urban centres.
- 3 In the 1980s many of these agents came from the Catholic Church, but during the 1990s and 2000s most came from NGOs.
- 4 The Constitution had opened a space, within the decision-making spheres traditionally reserved for the political elite, to the voices of excluded and marginalized populations (Dagnino, 1994).
- 5 Interviews with housing leaders A and D in September 2010.
- 6 Although some dissident voices within the MST state that certain leaders have been perpetuated at the national and intermediate levels (Interviews with 2 past sector coordinators, September 2011).
- 7 For example, it launched the Consulta Popular to regroup leftist forces outside of the party and create a socialist alternative to capitalist society.
- 8 Contrary to the local political context of the other two movements, there are relatively few Leftist municipal governments in rural municipalities limiting the possibility for participative democracy in the Brazilian countryside. Certain MST activists consider that this physical distance between an urban PT and a rural MST has helped maintain this critical distance.
- 9 Interview with dissent ex-MST member in September 2011.
- 10 Although according to an interview with an ex-member of the MST national coordination, it did participate for four years in the PT national directory during the 1990s.
- 11 In this letter, over 50 leaders accuse the MST of becoming dependent on the state, abandoning transgressional forms of contention so as to not destabilize the PT government despite numerous policies against MST interests (government investment in agro-business, the legal approval of GMOs and the expansion of the agricultural border towards the Amazon region).
- 12 The landless who have received their plot of land and live in MST settlements.
- 13 This included expanding its alliances to include the middle classes in order to enlarge its electoral base and increase its possibilities to win future elections.
- 14 In 2005, the mensalão scandal broke out tarnishing the PT's reputation among social movements and the larger public demonstrating that the PT is no more ethical than traditional ruling elite parties. Following this scandal the PT embarked upon a new effort to strengthen ties with its traditional social movement allies.
- 15 Although Hochstetler stresses broadly shared positions of CSOs (Hochstetler, 2008:39) we see a fundamental difference between social movements and NGOs: social movements have much more to lose such as their grassroots base that requires material distribution for continual mobilization.
- 16 At the state level in São Paulo, all movement participated in an 18 month process of elabo-

rating the PT state government candidate's platform and publically declared their support for Mercadante, the PT governor candidate (who subsequently lost out to the centre-right party PSDB).

- 17** This indicates that the MST is sought after by several PT candidates for the vote of their grassroots.

## **Subject Index**

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## **About the Author**

Charmain Levy is a professor at the Université du Québec en Outaouais since 2005 where she lectures on international development studies. She holds a Hon. B.A. in political science from York University, a Master's in Latin American Studies from Université de Paris III and a Ph.D. in Anthropology and Sociology of Politics from Université de Paris VIII. She has been working with and studying Brazilian social movements for the past 20 years. She is currently President of the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development (CASID), a member of the Nycole Turmel Chair on Public spaces and political innovations and a member of the Centre of studies and research on Brazil (CERB). She is co-author of the book *Collective Action and Radicalism in Brazil* and of numerous articles on the Sao Paulo housing movement.

## De la movilización a la institucionalización. La experiencia de organizaciones sociales en el gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina, durante el periodo 2002-2010

Juan Ignacio Lozano

**Resumen:** El tema principal de la ponencia es el análisis de una trayectoria que contempla el pasaje de un momento de movilización a otro de institucionalización, por parte de organizaciones sociales de matriz nacional – popular, participando en distintos estamentos gubernamentales en la provincia de Buenos Aires, ocurrido entre los años 2002 y 2010. Desde una perspectiva sociopolítica, exploraremos las transformaciones en las relaciones entre organizaciones sociales de esta matriz movimientista con el régimen político de gobierno, atendiendo a tres dimensiones principales: las formas de participación, las modalidades de representación y los procesos de legitimación de la decisión y la autoridad política. La propuesta es centralizar la mirada sobre las relaciones que establece con el régimen político en este doble contexto de descentralización y territorialización anteriormente descrito. En el caso argentino, ya con Kirchner en el poder, se constata como una de las principales novedades institucionales del periodo de gobierno con la participación de algunas organizaciones sociales en el gobierno y, por lo tanto, la participación de un conjunto de demandas producidas en la acción colectiva no institucional en el interior del Estado. Interesa aquí detenernos en lo sucedido en la Sub Secretaría de Atención a las Adicciones (SADA) de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, en particular en el programa de intervención comunitaria y juventud. Acompañando este proceso y observando prácticas políticas, debates y tensiones es que pretendo en este trabajo reconstruir el espacio en el que Estado y organizaciones sociales disputaron miradas, construcción de agenda y análisis sobre el rol del Estado y la respuesta estatal, basándome en el trabajo de campo, y en particular en la experiencia que fue la conformación del Consejo Consultivo Juvenil dentro de la Sub Secretaría de Atención a las Adicciones en la Provincia de Buenos Aires.

**Palabras clave:** Organizaciones Sociales – Estado – Movilización – Institucionalización -

### 1. Introducción

En los debates en torno a los procesos de movilización social y su relación con el régimen político de gobierno es interesante establecer primero tres momentos de la historia reciente de nuestro país en la que podemos identificar procesos de producción e investigación con enfoques particulares en cada uno de los mismos.

Me refiero con ello a las movilizaciones en torno a la democratización en década de los 80'; la protesta social surgida como resistencia frente al neoliberalismo en los 90' y a los sucesos dramáticos de fines de 2001 y la posterior restauración institucional del periodo de post crisis. Este último generó definitivamente una vuelta al interés en los enfoques teóricos acerca de la acción colectiva, la protesta y la movilización social.

Posteriormente al tratamiento de estos tres momentos, nos detendremos sobre el último para hacer una serie de referencias en relación a los cambios en las estrategias de las organizaciones ante la asunción de Néstor Kirchner en 2003, y a una serie de producciones en torno a las trayectorias de un grupo de organizaciones con el régimen político de gobierno en la que se visualiza ya no una confrontación hacia el gobierno sino distintos grados de participación e institucionalización con el mismo.

Hacíamos referencia a tres momentos. El *primero* se da en lo que se denomina *transición a la democracia*. En la década de los 80' y con la finalización de la dictadura militar, la asunción del gobierno democrático generó una serie de expectativas en torno a un necesario proceso de transformación institucional. En este proceso de transición se constata un marcado optimismo en torno a la democratización a partir de cambios institucionales, con una revitalización de los procesos de movilización social desligados de las prácticas corporativas típicas de los sindicatos, adhiriendo así a la constitución de nuevos actores colectivos de vocación democrática.

Frente al Estado, la postura de los movimientos sociales era de autonomía. Los mismos tuvieron una construcción más horizontal que vertical, no siendo ni actores corporativos ni tampoco actores de clase.

En este periodo se verifica un avance importante en la temática centrando el análisis en las causas colectivas, con objetivos y metas comunes. Los estudios sobre movimientos sociales obtuvieron el logro fundamental de mostrar los "marcos sumergidos de la acción", confirmando que los procesos de movilización social implican por un lado una identificación a través de valores comunes, intencionalidades comunes, acciones compartidas, por el otro acciones ligadas a cierta racionalidad a partir de la construcción de organizaciones, redes, estructuras, oportunidades, etc. (Pereyra, 2010)

El estudio sobre los movimientos sociales se articuló con una agenda de temas que tenían estrecha relación con la aspiración de una transición democrática que institucionalice un cambio definitivo frente a lo sucedido con la dictadura militar. Temas como la gobernabilidad, el consenso, la participación/representación, los procesos de institucionalización política, etc., fueron los principales abordajes.

La principal dimensión de análisis fue la dimensión política por sobre el análisis de las transformaciones socioeconómicas (Manzano, 2004).

A diferencia de otras organizaciones como los partidos políticos o los sindicatos, los movimientos sociales se definían por una estructura interna democrática, participativa, horizontal, autónomos del Estado y del sistema político.

En este momento los movimientos sociales son pensados como espacios de mediación entre la sociedad civil y el estado y la sociedad política (Jelín, 1987).

Un *segundo momento* se ubica después de la hiperinflación y con la *profundización de políticas neoliberales*, en la década de los 90', que es el momento de las protestas.

Auyero (2002) destaca tres procesos que dan cuenta de una transformación estructural en los 90'. Primero, por una alta desocupación al cambiarse el régimen social de acumulación ya iniciado en la dictadura militar y consolidado en esta década, con una marcada desindustrialización. Segundo, por el desmantelamiento del Estado de bienestar, a través de la reestructuración del Estado, un proceso de privatizaciones masivas, impactando de manera directa en las clases de menores ingresos. Por último un proceso de descentralización del Estado, con lo cual áreas de educación y salud fueron responsabilidad de las provincias, no así transfiriendo los presupuestos, marcando un gran deterioro en el sistema.

La retirada del Estado significó un grave empobrecimiento y desempleo, sin embargo, para Auyero (2002), este marco estructural no explica por sí solo los procesos de movilización y protesta. Al deterioro progresivo de las condiciones de vida se suma la incapacidad de los gobiernos de dar respuesta a las demandas, además de constatare procesos de corrupción en los mismos. Los ciclos de protesta aumentan como así también la participación de otros actores sociales nuevos a la misma. Provocando también un proceso que de identificación, de un pueblo, frente a la clase política.

Las transformaciones de la ciudadanía emergentes del ciclo de protestas abiertas en los 90' estuvieron así vinculadas al trabajo, la inclusión social y la participación política autónoma. Un balance debe tener en cuenta por un lado el agotamiento de una matriz de ciudadanía social que integraba a través de las relaciones laborales y por el otro aquellas nuevas formas de participación política emergentes de algunas experiencias sociales.

La movilización de los trabajadores desocupados debe entenderse en su reclamo inicial por trabajo. Posteriormente ante la ausencia de políticas laborales la lucha consignó en la obtención de una mínima ciudadanía social demandada al estado. La integración se ligó así a la supervivencia. (Delamata, 2009)

Distintas investigaciones, a su vez, han indagado en el proceso de descentralización del Estado nacional como respuesta a la crisis estructural del Estado social cuyas primeras manifestaciones pueden rastrearse hasta mediados de la década de 1970, y cuya eclosión se produce con los estallidos hiperinflacionarios de fines de la década de 1980 y principios de 1990 (Chiara y Di Virgilio, 2005; Andrenacci, 2002 y 2006; García Delgado, 1997; Cravacuore, 2003). Ambos procesos convergentes en la década del '90, la territorialización del conflicto social y la descentralización del aparato del Estado nacional, han dirigido la atención a los gobiernos locales como instancias privilegiadas de participación, representación y gestión del conflicto social.

Los estudios realizados sobre el proceso de movilización social y política producido en Argentina en el ciclo 1997-2002 han destacado la conformación de un nuevo ethos del conflicto social, configurado por dos características principales: la pertenencia territorial como instancia de configuración de identidades y demandas, y la dinámica asamblearia como procedimiento de toma de decisiones que cuestiona el orden delegativo característico del régimen político de la década de 1990 (Delamata, 2004; Delamata, 2005; Merklen, 2005; Svampa y Pereyra, 2003).

Giddens (1993) y Beck (1999) realizan un interesante aporte con los conceptos de modernidad reflexiva y subpolítica respectivamente. La propia modernidad capitalista desterritorializa la producción acelerando los flujos y las condiciones de reproducción del capital neutralizando el protagonismo político que le correspondía al estado nación en el modelo del capitalismo industrial fordista. Surge en este contexto un dominio al que Beck denomina "subpolítica" y que podemos resumir como nuevas formas de autoorganización de las demandas y las identidades políticas en un espacio público local, biográfico y no estatal. Estas nuevas formas de organización política abren un eje de problematización de las relaciones entre sociedad civil e instituciones políticas que en el marco de este proyecto denominamos campo estratégico relacional de la política.

Con algunas excepciones (Frédéric, 2004; Clemente y Girolami, 2006), no son muchos los estudios que han enfocado esta relación desde la perspectiva del campo estratégico de relaciones que emerge en el nivel del régimen político local, rearticulando las modalidades de participación, formas de representación y principios de legitimidad del orden y la autoridad políticos. En este punto deben consignarse las investigaciones que abordaron el vínculo entre gobiernos locales y actores territoriales circunscribiéndose a la temática del clientelismo político (Auyero, 2001; Levitzky, 2005).

Se constata un doble contexto de territorialización del conflicto y de descentralización del Estado que coloca a los municipios en el centro de procesos de distribución de recursos de asignación (desarrollo local) y de autoridad (gobierno local).

En los territorios existe un nuevo escenario político y relacional, donde operan un sinnúmero de organizaciones sociales y comunitarias que van desde las que tienen improntas religiosas (de iglesias católicas, de laicos católicos, evangelistas, etc.); inscripción sindical, las que son de extracción partidaria (de partidos tradicionales, de distintas tendencias dentro de estos partidos, de izquierda tradicional y de aquellos autodenominados de izquierda social o nueva izquierda); las autodenominadas como vecinales y deportivas (sociedades de fomento, clubes); organizaciones no gubernamentales con distintas orientaciones y abocadas a problemáticas específicas (vih-sida, juventud, etc.). En su devenir pareciera que presentan un límite en el desarrollo de la movilización al identificarse toda forma de representación política y de institucionalización del conflicto como cooptación y/o alienación de la voluntad política, bloqueando así el desarrollo de las acciones de estas organizaciones.

La movilización y fortalecimiento de organizaciones comunitarias de base territorial transforma la gubernamentalidad (Foucault, 2006) en los niveles locales, sustituyen-

do el vínculo político individualizado entre aparatos políticos locales y clientelas populares por otro configurado entre gobiernos locales y actores colectivos organizados que puede redundar en la asimilación, desmovilización, cooptación o institucionalización de estos últimos (Germani, 2003, Pérez, 2007).

Del lado del gobierno local, por el carácter distorsivo del proceso de descentralización, se concibe la política de una manera tradicional, transformando la descentralización en entes reducidos de la propia administración local, en un esfuerzo de mantener ciertas variables “bajo control” desalentando así la participación comunitaria y de las organizaciones.

El *tercer momento* al que nos referíamos es el iniciado con la *crisis de 2001 y el período de post crisis*.

Como mencionamos previamente, las investigaciones sobre movilización social y protesta centraban la mirada en los movimientos sociales. Estos eran definidos categorialmente para definir sus objetos de estudio.

En el primer momento, ligados al proceso de transición a la democracia varias investigaciones exploraron la utilidad de pensar los procesos de movilización en curso caracterizándolos como “nuevos movimientos sociales” (Pereyra, 2008).

Las protestas de diciembre de 2001 deben ser enmarcadas en un proceso más largo, al que nos referíamos en el segundo momento: cortes de ruta, ataques a edificios públicos, secuestro de autoridades municipales y provinciales, surgen en la década del 90´ para manifestar el descontento frente a la implementación de políticas neoliberales.

Pero como afirma Auyero (2002), a estas condiciones objetivas y estructurales, debe sumarse condiciones políticas concretas para que activen los mecanismos de acción colectiva.

Auyero (2001) utiliza el concepto de “repertorio de acción colectiva” trabajado por Tilly. Este concepto permite pensar la acción de una protesta no sólo como una respuesta a los problemas sociales, sino a enmarcarla con procesos políticos particulares respondiendo a una acción colectiva. Los cambios estructurales junto con los cambios en la acción colectiva se suponen en relación constituyendo dos distintos niveles de análisis, que enriquecen la mirada.

Pereyra, Pérez y Schuster (2008) hacen un balance de la producción académica sobre los estudios sobre protesta y conflictividad social en nuestro país ubicando dos perspectivas con orientaciones teórico-metodológicas particulares.

Un primer grupo de trabajos que priorizan los estudios de casos intentan analizar y evaluar las consecuencias de los procesos de reforma estructural de los 90´ como así también la respuesta de los sectores populares con nuevas formas de organización y una sociabilidad producto de los cambios estructurales.



Predomina la perspectiva etnográfica e inspiraciones en los estudios de culturas populares como E. P. Thompson o Raymond Williams.

Un segundo grupo, que centran sus análisis en las transformaciones del peronismo, de raíz politológica y corte institucionalista, enfocados en las transformaciones de los mecanismos clásicos de representación de demandas del sistema político, principalmente partidos y sindicatos. En este enfoque, la perspectiva epistemológica refiere a las teorías de elección racional y el elitismo competitivo.

El trabajo más representativo en esta perspectiva es el de Steven Levitsky (2005), también Sebastián Etchemendy (2001). (Pereyra, Pérez y Shuster, 2008)

Pereyra, Pérez y Shuster, (2008) reconocen la contribución que ambas perspectivas realizan en cuanto al análisis y caracterización de actores, así también como a los cambios institucionales. Sin embargo afirman que no incorporan una visión integrada de los aspectos centrales.

Para avanzar en dicha perspectiva proponen establecer una red conceptual de la sociología de los procesos políticos: formas de participación, modalidades de representación y procesos de legitimación del orden y la autoridad políticas.

Ya anteriormente el trabajo de Svampa y Pereyra (2003), Svampa (2005) y Schuster y Pereyra (2001) reflexionaron sobre la relación entre protesta social y régimen político de gobierno.

Adhiriendo a esta última perspectiva creemos que el concepto de movilización social constituyó la clave explicativa de los estudios sociopolíticos fundadores sobre el surgimiento del populismo como matriz de incorporación de los sectores populares a la comunidad política nacional. (Pereyra, Pérez y Shuster, 2008)

Una de las novedades institucionales del periodo de gobierno que se inicia en 2003 con respecto a los movimientos sociales que protagonizaron el ciclo de protestas, a saber, la participación de algunos de ellos en el gobierno y, por lo tanto, la participación de un conjunto de demandas producidas en la acción colectiva no institucional en el interior del Estado.

Masseti (2009) aborda la relación Estado – movimientos sociales, con el objetivo de describir una trayectoria de politización de movimientos sociales específicos, la que establece que está conformada por tres momentos: un primer momento de confrontación o demanda con el Estado, un segundo momento, de organización, y un último de institucionalización en la función pública de al menos parte de estos movimientos.

Por institucionalización refiere a un momento dentro de una trayectoria de politización en el cual determinadas organizaciones sociopolíticas se insertan en alguna instancia del Estado. Esta inserción en tanto que un punto en una trayectoria implica un doble desafío: la reconversión de las prácticas de las organizaciones sociopolíticas

que antes era confrontación / negociación (implica la desmovilización) y el desafío de modificar desde el interior mismo del estado las propias tradiciones en materia de función pública heredadas del proceso de los 90'. (Masseti, 2009)

Uno de los interrogantes ante este proceso de institucionalización reside en analizar si la incorporación de los movimientos sociales a la función pública es una vía para transformar los límites de la democracia. La intensidad de la protesta social fue incrementando durante 1997 – 2002. La dinámica de relación fue de confrontación, aunque con escenarios variados. No es una relación lineal. Además de represión hubo interlocución y reconocimiento por momentos.

Las dinámicas conflictuales no son puras en el sentido de que presentan distintos niveles e instancias de interlocución, que permite generar acuerdos y canalizar recursos.

Es interesante analizar como impactaron las transformaciones de la política asistencial del estado en las estructuras de las organizaciones sociales que encarnan el movimiento de pobres urbanos.

Uno de los requerimientos para que el Estado pueda canalizar recursos es que estas se constituyan bajo la figura legal de asociación civil, cumplimentar una serie de requerimientos.

La *onginización* de las organizaciones empezó a ser dominante y a destinar más cuadros políticos a tareas administrativas y de gestión de recursos, implicando un cambio en la capacidad de ejercer la demanda a través de la protesta de las organizaciones ahora volcadas hacia adentro.

La diversidad de escenarios de relación Estado – Movimientos sociales en torno a la dimensión conflictual y las dinámicas de colaboración permiten comprender en parte que la evolución de la relación adquiere hoy un cariz diferente con la incorporación de cuadros provenientes de los movimientos sociales a la función pública, esta institucionalización necesita también pensarse con las transformaciones paradigmáticas que operaron desde el kirchnerismo en contrariedad con el neoliberalismo.

En este punto cabe preguntarse sobre la persistencia de los reclamos temáticos que constituyen un movimiento social y sobre la coherencia o no de estos en las prácticas de los funcionarios provenientes de las organizaciones sociopolíticas.

¿La institucionalización implica la desmovilización de las organizaciones sociales y el abandono de temáticas que fueron los reclamos de partida de las mismas?

Ante este interrogante Massetti afirma que por un lado se puede pensar que los límites de la institucionalización los pone la capacidad de actuar en consecuencia con los temas centrales del movimiento social de origen, en su nuevo rol de funcionarios, debiendo observar que rol cumplen, que recursos manejan, como distribuyen esos

recursos. Por otro lado, se puede afirmar que el contexto actual ha perimido la vigencia de los reclamos – temáticas del movimiento social. Hay un debate en torno a la legitimidad que explique que el Estado pueda nutrirse de cuadros provenientes de las organizaciones sociales que previamente confrontaban. (Masseti, 2009)

Natalucci, Pérez (2010) abordan una reflexión interesante de este proceso al destacar que la estrategia kirchnerista combinaba la decisión de no reprimir con un discurso que se asentaba sobre la convocatoria a la "normalidad".

En la lógica oficial, las organizaciones piqueteras eran un corolario de la fragmentación social, emergente en la década de 1990 y que la crisis de 2001 remató dramáticamente. En consecuencia, en una coyuntura de normalización política, el curso de aquéllas debía caracterizarse por la integración y la desmovilización.

La doble estrategia del gobierno fue la revisión de la política social implementada durante el gobierno de Duhalde con una amplia convocatoria a la integración a la coalición de gobierno, por otro se pusieron en marcha otros desactivadores de la movilización, como la estigmatización y judicialización de los participantes en las protestas.

Esta relectura sobre el régimen político de gobierno generó cambios en estas organizaciones, tanto a nivel identitario (de organizaciones piqueteras a sociales) como de intervención política (de las protestas callejeras al trabajo territorial) y posteriormente con la progresiva incorporación a los planteles de gobierno, como agentes de la administración pública en las áreas correspondientes a sus intereses organizacionales.

Asimismo los autores realizan un importante aporte, al establecer esta trayectoria política en el marco de un incipiente crecimiento económico que desplazó el eje de la desocupación y las políticas sociales paliativas, hacia la integración al mercado de trabajo, la calidad del empleo y la promoción de la economía social como alternativa de producción.

Frente a la recuperación económica y la revitalización del sindicalismo, la movilidad social empieza a perder legitimidad social.

Otro punto de interés reside en pensar que la matriz nacional popular establece al Estado como instancia primordial de la intervención política. Sin embargo el proceso de profunda reestructuración neoliberal en nuestro país sumado al proceso de transformación del trabajo, implican serios desafíos para las organizaciones ya que las respuestas y soluciones por parte del Estado no son del impacto logrado décadas atrás.

Lo que da pie a reflexionar sobre una serie de experiencias por parte de organizaciones sociales en el gobierno de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.

## 2. Transformar el Estado, militándolo

A partir del año 2005, el Gobierno de la Provincia de Buenos Aires había convocado a organizaciones sociales cercanas al gobierno nacional a integrar diferentes espacios de gestión gubernamental.

El problema de la tensión entre movilización e integración a un régimen político de gobierno en proceso de transformación acelerada resulta la cuestión fundamental.

El análisis del régimen de gobierno de la Provincia de Buenos Aires resulta interesante ya que hablamos de la provincia más numerosa del país, en la que residen 1 de cada 3 habitantes. La Provincia de Buenos Aires es, al igual que las demás provincias argentinas, autónoma respecto del gobierno nacional en la mayoría de los temas, exceptuando aquellos de alcance federal. Por lo que, compartiendo políticas sociales diseñadas e implementadas desde Nación, el gobierno provincial también diseña otras, interviniendo ambas en los 135 municipios, con cierta prioridad en los 24 partidos del Conurbano Bonaerense donde viven 10 de los 15 millones de habitantes, según el último censo de 2010.

Al igual que el Estado Nacional y otros distritos el gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires también ha tenido estrategias de integración a diversos movimientos y organizaciones sociales, a partir del ingreso a distintos ministerios, secretarías y direcciones, o con distintos espacios ad hoc, como consejos consultivos o mesas de gestión.

Respecto a la dimensión temporal, es pertinente afirmar que en las elecciones legislativas de 2005, con el triunfo de Cristina Fernández, del FPV (Frente Para la Victoria), sobre Hilda González del PJ (Partido Justicialista), generó un encausamiento de todo el partido justicialista reconociendo el liderazgo de Kirchner, promoviendo en la provincia un proceso de institucionalización de las organizaciones, insertando diferentes cuadros en el gobierno provincial.

Comprende así un período paradigmático en un doble sentido. Por un lado, respecto de la coyuntura provincial por el alineamiento del gobierno provincial al proyecto nacional y legitimidad por parte de las organizaciones para acceder a cargos. Por otro, las transformaciones que se visualizan en la movilización. En definitiva, en ese ciclo se pueden analizar las relaciones y articulaciones establecidas entre las organizaciones, la dinámica del proceso de institucionalización y los resultados posteriores de ese proceso.

En los trabajos e investigaciones que se realizaron con las primeras experiencias, se constató que los propios militantes tenían un gran desconocimiento de lo que era "gestionar". Ante la apertura de 2005 las organizaciones habían leído como un logro entrar en el Estado pero había dificultades por parte de los militantes que asumían cargos de gestión en la administración pública, situación que derivó que en años posteriores se convocara a "técnicos" que viabilicen las propuestas políticas de las organizaciones desde el Estado. (Masseti, 2009)

## **2.1. La participación de las organizaciones sociales en la construcción de política pública.**

### **El caso de la S.a.d.a.**

La Sub Secretaría de Atención a las Adicciones (SADA) es un ente provincial dependiente del ministerio de Salud de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Internamente la estructura de la sub secretaria cuenta con dos tipos de atención, asistencia y tratamiento y prevención. Por un lado la atención directa a través de profesionales idóneos.

La SADA es una red pública y gratuita de atención a las adicciones de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, que intenta abordar de manera integral la problemática desde una perspectiva que pretende desarrollar estrategias de intervención acorde a la situación social, favoreciendo la articulación necesaria con los distintos agentes sociales referentes en la temática.<sup>1</sup>

Por otro lado procura desarrollar estrategias tendientes a fortalecer acciones preventivas y de promoción de las personas vinculadas a la construcción de su proyecto de vida.

La subsecretaría entonces tiene una complejidad interesante al contar con distintos tipos de respuesta a la problemática de las adicciones, por un lado una red provincial que aborda la problemática desde los Centro Provinciales de Atención (CPA) que están conformados por un equipo técnico de psicólogos, trabajadores sociales, operadores terapéuticos y comunitarios que atienden a personas afectadas por situaciones de consumo problemático de sustancias, o que requieren asesoramiento en relación a la temática.

También cuenta con otras formas de abordaje como las Casas de Día, de atención intermedia a las que se derivan determinadas personas según la situación de consumo que estén viviendo.

Y por otro lado desarrolla tareas de prevención, de visibilización de la problemática. La sede, ubicada en la localidad de Tolosa, lindante a La Plata, es un viejo edificio bajo y con muchos pasillos, emplazado sobre terrenos del ferrocarril.

En la misma están las direcciones y programas que coordinan los distintos efectores de prevención y tratamiento de la provincia, sumado a programas de trabajos específicos, como en escuelas, además del programa de control de la venta de alcohol en comercios, junto con los controles de alcoholemia a los conductores en la calle.<sup>2</sup>

El Área de intervención juvenil y comunitaria de la Sub secretaria fue asumida por una profesional de carrera, habiendo trabajado anteriormente en el conurbano y conociendo a la mayoría de los referentes de la misma en cada región sanitaria de la provincia.

El equipo que se conformó fue una mixtura entre algunos empleados de la secretaria, junto a un grupo de militantes representando a las cuatro organizaciones mayorita-

rias, que, como mencionamos anteriormente, estaban teniendo una inserción en el Estado provincial.

Siguiendo el organigrama, cabe decir que la Subsecretaría depende del Ministerio de Salud (estuvo los dos años anteriores en la órbita del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y ahora nuevamente en Salud, lo que denota que no hay una política clara al respecto).

El equipo conformado respondía al Área de intervención comunitaria y juvenil, y esta de la Dirección provincial de programación y control de gestión. Mientras que en esta dirección se encontraban todos los programas de intervención comunitaria y de relación con actores de la comunidad, en otra dirección reportan todos los servicios de atención de la provincia, además de las aéreas de registro y estadísticas.

Justamente a cargo de la primer dirección, de Programación y control, respondía el área estaba un militante del Movimiento Evita, quien fue quien impulsó la entrada de militantes de las organizaciones a todas las áreas.

Sin embargo, si bien era militante de la organización, hacía más de diez años que trabajaba para la subsecretaría por lo que conocía y mucho los distintos actores presentes en la institución, siendo además profesional, psicólogo, habiendo intervenido como tal en la atención a jóvenes en el conurbano.

El esquema de trabajo fue de total libertad ya que la agenda era que las organizaciones participen y se adecuen a este nuevo escenario de trabajo.

El diagnóstico era simple y contundente: los profesionales que trabajan en los distintos centros no salen a involucrarse con la comunidad, esperan que el "caso" llegue a la oficina, no se trabaja en red con instituciones comunitarias o religiosas, se cumple un horario. En síntesis, se observaba y compartía que se realizaba un ejercicio liberal de la profesión, interviniendo individualmente, con escasa relevancia a la cuestión social.

La prioridad era entonces conformar un espacio institucional que redefina la intervención y la respuesta estatal frente al problema del consumo y las adicciones.

Fue así que una de las principales líneas de trabajo era el establecimiento de un Consejo Consultivo Juvenil.

La principal razón para el consejo residía en convocar a jóvenes de las organizaciones, de otros espacios e instituciones, de la provincia, en la que a través del intercambio, diálogo, y sobre todo, la mirada desde los jóvenes, pudieran establecer políticas de prevención y tratamiento a las adicciones, pero desde una perspectiva de base y concebida por los propios jóvenes.

El hecho de crear el Consejo Consultivo Juvenil tenía el objetivo implícito de transformar la respuesta estatal y el compromiso de los profesionales

Otra de las metas era actualizar el diagnóstico que había sobre la situación de consumo y adicciones en la provincia, desde una perspectiva participativa que pudiera incidir en la planificación de políticas públicas.

Conformado el equipo se trazo una agenda de trabajo para poder trabajar e implementar el Consejo Consultivo Juvenil.

Los militantes tenían perfiles bastantes similares, eran cuatro y correspondían cada uno a la organización que participaba a nivel provincial y nacional de la incorporación de cuadros al estado.

## **2.2. La conformación del Consejo, entre tensiones, debates y dilates**

Las reuniones de equipo se sucedían semanalmente, y en el cotidiano de la semana la "gestión" pasaba por muchos llamados a referentes locales de los partidos del conurbano y alguno del centro de la provincia comentando la iniciativa.

Claramente cada representante de cada organización debía mostrar capacidad de fuerza y de representación que legitime así las posturas o posiciones. Así, los teléfonos estaban ocupados todo el tiempo, como así también las computadoras, ya que los mails eran otra forma de comunicación.

Las reuniones tenían la finalidad de ir moldeando la propuesta de conformación del CCJ. Por un lado, estaba la discusión política, decisiva a la hora de pensarlo, es decir las atribuciones y posibilidades. Por el otro, la conformación del CCJ estaba enmarcado en un decreto ministerial, lo que debía ser aprobado por la dirección de legales del ministerio y refrendado a nivel superior también, por lo que los tiempos tampoco eran rápidos en este sentido.

Volviendo al primer punto una situación cada vez mas complicada resultaba del hecho de que el director pertenecía a una de las organizaciones. Ante cualquier toma de decisión surgía de inmediato la desconfianza y la tensión entre las organizaciones, ya que obviamente la distribución de recursos y lugares no era igualitaria.

Y en este marco el principal problema fue definir los integrantes de la mesa ejecutiva del CCJ.

El funcionamiento al que se pretendía arribar con la CCJ consistía en que unos dos mil jóvenes de la provincia participen en el CCJ. Dividido en cuatro regiones, se reunirían periódicamente cada región para elevar luego a una comisión ejecutiva de veinticinco integrantes distintos análisis, diagnósticos y propuestas, quienes aunarían las regiones y elevarían a la gestión política dichas propuestas o líneas de acción.

La definición de estos veinticinco integrantes fue el principal debate y punto difícil de consensuar.

La expectativa de la conformación del CCJ y de una pronta respuesta por parte del estado comenzó a desdibujarse. Frente a esta situación, empezó a surgir fuertemente la posibilidad de incorporar militantes por parte de las organizaciones para tener mas presencia. Sin embargo los recursos más importantes eran los que estaban en relación a generar eventos, talleres, capacitaciones, no así en tema de infraestructura o la de poder generar nuevos espacios físicos de trabajo, como así tampoco contrataciones a profesionales

Mientras se dilataba el lanzamiento de la CCJ, la tensión y discusión crecía entre las organizaciones. En lo interno del CCJ, la redefiniciones de la relación con el estado, concretamente con el gobierno fue generando tensiones en la participación del CCJ. La alineación con gobierno nacional era clara en las cuatro organizaciones, sin embargo a nivel provincial y sobre todo local, cada organización tenía sus lecturas políticas del proceso, generando alianzas o rompiendo alguna de ellas, tensionando la relación propia de las organizaciones entre las que se quedaban y las que se iban. Los tiempos electorales de 2007 y la candidatura de Scioli como gobernador termino de profundizar lo que venía sucediendo. La imposibilidad de reelección de Solá y la confirmación de Scioli como el candidato del Frente para la Victoria, empezó a ejercer una fuente creciente de discusión y desconfianza.

A la demora y falta de novedades sobre avances significativos del lanzamiento y puesta en marcha del CCJ, entrábamos en época electoral, con las elecciones que llegaban en octubre.

Finalmente el lanzamiento se llevó a cabo a pocos meses de las mismas. Se decidió realizarlo en el centro de la provincia en unas jornadas de dos días de trabajo en talleres, con capacitación a los jóvenes, en una agenda que daba cuenta por un lado actividades de capacitación y por el otro paneles y participación de referentes políticos.

Se llegó a organizar el lanzamiento y en el primero de los días a definir los integrantes de la comisión ejecutiva. La definición de estos veinticinco integrantes fue el principal debate y punto difícil de consensuar, en lo que terminó imponiéndose que la mayoría de los integrantes fueron para una organización, generando tensiones y conflictos con las demás organizaciones los cuales se sentían defraudados y contrariados.

Hablar del principio del CCJ implica casi hablar del final de la experiencia, ya que no pudo materializarse un funcionamiento adecuado, al imponerse la transición al nuevo gobierno como la agenda mas importante en los ministerios, donde gran parte de las políticas fueron discontinuadas (al menos en salud y en varios ministerios también).

### **3. Sobre la autonomía o heteronomía de las organizaciones sociales (o cómo correrse de las miradas miserabilistas y/o de cooptación)**

Grignon y Passeron (1991) abordan desde dos perspectivas contrapuestas diferentes



formas de análisis sobre la cultura popular, las que identifican como relativismo y legitimismo. Mientras que el relativismo pretende darle estatus de cultura a lo popular, teniendo a su vez ciertos riesgos si se desconocen las relaciones de poder que articulan lo popular con lo dominante; la perspectiva legitimista pretende afirmar que aquellos que detentan el capital legítimo son los que tienen la capacidad para definir cuáles son las prácticas y representaciones culturales válidas para toda la cultura.

Así, solo existe cultura en lo legítimo. El legitimismo se convertiría en miserabilismo en tanto entiende la imposición de una manera absoluta, sin margen para que los sectores populares construyan cultura. (Garriga Zucal, 2010)

Rehaciendo parte de este trabajo recordé los debates en torno a Grignon y Passeron sobre la mirada miserabilista hacia los sectores populares desde una postura dominocéntrica. Si la mirada miserabilista no da margen para que los sectores populares no puedan construir cultura, creo que política tampoco. Muchas veces este dominocentrismo es el lugar común de la academia para observar procesos sociales en los sectores populares (termino que debería poner en *itálica*, como propone Quirós, 2011, al ser este un termino nativo).

Natalucci y Schuttenberg (2010) analizan que la relación entre gobierno y organizaciones fue explicada en numerosos trabajos bajo la clave de la cooptación, observándose, siempre según estos trabajos, que la estrategia estatal de contención de la protesta, el reemplazo en el nivel colectivo de la matriz clientelar, la manifestación de la debilidad de los sectores populares y la capacidad "infinita" de "volver al orden" por parte del Partido Justicialista explican esta relación, y construcción de mediaciones e institucionalidad entre estado y organizaciones sociales.

Este tipo de afirmaciones no hacen más que

*"tener una mirada "desde arriba" al poner en relieve la forma de intervención del Estado como variable explicativa de la acción política de los movimientos sociales". (Natalucci y Schuttenberg, 2010: 7)*

Manzano (2008, 2010) ya había identificado que los estudios sobre acción colectiva y los movimientos sociales definieron un campo de investigación centrada

*"en las formas en que el sistema político procesaba demandas y las transformaba en reformas estructurales, los mecanismos de cooptación de los líderes de los movimientos, la institucionalización de acciones disruptivas, y la decadencia o desaparición de movimientos sociales". (Manzano. 2008: 25)*

El abordaje etnográfico sobre la política colectiva permite realizar ciertos desplazamientos que enriquecen los análisis al correrlos de posicionamientos como los mencionados anteriormente "desde arriba", del actor al campo social, privilegiando practicas cotidianas.

En efecto, al observar las practicas cotidianas de militantes los cuales “desde el estado” empezaron a desarrollar tareas varias interpelaban las visiones sobre la temática, el efecto del estado en las organizaciones, o en todo caso, ver la complejidad del desarrollo de la política desde el estado.

Prosiguiendo en el análisis, las organizaciones que participaban y los militantes en representación de las mismas acudían al mismo desde una concepción de estado, que claramente debe su identificación con un heterogéneo y complejo universo nacional y popular, identificando en el nuevo gobierno el restablecimiento de las tres banderas históricas del peronismo: Soberanía política, independencia económica y justicia social; junto a la convocatoria a la reconstrucción del movimiento nacional.

Este sentido de pertenencia explicaría más el trabajo de los militantes en el estado, que la elaboración de estructuras de análisis de pros y contras, de mera estrategia racional de la acción.

Como explicita Manzano (2008) es necesario interpretar los procesos políticos, las relaciones entre estado y movimientos sociales a partir de las relaciones de poder históricamente construidas.

Los escenarios donde se configuran las disputas entre ellos dan cuenta de un proceso de producción conjunta, tanto de políticas como de modalidades de acción.

Adherimos así a pensar la sociedad como campo de fuerza, a partir de los aportes de Manzano (2008), Thompson (1984, 1992), Roseberry (1994) entre otros.

Entre los inmensos aportes y propuestas de Thompson quisiera priorizar aquí la posibilidad de centrar la experiencia como mediadora entre estructura y acción. Así, corriéndonos de cierto determinismo económico la clase es atravesada por la cultura, la experiencia y la lucha de clases.

Estudiando su caso, los motines, lejos de verlo como espasmódico lo ubico como una forma compleja de acción popular con objetivos claros. Los motines los entiende así en el marco de los límites, dando cuenta de las relaciones de hegemonía.

Mas que explicar las causas una de las preocupaciones del pensador eran pensar las condiciones de posibilidad.

Este corrimiento permite captar tensiones, lo contingente en las relaciones de fuerzas, los condicionamientos mutuos, y las modalidades de acción, que van mutando en el tiempo.

Lo que distingue Roseberry (1994) es que la mentada hegemonía no puede concebirse como un resultado, sino más bien como proceso, el cual es constantemente interpelado, dando cuenta de un campo más complejo en la articulación entre el estado y la cultura popular.

## **4. Reflexiones finales**

Frente a procesos de participación en la gestión pública por parte de organizaciones sociales debatimos acerca de los abordajes normativos desde las teorías sobre la acción colectiva o los movimientos sociales, acerca de lo que se espera de ellos.

Al momento de observarse un proceso de institucionalización de varias organizaciones en relación con el Estado, se constata que hubo una valoración negativa por parte de la "academia", apuntando nociones como "cooptación" y pérdida de autonomía.

Nos interesó destacar que las trayectorias de politización en el cual determinadas organizaciones sociopolíticas se insertan o insertaron en alguna instancia del Estado es de por sí compleja ya que implica un doble desafío, por un lado la reconversión de las prácticas de las organizaciones sociopolíticas que antes era confrontación / negociación (implica la desmovilización), y el desafío de modificar desde el interior mismo del estado las propias tradiciones en materia de función pública heredadas del proceso de los 90'.

Trabajando mis registros de observación me intereso correrme del proceso explicativo para ver prácticas políticas, debates y tensiones, las disputas con el estado y entre organizaciones, el análisis sobre el rol del Estado.

La estrategia analítica del seminario me permitió repensar mis afirmaciones en torno a este proceso, al repensar esta figura muchas veces maniquea del estado, para centrarme en las prácticas, los debates, los dilates, la complejidad, las expectativas y las frustraciones. Constatando lo interesante de pensar estos procesos en clave cambiante y no determinantes, con la certeza de que es pertinente un abordaje que apunte a la reconstrucción de campos de fuerzas sociales, además de constatar de que queda el desafío y el interés de reactualizar los debates y análisis acerca de la relación entre organizaciones sociales y el estado, así como la modalidad de acción política y la apropiación de la política por parte de los sectores populares en la Argentina.

## **Abreviaturas**

**SADA:** Sub Secretaria de Atención a las Adicciones.

**CPA:** Centro Preventivo de Adicciones

**PJ:** Partido Justicialista

**FPV:** Frente para la Victoria

**CCJ:** Consejo Consultivo Juvenil

**ONG:** Organizaciones no Gubernamentales

## **Apéndice metodológico**

Esta ponencia forma parte de los estudios doctorales que estoy llevando a cabo. La

estrategia general consiste en desarrollar una trayectoria de institucionalización por parte de un conjunto de organizaciones sociales de matriz nacional popular en el gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires. Reflexionaremos sobre la relación entre movilización social y régimen político de gobierno, considerando fundamental una caracterización exhaustiva de la matriz populista de movilización social. Partiendo de estos desarrollos teóricos, reunidos en los dos primeros capítulos, en los tres capítulos finales proponemos distintos abordajes al ciclo de movilización estudiado en relación al estudio de caso propuesto.

Dentro de la administración de la provincia se ha seleccionado al Ministerio de Salud por varios criterios: un primero de viabilidad, ya que se cuenta en el con informantes, y mediadores para poder obtener entrevistas con varios de los protagonistas. En ese ministerio ha operado una tensión interesante de analizar, si bien la salud no dependería solo de la profesión de los médicos para intervenir, la dimensión social de los procesos de salud - enfermedad, en la práctica son los médicos y unas pocas profesiones las que estarían en condiciones de establecer la política pública. La inserción de organizaciones sociales en ese área moviliza los debates en torno a otros modos y dispositivos de intervención, ya no competencia de "un" saber sino la posibilidad de establecer intervenciones desprofesionalizadas y comunitarias.

Se piensa hacer énfasis especialmente en una serie de programas que crearon las propias organizaciones como "Salud en movimiento" y "Promotores en salud" con fuerte impronta territorial, buscando promover la participación y capacitación de residentes de barrios con poca accesibilidad a los hospitales. También se analizara lo sucedido en la Subsecretaría de Atención a las adicciones (SADA) en el que también opero esta tensión, al intentar incorporar una intervención por fuera del espacio clínico de los psicólogos.

La investigación se desarrolla dentro de un marco metodológico de tipo predominantemente cualitativo. Como actividades principales se prevé la realización de entrevistas en profundidad según el siguiente criterio de selección:

- Funcionarios de primera y segunda línea de las áreas sociales y políticas de las gestiones del ministerio de salud del gobierno provincial, en el periodo referido.
- Cuadros técnicos y políticos de las organizaciones sociales movimientistas que son o hayan asumido cargos en el ministerio, en algún programa, dirección o secretaria.
- referentes de las organizaciones de base territorial más relevantes.
- otros actores que intervengan en la relación entre organizaciones y el ministerio: dirigentes políticos, profesionales, miembros de ONGs, referentes de organizaciones confesionales (Cáritas), etc.

Las entrevistas serán analizadas con técnicas de análisis del discurso siguiendo el modelo dialógico - enunciativo y semántico argumentativo- desarrollado por Germán Pérez (2004).

Se realizarán también análisis documentales de fuentes primarias y secundarias.

Entre las primeras se considerarán los documentos producidos por las propias organizaciones y por el Ministerio. Entre los segundos se realizará un relevamiento y análisis de las producciones periodísticas locales referidas al objeto de nuestra investigación. Los documentos se procesarán con software específico para el análisis cualitativo de datos.

Finalmente, se prevé un acercamiento a la experiencia de los Consejos Consultivos realizados por dicha cartera por tratarse de una instancia de articulación institucional fundamental en el campo estratégico relacional de la política local que conforma el objeto de este estudio.

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## Notas

- 1 La Red se encuentra conformada por 187 Servicios de Atención, públicos y gratuitos, que implementan políticas públicas considerando las particularidades de cada uno de los 134 municipios bonaerenses.
- Los Servicios de Atención, ofrecen diversas modalidades terapéuticas: Consultorios Externos, Hospitales de Día - Medio Día, Unidades de Internación y Desintoxicación. A partir de esta diversificación de la oferta asistencial, los Centros Provinciales de Atención (CPA), se constituyen en actores estratégicos en un constante diálogo interinstitucional, con la comunidad y los usuarios del servicio.
- La capacidad instalada de desarrolla en 176 Centros Provinciales de Atención, 9 Comunidades Terapéuticas, 2 Unidades de Desintoxicación. Además cuenta con un Servicio Gratuito de Orientación en Adicciones (Fonodroga). Fuente: [www.sada.gba.gov.ar](http://www.sada.gba.gov.ar)
- 2 Las estrategias implementadas desde la Dirección provincial de programación y control de la gestión se basaba en promotores Juveniles en Prevención de Adicciones, el mentado Consejo Consultivo Juvenil, el Programa Madres en Red, que propuso trabajar con madres referentes de los barrios con herramientas de intervención comunitaria y capacitación en adicciones, el establecimiento de Centros Preventivos en Iglesias (CPI), que planteo la relación entre Estado y Espacios Religiosos, el establecimiento de Centros Preventivos Laborales, el Programa de Prevención en el Deporte, También se destacaba el Programa Voluntariado en Adicciones, el Espacio para Madres y Padres, entre los principales.

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## Black Youth Movement and the New Political and Institutional Spaces in Brazil

Danilo de Souza Morais and Paulo César Ramos

**Abstract:** In this article it is presented a synthesis of the trajectory in the organization of the black youth in Brazil as a new actor or set of actors in civil society, emerging from the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, which express as its main demand the end of what they call as "genocide against black youth" in the country. It is emphasized in this synthesis the building of the first Black Youth's National Meeting and the Black Youth's National Forum, then it proceeds to describe the relations between this actor with the state actors, at the political and institutional public spaces, more directly concerning the first National Conference of Public Policies of the Youth and the National Council of Youth. The initial developed analysis points to new possibilities of public policies to ensure rights from the interaction between a new actor of the civil society: the black youth and the new democratic institutionalization in Brazil, the Councils and Sectoral Conferences. Therefore, it goes beyond the state-society dichotomy. It is argued, thus, that for a better analysis of this process in evidence one must not grasp these affinities airtight, nor the ties and tensions amongst the organizations of the black movement and the general youth movements (actors of the civil society), as also amidst these and parties and govern spheres (actors of the political society).

**Keywords:** Black youth, political and institutional public spaces, democracy building.

### 1. Introduction

In this paper we present a description of the emergence of black youth as an actor or set of actors subordinated to the Brazilian civil society, i.e. as a social movement, since the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

That description articulates two of the key moments for the establishment of this new set of actors, namely: the process of the 1<sup>st</sup> National Meeting of Black Youth (ENJUNE), whose national stage, preceded by several municipal stages and sixteen state stages, occurred in 2007, Bahia, and the launch meeting of the National Black Youth Forum (FONAJUNE) that occurred in 2008, São Paulo state.

The ENJUNE and FONAJUNE, as organizational initiatives of black youth, seem to be better understood when we insert the relation that this nascent black youth movement establish with the state at institutionalized public spaces, where they claim and propose public policies, especially to overcome racial inequalities that specifically target this segment.

In this article we advance in this direction with the description and analysis of two public spaces seem fundamental to the creation of public intervention in this black youth: the process of the 1<sup>st</sup> National Youth Conference (CNPPJ) in 2008, and articulating the demands of black youth in the National Youth Council (CONJUVE).

It is understood that black youth, at least in the way this has been presented in the public arena from the construction of the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE, configures itself as *emerging*<sup>1</sup> set of actors of the *democracy building*<sup>2</sup> in our country in the sense that they seek to expand and whilst amalgamating, claiming and proposing new rights both according to the demands of the black movement, as the other youth movements. They draw attention mainly to how racial inequalities impact on this particular segment: young black women and men.

Before we start with the description of the recent organization of black youth, it is important to highlight the agenda of the Public Policy for Youth (PPJs), opened in Brazil mainly since 2005, plus some specifics of racial inequalities they face as young black women/men in the country.

### 1.1. Youth, Public Policies and Racial Inequalities in Brazil

In Brazil, particularly since 2005 with the creation of the National Secretariat of Youth (SNJ) and the National Youth Council (CONJUVE)<sup>3</sup>, it starts to build within the framework of public policies aimed at youth segment<sup>4</sup> a quest to overcome the terms of neoliberal agenda of the 1990s concerning the policies aimed at this sector of the population. These, on one side, had a “celebratory” notion of youth, seeing it only as a “development agent”; and on the other a vision of the youth as a “problem”, as a matter of contention, especially on the theme of urban violence (Novais 2009). This new and alternative perspective to think about youth, coupled with the discussion of policies to meet their demands, the Public Policy for Youth (PPJs – *Políticas Públicas de Juventude*), was well summarized by Regina Novaes (2009) with the term “young people as subjects of rights” (Novais 2009:18), also widely used by the juvenile actors/sees.

The change pointed above occurs with significant influence on a number of actors of civil society and political society nationwide. However, as Novais (2009: 17) recalls such change occurs much influenced by a range of organized youth segments since the 1990s. Among these “[...] debtors of social struggles in 1970s and 1980s, the highlights are groups of young women, young black men/women and affirmation of diversity in sexual orientation groups.” (Novais 2009: 18).

Therefore, the black youth is placed in the context of transformations in the relationship between state and society in Brazil with regard to the meaning given to the theme of youth. And while they see a greater permeability for the recognition of their demands and specificities, as well as much of the youth in Latin America still suffers with “[...] the effects of neoliberal economic and socially disruptive policies, [...] affected by the perverse combination of the truculence in illicit drugs trafficking, the intensification of the firearms trade, corruption and police violence” (Novais 2009: 17).

Dealing specifically with racial inequalities that young black women and men face in Brazil, we emphasize some data relating to two areas: Education and Public Security.

Regarding *Education* the PNAD<sup>5</sup> of 2009 indicates, concerning the access to College education, that the proportion of young white people (in this case between 18 and 24 years) over the total number of young people at this level of education was approximately 2 / 3 (two thirds), i.e. 62.6% of the young students attending the College/University Education. Meanwhile, blacks (black and brown) were less than 1/3 (one third), i.e. approximately 30% of young students attending this level of education.

Regarding the *Public Security*, data on homicides of young black people are one of the most alarming about racial inequality that affects the youth specifically<sup>6</sup>. Between 2002 and 2008 fell by 30% the number of killings of young whites. In absolute numbers were 6,592 deaths per year in 2002 to 4,582 in 2008. The young blacks in the same period died 13% more by homicide as the cause. In absolute numbers rose from 11,308 in 2002 to 12,749 in 2008.

Thus, comparing the data of homicide of young blacks and young whites between 2002 and 2008, comes the conclusion that if in 2002 young blacks were already 45.8% more inflicted than whites, so in 2008 this percentage rises to an impressive 127.6 %. We emphasize that these data are confirmed by the Ministry of Justice, meaning, the Federal Government.

The examples of Education and Public Security in the racial inequalities that we highlight above are illustrative, because they help in understanding some of the motivations of this new set of actors who call themselves black youth. For instance, when at the ENJUNE they give centrality to its agenda to what they call "genocide or extermination against black youth" is evident, in terms of their political agenda, the establishment of a direct link between that and the objective reality of much of this population segment.

In the same way the demand for affirmative actions with racial emphasis in Higher Education, is obviously based upon the under-representation of black youth at this level of education.<sup>7</sup>

From here on we proceed to the description, main objective of this brief article, of two of the key moments of the recent emergence of black youth in Brazil, respectively: the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE, and the launch of FONAJUNE.

## 2. The ENJUNE – 1<sup>st</sup> National Meeting of the Black Youth<sup>8</sup>

The meeting brought together about 700 young people, among those: "delegates, observers, lecturers, state and national coordinators, support, guests from organized civil society and governments" (ENJUNE 2007: 5), between the days 27 and 29 of July 2007 in *Lauro de Freitas*, Bahia.

It can be argued that the ENJUNE focused its efforts around the dialogue between different black youths in Brazil and in its own organization to intervene on public policies in the country, which the report of the meeting expressed explicitly, as shown by the two sections that follow:

*“- The making of this document, which aims to provide guidance for the implementation of policies and focal actions for this youth, assisting in the actions of public power, civil society and the black youth itself, (...) (ENJUNE, 2007: p.4) places as its central proposal, the promotion of exchanges between the groups, collectives, organizations and active black youth and the socialization of experiences and actions of black youth amongst the participants. These two goals, placed as fundamental, show awareness on the part of young black men and women that integration is necessary between the various organizations of black youth, encouraging the creation of spaces for dialogue.” (ENJUNE 2007: 5)*

## **2.1. The Organization and Operation**

Emphasizing its national character the ENJUNE was made possible through National Organizing Committees. Divided into seven, these committees were: “fundraising, communication, coordination and mobilization, infrastructure, regiment and regulations, cultural schedule and methodology” (ENJUNE 2007: p.4). In addition there was also a committee of the National Coordination of the Meeting. This can be divided into “organizers” (quoted committee members) and political representatives of Brazilian states.

For the organization of the debate, there was a national agenda comprised of fourteen themes called “thematic axis”, considered by ENJUNE the themes identified as relevant to the “conjuncture of the Brazilian black youth”. These themes served not only as guides to the national stage, but also for all other stages, i.e., states, municipalities and/or regions. From each theme occurred “discussion groups” in which the same topics were discussed and proposals were developed and approved. The “thematic axis” were: (I) Culture; (II) Public Security, Vulnerability and Social Risk; (III) Education; (IV) Health; (V) Land and Housing; (VI) Communication and Technology; (VII) Religion of black people; (VIII) Environment and sustainable development; (IX) Work; (X) Social intervention in the political spaces; (XI) Amends and affirmative action; (XII) Gender and feminism; (XIII) Gender identity and sexual orientation; (XIV) Inclusion of people with disabilities.

Draws attention, as you can see the themes highlighted above, the search of the organizers of the meeting to intersect the racial (black) with the generational/age (youth) dimension, also with a series of other dimensions of the differences and inequalities that constitute the Brazilian society which somehow fall into the black youth. That is, in some way, in the interpretation of these actors, the recognition of the internal heterogeneity of black youth itself.

Back to the dynamics of the debate, each proposal was drawn up in discussion groups and taken to the final plenary of the respective step. Once approved at the final plenary of the proposal it would go to the "Final Report of Phase", according to the following workflow: from the Municipal Meeting of Black Youth to the Regional Meeting of the Black Youth, passing through the State Meeting of Black Youth to the National Meeting of Black Youth. There is no record of the number of Municipal and Regional meetings held, but the presence of sixteen states, already cited, ensures that, in them, there was the realization of State meetings.

It is noticed that a mobilization of the meeting was made in large measure by the National Commission of ENJUNE, From the Contact each member with Black youth organizations in the cities, states or regions. To maintain contact and publish information, one of the main instruments used was a list of e-mails that worked for all levels of the Organization, as shows the following registry:

*"With the same goal of socializing information and promote debates, besides this instrument, since the beginning of the construction process of the meeting it has been used to a discussion group on the Internet, where young people communicate through [ENJUNE@yahoogrupos.com.br](mailto:ENJUNE@yahoogrupos.com.br) Available at <http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/ENJUNE>" (ENJUNE 2007: 7).*

## **2.2. Emphasis on the Specificity of Black Youth and Affinity with the whole Black Movement**

There are arguments present in the ENJUNE document which holds the centrality in the self-affirmation of specificity of the black youth as a social and political actor, who claim a distinction and not a radical discontinuity between this black youth and the whole black movement. Some of these basic arguments are: the specific form that racial inequalities befall on the black youth; a generational perspective of organization, therefore, proper to those young blacks contemporaneously; the need for specific public policies for this population segment and self-perception of these actors as potential builders of these policies in dialogue with the State.

Regarding the racial inequality that black youth is subjected, which we mention in the introduction, the report ENJUNE points out:

*"Young black men (and women) reach as far as 16 million people, a percentage of 47% of blacks people in the Brazilian youth. When we look at the data concerning the living conditions of black youth, we see the urgency for action focusing this segment. Factors such as the escalating violence, unemployment, lack of harmony between the Brazilian educational system, culture and history of the black population is characterized today as major challenges to overcome. Thus, it is evident that the social chasm that separates blacks and whites in different social spaces, are the result not only of the process of slavery and past discrimination, but also an active process of prejudices*

*and racial stereotypes that legitimize, daily, discriminatory procedures.*" (ENJUNE, 2007: p.6)

About generational vision for the organization, which emphasizes the novelty that black youth brings on contemporaneously, their motto exemplifies: "New perspectives on ethnic/racial militancy," and it is the vision that led to construction of ENJUNE. Still, as mentioned, we insist to refer the "new", represented by ENJUNE, as a "foundation" which on his turn refers to the whole history of the movement and black. Returning to the speech from the actors themselves:

*"Acting as a broad movement [the black youth] has shown great capacity for organization and mobilization, denouncing racism, discrimination, violence and the lack of opportunities imposed by society. Among these alternatives, the ENJUNE stands out for being heading to a heterogeneous organization, whilst keeping its autonomy as a black youth, focusing on a new perspective in the fight for their rights. The choice of profile afro-centered, non-partisan and without religious ties, privileges the collective construction, includes the different profiles of youth and the particularities of each region. This "new perspective" means a contemporary approach to society, although grounded in the secular struggle of the black movement."* (ENJUNE 2007: 6)

In the transcript below it becomes clear that the arguments of ENJUNE draws attention to the performance of black youth as an agent or a political actor in the struggle for racial equality, highlighting the lack of public policies for the segment, and the proposition to become an actor in the construction state actions or policies.

*"The goals mentioned by ENJUNE translate, as well as the accountability with the ethnic/racial and youth affairs, the understanding of the black youth about the political and social context in which they live (...). The concern with the construction of a document that serves as guidance for the implementation of policies and focal actions for the black youth, shows a commitment to establish guidelines for the actions of government, organized civil society and of their own, taking the responsibility together to the overcome its demands."* (ENJUNE, 2007: p.7)

### **2.3. Some Results and Tensions built/expressed in the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE**

One of the most important results or consequences of the 1<sup>st</sup> National Meeting of Black Youth it is their report, with all the proposals approved at the final plenary meeting. It comprises any information from the ENJUNE, the regiment that ordered the Meeting, the approved proposals.

The creation of a Communication Network<sup>9</sup> for the black youth, through the Internet meeting page, was also a direct consequence of ENJUNE.

Another outcome from the proceedings of the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE, foreseen in its report and subsequently put into practice, was the realization of a National Black Youth Forum (FONAJUNE), an unprecedented initiative, with the purpose of organizing specifically the black youth in Brazil – in other words, different from the previous national black organizations – fomenting their political participation to defend the proposals approved at the Meeting. Among these proposals the highlight was the fight against the extermination against black youth, but also the defense of affirmative action and reparations.

*"It seeks to articulate and promote greater political and social participation of the black youth throughout the country. This forum will consolidate the achievement of the Meeting and will also work to implement and coordinate the actions indicated by the results of ENJUNE and contribute in the new social viewpoint in the ethnic/racial context. This Forum is buoyed on an afro-centered perspective coalescing upon different realities and perspectives important consensus as fighting the extermination of the black youth and the defense of reparations and affirmative action."* (ENJUNE, 2007: 7).

Around the term "afro-centered" there was a kind of "passive consensus" - in the Gramscian sense of the term, namely, was not the product of active reflection and exchange of arguments between the direct participants, but was a commonly shared understanding at the meeting. Therefore, the expression "afro-centered" was like a keyword that when held, did not aroused opposition, but around which there was no debate, just as there is no definition among the documents. But if we look at other discursive elements of the Final Report – as "non-partisan" or "no religious ties" – we can deduce that the term "afro-centered" captures the idea that, although black youth is diverse (in several religions and various parties), the references this organization would be focused on would be the African roots which all young blacks would have, or should have, reference.

From a first analytical point of view, obviously one can criticize the essentializing of a sole black African "being" or "root" that such "afro-centered" view conveys. However, in some ways, it is understood here that the black youth movement operates on what Gayatri Spivak (2003) called *strategic essentialism*, that is, a common form of identification that guides the actions of political actors to overcome the condition in which they are subordinated<sup>10</sup>.

As the resolutions 40, 47 and 63 of the Axis 10 mention, Social Intervention in Politic Spaces:

*"40. Highlighting the importance of doing the political struggle of black youth with an afro-centered positioning;* (ENJUNE, 2007: p.59).

*47. Politic education/formation for the Youth with a pan-African and afro-centered view (more reading, history of Black Struggle, party dynamics, etc.).* (ENJUNE, 2007: p.59).

*63. Promote the participation of Black Youth in a perspective of differential*

*intervention and occupation of public spaces, based on principles of autonomy and Afro-centrism; Axis 10: Social Intervention in Political Spaces.*" (ENJUNE 2007: 61).

Concluding this panoramic description of the process of ENJUNE, it seems important to mention the moment of greatest tension between the participants of the meeting, during their Final Plenary. The most prominent moment was a vote on a resolution that advocated the abolition of the Ministry of Education program called "University for All" (PROUNI – *Programa Univesidade Para Todos*)<sup>11</sup>.

This resolution reached the Senate Chamber at a time when there were a few attending delegates and, during its presentation, the Chamber was quickly filled. The proposal to reject PROUNI was approved by the plenary. However, the systematization of the report after a dialogue process, the negotiations and agreements between the participants, eventually dissolved the resolution, dividing it along the final document, so that the impact of this position was diminished.

One must consider at least a question at this episode, which is: there is a clear contradiction in this position against the PROUNI from the ENJUNE because the program is the main form of affirmative action, promoted by the Brazilian government, which benefits the black youth of the country. How then, one can wonder, this program was eventually rejected by the most significant gathering of this organized youth? Without solving the contradiction pointed out, we risk saying that a possible answer to this question is that the movement of black youth, who expressed a willingness for dialogue and cooperation with the Government to establish public policies, do not mistake this provision with the loss of critical autonomy.

Finally, we emphasize that the actual tension of the debate described above, in itself, does not seem to have gravitated around a conception of Education and or how the black youth place themselves in it. Before that, a decision that belonged to a minority sector of the student movement seems to have prevailed, whose conception of education sometimes comes down to the slang term "public education, free and good quality education for all". This statement, obviously, most activists agree, nevertheless, adds too little on the matter of thinking and intervening in the practical reality of unequal access of black youth to those rights. Thus, we would have to point out another contradiction: there was, in this case, a still very limited formulation from the black youth movement to the field of Education, where historically the Brazilian Black Movement has great relevance, performance and formulation (Gonçalves and Silva 2000).

### **3. The FONAJUNE - National Black Youth Forum<sup>12</sup>**

The National Black Youth Forum (FONAJUNE), as previously described was one of the proposals decided by a National Meeting of Black Youth (ENJUNE). Prominent among the various objectives of the Forum, four elements: continuity and defense of the ENJUNE's report; the communication and exchange among black youth; the encourage-



ment for political participation; and the defense of public policies for the black youth.

With these objectives<sup>13</sup>, the launch meeting of the National Black Youth Forum took place in Guarujá, the seaside city of São Paulo state, between 24 and 26 of July, 2008.

### 3.1. The Outlined Needs and Conjuncture Interpretation

It is noted in the self-definition of the FONAJUNE, a concern to reassert a leading role and autonomy of black youth in their political activity and the role of the articulations and spaces for exchange of experiences. Another important feature is the respect for differences and numerous identities within the black youth. It is not hard to see that all these features are strongly identified with the postulates in ENJUNE and if there is something that can set apart the *Lauro de Freitas's* Moment (ENJUNE) from this, then it has not yet appeared in the documents.

One important note, however, is the emphasis given in the *Lauro de Freitas's* meeting to the theme of fighting the "Genocide against the Black Youth" – an ongoing term of the actors in the black youth movement referring mainly to the high number of young blacks being victims of homicide and police violence, but often with this expression the actors (actresses) also refer to the marginalization in their access to the decent work, health, education and other social rights – and that, at the launch meeting of the Forum and its forwarding, did not appear with the same strength.

### 3.2. The Guideline

Thus, taken as a time of reaffirmation and consolidation of the process that culminated in the ENJUNE in *Lauro de Freitas*, the launching activity of the FONAJUNE didn't held debates aiming to produce a new set of questions/decisions. In its programming, we find the following subjects: "Black Youth, from ENJUNE to the Forum: New perspectives on ethnic and racial militancy!", "Law 10.639/03: Applicability of the law, black youth and affirmative actions", "Black Youth – Retrospective, national and international conjuncture", "Insertion of Black Youth in political spaces", "World Social Forum: Perspectives, mobilization and intervention", "Afro-Multimedia: New Perspectives of communication in ethnic and racial militancy", "Youth *Quilombola* and Traditional Communities : New Perspectives?"<sup>14</sup>.

Unlike the scheduling of *Lauro de Freitas*, the above schedule does not show a tendency to develop proposals in working groups, having just thematic panels. The so-called "Genocide of Black Youth" does not appear explicitly in the programming and there is only a moment to discuss public policies and organization of the movement of black youth.

Maybe we didn't highlighted enough that both for ENJUNE, as for the organization of this launching event of the FONAJUNE, a share of the funding activity was guaranteed

by the government, in this case, the three spheres of Government had a participation: The city of Guarujá, the Government of the state of São Paulo and the Federal Government. Therefore, what can be seen is that the notion of movement autonomy for the black youth militants towards the government powers cannot be confused with the idea of “no relationship” or rejection of them.

Among civil society organizations directly or indirectly involved as partners, guests or participants, it is mentioned in the schedule: Zulu Nation Brazil, the National Network of Youth Support, UNEGRO (Union of Black People for Equality), the Unified Black Movement (MNU), Indigenous and Afro-descendant Youth Network (REJINA), Collective *Kilombagem*, NGO *Fala Preta*, Public Education Network - RECID, NGO Peripheral, Aiye Hip Hop network, Brazil Yowly network, the *Quilombo of Caçandoca* from *Ubatuba*, Palmarino Circle, National Coordination of *Quilombolas* (CONAQ), *Quilombo* Conception of Creole.

It is noteworthy in this group the existence of three major national organizations of the Black Social Movement: MNU, Palmarino Circle and UNEGRO. In *Lauro de Freitas*, there were besides these three, the Collective of Black Entities (CEN) and the Afro-Brazilian National Congress (CNAB).

It is important to note, also, the presence of local organizations of black youth, whose presence appears to be more concentrated in São Paulo. Most likely due to the fact that this federal unit hosts the event.

The expected number of participants ranged between 400 and 500 people according to the material prepared for the launch of the Forum, accounting for all forms of participation (delegates, observers, organizers, speakers and representatives of the Government). There is no recorded information on the number of states present, but, according to the site of the National Black Youth Forum, currently there are ten State Coordinations consolidated in four of the five regions of the country (in the respective states: Paraná, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Bahia, Pernambuco, Maranhão, Tocantins and Pará). According to reports and our direct observation, other states were present in Guarujá (such as Santa Catarina, Paraíba, Acre and Amapá), but there is no public information on their coordination.

### 3.3. The Organization

FONAJUNE's organization is governed by the resolutions of the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE, and its role, according to them is:

- “- *The Provisory Coordination of the National Black Youth Forum, responsible for consolidating it, will be defined during the National Black Youth Meeting, in its final plenary session and shall hold office until the launch of this current Forum and the holding of elective session at a date to define;*
- *The Provisory Coordination of the National Black Youth Forum will consist*

*of two representatives, necessarily black, being a man and a woman, aged between 15 and 29 years;*

*- The states that have indicated their representatives to the National Black Youth Forum during the meeting shall forward the request of nomination to the Discussion Group of ENJUNE at the address: **ENJUNE@yahoo grupos.com.br**"(ENJUNE, 2007: 22)*

The coordination model above reveals two important features of the National Forum for Black Youth: (i) the decentralization and (ii) horizontality. That because there is no national coordination, but a federal collegiate, composed of state coordination; and that the speech of the actors (actresses) commonly have the a "gender equity" nature, but that is objectively equivalent to the presence of men and women.

### 3.4. The Results

The launch meeting of the National Black Youth Forum did held discussion groups to prepare proposals, nor a final plenary. However, there was a moment, at the end of the activity, to ratify the State Coordinators elected by each of the attending states.

This was a time of competition for positions of male and female coordinators since each state should elect two youth for their coordination, at least one woman and one man. Many of the disputes were seized between the major entities present: Unified Black Movement (MNU), Palmarino Circle, and Union of Black People for Equality (UNEGRO). At other times, however, some sectors of youth that did not belong to any of these organizations ended up being identified as activists of a political party - being highlighted the Workers Party (PT)<sup>15</sup>.

The event did not produce new documents, but was able to ratify the choices from the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE and give new legitimacy to the state coordinators who, until that moment, were "Provisory Coordinators".

The organized black youth will be present, bearing a programmatic document and the legitimacy of this event in São Paulo's coast, at many places on the public policies agenda, especially for the agenda of public policies for the youth on the scope of Sectoral Conferences and Board Councils of Public Policies – among them, a National Conference on Public Policies for Youth, the National Youth Council and the National Council for Public Security.

## 4. Some Aspects of the Articulation of a Black Youth at the 1<sup>st</sup> National Youth Conference and National Youth Council

The Management Councils of Public Policies, as the CONJUVE (National Youth Council) and the Public Policy Conferences, as the National Conference on Public Policies for Youth, are possible participative spaces since the Brazilian Constitution of 1988

– the first constitution promulgated after the end of dictatorship in the country (in force between 1964 and 1985). Basically, they can be defined as public institutional spaces of encounter between state and civil society actors for co-management of public policies, mainly social policies. These public spaces are planned for the three government spheres in Brazil (cities, states and the Union) and, in some cases as health and education policies, these are mandatory.

These public spaces have received a substantial boost nationwide in recent years, because they have broadened the dialogue of the Federal Government with population groups and historically subordinate themes in social life and in the relationship with the institutional policy in Brazil. This expansion can be seen in the establishment of new Management Councils of Public Policies and especially for conducting a significant number of new conferences. For example, between 1988 and 2009 National Conferences were held with 33 different themes. Among these, 22 themes were introduced between 2003 and 2009 – the first seven years the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Pogrebinski and Santos 2010) – and between these themes were: promoting racial equality, relationships gender and women's rights, LGBT issues (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender), youth policies, among others.

It is important to distinguish the planned dynamics for the Conferences, from those of the Councils. A conference, as the 1<sup>st</sup> CNPPJ, occurs as an event of mobilization, for a few months in a given year, to discuss an issue, in this case youth policies. The conference occurs in stages in the municipalities, next it passes through the states, culminating in a national event with a significant number of representatives discussing the priorities of this policy.

Conversely, councils like the CONJUVE are configured as more permanent spaces for dialogue between social and state actors, with a smaller number of participants (in the case of CONJUVE, 40 representatives from civil society and 20 representatives from government are elected), for the co-management of a particular policy, a more thorough monitoring of its implementation, in this case the National Youth Policy.

Both the National Youth Conference (CNPPJ), and the National Youth Council (CONJUVE) are examples of the expansion of political and institutional public spaces in Brazil.

In the mean time of the ENJUNE's conclusion and the launch of FONAJUNE the black youth got all the proposals of the final report of its meeting to be elected as the first priority of the National Conference on Public Policies for Youth (1<sup>st</sup> CNPPJ). This conference was attended by over 2000 male and female delegates across the country. These "delegates" were managers or representatives of government, representatives of youth movements or not, movements of identification, syndicates, political parties, all the elected at municipal and state levels previously to this national stage, which occurred in April 2008 in the city Brasilia.

The 1<sup>st</sup> CNPPJ aimed to build, in the dialogue between representatives of governments and civil society organizations, the priorities of the National Youth Policies developed

by the Federal Government. Therefore, it is noteworthy the fact that this black youth, a still emerging social movement and, thus, not fully established in the public sphere, had their demands put as a main priority within a participative political process so broad and heterogeneous. Two elements seem most relevant to understanding this result. One of these was the organizational increase that the ENJUNE prompted, since it was as a process in which occurred the recognition of differences within the nascent social movement (perceived in gender, sexuality, world urban and rural etc), but did not prevent the ability to build a unified action in this group of actors, which is now self-identified as black youth.

The second element that seems important to understand the results of the 1<sup>st</sup> CNPPJ is the ability of black youth to express their specificities in terms of the intersection between *race* (seen on the conditions of the black population) and *age/generation* (seen in terms of youth). This linkage is a central argument of an active consensus building among the participants of the 1<sup>st</sup> CNPPJ – expressed in their slogan of struggle against “genocide or extermination of the black youth” – that guaranteed the legitimacy of the proposal for black youth to become the first priority approved by the majority of conference participants.

The black youth that started to organize themselves at FONAJUNE in 2010 began to integrate the CONJUVE (National Youth Council – created in 2005) after their representatives were elected in a specific assembly of the civil society organizations. The CONJUVE is also an area of co-management between the federal government and civil society, which can also be termed as a political and institutional public space, focused, in this case, on monitoring the implementation of the National Youth Policy.

One specific moment of intervention from the black youth at CONJUVE called our attention and will be described here directly: the working group “Black Youth and Public Policies”, undertaken at the initiative of CONJUVE and by the demand of the representatives of the black youth members of this council.

The working group “Black Youth and Public Policies” – composed in the 15th meeting of CONJUVE in November 2008 – was created in the after the 1<sup>st</sup> CNPPJ, in response to the priority given to the black youth segment at the Conference. To do so, it would be important an analysis of ENJUNE document, which was a reference to the demand of black youth at the Conference and a prioritized analysis of the “state of art” in relation to the actions of the Federal Government aimed at young black men and women.

The first meeting of “Black Youth’s WG”, as it became known, took place on February 9, 2009. This inaugural meeting was set to hold a workshop on the theme to support the Council’s work.

The referred workshop was given the same workgroup name, i.e. “Black Youth and Public Policies”. This happened on days 7 and 8 of April, 2009, in partnership with the Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (SEPPIR)<sup>16</sup>. Participated

in the activity a number of young representatives of the black movement – Nadjara Silva (ACBANTU), Angela Guimarães (UNEGRO), Samoury Mugabe (APJN), Christina Batista (Rhyme Sister’s of Hip Hop) and Milton Santos (LGBT Collective Structuring) – and other youth movements – such as IJC (which was represented by Davi Barros also President of CONJUVE). Also present were representatives of government bodies responsible for policies aimed at black people and youth – Kátia Coelho (SEPPPIR), Jose Eduardo Andrade (SNJ), Barbara Souza (SEPPPIR), Alex Nazaré (SNJ), Andrea Couto (SEPPPIR), Paula Janaína (SEPPPIR), Patricia Bittencourt (Coordinator for the Promotion of Racial Equality in Fortaleza-CE).

The report produced by the workshop, which we have analyzed, discourses about the international and national political sceneries of struggle for recognition and equality of African descendants. Goes through the current dilemmas of the African continent and the diaspora, the intensification of structural racism, the consequent intensification of anti-immigration policies and xenophobia in the world, especially in Europe in crisis, which shows the removal of the European commitment to “Durban Review Conference” as well as the removal of this commitment from the U.S., Canada and Israel.

It is worth noting in this report the use of the concept of *ubuntu*, according to which the workshop participants say “we are all interdependent, will not win alone, we are all [male and females] interconnected”. The black youth activists put the notion of *ubuntu* as opposed to the scenario of fragmentation of social movements, driven by neoliberal agenda since the 1980s and resulted in an action of government that divided the implementation of public policies, insufficient to meet the agenda of rights denied to the majority of the population – this includes here, in the concerns of workshop participants: black people, women, the young male and female, the “popular classes”.

It also draws attention the radical perspective presented by the workshop participants and that is recorded in the report. For these participants the new set of milestones in the public policies that specifically addresses the black youth, including its internal heterogeneity, must overcome the milestones that establish the modern Nation-State, which they said would be based on: bourgeois conceptions of youth, in racist, sexist and homophobic ideologies, besides the typical miscegenation and whitening ideologies of Brazil. Since this is a dialogue in an institutional space between representatives of social movements with state actors, it seems a very significant expression of this more radical critique to ideological foundations of the government. This position seems to, us once again, be revealing that these social actors conciliate a willingness to dialogue and negotiation with the government/state actors, while maintaining a proper perspective of their autonomy as a social movement, which, thus, do not constrain them when it considered necessary to weaver major critiques.

The Working Group presented a series of recommendations of Government Organs articulation, changes in existing Public Policies, besides the suggestions of the CONJUVE itself. Such suggestions improve, in particular, national public policies that would meet the black youth needs in some way, the insertion of an ethnic-racial/

generational perspective in the implementation of new policies and the monitoring of policy implementation for the *Quilombo* communities.

## 5. A Brief Consideration to further understand the Black Youth in the Democracy Building in Brazil

The analysis of the democracy building in Brazil nowadays challenges us, increasingly, to think as a new democratic institutionality, or institutional innovation –Sectoral Conferences, Sector Councils and Managers of Public Policies (DRAIBE, 1998, and TATAGIBA, 2002), Participatory Budgeting (SANTOS, 2002; AVRITZER, 2002 and 2003) – which, is intertwined with societal innovation, the repositioning of both dominant actors, previously privileged, for dialogue with the State, as well as the subordinated ones, which today find greater permeability of government to their demands, until the emergence of new actors as a result of this context.

The recent history of black youth indicates an interlinking between the societal and institutional innovation mentioned above. Lacking a more descriptive and analytical effort, to be developed in future work, we believe, even then, that the article presented here gives indications that for a better understanding of how these new actors constitute and positioned themselves one must not grasp these affinities and connections airtight both with other actors of civil society – in this case, more specifically, the black movement organizations and youth movements – as well as with the actors of political society (political parties, government spheres).

### Abbreviations

**ACBANTU:** Cultural Association for Preservation Bantu Heritage (*Associação Cultural de Preservação do Patrimônio Bantu*)

**APJN:** Political Articulation of Black Youth (*Articulação Política de Juventudes Negras*)

**CEN:** Collective of Black Entities (*Coletivo de Entidades Negras*)

**CNAB:** Afro-Brazilian National Congress (*Congresso Nacional Afro-brasileiro*)

**CNPPJ:** National Youth Conference (*Conferência Nacional de Juventude*)

**CONAQ:** National Coordination of Quilombolas (*Coordenação Nacional de Quilombos*)

**CONEN:** National Coordination of Black Entities (*Coordenação Nacional de Entidades Negras*)

**CONJUVE:** National Youth Council (*Conselho Nacional de Juventude*)

**ENJUNE:** National Meeting of the Black Youth (*Encontro Nacional da Juventude Negra*)

**FONAJUNE:** National Black Youth Forum (*Fórum Nacional de Juventude Negra*)

**IJC:** Institute of Contemporary Youth (*Instituto de Juventude Contemporânea*)

**LGBT:** Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (*Lésbicas, Gays, Bissexuais e Transgêneros*)

**MNU:** Unified Black Movement (*Movimento Negro Unificado*)

**PC do B:** Communist Party of Brazil (*Partido Comunista do Brasil*)

**PPJs:** Public Policy for Youth (*Políticas Públicas de Juventude*)

**PROUNI:** University for All (*Programa Univesidade Para Todos*)

**PT:** Workers Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*)

**REJINA:** Indigenous and Afro-descendant Youth Network (*Rede de Jovens Indígenas e Afro-descendentes*)

**SNJ:** National Secretariat for Youth (*Secretaria Nacional de Juventude*)

**SEPPIR:** Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (*Secretaria Especial de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial*)

**UNEGRO:** Union of Black People for Equality (*União de Negros pela Igualdade*)

## Methodological Appendix

This paper is a product of the case study initiated by the authors about the emergence of black youth as an actor in the democracy building in Brazil beginning of XXI century - specifically between the years 2007 and 2010.

The sources of primary data were collected from participant observation in the following places and moments: i) national phase of the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE (July 2007), ii) the inaugural meeting of FONAJUNE (July 2008), iii) a National Youth Conference (April 2008) and iv) meetings of the National Youth Council (February, April and December 2009).

Secondary data were collected mainly from the following sources: i) a report of the 1<sup>st</sup> ENJUNE (2007), ii) Map of Violence in Brazil (2011), iii) Synthesis of Social Indicators of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (2010).

## Data Sources

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## Notes

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- 1 The notion of emergent is utilized in a similar way as given by Raymond Williams (1977), in the sense that black youth qualify, here in Brazil, as a set of actors not yet established in the public sphere. Both because they are a counter public (Fraser 1995), a subordinated group, but also to have a fairly recent creation in this public sphere.
- 2 Perspective that understands democracy - here, in Brazil's case - as an ongoing process and not just as a transition between political regimes, from those considered authoritarian to democratic, which leads this movement to adopt a set of procedures supposedly “neutral” and allegedly “universal” and that, as we understand, sometimes gives shape to an elitist liberal democracy, or dominant democracy. Therefore, it starts in an expanded concept of democracy, understanding the meaning of democracy (its limits and possibilities), which is in constant dispute and that the trajectory of the democratic construction is likewise in constant struggle for the maintenance and expansion of rights, also with the purpose of reframing the limits of citizenship. Some of the main references for the discussion of this approach are: GRUPO DE ESTUDOS SOBRE A CONSTRUÇÃO DEMOCRÁTICA (1999), and Dagnino, E. (2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006). For an initial discussion of democratic theory between the political philosophy and political sociology, granting the possibility of emerging prospects for democracy, in contrast to the dominant perspective, see Morais, D.S. (2011).
- 3 Both in the federal sphere of government. The SNJ is located in the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, and coordinates the National Youth Policy of the Federal Government. On the other hand the CONJUVE is a Sector Council, of advisory nature, with representatives of the public power, especially the Federal Executive (which indicates such representatives) and representatives of civil society, that since the second administration of the Council are elected at a meeting of the civil society itself. For more information see [www.juventude.gov.br](http://www.juventude.gov.br).
- 4 Today it is considered youth, in the subject of age used by the Federal Government of Brazil

- for Public Policy called Youth (PPJ), the age group between 15 and 29 years.
- 5 National Survey by Household Sample Survey, conducted by the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). The data used here were found at the Summary of Social Indicators of the IBGE 2010, available at [http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/condicaoodevida/indicadoresminimos/sinteseindicais2010/SIS\\_2010.pdf](http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/condicaoodevida/indicadoresminimos/sinteseindicais2010/SIS_2010.pdf) Accessed July 25, 2011.
  - 6 View Map of Violence in 2011, available at [www.mapadaviolencia.org.br](http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br). The data presented here are mainly synthesized in Waiselfisz (2011: 60).
  - 7 It is well recognized the role of the black movement and specifically black youth in the social struggle for the establishment of affirmative actions in Public Higher Education Institutions in Brazil. In April of 2012, the Supreme Court – the highest court of justice in the country – ruled as constitutional the affirmative action initiatives in Brazilian Public Universities, like the University of Brasilia (UNB) and the Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar), which have to reserve part of their vacancies, in their undergraduate courses, for black students and indigenous, to combat the historical marginalization in access to Higher Education suffered by these populations.
  - 8 The database used for this section is the report prepared by the First National Meeting of the Black Youth listing the proposals that resulted from the discussions, the last step (the national stage) of ENJUNE. From the 26 Brazilian states, 16 hosted the ENJUNE stages, besides the Federal District (Alagoas Amapá, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraíba, Paraná, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondônia, São Paulo and Sergipe).
  - 9 Consult the website: [www.enjune.com.br](http://www.enjune.com.br).
  - 10 Despite the latest critical to the notion of strategic essentialism of Spivak, as from strands of feminism that focus on the deconstruction of heteronormative order (Miskolci, 2010), we understand that to understand the dynamics of race relations, at least in Brazil, and struggles of the actors (actresses) from the Black Movement and other strands from anti-racist movement in that context, this notion remains analytically useful.
  - 11 The University for All Program (PROUNI) is a policy of the Ministry of Education of the Brazilian government initiated under the management of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The PROUNI offers scholarships to low-income students graduating from the High School held in public schools so that they study at private universities. 50% of these scholarships are aimed at black students. It should be noted that this policy differs from the granting of funding to pay for tuition, because the scholarship PROUNI does not cause the student to contract debt to be paid in the future, but exempts the student from the payment of partial or total values usually charged by these universities.
  - 12 This section is based on data from three sources: direct observation at the Forum, and the data provided by the directors; the event sites and call for the launch of the Forum (which we had access through the event organizers); and the site from FONAJUNE (<http://forumnacionaldejuventudenegra.blogspot.com>).
  - 13 These objectives have been highlighted at FONAJUNE's website on the internet, whose address is <http://forumnacionaldejuventudenegra.blogspot.com>; page was consulted on 13, July of 2011.
  - 14 The program of the National Black Youth Forum design is described and was made available to us by the organizers, as part of the communication between them through e-mail message since September 16, 2008.

- 15** We'll not highlight, although it is important to note, the existence of strong and well known the relationship between black organizations and political parties. Not coincidentally, many of the young blacks that have been identified with the PT (Workers Party) in this time of dispute to coordinate the FONAJUNE later will integrate other major organization of Black Social Movement in Brazil called the National Coordination of Black Entities (CONEN). This organization, despite self-called supra-partisan, has a majority of the Workers Party (PT) members. Likewise it is well known the link between UNEGRO and Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B).
- 16** SEPPIR is the organ that holds ministerial status and belongs to the structure of the Brazilian Federal Government.

## Subject Index

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## El contexto sistémico y el factor generacional en los agravios y la política del movimiento universitario chileno

Víctor Muñoz Tamayo

**Resumen:** En cada conflicto socio político, al tiempo que se enfrentan proyectos de sociedad, se debate una "moral" y una "normatividad" que opera como legitimación de la acción. Para Barrington Moore, operaría allí un "agravio moral" o sentimiento colectivo construido histórica y relacionamente que nombra lo "justo" y lo "injusto", lo aceptable y lo inaceptable, un posicionamiento ético, un sentido de legitimidad que cuestiona los límites establecidos o reclama lo que, se estima, debiera ser el real cumplimiento de estos (Moore 1989). Lejos de ser una esencialidad, ello se construye en conexión con las mutaciones de los Estados, los mercados y los sistemas culturales, asumiendo o proyectando límites de un orden social. Así como los agravios que fundamentan la acción colectiva son contextuales y culturales, también lo es el campo de la política y la condición juvenil mediada por la condición estudiantil. Es decir, tanto las conexiones entre politicidad social y política institucional que definen de modo complejo el campo de la política, así como los significados sociales de ser joven y de ser joven universitario, se conectan directamente con el modo en que se reproduce la vinculación entre Estado, Mercado y Sociedad. Es justamente esta relación la que ha cambiado radicalmente en Chile durante los últimos 40 años, razón por la cual, se ha producido una fuerte mutación de los tres aspectos mencionados: los agravios de los movimientos sociales universitarios, el campo de la política y la politicidad de los mencionados movimientos; y la condición de juventud y de ser joven estudiante universitario. La presente ponencia hace un recorrido por esta mutaciones a fin de explicar las recientes movilizaciones universitarias del año 2011, incorporando para ello, una perspectiva generacional para el abordaje de la construcción de identidad histórica en los sujetos.

**Palabras clave:** Movimiento universitario, Chile, generaciones, agravios.

### 1. Introducción

Este texto trata sobre la vinculación entre juventud y política en el marco de la reciente movilización de estudiantes chilenos en contra del modelo de educación superior heredado de la dictadura de Pinochet. Tanto la "juventud" como la "política" se entienden como categorías no esenciales sino como construcciones socio históricas y conceptos polisémicos en donde el significado asociado se vincula con determinada concepción de la sociedad y apuesta relativa a su construcción. En torno a la juventud,

si bien el aspecto biológico y vital tienen incidencia en su configuración, es claro que la influencia de los factores sociales incide de forma determinante en la duración, los atributos y hasta la existencia misma de un período reconocido como "juventud" en diversos contextos históricos. Por lo mismo, si bien hoy existen ciertos consensos en torno a tramos etarios que corresponderían a este sector, ya sea como grupo vinculado a un estatus jurídico —ciudadanía electoral, responsabilidad penal— o a unidad de análisis estadístico —la juventud hasta determinada edad como convención—, el carácter de esta condición etaria, lejos de implicar la existencia de una totalidad homogénea, sugiere, más bien, una pluralidad de "juventudes" definidas socialmente (Duarte y Zambrano 2001).. Por su parte, el concepto de política, se asume como una categoría en constante construcción en donde el cómo la definamos se asocia al cómo entendemos y/o deseamos la sociedad y los modos en que ésta se construye. En tal sentido, algunos sostienen que la política es esencial a lo humano y es inagotable en sus formas, mientras otros ponen límites a lo que entienden por el campo de la política. Al mismo tiempo, hay perspectivas que señalan que "la política" continuamente cambia en los contenidos y dimensiones de la acción social identificados en ella, de manera que sería posible distinguir hoy cierta diferenciación entre "la política" entendida como campo instituido formalmente con modos, roles, temas y lógicas específicas; y una dimensión de "lo político" que correspondería al modo cotidiano en que los sujetos asumen la construcción de realidad social y pública. Desde tal mirada, el que "la política" sea continuamente redefinida por temas y dimensiones que emanen "lo político", sería la condición para que no se separe de lo sociocultural convirtiéndose en un espacio de élite (Garretón 1994). Un modo de sintetizar el carácter de construcción permanente que tiene la política como campo es lo que plantea Norbert Lechner al entenderla como la "*conflictiva y nunca acabada construcción del orden deseado*" (Lechner 2006), una lucha no divorciada de lo social, de lo expresivo, del arte, de los afectos, de todo lo constitutivo de la cultura humana y en donde los contextos definen las posibilidades constructivas de los actores desde sus apuestas y conflictos. Visión similar a la de Laclau y Mouffe que ven en las democracias órdenes problemáticos —es decir, que siempre se interroga sobre sí y por tanto no es un acabado inmutable— que otorgan posibilidades y límites a la conflictividad política; un espacio en donde un consenso racional absoluto —muerte conceptual de la política como antagonismos— no es posible en tanto las sociedades son compuestas por sujetos que constantemente piensan y proyectan totalidades desde su particularidad (Laclau y Mouffe 2004).

De esta manera, las distintas perspectivas sobre juventud y política dan cuenta no sólo de categorías para la comprensión de realidades sociales, sino que también de instrumentos conceptuales para la construcción de tales realidades. Suponen, por tanto, posicionamientos políticos, de modo que pretender establecer conceptos únicos, indiscutibles y universales al respecto, sería una tarea no sólo complicada sino que además absurda. ¿Cómo pretender encerrar un concepto en una definición rígida cuando su carácter abierto y en pugna es lo que lo constituye? Por lo anterior, no es extraño que clásicos del pensamiento y las ciencias sociales abordaran la "definición" de tales conceptos con cierta dosis de ironía. Ironía como la que planteó Bourdieu cuando dijo que la juventud "no es más que una palabra", una palabra que aun cuando sugiera uniformidad, contiene toda la diversidad estratificada de la sociedad;

una palabra que crea sociedad y cambia con la sociedad; una palabra que establece fronteras, delimita y condiciona el acceso de las nuevas generaciones a determinadas posiciones en el orden sistémico; en definitiva, una palabra cuyo significado está constantemente en disputa y mediante el cual se ejerce poder (Bourdieu 1990). Una "jugarreta" similar es la que nos presenta Arendt en su ensayo "Qué es la política", en donde analiza la construcción de definiciones y sentidos que han acompañado tal concepto desde su origen semántico en la *polis* griega. A partir de esta revisión, la filósofa asume la política como el debate y la acción de seres humanos que se reúnen en el ágora social para construir sus propias historias, un ejercicio que surge entre los "libres e iguales", pues la libertad no sería el objetivo sino el piso necesario desde donde la política se ejerce. Con ello, la respuesta a su pregunta inicial, más que constituir una definición absoluta, es una "apuesta política" que asume la heterogeneidad y el carácter conflictivo de las definiciones, justificaciones y sentidos de la política en la historia Arendt (Arendt 1997).

Considerando estos aspectos, es que las definiciones de juventud y política que acá se utilizan, serán abordadas reconociendo su carácter de instrumentos de interpretación y acción social. Se entenderán y asumirán "las juventudes" como realidades y conceptos en donde se mezclan elementos simbólicos y materiales; tan estéticos como económicos, tan culturales como políticos e institucionales. En tal sentido, se entenderá y asumirá la juventud, más que como unidad objetiva, como una diversidad socioeconómicamente estratificada que está íntimamente asociada al modo de nombrar "las juventudes"; es decir, a la construcción social e ideológica de éstas.

En el presente texto entendemos que, sin ser hoy la condición de estudiante un sinónimo de joven, sigue ésta señalando un componente estructural importante para la comprensión de algunas dimensiones de la juventud. Asumiendo que los sistemas de educación contienen inequidades asociadas a la reproducción estratificada de las estructuras sociales, se entienden a los estudiantes como un sector adscrito a una condición diversa, multclasista e íntimamente ligada a los mecanismos de reproducción social y a los cambios que en estos se desarrollen. Es decir, la condición de estudiante, lejos de ser homogénea y estática, varía histórica y socialmente en su composición y en las posibilidades reales de desarrollo y ascenso socio económico de los diversos sujetos vinculados a ella (Bourdieu y Passeron 2003).

Para el estudio del movimiento de los jóvenes estudiantes chilenos, es preciso recordar que en cada conflicto socio político, al tiempo que se enfrentan proyectos de sociedad, se debate una "moral" y una "normatividad" que opera como legitimación de la acción. Para Barrington Moore, operaría allí un "agravio moral" o sentimiento colectivo construido histórica y relacionamente que nombra lo "justo" y lo "injusto", lo aceptable y lo inaceptable, un posicionamiento ético, un sentido de legitimidad que cuestiona los límites establecidos o reclama lo que, se estima, debiera ser el real cumplimiento de estos (Moore 1989). Lejos de ser una esencialidad, ello se construye en conexión con las mutaciones de los Estados, los mercados y los sistemas culturales, asumiendo o proyectando límites de un orden social. Pero así como los agravios que fundamentan la acción colectiva son contextuales y culturales, también lo es el



campo de la política y la condición juvenil mediada por la condición estudiantil. Es decir, tanto las conexiones entre politicidad social y política institucional que definen de modo complejo el campo de la política, así como los significados sociales de ser joven y de ser joven universitario, se conectan directamente con el modo en que se reproduce la vinculación entre Estado, Mercado y Sociedad. Es justamente esta relación la que ha cambiado radicalmente en Chile durante los últimos 40 años, razón por la cual, se ha producido una fuerte mutación de los tres aspectos mencionados: los agravios de los movimientos sociales universitarios, el campo de la política y la politicidad de los mencionados movimientos; y la condición de juventud y de ser joven estudiante universitario. A continuación se hará un recorrido por estas mutaciones a fin de explicar las recientes movilizaciones universitarias del año 2011 y 2012, incorporando para ello, una perspectiva generacional para el abordaje de la construcción de identidad histórica en los sujetos.

## **2. Configuración del ser joven y estudiante en Chile. Del contexto desarrollista al Estado subsidiario**

La "juventud" que conocimos como realidad de masas en América Latina surgió en el marco de las experiencias desarrollistas de América Latina que buscaban replicar los Estados de Bienestar del primer mundo. Entonces creció notablemente la expectativa de vida y por tanto, también creció la población económicamente activa, satisfaciendo los requerimientos de mano de obra (Reguillo 2000). Entonces, a la gran cantidad de sujetos que dejaban de ser niños, el sistema no los requirió para una incorporación inmediata al mundo del trabajo (mundo adulto), reteniéndolos en las escuelas que fueron el espacio de masas de una identidad específicamente juvenil. Por ello, durante gran parte del siglo XX, la condición de estudiante estuvo asociada a la categoría juventud casi como sinónimo, lo que fue cambiando con los años al emerger identidades juveniles asociadas a las producciones estético-culturales y a lo local. Para investigadora mexicana Rossana Reguillo, la educación masificada, la esperanza de un posible ascenso social por vía de ella, y una industria cultural y simbólica que se desarrollaba para el nuevo "mercado de los estudiantes-jóvenes", fue lo que definió al sujeto juvenil en este contexto de mediados del siglo XX, según lo cual los sistemas jurídicos lo incorporaron como una especificidad de derecho y partícipe de la política institucional (Reguillo 2000). Reguillo entiende que justamente es aquel contexto estructural el que cambia en las décadas de fines del siglo XX puesto que la actual incapacidad del sistema educativo para garantizar formación que signifique un ascenso social real, la precarización del empleo y el horizonte de inestabilidad e informalidad de las nuevas generaciones más pobres, así como el descrédito de la política institucional, marcarían el decaer de los factores que contextualizaron la definición e integración social de los jóvenes. En este contexto, mientras las instancias económicas, educativas, jurídico normativas y políticas decaen como "ritos de pasaje" que otorgan certidumbre a las inserciones sociales de los nuevos ciudadanos; ocurriría que todo aquello relativo a la expresión y la industria cultural asociada a la juventud, se fortalecería como elemento diferenciador. Los jóvenes de hoy tomarían estos últimos aspectos y los llenarían de identidad, dando lugar a múltiples sentidos de pertenencia

que compensarían el “déficit simbólico” de lo que es ser joven hoy en sociedad. Un análisis similar sostiene Manuel Antonio Garretón cuando plantea que aquello que a lo largo del siglo XX se entendió como propio de los jóvenes, como: “*inseguridad de futuro, inserción precaria en la sociedad, necesidades de formación y adaptabilidad*”, hoy, tras el decaer del desarrollismo industrializador y la irrupción de los modelos neoliberales, son aspectos que se vuelve transversales etariamente, volviéndose más difusas las fronteras que definen las categorías etarias (Garretón 2007). Estos análisis, nos sitúan en el plano de una juventud que estaría cambiando profundamente en el continente pues los aspectos que la definieron en el siglo XX se derivaban de un tipo de vinculación entre Estado, mercado y sociedad que ya no estaría vigente.

En el caso concreto de la Educación superior en Chile, su mutación en las últimas décadas ha sido evidente en el sentido de alterar los sentidos e imaginarios de juventud estudiantil como proyección de la movilidad social y la integración promovida y resguardada por el estado. A continuación una síntesis del sistema educativo actual y la magnitud de los cambios acaecidos desde las políticas de autofinanciamiento universitario promovidas por la dictadura:

· En Chile, el sistema educacional cuenta con ocho años de enseñanza básica y cuatro de enseñanza media, luego de los cuales se opta a la educación superior. Las universidades que están más directamente vinculadas al sector público son las llamadas “tradicionales”, a las que se accede por examen único, y constituyen los más antiguos centros académicos públicos y privados, e instituciones derivadas de ellos. Las universidades chilenas más importantes y prestigiosas son dos universidades tradicionales, la Universidad de Chile, entidad pública creada en 1842, y la Pontificia Universidad Católica, constituida en 1888 la cual es una institución privada dependiente de la Iglesia Católica pero que recibe recursos directos del Estado. Las universidades tradicionales se agrupan en el “Consejo de Rectores”, organismo existente desde 1954 que constituye una voz importante en la generación de políticas públicas de educación, así como en la acreditación de programas y carreras. El Consejo de Rectores es también el organismo que implementa el sistema de ingreso a sus universidades mediante una prueba única de selección que otorga puntajes en una escala de números de tres dígitos. Las universidades tradicionales son las únicas que reciben un financiamiento estatal directo y no condicionado, en cambio, las universidades privadas “a secas” que no pertenecen al Consejo de Rectores, no reciben financiamiento fiscal directo, pero sí pueden acceder a aportes fiscales indirectos concursables, compitiendo por ellos con las universidades tradicionales. En las universidades tradicionales, a mayor demanda por las vacantes disponibles de cada universidad, el postulante requiere de un mayor puntaje a obtener en el examen único de ingreso, de modo que los puntajes de selección para cada casa de estudios constituyen un indicador del prestigio de éstas. Las universidades privadas externas al Consejo de Rectores, tienen libertad de exigir o no, la rendición, o una determinada calificación en la mencionada prueba de ingreso, pues sus sistemas de incorporación de estudiantes funcionan por fuera de los de las universidades tradicionales. Sin embargo, es mediante el examen único de acceso a las universidades tradicionales, que las instituciones privadas “a secas” pueden acceder a un tipo de aporte fiscal indirecto que se otorga por recibir a los alumnos que

obtienen los más altos puntajes en esta prueba. Las universidades privadas no tradicionales se masificaron a partir de 1981, llegando hoy en día a tener una cobertura mayor que las universidades pertenecientes al Consejo de Rectores.

· En Chile, los colegios públicos básicos y secundarios son administrados desde los años ochentas por los municipios —proceso de municipalización entre 1981 y 1986—, lo que genera significativas diferencias sociales, puesto que hay gobiernos locales con óptimos recursos para sostener la educación y otros que no cuentan con las entradas económicas suficientes. Existen también los colegios privados que se financian con cuotas y los privados que reciben subvención del Estado. Debido a la imposibilidad de los colegios municipales pobres y de los particulares subvencionados gratuitos de competir en igualdad de condiciones con los privados pagados y con algunos colegios municipales que seleccionan académicamente a sus alumnos, ha ocurrido que la tendencia ha sido creciente en el sentido de que las pruebas de selección universitaria dejan fuera de las universidades tradicionales —sobre todo, de las de mayor prestigio— al grueso de la población de menos recursos.

· Desde 1977, la Universidad de Chile dejó de ser gratuita —mantenía sólo el cobro de algunos servicios— y pasó a tener un sistema de arancel diferenciado socioeconómicamente. Desde 1981 se abandonó este sistema y se implementó una modalidad de crédito que consistía en que todos los estudiantes pagaban las colegiaturas establecidas, pero accedían a solicitar, según su condición socioeconómica, porcentajes de crédito que significaban la postergación total o parcial del pago para cuando estuviesen insertos en el mercado laboral, una vez terminada su condición de estudiantes.

.- En Chile, en cambio, las universidades fueron concebidas como centros de élite con matrícula restringida, contándose, hasta 1981, con un limitado aumento de vacantes y centros académicos. Fue a partir de la década de los ochenta y hasta hoy, que con la expansión de instituciones privadas de educación superior, creció significativamente la cobertura, accediendo una mayor cantidad de estudiantes pertenecientes a los primeros quintiles socio económicos de la población, es decir, a los grupos de menos ingresos en una división que considera 5 tramos con el 20% de la población cada uno (Bruner, Uribe 2007). Estos fueron acogidos por tales entidades privadas que exigían menos requisitos de selección, no obstante, debieron pagar aranceles en un mercado académico diverso en precios, que incorpora como clientes a sectores de clase media baja y baja con capacidad de endeudamiento. Se da entonces la paradoja que hoy, mientras las universidades públicas y privadas tradicionales, sobre todos las más prestigiosas de la capital, se elitizan aún más —pues los quintiles de mayores ingresos las siguen prefiriendo y son ellos los que tienen las ventajas comparativas para su acceso—, gran parte de las privadas no tradicionales son, junto con algunas tradicionales de provincia y otras tradicionales técnicas y de formación en pedagogía de Santiago, las que en mayor medida recogen las masas de estudiantes de los primeros quintiles que mayoritariamente no obtienen altas calificaciones en el examen único de admisión. Por su parte, las políticas gubernamentales han incentivado la presencia de los bancos e instituciones privadas de cobranza en el sistema de educación superior, tanto para las universidades tradicionales como para las privadas, como es el caso de una reciente reforma que permite acceder a créditos bancarios teniendo al Estado como aval. En síntesis, la masificación de la educación superior en Chile, con un consecuente mayor acceso de los primeros quintiles más pobres, en vez de reali-

zarse mediante el aumento de la cobertura fiscal, se hizo desde el sector privado con inserción del capital bancario, lo que para los defensores del modelo constituye una característica de “*sociedad democrática de mercado*” (Brunner, Uribe 2007) .

### **3. Mutaciones en las vinculaciones entre juventud y política en el caso de los estudiantes**

Como síntesis de lo que ha cambiado en la historia reciente de la vinculación juventud – política en Chile, se presentan los siguientes puntos que dan cuenta de un proceso en curso:

#### **3.1. Sentidos y cargas simbólicas de juventud y política en el paso de la democracia a la dictadura**

Mientras los años 60 fueron de discursos renovadores e inclusivos de lo juvenil por parte de un centro y una izquierda política que apelaban a “la patria joven” y el “poder joven”, ello se quebró cuando la dictadura en 1973, junto con prohibir los partidos y negar reconocimiento a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, proyectó la imagen de un deber ser juvenil que desdeñaba la politización en aras de la unidad nacional (Muñoz 2003). Al mismo tiempo, si hasta 1973 la política atraía identitariamente a las nuevas generaciones socializadas en su valoración como ámbito decisor de la vida colectiva, en la segunda mitad de los setenta tal política no sólo fue satanizada por el régimen de Pinochet, sino que se le fue restando peso estructural en la medida que la conducción del Estado (objetivo de la pugna política) se consideró subsidiaria del mercado.

#### **3.2. Lo social y la política en el paso de la democracia a la dictadura**

Antes de 1973, y siguiendo una tendencia que venía desde los años treinta, el proceder de los actores sociales estaba conectado con la acción de las instancias formales de representación política, es decir, los partidos. Tal imbricación entre partidos y organizaciones sociales (Garretón 1994) se facilitaba por el hecho de que las demandas y discursos sectoriales contenían un horizonte político global, del mismo modo que los partidos tenían conexiones sociales afianzadas en orgánicas sectoriales, las que en algunos casos se manifestaban como militancia de masas. En tal contexto, los actores juveniles fueron en gran medida dobles militantes de organizaciones sociales y de partidos, ocurriendo que las organizaciones sociales politizadas (“frentes sociales” en el lenguaje partidista) veían en los partidos la posibilidad de unir las miradas sectoriales con las nacionales, ello al tiempo que los partidos de “masas” (o aquellos que sin ser de masas estaban involucrados en el activismo social), entendían que los “frentes sociales” eran las instancias donde las políticas partidistas luchaban por la hegemonía desde las bases. Con la dictadura militar, la represión encontró la resistencia de movimientos sociales y partidos políticos que se reconstruyeron paralelamente desde la clásica figura del “doble militante social partidista”, aunque esta vez, con eje en partidos políticos prohibidos y organizaciones sociales no reconocidas

institucionalmente. Tal recomposición, con un fuerte componente de gestión cultural a fines de los años setenta en lo que fue la Agrupación Cultural Universitaria ACU en la Universidad de Chile (Muñoz 2006), dio paso a coyunturas cada vez más confrontacionales durante los ochenta, en donde la lucha fue por ocupar los espacios públicos y ganar la representatividad de instituciones alternas al orden dictatorial, como fueron las federaciones estudiantiles. En resumen, mientras que antes de 1973 primaba una política en donde la interlocución de los referentes sociales juveniles con las instituciones estatales se desarrollaba tanto desde las instituciones de representatividad sectorial como desde los canales internos de la militancia partidista; durante la dictadura ocurrió que, no obstante se cerraron los canales de interlocución Estado - sociedad y se prohibieron los partidos políticos, hubo una rearticulación de los ámbitos de participación social y partidista que en tanto campos alternos a la institucionalidad del régimen, reprodujeron, en parte, lo que habían sido sus tradicionales lógicas de relación.

### **3.3. La política y las organizaciones sociales representativas en el paso de la democracia a la dictadura**

Cuando en la dictadura se reconfiguró lo que venía siendo, desde la década 1930, una vinculación particularmente imbricada entre organizaciones sociales y partidos políticos, ocurrió que la cultura política altamente institucionalista de los chilenos encontró continuidad pese al régimen dictatorial. Fue así como la Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile, FECH reconstruida en 1984, aun cuando no tendría el más mínimo reconocimiento de la autoridad, nació de un largo proceso de elaboración de estatutos que buscaban hacer de la federación un organismo único, normado y representativo de todo el alumnado (García, Isla y Toro 2006).. Algo similar pasó con las otras federaciones universitarias y con la federación de los secundarios FESES que también, junto con desarrollar esta institucionalización alterna a la dictadura, se reconstruían actualizando el viejo esquema de la doble militancia social partidista. Efectivamente, aquí los partidos políticos ilegales, pero con orgánicas de base reconstruidas, eran determinantes en las demandas y lógicas de acción que se desarrollaban a nivel social, esto al tiempo que las listas a las elecciones de federación se acordaban en mesas partidarias bajo los ojos atentos de las direcciones políticas nacionales. De algún modo, se asumía por parte de los partidos, que tales experiencias eran también un valioso barómetro de aquella política nacional que, no estando presente en el parlamento, sí tenía en el mundo social (en este caso, en las federaciones estudiantiles) un campo de reproducción (Muñoz 2011).

### **3.4. El eje dictadura – democracia en los años de la transición**

La repolitización de la sociedad en los años ochenta tuvo en el eje dictadura – democracia un catalizador de las conflictividades. Tal eje iba más allá de la dicotomía autoritarismo – elecciones libres, e involucraba toda la profunda transformación que la dictadura había materializado en las relaciones entre Estado, mercado y sociedad.

No obstante, durante la transición no se abordó este carácter global de la tensión, y los partidos políticos, más que atender a la conflictividad social, a revertir las modernizaciones autoritarias que dejaba el régimen, y a satisfacer expectativas de cambios estructurales (que en décadas pasadas coparon buena parte de sus preocupaciones), tendieron a eludir los efectos disruptivos de tal conflictividad y promesas de cambio, orientándose a lograr acuerdos parlamentarios sobre la base de la aceptación de la "obra gruesa" del modelo político y económico vigente, es decir, aquel heredado de la dictadura. Sin duda, los llamados "enclaves autoritarios" (existencia de senadores designados, inamovilidad de los jefes de las fuerzas armadas, atribuciones y carácter del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional) colaboraron con esta tendencia en que el imperativo pragmático de consenso se impuso acosta de una tecnificación y desvinculación social de la política. Entre los efectos inmediatos de esta situación, ocurrió que la reconfiguración de los partidos dentro de un sistema legal, el retorno de los mecanismos electorales de participación y el reconocimiento de las instancias representativas del mundo social, se vivieron en paralelo con una crisis de las conexiones "de masas" de muchos partidos y un declinar del interés ciudadano por participar en los procesos electorales. En síntesis, se perdía el carácter totalizador que las ideologías utópicas de la modernidad le habían conferido a la política, esto en la medida que el creciente poder definitorio del mercado contrastaba con el vaciamiento de contenidos en las disputas programáticas por la conducción del Estado.

### **3.5. Los agravios de los universitarios chilenos en el paso de la dictadura a la democracia**

En Chile, las universidades que tradicionalmente recibían financiamiento del Estado, hasta antes de 1973, sólo cobraban montos mínimos por algunos servicios y establecían cuotas de solidaridad voluntarias. El aporte estatal se vio reducido desde el mismo momento del golpe de Estado, lo que fue paralelo a la implementación de sistemas de autofinanciamiento como fue la modalidad de aranceles diferenciados según condición socio económica en 1977 y luego el sistema crediticio que se aplicó desde 1981, esto al tiempo que se detenía el crecimiento de la cobertura pública de educación superior y se incentivaba el surgimiento de universidades privadas sin financiamiento estatal. Si entre los años 77 y 80 el movimiento universitario buscó superar el miedo, recuperar las solidaridades colectivas y construir identidad desde la actividad artístico cultural, la década de los 80 se caracterizó por una resistencia a las medidas restrictivas del financiamiento de las universidades, la que se entendió como parte de toda una acción orientada al derrocamiento del régimen y el fin de la intervención militar de los gobiernos universitarios. Al producirse una transición política que no cambió el eje del autofinanciamiento de la educación superior, consolidándose una crisis económica permanente de las universidades, los estudiantes optaron por una demanda que reclamaba volver a lo existente en 1977, es decir, al "arancel diferenciado". El fundamento de esta opción, en lugar de una demanda de gratuidad, fue que se estimó que el grado de elitización alcanzado por la universidad (sobre todo por la Universidad de Chile), hacía más viable e incluso justo el pago diferenciado. El 2005, en un contexto de movilización contra la propuesta gubernamental

de un sistema de crédito universitario con participación bancaria y aval estatal, los estudiantes de las Universidades tradicionales lograron que el gobierno aceptara dar garantías de gratuidad a los pertenecientes al 40% más pobre del país (de acuerdo al arancel de referencia). Sin embargo, los efectos de esto no han sido suficientes para satisfacer a los movimientos estudiantiles, y ya en el 2011, en medio de una crisis generalizada del sistema de representación política, tales movimientos han vuelto a poner en el tapete el tema de la gratuidad de los estudios universitarios. Todos estos cambios nos muestran que los agravios estudiantiles en torno a la universidad pública, su financiamiento y el acceso y permanencia en ella de los sectores populares, no son una esencialidad o característica invariable, sino una construcción cultural y generacional vinculada a las condicionantes sociohistóricas.

### **3.6. La política y las organizaciones sociales representativas en la transición a la democracia**

Durante la transición política, la decepción primó en buena parte de las fuerzas opositoras que presenciaron la mantención de la constitución autoritaria y del modelo económico. Ello generó la desarticulación de gran parte de las redes organizadas en los territorios y centros de estudio. A partir de entonces, las nuevas organizaciones se reconstruyeron ya no al viejo estilo de la doble militancia social partidista, sino desde referencias diversas, varias de ellas autónomas respecto a los partidos. Estos últimos, se reconfiguraron institucionalmente, pero perdieron presencia local. En las universidades hubo crisis de las federaciones a principios de los noventa, las que luego se rearticulaban y llegaron a ser dirigidas por miembros de antiguas o nuevas agrupaciones de identidad política.

### **3.7. Lo social y la política en la transición a la democracia**

En la cotidianidad transicional, los partidos cambiaron su estructura desde masivas agrupaciones de "dobles militantes" sociales – políticos, a orgánicas reducidas aunque profesionalizadas desde su inserción en esferas de administración de gobierno nacional o local. Entonces, pareció acentuarse la diferencia entre "la política" entendida como campo estructurado formalmente a nivel institucional y de gobierno, en donde se establecen las relaciones de poder conectadas con la conducción general de la sociedad (representatividad electoral y partidos políticos); y una dimensión de "lo político" vinculada al modo cotidiano en que los diversos sujetos asumen la construcción de la realidad social deseada (instancias de sociabilidad, organizaciones civiles, movimiento ciudadanos) (Garretón, Manuel Antonio- 2007) y que contiene las conflictividades o antagonismos de fundamento social e identitario (Mouffe Chantal - 2007). Es decir, la institucionalidad de "la política" pareció cada vez más desconectada de aquello que la nutre y legitima en un orden democrático: su capacidad de ser permeada por "lo político" presente en las proyecciones e intereses que conflictivamente habitan lo social.

### **3.8. Sentidos y cargas simbólicas de juventud y política en la transición a la democracia**

Un modismo juvenil recurrente en los años noventa fue: “no estoy ni ahí”, expresión traducible como “no me interesa”, que parecía calzar con el creciente desinterés por la participación política y electoral, así como con la ausencia de debate político en la cotidianidad. Tal desinterés era particularmente visible en los jóvenes, que eran quienes no estaban acudiendo a inscribirse en los registros electorales, en circunstancias que los mayores ya lo habían hecho durante la coyuntura plebiscitaria de 1988. Se popularizó entonces una imagen que representaba a los jóvenes como expresión extrema de apoliticismo, y se tendió a asimilar lo juvenil a la apatía que entonces simbolizaba el joven tenista Marcelo Ríos, figura pública que parecía no motivarse por nada que no fuera su propia persona en una cancha de tenis. Sin embargo, no todos vieron en el diagnosticado apoliticismo un problema, incluso algunos lo valoraron positivamente atendiendo a que cierto desinterés en la política podría indicar que el país funcionaba sin mayores conflictos. Pero independientemente de lo anterior, lo cierto es que la situación era más compleja que un repentino apoliticismo en los jóvenes, de hecho, todavía más compleja que una desafección generalizada de los ciudadanos con respecto a la política. Lo que estaba en curso era que no sólo se vaciaba de política lo juvenil y lo social, sino que la propia política se vaciaba de conflictos y de miradas globales. En este sentido, hubo un discurso y una práctica que pretendía desconectar a la política de la sociedad, ello al plantearse una separación entre los grandes y complejos temas “políticos” (las relaciones entre Estado, mercado y sociedad, abarcando en esto los cuestionamientos a la constitución y al modelo económico), y lo que se suponía más simple, concreto y de efecto inmediato y palpable en lo “social”: “hacer cosas para la gente” preocuparse de “los reales problemas de la gente”. Quienes extremaron esta mirada, promovieron discursos que declaraban a la política como debate esencialmente alejado de los ciudadanos, esto al punto de levantar candidatos presidenciales que se declaraban “no políticos” y sí “hacedores de cosas”, como fue el caso de Joaquín Lavín en 1999 (Moulián 2004). No obstante, esta realidad ha ido cambiando, y hoy los contenidos simbólicos asociados a política y juventud se encuentran en plena revisión y pugna. Una creciente presencia pública de movimientos ciudadanos juveniles como el estudiantil (movilizaciones 2006- 2011), hacen presente día a día su descontento con los marcos institucionales de la política, al tiempo que se asumen como legítimamente “políticos” desde lo social, abordando tópicos como reformas tributarias, nacionalización de recursos naturales y una nueva constitución. Con ello, el apoliticismo ha dejado de ser presentado como sinónimo de juventud, pero lo pendiente sigue siendo el modo en que se comprende y proyecta la conexión entre sociedad y política.

## **4. La generación universitaria de la movilización 2011-2012**

Los agravios expuestos en el año 2011 por los estudiantes chilenos tenían continuidad con lo que habían sido los movimientos de la posdictadura, pues se volvía a rechazar el autofinanciamiento de las universidades, el endeudamiento al que se sometía a



los estudiantes, así como el rol determinante del mercado y del lucro en el sistema educativo. Pero también se iba más allá, pues si en lo que respecta a financiamiento y acceso, los movimientos universitarios de los noventa y del dos mil demandaron volver al sistema de arancel diferenciado e incrementar las becas para los grupos más vulnerables, este movimiento del 2011 fue explícito en sostener que "lo justo" era que el Estado garantizara una educación pública, gratuita y de calidad en todos los niveles, exigiendo medidas concretas que se orientaran a ello, como establecer becas de gratuidad para el 70% más pobre de la población (Bases para un gran acuerdo social por la educación chilena 2011). Lo anterior evidenciaba que, esta vez, el movimiento no sólo pedía reformas puntuales al sistema universitario, sino que exigía una política conducente al término del modelo educacional vigente en todos sus niveles y con todas sus implicancias de desigualdad en el acceso a la enseñanza de calidad.

La exposición de las ideas dejó al desnudo una radical diferencia de conceptos y valoraciones entre los movilizados y los defensores del modelo cuestionado. Mientras los primeros entendieron la educación como un derecho, el Presidente de la República la llegó a definir como un "bien de consumo" y una "inversión". Mientras los estudiantes rechazaron el lucro en las universidades mercantilizadas y denunciaron que éste sólo representaba deuda para aquellos que hipotecaban su futuro a fin de poder pagar los estudios, el Presidente argumentó que "nada es gratis en esta vida". Mientras el movimiento denunció la realidad del modelo como "*apartheid* educacional" y exigió que el Estado garantizara gratuidad a fin de que la calidad no fuese mediada por la condición socioeconómica del estudiante, Sebastián Piñera sostuvo que lo que se requería no era un "Estado docente" sino una "sociedad docente" en donde la iniciativa privada garantizara la "libertad de elegir en educación".

En este contexto, la evidencia de los antagonismos interpeló al conjunto de la sociedad. El movimiento fue entonces prolífico en mensajes destinados a obtener apoyos sociales, experimentando una notable variedad de medios para transmitirlos. Como ocurriera en los tiempos de la Agrupación Cultural Universitaria, una conjunción entre vías explícitas y simbólicas, dio cuenta de la unión de arte y política. Todo ello inundó no sólo las calles sino también las plataformas sociales de internet, de manera que se pasaba de la marcha o el baile callejero a los videos compartidos en Facebook; del "caceroleo" a las reflexiones de los blogueros y los twitter. Desde tales medios, un tópico recurrente fue la referencia internacional de los agravios y las demandas, para lo cual se difundieron saludos solidarios de estudiantes de distintos países del continente que exponían la realidad de sus propios sistemas públicos de enseñanza, ello a fin de resaltar las abismantes diferencias entre la realidad latinoamericana y el mercantilizado modelo chileno de educación. Ha habido, sin duda, un ajuste de los agravios y un aprendizaje generacional que inaugura un nuevo horizonte en las luchas sociales y políticas de Chile. Se está cerrando una etapa, pues hay un colapso no sólo del sistema educativo sino del modo de asumir la política. Los actores sociales se politizan, articulan equivalencias entre sus demandas y cada movilización se presenta como trascendente de lo local y lo gremial, pues para los movilizados no existe lo "estrictamente educativo", sino que, más bien, lo educativo se conecta directamente con las relaciones sistémicas entre Estado, mercado y

sociedad, de modo que lo que se cuestiona, son las bases políticas, económicas y culturales del neoliberalismo expresadas en la realidad educativa. Por eso, hablar de educación justa es también para los movilizados pronunciarse sobre el aprovechamiento nacional y social de las riquezas naturales (exigir la re nacionalización del cobre), el modo de garantizar los recursos para la educación equitativa y de calidad (reforma tributaria) y la generación de mecanismos institucionales para la participación óptima de los ciudadanos (reformas políticas, plebiscitos, propuesta de Asamblea Constituyente, demanda de una nueva Constitución). De ahí que cayeran en lo absurdo las acusaciones del gobierno en torno a que intereses políticos y no estudiantiles motivaban al movimiento, pues este último era explícito en declararse "político", y asumir como objetivo una repolitización de la sociedad en tanto participación efectiva de ella en las grandes decisiones que competen a la política. No obstante, es claro que hoy, esta politicidad emergente desborda y difiere de aquella política institucional que se materializó entre enclaves autoritarios e imperativos de consensos que perpetuaron la obra gruesa pinochetista. Lo que inspira a los estudiantes es una política que no sea impermeable a la conflictividad social, sino su canal. En tal sentido, los movilizados ya no quieren un consenso forzado por ataduras de una institucionalidad que no es funcional a los cambios. Ya no quieren cambiar en "la medida de lo posible", y parecen decididos a presionar para que "lo justo" sea la medida ética de una profunda transformación social.

## 5. Conclusiones

Es posible concluir que en el movimiento universitario chileno se refleja la configuración sistémica que tiene tanto la condición juvenil- estudiantil como las dimensiones de lo político y la política. En ello es clave la transformación revolucionaria que ejerce la dictadura en la matriz institucional y el modelo de desarrollo, lo que encuentra continuidad y adaptación en los años de la posdictadura. El contexto se sitúa, de tal modo, como un ámbito definitorio que los movimientos sociales universitarios han apostado a transformar al plantearse de modo paulatinamente más explícito el problema político de la construcción general de sociedad a nivel de las vinculaciones entre Estado, mercado y sociedad. Tanto juventud como política aparecen, en definitiva, como ámbitos que derivan de realidades estructurales, no obstante, las actorías sociales, en tanto actorías políticas, pugnan por reconfigurar. Se trata, sin duda, de un proceso en curso en donde lo que queda por resolver a la sociedad chilena es el modo en que logrará reconectar las dimensiones de lo político y la política a fin de que ambos factores conformen ciudadanías integrales y no reproduzcan impotencia en los actores sociales y deslegitimación social de las instituciones democráticas.

## Fuente de datos

"*Bases para un gran acuerdo social por la educación chilena*" Santiago 2011.  
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## Territorios disputados. Movilización política y procesos de institucionalización en niveles locales de gobierno (Argentina, 1997-2011)

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**Resumen:** Esta ponencia sintetiza los resultados del proyecto de investigación "Movilización política y gobierno local: Un análisis comparado de las relaciones entre las organizaciones territoriales y los municipios en el Gran Buenos Aires, 1997-2005" ejecutado entre 2008 y 2011 por el Grupo de Estudios sobre Protesta Social y Acción Colectiva del Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani y financiado por la Universidad de Buenos Aires. El proyecto analizó la relación entre la movilización y las transformaciones del régimen político de gobierno; concretamente, el vínculo entre las organizaciones territoriales y los gobiernos locales en un contexto caracterizado por el doble proceso de territorialización del conflicto social y la descentralización del estado nacional. Para esto se realizaron entrevistas a funcionarios locales, dirigentes de organizaciones sociales y análisis de un programa social impulsado por el ministerio de Desarrollo Social. Entre las conclusiones se sostendrá, por un lado, que ambos procesos complejizaron el campo estratégico de la política local a partir de a) el surgimiento y consolidación de organización territoriales con capacidad de movilización y recursos, y b) un cambio en la política social reorientada a un perfil productivista. Por otro lado, demostraremos que pese a la convergencia de esos procesos y al incremento de la capacidad estratégica de los actores informales organizados en la consecución de recursos derivados de la política social en el plano local, este fortalecimiento organizativo no condujo a una mayor institucionalización; sino que se vio limitado en sus posibilidades de participación y representación democrática en los niveles locales de gobierno por una sobredeterminación de la disputa entre aparatos partidarios y gobiernos locales por el control electoral de los territorios y para la reproducción de sus respectivas burocracias.

**Palabras clave:** Movilización política, gobierno local, institucionalización, participación política, Argentina.

### 1. Introducción

En este artículo se presentan los resultados de una investigación colectiva cuyo objetivo ha sido analizar la relación entre la movilización social y las transformaciones del régimen político de gobierno. Más específicamente, hemos estudiado las articulacio-

nes institucionales entre un nuevo *ethos* de la movilización social, caracterizado por la recuperación del territorio como unidad de acción política, la dinámica asamblearia y la democracia por consenso como procedimiento de toma de decisiones y una retórica de derechos para el reconocimiento de las organizaciones y la enunciación de sus demandas, por un lado y, por el otro, la descentralización política y administrativa del estado como estrategia de optimización de la intervención del poder político. Esta convergencia, registrada desde el segundo lustro de la década del '90, entre territorialización deliberativa del conflicto y descentralización institucional de la política pública, nos ha llevado a dirigir la atención a los gobiernos locales, en tanto instancias privilegiadas de participación, representación y gestión del conflicto social.

Frente a este contexto, el objetivo principal que recorre los distintos apartados de este trabajo remite a repensar la relación que se establece entre las organizaciones territoriales y los gobiernos locales tomando en consideración, por un lado, el advenimiento de un campo estratégico propicio para el desarrollo de formas innovadoras de democracia y desarrollo local, al mismo tiempo que, por el otro, los déficits político institucionales de la descentralización y los marcos ideológicos e incentivos a la participación institucionalizada de las organizaciones.

Con algunas excepciones (Frédéric 2004; Clemente y Girolami 2006) no son muchos los estudios que han enfocado esta relación desde la perspectiva del campo estratégico de las relaciones que emerge en el nivel del régimen político local, rearticulando las modalidades de participación, formas de representación y principios de legitimidad del orden y la autoridad política. En este punto -y si bien deben consignarse las investigaciones que abordaron el vínculo entre gobiernos locales y actores territoriales circunscribiéndose a la temática del clientelismo político (Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2005)- lo que no aparecía tematizado en dichos trabajos era la novedad que suponía para el campo de la política local: las organizaciones comunitarias de base territorial surgidas al calor de la movilización.

Ante esta falta, y frente a un contexto de crisis del estado social y de desterritorialización de la producción, surgen nuevas formas de autoorganización de las demandas y las identidades políticas en un espacio público local, biográfico y no estatal. Estas nuevas formas de organización política abren un eje de problematización de las relaciones entre sociedad civil e instituciones políticas que hemos denominado: campo estratégico relacional de la política en los niveles locales. Al interior de dicho campo hemos relevado y analizado las prácticas y los discursos a través de los cuales se vinculan los actores territoriales organizados con el estado y el régimen político locales, generando de esta forma lo que Foucault (2001) denomina un dispositivo de gubernamentalidad: el modo en que se configura la relación entre estrategias de poder y estrategias de resistencia formando sistemas de reglas de producción, reconocimiento y distribución de recursos.

Para el estudio de dicho campo estratégico, la investigación atendió a tres dimensiones fundamentales: las modalidades de participación, los mecanismos de representación y los dispositivos de legitimación del orden público. La aproximación

fue predominantemente cualitativa, incluyendo como estrategia metodológica principal la realización de entrevistas semi-estructuradas a funcionarios municipales y dirigentes locales de las organizaciones, así como un vasto análisis documental de fuentes primarias y secundarias. Respecto de los casos tomamos tres municipios del conurbano bonaerense: Florencio Varela, Morón y San Martín. Estos fueron seleccionados siguiendo los criterios de densidad y diversidad de las organizaciones de base territorial y las características políticas de los gobiernos locales. Complementariamente, se incorporó como unidad de estudio un caso de política pública: el Programa Argentina Trabaja. Su análisis nos permitió indagar en las transformaciones de la política social desde un modelo compensatorio e individualizante hacia un modelo de tipo cooperativo/participativo con pretensión de promover la participación activa de las organizaciones territoriales en la nueva inflexión productivista de la política social.

A partir del marco conceptual descrito, hemos decidido dividir el artículo en tres apartados que sintetizan algunos de los principales hallazgos y nudos temáticos a los que ha llegado esta investigación. En el primer apartado proponemos una reconsideración del concepto de "institucionalización de la movilización política" para pensarlo desde una perspectiva sociopolítica. Sugerimos allí la necesidad de pensar la institucionalización de los movimientos como un proceso de experimentación democrática frente a un contexto de profunda mutación del Estado-nación.

Posteriormente, en el segundo apartado, nos dedicamos a describir los efectos que la transformación del campo estratégico entre gobierno local y organizaciones de base comunitaria produjo sobre la democracia local, entendida como formas autónomas de conformación de la voluntad política en los planos municipales. Aquí prestamos especial atención a los distintos espacios creados por los municipios para la incorporación de la participación de las organizaciones y las tensiones entre los distintos tipos y formatos de participación que estos espacios generan. Quiénes participan de estos espacios, cómo lo hacen y cómo se reestructuran las demandas, repertorios e identidades locales una vez culminado el ciclo de movilización serán los principales interrogantes a los que dicho apartado pretenderá responder.

El tercer apartado se concentra, por un lado, en las transformaciones de la política social, en particular en el renovado contexto de crisis del modelo universalista y/o distributivo centrado en el estado nacional, poniendo atención en los efectos de estas transformaciones sobre el campo estratégico bajo estudio. Y por el otro, pretende señalar las transformaciones productivas del desarrollo local prestando particular atención a aquellas relacionadas con la reestructuración productiva del territorio y la emergencia de nuevas modalidades que intentan responder a la crisis del trabajo asalariado industrial clásico.

Finalmente, en el apartado final, se presentan las conclusiones generales del artículo y se recapitula respecto del grado de institucionalización de la participación en un contexto de incremento de la capacidad estratégica de los actores informales organizados pero de sobredeterminación de la disputa entre aparatos partidarios y gobiernos locales por el control electoral de los territorios y burocracias, por el otro.

## 2. Repensando la noción de "institucionalización" desde una perspectiva sociopolítica

Reflexionar en torno a la relación entre la movilización y las transformaciones del régimen político de gobierno implicaba para nosotros un necesario replanteo y reelaboración conceptual de la noción de institucionalización a partir de una perspectiva sociopolítica. En particular, debido a que se nos hacía evidente que las posibles formas de institucionalización en el contexto contemporáneo argentino iban más allá de la cooptación estatal o partidaria de las organizaciones sociales, admitiendo un escenario de juego complejo y de posibles articulaciones con inflexiones más o menos democráticas y participativas.

De esta forma, en vistas a reflexionar en torno a esta noción, una primera aproximación estuvo dirigida a analizar de qué manera los estudios de la acción colectiva y los movimientos sociales habían pensado el concepto de la institucionalización. Para ello, fue necesario en primer lugar retrotraerse a la sociología de masas. La versión funcionalista, -especialmente los trabajos de Smelser -aunque desprendida de los rasgos psicologistas que caracterizaron a los primeros estudios como los de Le Bon, Tarde y Freud- indagaba sobre los fenómenos colectivos conceptualizándolos como anomalías de un orden político (Pérez y Natalucci 2008). Esta caracterización negativa se asentaba sobre el carácter no institucional de dichos procesos, en un marco donde era necesario que todos los fenómenos contribuyeran o apuntaran al equilibrio del sistema social.

Por su parte, Olson (1968) pero fundamentalmente la teoría de la movilización de recursos (Oberschall 1973; Mc Carthy y Zald 1977; Jenkins 1994) cuestionaron esa equiparación de los fenómenos colectivos como anomalías por su desapego institucional, a cambio repusieron una discusión en términos de la racionalidad y los incentivos en juego en la participación en la movilización social. Esta perspectiva hizo hincapié en las continuidades entre el movimiento social y las actuaciones institucionales. Siguiendo a Jenkins (1994: 9), los movimientos sociales, agentes del cambio social, eran concebidos como "actores colectivos que luchan por el poder en un determinado contexto institucional". Es en esta dirección, que el movimiento social era considerado como "una prolongación de actuaciones institucionalizadas". En consonancia con esta posición, Mc Carthy y Zald (1977: 1217-1218) también consideraron al movimiento social como un "conjunto de opiniones y creencias de la población que representa preferencias para cambiar algunos elementos de la estructura social y/o la distribución de las recompensas en una sociedad". Desde esta perspectiva, las actividades de los movimientos no eran concebidas como informales, sino organizadas con base en intereses compartidos y la posibilidad de contar con los recursos necesarios. Tales recursos remiten, en la mayoría de los casos, a capacidades institucionales.

Si bien la teoría de movilización de recursos no desdeña la dimensión instituyente que supone toda participación política o movilización social, sus fundamentos sociopolíticos residen en la teoría del Pluralismo Competitivo, cuyo exponente es Robert Dahl. En esta, la concepción de la política hace referencia "al modelo económico de la com-

petencia por recursos e influencia llevada adelante por grupos de interés constituidos en el marco institucional estable del gobierno representativo” (Pérez y Natalucci 2008: 83). En definitiva, esta teoría de la acción colectiva promueve una concepción de la política como la posibilidad de acceso a instituciones, y no como una práctica social con capacidad de transformación de esos propios marcos sistémicos. Se hace evidente así que desde esta perspectiva, la política pertenece exclusivamente al orden de lo estatal/institucional.

Respecto del tratamiento de la discusión sobre institucionalización dado por la teoría de los nuevos movimientos sociales (Melucci 1980, 1994; Touraine 1987, 1991; Offe 1988, Pizzorno, 1994), esta surgió en el marco de la constitución de experiencias de organización cuyo protagonista ya no era la clase obrera, sino lo que Melucci (1994:155) denominó “luchas encaminadas a la extensión de la ciudadanía”. En una sociedad que se transformaba, la atención se centró sobre la construcción de estas identidades emergentes; dado que ya no eran trabajadores los que desafiaban a la sociedad industrial, sino nuevos sujetos colectivos que exigían el tratamiento de problemas hasta entonces considerados subsidiarios del conflicto fundamental entre capital y trabajo, como los de género, sexuales, culturales, etc. Los movimientos desde esta perspectiva eran pensados como “un actor colectivo movilizador que, sobre la base de una alta integración simbólica y una escasa especificación de su papel, perseguía una meta” (Raschke 1994:124). Estas metas se dirigían en general a introducir cambios en la estructura social, pero sin que afectara a la totalidad del sistema. En este sentido, los movimientos estaban claramente diferenciados de los sindicatos y los partidos políticos e incluso había una suerte de teleología que establecía en una sucesión histórica ciertos protagonismos: partidos políticos, sindicatos y movimientos sociales (Pérez 2010). Así, desde esta perspectiva, la institucionalización era pensada como integración en el sistema político y en este sentido como movimientos capturados por el sistema que decían impugnar (Pérez 2010).

Más allá de las diferencias entre la teoría de movilización de recursos y la de nuevos movimientos sociales, es necesario remarcar que ambas coinciden en la concepción general de institucionalización. En primer lugar, debido a que los movimientos emergen de una falencia del sistema institucional, o bien para re-introducirse como intereses en un sistema representativo o bien como un cambio parcial en el sistema social. En segundo lugar, ambas teorías comparten una idea de la política cristalizada en instituciones y principalmente en el Estado, por lo que aquella queda cautiva del sistema político o de instancias de representación de intereses. Esta premisa conlleva una taxativa división entre el estado y la sociedad civil, entre lo político y lo social (Natalucci 2012). Por último, la política es una especie de juego regido por un sistema de distribución general de recursos donde la “capacidad de poder se justifica en términos de quienes acuerdan o no con aquellas reglas de juego” (Pérez y Natalucci 2008: 90).

Así vemos como la cuestión de la institucionalización de la acción colectiva ha resultado un punto ciego para las teorías sociológicas que han pensado estos fenómenos con mayor detenimiento. Desde la perspectiva de la teoría de la movilización de recursos,



si los movimientos no se institucionalizan, es decir, si no logran incorporar sus demandas a las instituciones políticas del gobierno representativo, fracasan dado que no logran su principal propósito estratégico. De tal suerte, la influencia en el sistema político se concibe como el éxito estratégico que permite evaluar el rendimiento político de los movimientos sociales. Contrariamente, para la teoría de los nuevos movimientos sociales, que piensa a los mismos como emergentes de una transformación sistémica en el tránsito del capitalismo industrial a las sociedades postindustriales, programadas, del riesgo, etc., si los movimientos se institucionalizan fracasan, dado que quedan capturados por el sistema de relaciones sociales que vienen a impugnar. En este último planteo, la virtud de los movimientos radica en promover el *radicalismo autolimitante*: espacios de conformación y consolidación de identidades que disputan el modelo de desarrollo y sustentan formas de vida alternativas frente a la voracidad instrumental del aparato del estado y la lógica utilitarista del mercado (Pérez 2010).

Para enfrentar tal aporía, propia del concepto de institución política en las teorías contemporáneas de la acción colectiva, resulta importante superar el marco sistémico y/o jurídico en el que la ciencia política ubica al concepto de institución, ya sea en la órbita del sistema político o del estado, respectivamente. En nuestra investigación hemos avanzado hacia un concepto sociopolítico de institucionalización de la movilización que considera estos procesos como la consolidación de dispositivos de reglas legítimas de distribución de recursos de autoridad y asignación, vinculando a las nuevas experiencias organizativas surgidas en los procesos de movilización con las estructuras formales del régimen político de gobierno. En este sentido, hablar de institucionalización no refiere a la mera integración en el aparato del estado y/o en las estructuras formales del régimen político -partidos y sindicatos-, mucho menos remite al estatuto jurídico de una organización, sino que enfoca las formas de regulación de la participación, la representación y la legitimidad de un orden político en proceso de transformación por la vía de la movilización política (Pérez 2007) Esta torsión del concepto de institución lo abre a un análisis histórico en el cual las propias instituciones, en tanto sistemas de reglas que organizan tiempos, espacios y sujetos de la experiencia colectiva, se piensan como dimensiones fundamentales de procesos políticos conflictivos, más que como su horizonte de clausura.

Este concepto de institucionalización como proceso anula la taxativa diferencia que señalábamos entre estado y sociedad civil. Al respecto, Tapia (2009) postula que si bien en las sociedades modernas el estado constituía la esfera privilegiada para la política, las mismas complejidades que fueron transformado progresivamente a la sociedad -en especial los procesos de ciudadanía- ampliaron los lugares predilectos para la política. En esta dirección, la sociedad civil pasa a constituirse como otro lugar de la política; no estatal y regido por otras pautas, pero espacio para la política al fin. De esta forma, la institucionalización no queda reducida a ninguno de los dos espacios, sino que es posible pensarla como estabilización o como establecimiento de ciertas regularidades y pautas comunes, en relación con -pero no necesariamente al interior de- el aparato estatal.

La evidencia empírica que exponemos a continuación, invita a pensar que actualmente nos encontramos en un proceso transicional donde los actores surgidos de la movilización exploran formas de articulación en un contexto estratégico de reconfiguración de los actores políticos clásicos.

### **3. Delineando el campo estratégico de la política local. Las experiencias de Florencio Varela, Morón y San Martín**

El recorrido analítico realizado en el anterior apartado en torno a la noción de “institucionalización”, no sólo pretendió descentrar el concepto respecto de su vinculación intrínseca con el espacio de lo estatal, sino que al mismo tiempo pretendió servir como marco introductorio a aquello que denominaremos la complejización del campo estratégico de la política local de los municipios estudiados.

El propósito de este apartado consiste en iluminar aspectos de esa compleja trama de relaciones estratégicas que se han ido trazando en los gobiernos locales de Florencio Varela, Morón y San Martín. Cuando hacemos mención a la dinámica del gobierno local, estamos aludiendo a ese campo estratégico de institucionalización de prácticas recursivas que vincularon a las organizaciones territoriales, la ciudadanía y los representantes en sus distintas versiones y dinámicas de interacción, demanda y procesos de apertura. Una vez culminado el ciclo de movilización (1997-2001) y frente a la presencia de un diagnóstico de fuerte territorialización de las organizaciones sociales, ¿qué espacios innovadores de interacción surgieron a nivel local? ¿Cuáles son las tensiones que acarrearán estos nuevos espacios?

Para abordar estos interrogantes, nos centraremos en dos formas a partir de las cuales se delimitó un determinado campo estratégico en el ámbito de los gobiernos locales analizados.

#### **3.1. Formas individualizantes de la participación política: la experiencia del presupuesto participativo en Morón y en San Martín**

El dispositivo del Presupuesto Participativo encuentra su antecedente más influyente en el contexto regional en Porto Alegre, Brasil, a partir de dos momentos coyunturales claves. Por un lado, el contexto de cambio de los patrones asociativos acontecido entre fines de los setenta y mediados de los ochenta como consecuencia de la conformación de asociaciones barriales como parte de un movimiento social que se opuso al régimen autoritario y de asociaciones de moradores, conformadas luego de los desalojos de las favelas durante los setenta. Por otro lado, el surgimiento de una legislación participativa y deliberativa como resultado del restablecimiento del gobierno democrático en 1985 y del proceso constituyente de 1988.

Esta experiencia constituida *a priori* como producto de una demanda de la ciudadanía movilizada se extendió entre 1990 y 2001 a cientos de ciudades brasileñas; en 1996

fue premiada por la Conferencia Hábitat II de Naciones Unidas en Estambul como una de las cuarenta mejores prácticas de gestión urbana. Hacia 2005 la difusión de este dispositivo abarcaba no sólo América Latina sino países asiáticos (China, India e Indonesia), europeos (Italia, España y Serbia) y del Sudeste Africano.

Sin lugar a dudas, este proceso de difusión aparejó grandes mutaciones respecto del modelo original implementado en Porto Alegre, pudiendo ser pensada a partir de dos dinámicas: demandas *bottom-up* e iniciativas *top-down*. Con demandas *bottom up* hacemos referencia a aquellos procesos a partir de los cuales surgen dispositivos de participación como producto de una demanda de la sociedad civil hacia sus representantes, mientras que de forma inversa, las iniciativas *top down* son aquellos procesos cuyo origen reside en la toma de decisión por parte de los representantes de la apertura específica de espacios de participación y que por tanto no siempre se corresponde con demandas ciudadanas específicas sino que son resultado de acciones puntuales de promoción de la participación por parte del aparato estatal (Gattoni 2011). Si bien en la mayoría de los casos ambos factores se produjeron de forma solapada, fueron aquellos con primacía de iniciativas *top-down* los que acarrearón mayores transformaciones en el campo estratégico de la política local, delimitando un repertorio de participación<sup>1</sup> específico caracterizado por la individualización y la descolectivización.

Es importante subrayar que no connotamos con esta caracterización una evaluación necesariamente negativa respecto de la magnitud de la participación que genera este tipo de repertorio. Lo que sí tratamos de marcar es que estos dispositivos incentivan un determinado tipo de participación individual -orientada al vecino y/o ciudadano- disuadiendo la participación de formatos colectivos de participación.

Los casos de experiencias de Presupuestos Participativos en los municipios de San Martín y Morón dan cuenta de este repertorio específico al que hacíamos referencia en el párrafo anterior. Si bien surgidos a partir de circunstancias y coyunturas políticas diferentes, los resultados de nuestra investigación señalan que ambos dispositivos de participación son promovidos por los gobiernos locales en el marco de un contexto de recomposición de la autoridad política local post crisis 2001. Es importante hacer esta referencia, dado a que el contexto de surgimiento e implementación de estas experiencias condiciona fuertemente los resultados que las mismas arrojan con posterioridad.

El hecho de que ni en Morón ni en San Martín el Presupuesto Participativo haya surgido como producto de una demanda organizacional local -como sí sucedió en otros municipios como el caso de San Miguel- no implicó sin embargo la ausencia de un *ethos* participativo consolidado en cada uno de los municipios; sino que muy por el contrario, la apertura de estas instancias por parte de los gobiernos locales da cuenta de la búsqueda por vehiculizar e institucionalizar dichas dinámicas a partir de la promoción de nuevos espacios de participación.

Sin embargo, a la hora de indagar respecto de cómo las organizaciones sociales lograron o no apropiarse de esas nuevas instancias de participación a nivel local, no-

tamos que el recorrido participativo de las organizaciones y el de los dispositivos de participación corren por márgenes paralelos, cuando no radicalmente diferenciados.

Este recorrido diferencial ha llevado a algunos autores a caracterizar el espacio de los dispositivos de participación como un campo complejo de disputa semántica. Dagnino (2004) alude a la progresiva expansión de un “confluencia perversa” entre dinámicas de corte participacionista (y de recreación de la experiencia portoalegrista) en conjunción con dinámicas de permisivismo neoliberal. Por su parte, Olvera (2010) habla de “coincidencia semántica” como forma de expresión de esta disputa de sentidos y resultados de un mismo diseño institucional.

En lo que respecta a este trabajo, los resultados nos colocan más cercanos al diagnóstico de Rosanvallon (2009:295), respecto de que si en el período 1960-1970, la referencia a la democracia participativa era patrimonio de los movimientos sociales que reivindicaban un nuevo reparto de poderes, en la actualidad el predominio de dispositivos participativos se ha convertido en un medio de gobierno para restaurar una legitimidad desbaratada por la crisis de representación.

Los presupuestos participativos analizados se constituyen como espacios en donde los sujetos interpelados son sujetos individuales - ya sean “vecinos” y/o “ciudadanos” - o en tanto sujetos miembros de instituciones tradicionales (sociedades de fomentos, clubes de barrio, iglesias). Al mismo tiempo, las temáticas de deliberación tienden a restringirse a políticas de mejoramiento urbano lo que sistemáticamente desincentiva la participación de las organizaciones sociales quienes buscan vehicular sus demandas por vías diferentes, en general a partir de la conformación de un vínculo estratégico con las áreas encargadas de dirigir la política social de los municipios.

Si bien los funcionarios entrevistados destacan en distintas oportunidades la importancia que para ellos tendría la incorporación de la participación de las organizaciones sociales en estas instancias, de las observaciones y entrevistas realizadas se colige que la forma a partir de la cual fueron concebidos los dispositivos de Presupuesto Participativo y los diseños institucionales que rigen el funcionamiento de los mismos *per se* encarnan una autolimitación para la construcción de una voluntad política colectiva producto del proceso deliberativo. Las propias características procedimentales que regulan los dispositivos (restricción temática; extensión temporal de los proyectos presentados; recursos limitados; competencias reducidas; entre otras) conforman un proceso autónomo de toma de posiciones que impiden exceder los marcos de referencia y propuestas temáticas pre-formateadas por las instancias gubernamentales (Gattoni 2010). Al mismo tiempo, la interacción entre las dinámicas deliberativas y representativas dentro de dichos dispositivos encuentra un radical desequilibrio, priorizándose así los momentos electivos individuales por sobre las instancias de deliberación colectiva o grupal.

Finalmente, la ausencia del dispositivo de Presupuesto Participativo en Florencio Varela no implica sin embargo la inexistencia de la problemática del formato individuali-

zante y descolectivizante de la participación. Allí, las experiencias de las Unidades de Gestión Local, sustitutos de los foros barriales y/o asambleas del Presupuesto Participativo, también evocan el asociativismo, reivindicando una matriz más bien estadocéntrica en el marco de la cual las organizaciones sociales no encuentran un lugar para expresar sus demandas. La iglesia, el jardín, la escuela, la sociedad de fomento, la liga de mujeres, la copa de leche son así las instituciones interpeladas por estas instancias y las que protagonizan el proceso de interacción con el gobierno local.

### **3.2. Formas colectivizantes de la participación política: el programa Argentina Trabaja como campo de visibilización de la disputa.**

Si bien las organizaciones sociales no lograron apropiarse de los dispositivos revisados en el apartado anterior, sus lógicas de participación se hicieron presentes en otro escenario, uno a partir del cual por cuestiones de trayectoria organizativa les resultaba mucho más familiar: el de la política social.

Es a partir del estudio del Programa de Ingreso Social con Trabajo, más conocido como "Argentina Trabaja", creado a partir de la resolución N° 3182/09 del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social de la Nación que nos resultó posible entonces la reconstrucción del campo estratégico de interacción entre las organizaciones sociales y los gobiernos locales. Dicho programa, no sólo introdujo innovaciones respecto de cómo pensar las protecciones sociales, sino que al mismo tiempo su implementación generó desafíos para las organizaciones, que trastocaron sus dinámicas y el campo multiorganizacional, reordenando a partir de otros parámetros las tradicionales disputas territoriales.

El propósito del programa se orientaba a la generación de empleo, la capacitación desde una perspectiva integral y la promoción de la actividad cooperativa, cada una de las cuales debía registrarse en el Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía Social (INAES). En la formación de las cooperativas puede observarse una primera disputa, los municipios –y las organizaciones en menor medida– fueron los encargados de empadronar a los postulantes. El programa no tuvo un carácter universal, más bien se dirigió al sector de la población caracterizado como pobre, vulnerable o no empleable. Aún con este carácter focalizado, pueden identificarse algunas características de universalización, por ejemplo respecto de la equiparación de las necesidades y prioridades de todos los municipios. Al mismo tiempo, al involucrar nuevas nociones, como protección social e integralidad, articuladas en el marco de un lenguaje de derechos, el programa excedía los moldes compensatorios y focalizados de las políticas sociales neoliberales.

Inicialmente el Programa fue pensado a partir de una iniciativa de organizaciones sociales, entre ellas el Movimiento Evita (Natalucci en prensa); su demanda se orientaba a la extensión del salario familiar a los desocupados y trabajadores en negro. Incluso, un antecedente del programa fue impulsado por Emilio Pérsico desde la Subsecretaría de Economía Social del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social de la Nación. Pese a esto, el gobierno nacional no les atribuyó el rol que esperaban, sino que la responsabilidad

sobre la implementación recayó sobre los gobiernos locales.<sup>2</sup> Esta situación fue decisiva en la disputa que las organizaciones entablaron con el gobierno, que asumió diferentes maneras según la relación que tuvieran con el kirchnerismo. Mientras el Evita logró a partir de la negociación con funcionarios nacionales la ampliación de sus cupos, otras –como Barrios de Pie– llevaron adelante varias movilizaciones para poder intervenir.

Más allá de la estrategia puntual adoptada por cada organización, lo cierto es que la disputa se organizó en torno a quién se ocupaba de la gestión de la política social. De fondo, lo que se discutía era la relación con los sectores populares y quien podía construir una representación de ellos. En este sentido, el programa marcó un punto de inflexión ya que hasta entonces la gestión de la política social era compartida (de un modo conflictivo) entre organizaciones sociales y municipios. El Ejecutivo nacional no sólo intentó ordenar “desde arriba” la gestión de la política social, sino que en paralelo reorganizó las relaciones entre municipios, organizaciones y sectores populares, generando malestares en aquellas en tanto vieron cuestionado el tipo de participación que habían tenido hasta entonces y que habían adquirido al calor del estado neoliberal.

En tanto dispositivo institucional operante en los niveles locales, el Programa Argentina Trabaja construyó un campo específico de acciones posibles, donde intentó conformar un repertorio de participación de carácter colectivizante, este tuvo matices particulares debido a la forma en la que fue pensado e instrumentado el sujeto participativo. Al respecto, es innegable que en la idea de formación de cooperativas está presente una dinámica colectivizante de participación; sin embargo queda diluida en cuanto no surgieron de una voluntad política preexistente, sino que fueron creadas por la selectividad de los gobiernos locales. En estos casos, la idea de vínculo horizontal y comunitario que connota la noción de cooperativa se ve cuestionada por una individualización de la participación de los cooperativistas en función de la selección realizada por el gobierno local con criterios burocráticos y de acumulación política. Más aun, este tipo de selección redundó en la paradoja de un cooperativismo individualizante en la medida en que afecta la integración de las organizaciones sociales previas, disgregándolas a partir de un determinado criterio de distribución de recursos.

#### **4. Transformaciones en la producción y en la política social: ¿Nuevas formas de desarrollo local?**

Pese a las transformaciones en las formas de concebir la política social, destacadas en el apartado anterior, los resultados arrojados por nuestra investigación comprueban la existencia de un doble bloqueo respecto del avance hacia nuevas formas de desarrollo, producción y democracia local. En primer lugar, del lado del gobierno local, por el carácter inacabado y distorsivo del proceso de descentralización que pese a registrar un avance en términos administrativos y económico-financieros no derivó en una reestructuración y transferencia análoga de recursos y capacidades político-institucionales. Al mismo tiempo, de parte de las organizaciones de base comunitaria

porque dentro del marco ideológico de la movilización se tendió a identificar toda forma de representación política y de institucionalización del conflicto como cooptación y/o alienación de la voluntad política. De esta forma, ambas limitaciones debilitaron estructuralmente a los actores institucionales y sociales locales abriendo la posibilidad de una intervención no institucionalizada de las instancias superiores de gobierno, los aparatos partidarios y las fuerzas del mercado en la gestión de la política local.

Este bloqueo provocó entonces una transformación de la gubernamentalidad (Foucault 2001) en los niveles locales, sustituyendo al mismo tiempo el vínculo político individualizado entre aparatos políticos locales y clientelas populares -tradicional de los estudios que abordan la dinámica política del conurbano bonaerense- por otro de mayor complejidad y lógicas superpuestas, configurado por la relación entre los gobiernos locales y actores colectivos organizados.

En este marco, las nuevas formas de desarrollo y producción no encontraron un terreno fértil para consolidarse. En el caso de las formas individualizantes, no solo por su debilidad en la capacidad de convocar a las organizaciones territoriales como sujetos participativos de los nuevos dispositivos promovidos, si no al mismo tiempo por las enormes dificultades de coordinación entre los distintos niveles de gestión (nacional, provincial, local).

En el caso de las formas colectivizantes, debido a las dificultades de implementación producto de cada complejidad local y por la presencia de una tensión inherente a la propia forma en la que fue concebido el programa; en tanto que si bien por un lado remarcaba la importancia de la selectividad en detrimento de la focalización -por el tipo de población a la que se orienta- intentaba al mismo tiempo preservar el componente de la masividad -tanto por la gran cantidad de recursos destinados como por los cooperativistas que nuclea.

Con enormes matices, ambas formas de participación no lograron transformar de forma sustancial el desarrollo local. Para algunos referentes de organizaciones, el Programa Argentina Trabaja fue interpretado como un dispositivo planeado en su capacidad de desarticular a las organizaciones sociales reavivando el rol del PJ y restituyendo así el manejo de los recursos al ámbito municipal. El Presupuesto Participativo por su parte, no se conformó como un dispositivo convocante o atractivo para este mismo tipo de organizaciones.

Respecto de los alcances de la política social. Las representaciones a las que aludíamos de los referentes de organizaciones, se solapan asimismo con lo que se observa como una suerte de debilidad en la conformación de las identidades de los trabajadores del Programa Argentina Trabaja. No existe una percepción por parte de los cooperativistas, como así tampoco por parte de los funcionarios, respecto de la economía social como una economía alternativa a la economía formal de mercado.

El componente identitario es entonces inestable, se es cooperativista esperando dejar de serlo en un futuro cercano. Se es cooperativista en tanto identidad construida por

un ente externo a la propia colectividad de cooperativistas. Argentina Trabaja revela así un doble carácter: surgido sobre la base del cuestionamiento al asistencialismo y la implementación de subsidios a la pobreza, tales como los programas de transferencia condicionada de ingresos, reafirma al mismo tiempo la línea estratégica que el gobierno había adoptado en materia de política social consistente en la promoción del empleo, esta vez bajo la forma del cooperativismo. Ambos núcleos provocan así una suerte de mixtura entre una visión de la política social que busca regenerar los lazos de solidaridad que ligaban a ciertos grupos e individuos con el resto de la comunidad (y que quedaron excluidos a causa del desempleo y la recesión) con una visión de la política social derivada de la política económica, subordinada a esta última y fuertemente arraigada a la idea de inclusión social a partir de la producción alternativa de empleo.

Nuestra investigación demuestra así que figuras tales como la autogestión, la economía social, y otras formas alternativas de producción, no son tomadas ni por los miembros de las organizaciones ni por los funcionarios como sustitutos claros de la economía formal. Surgida en el marco de un contexto de reestructuración productiva del territorio, la economía social es tomada como paliativo y como etapa transicional en vías a la re-incorporación al trabajo asalariado formal.

## **5. Conclusiones**

La propuesta de este artículo se orientaba a la reconstrucción de las relaciones entre movilización y transformación de régimen político de gobierno, en particular a partir del análisis del vínculo entre organizaciones territoriales y gobiernos locales. Este esfuerzo explicativo requirió una reelaboración de la noción de institucionalización desde la perspectiva de la sociología política.

Desde este enfoque, la institucionalización fue reformulada siguiendo la propuesta de Giddens (1993), esto es, la posibilidad de conformar nuevas pautas comunes que a modo de rutinizaciones organicen los modos en que los sujetos intervienen en las instancias de participación, representación y legitimación del orden. De esta forma, este trabajo corrió la mirada exclusivamente del estado, pensando en las relaciones y desplazamientos entre este y el ámbito de lo social.

Los resultados permitieron corroborar el proceso de complejización del campo estratégico de la política local centrado principalmente en dos procesos: por un lado, el surgimiento y consolidación, al calor de la movilización, de organizaciones territoriales de base comunitaria con capacidad de movilización de recursos, lo que les facilitó una mayor intervención estratégica en el proceso de implementación y gestión de la política social en el plano local; por otro lado, el giro concomitante de la política social, impulsado por el gobierno nacional a partir de 2003 hacia un modelo de matriz cooperativista y productivista crítico de los modelos individualizantes y focalizados de los noventa.



Una de las conclusiones señala que la convergencia de ambos procesos no condujo a una mayor institucionalización de la participación y el conflicto, en la medida en que las lógicas territoriales de los partidos -principalmente de las fracciones internas del propio peronismo- se impusieron a las reformas estatales y los incentivos necesarios para integrar a los actores de la movilización. En otros términos, si bien hemos podido corroborar el incremento de la capacidad estratégica de los actores informales, este fortalecimiento organizativo se vio limitado en sus posibilidades de participación y representación democrática (institucionalización) en los niveles locales de gobierno por una sobredeterminación de la disputa entre aparatos partidarios y gobiernos locales por el control electoral de los territorios y para la reproducción de sus respectivas burocracias.

De esta suerte se constata un solapamiento complejo de tres lógicas intervinientes en el campo estratégico analizado:

- a.** la lógica de la administración pública con sus imperativos de eficiencia y optimización en la gestión de recursos que afecta a las cuestiones de coordinación entre niveles de gobierno
- b.** la lógica del control territorial de los aparatos partidarios orientados a incrementar su poder electoral y al mantenimiento de sus burocracias
- c.** la lógica de la institucionalidad local con crecientes demandas de mayores espacios de participación y representación por parte de las organizaciones de base territorial surgidas en el proceso de movilización

Excepto en el caso de Morón, donde la problemática de la institucionalidad local planteada por las dificultades de implementación del Presupuesto Participativo sobredetermina a las otras lógicas, tanto en San Martín como en Florencio Varela se advierte la preponderancia de la lógica del control territorial de los aparatos partidarios, sea negociando directamente con los dirigentes de organizaciones sociales la provisión de programas, como en el caso de Varela, o bien a través de una definitiva segmentación del territorio municipal en la provisión de la política social en función de los alineamientos políticos, como en el caso de San Martín. Así planteado el campo estratégico, queda notoriamente postergada la lógica de coordinación administrativa de la política social advirtiéndose una trama difusa de superposiciones entre actores y niveles de gobierno en la implementación y gestión de programas. Nuestro trabajo sobre el Programa Argentina Trabaja da cuenta de este bloqueo en la coordinación administrativa del programa en función de las lógicas de acumulación política partidaria en los niveles locales.

Finalmente, el caso de Morón resulta interesante como contrapunto de los otros dos casos analizados dado que por tratarse su gobierno de un partido de matriz vecinalista con vocación de reforma institucional, el problema que se plantea es el de las limitaciones del Presupuesto Participativo en su capacidad de convocatoria como consecuencia de su interpelación individualizante a la figura del vecino como actor político local por fuera de los marcos organizativos fraguados en el proceso de movilización.

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- 1 La noción de "repertorio de acción colectiva" de Charles Tilly (1978; 2000) se aplica al conjunto de medios que un grupo dispone para canalizar sus demandas. En este sentido, trasladar la noción de repertorio al concepto de participación implica describir distintas formas de interacción entre actores, objetos de acción, tiempos, lugares y circunstancias estratégicas a partir de las cuales se constituye un determinado patrón de participación.
- 2 El primer momento conflictivo se sitúa en los inicios del programa, cuando las organizaciones cuestionan la decisión de priorizar a los municipios como entes de la contraparte, quedando así desvinculadas de la formación de las cooperativas y el segundo momento más cercano a la gestión del programa en donde las organizaciones protagonizan protestas por parte de algunas organizaciones respecto de cuestiones relativas a la gestión de las cooperativas; afectando la dinámica de solidaridad interorganizacional (Natalucci en prensa).

## Exceso y defecto: movilización política e institucionalidad democrática. Un aporte germaniano

Germán J. Pérez

**Resumen:** La propuesta consiste en recuperar el concepto de movilización política desarrollado por Gino Germani en su última obra sobre el problema del populismo nacional, publicada por la Universidad de Harvard en 1978, para indagar las formas de articulación entre formas de movilización y régimen político de gobierno. Se cierra el trabajo con una recuperación de ciertos conceptos fundamentales de la sociología política de Gerani para pensar las transformaciones recientes en las sociedades latinoamericanas.

**Palabras clave:** Sociología política, movilización, secularización, democracia

### 1. Introducción

En un texto titulado "Política y sociedad. Escisión o convergencia", publicado en un volumen compilado por Graciela Di Marco y Héctor Palomino (2004), Emilio de Ípola realiza el siguiente diagnóstico sobre el agotamiento de la imaginación sociológica para dar cuenta de los profundos procesos de cambio que experimentó la sociedad argentina en las últimas dos décadas: "Quisiera concluir haciendo una rápida alusión a partir de estas indicaciones sociológicas sobre los piquetes a un tema más amplio. Desde los años `80 del siglo último hemos asistido a un revival extremadamente fecundo de los temas de la filosofía política –a partir de la mal llamada crisis de los grandes relatos- sobre los fundamentos del orden justo, sobre el totalitarismo y, en particular, sobre la democracia, sobre su vigencia, su alcance, sus promesas incumplidas. Los nombres de Norberto Bobbio, Claude Lefort y póstumamente Hannah Arendt, resumen sintéticamente esos primeros aportes que luego otros desarrollaron, debatieron y siguen debatiendo. Desgraciadamente, la sociología, encerrada en convicciones testarudas e indiferente a los cambios que se sucedían en el mundo estuvo prácticamente al margen de esa discusión y, por ende, nada aportó por años a ella. La sociología se quedó en el '45, en el análisis "objetivo" –incluso con ribetes "marxistas"- de la estructura social y en las categorizaciones "superestructurales" de Poulantzas. Hoy en día, creo, las cosas parecen querer cambiar, los nuevos aportes sobre la teoría de la acción la habilitan con pleno derecho para incorporarse a los debates presentes. Para ello, ha debido (como lo querían sus fundadores en la Argentina, Germani en particular) acercarse a la política y reformular categorías nuevas, alejadas de un objetivismo desgastado y ramplón. De manera inversa, creo, sería deseable que el pensamiento de lo político, en sus formas de filosofía y teoría y

filosofía política, se acerque a su vez a esos nuevos aportes de la sociología” (de Ípola, 2004: 70 – 71). De ese “acercamiento a la política” del pensamiento sociológico trata este texto, recuperando, justamente, la evolución del concepto clave de movilización en el pensamiento, tan fundador como olvidado, de Gino Germani. Nos proponemos argumentar en dos pasos fundamentales: a) una reconstrucción epistemológica del concepto de movilización más allá de las aporías de la teoría de la modernización y b) la recuperación, a través de a), de una dimensión clave de análisis de los procesos de cambio social como relación entre procesos de movilización y su articulación con el régimen político de gobierno. En definitiva, se trata de recuperar la perspectiva de la sociología política eclipsada por los enfoques etnográficos y/o institucionalistas en el estudio de los procesos políticos de las últimas décadas en el país.

## 2. Populismo, modernización, movilización

La primera formulación del concepto de movilización aparece en la caracterización pionera que Gino Germani realiza del “populismo nacional” peronista. Para el caso de los estudios sobre populismo, ha sido Ernesto Laclau quien de manera minuciosa ha cuestionado los análisis en términos de teoría de la modernización. Aun rescatando la teoría de Germani como “la más coherente y elaborada” acerca del fenómeno populista, Laclau desarrolla un extenso argumento crítico tomando como referencia el concepto de “efecto de fusión”: “Al estudiar el efecto de fusión Germani percibe con claridad –y este es un mérito indudable– que ciertas formas de ‘modernización’ no sólo no son incompatibles, sino que tienden a reforzar rasgos tradicionales (...) Hasta aquí no habría nada objetable, más aun, la palabra elegida, ‘fusión’, alude muy bien al hecho de que los elementos ‘tradicionales’ y ‘modernos’ pierden su identidad como tales en la mezcla resultante. Pero aquí se abre una línea de desarrollo lógico que lleva a negar las premisas en las que el conjunto del razonamiento se asienta. Sigamos dicha línea de desarrollo: 1) si se acepta que la modernización de ciertos aspectos de la sociedad no es un indicio necesario de la modernización de dicha sociedad considerada como un todo –bien al contrario, la modernización de aspectos parciales puede conducir a reforzar un patrón social tradicional–, hay que admitir también que una sociedad puede ser más ‘tradicional’ que otra desde el punto de vista de algunos o la mayoría de sus rasgos y, sin embargo, ser más ‘moderna’ desde el punto de vista de su estructura. Lo cual significa, por un lado, que esta estructura no puede reducirse a la mera adición descriptiva de sus rasgos, y por otro, que la variable relación entre dichos rasgos y el todo implica que aquellos, considerados en sí mismos, carecen de significación específica. 2) Con esto se ha introducido un elemento estructural en el análisis. De él se deduce que hay que abandonar el análisis de la transición en términos de un *continuum* de rasgos y actitudes, y es necesario encararlo como una serie *discontinua* de estructuras. 3) En consecuencia, si los elementos considerados aisladamente han perdido significación en sí mismos, su unificación en los paradigmas ‘sociedad tradicional’ y ‘sociedad industrial’ carece de sentido. Toda afirmación de que los elementos aislados tienen un en sí al margen de las estructuras, consistente en su inserción esencial como momento de un paradigma, es una afirmación metafísica totalmente ilegítima” (Laclau, 1978: 180-181).

Creemos que la crítica de Laclau resulta perfectamente pertinente en la medida que enfoca uno de los principales déficit epistemológicos de la teoría estructural-funcionalista, dominante durante los años '50, que Germani suscribe en sus primeros análisis sobre el populismo durante el segundo lustro de esa década. Se trata de una concepción atomista del sistema social según la cual los "sistemas parciales" resultan interdependientes entre sí pero concebidos como unidades discretas pasibles de un análisis diferenciado. Son "partes" o elementos cuya interrelación se resuelve en función de su grado de adecuación a "un sistema de valores centrales, que caracteriza a la estructura de la sociedad global misma" (Germani, 1971: 50). Como incisivamente argumenta Laclau, esta concepción de la estructura social como adición de partes interrelacionadas adolece de un problema idéntico al que Thomas Kuhn imputaba a la concepción empirista lógica del cambio científico: el valor de los elementos de una estructura de significado sólo puede decidirse analizando las relaciones que establece con el resto de los elementos de esa misma estructura en un momento histórico específico, perdiendo toda sustentabilidad la posibilidad de la identidad del significado de los elementos en contextos estructurales distintos. De esta suerte, o bien la relación entre las partes -los "sistemas parciales"- asume la forma de un conjunto que por definición reúne elementos discretos vinculados por nexos lógicos, en cuyo caso no tendría ya sentido hablar de algo así como un "efecto de fusión" dado que el carácter discreto de los elementos permanecería indemne, o bien efectivamente la relación entre los elementos permite hablar de un "efecto de fusión", pero en este caso el sistema social no respondería ya a la forma de un conjunto, sino de una estructura de significado donde la propia idea de partes o elementos discretos estaría cuestionada. Por supuesto, de la crítica no se sigue que ya no podamos hablar de estructuras o de sistemas sociales, sino que el análisis deberá orientarse a la "serie *discontinua* de estructuras" dilucidando sus correspondencias parciales e inconmensurabilidades locales en un registro histórico. Lo que sí se clausura es la posibilidad de recurrir a modelos o tipos paradigmáticos de estructuras que habiliten la profusión de predicados teleológicos que abonan la jerga estructural-funcionalista: etapas, asincronías, desarrollo, transición, tradicional-moderno, modernización, etc.

Según nuestra exposición, parece evidente que la teoría de la modernización no ofrece ya buenas razones para conformar el núcleo de una teoría del cambio social; sin embargo: ¿significa esto que los análisis en términos de movilización social han quedado inutilizados como herramientas capaces de ilustrar algunas dimensiones fundamentales de los ciclos de conflicto y cambio social?. Creemos que no. Es más, en consonancia con los aportes de Charles Tilly (1978), proponemos que la sustitución del concepto de modernización por el de movilización como núcleo de una teoría integrada del cambio social, puede abrir perspectivas de análisis hasta ahora relativamente inexploradas. Por ejemplo: la elaboración de una tipología de la movilización social que se defina por las complejas relaciones entre formas, demandas y organización de la acción contenciosa y sus formas de institucionalización-integración al nivel del régimen político de gobierno. Claro está, la red conceptual de este análisis ya no sería la que se asocia al concepto de modernización que anteriormente mencionamos, sino la que es propia del concepto de movilización: coordinación, articulación, participación, integración, institucionalización, legitimidad, disponibilidad, representación.

Ese parece haber sido el recorrido del propio Germani quién coronó sus estudios sobre el populismo en un libro fundamental publicado en Harvard tres años antes de su muerte y que lleva por título: *Autoritarismo, fascismo y populismo nacional*. Destaquemos, en principio, que la introducción teórica al trabajo sobre populismo que en 1962 versaba sobre la relación entre estructura, acción y cambio social, siguiendo los argumentos de Parsons, en el libro publicado en 1978, curiosamente el mismo año de publicación del libro de Laclau que citábamos más arriba, se dedica exclusivamente al concepto de movilización social. La propuesta de Germani es considerarlo, siguiendo a otro clásico de la tradición del análisis funcional, como una “teoría de alcance intermedio” (Merton, 1993) capaz de conectar el desmesurado desarrollo analítico de la teoría de la modernización con sus eventuales aplicaciones históricas superando, de esta forma, el extenuante vaivén entre el “empirismo abstracto” y la “gran teoría” que magistralmente describió Wright Mills (1964).

El desarrollo de Germani parte de la definición clásica de movilización elaborada por Karl Deutsch. Para este autor, el término “movilización social” se emplea para designar los procesos acelerados de cambio social que producen la disponibilidad de vastos sectores de la población para aceptar nuevas formas de comportamiento. Los indicadores de la movilización no se diferencian, desde la perspectiva de Deutsch, de aquellos que intervienen en la caracterización de los procesos de modernización: desplazamientos geográficos -migraciones-, incremento de la movilidad socioprofesional, desarrollo de instancias de comunicación y contacto entre estratos jerárquicos anteriormente desvinculados, sustitución de pautas adscriptivas por pautas electivas de acción, etc. Aquí la noción de disponibilidad aparece como variable dependiente del proceso de modernización.

Si bien Germani admite la utilidad de la definición de Deutsch (1961) para dar cuenta de manera comparativa de las proporciones de la población movilizada, cuestiona asimismo las limitaciones de una definición puramente descriptiva del concepto que neutraliza las posibilidades de un uso explicativo del mismo en términos de causas y consecuencias del cambio social. En este sentido, para Germani la movilización social no resulta una mera consecuencia determinada por el proceso de modernización, sino que constituye la dimensión específica a través de la cual puede analizarse la articulación de tal proceso en contextos históricos determinados. En referencia a la definición de Deutsch, escribe Germani: “Asimismo, definir movilización en términos del grado, de la forma y de la naturaleza de la participación, o como la modificación real o deseada de los grupos sociales regulados normativamente por un conjunto de roles que se localizan en posiciones dadas dentro de la estructura social puede presentar varias ventajas. La más importante de ellas es la que destaca el hecho de que los cambios en la participación de un grupo pueden afectar profundamente a otros, por ejemplo, a través de la invasión del estatus, de la privación relativa y de otras situaciones similares. De esta forma, la naturaleza frecuentemente conflictiva del proceso no puede ser ignorada, tal como sucede cuando se utiliza una definición puramente descriptiva.” (Germani, 2003: 45). De forma análoga a los cuestionamientos que más arriba realizábamos a la definición puramente descriptiva del concepto de modernización, utilizado por Germani en sus primeros trabajos sobre el populis-



mo, el autor italoargentino cuestiona las limitaciones de una definición del concepto de movilización que omite dos aspectos fundamentales: la interdependencia entre los grupos y la conflictividad inherente al proceso que de ella deriva.

El carácter conflictivo de la movilización se revela en la dificultosa convergencia entre los dos aspectos fundamentales del proceso de secularización. Por un lado, la revolución industrial que, como consecuencia de la organización racional del estado y la diferenciación de las elites políticas y técnicas, produce una creciente centralización y concentración del poder y la autoridad; por el otro, la "democratización fundamental" (Mannheim, 1986), signada por una ruptura de las lealtades locales y la consecuente integración a la comunidad nacional a través de una ampliación de la participación política y la dinámica igualitaria. El impulso secularizador requiere de una trabajosa institucionalización del cambio y el conflicto en un contexto de autonomización de las elites y despersionalización de la interacción social.

El problema de la institucionalización del cambio en un contexto de persistente diferenciación estructural y autonomización de las esferas de acción, el diagnóstico de la racionalización social de Max Weber, repone en el centro de la problemática a la cuestión de la integración social como definición legítima de las fronteras de la comunidad política. El tema ha sido también formulado, con el afán de analizar los movimientos de protesta en los procesos de modernización, por S. N. Eisenstadt (2001) como la paradoja de la "legitimidad contractual". Si los sistemas institucionales en contextos modernos se definen por una regulación consensual de las disposiciones que establecen, lo que Eisenstadt llama "orientación al consenso de masas", al mismo tiempo tales principios de justificación requieren de símbolos y orientaciones pre-contractuales para asegurar un mínimo de integración social. Germani desarrolla la cuestión presentándola del siguiente modo: "El requisito mínimo para el ascenso y el desarrollo de la sociedad moderna es la extensión de la secularización a tres áreas: conocimiento, tecnología y economía. Aun cuando los rasgos tradicionales comúnmente permanecen o pueden fundirse con las estructuras modernas, sigue siendo cierto que la secularización tiende a extenderse al resto de la sociedad, hacia todas las áreas del comportamiento y los subsistemas. Ninguna sociedad puede existir sin la presencia de ciertos núcleos prescriptivos centrales para asegurar una base mínima, aunque suficiente, para la integración: un conjunto central de valores y normas en los cuales se asientan los criterios para las elecciones y aquellos que regulan el cambio." (Germani, 2003: 37). Nótese la ausencia, nada menos que en la caracterización del "requisito mínimo" para el desarrollo de la sociedad moderna, de una dimensión política; sin embargo, el problema político reaparece, poco más abajo, en forma de hipótesis general y ligado directamente a lo que constituye el problema primordial de las reflexiones de Germani: la relación estructuralmente conflictiva entre movilización social e integración política: "De aquí, uno puede formular la hipótesis que postula que *la tensión estructural inherente a toda sociedad moderna entre la secularización creciente y la necesidad de mantener un núcleo prescriptivo central mínimo suficiente para la integración, constituye un factor causal general en las tendencias hacia el autoritarismo moderno*" (Germani, 2003: 37) Podemos preguntarnos: ¿Por qué razón la "tensión estructural inherente a

toda sociedad moderna” aparece como factor causal de las tendencias autoritarias y no, por caso, de las democráticas? ¿Es posible pensar la relación entre secularización e integración como no conflictiva si se admite que “*la tensión estructural es inherente a toda sociedad moderna*”? ¿Puede resolverse semejante tensión, que habita todas las esferas de la sociabilidad moderna, sin conflicto ni resto, es decir, sin política? Estimamos que la respuesta a nuestros interrogantes se encuentra en la ausencia de la dimensión política de la que dábamos cuenta cuando referíamos los requisitos mínimos de los que nos habla Germani. Efectivamente, desde la perspectiva del autor, la dinámica de la modernización puede y debe, y aquí radica el residuo normativo y teleológico de la teoría de la modernización en esta formulación más refinada, resolverse en un sistema político específico: la democracia pluralista y representativa, que sería el correlato funcional, en la esfera política, del desarrollo de los “requisitos mínimos”.

No obstante, la introducción de la teoría de la sociedad de masas (Mannheim, 1986, Kornhauser, 1969) en el argumento viene a enmendar subrepticamente esta aporía, dado que enfoca el problema político de la integración social en su especificidad institucional y organizativa, analizando sus complejas articulaciones con los procesos de transformación socioeconómica, sin presuponer ninguna forma de reintegración funcionalmente superadora. En esta línea, desde la teoría política contemporánea, Claude Lefort ha realizado un aporte fundamental e insoslayable para pensar a la democracia moderna como “forma de sociedad” más que como emergente derivado de un proceso de modernización sistémica y/o estructural. Sus trabajos han mostrado con claridad e insistencia el modo en que la “revolución democrática” operó una transformación profunda del orden simbólico que estructura lo político moderno, definiendo una nueva forma de institución de lo social. La diferencia radical que introduce la democracia moderna es que el sitio del poder pasa a ser un lugar vacío cuya figuración resulta imposible, desapareciendo así la referencia a un garante trascendente y, con él, la representación de una unidad sustancial de la sociedad. Como consecuencia de ésta indeterminación última de los referentes absolutos de certidumbre -pueblo, nación, estado-, se produce una “desimbricación” entre las instancias del poder, del saber y de la ley que reclaman un proceso de legitimación tan constante como en última instancia insuficiente. Lefort analiza, en definitiva, como la secularización produce una dislocación en el orden político moderno que altera las reglas de producción y reconocimiento del mismo así como, consecuentemente, la configuración de sus tiempos, sujetos y espacios.

La democracia como forma de sociedad queda expuesta a la posibilidad de una interrogación sin fin. “El lugar del poder llega a ser un lugar vacío. Inútil insistir sobre el detalle del dispositivo institucional. Lo esencial es que prohíbe a los gobernantes apropiarse o incorporarse el poder. Su ejercicio es sometido al procedimiento de reposición periódica. Esta se hace en términos de una competencia reglamentada, cuyas condiciones son preservadas de manera permanente. Este fenómeno implica una institucionalización del conflicto. Vacío, inocupable -ningún individuo ni grupo le puede llegar a ser consubstancial- el lugar del poder no permite la figuración (...) El poder sigue siendo la instancia en cuya virtud la sociedad se aprehende en su unidad,

se relaciona consigo misma en el espacio y en el tiempo. Pero esta instancia ya no está referida a un polo incondicionado; en este sentido ella es como la marca de una separación entre el adentro y el afuera de lo social, y que instituye su contacto: ella se hace reconocer tácitamente como puramente simbólica" (Lefort, 1985: 82)

Sociedad sin cuerpo ni representación orgánica, la matriz simbólica democrática requiere de una particular estructuración de la escena política, donde la división aparece como constitutiva de la unidad misma de la sociedad. Es importante resaltar que, desde esta perspectiva, las características de la secularización "en sentido sociológico" señaladas por Germani conservan toda su importancia: 1) la institucionalización del cambio y sus implicaciones conflictivas, 2) la especialización creciente de las instituciones presentada en este caso como escisión de las esferas del poder, el saber y la ley y, por último, 3) la autonomización de los valores referida como el problema de la representación puramente simbólica del poder y sus consecuentes déficits de legitimación. Como vemos, estamos frente a un análisis de la secularización en el plano estrictamente político que, proponemos, nos abre la posibilidad de superar la dificultad que presentaba la concepción del "requisito mínimo" de la secularización moderna como puramente restringido al plano técnico-económico. Si era este residuo funcionalista de la teoría de la modernización el que llevaba a Germani a pensar el desarrollo de la esfera política en términos de adecuación funcional -sincronía- con la evolución del sistema técnico-económico, la introducción del análisis de la secularización como "revolución democrática" permite entender a la tensión entre movilización e integración, propia de los procesos de cambio, no ya como disfunción generadora de las tendencias autoritarias, sino como inherente al propio proceso de democratización. Desde la perspectiva de la secularización como "revolución democrática", ningún tipo de correlato funcional entre estructura técnico-económica y sistema político garantiza la neutralización del conflicto y el desarrollo de la modernización como "mera difusión cultural". Sin abandonar el concepto de secularización, hemos incorporado una dimensión que nos permite pensar la conflictividad propia de lo político moderno, sin renunciar al análisis de las relaciones de interdependencia en las que se inscribe, pero eliminando toda alternativa reduccionista.

### 3. Movilidad, movilización social y movilización política

Volviendo a la caracterización del concepto de movilización social, Germani establece tres "raíces" del mismo que deben considerarse si se pretende superar las definiciones puramente descriptivas como la de Deutsch:

1- "El proceso de la extensión sucesiva de los derechos legales sociales y políticos a todos los habitantes de un Estado; esto es, su incorporación a la nación como ciudadanos más que como súbditos (...) Desde esta perspectiva, el concepto de movilización corresponde a lo que Karl Mannheim denominó 'democratización fundamental' y al concepto de Marshall acerca de la extensión de los derechos civiles, políticos y sociales. Dichos derechos también incluyen el acceso a bienes y servicios y a los objetos culturales materiales y no materiales." (Germani, 2003: 44) En esta vertiente de

la movilización encontramos que la misma compromete la distribución de recursos tanto de autoridad (derechos, nacionalidad) como de asignación (acceso a bienes y servicios) y plantea, evidentemente, el problema del establecimiento de reglas legítimas de producción y distribución de esos bienes, es decir, actualiza el problema de la institucionalización.

**2-** “La naturaleza fuertemente conflictiva de la movilización. La extensión de los derechos y las formas de participación no es el resultado de un proceso de mera difusión cultural. Ciertamente, lo fue en determinados casos. Pero muy a menudo, la extensión fue el resultado de una lucha, de conflictos violentos o, incluso, de revoluciones. Los derechos se conquistaron en contra de los intereses de las ideologías de grupos sociales poderosos, contra la voluntad de las elites gobernantes, de los estratos superiores o de otros sectores privilegiados o previamente establecidos. De todas formas, se obtuvieron ya sea ante la amenaza del conflicto o como parte de un compromiso, a través de una alianza de clase y, en general, a través de algún tipo de confrontación y acciones que involucraban riesgos para lograr la integración del grupo marginal por medio de su cooptación dentro del sistema.” (Germani, 2003: 44). Fundamental para nuestro análisis: ¿en qué casos la movilización fue el resultado de “un proceso de mera difusión cultural”? Si esta es una posibilidad histórica, entonces la conflictividad inherente a la tensión entre movilización e integración puede pensarse en los márgenes de una adecuación funcional por la vía de un proceso de “difusión cultural”, es decir, como momentos de un despliegue estructural autogenerado. Como planteamos poco más arriba, esta posibilidad queda clausurada si se considera la dimensión propiamente política de la secularización como “democratización fundamental” o, más aun, como “revolución democrática”, dado que en estas condiciones el conflicto pasa a ser una dimensión estructural de la secularización más que una eventualidad histórica.

**3-** “La movilización social constituye un proceso complejo que implica la desintegración de la estructura preexistente, algún tipo de respuesta o reacción a ella, la disponibilidad de personas hacia nuevas formas de comportamiento, la representación dramática de dicha disponibilidad, y finalmente, la reintegración a la sociedad. Puede ser percibida como el cambio en la naturaleza y en el alcance de la participación, definida como el conjunto de roles que un individuo desempeña en virtud del estatus en el cual se encuentra ubicado en la sociedad. Estos roles incluyen no sólo aquellos correspondientes a las posiciones estructurales en varias instituciones y grupos, sino también aquellos que definen el acceso del individuo al consumo de bienes y servicios, al ejercicio de derechos y al cumplimiento de obligaciones.” (Germani, 2003: 44) Aquí alcanzamos lo que entendemos constituye el aspecto propiamente político de la movilización. Si la movilización es un proceso que implica la desintegración, o dislocación en el lenguaje del propio Germani y de Ernesto Laclau: ¿en qué medida puede hablarse del primer tipo de roles a los que se refiere Germani cuando define el alcance de la participación, es decir, aquellos correspondientes a las posiciones estructurales en una estructura desintegrada o dislocada? Tales roles, definidos por una estructura de estatus, sólo pueden permanecer idénticos frente a un proceso de dislocación o desintegración si mantenemos la definición atomista de la estructura

social que cuestionábamos en el apartado anterior. De lo contrario, deberíamos admitir que existe, por lo menos, un significado posible de la movilización según el cual la misma no implica tan sólo la circulación de personas o grupos entre distintas posiciones sociales anteriormente restringidas, sino la propia transformación del significado de dichas posiciones. En este caso, lo que la movilización subvertiría serían las reglas de distribución de la asignación y la autoridad entre sistemas transformando el significado de las propias estructuras de estatus y, consecuentemente, generando la "emergencia" de una nueva "formación sociocultural". Proponemos que la dimensión propiamente política de la movilización reside, no ya en la distribución funcional de identidades socialmente establecidas -aspecto al que proponemos llamar movilización social-, sino en la impugnación, y eventual transformación, de los dispositivos que definen el acceso y la distribución de los recursos de autoridad y asignación (Giddens, 1994: 65).

Para pensar la movilización como aspecto central del análisis del cambio, Germani comienza por caracterizar lo que debe entenderse como una sociedad integrada. Al respecto, distingue tres dimensiones de la integración social: 1) la dimensión normativa que consiste en el ajuste recíproco relativo de los sistemas de normas, estatus y roles destacando el problema de la *institucionalización* del cambio, 2) la dimensión psicosocial que remite a la *internalización* de las normas expresada en la relación entre experiencia y expectativa de los agentes sociales en un contexto de "revolución de expectativas crecientes" y 3) la dimensión ambiental definida por la *adaptación* de los sistemas a los hechos físicos, la distribución espacial y la influencia de los sistemas externos. Ahora bien: ¿en qué medida puede hablarse de movilización en los márgenes de una sociedad integrada en estas tres dimensiones?: "Si la movilidad vertical colectiva se acepta normativamente, no es posible hablar de movilización. Este sería el caso de la movilización por participación creciente, un proceso normal en países desarrollados en los que la movilidad social ha adquirido el carácter de un mecanismo autosostenido (aquí nos estamos refiriendo a la movilidad integrada, que tiene lugar en la sociedad que la incluye en su sistema normativo, que se internaliza como una actitud y una motivación y que, además, provee oportunidades reales para su realización). En contraste, la movilidad *de facto* que no está legitimada por las normas sociales en funcionamiento y que no está integrada, constituye un fenómeno de movilización cuando es movilidad colectiva y no solamente un caso de desvío individual" (Germani, 2003: 52) La movilidad institucionalizada, internalizada y adaptada sería entonces un proceso *de jure* mientras que aquella que no se ajustara a todas o a algunas de estas dimensiones sería *de facto*. Sin embargo, insistimos con la pregunta que parece tener ya un atisbo de respuesta: ¿constituye la movilidad *de jure* realmente un caso de movilización?

Concluye Germani: "Es importante distinguir este tipo de participación integrada de la no integrada. La primera tiene lugar en condiciones de integración normativa, psicosocial y ambiental. La segunda ocurre cuando no existe correspondencia entre el grado, la forma y la extensión de la participación requerida o tolerada por las normas predominantes (y por los actores poderosos de la sociedad) y lo que realmente ocurre. Esta falta de correspondencia puede desembocar en dos situaciones opuestas, ya sea

de exceso o de deficiencia, en relación con la participación normativa y psicológica esperada o con la participación posible en términos de las circunstancias ambientales existentes. El concepto de movilización social resulta de la aplicación de esta distinción (...) Es de especial importancia en el análisis de la transición social el aumento y/o el cambio en la naturaleza de la participación. Este proceso que denominamos 'movilización' se define como *el exceso (en grado, alcance o forma) de la participación del grupo en relación con el nivel considerado normal por la vieja sociedad*" (Germani, 2003: 50) La movilización, entonces, constituye siempre una forma de participación disruptiva por exceso o por defecto. No resulta de un mero incremento en los niveles de participación, de hecho Germani apunta la existencia de "regímenes de movilización" que se caracterizan por su capacidad de incrementar sus niveles de participación sin afectar sus marcos de integración; se trata, en cambio, de un particular tipo de exceso que nuestro autor se esfuerza por caracterizar: "El término exceso no sólo se utiliza para enfatizar que el cambio en el conjunto de roles (en la participación) implica una sustitución de algunos de ellos por otros, sino que fundamentalmente incluye la invasión de roles que han sido reservados para otros sectores de la sociedad. El cambio en el grado y en la composición de la participación (como en el conjunto de roles) puede expresarse de una forma más general y neutral sin enfatizar el aspecto de la invasión en el ejercicio de roles denegados al grupo que está siendo movilizado. Es preferible utilizar un concepto con mayor carga para subrayar dos hechos importantes en el análisis del proceso de transición: 1) la expansión de la participación y 2) el hecho de que la expansión aparece frecuentemente como una invasión de roles y estatus, previamente reservados para otros grupos." (Germani, 2003: 51)

Esta última cita nos parece decisiva en nuestro afán por reconstruir el concepto de movilización política. Nótese, además, que el concepto de asincronía -núcleo semántico de las paradojas de la teoría de la modernización- ha sido sustituido, dentro del vocabulario propio del enfoque en términos de movilización, por la noción más atenuada y flexible de "correspondencia". El exceso del que nos habla Germani no se deja confundir ni con la sustitución, ni con la ambigüedad de roles, es más, tampoco se define como una incongruencia de estatus característica de los procesos de crisis y desestructuración social, la figura con "mayor carga" que nuestro autor elige es la de invasión de roles y estatus. Más arriba nos preguntábamos: ¿en qué medida puede hablarse del primer tipo de roles a los que se refiere Germani cuando define el alcance de la participación, es decir, aquellos correspondientes a las posiciones estructurales en una estructura desintegrada o dislocada? El concepto de exceso que venimos recorriendo, evidente intuición holista de Germani, nos sugiere una respuesta: la invasión de roles y estatus que define a la movilización en su forma extrema, si es que podemos pensar en otra, revela que la misma subvierte no ya el desplazamiento entre posiciones en la estructura de estatus sino el propio significado de los mismos. Es decir, una movilización política no consiste únicamente en el desplazamiento de los grupos en la estructura de estatus establecida, sino que afecta las propias reglas de distribución de las posiciones y los roles sociales.

Retomemos lo que Germani denomina el ciclo de la movilización. De una situación de integración dada, y como efecto de una alteración producida en alguno de las di-

mensiones de integración anteriormente mencionadas -normativa, psicosocial y/o ambiental-, que se experimenta como "evento traumático", se produce un fenómeno que Germani designa *desplazamiento*. Tal concepto refiere al desprendimiento de ciertos grupo, estratos o elites de la estructura social previa, como resultado de la alteración mencionada, pero no basta para hablar de movilización en la medida que cabe la posibilidad de una reacción de los mismos en términos de lo que Germani denomina "*participación imperfecta o negativa*": formas anómicas de repliegue y/o apatía. Para el paso a la movilización el desplazamiento debe dar lugar a la *disponibilidad*. Esto es, una "movilización psicológica" expresada en la disposición a impulsar una transformación en los estándares de participación. Aquí se abren tres alternativas: a) la *desmovilización*, resultado de la oposición exitosa de otros grupos y/o élites, b) puede ocurrir un caso de *asimilación*, la modificación de los grupos movilizados con el propósito de ser legitimados en la estructura social existente, o, por último, c) cabe la posibilidad de una *dislocación o cambio estructural*, el caso del exceso y la invasión de estatus que señalamos más arriba y que implica el trastocamiento de todas las posiciones sociales en función de un nuevo principio de legitimidad. Claro que se trata de distinciones analíticas que deberán ser pacientemente sopesadas en el análisis aplicado dado que admiten las más diversas combinaciones: "Debido a la naturaleza asincrónica del cambio, el desplazamiento, la movilización y la integración pueden no suceder al mismo tiempo en todos los sectores del comportamiento en el mismo grupo social (o en todos los sectores de la estructura de la cual participa el grupo). El resultado es que pueden coexistir situaciones muy diferentes: desplazamiento con apatía en ciertos sectores, movilización en otros, participación integrada en algunas esferas de acción y persistencia del patrón preexistente en las restantes. Este esquema simplifica el proceso real que tiene lugar, debido a que dentro de lo que consideramos analíticamente como un área de comportamiento dado (tales como el trabajo, la familia, la actividad política, la recreación, etcétera), podemos tener combinaciones de viejos y nuevos elementos. Este fenómeno, que en otros trabajos ha sido denominado con el término 'efecto de fusión', se presenta en varias situaciones transicionales." (Gernani, 2003: 54).

Así planteadas las cosas, se imponen dos preguntas fundamentales: primero, ¿cómo se justifica el paso del desplazamiento a la disponibilidad?, luego, ¿qué condiciones favorecen o bloquean la resolución del proceso en términos de movilización negativa, desmovilización, asimilación o cambio estructural?

Respecto de la primera cuestión, el evidente psicologismo implicado en la dimensión psicosocial de la integración, aspecto en el cual se produce el fenómeno de la disponibilidad, dificulta una justificación clara del tránsito entre desplazamiento y disponibilidad. Sin embargo, Germani apunta dos condiciones que deben atenderse para el análisis de la puesta en disponibilidad: la cultura política nacional y la existencia de tradiciones previas de movilización en los sectores desplazados. Es interesante destacar que, en este último uso, el concepto de tradición tiene un valor completamente distinto al que se le asigna cuando se lo usa en el contexto de la oposición sociedad tradicional-sociedad moderna. En este sentido, la tradición no representa aquello por definición opuesto a lo moderno, el término marcado de la oposición, sino la trans-

misión intergeneracional de pautas de confrontación y formas de organización. Esta idea de tradición como memoria práctica, sobre la que volveremos, entendemos que permite superar el *corset* psicosocial en el estudio de lo que Germani denomina la "puesta en disponibilidad", es decir, el tema fundamental para el estudio de la movilización de la transición entre una situación de dislocación estructural (desplazamiento) y la disponibilidad de sectores sociales dispuestos a intervenir mediante la participación directa.

En ese hiato lo que entra en juego, entonces, es lo que el gran teórico de la movilización sociopolítica Charles Tilly (1978) denomina "repertorios de movilización": pautas de acción aprendidas en la lucha que dotan de marcos interpretativos y alternativas estratégicas a los actores movilizados. Los repertorios son limitados en la medida en que garantizan la continuidad de la lucha, pero abiertos a la innovación en relación permanente con las transformaciones de las oportunidades políticas en las que se desarrolla la acción contenciosa (Tarrow, 1997). El aporte fundamental de Tilly reside en subrayar la importancia de tomar como unidad de análisis, al momento de estudiar procesos de movilización, a las formas de expresión, organización y confrontación mismas, independientemente de los grupos previamente constituidos que en ellas participan. En este sentido, forma parte de la propia definición de la acción colectiva contenciosa y de los movimientos sociales el carácter heterogéneo, dinámico y conflictivo de su composición social y organizativa. La idea de repertorio, finalmente, nos invita a pensar a la acción colectiva como una esfera pública específica donde se desarrollan complejos procesos de aprendizaje a través de un constante trabajo de relectura de tradiciones previas de confrontación, más que como la reacción emotiva e irracional de los grupos afectados por situaciones de agravio.

Dos factores fundamentales son los que intervienen en la configuración de la movilización orientándola hacia alguna de sus posibles formas de resolución: las elites y la ideología. También las elites están expuestas al desprendimiento y la disponibilidad en la medida que pueden encontrarse en una situación incongruente con el sistema de estratificación. Germani distingue tres tipos de intervención de las elites que lideran los procesos de movilización: 1) movilización con intervención de una elite externa: la diferenciación de la elite respecto del grupo movilizado es anterior a la puesta en disponibilidad, incluso puede tratarse de un elite que no pertenezca a los sectores desprendidos; 2) movilización con generación de una elite interna: la elite se diferencia después o simultáneamente con el proceso de movilización; 3) movilización sin liderazgo: aunque no aparece un liderazgo diferenciado, en este caso se registra la intervención de líderes informales que operan como grupo a nivel primario. Nos parece destacable la importancia que otorga Germani a la conformación de elites en los procesos de movilización, una dimensión poco explorada en los estudios contemporáneos sobre acción colectiva contenciosa, en la medida en que su configuración influye de manera decisiva sobre las relaciones de los grupo movilizados con las instituciones formales del régimen político de gobierno. Al respecto, escribe Germani: "Lo que puede diferenciarse más claramente es el rol que elites y masas habrán de desempeñar en tales procesos. Generalmente se supone que el rol de las elites es de tipo más activo, correspondiéndole la iniciativa, el liderazgo y la organización (cuando esta fase



esté presente en el proceso considerado); pero esta distinción es también sumamente imprecisa: en el fondo ella apunta al hecho de que en cualquier movimiento es posible distinguir una diferenciación entre conductores y conducidos (u otra distinción análoga) aunque nada se indica acerca de las relaciones internas entre estos dos sectores. Por ejemplo en una situación de 'disponibilidad' de grandes estratos de la población, su conversión en 'movilización' puede ocurrir -según las circunstancias- debido a la intervención activa de una élite externa a los estratos (la que podría percibir por ejemplo las posibilidades ofrecidas por tales estratos como base de reclutamiento de un movimiento), como respuesta espontánea en ausencia de estímulos externos (y en este caso tenderá a generarse una nueva élite, que surge desde el interior de los estratos en movilización), de una presión por parte de los estratos sobre élites existentes (algunas de las cuales podrían responder facilitando la movilización, mientras que otras podrían tener reacciones opuestas), o más probablemente, por combinaciones de todas estas posibles situaciones" (Germani, 2003: 57)

Respecto del problema de la función de las ideologías en los procesos de movilización, Germani establece una crítica distinción entre lo que denomina "finés reales" e ideología. Es evidente que la concepción conductista de la dimensión psicosocial tampoco colabora en este caso para una definición de la ideología que supere su análisis en términos de falsa conciencia o distorsión de los "finés reales". Aun con esta limitación, Germani establece tres factores que afectan la "elección" de las ideologías: primero, por la naturaleza de otros grupos o sectores de la población disponibles y movilizables; segundo, por la naturaleza y el contenido de las ideologías disponibles; y tercero, por la cultura política de la sociedad y el sector movilizado. Creemos que los factores introducidos por Germani pueden conservarse como dimensiones de análisis si se consideran como marcos interpretativos de la acción colectiva más que como epifenómenos o abstracciones distorsivas de una conciencia transparente. Los marcos interpretativos operan como construcciones simbólicas estratégicas en la lucha por el reconocimiento de los grupos y la realización de sus demandas y, en este sentido, forman parte de los repertorios de confrontación a los que hacíamos referencia más arriba (Cefai, 2008).

Para finalizar nuestro análisis del concepto de movilización proponemos distinguir tres significados del término que se infieren de nuestra interpretación de los argumentos de Germani. Es importante destacar que, en la medida que lo que sugerimos es una distinción conceptual, en los procesos históricos de movilización estas modalidades pueden superponerse y solaparse de distintas formas.

*Movilidad:* Este término tiene un uso puramente descriptivo y designa a los índices de circulación entre estratos y/o clases. Se trata de la movilización en el sentido de Deutsch.

*Movilización social:* Remite a las consecuencias psicosociales de las transformaciones estructurales propias de los "desplazamientos" que genera el proceso de secularización: urbanización, industrialización, burocratización, centralización de la autoridad política, ampliación del estado de derecho, etc. La situación de disponibilidad se

resuelve en la integración funcional dentro de un proceso relativamente ordenado de diferenciación y especificación del sistema social. Incluimos aquí los casos de asimilación y/o desmovilización.

*Movilización política:* Son los casos de “dislocación” de la estructura como resultado del exceso o defecto producido por la participación respecto de algunas o todas las dimensiones de integración. Germani mismo, refiriéndose a un caso de integración por asimilación, diferencia claramente entre una movilización que puede tener “implicaciones políticas” y aquellas que tienen “expresión política directa”: “El proceso completo tendrá implicaciones políticas, pero no necesariamente una expresión política directa, tal como un nuevo movimiento, un nuevo partido o régimen o un cambio drástico en los alineamientos políticos.” (Germani, 2003: 61). En definitiva, sugerimos restringir el uso del concepto de movilización política para los casos en los que se produce la emergencia de un sujeto político que plantea problemas de integración: la impugnación de las reglas que organizan la distribución de recursos de autoridad (legitimación, representación, participación) y de asignación (condiciones de acceso a bienes y servicios).

## 4. Conclusión

Hemos intentado recuperar el concepto de movilización política de Germani liberándolo de lo que consideramos dos aporías fundamentales al interior de su complejo marco conceptual: a) la idea de que la movilización es una función acrítica y no conflictiva de un proceso de modernización concebido de manera teleológica y paradigmática, y b) la idea según la cual la movilización política tendría un carácter anómico o anormal toda vez que no se produzca como mera “difusión cultural” dentro de un régimen democrático representativo y pluralista.

La operación teórico-epistemológica que realizamos se justifica en la importancia que asignamos al alcance heurístico y crítico del concepto de movilización desarrollado por Germani, principalmente en sus últimos trabajos. Frente a las perspectivas endógenas y formalistas al momento de estudiar los movimientos sociales, propias de los enfoques etnográficos e institucionalistas, respectivamente, el concepto de movilización que propone Germani enfoca el problema fundamental de la relación compleja y variable, la articulación estamos tentados a decir, entre las organizaciones y los repertorios de la movilización y las estructuras formales del régimen político de gobierno, permitiendo un análisis relacional y estratégico de problemas centrales como las formas de participación, los procesos de representación y los marcos simbólicos que establecen las fronteras de la inclusión en las sociedades postradicionales y posfuncionales en las cuales la tradición no informa la conducta y la función no define la identidad.

En sus últimos trabajos el concepto marco de modernización va perdiendo terreno frente a una concepción histórica crítica de la modernidad capitalista occidental como proceso de secularización. Allí claramente lo que constituían “asincronías” patológi-

cas en los regímenes políticos de los países periféricos (en la medida que superponían patrones de conducta tradicionales y modernos) pasan a ser contradicciones y torsiones propias del proceso de secularización occidental en su conjunto, al que no se lo concibe como una dinámica técnico-económica inmanente, sino como una creciente y alarmante contradicción entre el desarrollo económico-tecnológico y los problemas de integración social y legitimación política que conllevan. En este nuevo marco la anterior polaridad tradicional – moderno no opera ya como frontera y contrapunto del paradigma moderno, sino como tensión interna al proceso de secularización en su complejo despliegue. Es así que tanto lo tradicional como lo moderno asumen otro valor en el contexto del desanclaje, la diferenciación y la individuación que opera sobre el orden social la dinámica instrumental del subsistema técnico-económico.

La tradición reaparece en este marco como fuente de legitimidad e integración social a través no ya de principios extrasociales o suprahumanos, sino mediante la producción de relatos de legitimación capaces de promover efectos imaginarios de comunidad, allí donde los niveles de individuación, particularmente en el capitalismo posliberal y posplanificado –al que Germani se asoma hablando de las “transformaciones recientes”– resultan disgregadores de las formas elementales de cooperación social. Es decir, esta noción de tradición como autoridad legitimada en la historia compartida, resulta una presencia de lo premoderno en lo moderno, trabajando al interior de la secularización y no en su exterior constitutivo. Asimismo, advierte Germani una suerte de sobremodernidad para la cual el progreso técnico-económico no funciona ya como condición y resultado, como engranaje diríamos, de la democracia liberal representativa, sino como su amenaza, como su núcleo dislocador a través de la producción de tecnopoderes concentrados y de la exclusión como efecto paradójico del crecimiento económico y el desarrollo técnico. Es decir, el eje tradicional-moderno se pone al servicio del análisis crítico de las paradojas, contradicciones y represiones del proceso moderno de secularización y no de su confirmación especular.

Y la crítica de la modernización capitalista no se ajusta sólo a una dimensión temporal en el eje tradicional-moderno, sino que también se deja analizar resignificando la relación centro-periferia. Dice Germani: “Es posible que los países llamados en desarrollo tengan mejor oportunidad de hallar soluciones originales a las graves contradicciones que encierra la sociedad industrial en todas sus versiones y formas. Tales contradicciones, algunas de las cuales se señalan aquí, son inherentes a ciertos aspectos centrales de la estructura moderna” (Germani, 1979: 28). Aquí lo moderno es pensado como crisis, como dispositivo de dislocación permanente de sus propias promesas constitutivas; y acaso Latinoamérica, se espera Germani en un texto tardío de prudente tono apocalíptico, sus formas democráticas populares, sus “ideologías de la industrialización” capaces de reeditar el fantasma de la nación, su diversidad productiva de base territorial y comunitaria, en fin, este mundo de fusiones y demostraciones, se anuncia también como el de las “soluciones originales” al letal nihilismo de la individuación compulsiva en la modernidad tardía.

Los países en desarrollo como promesa entonces. Casi en la inversión de su argumento inicial sobre la modernización como proceso transparente de progreso mate-

rial e integración democrática al modelo central, Germani nos invita a pensar en la creatividad de los márgenes. Y los márgenes se expresan en la acción; en el estudio de las formas de movilización, sus repertorios y sujetos, y en los modos en que se articulan con el régimen político, hay una intriga para la sociología y una promesa para la política.

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## Identity Battles, Social Movement Networks and Political Opportunity Structures in the Basque Public Space: Bilbao's *Aste Nagusia* (2009-2010)<sup>1</sup>

Ignacia Perugorriá

**Abstract:** In this paper I will analyze the identity work performed by the organizers of Bilbao's annual popular festivities (*Aste Nagusia*). *Aste Nagusia* constitutes a major experiment of what I call "participatory culture;" it involves networks of state institutions, political parties, entrepreneur associations, and a group of social movement organizations and cultural collectives affiliated to a Federation of *Comparsas*. As such, *Aste Nagusia* represents the sole "cultural space" where actors with center-, right-, and left-wing ideologies, and Spanish unionist and Basque separatist tendencies meet, and collide, in Spain. Due to these characteristics, *Aste Nagusia* is an exceptional scenario for the display of "identity battles" related not only to the festivity, but also to divergent understandings of culture, the city and political liberties. My paper will focus on the identity narratives developed by the Federation of *Comparsas*, the strategies and alliances it has crafted, and their symbolic and performative representation in the festive space. It will also provide an account of the arduous work of identity synchronization/de-synchronization conducted by the *comparsas* to articulate internal differences amidst radically changing political opportunity structures. I will focus on the critical years of 2009-10; the decade-long repression and criminalization of the *abertzale* or patriot Left (hub of socialist and independentist organizations linked to the armed organization ETA) reached Bilbao's festive field during this period. 2009 was, too, the year in which the *abertzales* launched a "purely political way," that is, an internal process of "democratization" aimed at putting an end to 50 years of armed struggle, and to their 8-year electoral proscription. Given that almost half of the *comparsas* in the Federation fall within the *abertzale* umbrella, this is a key period for my research. Textual and visual data analyzed in the paper come from a two-year ethnographic study conducted in Bilbao, archival material, and in-depth interviews.

**Keywords:** participatory culture, identity battles, identity synchronization/de-synchronization strategies, social movement networks, political opportunity structures.

### 1. Introduction

Every late August the summer-long season of festivities held in the Basque Country lands in Bilbao, the region's largest and most modern city. For nine days, the city cen-

ter bursts with people, young and old, enjoying a blend of traditional music, dance and sports, and more modern performances and competitions. The nine-day festive week begins with a public announcement by the elected town crier and the launching of the festive rocket, and ends with the burning of Marijaia, the festivity's rosy-cheeked, peasant-like female mascot. From beginning to end, news about the festival occupy the front pages and prime time of the entire Basque media; Spanish and international media, too, give ample coverage to the event.

In 2009, Bilbao's Big Week (*Aste Nagusia*) was declared Immaterial Cultural Patrimony of Spain by UNESCO.<sup>2</sup> That same year, its celebrations comprised 300 free shows and cultural activities, run on a budget of three million Euros, and convoked more than 460,000 attendants—80,000 of which were tourists.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the nine-day week represented 7 percent of Bizkaia's annual gross domestic product, and as in previous years it resulted in considerable revenues for the lodging, gastronomic, and transportation sectors. *Aste Nagusia's* sociological relevance exceeds, however, this prestigious award, and these impressive figures. I contend that it is a privileged setting to study the interaction between culture and politics in the public space, from both a relational and historical-comparative perspective. This is the case for three main reasons.

First, *Aste Nagusia* constitutes an exceptional major experiment of what I call "*participatory culture*." Whereas festivities in small Basque villages and neighborhoods entail certain degree of citizen participation in the organization, those taking place in large urban areas like Bilbao have historically been organized in a top-down fashion by the city government. *Aste Nagusia*, however, is based on a unique hybrid organizational model that involves networks of state institutions, major political parties, entrepreneur associations, and a Federation of *Comparsas* formed by social movement organizations, neighborhood and cultural associations, and cultural collectives of different kind, many of them proscribed due to alleged ties to the "armed organization"/"terrorist group" ETA. I thus claim that *Aste Nagusia* can be analyzed as a *multi-organizational field* (Klandermans 1992:95-6; Mische 2008:9) formed by social networks located at the intersection of the political, cultural and economic spheres. As I will show below, the majority of these organizations, and the social networks they constitute, can be catalogued along two politico-ideological axes: Left-Right, and Basque nationalism-Spanish unionism.

Second, due to the structural characteristics of the field, and the diversity of the organizations involved in it, *Aste Nagusia* is a stage for constant *identity battles* (Zerubavel 1997) and *identity synchronization/de-synchronization* strategies (Mische 2005). Drawing on Mellucci (1995:44-5), I define collective identities as interactive and shared definitions concerned with the orientations of the action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place. This definition must be understood as a process, that is, as something constructed and negotiated in a dialectic interaction with historical events, and through the repeated activation and deactivation of the ties that link groups or individuals.<sup>4</sup> This historical and relational approach emphasizes the insertion of identities in networks of social relationships that suffer

changes across time and space. I argue that *Aste Nagusia* can be analyzed as a *relational setting* (Somers 1994), that is, a geographically- and temporally-bound locale of patterned but contested relations among organizations, public narratives and social practices where identity-formation—and confrontation—takes place. As I will show, these identity disputes are articulated through narratives, performances, and symbols displayed in the public space. *Aste Nagusia* thus operates not only as a massive identity showcase, but also as a titanic identity battlefield with crucial cultural and socio-political impact, especially to social movement organizations outside state institutions and mainstream politics. *Aste Nagusia* is also a privileged setting to observe the identitarian display of political organizations that have gone “underground” due to their electoral proscription. At first sight, the identity battles waged in *Aste Nagusia* relate to the format and content of the festivity (e.g. content, dates, settings, budget); a deeper analysis reveals, however, their association with divergent ideals and practices related to culture, activism, civil liberties and urban utopias.

Third, *Aste Nagusia* allows us to study the interaction between culture and politics in Bilbao’s public space for a period of over thirty years, and under very diverse *political and urban opportunity structures* (Meyer 2004:133-6). *Aste Nagusia* was “invented” in 1978, year in which the Basque region began its autonomic construction and Spain started its formal democratic transition after four decades of authoritarian rule and absence of popular festivities in major cities like Bilbao.<sup>5</sup> In this context, *Aste Nagusia* was interpreted and experienced as an outburst of long repressed freedom, spontaneity and joy, and also as a recovery of “the streets” that had been “expropriated” from Bilbao’s citizens. Since then, the Basque political, cultural, urban and socio-economic spheres have undergone considerable transformations: the democratization of institutional politics and the demobilization of an ample sector of civil society; the dissolution of the anti-Franco front and the Balkanization of the political arena into Basque nationalist and Spanish unionist political parties of right-, center- and left-wing tendencies; the increasing exclusion and repression of social movement organizations; and the illegalization of Basque left-wing separatism. Likewise Bilbao has experienced a set of transformations as the economic and political (though not administrative) “capital” of the Basque Autonomous Community, one of the two richest regions in Spain. These include the de-industrialization and tertiarization of its economy and workforce and the embellishment, modernization and increasing globalization of the city after the installation of the Guggenheim Bilbao in 1997. As I will show below, these transformations have had substantial impact on the identity disputes that have emerged between *Aste Nagusia*’s organizers.

In this paper I analyze the *identity battles* waged between *Aste Nagusia*’s organizers, focusing solely on the perspective of the Federation of *Comparsas*. I concentrate on their *identity narratives* (Anderson 2006[1983]:205; Somers 1994:615-7; Polletta 1998a:421-6, Polletta 1998b), the strategies they have crafted in order to cope with different political opportunity structures, and their symbolic and performative representation in the festive space. I also provide an account of the internal synchronization and de-synchronization of identities that the Federation has undergone throughout these processes, and the associated processes that I have defined as *symbolic align-*



*ment* and *counter-symbolization*. I focus on the critical period comprised between 2009 and 2011; 2009 was the year in which the state-led repression and criminalization of the *abertzale* (patriot) Left initiated in the early 2000s reached the festive field. 2009 was, too, the year in which the *abertzale* cluster began a transition that, following the Irish and South African experiences, would take it from a hybrid politico-military to a "purely political" model of opposition. In the long run, this transition meant to put an end to the last armed conflict in Europe, a five-decade process that has entailed numerous failed peace talks, truces and cease-fires. Given that 45 per cent of the *comparsas* fall within the *abertzale* umbrella, this is a pivotal point in my investigation. As I will show, the festive field of *Aste Nagusia* operated as a key laboratory for the development and testing of successful transition narratives and strategies. Data analyzed in this paper come from a two-year ethnographic study conducted in Bilbao and in-depth interviews conducted among representatives of the different *comparsas*. I also analyze archival data, as well as bylaws, administrative sanctions and court rulings regulating festive and political affairs. In addition, my analysis relies heavily on visual images (mainly photographs) collected during my ethnographies or available on the internet. Following the principles of visual sociology, these images intend to add substance, sociological meaning, and evidentiary value to my analysis (Becker 1995; Harper 1998).

## 2. *Aste Nagusia's* Multi-Organizational Field and Social Movement Networks

I contend that *Aste Nagusia* can be analyzed as a multi-organizational field (Klandermans 1992:95-6; Mische 2008:9).<sup>6</sup> This field constitutes a relational setting (Somers 1994:626-7), that is, a geographically and temporally bound locale of contested but patterned relations among networks of institutions and organizations, public narratives and symbols (Ikegami 2000:997), and social practices where identity-formation—and identity disputes—take place.<sup>7</sup> The structure of *Aste Nagusia's* multi-organizational field is determined by the "hybrid festive model," embodied in *Aste Nagusia's* Mixed Organizing Commission. The Commission is formed, on the one hand, by one councilman per political party represented in Bilbao's City Hall. In the Spanish "unionist" side, this includes the right-wing Popular Party, and the Basque branches of the Spanish Socialist Party and United Left; in the "autonomist-separatist" side, the right-wing Basque Nationalist Party and Bildu, the electoral coalition representing the *abertzale* Left. Also referred to as the Basque National Liberation Movement, the *abertzale* Left is formed by a cluster of specialized and interrelated organizations (e.g. youth, linguistic, environmentalist, pro-amnesty, trade union, etc.) sharing the socialist and independentist ideology originally synthesized by the armed organization Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) in the early 1960s. From the return to democracy in the late 1970s until its illegalization in 2003 due to alleged ties to ETA, this synthesis was represented in the electoral arena by the political party Batasuna. During the proscription years, *abertzales* continued to organize and mobilize their loyal base through their specialized organizations and through intensive politics at the local level (i.e. villages and neighborhoods). In 2011, and after a long self-imposed process

of internal democratization, the *abertzale* Left reentered Basque political institutions through the Bildu coalition.

On the second hand, the festive Commission is formed by a number of delegates representing the Federation of *Comparsas*. The dictionary of the Spanish Royal academy defines “*comparsa*” as a group of people who, wearing uniforms or dressed in a similar fashion, participate in carnivals or other festivities. The delegates of the Federation of *Comparsas* are often experienced with multiple long-term militancies in social movement organizations and even political parties. In addition, three seats are destined to organizations or associations with ties to the festivities; these are to be proposed and approved by the stable members of the Commission. During the past years, only two seats have been occupied, one of them by a delegate of the Association of Disabled People, ideologically close to the Federation of *Comparsas*, and the other by a representative of Bilbao’s Historic Center Entrepreneur Association, with ties to the hegemonic Basque Nationalist Party. This Association gathers Bilbao’s taverns and bars, a highly visible and powerful sector given that Basque social life is predominantly associated to the tradition of “*poteo*” (going on rounds of drinks and having one drink per bar). The Mixed Organizing Commission is presided over by the Secretary of Tourism and Festivities, historically in hands of the Basque Nationalist Party. Activities funded by Bilbao’s City Hall are implemented by a group of professional planning experts and technicians; activities funded by the Federation are in turn organized with the pro bono work of *comparseros*.

In 2009-2011, the Federation of *Comparsas* was formed by twenty-nine *comparsas*, integrated by more than 3,000 members. Each *comparsa* has its own set of identifying symbols (e.g. costume, mascot, etc.), and throughout the year the *comparseros* organize and participate in several Basque rituals, such as gastronomic encounters, and hiking expeditions. During *Aste Nagusia* each *comparsa* organizes its own activities, participates in common competitions, and runs its own tent, where food and beverages are served, and where each *comparsa*’s ideological orientations, together with its political, cultural and socio-economic concerns and denunciations are displayed. Bilbao’s *comparsas* are the offspring and inheritors of a “clandestine social milieu” (Pérez-Agote 2006:93-4; 169) that emerged in the 1950s and 60s to circumvent and resist the Francoist repression of popular movements, particularly those with a Basque nationalist ideology. In 1978, 70 percent of the *comparsas* had a neighborhood affiliation, and 25 percent had a purely political one. The former were, nonetheless, tied to *cuadrillas* (highly institutionalized groups of friends)<sup>8</sup>, neighborhood associations<sup>9</sup> and cultural/recreational groups and clubs—hiking, dancing, gastronomic, religious, etc.—that operated as key agents of underground political socialization, recruitment and resistance during the Franco years. During the 80s and 90s, this milieu was gradually debilitated and de-politicized; the wide majority of its militants transitioned either to political parties and/or social movement organizations. The results of this process on the festive field are clear: by 2010, 20 percent of the *comparsas* had a neighborhood affiliation, and 70 percent had either an overt or covert political association.



Figure 1 shows the network of *comparsas* (circle nodes) that integrated the Federation in 2009-2011, and their ties. The thirtieth *comparsa*, Gogorregi —tied to Egin, the youth section of the Basque Nationalist Party—, abandoned the Federation in 2003. Out of the remaining 29 *comparsas*, fourteen are tied to legal or proscribed political organizations (square nodes), eight to neighborhood associations (triangle nodes), two to some type of independent media (diamond nodes), and one to a private cultural venture (cross node); the rest respond to different cultural collectives. On the bottom of the figure we can see a total of twelve *comparsas* (forty percent) that fall under the umbrella of the *abertzale* Left, either due to the politico-ideological sympathies (and oftentimes militancy) of the majority of their members, or because of their ties to a particular social movement organization. Since many of the *abertzale* organizations are currently illegalized, I have excluded the “organizational” ties in the figure. The majority of these *comparsas* are associated with highly specialized social movement organizations (eg. organizations pursuing linguistic, environmentalist, pro-amnesty, or internationalist causes, or representing the *abertzale* youth sector). Other *comparsas*, however, do not have an organization behind and therefore do not possess such a clear-cut profile. Some *comparsas*, like Kobeta Mendi, Txinbotarrak, Kaixo and Pa...Ya! have a double “affiliation”: they are neighborhood-based, but also have clear political ties to the *abertzale* Left. In addition, the neighborhood of Otxarkoaga has two *comparsas*: Aixe-Berri and Pa... Ya!, respectively responding to an “a-political” and an *abertzale* group of neighbors.

I argue that from the perspective of each organization involved in *Aste Nagusia*, the multi-organizational field is split into an *alliance* network of supporters, a *conflict* network of opponents, and a *neutral* sector of organizations that both clusters intend to win to their side (Evans 1997:2). Figure 2 shows the disposition of the political or “politically-oriented” organizations operating within this field. Hybrid organizations (combining politics and neighborhood-based activities, politics and media, etc.) have also been taken into consideration; I have excluded “purely” recreational, cultural or neighborhood-based *comparsas*. A first dividing line can be traced in the field between the *comparsas* and Bilbao’s “City Hall;” this encompasses the Basque Nationalist Party and other political parties represented in the city government, and Bilbao’s Historic Center Entrepreneur Association. This is how the field dynamic has worked since the *abertzale* political party Batasuna was illegalized in 2003, and the Socialists and United Left started moving closer to the right-wing Basque Nationalist Party and Popular Party, thus precluding “popular” alliances with the Federation of *Comparsas*. After the re-entrance of the *abertzale* coalition Bildu to the City Hall in May 2011, Federation representatives feel they have recovered their long-time ally, although the relationship with the *abertzales* continues to be problematic, particularly for the a-political *comparsas* and for the non-nationalist political ones.

In addition to this initial clear-cut opposition between the Federation of *Comparsas* and the “City Hall,” there is a second layer of alliance and conflict networks. My two-year ethnographic study shows that the multiple organizations involved in *Aste Nagusia*’s field can be categorized according to two politico-ideological axes: Left-Right, and Basque nationalism-Spanish unionism. These axes cut across the previous *Comparsas*-“City




Figure 2. Alliance and Conflict Networks in Aste Nagusia's Multi-Organizational Field, 2009-2011.

Hall” divide, thus generating parallel sympathies, and oftentimes-contradictory alliances. Close to the y axis, in the bottom of the figure, we can see United Left (represented in Bilbao’s City Hall until May 2011) and the Spanish Socialist Party, nominally leftist political parties that profess a Spanish unionist ideology but that are organized as federations of regional branches. On the bottom right-hand corner we find the Popular Party, a political party that is located in the extreme right wing and unionism of the political spectrum. Finally, in the upper right-hand quadrant we find the Basque Nationalist Party’s influence area. Gogorregi is the *comparsa* tied to Egin, the party’s youth section. Bilbao’s Historic Center Entrepreneur Association is also closely tied to the party.<sup>10</sup>

In the upper-left hand quadrant we can observe, in turn, an important hub of *comparsas* tied, either organically or ideologically, to the *abertzale* Left and now to the Bildu coalition. Both Kobeta Mendi and Satorrak have one foot in, and one foot out of this hub, though for different reasons.<sup>11</sup> Closer to the x axis we can find a second group of *comparsas*. They do not share a political affiliation, but they tend to partake in projects, platforms, and broader causes, and except for Zaratas, they all respond to social movement organizations. In addition, there is a strong flow of communication, and even militants, between these *comparsas*. Many members of the environmentalist Bizizaleak were previously members (or worked on a “free-lance” basis in the tent) of Mekauen, associated to the non-*abertzale* internationalist social movement organization Komites Internazionalistas. The same is true for Sin Kuartel, associated to the anti-militarist social movement organization MOC, and the anarcho-syndicalist Hontzak. Sin Kuartel, in addition, has one of the most prominent activists in the Federation. Zaratas is tied to the free radio Tas Tas Irratia, of libertarian ideology; the anti-militarist MOC is a shareholder in Zaratas, and so are several members of Hontzak on a personal basis.

Hontzak and Txomin Barullo are somewhat separated from this group; the “coincidence in the streets” with the other five organizations is not as strong. Hontzak responds to the historical National Labor Confederation, an anarcho-syndicalist trade union that played a key role during the Spanish Republic (1931-9), and the ensuing Civil War (1936-9), especially in Cataluña. Since the return to democracy, the Confederation has lost thousands of affiliates, and in its current representation in the Basque Autonomous Community is almost negligible. It has nonetheless retained important quotas of political prestige and its militants are well-trained and widely regarded, especially in the Federation. As one interviewee mentioned “the Confederation has almost no presence in Bilbao’s streets, but Hontzak is a key player in the Federation of *Comparsas*.” Txomin Barullo, in turn, was originally linked to a Maoist political party that also emerged from an ETA split in 1966. Now that this party and its successor Zutik have disappeared, Txomin Barullo is home to left-wing militants of different affiliations: Alternatiba (split from United Left), Spanish Socialist Party, etc. Despite being *Aste Nagusia*’s founding father, and still retaining its popular appeal during *Aste Nagusia*, Txomin Barullo has lost its original grasp within the Federation of *Comparsas*. Leoihak, in turn, is associated to an extremely marginal Trotskist political party that is organized at the level of the Spanish state; it was expelled in 2010 due to the non-compliance of Federation statutes and agreements.

### 3. Political Opportunity Structures

Given that forty percent of the *comparsas* integrating the Federation are overtly or covertly related to the *abertzale* Left, and given that politics in the Basque Autonomous Community—and, more generally, in Spain—have gravitated around the “Basque (armed) conflict” for the last five decades, I will conceptualize “political opportunities” as consisting of the existence/inexistence of laws, judicial proceedings, and/or legal repression constraining the exercise of political freedoms by non-violent Basque nationalist activists and/or organizations at the national, regional and local levels.<sup>12</sup> In this sense, the passing of the Political Parties Law and the beginning of the illegalization of *abertzale* organizations in the early 2000s, the “anti-*abertzale* Left” pact signed by the Spanish Socialist Party and the Popular Party upon their arrival to the Basque presidency in early 2009, and the Bylaws regulating festivities (2003) and the use of public space (2010) in Bilbao, are clear indicators of constricting structures of political opportunity. Although they have explicitly targeted *abertzale* organizations, I contend these measures have ultimately affected *Aste Nagusia*’s broader multi-organizational field and the social movement sector at large.

My ethnographic fieldwork began in November 2009 and went on unstopped until early 2012. This was a very peculiar period in the political history of both the Basque Autonomous Community and Bilbao.<sup>13</sup> In May 2009 a post-electoral alliance between the Basque Socialist Party and the Popular Party took the Presidency of the Basque Autonomous Community from the hands of the so far undefeated right-wing Basque Nationalist Party. The alliance between the two major Spanish unionist parties—one of social democrat or center-left ideology, and the other one originally heir to the Francoist dictatorship—had no precedents in Spain. Their government pact was two-fold: to put an end to ETA’s “terrorism,” and to ameliorate the socio-economic crisis that had begun to cripple Spain in 2008. The arrival of the Socialist-Popular coalition to the Basque presidency turned the Basque political field upside-down. In Madrid, the Basque Nationalist Party kept its leverage power; the Socialist administration lacked a majority of its own in the Spanish Parliament and needed its support.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, after 30 years of unquestioned hegemony, the Nationalists were forced into the opposition role at the regional level while nonetheless retaining power in many important town and cities. This new scenario had a considerable impact on local politics: either influenced by the new correlation of forces, or by their own previous (though silenced) personal convictions, some Basque Nationalist mayors began to consider endorsing the “zero tolerance” policy that the Socialist-Popular coalition was championing against ETA and the *abertzales*. Bilbao—the most important city in terms of residents, economic activity and political relevance in the Basque Autonomous Community—was both the spearhead and target of this new strategy.

This “firm hand” policy was not new in Spain. In 1998, under a Popular Party administration, the Spanish state began a process of criminalization and judicialization of the *abertzale* Left hub guided by the motto “everything is ETA.”<sup>15</sup> The premise behind this slogan was that the organizations within the arch of the Basque National Liberation Movement were the financiers of ETA activities and the repository of ETA members.

This “firm hand” policy was reinforced in the post 9/11 scenario; since the passing of the new Political Parties Law in 2002, all ensuing *abertzale* political parties were illegalized (i.e. Batasuna, Herri Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok and Sortu). The same holds true for most of the non-electoral *abertzale* organizations (eg. Jarrai, Haika and Segi, the three ensuing youth movement organizations, and Gestoras pro Amnistía and Askatasuna, the two ensuing pro-“political prisoners” amnesty organizations, both of them tied to a *comparsa* in the Federation). The novelty in 2009 was that this deemed “*españolista*” (pro-Spain and thus anti-Basque) policy began to be applied by the right-wing Basque Nationalist Party against its leftist “sons.” Iñaki Azkuna, Bilbao’s Nationalist mayor since 1999, was the chief promoter of this policy; he applied it, mainly, in the festive stage.

In August 2009 two historic *comparsas* —Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri, linked to the pro-amnesty and youth *abertzale* organizations respectively— received an administrative sanction for displaying photographs of Bilbao’s “political prisoners” (or “ETA terrorists,” according to the point of view) in their tents during *Aste Nagusia*. This practice dates back to the late Franco years, when *abertzale* militants started denouncing the precarious situation of their political prisoners, and it gained more relevance after 1989 with the beginning of Spain’s “dispersal policy,” that is, the dispersal of *abertzale* prisoners in remote Spanish and French correctional institutions.<sup>16</sup> Since then, the photographic display of prisoners’ portraits has been an inseparable trait of every *abertzale* “people’s tavern” (*herriko taberna*), placard protests, demonstration, and even neighborhood. However, the biggest display takes place during the summer festivities. The motto that guides this strategy is “*jaiak bai, borroka ere bai*,” “festivity, yes, but struggle too.” As such, it is opposed to the Basque Nationalist Party’s motto: “*jaietan jai*,” “during festivities, festivity,” or “the festivity for the festivity itself.” This slogan allegedly pursues the “de-politization” of festivities; in truth, it intends to preclude the “*abertzalization*” of the public space.

In hands of the Basque Nationalist Party since 1978, Bilbao’s City Hall was the first to interpret the display of prisoners’ photos as “glorification of terrorism;” no other Nationalist mayor had done so before. The law regulating the practice leaves ample room for interpretation and, in addition, one 2009 sentence had established that displaying pictures does not *necessarily* constitute an act of glorification of terrorism or denigration of victims.<sup>17</sup> The enforcement of the law has thus been the result of a complex equation taking into account the local correlation of forces and the multiple electoral calendars. In addition, such a move is a dangerous one for Basque Nationalists, even for right-wing hardliners. The “prisoners’ problem,” especially the strong opposition to the central government’s dispersal policy, has historically cut across the Right-Left wing divide within Basque nationalism. And, according to many nationalists, it is exactly the economic, emotional, and socio-political consequences of this policy what the photographs displayed during festivities aim to denounce. Although the Azkuna administration did not press criminal charges against the *comparsas*, it imposed administrative sanctions on both of them based on Bilbao’s Festive By-laws.<sup>18</sup> The sanction established that Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri could not set up their tents in *Aste Nagusia* for two consecutive years (2010 and 2011). They were thus



stripped of their main ideological showcase and the annual revenues derived from the sale of food and beverages during the festive week—close to 350 thousand Euros, 50 thousand after deductions.

Simultaneously, the *abertzale* organizations were giving the first steps of what has been defined as the most transcendent socio-political process in the last five decades in Spain. In November 2009, *abertzale* militants began to gather in clandestine assemblies held in every Basque town and neighborhood. These assemblies were portrayed as the primary instances in the bottom-up development of a new strategy for the *abertzale* cluster. In reality, they functioned as fora for the diffusion and legitimation of a strategy that had already been conceived, negotiated and approved in the high spheres of the movement. This strategy was presented to the *abertzale* base in a document for debate entitled "Clarifying the Political Phase and the Strategy," issued in October 2009, and was then summarized in the "First Step in the Democratic Process: Principles and Will of the *Abertzale* Left" (a.k.a. the "Altsasua Declaration") of November 2009. The documents constituted a pivotal turning point in the Basque conflict: for the first time<sup>19</sup> in fifty years the "political branch" within the *abertzale* Left was stepping up and implicitly asking ETA's "military vanguard" to drop its weapons and replace them for a "purely political and democratic strategy." The models they were following were the Irish and South African experiences of transition from militarized to political opposition.<sup>20</sup> In the long run, the strategy's main goal was to put an end to the last armed conflict in Europe, a five-decade process that has entailed numerous failed peace talks, truces and cease-fires. In the short run, the strategy aimed at obtaining the legalization of the *abertzale* political party after eight years of proscription, and allowing its participation in the May 2011 municipal and provincial elections—key due to the local character of Basque politics.

The process that followed the "Altsasua Declaration" was certainly arduous. Internally, *abertzale* bases had to be convinced that the "just war" the Basque people had been fighting since the Francoist dictatorship was no longer conducive to their socialist and separatist cause. This objective had to be achieved, first, without alienating the "political prisoners" and exiles and their tight and influential network of friends and families. The "prisoners' issue" has long been the unquestioned meeting point of a heterogeneous cluster of *abertzale* militants and organizations that have often disagreed in other fronts—even in their attitudes towards ETA's continued armed struggle. Second, the objective had to be obtained without eliciting the defection of militants to Aralar, a socialist and separatist political party that had split from the *abertzale* cluster after ETA broke the truce in 2000 and that has since then advocated for purely democratic methods. And, finally, it had to be accomplished by holding sway of the most radicalized (mainly young) sectors within the *abertzale* base, previously involved in organized civil disobedience and street fight actions labeled "street struggle" (*kale borroka*). Externally, the strategy had to convince the Basque society, the Spanish state, and the international community that this was a serious and definite change in the *modus operandi* of the *abertzale* milieu. As I will show below, much of this work was conducted in the festive milieu. *Aste Nagusia* thus operated as a laboratory for the development and testing of transition narratives and strategies for the *abertzale*-

les. The task was undoubtedly complex; the interlocutors, both within and outside the lines of the *abertzale* Left, were extremely heterogeneous in terms of the ideology, interests and objectives.

#### 4. Forging the “*Pulso*” Narrative

I have argued that from the perspective of each organization involved in *Aste Nagusia*, the multi-organizational field is split into an *alliance* network of supporters, a *conflict* network of opponents, and a *neutral* sector of organizations that both clusters intend to win to their side (Evans 1997:2). I now claim that these networks are the bearers of divergent *identity narratives* (Anderson 2006[1983]:205; Somers 1994:615-7; Polletta 1998a:421-6, Polletta 1998b), that is, temporally and spatially structured cognitive associational networks of meaning and symbols (Ikegami 2000:996; Bearman & Stovel 2000:70-1).<sup>21</sup> Somers (1994:606-7) contends that it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives—rarely of our own making—that we constitute our social identities. She advocates for the study of identity formation from a relational and historical perspective that avoids categorical rigidities by emphasizing the embeddedness of identity in overlapping networks of relations that shift over time and space. As I will show in this section, the boundaries between the alliance and conflict networks in *Aste Nagusia*'s multi-organizational field, and the content of their identity narratives are fluid, and have changed in the course of events (Klandermans 1992:95; Melucci 1995:44-5) or in response to changing—in our case closing—political opportunity structures.

The sanctions imposed by Bilbao's City Hall to the *abertzale comparsas* Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri for displaying photographs of Bilbao's “political prisoners”/“ETA terrorists” in their tents during *Aste Nagusia* 2009 put the Federation in the verge of fracture. During the numerous assembly meetings I observed in the ensuing months, the a-political *comparsas* refused to assume the economic, but mostly the social and political costs entailed in a “defense of the *abertzales*.” The non-nationalist political *comparsas* tended to support them during Federation general assemblies—after all, they were all part of the social movement sector and often shared the same enemies—, but distrusted and criticized them in “petit committees.” The *abertzale comparsas*, finally, differed in terms of their preferred strategies and tactics, and even in terms of their objectives. The overcoming of these cleavages was not easy; it implied an arduous consensus-building process that had to take into account not only the events occurred in the “festive field,” but also those taking place in the broader Basque political arena. If the *abertzales*, or sectors within the *abertzale* cluster, were truly trying to “put down the weapons” and were sincerely pushing for a purely democratic path, then the Federation would perhaps be willing to close ranks behind Kaskagorri and Txori Barrote. Before doing that, however, key players had to be convinced to put their and their organization's necks on the line; a problematic re-signification of the situation had to be made; and a new narrative had to be forged and “sold” inside and outside the Federation's confines.



Figure 3. Federation's "Pulso" Narrative, in relation to Political and Urban Opportunity Structures

In this context, an old narrative crafted by the Federation of *Comparsas* about the history of *Aste Nagusia* was revived. This narrative can be described as a story of a prolonged “*pulso*” with Bilbao’s City Hall. The dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy defines “*pulso*” as a confrontation between two balanced parts that hold different interests or perspectives. The term is a native category; it spontaneously and consistently appeared in the interviews I conducted among *comparseros*. It also emerged in a systematic manner during my two-year ethnographic observations in their fortnightly assemblies, their recurring social gatherings, and also during Carnivals and *Aste Nagusia* 2010 and 2011.

Figure 3 shows the events that have systematically appeared in this “official” narrative, inductively organized in three main phases: “genesis and consolidation,” “silence,” and “erosion and struggle to recover” the “hybrid festive model.” The first phase, coinciding with the aftermath of the military dictatorship, is described as a period of rupture with the dictatorial past, with the boredom and inactivity of a “deserted” city, and with “elitist” festivities that were organized by Bilbao’s City Hall in a top-down fashion and with little to none popular appeal. *Aste Nagusia* is described as the result of a contest of ideas organized by Bilbao’s still Francoist City Hall to combat citizen disenfranchisement. The winning project was developed by the collective Txomin Barullo, then the cultural branch of the Maoist Basque Communist Movement. Txomin Barullo’s project proposed a popular plural and democratic organizational model based in preexistent neighborhood associations; this model had had no precedents in the Basque region, or in Spain. Since the contest was non-binding, City Hall officials did everything in their hands to prevent its implementation; the pressure of the powerful neighborhood associations did nonetheless force them to execute the agreement. In a matter of days, the First Popular Festive Commission was formed, and a public call to create *comparsas* all around Bilbao was issued. Echoing a powerful *abertzale*-led linguistic campaign for the recovery of Euskera, the organizers decided to translate the festivity’s traditional Spanish name into “*Aste Nagusia*.” The format and content of *Aste Nagusia* were frenziedly crafted over the summer. The celebration was a complete success, in every single aspect. So was it the following year.

In 1980, however, the “democratic” mayor Jon Castañares, representing the Basque Nationalist Party, made an attempt to return to the pre-1978 era by excluding all popular representation from the Festive Commission. But the *comparsas* and popular collectives offered resistance to what they denominated “Castañarazo” (Castañares’ *coup*), and in a matter of weeks they organized an active boycott to the celebration. The strategy worked, and the following year Castañares was forced to form the Mixed Organizing Commission as we know it today. Except for a brief mention to their heroic rescue actions during the 1983 massive floods, and to a new confrontation with Bilbao’s mayor for this exact reason, the *comparsas*’ “official” narrative about *Aste Nagusia*’s history remains silent regarding the ensuing 20 years.

The account is resumed in 2003, the year that marks the beginning of the “Parallel Carnivals” after a clash between the Popular Party councilman and members of the *abertzale comparsa* Txori Barrote. Drawing an analogy with the crowds that per-

egriate to the Santiago de Compostela cathedral every year, Txori Barrote's Carnival parade was set to denounce the Spanish dispersion policy of "political prisoners." Dressed up as peregrines, the *comparseros* carried the photographs of Bilbao's prisoners, detailing the exact number of kilometers their families and friends needed to travel every week to pay them a two- to three-hour visit. The Popular Party councilman interpreted this performance as an act of "glorification of terrorism," and provoked a fight with the *comparseros* that ended up with the exclusion of the *comparsas* from the main parade. Since 2004, the City Hall and the *comparsas* have organized simultaneous parades, on parallel roads. *La Gran Vía*—Bilbao's main and most glamorous avenue, and the parade's historic site since the tradition was recovered in 1979—has remained under the control of the City Hall. The year 2003 was also marked by the defection of *comparsa* Gogorregi from the Federation; Gogorregi is tied to Egin, the Basque Nationalist Party's youth section. Several *comparseros* have interpreted this defection as a sign that the 2003 Carnival episode was neither a fortuitous occurrence, nor the result of the Popular Party's anti-ETA stance. In their opinion, this defection also indicated that following the "firm hand" policy tide, the Basque Nationalist Party had given the first steps in a long-term strategy against the Federation.

The narrative marks 2003 as the year in which Bilbao's City Hall began an "erosion campaign" of the Mixed Organizing Commission. With the *abertzales* already proscribed, and based on an alliance between the hegemonic Basque Nationalist Party, the Popular Party and the Basque branches of the Socialist Party and United Left, the campaign intended to turn the Commission into a forum where "decisions were just communicated, no longer made." The Federation was progressively excluded from the decision making process, particularly in that related to the programming of the content and format of *Aste Nagusia*. Also part of this strategy was an institutional restructuring that took place in 2008: the planning, management and finance of the festivity would no longer fall within the orbit of the Culture and Education Secretariat; it would henceforth be part of a newly created Secretariat of *Tourism* and Festivities. The Federation interpreted this as a new anti-popular turn: Bilbao's festivities were to be tailored for tourists, and no longer for Bilbao's citizens; also, this restructuring indicated a new conception that associated festivities to "entertainment" and excluded them from the cultural and educational realms. Coincidentally, this move came one year after the opening of the Guggenheim Bilbao museum, the centerpiece in a Basque Nationalist Party-led strategy aimed at turning Bilbao into a glamorous post-industrial center for services, finance and tourism.

Two vital events mark the Federation's narrative in 2009. First, the dire attacks received over the summer by the rocket launcher (*txupinera*), a female *comparsera* elected every year to lit the rocket that announces the beginning of *Aste Nagusia*.<sup>22</sup> Together with *Aste Nagusia's* mascot Marijaia, the *txupinera* and the town crier are the most prominent festive icons and public figures during *Aste Nagusia*. They receive ample media attention and their positions carry a good amount of social prestige and popular esteem; the election of the citizens that are to fill these positions is thus a highly contested process. In 2009, the Popular Party representative in the Mixed Organizing Commission fervently objected Sonia Polo's election as the *txupinera*; Sonia

was not only a member of the *comparsa* Eguzkizaleak—tied to the *abertzale* environmentalist organization Eguzki—but also was the sister of an imprisoned “ETA terrorist.” This opposition triggered a heated and unprecedented public debate on the proper use of festive icons and the “politization” of *Aste Nagusia* that lasted several weeks, and was appeased only after Sonia had received a death threat: an envelope with her picture and a 9 mm bullet delivered anonymously at the City Hall building.

As mentioned before, also during 2009 Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri received City Hall administrative sanctions for displaying photographs of Bilbao’s “political prisoners” in their tents. Finally, 2010 was marked by a City Hall boycott to the newly formed *comparsa* Komantxe, tied to Bilbao’s squatter movement, controlled by the *abertzale* Left. Alleging the non-observance of administrative regulations, Komantxe was prevented from setting up its first-time tent. Also, 2010 saw the first criminal prosecution of a festive agent in Spain. Members of the *abertzale comparsa* Txori Barrote were taken to trial before Spain’s *Audiencia Nacional*—a national “political tribunal” where terrorism cases are tried—for displaying pictures of Bilbao’s “political prisoners/ETA terrorists” during *Aste Nagusia* 2008.<sup>23</sup> In addition, 2010 was the year in which the City Hall passed an extremely restrictive Bylaw regulating the use of Bilbao’s public space.

## 5. *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!*

This official “*pulso*” narrative comprises what the Federation of *Comparsas* identifies as “attacks perpetrated by Bilbao’s City Hall on the hybrid festive model.” However, this narrative does also contemplate two major defensive campaigns: the project *Manifestua-Jaiki* in 2004, and the campaign *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* in 2010. The 2004 campaign responded to the beginning of the “parallel Carnivals” after the clash between Txori Barrote’s *comparseros* and the Popular Party councilman in 2003; the second one to the sanctions imposed to Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri during *Aste Nagusia* 2009. Both “attacks” responded to the display of photographs of “political prisoners”/“ETA terrorists” in the festive space.

The 2004 campaign emerged from the Coordinator of *Comparsas* located in the neighborhood of Altamira, hometown to the *comparsa* Kobeta Mendi. Kobeta is a politically diverse, neighborhood-based *comparsa*, but its delegate in the Federation is a prominent member of the *abertzale* Left, and there are many *abertzale* militants and sympathizers in the *comparsa*. An internal document prepared by a *comparsero* involved in the campaign explains the rationale that guided the strategy, and the content of the strategy itself. The strategy was developed by three *comparsas*: Hor Dago! (tied to the then illegalized newspaper Egunkaria due to its alleged ties to ETA—accusation that was proven unfounded in the 2010 trial), Hontzak (tied to the anarcho-sindicalist trade union CNT), and Algara (tied to a private cultural venture started by a former member of ETA(pm) focused on the teaching and recovery of Euskera, and on providing Euskera-speakers with cultural spaces to “live in Euskera”). The organizing triumvirate was thus integrated by members of the three main “alliance networks” integrating the Federation: political *comparsas* of both *abertzale* (Hor Dago!) and non-Basque

nationalist (Hontzak) tendencies, and one non-political *comparsas* (Algara—working on the cultural aspects of Basque nationalism). Kobeta Mendi, in turn, represented the neighborhood-based *comparsas*.

According to the internal evaluative document—prepared by Hor Dago!’s representative, another high-level *abertzale* militant—the strategy was twofold. On the one hand, it included the development of the first “Manifesto for Festivities and Popular Culture” issued in the Basque Country and in Spain. “*The document had to synthesize the meaning of the popular fiesta and call the citizenry in its defense. That meaning, as interpreted in Altamira (Kobeta Mendi), implied referring not only to Aste Nagusia, but mainly to a festive model that was implanted in the entire Euskal Herria (Basque Country), and that was being undermined by the different local administrations.*” This manifesto was thus to be socialized among all festive agents in the Basque territory, and to be used “*to foster their alliance in defense of the model.*” On the other hand, the strategy included the organization of a *Jaiki*, a pioneering one-day marathon of large-scale festive events for people of all ages and tastes. This combination of elements is justified in the following way: “*Our task was to craft a campaign that would shield both the comparsas and the festive model, a campaign that would gather the necessary popular support to demonstrate that the comparsas are the essential component of this model. In addition, given the fact that our main work is not political, we believed we needed to give this campaign the festive element that is our signature.*” The evaluation of the strategy included in the document is largely positive; it establishes that the experience constituted a solid first step in generating awareness about the intrinsic characteristics of the popular festive model, the attacks it was undergoing by major political parties, state institutions and private ventures, and the urgency of generating strategies and crafting alliances in its defense.<sup>24</sup>

The 2010 campaign departed from a similar diagnosis, but arrived at a quite different prognosis. In its annual assembly, celebrated right after the 2009 administrative sanctions were imposed to Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri, the Federation developed a year-long defensive campaign. The campaign would later receive the name *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* (Defend Aste Nagusia!). The strategy contemplated increasing the visibility of the *comparsas* in the street and in the media, building direct channels of communication with Bilbao’s citizenry, garnering the support of prominent cultural, political and social agents, and revitalizing the contacts that had been established with Basque festive agents in 2004 in order to foster a “network” in defense of the hybrid festive model.

During the first week of November 2009, hundreds of *comparseros* were mobilized to distribute more than 150,000 brochures in homes, shops and bars in Bilbao. In this first mailbox campaign the Federation stated a few facts, and posed a few questions: “*Why does it suffer politically-driven media attacks? Why is it used for personal political wars? Do these respond to political or economic interests, or both? Are they interested in substituting popular participation for private initiatives? Why can’t we just enjoy Aste Nagusia after a long year of work?*” The brochure ended with this statement: “*The Federation is festivity; we were born with it and for it. That is our sole objective, to defend a popular, participative, and plural Aste Nagusia.*”

The second aspect of this year's strategy was strengthening the Federation's public image during the "parallel" Carnivals. While Bilbao's City Hall cut down the festive budget, shortened the celebration from five to three days, and violated festive conventions that had been in place for more than thirty years, the Federation presented itself as the "guardian" of the city's true traditions. It also redoubled its efforts to offer more and better quality activities than ever before: the previously waning Carnival parade saw record numbers of *comparsero* participation, and the majority of the *comparsas* excelled at crafting costumes, decorating coaches, and preparing theatrical performances. Partly drawn by the selection of artists (clowns, magicians, and rock bands) that had chosen to participate *pro bono* or had been hired by the Federation, the affluence of spectators far exceeded those in the "parallel" City Hall parade. In its official carriage, the Federation "burnt" the effigies of both the Mayor and the Basque Nationalist Party councilwoman in charge of the Tourism and Festivities Secretariat in a fake bonfire. This official carriage, and all the other used by the twenty-nine *comparsas* carried, as well, the symbol against censorship and for free speech (blue smiling theater mask with a red tape crossing its mouth).

The third aspect of this defensive campaign was the development of a new manifesto, and the planning and execution of the First Congress of Popular Festivities of the Basque Country (a.k.a. Congress of "Fiestologists"). Again, those in charge of its organization were the delegates of the *comparsas* Hor Dago! and Kobeta Mendi, both highly-ranked leaders in the *abertzale* Left. The manifesto "Promoting Popular Festivities" (*Jai Herrikoiak Bultzatuz*) was drafted by these *comparseros* and then re-written by a poet with the explicit intention of "making it look more festive, and less political." The Congress took place in May, and it counted with the presence of the principal festive agents of the four Basque capitals. Each of them made a Powerpoint presentation, detailing their history and that of their *fiesta*, the challenges and attacks they were currently facing, and the lines of action they were pursuing to cope with them. The congress received coverage in both mainstream and alternative media, and the manifesto was endorsed by more than four hundred organizations.<sup>25</sup> The overall balance was positive, although some *comparseros* cynically pointed out that the Congress felt like an "*abertzale cultural summit*."

## 6. Identity Synchronization and Symbolic Alignment

I claim that in each *Aste Nagusia* edition, the Federation of *Comparsas* and the different agents involved in the organization of the festivity engage in two different processes of symbolic representation of *identity narratives* (Cerulo 1995:1-2; Zerubavel 1997:69): symbolic alignment and counter-symbolization.<sup>26</sup> I define *symbolic alignment* as the process by which organizations intend to build, strengthen or reconfigure internal or external alliances through processes of identity synchronization (Mische 2005) mediated by narratives and symbols; counter-symbolization, in turn, is the process by which they intend to distance themselves from other organizations using these same means. I argue that these processes are influenced not only by the organization's goals and ideology, but also by its perception of both the mutating structure



of *Aste Nagusia's* multi-organizational field and the Basque political arena (Evans 1997:4-5), and of the changing *political opportunity structures* (Meyer 2004:129-31).<sup>27</sup> Although Evans (1997:6) focuses solely on the ways in which field transformations spawn changes in *frames*, building on Ansell (1997), as I will demonstrate below, I contend that in *Aste Nagusia's* case the opposite "causal" relationship is also true.<sup>28</sup> While engaging in symbolic alignment and counter-symbolization, the Federation and the individual *comparsas* are simultaneously constructing or obliterating ties with other organizations, and reproducing or reconfiguring the barriers between their alliance and oppositional networks in response to changing political opportunities.

Despite the defensive efforts contemplated in the *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* campaign described in the previous section, over the summer of 2010 it became clear that Bilbao's City Hall was not going to withdraw the administrative sanctions that prevented Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri from setting up their tents during *Aste Nagusia*. Conscious of the fact that *Aste Nagusia* was their moment of highest strength and visibility, the *comparsas* engaged in a series of heated debates about the strategy to follow during the nine-day festive week. After three endless assemblies and extremely harsh debates, two points were agreed upon. Both were described and justified in the second brochure that the Federation of *Comparsas* distributed in Bilbao's homes, bars and stores in mid-July: first, "*the beginning of the festivity will be marked by the color black, used ironically in defense of the freedom of speech;*" and second, "*for the first time since [Bilbao's Mayor] Castaños, the Federation will go on a 24-hour strike to visualize the danger of losing the current festive model.*"<sup>29</sup>

While the 2004 defensive strategy seems to have generated almost no conflict within the lines of the Federation, the 2010 campaign was characterized by strong internal friction. As mentioned before, both strategies were immediately triggered by "attacks" to *abertzale comparsas* for displaying photographs of "political prisoners," first during Carnivals 2003, and then during *Aste Nagusia* 2009. In the first place, many *comparsas* felt that this was a purely "*abertzale* problem," and not a Federation one; both the Basque Autonomous Community, governed by the Popular-Socialist coalition, and the City Hall government, in the hands of the Basque Nationalist Party, had announced they would not tolerate any ETA-related symbology, and the *abertzales* had still displayed the pictures of their prisoners. Though this topic was certainly the "elephant in the room" during the Federation's assemblies—Basques do not tend to talk about "armed struggle"/"terrorism" in open fora—, these types of opinions were manifested in several confidential informal conversations I held with *comparseros* over the summer, and in some of the interviews I conducted after *Aste Nagusia* 2010. Political *comparsas*, even those on the opposite side of the *abertzale* spectrum, did their best to address this feeling, trying to reframe this as a common "free speech" problem that any other *comparsa* could have.

Despite these initial difficulties, a one-day strike ("*plante*") was finally accepted—the vote, however, was not unanimous. The decision of using black as a symbol of general "mourning" in response to the violation of the freedom of speech—and, as was constantly reminded, not as a reaction to the absence of two particular *comparsas*—, also

received strong opposition. Fiesta, in the opponents' point of view, meant colors and plurality. After a second heated debate, three decisions were made. All of them can be analyzed as examples of identity synchronization, and symbolic alignment. First, the traditionally "Bilbao blue" festive neckerchief created in 1978 would be replaced for a black neckerchief during the first day of *Aste Nagusia*. Second, during the day of the strike the *comparseros* would leave behind their identifying jerseys and would all wear black t-shirts with the campaign's exhortation: *Aste Nagusia defendatuz!*. (These t-shirts were also for sale at the insignificant price of 5 Euros; I could observe a considerable number of people wearing them during, and after, *Aste Nagusia*.) Third, the decorations of every tent had to have a black background, and incorporate two logos: the symbol in support of free speech and against censorship (a theater smiling mask with a red tape crossing its mouth); and a "quadruple logo" synthesizing the "Bultzatuz rocket," and Txori Barrote's, Kaskagorri's and Komantxe's logos (see Figure 4). This "quadruple logo" brought together all agents under "City Hall attack" —all of *abertzale* ideology—and associated them to Basque festivities in general.

Txori Barrote's logo: a woodpecker (*txori*, bird) pecks on prison bars (*barrote*) to set Basque "political prisoners" free. Between "Txori" and "Barrote" we can observe the symbol of Gestoras Pro-Amnistía (organization fighting towards the amnesty for political prisoners).

Logo used in the Manifiesto "Jai Herrikoiak Bultzatuz" (Promoting Popular Festivities), and during the First Congress of Popular Festivities in Euskal Herria in 2010. Every Basque festivity begins with the launching of a rocket (*txupin*).



Kaskagorri's logo: Asterix (symbol of the Gaulish resistance to Julius Caesar's invasion of what is now France) and a five-pointed red star.

Komantxe's logo: A *comanche* hunter holds a book (?) with the logo of the international squatter movement. In the back, the logo of Bilbao's squatter movement: a "B" with a pirate-like cross made of two large bones. The "x" in "Komantxe" has the shape of a 4-headed cross named *lauburu*. The *lauburu* is the oldest Basque coat of arms; it was used as a war banner during the resistance to Roman legions.

Figure 4. Symbolic Alignment during the *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* Campaign, 2010.



Mayor Iñaki Azkuna arrives to Bilbao's City Hall building escorted by members of the military forces and the secret police.



Comparseiros stripe their clothes when the Txori Barrote jersey (white with black stripes, symbolizing prison bars) is not allowed into the building.



A speech presenting the "pulso" narrative is read.



"1978: Blessed crazyness."  
"Aste Nagusia is born."



"Jaja = Askatasuna" (Festivity = Freedom).  
"Marjaja = Aste Nagusia."  
(Marjaja is Aste Nagusia's mascot).



Figure 5. Federation's Performance during the Day of the "Plante," 2010.

The day of the strike was planned, and experienced, as the climax of the *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* campaign. In addition, it was the moment when the Federation's one-year defensive strategy and official "*pulso*" narrative came "ritually together." Although the tents were closed to help people "*visualize the danger of losing the current festive model*," that same day the Federation organized a performance at the doors of Bilbao's City Hall. The plot that guided the performance was a point-by-point dramatization of the "*pulso*" narrative, with the addition of some last-minute elements. Figure 5, shows a series of photographs I took during the performance. In the beginning, a *comparsero* playing Bilbao's right-wing nationalist Mayor Iñaki Azkuna arrives to the City Hall escorted by members of the military and the secret police. Security forces set up a "control post" at the doors of the building, and stop a group of *comparseros* as they try to get in. They inform the *comparseros* that no "pro-ETA symbology" is allowed inside the building; they refer to Txori Barrote's jersey. After a heated discussion, *comparseros* decide to strip their clothes and are allowed in. (This actually happened the first day of *Aste Nagusia* 2010, when a Txori Barrote *comparsero* tried to exercise his right to be in the Arriaga Theater's balcony while the *txupin* announcing the beginning of *Aste Nagusia* was lit.) Then, the dramatization of the "*pulso*" narrative begins; while a *comparsero* reads a well-crafted speech, others raise placards with the "take-home messages:" Mayor Azkuna stands for the "privatization" of *Aste Nagusia*; his administrative obstacles, sanctions, and prohibitions are tactics that intend to turn the Mixed Organizing Commission into an ineffective body, and thus to put an end to the hybrid festive model. The Federation demands freedom of speech, consensus, agreements, and the recovery and deepening of the hybrid model. *Aste Nagusia* is—or should go back to being—a synonym of freedom.

The synchronization of the *comparsas'* multiple identities into a one and only Federation identity, and the associated processes of internal symbolic alignment and external counter-alignment (against Bilbao's "City Hall"), entailed an arduous consensus-building labor protagonized by key *comparsas* and very particular militants. The anarcho-syndicalist Hontzak and the anti-militarist Sin Kuartel played vital roles in this regard. Their delegates had almost two decades of activism in their own organizations, had been members of their National Boards, and had even represented them abroad. In addition, they were long-term activists in the Federation, had been members of its Board for several years, and had a thorough knowledge of its "ropes." These militants' support, added to the fact that their *comparsas* were non-*abertzales*, legitimated the campaign. Sin Kuartel's tradition of arriving at decisions by consensus (and not voting), was also felt, and appreciated, during the debates. Important roles were also played by Kobeta Mendi and Hor Dago, the two *comparsas* with the most talented and high-ranked delegates in the *abertzale comparsa* hub.

The proposed strategy for *Aste Nagusia* 2010 allowed ample room for the symbolic de-alignment of the different *comparsas*; the agreement referred solely to the "quadruple logo" presented in Figure 4 and to the tents' (black) background. The *comparsas* used the tents' *foreground* to project their own particular messages—as they had been doing since 1978, and many of them did so with talent, irony, and poise. But not every rose was "black" in *Aste Nagusia's* 2010 bed. Several *comparsas*, specially the


a-political ones, felt the *abertzales* were using the *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* campaign to push their own political agendas against local and regional administrations. With their political party still proscribed and municipal and provincial elections in the horizon, the campaign had given *abertzales* media visibility around a very “popular” subject. Others felt the *abertzales* were using the campaign—specially due to the defense of Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri—to “over-stage” their unconditional support to their “political prisoners” and their families and friends. Given that the *abertzale* Left had recently taken a “political turn” whose ultimate goal was to regain the legalization of its political party and to put an end to ETA’s armed struggle, it was important to clarify that this would not be achieved at the cost of betraying “the family” (“*los de casa*”). Finally, others felt that the First Congress of Popular Festivities of the Basque Country had helped *abertzales* to recover and strengthen their ties with other festive agents in the Basque Country—some critiques regarding the festive agents that were invited to the First Congress of Popular Festivities of Euskal Herria went in this direction.

Moreover, these suspicions against the *abertzales* were combined with a broader and deeper feeling: the festive one-day strike and the “fade-to-black” strategies would kill *Aste Nagusia*, or at least they would seriously endanger it. The 2004 campaign was based on “doing *more fiesta*” in “non-festive time.” The 2010 campaign proposed exactly the opposite: shutting down the festivity during Bilbao’s traditional festive week. While the *abertzale*, and other political *comparsas* felt this was the only way to demonstrate what it would be like if the City Hall achieved its ultimate objective—“privatizing *Aste Nagusia* and destroying the *comparsas*”—others, many, felt this was the shortest path to suicide. In their perspective, the absence of the *comparsas* in *Aste Nagusia* 2010 would open a window of opportunities for Bilbao’s City Hall to implant what it had always wanted: a privatized though state-run festive model. With the support of United Left, the Socialist and Popular parties, and that of the politically-controlled media, the City Hall would be able to weather popular discontent, and in one or two years *Aste Nagusia* would have returned to the pre-1978 era.

In addition, as opposed to the 2004 strategy, this one was interpreted as “political” and not “cultural” by many *comparsas*, particularly by the ones not tied to social movement organizations. In their perspective, “making *fiesta*” was their *raison d’être*, and boycotting it would mean betraying the work they had been doing for the last thirty years. In addition, the “fade-to-black” strategy entailed the loss of that valued plurality associated to the *comparsas*, and represented by the multiplicity of their jersey colors. The sum of both strategies was, in the view of some *comparseros*, the “anti-festivity.”

However, although several *comparsas* argued this point during the endless summer debates, only three would take their discrepancy and their discontent to the “*Aste Nagusia* showcase.” As Figure 6 shows, one of them, Leoihak, tied to a marginal Trotskyist political party, simply kept its traditional red background instead of repainting it black. Months after *Aste Nagusia* 2010 Leoihak was expelled from the Federation due to its noncompliance with this and other agreements. The second dissident *comparsa* was Pinpilinpauxa (“butterfly” in Basque). Pinpilinpauxa was originally tied to the non-political prisoners and to the LGBT movements, and currently is a (non-

Basque Nationalist Party associated) “*jaietan jai*” *comparsa* that is, one that believes in the festivity for the festivity itself. “Pinpi” symbolized its divergency by using black only to demarcate large colored squares, and by including a sinking ship whose name was “*Bilboko Jaiak*” (Bilbao’s festivities) in its decoration. The motto of this decoration was, in addition, Victoria’s Secrets “Think Pink”! Finally, the most commented symbolic counter-alignment was that of Txomin Barullo, *Aste Nagusia*’s founding father. In 2010, Txomin Barullo was undergoing an internal crisis associated to the dismantling of the political party Zutik. Although the strike was countersigned by the majority of Txomin’s members, many of them did not agree with the “fade-to-black” demand because it went against the *comparsas*’ individual “personalities” in general, and against Txomin’s signature white and red stripes. In a mid-way position, Txomin changed them for grey and white ones.



## 7. Conclusions

In this paper I have analyzed the identity battles waged between *Aste Nagusia's* organizers, focusing solely on the perspective of the Federation and the *comparsas* that currently integrate the Federation. I have concentrated on the identity narratives and strategies they have crafted in order to cope with closing political opportunity structures, and their symbolic and performative representation in the festive space. I have also provided an account of the internal synchronization and de-synchronization of identities that the Federation has undergone throughout these processes, and the associated processes of symbolic alignment and counter-symbolization. Although *Aste Nagusia's* history dates back to 1978, I have focused on the critical period comprised between 2009 and 2011. The year 2009 was the year in which the state-led repression and criminalization of the *abertzale* Left that begun in the early 2000s finally reached Bilbao's festive field; given that 40 per cent of the *comparsas* integrated in the Federation fall within the *abertzale* Left umbrella this was an important turning point for my investigation.

My study shows that the Federation's "official" narrative can be described as a story of a prolonged confrontation ("*pulso*") with Bilbao's City Hall; the source of the conflict lies in the "attacks" that the city government has historically perpetrated on the "hybrid festive model," characterized by both state and social movement participation. The 1980 "Castañerazo," by which Mayor Castañares tried to exclude "popular representation" from the Festive Commission, is the clearest example of these attacks. More recent administrative obstacles, and the Town Hall-led boycott of the Mixed Organizing Commission, are also interpreted as attacks on the hybrid model. A second aspect of the Federation's official narrative focuses on Town Hall attacks on "freedom." In this narrative, the display of "political prisoner" photographs is considered a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of speech. The "Parallel Carnivals" that begun in 2003 after a clash between Txori Barrote *comparseros* and a Popular Party councilman, and the 2009 administrative sanctions to Txori Barrote and Kaskagorri are interpreted as violations of this right. In the same line, the Bylaws regulating the use of Bilbao's public space are interpreted as an infringement of Bilbaíno's right to freely enjoy their city.

The Federation's official "*pulso*" narrative includes an account of these attacks, and also of the Federation's defensive strategies in constricting political opportunity structures: the Jaiki (2004) and *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* (2010) campaigns. In both campaigns, the Federation established or re-activated ties with other relevant Basque festive agents, crafted manifestos and sought the endorsement of personalities or organizations in the cultural, sports, and academic fields. However, the campaigns differed in their "climax events:" in 2004 the Federation offered "more *fiesta*;" in 2010, like in 1980 with the "Castañerazo," it proposed a festive strike or "*plante*." Desperate times called for what many *comparseros* deemed "political" instead of "cultural" and thus anti-festive measures.

Given the characteristics of the different *comparsas* and of the Federation's diverse internal alliance and conflict networks, the decision was difficult, and dangerous.



During the weeks after the strike decision was made, the Federation's Board and key *comparseros* conducted intensive identity synchronization efforts to prevent the Federation's fracture, and to ensure conviviality among its members. As I have showed, symbolization played a key role in these efforts: elaborated symbols such as the tents' black background and the "quadruple logo" did not express previously-crafted alliances; they were necessary steps in their construction. Leaving enough room for the traditional de-differentiation of each individual *comparsa*'s message (and even for internal counter-symbolizations like that of Txomin Barullo or Pinpilinpaxa), these symbols helped achieve unity. The performance conducted during the day of the strike, in turn, was key in socializing, and also in "embodying," the Federation's "common" narrative.

The attacks and defensive campaigns described in the "*pulso*" narrative have taken place in constraining political opportunity structures. As described earlier, in the early 2000s, particularly after the passing of the Political Parties Law, the Spanish state began a process of criminalization and judicialization of the *abertzale* Left guided by the motto "everything is ETA." In 2009, with the arrival of the Socialist-Popular alliance to the presidency of the Basque Autonomous Community, this "*españolista*" campaign infiltrated the lines of Basque institutions, until then in the hands of the right-wing Basque Nationalist Party. That same year, Azkuna sanctioned Txori Barrote and Kas-kagorri for displaying "political prisoners'" photographs during *Aste Nagusia*. Almost simultaneously, the *abertzale* Left begun an internal process whose main goal was to put an end to ETA's five-decade armed struggle, and to obtain the legalization of the *abertzale* Left after eight years of proscription. Amidst this process, and given *Aste Nagusia*'s transcendence and visibility, the *Aste Nagusia Defendatuz!* campaign was devised to kill two or three birds with one stone: defending the hybrid festive model, associating Basque Nationalist hardliners like Mayor Azkuna to the "*españolista*" pledges, and sending a vital message to *abertzale* bases in order to avoid their defection: the path to a "purely democratic way," that is, the transition from a hybrid politico-military to a political model of opposition, would not be traveled at any cost. Loyalty to "those from home" ("*los de casa*"), that is former and current "political prisoners," their families and friends, was not to wane.

As I mentioned above, for the last thirty years, and across radically changing political opportunity structures, *Aste Nagusia* has functioned as a geographically and temporally bound locale of contested but patterned relations among institutions and organizations, public narratives and social practices where identity-formation—and identity disputes—take place. Amidst an extraordinarily politicized society, and a political culture that is conspicuously sectarian —and whose divisions influence the ways in which citizens create, live and interpret culture, particularly festivities—, these characteristics are far from trivial. Despite this sociological relevance *Aste Nagusia* remained surprisingly unexplored. By focusing on the interaction between culture and politics, and on the cross-fertilization between *Aste Nagusia*'s multi-organizational festive field and the broader Basque political arena, this paper has also tried to bring an innovative approach to the study of popular festivities, phenomena that have for long remained neglected by the sociological discipline.

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## Methodological Appendix

Data analyzed in this paper come from a two-year ethnographic study conducted in Bilbao, and in-depth interviews conducted among representatives of the different *comparsas*. I also analyze archival data, as well as bylaws, administrative sanctions and court rulings regulating festive and political affairs. In addition, my analysis relies heavily on visual images (mainly photographs) collected during my ethnographies or available on the internet. Following the principles of visual sociology, these images intend to add substance, sociological meaning, and evidentiary value to my analysis (Becker 1995; Harper 1998). Table A.1 details the research methods, data sources and sampling strategies utilized in this study.

Table A.1. Data & Method

Type of data		Methods / Sources	Universe / Sampling strategy
Primary	In-depth interviews	1. Representatives of the Federation's <i>comparsas</i>	Universe. Representatives of all the <i>comparsas</i> operating in 2010 (N=29).
	Ethnographic observations	Conducted during: 1. Aste Nagusia, Carnivals, Day of Santo Tomás, Day of the <i>Comparsero</i> 2. First Congress of Popular Festivities of Euskal Herria 3. Federation's weekly and annual assemblies 4. Ad hoc meetings, demonstrations, trials, etc.	I have conducted ethnographic observations in all the mentioned events.
Secondary	Public archives	Federation of <i>Comparsas</i> : - statutes - meeting agendas and minutes - press conference releases - manifestos (ej. <i>Manifestua Jaiki</i> , 2004, and <i>Manifesto Jai Herrikoiak Bultzatuz</i> , 2010).	Theoretical sampling, until the point of theoretical saturation.
	Agreements and Declarations	1. "Clarifying the Political Phase and the Strategy," issued by the <i>Abertzale Left</i> , October 2009. 2. "First Step in the Democratic Process: Principles and Will of the <i>Abertzale Left</i> " (a.k.a. the "Altsasua Declaration"), issued by the <i>Abertzale Left</i> , November 2009. 3. "Agreement for a Scenario of Peace and Democratic Solutions" (a.k.a. the "Gernika Agreement"), issued by the <i>Abertzale Left</i> , September 2010.	Theoretical sampling, until the point of theoretical saturation.
	Laws, bylaws, administrative sanctions, court rulings	1. Political Parties Law ( <i>Ley de Partidos Políticos</i> ), 2002. 2. Bylaws: Bilbao's Festive Bylaws (2004) and Use of the Public Space Bylaws (2010) 2. Administrative sanctions to <i>Kaskagorri</i> and <i>Txori Barrote</i> . 3. Court rulings (eg. trial to <i>Txori Barrote's</i> representatives, both in the <i>Audiencia Nacional</i> )	Theoretical sampling, until the point of theoretical saturation.

## About the Author

Ignacia Perugorria is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Rutgers University, working on the interaction between identity battles, social movement networks and political opportunity structures in the making of “participatory culture.” She is a Fulbright scholar and has also been awarded fellowships by the Institute of International Education and the Graduate School at Rutgers University. She received her M.A. in sociology at Rutgers and her B.A. at the University of Buenos Aires, both with honors. She is affiliated to the Gino Germani Research Institute (University of Buenos Aires) and is currently a visiting researcher at the Collective Identity Research Center (University of the Basque Country). She has participated in numerous research projects with Argentine, American and European funding, and has taught undergraduate and graduate courses both in Latin America and the United States. Her most recent publications include *Occupy Social Movements: A New Wave of Global Mobilizations* (Current Sociology monograph issue, edited with T. Benski, L. Langman and B. Tejerina, 2013), and the volume *From Social to Political. New forms of Mobilization and Democratization* (edited with B. Tejerina, 2012). She is also the co-editor of *Grassroots. The Newsletter of the Research Committee on Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change of the International Sociological Association*. Her research interests lie at the intersection of culture and politics, with a particular focus on “participatory culture,” cultural activism and “cultural citizenship.”

## NOTES

- 1 This is a draft version; please do not cite or quote without permission from the author. If you would like to receive an updated version of this article, please e-mail the author at [ignacia.perugorria@fulbrightmail.org](mailto:ignacia.perugorria@fulbrightmail.org).
- 2 Source: The International Bureau of Cultural Capitals, <http://www.ibocc.org/patrimonio.php>, accessed on 10/08/09.
- 3 Source: El Correo Digital, <http://www.elcorreodigital.com/vizcaya/20090715/local/aste-nagusia-ofrece-actos-200907151844.html>, accessed on 10/08/09.
- 4 According to Melucci, collective identity involves cognitive definitions concerning the ends, means, and field of action, refers to a network of active relationships between the actors, and entails a certain degree of emotional investment that enables individuals to feel part of a common unity.
- 5 López Romo (2008:4) points out that during the Francoist dictatorship, the festivities had an elitist character and very little popular appeal; they would take place indoors, and would basically consist of bull-fighting, opera and theater performances.
- 6 Klandermans (1992:95-6) defines a multi-organizational field as all of the groups in a society with which a social movement organization may establish a link.
- 7 Drawing on Harrison White, Ikegami (2000:997) uses the term “public” to refer to communicative sites that emerge at the points of connection among social and/or cognitive networks. The “public” is the sphere—actual-physical and/or imagined-virtual space—in which the actions of switching-connecting and decoupling of networks take place. A public emerges on the smallest scale as the site of a temporary intersection of two or more “network do-

mains." In this sense, *Aste Nagusia* could constitute a public where networks of symbols, identity narratives, and organizations intersect. According to Ikegami, these social spaces are characterized by the temporary suspension of longer-term processes and settings, or pre-existing ties. I contend that in the case of *Aste Nagusia* these broader ties are not suspended, but rather intensified.

- 8 In the Basque Country, the term *cuadrilla* refers to a group of friends who are linked by very strong ties, generally forged during early childhood, and in many cases lasting until late adulthood. The *kuadrilla* meets intermittently during friends' free time (i.e. vacations, weekends, and after work), and its central activity is the *poteo* or *txikiteo* ("the ancient Basque sport" of going on long pub crawls). Pérez-Agote (2006:93) states that the *txikiteo* transcends a mere pastime; it is, rather, a highly important activity from a national and political point of view. The importance of this activity is paralleled in Basque culture by that of hiking or dancing. According to one of Pérez-Agote's interviewees: "during the Franco years, hiking became a form of struggle. One of the strongest ways of protesting at that time was a mountain celebration, the *Bizkargi* [mountain] picnics, etc.; they were completely banned by the Civil Guard because it was the place where the Basque spirit was really preserved." A different interviewee stated that "most dance groups were created in the sixties. You danced out of patriotism. These groups brought together many young people. In many groups people started to get involved politically" (Pérez-Agote 2006:180).
- 9 The neighborhood associative movement was a byproduct of the industrialization process, the increasing waves of Spanish immigration, and the overnight creation of new, precarious, and institutionally neglected neighborhoods. The movement's "official" birth dates back to 1964, when the Associations Law was passed by Franco's dictatorial regime. Amidst the proscription of all types of political activity, clandestine political parties took advantage of this law to take their proposals and demands to larger social sectors. However, clandestine "neighborhood commissions" are previous to this law; these commissions had been formed following the "worker commissions" model at the initiative of left-wing political parties and base Christian communities. The neighborhood associations have historically had the following main characteristics: progressive ideology; integral perspective on neighborhood problems; the defense of collective over individual interests; and strong ties with other social movements and political parties (Fernández 2008:4).
- 10 The Basque Nationalist Party has a tradition of controlling key positions in the cultural sphere: the presidency of this Entrepreneur Association, the presidency of the soccer club Athletic de Bilbao, the presidency of *Aste Nagusia's* Mixed Organizing Commission, etc.
- 11 Kobeta Mendi is a politically diverse, neighborhood-based *comparsa*, but its delegate in the Federation is a prominent member of the *abertzale* Left, and there are many *abertzale* militants and sympathizers in the *comparsa*. Satorrak, on the other hand, used to be tied to a Trotskyist political party that emerged after a split from the *abertzale* armed group ETA in 1970. Satorrak outlived this party, and during several years its members offered the revenues coming from its tent to kindred political platforms and social movement organizations. Currently, most of its *comparseros* can be placed within the *abertzale* Left spectrum.
- 12 According to Meyer (2004:133-6) scholars within the POS tradition differ in terms of how many, and which, factors in the political environment constitute components of political opportunities. They also disagree in terms of the formulation of hypotheses involving political opportunities; whereas some articulations of the theory stress expanding opportunities as a precursor for mobilization (e.g. McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Costain 1992), others consider threat and

constricting institutional opportunities as conditions for extra-institutional mobilization (e.g. Meyer 1990, 1993; Smith 1996). Disagreement exists, too, in relation to the “dependent variable” explained by political opportunities (e.g. social protest mobilization in general, particular tactics or strategies, formation of organizations, and influence on public policy).

- 13 One note on the multiple terms commonly used to refer to “Basque territories:” Euskal Herria is the name given to the cultural region that is situated on both sides of the Pyrenees and that is composed of territories within the frontiers of both the Spanish and French states. It is the area in which the Basque culture is apparent in all its dimensions. To the north of the Pyrenees, Euskal Herria is composed of Lapurdi, Nafarroa Beherea and Zuberoa, territories that in the French administrative organization are part of the Department of the Atlantic Pyrenees. This area is commonly known as Iparralde or Ipar-Euskal Herria. The southern area (known as Hegoalde or Hego-Euskal Herria) is composed of Nafarroa, Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. Nafarroa forms the Regional Community of Nafarroa, and the last three territories make up the Basque Autonomous Community, also referred to as Basque Country or Euskadi. Euskal Herria covers a surface area of 20,664 km<sup>2</sup>, and has a total population of around 3 million inhabitants.
- 14 As it had done before, the Basque Nationalist Party used this leverage power wisely: it toughened its bargaining positions and obtained concessions that strengthened the Basque Community’s economic autonomy—an autonomy that was already the highest within the Spanish state.
- 15 This process began in 1998 with the “macro-trial 18/98,” in which 59 people related to different *abertzale* organizations or collectives were accused of being part or collaborating with ETA. Since then, several other trials have taken place against the following organizations: the youth organization Jarrai-Haika-Segi; the *abertzale* coordinator KAS-Ekin; the *Herriko Tabernas* (“people’s tavern”); Gestoras pro Amnistía-Askatasuna; the radio and newspaper Egin (antecessor of Gara); the newspaper Egunkaria; and Udalbiltza, the coordinator body of elected representatives in Hego- and Ipar-Euskal Herria. Although many of the defendants were eventually absolved, others have received prison sentences ranging from 6 to 24 years. However, *abertzale* organizations are still legal in France, including the political party *Abertzalen Batasuna*.
- 16 The political prisoner dispersion policy began in 1989, soon after the Algiers peace talks between ETA and the Socialist Party administration failed. There are currently 688 Basque “political prisoners”. Eight of them are located in prisons in the Basque Country, 536 in other territories within the Spanish State, 140 in France, one in Portugal, one in Mexico, one in England, and one in Northern Ireland (Source: Etxerat, <http://www.etxerat.info>, accessed on 09/24/2011). According to the pro-amnesty collective KM-0, the mean distance between these prisoners and their families and friends is 630 km. In addition, hundreds of “political exiles” are currently located in Ipar-Euskal Herria, Venezuela, Panamá, Cuba, México, Bélgica, Cabo Verde, and other countries.
- 17 Although this was an old practice, it is only after the reform of the Penal Code in 1995, but mainly after the passing of the national Political Parties Law in 2002, that the display of “political prisoner” photographs became the target of institutional repression. Spain’s Ministry of Interior, in Socialist hands from 2004 to 2011, has led an aggressive campaign in this regard. The law leaves, however, considerable room for interpretation, and two important sentences have already established that displaying pictures does not necessarily constitute an act of glorification of terrorism or denigration of its victims: the Basque Superior Tribunal of Justice did so in the 2009 Etxerat case, and so did the *Audiencia Nacional* (see endnote

number 20) in the Txori Barrote case tried in October 2010. Txori Barrote's legal representatives were accused, again, of glorification of terrorism, for the exact same reasons that had triggered Bilbao's City Hall's sanctions. The case, however, was based on facts that had taken place in *Aste Nagusia* 2008. The claimant was Daniel Portero, president of Dignity and Justice (*Dignidad y Justicia*), an association in support of ETA's victims with strong ties with the Spanish extreme Right. Portero was son to a national chief prosecutor who was murdered by two former ETA militants whose pictures were displayed in Txori Barrote's tent. Though the *comparseros* were finally absolved, the prosecution had asked for 18 months of imprisonment, the standard for acts involving glorifying terrorism. In addition, the *Audiencia Nacional* declared the display of prisoners' portraits legal; this gained Azkuna considerable popular criticism. The current Socialist-Popular administration of the Basque Autonomous Community and Bilbao's Mayor Iñaki Azkuna rejected the sentence, and declared they would continue with their line of action. In April 2011, however, the *Tribunal Supremo* (see endnote number 20) modified the *Audiencia's* sentence, stating that the display of these portraits was indeed a case of glorification of terrorism. The *Tribunal Supremo* nonetheless released Txori Barrote's members; it was unable to ascertain the authorship of the actions.

- 18 The Festive Bylaws were passed in 2004. Article 26 of the Bylaws establishes that "the repeated non-compliance of the Bylaws, or the non-fulfillment of one of their substantial sections, might preclude the responsible party from obtaining authorizations for at least two ensuing festive editions." Article 27, in turn, establishes that "the authorizations foreseen in these Bylaws are always given in a precarious fashion; they thus do not generate any type of rights on behalf of the beneficiaries, and they can be freely revoked if situations of risk, disorders or alterations emerge [...], including the use of placards and/or symbols that assail people's dignity, support terrorism, and could thus endanger coexistence or the normality of festive acts."
- 19 In previous occasions, the internal opposition to armed struggle had generated the defection of sectors from the *abertzale* Left. Such was the case of the "*Polimilis*," members of ETA(político-militar) in 1982, and the political party Aralar in 2000.
- 20 Source: "Un primer paso en el proceso democrático: Principios y voluntad de la Izquierda *Abertzale*," a.k.a. Altsasua Declaration, Euskal Herria, 11/14/2009.
- 21 According to Polletta (1998a:421), narratives are characterized by emplotment, point of view (e.g. narrator, protagonist, audience), indeterminacy of meaning (and, thus, by interpretive participation), and canonicity. The *plot* is the logic that makes the events that precede the story's conclusion meaningful; it is a story of "becoming" that integrates past, present, and future events in a heuristic and normative fashion (Polletta:1998a:421-6; 1998b:139). Emplotment emphasizes identities' temporal dimension and helps align individual and collective identities. Polletta points out that stories are differently intelligible (due to their ambiguity), salient, available, and authoritative depending on who tells them, when, for what purpose, and in what institutional context. Storytelling's content and context mutually sustain each other: what stories can be told on particular occasions endow those occasions with institutional meaning.
- 22 The election of the *txupinera* is made every June or July. The Federation conducts a raffle among those *comparsas* that have not yet had a *txupinera*, and draws one name. Then the elected *comparsa* selects one of its female members to perform the duty. While the *txupinera* is elected by the Federation of *Comparsas* alone, the town crier is elected by the Mixed Organizing Commission.

- 23** The *Audiencia Nacional de España* ("National Court of Spain") is a high court in Spain. Its remit is to try cases of terrorism (and on rare occasions other exceptional crimes such as organized crime, and genocide). It was conceived after the end of the Francoist dictatorship to try ETA members and other minor armed groups. Even today, most of the terrorism cases heard at the *Audiencia* are ETA-related. The *Audiencia* has its seat in Madrid, with jurisdiction over Spain and international crimes that come under the competence of Spanish courts, unlike most of the courts that have a territorial bailiwick. It is reserved for cases that are deemed nationally important by the government of the day; its decisions can be overturned by the Supreme Court of Spain (*Tribunal Supremo*) and the Constitutional Court (*Tribunal Constitucional*). The *Audiencia* has been marred by controversy throughout its history and has often been accused of being excessively influenced by political pressure and the media. In recent years, judges Baltasar Garzón and Grande-Marlaska were at the center of polemic for ordering the closure of two Basque newspapers (Egin and Egunkaria), a radio station (Egin Irratia) and a monthly magazine (Ardi Beltza). The judges have tried many cases related to ETA's armed struggle but have also been alleged to cast the net too widely, indicting writers, journalists, lawyers and political activists with no proven links to terrorist organizations. Judge Garzón is also responsible for banning the *abertzale* political party Batasuna in 2003, and its successors Herri Batasuna and Euskal Herritarrok, the youth organizations Haika-Jarrai-Segi, the *abertzale* coordinator body KAS, and the cross-border regional coordinator Udalbiltza. The judge is believed to have bowed to pressure from former President Aznar's (Popula Party) hard-line stance on Basque politics, whose maximum exponent was the passing of the controversial Political Party Law in 2002, practically tailor-made to outlaw Batasuna. The appeal by Batasuna was however heard and rejected by the European Human Rights Court in late 2009, and then in 2010 for the kindred political party Basque Nationalist Action. The *Audiencia's* reputation has been further blemished by its tolerance of *incommunicado* detentions, which have been repeatedly condemned by NGOs such as Amnesty International and the United Nations for failing to safeguard the detainee's rights and allowing torture to take place with impunity. The *Audiencia* has seldom given credence to notorious cases of torture. Source:  
<http://www.websters-dictionary-online.org/definitions/Audiencia+Nacional+of+Spain?cx=partner-pub-0939450753529744:v0qd01-tdlq&cof=FORID:9&ie=UTF-8&q=Audiencia+Nacional+of+Spain&sa=Search#906>
- 24** In just two months, the Federation demonstrated its "muscle" and organizational power. It pulled off a macro-festival that run on a budget of over 180,000 Euros, involved highly visible solo artists and cultural collectives from the entire Spanish state, had an ample repercussion among Bilbao's citizens, and received considerable media coverage. The manifesto received the endorsement of more than 1,700 prominent socio-political and cultural agents, associations and social movement organizations. And although the coordination of efforts with the festive agents in the Basque territory did not work as well as had been expected, first-time contacts were established with those agents located in the four major Basque capitals, where the largest and most prominent annual summer festivities take place.
- 25** A break down of the list of endorsements elaborated by the Federation shows that 30 percent of them came from the artistic world, 26 percent from social movement organizations and cultural associations, 17 percent from festive agents, 7 from athletes and sportsmen, and the remaining 17 from a big "other" category that includes academics, journalists, chefs, etc. Of the three trade union organizations that endorsed the manifesto, one is the anarcho-



syndicalist CNT, tied to the *comparsa* Hontzak, and the other is the *abertzale* LAB, which contrary to several other organizations within the *abertzale* cluster has never been illegalized. Interestingly enough, social movement organizations and cultural associations are collapsed in one category, and separate from trade unions, in the document elaborated by the Federation.

- 26** Ansell (1997:361) defines symbols as highly condensed though multivocal representations. Using symbols presupposes a mental association of two elements, one of which (the "signifier") is regarded as representing, or "standing for," the other (the "signified") (Saussure 1959[1915]:67, as quoted in Zerubavel 1997:68). According to Zerubavel (1997:69-71) symbolic associations involve shared meanings, that is, they rest on sociomental associations of particular signifiers with particular signifieds. This association is purely artificial or conventional; the meaning of symbols is a product of the particular sociomental connection between the symbols and the particular thought community that uses them (Zerubavel 1997:78).
- 27** According to Meyer (2004:133-6) scholars within the POS tradition differ in terms of how many, and which, factors in the political environment constitute components of political opportunities. They also disagree in terms of the formulation of hypotheses involving political opportunities; whereas some articulations of the theory stress expanding opportunities as a precursor for mobilization (e.g. McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Costain 1992), others consider threat and constricting institutional opportunities as conditions for extra-institutional mobilization (e.g. Meyer 1990, 1993; Smith 1996). Disagreement exists, too, in relation to the "dependent variable" explained by political opportunities (e.g. social protest mobilization in general, particular tactics or strategies, formation of organizations, and influence on public policy).
- 28** According to Ansell (1997:360) organizing symbols create a shared interpretative framework that facilitates coordination, exchange, and ultimately commitment. Ansell contends that it is through the interplay between organizing symbols and social or inter-organizational networks—sets of multilateral linkages between individuals or organizations—that organizational cohesion emerges. I expand upon Ansell's work by focusing on inter-organizational conflict, as well.
- 29** Six reasons were offered to justify the decision: the City Hall's intent to privatize the model, the exclusion of the Federation of *Comparsas* of the decision-making process, the parallel parades during Carnivals, the disrespect of the festive calendar for economic and political reasons, budget reduction for participative activities, sanctions to *comparsas* and associated limits to freedom of speech.

# De las prácticas articulatorias entre movilización social y gobiernos. Notas sobre las experiencias de Argentina y Bolivia en el siglo XXI

María Virginia Quiroga y Sebastián Barros

**Resumen:** El objetivo de esta ponencia es examinar los procesos a los que se exponen los gobiernos y los movimientos sociales latinoamericanos en su articulación política mutua, especialmente en los casos de Argentina y Bolivia. La noción de articulación remite a la existencia de una relación entre las identidades a partir de la cual ambas resultan modificadas (Laclau y Mouffe 2004); y se presenta, en la coyuntura actual, como uno de los grandes desafíos a los que se ven expuestos tanto los gobiernos como los movimientos y las organizaciones sociales. En esta línea de indagación, el presente trabajo aborda dicha articulación identificando agencias o iniciativas de acción que ponen en juego una determinada subjetividad y trazan un mapa de fuerzas estructurando un espacio en el que adquieren consistencia los sujetos.

**Palabras clave:** Articulación – gobiernos - movimientos sociales - identidades políticas – América Latina

## 1. Introducción

El objetivo de esta ponencia es examinar los procesos a los que se exponen los actuales gobiernos y los movimientos sociales latinoamericanos en su articulación política mutua. Para ello, daremos cuenta en primer lugar del contexto latinoamericano del siglo XXI, marcado por algunas continuidades y rupturas con la década iniciada en 1990. Ese período se caracterizó -entre otros aspectos- por la resistencia de diversos colectivos organizados a la aplicación de políticas neoliberales.

Luego, nos centraremos en las realidades nacionales de Argentina y Bolivia, analizando cómo se configuran en esta nueva coyuntura las complejas articulaciones entre gobiernos y movimientos sociales. Dicho análisis es emprendido en base a la noción de articulación definida en tanto relación entre elementos de sentido que se modifican mutuamente como resultado de su vinculación. (Laclau y Mouffe 2004). Asumir esta perspectiva supone tomar distancia de dos líneas de interpretación clásicas sobre el vínculo entre organizaciones sociales y gobiernos. En primera instancia, se cuestionan aquellos planteos que exacerban la plena autonomía de la organización popular; ya sea a través de la idea de un “gobierno de los movimientos sociales”, como sosteniendo su absoluta independencia de las reglas del juego electoral. En segundo término, esta lectura se aleja de aquellas formulaciones que, por el contrario, anulan dicha autonomía señalando que la integración o afinidad de diversos colectivos organizados con los gobiernos se resume en la idea de cooptación.

De este modo, el abordaje aquí propuesto busca profundizar el análisis sin descuidar ninguna de las identidades involucradas en la articulación; es decir, tanto el plano gubernamental como el de los movimientos sociales. La relación que se entabla entre ellos será clave a la hora de preservar el potencial político democrático necesario para superar los distintos desafíos abiertos.

## **2. Del nuevo mapa político latinoamericano y la centralidad de las articulaciones gobiernos-movimientos sociales**

Distintos autores e investigaciones recientes han sostenido la existencia de un cambio en el clima político e ideológico de la región latinoamericana de cara al siglo XXI (Boersner 2005; Paramio 2006; Rojas Aravena 2006; Touraine, 2006). De esta manera, se hizo referencia a la conformación de un nuevo mapa político que abarcaría desde la elección de Hugo Chávez en 1998, en Venezuela, y las posteriores asunciones de "Lula" Da Silva en Brasil, Néstor Kirchner en Argentina, Tabaré Vázquez en Uruguay, Michelle Bachelet en Chile, Evo Morales en Bolivia, Rafael Correa en Ecuador, Daniel Ortega en Nicaragua, Fernando Lugo en Paraguay; hasta la elección en El Salvador de Mauricio Funes. Se trataría de la consolidación de gobiernos que dentro de su diversidad manifestaron la intención de reparar progresivamente el tejido social, recuperar el rol del Estado, revertir las tendencias de una modernidad excluyente y favorecer la integración latinoamericana. Siguiendo a Morel y Quiroga (2011) cabría identificar que varias de las iniciativas de estos nuevos gobiernos apuntaron a profundizar y expandir los mecanismos democráticos, como por ejemplo la elaboración de los textos constitucionales a través de asambleas constituyentes, la aprobación de los mismos por vía de referéndums, la realización de los revocatorios de mandatos; luego también la aplicación de políticas redistributivas tendientes a la mejora de la calidad de vida de los sectores más desfavorecidos, y la búsqueda para ampliar el alcance de estas medidas.

En miras a distinguir el amplio y diverso abanico de gobiernos a los que se alude, desde el análisis político, se han intentado algunas clasificaciones, la mayoría atravesadas por la dicotomía entre dos izquierdas. Por un lado, se identifica a una izquierda pragmática, sensata y moderada (Chile, Brasil, Uruguay); y, por otro, a una demagógica, nacionalista y populista (principalmente Venezuela, Bolivia y Ecuador). En palabras de autores como María Antonia Muñoz (2011) o Franklyn Ramírez Gallegos (2006) estas lecturas dicotómicas opacan los abordajes en tanto sólo presentan un notorio sesgo normativo y, además, desconocen la profunda complejidad y especificidad de las distintas realidades nacionales que conforman la América Latina. En este sentido, Muñoz señala que sería interesante buscar también otro tipo de criterios para pensar el cambio político en el subcontinente, "*más allá de la relación con el régimen político o las debilidades y fortalezas institucionales*" (Muñoz 2011:45). Entre estos tópicos, creemos que la articulación gobiernos-movimientos sociales adquiere destacada centralidad. Para los primeros está en juego el apoyo popular, la legitimidad de sus actos y el alcance de sus propuestas de inclusión. Para las experiencias de movilización social se trata del dilema de cómo preservar la autonomía cuando los

gobiernos parecen avanzar cada vez más sobre ellos; y, a su vez, cómo lograr que la autonomía no se transforme en creciente repliegue y aislamiento. Raúl Zibechi (2011) le agrega, a este entramado, las vinculaciones con la disyuntiva entre preservación del medio ambiente y avance del productivismo-extractivismo. En palabras del autor, los nuevos gobiernos “progresistas” deben moverse en el precario equilibrio entre mantener las condiciones para la permanencia y reproducción del capital, a la vez que conservar el respaldo -activo o pasivo- de los movimientos que les dan legitimidad. Asimismo, el pensamiento crítico queda atrapado en la encrucijada entre dar su apoyo a los gobiernos por sus logros en materia social o señalar las contradicciones y límites de su proyecto.

Dentro de los debates sobre autonomía y horizontalidad de los movimientos sociales se bosquejaron referencias a un Estado que “cooptaba” sus demandas o al menos sus principales cuadros dirigentes. Así, se analizaron las estrategias operadas desde los nuevos gobiernos para contener la activa movilización social (Svampa 2005; Campione y Rajland 2006; Borón 2007; Battistini 2007). Dichas estrategias abarcarían mecanismos más sutiles que la represión directa del conflicto social y evidenciarían la persistencia de cierta matriz clientelar que pondría de manifiesto la “debilidad” de los sectores populares. Desde el punto de vista defendido en este trabajo, la frontera autonomía/heteronomía no resulta fácilmente identificable. Desde este punto de vista, la autonomía no tendría un sentido político en tanto topología a ser defendida o mantenida por determinadas posiciones, sino una iniciativa de acción dentro de una correlación de fuerzas en el marco de la cual se constituyen los sujetos políticos. En suma, argumentamos la insuficiencia de un análisis centrado exclusivamente en el voluntarismo de los gobiernos nacionales, como así también en la infinita capacidad de preservar la autonomía por parte de las organizaciones del campo popular.

Frente a ello, este artículo plantea la necesidad de miradas capaces de reparar en actores permeados por conflictos y tensiones dando cuenta de un proceso de articulación política en un contexto histórico específico. Esto pone de manifiesto la contingencia de las identidades, como así también su contaminación mutua y su permanente interacción con el contexto. De allí que la noción de articulación es clave para entender la constitución de identidades políticas y la vinculación entre movimientos sociales y gobiernos. En la definición dada por Laclau y Mouffe (2004), la hegemonía es una “relación de tipo político” que es dominada por la noción de articulación. Esto tiene dos consecuencias importantes. Por un lado, esto significa que una práctica articuladora establece una relación entre los elementos de modo que su identidad se modificará como resultado de la articulación. Este carácter relacional significa que no hay identidades capaces de ser reducidas a su presunta posición de clase, a su lugar institucional o a un dispositivo de enunciación. Las identidades se constituyen siempre en relación a una otredad. Por el otro lado, como resultado de la articulación uno de los elementos de la relación podrá empezar a trabajar como “la superficie de inscripción” de otras demandas sociales (Laclau 1990:63). Esto es precisamente lo que supone una práctica hegemónica: una demanda social particular que transforma su contenido particular en la fijación parcial de sentido alrededor del cual se articulan otras demandas sociales.

A su vez, estas prácticas articularias no se dan en un vacío de sentido. Los procesos políticos de los que damos cuenta no se presentan como totalmente nuevos sino que siempre contienen elementos de una relativa estructuralidad. De modo que se pone en cuestión "lo social" en tanto realidad completa o acabada y se advierte su constitución como sistema de relaciones sedimentadas, donde es posible identificar aquellos mecanismos de poder que hicieron posible su afianzamiento. Es decir, la vinculación entre movimientos sociales y gobiernos implicó necesariamente un proceso de luchas por la fijación parcial de sentido que se plasmó en distintas articulaciones y procesos. Para tomar un ejemplo, se puede mencionar la alusión desde las organizaciones sociales a la necesidad de "militar el Estado". Esto presupondría un "Estado en disputa", una situación política incierta, indefinida entre "lo nuevo y lo viejo", una lucha entre fuerzas políticas que puján por la hegemonía del proceso político en el sentido antedicho.

En adición a ello, la recurrencia a la noción de articulación para pensar el vínculo entre movimientos sociales y gobiernos, complejiza la dicotomía interior-exterior; cuestionando la separación tajante entre aquello que podríamos identificar como el afuera de las organizaciones sociales y las características que configurarían su interior. El mismo Ernesto Laclau aclara que *"la oposición pura interior-exterior presupondría una frontera inmóvil, hipótesis que hemos rechazado como descripción de cualquier proceso real"* (Laclau 2005:192). En un sentido similar Martín Cortés (2009) argumenta que la relación entre el Estado y un movimiento social (o, en última instancia, cualquier actor que lo interpele) no debe concebirse en términos de exterioridad, sino como partes integrantes de la política como escenario de conflicto que se constituyen y transforman allí. Es por ello que los objetivos de la presente investigación no se resuelven a través de una consideración exclusiva de los factores contextuales ("externos") que favorecieron la acción colectiva en Argentina y Bolivia, ni tampoco mediante el análisis pormenorizado de sus características particulares ("internas"). Nuestra propuesta radica en adentrarnos en la articulación entre ambas instancias, considerando que las condiciones del entorno no son absolutamente externas a los actores colectivos, ni éstos pueden dar cuenta de las mismas en forma mecánica. El contexto no opera solamente como el paño en el que se desenvuelven los modos de identificación, sino que limita estructuralmente las posibilidades identificatorias (Barros 2010). A su vez, las identidades se desplazan y admiten redefiniciones, provocando también cambios en el contexto en que operan.

Las argumentaciones precedentes resultan claves para el análisis que nos proponemos efectuar, como así también dejan entrever futuras líneas de indagación y profundización de los temas aquí planteados. La escasez -cuasi inexistencia- de investigaciones comparativas entre Argentina y Bolivia, anima el desafío de problematizar diferencias que muchas veces se asumen como naturales. En este sentido, enfatizamos que dichas diferencias no responden a circunstancias prefijadas, sino que necesitan ser explicadas a partir del análisis de prácticas de articulación y sobredeterminación. En lo sucesivo trazaremos algunas líneas interpretativas en torno al vínculo entre gobiernos y movimientos sociales en los contextos de Argentina y Bolivia en la última década. Estas lecturas se orientan por los señalamientos

desarrollados en esta sección; en consecuencia, partimos de considerar la complejidad que reviste esa articulación “ya que la identidad de los elementos resulta modificada como resultado de la misma práctica articuladora” (Laclau y Mouffe 2004:142-143).

### 3. Movilización social y kirchnerismo

En la Argentina post 2003 se ha abierto un interesante debate en torno al posicionamiento de las organizaciones sociales que adquirieron destacada presencia en la resistencia neoliberal y la crisis de 2001, y que posteriormente optaron por el acercamiento al gobierno de Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) y luego al de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2011). En relación a ello destacamos, en primer lugar, la evidencia de la reconfiguración del campo popular; y, en segundo lugar, el carácter “disputado” que asume la lectura de esa reconfiguración.

A partir del año 2003, el mapa de organizaciones sociales y piqueteras se modificó (Quiroga 2010). La Federación Tierra y Vivienda para el Hábitat Social (FTV) y Barrios de Pie –nucleado en la expresión Libres del Sur– hicieron expreso su apoyo al kirchnerismo y se integraron en la gestión estatal<sup>1</sup>. La Coordinadora Aníbal Verón –que bregaba por la construcción de poder popular– prácticamente se disolvió con la fragmentación entre los Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados (que se conocieron como MTD Aníbal Verón) y la Coordinadora que permaneció ligada a sectores de la izquierda radical. Tiempo después el primer grupo sufrió el alejamiento de los MTD Solano, Guernica y Allen y se subdividió entre aquellos MTD cercanos al de Florencio Varela y el Frente Popular Darío Santillán –como la expresión más clara de la narrativa autonomista, que postulaba la idea de construir paulatinamente poder popular antes que involucrarse en su toma–. Por su parte, la Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA) experimentó cierto repliegue y fragmentación, atravesada por disputas internas en torno a su posicionamiento político; dichas tendencias se exacerbarían durante el gobierno de Cristina Fernández. La Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) –bajo conducción de Hugo Moyano– se mantuvo fuertemente alineada al nuevo gobierno<sup>2</sup>. Asimismo, las organizaciones de derechos humanos –como HIJOS y Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo– se identificaron con las medidas que en esta materia impulsó el gobierno kirchnerista, otorgando su apoyo y asumiendo el desarrollo e implementación de políticas conjuntas.

Este acercamiento de diversas organizaciones sociales al gobierno kirchnerista, ha suscitado múltiples interpretaciones desde el campo académico-intelectual. Para algunos analistas durante la gestión de Néstor Kirchner se consagraría un patrón de subordinación al Estado de los principales movimientos sociales (Svampa 2006, 2008; Borón 2007). En esta línea, Svampa señala que este patrón de subordinación estaría signado por estrategias de “*integración y negociación de las corrientes afines al ideario nacional popular o populista, combinadas con otras de control y disciplinamiento contra los grupos más movilizados*” (Svampa 2008:163-165). En otros casos, se sostiene que lo importante sería preguntarse por las consecuencias de las relaciones establecidas entre kirchnerismo y movimientos sociales en términos de

construcción de alternativas políticas complejas y superadoras (Cortés 2009; Massetti 2009; Gómez 2010). En este sentido, Cortés señala la necesidad de superar el concepto de cooptación, *"no sólo porque no explica demasiado, sino porque no es operativo políticamente"* (Cortés 2010:112); mientras que Gómez apunta que la aproximación al Estado de los movimientos sociales fue *"una decisión madurada orgánicamente y discutida internamente de apoyo convencido a las medidas tomadas por el poder político"* (Gómez 2010:90). En vinculación con algunos de estos señalamientos, hay explicaciones que se concentran en la inscripción en una narrativa común como elemento clave para explicar el acercamiento al kirchnerismo por parte de corrientes afines a la tradición nacional-popular, lo que nos situaría en un plano más afectivo que racional. *"Kirchner reintrodujo ejes en el debate público que generaron la imagen de un gobierno con capacidad de interpelación de los sectores populares desde una renovada tradición movimientista, que había significado su principal matriz de integración a la disputa política nacional desde 1945"* (Pérez y Natalucci 2010:97).

En otros casos, el acento está puesto en la operación clave que habría emprendido el kirchnerismo atenuando el antagonismo pueblo vs. clase política. Esto se percibiría en las alusiones a un pueblo soberano con representación legítima en el nuevo gobierno. Así, para estas posturas Kirchner reconocería *"al pueblo como su colectivo de pertenencia y se autoproclama intérprete de su verdad interior"* (Muñoz y Retamozzo 2008:134). Ese pueblo además se reconocía, en el discurso gubernamental, como dañado por el terrorismo de Estado de los '70 y la embestida neoliberal de los '90. Esta línea se acerca de manera decisiva a lo que se argumenta en este trabajo ya que muestra que la articulación que se va tejiendo entre las partes involucradas da cuenta de un proceso más complejo que el mero dominio de un polo sobre los otros, o la sola predominancia de lazos afectivos o cálculos racionales sobre los mayores beneficios de un acercamiento al Estado. Diversos exponentes de las organizaciones antes mencionadas identificaron al gobierno kirchnerista como la consecuencia del proceso de movilización social ascendente y manifestaron encontrar en dicho proyecto político una propuesta afín a sus tradiciones, inscribiéndose en una narrativa común y coparticipando de la implementación de determinadas políticas públicas (Quiroga 2010).

Otros análisis mantienen voces críticas frente a la articulación entre gobierno y organizaciones sociales. Las mismas sostienen críticas que incluso van más allá de la relación que estamos analizando para referirse a sus consecuencias políticas, como por ejemplo la concentración de poder en el Ejecutivo, la continuidad de un patrón redistributivo desigual, la extensión de viejas redes clientelares y la falta de discusión en torno al modelo de desarrollo. En este caso se destaca la fuerte presencia de colectivos organizados que se oponen a la implementación de políticas extractivistas en diversas provincias del territorio nacional. Se trata básicamente de asambleas de pobladores que resisten la minería contaminante. En ese marco, se critica el accionar del gobierno nacional por desconocer estas demandas y coparticipar, junto a los gobiernos provinciales aliados, de la invisibilización -y hasta represión- de dichas manifestaciones. En tanto que múltiples voces cercanas al kirchnerismo -desde el campo académico, militante o periodístico- minimizan las consecuencias

del extractivismo y sostienen la necesaria creación de riquezas y acumulación de los excedentes para profundizar su distribución<sup>3</sup>.

Aquí proponemos una lectura de la relación entre gobierno kirchnerista y movilización social basada en la categoría de articulación. Esto permitiría superar las dicotomías entre interior-exterior y arriba-abajo, partiendo de la complejidad del proceso mismo de constitución identitaria. Es decir, la lógica de la subjetivación, es una heterología, una lógica del otro, porque hablamos de la formación de un "uno" que no es un "uno mismo" sino que es la relación de un "uno mismo con otro" (Rancière 2004). Se trata, en palabras del autor, de un ser-junto, un ser-entre: entre los nombres, entre las identidades, entre las culturas. Así, no podríamos analizar a los movimientos sociales en tanto sujetos homogéneos y esenciales; sino que precisamos reparar en las diversidades y especificidades del campo popular argentino sumido en permanentes tensiones. La construcción de significados compartidos, con los que suele identificarse a un movimiento social, se constituye en oposición a una alteridad y a través de una lectura retrospectiva del pasado que encarna una promesa de plenitud. Desde esta perspectiva, diversos colectivos organizados de la Argentina post 2003 encontraron en el proyecto kirchnerista la re emergencia de una tradición política cercana, disponible y creíble a la cual asirse. La instancia del Estado dejó de desempeñar su rol totalizador como personificación discursiva del enemigo, ya que buena parte de las demandas manifiestas por los colectivos movilizados desde la década de los noventa -y mucho antes también si se piensa por ejemplo en la reivindicación de los derechos humanos tras la instauración de la última dictadura cívico militar- se incorporaron a la agenda gubernamental. Así, el kirchnerismo fue articulando discursivamente un conjunto de demandas múltiples pero comúnmente insatisfechas, presentándose como una respuesta a la dislocación abierta en la crisis de diciembre de 2001.

#### **4. EL MAS-IPSP, los movimientos sociales y la etnicidad**

En Bolivia, el Instrumento Político que llevó a Evo Morales al poder (2006-2009 y 2010-2013) surgió como iniciativa de las organizaciones campesino-indígenas que decidieron complementar el accionar sindical con la lucha político-electoral. Así, los movimientos y organizaciones sociales y sindicales que conformaron el Movimiento Al Socialismo-Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (MAS-IPSP) plantearon la necesidad de trascender la acción defensiva y reivindicativa para asumir el control del Estado y desde allí impulsar su transformación. En este sentido se refiere Álvaro García Linera, destacado intelectual y vicepresidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: *"El movimiento indígena y campesino no solamente formuló la necesidad de resistir ante las políticas neoliberales impuestas por los gobiernos excluyentes y racistas, sino que también les tocó proyectar la toma y construcción del poder"* (García Linera 2008:8). Para el mencionado analista, *"los sujetos de la política y la institucionalidad real del poder se han trasladado al ámbito plebeyo e indígena (...) Los condenados a la subalternidad silenciosa hoy son los sujetos decisores de la trama política"* (García Linera 2012:2)



No obstante, en este artículo esbozamos una interpretación que pretende alejarse de una visión idealizada que identifica al gobierno del MAS-IPSP directamente como un gobierno de los movimientos sociales. Frente a ello, consideramos que no se trata de experiencias de movilización social con carácter unívoco, ni sentidos prefijados, sino que admiten diferencias, conflictos de intereses y riesgos ante las tendencias internas que buscan el repliegue o el tutelaje que en muchas ocasiones parece pretender ejercer el Estado. En este sentido, desde la asunción de Evo Morales diversos autores sostienen la existencia de un repliegue considerable de la movilización, tendencias a la institucionalización del MAS-IPSP y fuerte centralidad de la toma de decisión en el Poder Ejecutivo. Así, Viaña y Orozco (2007), retomando parte del análisis de Luis Tapia, señalan que no podría hablarse de movimientos sociales sino más bien de organizaciones de la sociedad civil, dado su corporativismo y la digitación que se opera desde el Estado central. En consecuencia: *"sino existen los movimientos sociales, menos aún en su faceta colectiva de deliberación y decisión, mucho menos puede existir un gobierno de los movimientos sociales"* (Viaña y Orozco 2007:125).

Los caudillos salvadores y el rol protagónico del Estado a partir de la gestión de Morales parecieron sustituir, en parte, la pluralidad autoorganizativa y los liderazgos colectivos del ciclo de movilización popular iniciado en el año 2000. En esta línea cabría interpretar los conflictos desatados al interior de algunas organizaciones sociales porque sus líderes fueron convocados a título individual para presentarse como candidatos electorales por el MAS-IPSP, sin consultar a sus bases tal participación. Asimismo, el presidente recibió acusaciones -principalmente provenientes de la intelectualidad aymara y las organizaciones indigenistas- de estar rodeado de un "entorno blancoide" que lo alejaba de las bases campesinas; ante ello, el gobierno argumentaba que los límites de la revolución democrática eran el patrimonialismo, los repliegues particularistas y la falta de cuadros político-administrativos (Svampa y Stefanoni 2007).

En otros casos, se ha argumentado que las últimas elecciones locales y regionales de abril de 2010 se presentaron como un indicio de que los *"de abajo y a la izquierda mantienen su autonomía"*, en tanto los grupos más radicales y descontentos con la selección a dedo de candidatos, retiraron su apoyo incondicional al MAS, intentando incidir en el rumbo del gobierno (Zibechi 2010). Si bien en un balance general el MAS-IPSP resultó victorioso<sup>4</sup>, podría inferirse la curiosa tendencia de que mejoró su posicionamiento en oriente, mientras que perdió apoyo en las zonas más radicales del occidente. A su vez, varios dirigentes, que antes se mostraron completamente opositores al gobierno, se traspasaron a las filas del instrumento político y figuraron en puestos secundarios de las listas de candidatos<sup>5</sup>. Se presenta entonces como un importante desafío para el gobierno boliviano y el abanico de organizaciones sociales activas lograr consolidar los cambios impulsados, en busca de un proyecto que apunte más allá de la ampliación de los márgenes de soberanía e incentive la creciente inclusión de los colectivos organizados en la toma de decisión pública. No obstante, la ampliación de la esfera de decisión también ha sumido al gobierno en algunos conflictos, obligándole a dar marcha atrás en la enunciación de medidas tales como el "gasolinazo" de diciembre de 2010<sup>6</sup> o la construcción de una importante carretera que atravesaría un asentamiento de comunidades indígenas en el nordeste boliviano<sup>7</sup>.

Mientras el gobierno esboza referencias discursivas de alabanza a la pachamama, permanece sumido en el desafío de cómo compatibilizar la extracción de recursos naturales con el desarrollo de un medio ambiente sostenible para las generaciones actuales y vendieras. En este sentido, en nuestros días el MAS-IPSP se enfrenta a la férrea oposición de organizaciones indigenistas que acusan al gobierno de no respetar las autonomías indígenas a la hora de disponer libremente sobre territorios y recursos que les conciernen<sup>8</sup>. Asimismo, desde el campo académico y periodístico se ha señalado que el gobierno emprendería una supuesta utilización de la retórica decolonial y la exaltación del sujeto indígena como coartada para ocultar el desinterés por discutir el modelo de desarrollo que se inclina, en la mayoría de los países del Cono Sur, a la reprimarización creciente de la economía y al afianzamiento del modelo extractivista (Yampara 2011; Stefanoni 2010; Svampa 2010). En esta misma línea, un grupo de ex funcionarios del gobierno de Morales, intelectuales y algunos dirigentes sociales firmaron, en julio de 2011, un manifiesto reclamando la *"reconducción del proceso de cambio"*. Allí cuestionaron las inconsistencias en la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos, la falta de voluntad para aplicar la nueva constitución y la ausencia de espacios democráticos de discusión (Stefanoni 2011:27). La respuesta oficial provino del propio vicepresidente, quien acusó a los firmantes de "oenegistas", "resentidos", "neoliberales" y "clase medieras"<sup>9</sup>. De este modo, pese al mejor posicionamiento político-electoral obtenido por el MAS-IPSP en las elecciones de diciembre de 2009, debe hacer frente a importantes desafíos. Así, el escenario actual se aleja de la anterior situación de "empate catastrófico" para vislumbrar una alta conflictividad social con sectores que otrora apoyaban fuertemente al gobierno evista.

El análisis del escenario político-social boliviano se complejiza en tanto no habría exclusivamente diferencias de clases o de partidos, sino fuertes diferencias étnico-culturales. La cuestión étnica, sin lugar a dudas, fortaleció la construcción equivalencial en torno al MAS-IPSP y su cristalización en significantes comunes. Pese a ello, cuestionamos la lectura que analiza el pasaje de movimiento social a gobierno a partir del componente indígena de las organizaciones bolivianas; destacando que en nuestro abordaje "lo étnico" no sería una mera categoría sociológica sino un rasgo de identificación. Entonces, que lo indio se transforme en fuente de capital político -al decir de Pablo Stefanoni (2006)- supone analizar su inserción en un complejo relacional más amplio. En esta línea, Sebastián Barros (2011) señala que la articulación entre distintas identificaciones posibles se basa en un proceso de sobredeterminación, por el cual esas identificaciones se van solapando y contaminando mutuamente y de forma bastante dispersa. Esto es lo que sucede con las múltiples identificaciones de nuestros sujetos que se superponen y contaminan<sup>10</sup>: productores de coca, campesinos, indígenas, hombres de izquierda. Pero habrá una identificación que prevalecerá sobre las otras, sobredeterminándolas; lo que dependerá del contexto y la relativa estructuralidad que éste supone. Es más, en el proceso expansivo de esa articulación equivalencial, las identidades que amalgama el MAS-IPSP ya no remitirían a un sujeto particularmente identificado como campesino o indígena, sino en tanto sujeto excluido que representa al "pueblo boliviano". Así, las demandas manifiestas a través del Instrumento Político trascendieron la exigencia del sujeto por "su parte"; cuestionando la misma distribución jerárquica de las partes y los lugares, y planteando una ruptura con el bloque de poder.

## 5. Conclusiones

El análisis de las actuales coyunturas en los países de la región no asume contenidos a priori, estos es, con independencia de los significados que puede articular. Esos significados son construcciones históricas, cuya génesis y movimientos es posible indagar. De manera que no podemos calificar de antemano, ni de una vez y para siempre, el vínculo que se establece entre gobiernos y movimientos sociales. Para encarar dicha tarea, necesitamos de abordajes más complejos, que logren dar cuenta de la heterogeneidad y la contingencia, de las dimensiones múltiples y de las fronteras borrosas. Enfatizamos, entonces, que un análisis centrado en las prácticas articularias entre gobiernos y movilización social nos aleja de reduccionismos marcados por la dicotomía "autonomía-manipulación" y nos acerca a un entramado complejo cuyas particularidades dependen de una situación de relativa estructuralidad. En Bolivia, el MAS-IPSP logró capitalizar las demandas manifiestas durante la resistencia cocalera y la ola de protestas 2000-2005, convirtiéndolas en bases de su plataforma electoral. En relación a ello podríamos pensar que las demandas encaradas por los sectores movilizados en dicha coyuntura se construyen performativamente a partir del discurso del Instrumento Político que articula los múltiples sentidos disponibles, presentándose como respuesta a la dislocación y retomando referencias a la relativa estructuralidad del contexto. Por su parte, en Argentina fue un actor de la política tradicional el que asumió la representación de las demandas post diciembre de 2001; es decir, no se trataba de un líder sindical ni de las organizaciones sociales, ni siquiera de un *outsider*; sino que provenía del seno mismo de la política que colapsó hacia fines de siglo XX. Así, el discurso kirchnerista buscó atenuar la brecha entre clase política y sociedad civil -que había llegado a su punto máximo hacia las jornadas de diciembre de 2001-; nominándose como "uno más del pueblo", alentando el movimientismo y escapando de los formalismos de protocolo.

Tal como hemos analizado, la articulación entre gobiernos y movimientos sociales resulta clave para comprender el devenir del contexto argentino y boliviano, y sopesar la magnitud de los cambios impulsados. A su vez, podríamos señalar algunos desafíos que se desprenden de los párrafos anteriores y atañen conjuntamente a estos -como también a otros- gobiernos de la actual coyuntura latinoamericana. Las gestiones de Kirchner y Fernández (en Argentina) y de Morales (en Bolivia), han enfrentado críticas en relación a la reapropiación de ciertas banderas de lucha de los colectivos movilizados, impulsando cambios desde arriba y desde el centro. Es decir, en ejercicio del gobierno se arrogarían el monopolio de algunas decisiones y acciones que acumulaban un largo proceso de luchas sociales, lo cual generó disconformidad en sectores organizados que decidieron alejarse al no ver colmadas sus expectativas de participación e inclusión. En relación a esta última cuestión, los mencionados gobiernos se han involucrado en la apertura -quizás insuficiente- de canales para que las organizaciones y dirigentes sociales participen de la gestión estatal; pero esto ha traído disputas entre diferentes agrupaciones, repliegues corporativistas y enfrentamientos por las "pegas" (empleos públicos). Por otro lado, también se han señalado fuertes ambivalencias en la construcción discursiva de ambos proyectos nacionales en relación a la compatibilización del crecimiento económico con un

medio ambiente sustentable. Esta puja estaría representada, por un lado, por las reivindicaciones en torno al “buen vivir” y, por el otro, el desarrollo de un modelo extractivista productivista que avanza sobre la tierra y los recursos

En definitiva, nuestras argumentaciones se han basado en la consideración de que las identidades no podrían comprenderse como adscripción a una posición estructural prefijada o como la autopercepción de actores empíricamente dados, tampoco implicarían un proceso enteramente negociable ajeno al conflicto. Asumimos el carácter disputado, redefinible, mediado y posiblemente, reinventable, de todo fenómeno social y político. Asimismo, resulta pertinente aclarar que un proceso articulador no conduce necesariamente a una articulación populista. Esto problematiza la rápida identificación de los nuevos gobiernos latinoamericanos como un retorno a las experiencias de populismo histórico de mitades del siglo XX (el peronismo en el caso de Argentina y la revolución nacional-popular del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario en Bolivia). La dislocación de un orden de sentidos abre posibilidades identificatorias que pueden articularse políticamente dependiendo del contexto. En definitiva, una articulación populista de lo social es una posibilidad articuladora más entre otras, *“cuya emergencia dependerá del juego de fuerzas en el espacio que queda entre la dislocación de ciertas estructuras de sentido y la relativa estructuralidad que queda en ese contexto dislocado”* (Barros 2012:6)

En líneas generales, esta conclusión recupera los puntos centrales del presente artículo que ha intentado trascender una descripción lineal de hechos, o una presentación de realidades homogéneas y acabadas. En ese sentido, remarcamos la complejidad de la temática de estudio; en tanto se entrecruzan diversos clivajes y se colocan varios horizontes en diálogo, pero también en pugna. El estudio de la articulación entre gobiernos y movimientos sociales en Argentina y Bolivia en el siglo XXI, supone el desafío de analizar procesos en curso, con preguntas que permanecen abiertas e invitan al debate.

## Abreviaturas

**CGT:** General Work Confederation (*Confederación General del Trabajo*)

**CTA:** Central Workers' Union of Argentina (*Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina*)

**FTV:** Federation Land and Home (*Federación Tierra y Vivienda*)

**IPSP:** Political Instrument for Popular Soberaninity (*Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos*)

**MAS:** Movement to Socialism (*Movimiento Al Socialismo*)

**MTD:** Movement of Unemployed Workers (*Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados*)

## Apéndice metodológico

Esta ponencia recoge parte de las investigaciones plasmadas en la tesis doctoral de María Virginia Quiroga, dirigida por Sebastián Barros, "Constitución y redefinición de identidades políticas en experiencias de movilización social. La CTA en Argentina y el MAS-IPSP en Bolivia (2000-2005)." Dicha tesis será presentada para su evaluación en julio de 2012, en el marco del Doctorado en Estudios Sociales de América Latina del Centro de Estudios Avanzados de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba-Argentina.

En el abordaje de nuestra propuesta se destacan los aportes de la ciencia política y, en especial, de la teoría política postfundacional. Asimismo, el diseño metodológico intentó una triangulación de métodos entre el estudio de casos y la investigación comparativa; es decir, se combinó la descripción minuciosa de los procesos particulares de articulación de identidades en Argentina y Bolivia, con la búsqueda de diferencias y semejanzas que permitieran comprender los procesos que fueron desarrollándose para que en estos contextos se produjeran distintos efectos dislocatorios e intentos de sutura.

En la construcción de la metodología de trabajo se han tomado en cuenta las consideraciones de David Howarth (2005), quien sostiene que la asociación del estudio de casos con la investigación comparativa -especialmente de casos de variación máxima (como podrían considerarse dos países latinoamericanos de amplias diferencias como Argentina y Bolivia)- resulta de suma utilidad para establecer las condiciones en las que ciertas prácticas surgen y se desarrollan, y otras no; y para constatar la presencia o ausencia de ciertos factores en la constitución y reproducción de fenómenos particulares.

En cuanto a los materiales de la investigación, la principal evidencia consistió en registros narrativos provenientes de la realización de entrevistas con integrantes de organizaciones sociales (datos primarios) y la revisión de documentos y textos producidos por las mismas (datos secundarios); como así también la revisión exhaustiva de bibliografía especializada en la temática de estudio, centrándonos en los aportes que la teoría de la hegemonía puede realizar al análisis de las acción colectiva en su compleja articulación con los gobiernos de la América Latina actual.

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## Notas

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1 De modo que varios líderes piqueteros pasaron a ocupar cargos dentro de la instituciona-

lidad burocrática. Barrios de Pie por ejemplo se involucró en el Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, haciéndose cargo de la Subsecretaría de Organización y Capacitación Popular –encabezada por el dirigente Jorge Ceballos-, y de la secretaría ejecutiva del Consejo Federal de Derechos Humanos –en manos del también dirigente Humberto Tumini-. Por su parte, Luis D´Elía –de la FTV- fue convocado para asumir en la Subsecretaría de Tierras para el Hábitat Social.

- 2 No obstante, de cara al segundo mandato de Cristina Fernández se evidenciaría un alejamiento. Moyano renunció a la vicepresidencia del Partido Justicialista e hizo públicas sus diferencias con la presidenta.
- 3 “La pregunta inquietante, la que no se puede eludir, es de qué modo garantizar los recursos para hacer mejor la vida, la educación y la salud de una sociedad que no puede desentenderse de la riqueza de su suelo y de su subsuelo. Ninguna corriente ecologista o medioambientalista puede resolver la ecuación, extremadamente compleja, entre creación de riquezas, disminución de la pobreza y distribución igualitaria...” (Foster en Página 12, del 14-02-2012).
- 4 De hecho, ganó en 6 de los 9 departamentos y se arrogó la mayoría parlamentaria en ambas cámaras (25 de 36 senadores y 80 de 130 diputados). No obstante, vale destacar que el MAS perdió no sólo las prefecturas de la Media Luna (los cuatro departamentos del oriente boliviano), donde se ratificaron las fuerzas conservadoras; sino también alcaldías importantes como La Paz, Oruro y Potosí; e incluso en El Alto triunfó con el 39% de los votos cuando antes reunía adhesiones que rondaban el 80%.
- 5 El grupo Santa Cruz Somos Todos integrado por profesionales de clase media críticos del autonomismo patronal se sumó a la campaña “Evo Presidente”. Otros que juraron lealtad al gobierno fueron el máximo representante de Unión Juvenil Cruceñista (UJC) Ariel Rivera, toda su directiva y varios activistas de este grupo de choque otrora opositor. El director de Seguridad Ciudadana de la Prefectura de Santa Cruz, Jorge Aldunate, y hasta el guardaespaldas del prefecto opositor Costas, Edmundo Arias, también se pasaron a las filas del MAS. En Tarija también se reclutaron adversarios conversos, entre ellos el senador tarijeño de Podemos Roberto Ruiz Bass Werner, líder de la agrupación ciudadana Dignidad.
- 6 El vicepresidente García Linera anunció dicha medida el 26 de diciembre de 2010, que produjo el aumento de hasta el 83% en el precio de los carburantes a partir de la eliminación de los subsidios, que alientan un fuerte contrabando hacia los países vecinos –donde los precios son más altos-. (Stefanoni, 2011: 24). Ante la ola de protestas, el gobierno dio marcha atrás con la medida, aduciendo regirse por la consigna zapatista: “mandar obedeciendo”.
- 7 El problema concretamente se ha desatado a partir de las intenciones del gobierno de construir una carretera que uniría las localidades de Villa Tunari (Cochabamba) con San Ignacio de Moxos (Beni). Mientras desde el Poder Ejecutivo señalaron que se trata de una ruta clave para el desarrollo económico y comercial del país; diversos movimientos indígenas protestan contra su construcción, porque parte de su recorrido atravesará el corazón de una de las mayores reservas naturales del país, el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) con presencia de población nativa. Hasta la fecha de redacción de este artículo el proyecto había sido aplazado por el gobierno frente a las protestas, proponiéndose que el tema se dirimiera a través de un referéndum.
- 8 Estas críticas adquirieron notoria relevancia en el marco del conflicto que señalamos en la nota anterior. Las ONG´s indigenistas y grupos de habitantes de la zona del TIPNIS manifestaron que la construcción de la carretera acabará con sus formas de vida tradicionales y promoverá la expansión de las zonas dedicadas al cultivo de coca.



- 9 Dichas acusaciones son plasmadas en una reciente publicación de García Linera, bajo el provocativo título: "El oenegismo, enfermedad infantil del derechismo [o como la renovación del proceso de cambio es la restauración neoliberal]".
- 10 En este sentido podrían considerarse las referencias de distintos entrevistados consultados por Quiroga en el trabajo de tesis citado en el apéndice metodológico de este artículo. Los entrevistados reconocen su pertenencia a una clase obrera que primero era hija de aymaras y quechuas: "Antes que marxista o socialista, hombre de izquierda, soy aymara y productor de coca" (Entrevista a Nuñez, 2009). La expresión de Nuñez da cuenta de su doble adscripción identitaria, en tanto indígena y cocalero; luego acontece su definición político-ideológica como marxista o de izquierda.

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## Las organizaciones sociales en los conjuntos oficialistas: Identidades parciales y definiciones de pertenencia en el MST y en organizaciones sociales kirchneristas (primer gobierno de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva y gobierno de Néstor Kirchner)

María Dolores Rocca Rivarola

**Resumen:** Esta ponencia analizará dos aspectos relativos a uno de los sectores que conformaba la base activa organizada en torno al presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (primer mandato) y al presidente Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007): las organizaciones sociales. Se toman para ello cuatro organizaciones sociales argentinas (Federación Tierra y Vivienda, Barrios de Pie, Frente Transversal y Movimiento Evita) y una brasilera (Movimiento de Trabajadores Rurales Sin Tierra o MST). El trabajo se estructurará en torno a dos ejes. En primer lugar, se analizará la presencia de las identidades peonista y petista (identidades partidarias de origen de ambos presidentes) al interior de las organizaciones sociales y las características diversas que asumían esas identidades en esas organizaciones. En segundo lugar, serán examinadas las diferentes implicancias de la pertenencia al oficialismo en las organizaciones sociales a través de la ubicación del “nosotros” en relación con el gobierno.

**Palabras clave:** Organizaciones sociales – Kirchner – Lula – gobierno – identidades

### 1. Introducción

Los conjuntos de organizaciones y dirigentes configurados en torno a un presidente y que constituyen su base de sustento político organizado pueden ser abordados tomando en cuenta distintos aspectos: su modo de relacionamiento con el gobierno, su presencia efectiva en el Estado, su interacción con otros actores dentro del mismo conjunto, etc. Este trabajo, en particular, estudia el modo en que un sector de los que integraban la base activa de sustentación de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, en Brasil, y Néstor Kirchner, en Argentina, definían y experimentaban su pertenencia. Para ellos, se sumergirá en las interpretaciones que los propios actores elaboraban de esa pertenencia, en el marco de una investigación más amplia en la que se enmarca esta ponencia. Una investigación que procura delinear los rasgos de la propia dinámica al interior de lo que podríamos denominar los *oficialismos* conformados en torno a ambos presidentes. Se propone aquí, entonces, un abordaje de esos conglomerados de organizaciones a través del concepto de *oficialismo*, que debemos distinguir respecto

de las nociones de *partido oficial* y de *coaliciones partidarias*. Dadas las particularidades de estos conjuntos, pensarlos en términos de partidos gobernantes –Partido Justicialista, en Argentina, y *Partido dos Trabalhadores*, en Brasil– o incluso de coaliciones partidarias, implicaría una reducción de la amplia diversidad de sectores que conformaban la órbita política de ambos presidentes y que tenían incluso una participación activa en el gobierno.

El oficialismo es, por tanto, el conglomerado de sectores organizados que fueron confluyendo, alejándose y realineándose en torno de las figuras de Kirchner y Lula. Es, en otros términos, la base organizativa en la que se sostenía el presidente, y cuyas organizaciones y espacios políticos desarrollaron, a lo largo del período escogido por el recorte temporal (2002-2006 en Brasil y 2003-2007 en Argentina, es decir, el primer mandato de Lula y el gobierno de Kirchner), manifestaciones públicas de apoyo a la política oficial o a la figura misma del primer mandatario. Se trata, asimismo, de organizaciones y espacios con algún grado de presencia institucional en el gobierno, ya sea en el Estado o en listas de candidaturas electorales en apoyo al presidente.

En este trabajo me referiré, como fue anticipado, a un sector dentro de ambos oficialismos: las organizaciones sociales (otros sectores eran el espacio partidario, por un lado, y las centrales sindicales, por el otro). Y los argumentos que se plasmen se circunscribirán a los distritos en los que fue realizado el trabajo de campo (San Pablo, Río de Janeiro, Ciudad de Buenos Aires y conurbano bonaerense –especialmente La Matanza).

Estas organizaciones sociales<sup>1</sup> brindaron un apoyo activo –aunque con matices entre ambos países– a ambos presidentes, portando en aquella acción significativas capacidades en términos de construcción territorial y movilización. Este trabajo se interrogará sobre esas organizaciones en tanto parte de las bases de sustentación activa de Lula y Kirchner. Específicamente, se analizará la modalidad de presencia de las identidades peronista y petista (identidades partidarias de origen de ambos presidentes) al interior de las organizaciones sociales, para luego examinar, por otro lado, las diferentes implicancias de la pertenencia al oficialismo en las organizaciones sociales a través de la ubicación del "nosotros" en relación con el gobierno.

## 2. La conformación del vínculo con el gobierno

¿Cómo fue el proceso mediante el cual las organizaciones sociales fueron estableciendo un vínculo con los gobiernos de Lula y Kirchner? ¿Qué características asumió esa relación?

### 2.1. Argentina

En Argentina, Néstor Kirchner no había sido, en los años previos a su llegada al poder –como sí lo fue Lula en el PT–, la figura más visible del Partido Justicialista (PJ). Poco más de tres meses antes de las elecciones presidenciales de 2003, sin embar-

go, recibió el apoyo del entonces presidente interino Eduardo Duhalde y, con él, de gran parte del PJ bonaerense. Electo con un porcentaje históricamente bajo del 22%, el presidente desarrollaría, a partir de entonces, una estrategia de construcción de una base de sustentación activa y organizada propia que incluía, entre otros actores, a organizaciones sociales (las que serán analizadas aquí eran las de mayor tamaño o presencia pública). Por un lado, las primeras medidas de Kirchner –como la política de derechos humanos, algunos aspectos de la política económica, la renovación de la Corte Suprema, la retórica encendida en torno a las empresas privatizadas, etc.– generaron en el imaginario de parte del ya diversificado movimiento piquetero (al que pertenecían estas organizaciones) una idea de un “cambio de rumbo”, un “punto de inflexión”, o incluso, en el caso del Movimiento Evita, una de las organizaciones que este paper analiza, una lectura posterior (el Evita se lanza ya como movimiento de apoyo a Kirchner) de una suerte de “regreso a las fuentes históricas del justicialismo”. Y, por otro lado, asistimos a una estrategia específica del gobierno hacia las organizaciones piqueteras (que luego pasarían a concebirse como “organizaciones sociales”). Ha habido distintas interpretaciones sobre el origen de la relación entre Kirchner y las organizaciones sociales, y sobre esa estrategia. Algunas se valen de la idea de cooptación, otras la rechazan, pero todas reconocen una política diferenciada del gobierno de Kirchner en torno a las distintas organizaciones piqueteras, en la que se procuraría atraer a algunas de ellas y aislar a las otras.

Svampa y Pereyra (2003) describen la estrategia del gobierno hacia las organizaciones sociales como habiendo puesto en acto “simultáneamente, el abanico de estrategias disponibles para integrar, cooptar, disciplinar y/o aislar al conjunto del movimiento piquetero, discriminando entre las diferentes corrientes y organizaciones”. Para los autores, el gobierno consiguió así integrar e institucionalizar a las corrientes afines así como aislar a las corrientes opositoras (Svampa y Pereyra, 2003:212).

Otros trabajos (Cortés, 2008; Schuttenberg, 2009; Natalucci y Schuttenberg, 2010) sobre las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas han criticado la interpretación de una cooptación como mecanismo para entender el posicionamiento de estas organizaciones sociales a favor del gobierno de Kirchner<sup>2</sup>, y han caracterizado su incorporación a partir de una lectura positiva, por parte de las organizaciones, de las medidas del gobierno y de la convocatoria o espacio que éste abriera en ese momento. De todos modos, incluso desde esas perspectivas, se reconoce, como lo hace Natalucci (2008a), una política gubernamental diferenciada en torno a las organizaciones piqueteras que podían devenir potenciales aliados y las que se mostraban aún críticas al nuevo escenario político. Natalucci señala, de ese modo, que el gobierno planteaba la decisión de no reprimir junto con un discurso de retorno a la normalidad, a partir del cual las organizaciones decían integrarse y desmovilizarse, mientras que se estigmatizó y judicializó a las protestas de las organizaciones que seguían manteniendo una estrategia de confrontación (Natalucci, 2008a:125).

¿Cuál fue la respuesta de las organizaciones sociales frente a esta estrategia gubernamental? Aunque ya antes del gobierno kirchnerista se observaban síntomas de clara diferenciación entre las distintas organizaciones piqueteras (Burkart *et al.*,

2008),<sup>3</sup> la lectura positiva respecto del nuevo gobierno por parte de algunas de ellas determinaría entonces un quiebre ostensible al interior del mundo piquetero. Un signo marcado de esas respuestas fue que, un año después de la llegada de Kirchner al poder, las organizaciones Barrios de Pie (en 2006 pasaría a integrar, como fuerza predominante, el movimiento político Libres del Sur), el Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD) Evita, la Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV), y el Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular consensuaban el documento "La Hora de los Pueblos", en el que manifestaban su apoyo al presidente:

*"No nos cabe actuar como observadores ni fiscales, sino que nos asumimos como constructores de la acumulación de fuerzas sociales y políticas a favor del nuevo rumbo emprendido. No queremos ocupar un lugar aséptico y equidistante del oficialismo y la oposición, sino profundizar nuestro compromiso con las políticas a favor del pueblo y la defensa del interés nacional, para enfrentar el único hegemonismo peligroso: el de los grupos de poder económico que manejaron durante décadas el destino del país, en contra del pueblo y la nación"* (Frente Patria para Todos, 2004).

Según coincidían miembros de algunas de estas organizaciones entrevistados, el documento en cuestión y la reunión en la que éste fue discutido habían sido el producto de una iniciativa del propio gobierno, el cual, frente a la continuidad de la protesta social durante sus primeros meses de gestión, se habría abocado a negociar con algunas de ellas para integrarlas a su propia base de sustentación.

La integración al gobierno se producía de modo diferente entre las organizaciones analizadas aquí. La FTV, dirigida por Luis D'Elía, y el Frente Transversal, conducido por Edgardo Depetri, habían forjado su relación con Kirchner con anterioridad a su llegada al poder.

La FTV había surgido como organización barrial en los años ochenta, como una cooperativa en el asentamiento El Tambo, en La Matanza, donde se habían producido tomas masivas de tierras. Su desarrollo territorial se basó en gran medida en la organización colectiva para la provisión de servicios básicos al barrio (electricidad, agua, salud, tendido de calles) y, a partir de la expansión del desempleo, se convirtió en una de las primeras organizaciones en utilizar el corte de ruta en la zona como modo de reclamo (Delamata y Armesto, 2005). Si bien el núcleo organizativo de la FTV partía de allí, fue la aparición de la CTA en los años noventa un factor de peso para la confluencia de ese primer núcleo con otras redes y organizaciones, confluencia que derivaría en una verdadera federación nacional. En el marco de la CTA, la FTV se convertiría en una de las organizaciones piqueteras de mayores dimensiones. El origen de su vínculo con Kirchner se ubica en las mismas elecciones de 2003. En palabras de Lorenzo (Entrevista con Lorenzo, dirigente nacional de la FTV), la Federación había apoyado a Kirchner ya durante el proceso electoral que lo llevó a la presidencia, proveyendo fiscales en localidades como Merlo, convocando a su acto de lanzamiento, etc. Sin embargo, a nivel de declaraciones públicas, el posicionamiento de la FTV a favor de la candidatura de Kirchner se producía con claridad recién antes del *ballotage* (que

finalmente no tuvo lugar, por la renuncia de Carlos Menem a competir en el mismo).

En cuanto al Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular, éste no existía como tal antes del gobierno de Kirchner, pero la relación personal entre el presidente y el líder de aquella organización, Edgardo Depetri, había comenzado hacía aproximadamente dos décadas, cuando Depetri era delegado gremial y Kirchner, asesor jurídico de la seccional ATE-Santa Cruz. Ese carácter personal del vínculo entre ambos dirigentes, configuraría una relación del gobierno diferenciada respecto de la sostenida con otras organizaciones sociales. El Frente Transversal se fundaba, en base a esa relación, y con una composición marcadamente sindical pero con un propósito de desarrollar una construcción territorial como organización social.

Otra de las organizaciones en cuestión, Barrios de Pie –dirigida por la Corriente Patria Libre<sup>4</sup>–, surgía luego de la crisis y estallido de 2001, con el nombre de CTA de los Barrios. Poco después, sin embargo, se desprendería de la central cuestionando el rol de la FTV, que era la mayor organización territorial de la CTA, en tanto coordinadora y eje central de las distintas organizaciones territoriales que se incorporaran a la central de trabajadores.<sup>5</sup> En las elecciones de 2003, Barrios de Pie había planteado el voto en blanco, en lo que Burkart *et al.* (2008) denominan “una campaña contra-electoral”, retomando incluso la consigna de “que se vayan todos”, vigente desde el estallido de 2001. Su incorporación al oficialismo se produciría más tarde, en 2004, siendo una de las organizaciones que firmó el documento citado de apoyo al gobierno.

En abril de 2006, con un acto en Costa Salguero, Barrios de Pie, ya integrado al gobierno de Kirchner a nivel político y estatal (es decir, con integrantes de la organización en distintos cargos públicos y habiéndose posicionado activamente a favor del gobierno), conformaría junto con otras organizaciones<sup>6</sup> el Movimiento Libres del Sur.

Otra organización que haría su aparición en tanto actor oficialista con posterioridad a la victoria de Kirchner es el Movimiento Evita, cuyo lanzamiento oficial se llevaría a cabo en un acto masivo en el estadio Luna Park en mayo de 2005. El Movimiento Evita surgía así como producto del aglutinamiento de distintos sectores y redes, algunos provenientes del Partido Justicialista, otros de organizaciones territoriales menores [incluida una escisión del Movimiento Quebracho], y también del Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados Evita (MTD-Evita).<sup>7</sup> Este último había desarrollado una construcción territorial desde 2002 en zonas del conurbano bonaerense. De todas las organizaciones mencionadas, el Movimiento Evita haría el mayor énfasis en la tradición peronista y en la necesidad de recuperar esa identidad.

El apoyo conjunto al gobierno por parte de las cuatro organizaciones en estudio se formalizaba en junio de 2004, con el documento antes citado (“La Hora de los Pueblos”), y con algunos encuentros posteriores, como un acto en el Luna Park (octubre de 2004) y un Congreso del Frente Patria para Todos (diciembre de 2004). Tal como reconocían los distintos dirigentes y militantes entrevistados, sin embargo, esta construcción frentista (es decir, en tanto “Frente Patria para Todos”), no constituyó el inicio de un itinerario de cooperación y articulación en tanto miembros del mismo sector

–las denominadas “organizaciones sociales”– dentro del conjunto oficialista, con la excepción de distintas apariciones públicas conjuntas de sus máximos referentes.

¿A qué respondía ese esquema de difícil y escasa vinculación cotidiana entre las organizaciones, e incluso de, en ocasiones, ignorarse mutuamente en el territorio? Podríamos advertir diferencias entre estas organizaciones en términos de formas de construcción política y territorial y de dinámicas internas de funcionamiento: más semejantes a las de un partido organizado y centralizado (Libres del Sur)<sup>9</sup>; más descentralizadas entre las distintas ramas regionales y con un modo de acumulación organizativa sin pautas claras (Movimiento Evita)<sup>9</sup>; o con componentes delegativos, más dependientes de un liderazgo dentro del movimiento (FTV<sup>10</sup> y Frente Transversal<sup>11</sup>).<sup>12</sup> Pero la lógica de escaso vínculo horizontal que caracterizaba la coexistencia entre estas distintas organizaciones, todas integradas al oficialismo, podía comprenderse teniendo en cuenta un escenario más amplio: la propia forma de construcción de una base política propia del entonces presidente Kirchner, que establecería vínculos directos (radiales) con dirigentes y personalidades políticas que podían ser o no los más representativos de una organización o sello partidario. Se trataba de una estrategia de suma de voluntades heterogéneas en torno al presidente sin una construcción de vínculos horizontales, que se observaría con claridad en las elecciones de 2007. Las elecciones legislativas previas, dos años antes, en 2005, por otro lado, habían constituido para las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas un momento de especial importancia, tanto en términos de la disputa que esos comicios ponían en escena como en cuanto a su propio lugar dentro del conjunto oficialista. Aquellos comicios fueron el escenario de la rivalidad entre Kirchner y Duhalde por el poder bonaerense, con sus respectivas esposas a la cabeza de las listas de senadores/as por la provincia de Buenos Aires. En esa coyuntura, que las organizaciones sociales leyeron como una disputa crucial con sectores tradicionales del PJ, esas organizaciones reforzaron políticamente su pertenencia al oficialismo. Las organizaciones sociales oficialistas tuvieron en aquella ocasión una presencia novedosa en las listas legislativas provinciales del Frente para la Victoria, sello electoral del oficialismo, y una suerte más variada en su intento de integrar listas legislativas locales en los distintos municipios de la provincia de Buenos Aires.<sup>13</sup>

Las elecciones de 2007 tuvieron características diferentes a las de 2005, especialmente por la habilitación, en la provincia de Buenos Aires, de numerosas listas colectoras –diferentes listas en cada distrito, en mutua competencia, que obtenían el permiso para llevar como boleta presidencial la de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Esta operación le permitió a Fernández de Kirchner, impulsada por el presidente, sumar, para su candidatura, distintas opciones locales en el distrito más importante del país, que representa más de un tercio del electorado nacional.

Es en esos comicios de 2007 que –a través de fuentes periodísticas, documentos de las organizaciones y el relato de los propios entrevistados– podría argumentarse que las cuatro organizaciones sociales en cuestión exhibieron estrategias de construcción electoral muy diferentes y no coordinadas. La confrontación pública con algunos intendentes del conurbano que eran apoyados por Kirchner fue el camino escogido

por Libres del Sur –paralelamente al apoyo activo a otros candidatos kirchneristas en esos distritos. El intento de integración de algunas listas oficialistas locales y mantenerse al margen de otras pero sin antagonizar fue la estrategia ensayada por la FTV y el Frente Transversal. Finalmente, el Movimiento Evita optó por amalgamarse más explícitamente con algunos de los intendentes oficialistas (kirchneristas) a los que Libres del Sur cuestionaba (Sergio Villordo, en Quilmes; Baldomero Álvarez de Olivera, en Avellaneda, entre otros), bajo el supuesto de que esas alianzas eran estratégicas para ingresar a las estructuras estatales y construir así más “poder popular”<sup>14</sup>.

Las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas, entonces, asumieron diferentes patrones de acción de cara a las elecciones nacionales de 2007, en un contexto de desplazamiento parcial de su gravitación en las listas nacionales y provinciales respecto de las elecciones de 2005, y en el que ya comenzaba a observarse lo que luego sería, en el gobierno de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, una pérdida parcial de su presencia institucional dentro del Estado tanto a nivel nacional como provincial, por ejemplo, en la coordinación de programas sociales y educativos.<sup>15</sup>

Las cuatro organizaciones sociales que ha tomado el trabajo se mantuvieron dentro del oficialismo y considerándose como parte del mismo durante todo el gobierno de Néstor Kirchner. Recién en 2008, durante el gobierno de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, y poco después de la culminación del conflicto por las retenciones móviles,<sup>16</sup> Libres del Sur anunciaría su salida del gobierno. La decisión había sido precedida por un proceso de profundización de sus críticas, en las que la organización argumentaba una “pejotización del oficialismo”.

Pasemos al caso brasilero, y a los orígenes de la relación entre el Movimiento Sin Tierra (MST) y el PT, y a los avatares que sufrió esa relación con la llegada de Lula al poder.

## 2.2. Brasil

En primer lugar, cabe aclarar que he seleccionado sólo una organización social en Brasil dado que se trataba de la organización social de mayores dimensiones en el país, y que dado su carácter, era posible de ser comparada con las escogidas en Argentina.

El MST ha despertado un intenso interés académico en términos de su vasta trayectoria.<sup>17</sup> El *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (denominación oficial) o, como comúnmente fue denominado, el Movimiento sin Tierra (MST), ha tenido diversas influencias ideológicas, desde el cristianismo tercermundista, a través del trabajo de las comunidades eclesiales de base (CEB)- hasta el marxismo. Se concibe, a su vez, como portador de la memoria colectiva de distintas luchas históricas por la tierra en Brasil (Santos, 2006), como las encabezadas por las Ligas Campesinas, de las que se considera heredero y que sostenían la necesidad de una reforma agraria radical (Piñeiro, 2004). La metodología histórica de ocupaciones de tierras por parte del MST



es acompañada por el posterior sostenimiento de campamentos en esos espacios, a veces durante años, esperando a que el Estado formalice la expropiación de esas haciendas, consideradas improductivas, de modo de poder instalarse allí definitivamente, momento en el que el campamento se convierte en asentamiento y en un espacio de producción.

Ahora bien, ¿por qué incluir al MST como organización dentro del oficialismo aun teniendo en cuenta que sus direcciones estatales y nacionales no se autodefinían precisamente como oficialistas, algo que sí ocurría con las organizaciones sociales tomadas para Argentina? Después de todo, se trata de un movimiento que se ha propuesto a través de los años, como vimos, la necesidad de sostener una absoluta autonomía respecto de los gobiernos y de partidos políticos, y ha esgrimido duras críticas públicas frente al gobierno de Lula en particular. Esa reivindicación de autonomía ha sido ya relevada por numerosos estudios académicos (Vergara-Camus, 2006; Santos, 2006; Marques, 2006; Bringel, 2006, Comelli *et al.*, 2005), y es un aspecto que ha sido resaltado con notable insistencia por los dirigentes del movimiento. Entonces, ¿qué podría justificar la decisión de incluir a esta organización dentro del conjunto oficialista detrás del liderazgo de Lula? La respuesta a este interrogante radica en el vínculo histórico entre el MST y el PT, por un lado, y en determinadas actitudes del MST hacia Lula una vez que éste se convirtió en presidente, por otro. Todo ello da cuenta, asimismo, de aquello que describe este apartado, la historia de la relación entre Lula y el MST.

En primer lugar, el vínculo del MST con el *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT), dirigido por Lula, hunde sus raíces en la misma fundación del Movimiento Sin Tierra, en 1984, fundación en la que el PT participó activamente, junto con otras organizaciones como la Comisión Pastoral de Tierra (CPT).<sup>18</sup> Desde 1989, asimismo, el MST brindó apoyo militante a las sucesivas campañas electorales del PT y a la candidatura presidencial de Lula. Sader (2005) afirma que el MST encontraba en el PT, antes de la llegada de éste al poder, su principal interlocutor político.<sup>19</sup> Para Santos (2006), asimismo, era la tensión permanente en el seno del PT entre posiciones más moderadas, que privilegiaban acciones en torno a la disputa electoral, y posiciones más radicales, que priorizaban aquellas centradas en la consolidación de los movimientos de acción popular, la que habría entrelazado en el tiempo al PT y al MST, aunque no a través de un vínculo orgánico formal. Con el crecimiento electoral del PT, algunos de los miembros del MST ocuparían cargos en los gobiernos estatales conquistados por el partido, como en Río Grande do Sul, con el gobernador Olívio Dutra (1998-2002), que aumentó el peso de los recursos destinados a la aceleración de los procesos de expropiación legal de las tierras.

En segundo lugar, el triunfo electoral de Lula en las elecciones presidenciales de 2002 portaba un alto simbolismo para el MST, ya que se trataba de un ex delegado sindical metalúrgico, de familia pobre, nordestino, y, especialmente, de un líder político que los había apoyado y reivindicado durante todos esos años, tanto frente a la dictadura (1964-1985) como a los sucesivos gobiernos que los reprimieron. Era la llegada al poder, en palabras de la dirigencia del MST, de un *amigo dos sem terra*,

con la consiguiente esperanza de un eventual salto cualitativo en la reforma agraria reclamada durante tanto tiempo. Y, con esa esperanza, el MST participó activamente de la campaña electoral. El gobierno de Lula significaría para el MST, por otro lado, facilidades de crédito y subsidios para la producción en los asentamientos, el apoyo a los programas educativos.

En tercer lugar, hay dos momentos del período observado (período que va de 2002 a 2006, es decir, primer gobierno de Lula desde su elección), incluso, en los que el MST se posicionaría públicamente defendiendo al gobierno de Lula. Ambos momentos fueron leídos por parte de la dirigencia del MST como amenazantes para la continuidad del presidente y como escenarios que abrían la posibilidad de un retorno del Partido Social Demócrata Brasileiro (PSDB) al poder, fuerza política que para el movimiento encarnaba una sistemática estrategia de represión y persecución de los sin tierra.<sup>20</sup> Uno de esos momentos fue el proceso inaugurado por las denuncias de corrupción contra el PT (por los fenómenos denominados como *Mensalão* y *Caixa Dois*) en 2005, que incluyó anuncios por parte de la oposición de que se intentaría impulsar un juicio político al propio presidente. En esa coyuntura, el MST llamó a defender al gobierno de la amenaza desestabilizadora.<sup>21</sup> La dirigencia del MST resolvió nuevamente llamar a un apoyo activo y militante al gobierno en la campaña por el *ballotage* en 2006, luego de que Lula no obtuviese un caudal de votos suficiente para ganar la elección presidencial (por un segundo mandato) en primera vuelta frente al candidato del PSDB, Geraldo Alckmin. Se trataba, según ellos mismos explicaban en las entrevistas, de un apoyo estratégico, bajo la noción de que un gobierno del PSDB traería aparejado un escenario aún más difícil para los movimientos sociales y los sectores más pobres de la población.

La misma dirigencia del MST enfrentaba, según sus propios miembros, dos imputaciones bien diferentes: desde los sectores más orgánicamente vinculados al gobierno, se esgrimía el mote de “radicalizados” para caracterizarlos, mientras que desde organizaciones y partidos opositores al gobierno se los denominaba *governistas* (oficialistas, en portugués).

En síntesis, aunque exhibía un nivel de autonomía y un volumen de críticas al gobierno de Lula mayor que el resto de las organizaciones que he considerado –en la investigación más amplia en la que se enmarca esta ponencia– como parte del oficialismo brasileiro, el MST se percibía a sí mismo como una suerte de aliado histórico que, precisamente por la trayectoria recorrida al lado del PT, consideraba tener la legitimidad moral necesaria para poder esgrimir duros cuestionamientos a la política económica y a la composición de la base oficialista. También para continuar movilizándose por la reforma agraria (e incluso aumentar el número de las ocupaciones):<sup>22</sup> luego de un primer año de “tregua”<sup>23</sup> desde la victoria de Lula en su primera elección en 2002 (Branford, 2006: 56), los Sin Tierra retomaron con intensidad las ocupaciones y la movilización. La relación del MST con el gobierno de Lula, entonces, se caracterizaría por una combinación entre esos lazos históricos y una desilusión respecto del gobierno que llevaba a continuar con la movilización. A fines de 2004, dos de los líderes del MST afirmaban, en ese sentido:

*"Consideramos al compañero Lula un amigo de nuestro movimiento, pero no hay avances sin luchas [...] Hasta ahora la política económica es igual a la del gobierno neoliberal de FHC [...] Lula y Cardoso no son iguales. El gobierno actual ha tendido puentes de diálogo hacia el MST, oye nuestros reclamos, nunca ha ordenado reprimirnos. Cardoso era enemigo del movimiento, ordenó que se nos reprima y se nos persiga"* (Entrevista a Jaime Amorín y Walquimar Reis, Página 12, 29/12/04).

Y concluyendo ya 2006, se señalaba desde la Dirección Nacional del MST,

*"El gobierno de FHC [...] trataba la cuestión agraria y a los trabajadores sin tierra como un caso policial. [...] El gobierno de Lula tiene más sensibilidad y comprende la importancia histórica de la lucha por la reforma agraria del MST. Tanto que nos recibieron y nos invitaron a participar de Consejos para discutir el hambre en el país. Ésa es una diferencia fundamental, que no va a acabar con el latifundio, pero que ayuda a los movimientos sociales"* (Entrevista a Marina Dos Santos, de la Coordinación Nacional del MST, [www.mst.org.ar](http://www.mst.org.ar), 13/12/06).

### **3. Identidades y definiciones de pertenencia al oficialismo en las organizaciones sociales**

Esta sección se estructurará en torno a dos ejes. En primer lugar, se analizarán las modalidades de presencia de las identidades peronista y petista al interior de las organizaciones sociales. En segundo lugar, se observarán contrastes entre identidades que podríamos denominar "parciales" dentro de ambos oficialismos, el de Lula y el de Kirchner. Y serán examinadas, a partir de ese contraste, las diferentes implicancias de la pertenencia al oficialismo en las organizaciones sociales a través de la ubicación del "nosotros" en relación con el gobierno.

#### **3.1. La identidad peronista y la petista dentro de las organizaciones sociales oficialistas**

¿Qué presencia tenían la identidad petista y peronista al interior de las organizaciones sociales y centrales sindicales oficialistas durante los gobiernos de Lula y Kirchner?  
¿Asumían estas identidades las mismas características en las distintas organizaciones? Veamos primero el caso argentino.

##### **3.1.a. Argentina**

En Argentina, la identidad peronista no jugaba del mismo modo en las distintas organizaciones sociales kirchneristas.

En Barrios de Pie/Libres del Sur, aunque no se desconocía la experiencia peronista como símbolo gravitante en la identidad política de los argentinos, se pretendía, de algún modo, superarla y se planteaba la disputa más crucial en torno a la “vieja política” encarnada en el “PJ tradicional”. Así lo manifestaba Santiago, afirmando que ellos no querían volver al peronismo, que querían construir un movimiento superador, con distintos sectores, que no quedara acotado al peronismo (Entrevista con Santiago, dirigente local de Barrios de Pie. Oeste del conurbano).

De todos modos, la asociación o apelación a la identidad peronista aparecía para todas las organizaciones sociales oficialistas como algo ineludible en última instancia. Incluso para Barrios de Pie, que tomaba a Perón y Evita como símbolos –aunque no de manera central, y siempre junto con otros como el Che Guevara y el padre Mujica–, en su propia modalidad de construcción territorial, según contaba Ramiro (Entrevista con Ramiro, funcionario municipal y militante de Barrios de Pie/Libres del Sur en el sudoeste del conurbano bonaerense). Y que en algunos distritos tendía lazos hacia organizaciones territoriales peronistas (“agrupaciones”) disidentes en ese momento de los gobiernos locales a los que Barrios del Sur se oponía.

Dentro de las organizaciones –tanto las organizaciones sociales como las centrales sindicales– que se reivindicaban explícitamente peronistas o con alguna influencia de esta identidad en el presente, por otro lado, aparecía una acepción del “ser peronista” diferente de la pertenencia partidaria. Una identidad que aparecía en los entrevistados como algo irreductible al PJ como organización, como mucho más amplia y trascendente a la estructura partidaria y pasible de ser disociada de las estructuras y redes del partido. Aunque con matices, era esa noción la que sobrevolaba en las entrevistas a miembros de las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas. Se trataba de una acepción muy diferente a la que predominaba en actores que no han sido analizados aquí, como el Partido Justicialista (PJ) y la Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT). En estas últimas, tan sólo a modo de contraste con las organizaciones que sí analiza esta ponencia, “ser peronista” se traducía en una identidad directamente pensada en asociación con el Partido Justicialista, con el “peronismo organizado”, y que, al igual que en el espacio partidario, era reivindicada por entrevistados que mostraban cierta disconformidad por el estado de impasse en el que Kirchner había mantenido al PJ durante todo su gobierno.

Ambas acepciones de lo que ser peronista implicaba constituían, en la práctica, dos identidades parciales diferentes, dado que reivindicaban, por ejemplo, significados e implicancias distintas en torno a la representación política y a forma en que se concebía una identidad política, si como partidaria o pasible de transcurrir y desarrollarse por fuera de una organización de ese carácter.

Las palabras de Ramiro ilustraban aquella primera noción, tan presente en los entrevistados de las organizaciones sociales (y de la transversalidad kirchnerista, un espacio político inorgánico que nunca terminó de estructurarse como una fuerza de apoyo a Kirchner pero que incluía a dirigentes muy diversos que no formaban parte del PJ y que se habían sentido atraídos por la convocatoria del presidente Kirchner a

formar parte del gobierno), de una identidad peronista no partidaria. Cabe aclarar que Ramiro pertenecía a Barrios de Pie/Libres del Sur pero explicaba, a lo largo de la entrevista, que él provenía del peronismo, a diferencia de muchos de sus compañeros, y que se asociaba a esa identidad más que otros entrevistados de la propia organización (y que sus propios documentos públicos):

Ramiro: *"Desde ahí nosotros arrancamos. En los noventa, resistiendo, como muy jóvenes, nosotros siempre decimos, nosotros nos identificamos, históricamente con estos movimientos nacionales, identificando al peronismo como una de las herramientas, esto también es un poco personal mío. Porque en esta corriente confluimos compañeros de distintas... visiones, algunos más peronistas, otros menos, pero, yo lo que identifico es el peronismo como la gran fuerza de transformación nacional, con arraigo popular, y bueno, con por lo menos la lectura del proceso nacional más acorde a lo que yo pienso, digamos. Lo que pasa, que bueno, yo siempre le digo a los compañeros, en las reuniones, o en ámbitos, a los compañeros más grandes, yo en el '95 no podía sumarme al Partido Justicialista. Yo me siento peronista, quizás hasta la médula, pero no me podía sumar al Partido Justicialista. El Partido Justicialista era, en los noventa, el que estaba llevando adelante el proceso de destrucción, de miseria y de hambre más terrible que sufrimos en nuestra historia, digamos. Entonces, después está el otro tema, de que una cosa es el peronismo y otra cosa es el PJ, ¿no? Pero nosotros nos sumamos a una agrupación [Patria Libre, partido que organizó a Barrios de Pie] que no se identificaba peronista, pero que confluían un montón de compañeros con la idea de resistir al neoliberalismo. Resistir al neoliberalismo era el elemento unificador".* (Entrevista con Ramiro, funcionario municipal y militante de Barrios de Pie/Libres del Sur en el sudoeste del conurbano bonaerense)

Desde la FTV, por otro lado, a la vez que se reconocía en su composición la presencia de muchos integrantes provenientes "del peronismo más rastrero" (Entrevista N° 28 en Argentina. Lorenzo, dirigente de la FTV a nivel nacional), se sostenía paralelamente aquella diferenciación entre ambas acepciones del ser peronista. Así lo resumía Jesús:

Jesús: *"Yo digo, si miro el pueblo, y hablo con el pueblo, el pueblo es peronista. En general, después hay... pero en su mayoría, 70 u 80% son peronistas. Ahora, no son del PJ. Nosotros qué decimos, que la crisis del 2001 se veía en los partidos, en la partidocracia".* (Entrevista con Jesús, legislador, dirigente de la FTV y ex dirigente en CTA. Oeste del conurbano bonaerense)

Edgardo Depetri<sup>24</sup>, que provenía, él mismo, del peronismo "por descendencia familiar", y que había militado en una Unidad Básica del PJ en Río Turbio, reconocía que en su propia organización, el Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular, la identidad peronista era predominante, pero, nuevamente, no era una identidad partidaria, una identidad asociada al peronismo como estructura partidaria:

Depetri: *“Yo creo que en la dirigencia nacional [del Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular] es más fuerte el peronismo que... y en las bases más todavía [...] La mayoría viene del peronismo. Muchos compañeros que vienen de la izquierda, de la experiencia de izquierda o que han pasado por el FREPASO, pero en general, la mayoría de los dirigentes vienen del peronismo. Incluso en la CTA la mayoría son del peronismo. [...] Lo que me parece es que en nosotros hay una concepción de que el peronismo no es el PJ. [...] el PJ está muy, para la militancia nuestra, está muy ubicado en la negociación meramente electoral, o en algún negocio, o en la construcción en función de aparatos. No de debate de ideas ni de proyecto ni de recuperar nuevas formas de representación en todos los órdenes que nosotros planteamos”.* (Entrevista con Edgardo Depetri, líder del Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular y ex dirigente de la CTA).

En el Movimiento Evita, por otro lado, no sólo estaba la idea de que la organización era mayoritariamente peronista en sus bases (o de que se había convertido en peronista al ingresar al movimiento), sino que los principales símbolos reivindicados eran los del peronismo histórico, aunque con un énfasis particular en la izquierda peronista de los años setenta, con la imagen, paradigmática de aquella, de la “Evita Montonera”, un Evita muy joven y con su cabello suelto (Natalucci, 2008a:123). El relato de Emilio Pérsico sobre su propia adopción personal del peronismo como identidad política refería a ese período: “El peronismo empoderó a la clase obrera. Por eso evaluamos en los setenta que teníamos que meternos en el peronismo” (Notas de campo. Emilio Pérsico, Charla de Cierre “I Congreso Nacional Protesta Social, Acción Colectiva y Movimientos Sociales”, 31/3/2009). Pérsico asumía, en su relato, como propia, la experiencia de los jóvenes que se unieron a organizaciones armadas peronistas (FAP, FAR, Montoneros) a partir de la evaluación de que la mayoría de los sectores populares argentinos eran peronistas y de que un proyecto revolucionario debía, entonces, partir de esa apelación identitaria. Esto nos conduce a un punto vinculado a la presencia de la identidad peronista en el oficialismo kirchnerista: la relación simbólica con la izquierda peronista de los años setenta. Era en el Movimiento Evita donde esa relación simbólica con la izquierda peronista de la década del setenta se observaba con mayor intensidad. “La Gloriosa” (JP Evita, 2008), documento de formación de la juventud del Movimiento Evita, lo ilustraba con claridad.

“La Gloriosa” contaba, de modo sintético, la historia de la Juventud Peronista, desde sus inicios al calor de la resistencia peronista clandestina posterior al golpe de 1955, hasta la campaña “Luche y Vuelve” de 1972, concebida para forzar el retorno de J.D. Perón del exilio. El documento comenzaba con una larga cita del propio Perón en su mensaje “A los compañeros de la Juventud”, el 23/2/1971. Es decir, el documento escogía pensar la JP a partir de su momento de mayor fuerza y también en torno a un período exento de las posteriores tensiones entre Perón y Montoneros, tensiones que derivaron en los episodios de la Plaza de Mayo el 1º de mayo de 1974. -la jornada en la que las tensiones entre Perón y Montoneros estallaron en ruptura, y jornada a la que Kirchner se refería sin explicitarlo para construir su apelación política el 25 de mayo de 2006, en el acto aclamatorio que el gobierno había organizado en la Plaza de Mayo, el mismo lugar de 1974, para celebrar el tercer aniversario de la asunción del presidente. Kirchner decía en ese discurso:

*"Compañeros y compañeras, argentinos y argentinas...Y al final, un día volvimos a la gloriosa Plaza de Mayo a hacer presente al pueblo argentino en toda su diversidad. ¡Hace 33 años yo estaba ahí abajo [se refiere al día de asunción de Cámpora, cuyo gobierno constituyó el momento de auge de Montoneros en la relación de fuerzas al interior del peronismo]!. El 25 de mayo de 1973, como hoy, creyendo y jugándome por mis convicciones de que un nuevo país comenzaba. Y en estos miles de rostros veo los rostros de los 30.000 compañeros desaparecidos"* (Discurso de Néstor Kirchner, 25/05/06, Plaza de Mayo. Resaltado propio).

Aunque Kirchner hacía referencia al 25 de mayo de 1973, a la asunción de Héctor Cámpora como presidente, su "volvimos" tenía ecos del 1º de mayo de 1974. De ese modo, entonces Kirchner movilizaba, en su apelación al conjunto oficialista, presente en su totalidad en esa plaza de 2006, símbolos (el propio "Volvimos" y la figura de Cámpora) asociados a una parte específica del peronismo, es decir, a los que luego recibieron la denominación de "setentistas". Por supuesto, los símbolos que había movilizado Kirchner en ese acto no eran los mismos que aparecían en los entrevistados de otros grupos y organizaciones dentro del oficialismo kirchnerista más allá del Movimiento Evita (los PJ locales, la CGT, etc.)

La identidad peronista, por lo tanto, era operante en las distintas organizaciones sociales kirchneristas, aunque en diferentes modalidades –todas ellas, sin embargo, disociando la identidad peronista portada del Partido Justicialista–, y asimismo, se observaba una mayor intensidad en el Movimiento Evita.

### 3.1.b. Brasil

En lo que respecta al MST en Brasil, distintos entrevistados resaltaban una presencia significativa de la identidad petista al interior del movimiento Sin Tierra, tanto de militantes petistas como, en mayor medida, de una base del MST que votaba a Lula. João, del PT, y Guido, de la CUT (aunque refiriéndose al MST), por ejemplo, decían:

João: *"También hay mucha diversidad dentro del MST. La impresión que da a veces, por ejemplo, es que la base del MST es todo PT y Lula, que les gusta mucho Lula. Y después la dirección más intermedia está muy en contra, y que la nacional..."*

Dolores: *"¿Vos llamas intermedia a las direcciones de cada estado?"*

João: *"Sí, a las estaduais. Y la dirección nacional es como la más equilibrada entre los dos [bases y direcciones de cada estado]"*.

(Entrevista con João, militante del PT de San Pablo).

Guido: *"Todos los del MST siempre, en algún momento de su vida fueron militantes del PT"*.

Dolores: *"¿Los líderes, decís?"*

Guido: *"Sí, ahora ya un poco menos los más jóvenes, pero los más viejos sí."*

*Todos, todos. Inclusive hoy muchos lo son*.  
 (Entrevista con Guido, asesor de la CUT en San Pablo)

Sin embargo, hablar de identidad petista no era una idea absolutamente unívoca dado que, por un lado, el partido tenía una trayectoria de corrientes internas sostenidas en el tiempo, que representaban proyectos muy diferentes y aún así coexistían dentro de la misma estructura partidaria. Y por otro lado, no se trataba de una idea con un solo sentido porque el PT había experimentado transformaciones sustantivas sobre modalidad organizativa y también sobre su perfil identitario, que hacían que muchos se preguntaran qué era realmente el PT durante el gobierno de Lula. Es decir, las interpretaciones de los entrevistados del MST sobre las transformaciones del PT desde los años noventa no diferían de las de los propios petistas (moderación programática, reformas organizativas que diluían el peso de los militantes y de los dirigentes intermedios frente al afiliado común y a los legisladores de distintos niveles vinculados al PT, metamorfosis en la composición de los afiliados y militantes, etc.) incluyendo entre sus repercusiones la pérdida del partido de vida organizativa de base, y el haber quedado desdibujada la identidad petista, asumiéndose incluso como más “light” (Entrevista con Tadeu, militante de Consulta Popular en San Pablo).

Entonces, la identidad petista parecía tener una presencia considerable en el MST sin ser la única identidad presente en sus miembros. Y la marcada diversidad interna del PT en términos ideológicos y las transformaciones programáticas que había sufrido con los años hacían que esa identidad petista presente en el MST no fuera uniforme en su carácter.

### **3.2. Identidades parciales al interior del oficialismo y definiciones de pertenencia en las organizaciones sociales**

Observando los oficialismos de Kirchner y el de Lula como un conjunto de organizaciones, espacios, dirigentes, puede advertirse en cada uno de ellos la ausencia de una identidad compartida y la coexistencia de distintas identidades parciales –parciales en tanto no aglutinaban o representaban a todos los actores dentro del conjunto– que en algunos casos se asemejaban más o podían coexistir sin tensión, mientras que en otros portaban elementos antagónicos. Es decir, podría esbozarse el diagnóstico de una diversidad de actores oficialistas que devenía conflictiva, que era portadora de tensiones insalvables entre las tradiciones, trayectorias y hasta en los vínculos que esos actores establecían con el gobierno y el presidente. Al afirmar la ausencia de una identidad compartida me refiero a dos conjuntos oficialistas en los que el presidente no había instituido una identidad que fuera operante para todos los actores dentro de esos conglomerados (organizaciones sociales, centrales sindicales, distintos actores del espacio partidario aliados al gobierno).

Dado que esta ponencia no estudia los oficialismos como conjuntos sino sólo un sector dentro de los mismos, las organizaciones sociales, se evitará una inmersión más detallada en aquel argumento, que ha sido desarrollado en trabajos previos (Rocca



Rivarola, 2010). Sin embargo, tomando a las organizaciones que esta ponencia sí analiza, podríamos establecer un contraste entre la identidad portada por estos sectores como parte del oficialismo en ambos países.

En Argentina, en las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas, podríamos argumentar la existencia de una identidad (aunque parcial) vinculada a Kirchner a través de un vínculo forjado en la misma coyuntura de gobierno, con posterioridad a la asunción, es decir "a partir de" las medidas o rumbo del gobierno. Y la proliferación de apelaciones que no se centraban en la trayectoria del líder o de su partido de origen sino en un discurso inaugurado a partir de su asunción como presidente. Incluso eso implicaba que algunas de estas organizaciones (el Frente Transversal y el Movimiento Evita) surgieran como tales ya durante el gobierno de Kirchner, para sustentarlo y "consolidarlo".

En Brasil, la identidad parcial vinculada a Lula y autoconcebida como compuesta por actores más nucleares, más leales al gobierno (incluyendo aquí al MST), se presentaba como una identidad vinculada a Lula a través de un lazo y trayectoria históricos, de lucha social y sindical común, un lazo tensado, aunque no roto, por el rumbo asumido por el gobierno. Las apelaciones que definían ese lazo con la CUT y con el MST tenían, a diferencia del caso argentino, mucho más que ver con el perfil biográfico del presidente (sindicalista, pobre, nordestino, de izquierda). Y aunque se presentaba ese perfil personal, esas apelaciones que definían, en las entrevistas, el lazo con el gobierno, estaban planteadas en términos de las organizaciones de pertenencia de los actores y del propio Lula. Es decir, en torno a la CUT, el MST, y el PT (aunque no todos fueran petistas, sostenían un vínculo con el partido) y no solamente a la figura de Lula. En torno a un partido cuya fundación, como ya hemos visto, se inscribía en un proceso general que había incluido la fundación de otras dos organizaciones, la CUT y el MST.

Esas dos identidades parciales tenían correlatos diferentes en las definiciones de pertenencia. En otros términos, los significados e implicancias de la pertenencia en las organizaciones sociales exhibían una diversidad muy marcada (significados diferentes de lo que ser oficialista implicaba o suponía para la propia organización o actor individual). Esas diferencias podían hallarse, por ejemplo, en cómo los entrevistados identificaban el "nosotros" en relación con el gobierno.

En algunas de las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas, en Argentina, a pesar de una clara pertenencia al oficialismo, se observaba una pertenencia primaria a la propia organización –era de ella que los entrevistados de las organizaciones sociales se consideraban más "orgánicos". Y esa pertenencia primaria a la propia organización se presentaba más marcada en Libres del Sur y en la FTV que en el Movimiento Evita y el Frente Transversal. Pero todos se consideraban explícitamente parte del gobierno. En ese sentido es que Sandra, de Barrios de Pie, decía que ellos estaban "adentro" (Entrevista N ° 29 en Argentina. Sandra, militante de Barrios de Pie/Libres del Sur. Ciudad de Buenos Aires); y Santiago, de la misma organización, afirmaba "A comienzos del 2004 nos incorporamos al gobierno, somos parte del gobierno" (Entrevista N ° 7. Santiago, dirigente local de Barrios de Pie. Oeste del conurbano). O que Jesús, al describir la diversidad dentro del oficialismo, postulaba a la FTV, por

contraste con otros actores oficialistas, como la organización que estaba presente en los momentos clave defendiendo al gobierno:

Jesús: *“Dentro del oficialismo hay de todo. Hay los obsecuentes, que dicen todo que sí, que sí, que sí. Hay otros que, no sé si son oficialistas, porque se dicen oficialistas pero después a la hora de los bifés no los ves”*. (Entrevista con Jesús, legislador, dirigente de la FTV y ex dirigente en CTA. Oeste del conurbano bonaerense)

Depetri, del Frente Transversal, por su parte, tenía un marcado “nosotros”: el gobierno. Incluso se advertía en él un uso frecuente de la primera persona plural para referirse a lo que el gobierno había hecho o dejado de hacer (distinguiéndose así de los entrevistados de Libres del Sur, que hablaban del gobierno en tercera persona). Así, el dirigente postulaba un “nosotros” que trascendía a su propia organización, y que incluía al presidente:

Depetri: *“Yo explico, siempre trato de explicarles. El proyecto, la rentabilidad del modelo, el giro económico, explico las líneas centrales del gobierno. Tampoco niego que faltan cosas ni digo que **no hemos hecho mal las cosas**. Pero es parte de la vida. O sea, en la vida personal de uno tiene cosas buenas, cosas más o menos, que después se arrepiente”*. (Entrevista con Edgardo Depetri, líder del Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular y ex dirigente de la CTA. Resaltado propio).

*“No nos van a perdonar que hayamos derrotado al ALCA [...] o que hayamos metido presos a los genocidas del Proceso militar”*. (Notas de campo. Discurso de Edgardo Depetri en acto del Frente Transversal y otras organizaciones kirchneristas en el Luna Park. Ciudad de Buenos Aires. 27/04/09).

En el MST, el “nosotros” no incluía, de ningún modo, al gobierno, que era visto como un actor separado y que, según consideraban los Sin Tierra, no podía escapar a la lógica del sistema económico y de los intereses de distintos grupos, como el *agronegocio*, que el MST se proponía combatir. Pero el “apoyo crítico” al gobierno de Lula era una forma –aunque bien distinta a la de las demás organizaciones– de pertenecer al oficialismo. No se consideraban parte del gobierno, pero tampoco se consideraban oposición. Principalmente, el núcleo de las reflexiones de dirigentes del MST sobre su relación con el gobierno Lula procuraba situar al movimiento más allá del problema de la pertenencia o no al oficialismo. Es decir, postulaban la cuestión de esa relación como secundaria, siendo lo fundamental su lucha por la tierra y contra el *agronegocio*. Y, por ello, la insistente noción entre los entrevistados de que todos intentaban caratularlos (como oficialistas, o incluso *pelegos*, o bien como oposición) y de que ellos se sentían incómodos ante esa dicotomía, que les parecía algo marginal, sin tanta importancia como su propia lucha por sus objetivos como organización:

Tadeu: *“Nosotros, de Brasil de Fato [periódico vinculado a Consulta Popular], que es un portavoz de nuestra línea política, en las elecciones publicamos una*

*editorial y una tapa a favor de Lula, apoyándolo. Y fuimos acusados de oficialistas [governistas]. ...] Nosotros dividimos a la izquierda en tres campos. Campo 1: los movimientos deben sustentar al gobierno de Lula. Campo 2: los movimientos de la izquierda y los militantes harían oposición, ahí en el mismo nivel. Campo 3, que somos nosotros, nosotros no nos pautamos por el gobierno. Lo que sea bueno, lo vamos a apoyar. [...] Lula tiene un 64% de aprobación. Para nosotros es una estupidez decir "ese tipo es un ladrón, un traidor", porque el 64% de la población no piensa eso. Entonces quienes nos llamaron oficialistas rompieron con el periódico". (Entrevista con Tadeu, militante de Consulta Popular en San Pablo en San Pablo)*

*Manuela: "Hay un problema, vamos a hablar de la izquierda. ¿Qué pasa hoy? La izquierda hoy continúa todavía muy fragmentada. Hace unos diez años hay un esfuerzo muy grande de algunos sectores, y nosotros también, de construir luchas unitarias, pero hay muchas divergencias. Una de las mayores divergencias que hay hoy es que hay un bloque de los oficialistas, y un bloque de los no oficialistas, y que se quedan diciendo "vamos a hablar mal del gobierno", "vamos a hablar bien del gobierno", hablan bien, hablan mal. Para nosotros ése no es el punto central. Nuestro enemigo no es el gobierno, es el capital". (Entrevista con Manuela, militante del MST en Río de Janeiro)*

Una diferencia con las organizaciones sociales argentinas era que los entrevistados del MST negaban compartir con el gobierno un modelo o sus propósitos fundamentales. Pero reconocían igualmente al gobierno de Lula como aquel que les había dado una voz: "Por primera vez nosotros estamos consiguiendo a través de un presidente tener un poco de presencia y voz en este país" (Gilmar Mauro, entrevista en Solidaridad para el Desarrollo y La Paz, 2005. [www.sodepaz.org](http://www.sodepaz.org)). Defendían al gobierno de Lula en momentos clave en términos de su estabilidad y continuidad. Y concebían a las amenazas al gobierno (como el PSDB, por ejemplo) como amenazas contra el propio MST.

## 4. Conclusiones

Las conclusiones de esta ponencia constituyen un fragmento de una investigación que abordó los conjuntos de sustentación activa y organizada en torno a los presidentes Lula y Kirchner (oficialismos). Aquella investigación partía de un diagnóstico de transformaciones en las identidades políticas y en los formatos de representación (Manin, 1992; Pousadela y Cheresky, 2004; y otros). Con ello, el estudio se preguntaba de qué modo un contexto de identidades políticas fluctuantes, de partidos con menor capacidad de suscitar y configurar identidades partidarias duraderas en el electorado, y de liderazgos de popularidad que establecen una relación directa y sin mediaciones con la ciudadanía, inciden sobre el modo en que los miembros de los conjuntos oficialistas definen su propia pertenencia.

En esta ponencia se ha tomado a uno de los tres sectores (espacio partidario, centrales sindicales y organizaciones sociales) que la investigación delinea como parte

del oficialismo: las organizaciones sociales, y se han analizado en ellas tan sólo dos aspectos: la presencia de la identidad peronista y petista dentro de estas organizaciones (identidades de origen del presidente Kirchner y del presidente Lula); y diferentes significados e implicancias de la pertenencia al oficialismo que aparecían en estas organizaciones sociales (en sus miembros entrevistados, en los documentos publicados, las declaraciones públicas, sus estrategias en relación con el gobierno, etc.).

A lo largo de la ponencia se analizó, primero, el proceso mediante el cual las distintas organizaciones sociales estudiadas fueron estableciendo un vínculo con los gobiernos de N. Kirchner, en Argentina, y L. I. Lula da Silva, en Brasil. Fueron destacados así procesos diferenciados en Argentina (entre las distintas organizaciones), aunque con una clara estrategia desde el gobierno de integrar a esos sectores desde 2003, en un contexto de una base presidencial parlamentaria y partidaria débil y fluctuante pero en proceso de crecimiento. Y, en cambio, en Brasil, se observaba una trayectoria histórica común entre el PT y el MST, sumada a las expectativas despertadas por la llegada de Lula al poder.

Luego se ha descrito la conformación de un vínculo político muy intenso de las organizaciones sociales argentinas con el gobierno, mientras que en el MST se advierte una preocupación por resaltar la autonomía del movimiento respecto del gobierno, aunque con distintos episodios que mostraron un apoyo militante en momentos cruciales (amenaza de un eventual juicio político a Lula y segunda vuelta electoral en comicios presidenciales de 2006).

En cuanto a la incidencia de las identidades partidarias de origen de ambos presidentes en las organizaciones sociales, se ha argumentado aquí que esas identidades estaban presentes pero no de modo unívoco. En Brasil, la presencia de la identidad petista en el MST era significativa y, sin embargo, los significados de esa identidad ya no eran tan claros como antes de las múltiples transformaciones que el PT sufrió desde los años noventa. Y las pautas de autonomía que el movimiento se planteaba, por otro lado, hacían imposible poder asociar orgánicamente al MST con el PT. En Argentina todas las organizaciones sociales se mantenían por fuera del PJ y, sin embargo, la identidad peronista se encontraba ineludiblemente presente en sus idearios, declaraciones, documentos y testimonios (aunque con diferente intensidad y modalidad según la organización). Pero se trataba, cabe aclarar, de una identidad no partidaria e incluso explícitamente disociada del PJ como organización.

La cuestión de la pertenencia en sentido estricto (qué es pertenecer, quién es el nosotros)<sup>25</sup> exhibía algunos contrastes entre las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas y también entre éstas y el MST.

En Argentina, algunas de las organizaciones postulaban un “nosotros” inclusivo del gobierno mientras que otras mostraban un sentido de pertenencia primaria a la organización aunque también diciéndose parte del gobierno. En Brasil, en cambio, los militantes y dirigentes del MST portaban una preocupación insistente por no definir al MST en torno a su relación con el gobierno de Lula, por escapar a la dicotomía que,

decían, intentaba ubicar a todos los actores dentro del mismo o como activos opositores. Se ha argumentado, sin embargo, en esta ponencia que el "apoyo crítico" (tal como lo denominaba el propio MST) al gobierno de Lula era una forma de pertenecer al oficialismo –la única posible dada la trayectoria histórica y postulados programáticos del movimiento.

## Apéndice metodológico

El modo en que la investigación en la que esta ponencia se enmarca fue llevada a cabo involucra la noción de un conocimiento de naturaleza situada histórica, cultural, social e institucionalmente (Bryman, 2000; Meo, 2007). La propia pregunta de investigación y las técnicas de recolección de datos utilizadas –sobre todo, el uso de las entrevistas y, de modo complementario, el análisis de documentos– están fundadas en la perspectiva de investigación cualitativa, que ha sido ampliamente utilizada por distintos campos disciplinarios, como la sociología, la historia y la antropología, pero que no ha sido el enfoque metodológico predominante en la Ciencia Política. Concibiendo la investigación cualitativa como emergente, inductiva e interpretativa, el diseño ha tenido un carácter flexible (Maxwell, 1996), estando así en permanente construcción y reformulación, y suponiendo una interacción continua entre la teoría y lo observado/recolectado en el campo. Así, la realización y análisis de entrevistas han servido para reformular la propia pregunta de investigación y los objetivos específicos (Dey, 1993). Las entrevistas de carácter semi-estructurado (Denscombe, 1999; Kvale, 1996) a dirigentes, militantes y legisladores oficialistas han tenido en esta investigación un papel fundamental en tanto métodos de recolección de datos, siendo complementadas con el análisis de documentos elaborados por las propias organizaciones. Las entrevistas no fueron utilizadas para proveernos de datos objetivos del pasado o del presente, sino interpretaciones subjetivas, basadas en la propia perspectiva de los entrevistados, sobre sus comportamientos, sus experiencias y sus identidades en tanto miembros de organizaciones o espacios oficialistas. Iba a comprenderse con ellas el modo en que los entrevistados concebían determinados acontecimientos y procesos, el sentido que les daban, y ello era precisamente lo que se buscaba, dado que se estudiaban las definiciones de pertenencia de los actores dentro del oficialismo. Las entrevistas realizadas para esta investigación fueron de carácter semi-estructurado: consistían en una lista definida de temas que se pretendía fuesen tratados e incluso algunas preguntas ya tentativamente formuladas, pero con flexibilidad en términos del orden y también de los temas a tratar, en términos de poder permitir al entrevistado desarrollar ideas y nuevas cuestiones no concebidas originalmente en la guía (Denscombe, 1999: 113). La información recolectada a través de los distintos métodos mencionados derivó, además de las grabaciones y transcripciones de las entrevistas en su idioma original, en 13 cuadernos de trabajo de campo y de fichado bibliográfico ordenados de modo cronológico. Dentro de cada país tomado, las unidades de análisis no han sido individuos sino más bien organizaciones, redes y espacios de dirigentes y sus bases. A la hora de definir a los potenciales entrevistados, se optó por lo que Patton (2002) denomina un muestreo intencional, es decir conformar una muestra con casos ricos en información a partir de los cuales puede realizarse un estudio que busca la profun-

dización y no la generalización. En este tipo de muestras, la representatividad no aparece asociada a la lógica cuantitativa sino más bien a lo representativo del caso, la riqueza de éste en relación con el objetivo de investigación. La selección de los distintos entrevistados (cantidad y quiénes) no fue una decisión establecida antes del trabajo de campo sino una definición gradual y abierta durante todo el proceso de investigación (Morse, 1994; Meo y Navarro, 2009), y que no sólo dependía de las necesidades de la investigación, sino también del acceso. En Argentina, las entrevistas se hicieron entre 2005 y 2010, en la ciudad de Buenos Aires y en distintos municipios del conurbano bonaerense, área metropolitana que rodea a la Capital Federal y que está dentro de la provincia de Buenos Aires, caracterizada históricamente por altos niveles de voto al peronismo. Predominaron allí las entrevistas realizadas en La Matanza, distrito con la mayor población de toda la provincia de Buenos Aires. Juntos, la ciudad de Buenos Aires y el conurbano aglutinaban al más alto porcentaje de votantes del país. En Brasil, al no ser mi país de residencia, las entrevistas se realizaron en el marco de dos viajes de trabajo de campo. Uno, en septiembre de 2008, a la ciudad de San Pablo, la mayor área metropolitana del país y el centro urbano en cuyo cinturón industrial nació y creció el Partido de los Trabajadores (PT). El segundo trabajo de campo fue realizado en junio de 2009 en Río de Janeiro. Esta última ciudad, al igual que la de Buenos Aires, en Argentina, es, a la vez que un centro urbano de peso en el país, un distrito tradicionalmente difícil para el PT en términos de apoyo electoral. Es decir, mientras que San Pablo y el conurbano bonaerense eran lugares especialmente importantes en la historia del PT y del PJ, Río de Janeiro y la Capital Federal eran, en cambio, dos ciudades más adversas electoralmente y organizativamente para el PT y el PJ, y en las que Lula y Kirchner, sin embargo, fueron ganando más adeptos. Las entrevistas fueron analizadas con el software Atlas TI y siguiendo distintos trabajos sobre codificación y análisis cualitativo de entrevistas, como Dey (1993), Hammersley y Atkinson (1994), Coffey y Atkinson (2003), Miles y Huberman (1994) y Strauss y Corbin (2002).

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## Notas

- 1 Así se autodenominaron en Argentina (aunque a veces también se referían a sí mismas como movimientos sociales) estas organizaciones que provenían originalmente del espacio piquetero pero que procuraban no usar este último término (o, al menos, dejar de usarlo a partir de su inserción en el oficialismo). Me he valido de la noción de organización social para aludir también al MST, que en Brasil era caracterizado por los distintos actores del oficialismo como tal, o también como movimiento social.
- 2 En el caso de Cortés (2008), la crítica se remite más bien a la acepción más tradicional del concepto de cooptación, la que refiere a una forma de seducción que implica un elemento activo, el que coopta, y uno pasivo, el que es cooptado, insinuando una compra-venta de voluntades. A



partir de ese rechazo, el autor no descarta la idea de cooptación pero propone una redefinición del mecanismo, aludiendo ya no a la cooptación de un movimiento o un actor particular sino a la cooptación del conflicto en términos generales.

- 3 A inicios de 2002 se perfilaban ya, según los autores, dos grandes lineamientos en el mundo piquetero. Por un lado, la Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV) junto a la Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC); y, por otro lado, el Bloque Piquetero Nacional, integrado por organizaciones como el Polo Obrero y la Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados Aníbal Verón (CTD-AV), el Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados (MIJD), Barrios de Pie y el Movimiento Sin Trabajo Teresa Vive (MST-TV). Burkart *et al.* (2008:38) caracterizan la relación entre estos dos sectores como "conflictiva y de distanciamiento permanente". Centralmente se distinguían en términos de su vinculación y posicionamiento en torno al gobierno de Duhalde.
- 4 La corriente Patria Libre es un partido autoconcebido como nacionalista de izquierda, con distintos frentes, en el ámbito sindical, universitario y luego también territorial, con Barrios de Pie (primero denominado CTA de los barrios). Surgía en Córdoba a fines de los ochenta. Para más detalle, ver Fornillo (2008).
- 5 En el Congreso de la CTA en 2002 se debatió la posibilidad, reclamada por la FTV, de que el estatuto de la central incluyera una condición según la cual cada organización territorial que quisiera ingresar a la CTA se afiliara previamente a la FTV (Pérez, 2008). Con ello, la Federación se proponía como única expresión territorial de la CTA (FTV, 2002). Detrás de esa discusión aparecía, según Armelino (2008), una tensión entre la vertiente sindical y la vertiente territorial de la CTA, en la cual la FTV era predominante. Finalmente, la iniciativa de la FTV no sería aprobada en términos de inclusión explícita de esa prescripción en el estatuto, pero el plenario al cierre del Congreso reconoció a la FTV como "la expresión barrial" de la central, y se decidió alentar a las organizaciones territoriales a confluir en la FTV (Armelino, 2008).
- 6 Además de la corriente Patria Libre y de Barrios de Pie, compondrían Libres del Sur organizaciones como el Partido Comunista Congreso Extraordinario (PCCE), el Frente Barrial 19 de diciembre y la Agrupación Envar el Kadri.
- 7 Natalucci (2008a) sintetiza esa confluencia de sectores en el Movimiento Evita en tres vertientes: setentistas (que habían sido parte de la organización Montoneros), ochentistas (de agrupaciones peronistas como Intransigencia y Movilización, agrupación que aglutinó en los años ochenta a sectores de la izquierda peronista, y con una fuerte gravitación de Vicente Sardi) y noventistas (pertenecientes a organizaciones de derechos humanos, de universidades y organizaciones radicalizadas como Quebracho).
- 8 Tanto los entrevistados de Libres del Sur como los de otras organizaciones sociales oficialistas caracterizaban el funcionamiento del movimiento en esos términos. Así, los entrevistados de Barrios de Pie/Libres del Sur la presentaban como una organización más homogénea, y como portando una línea política definida, mientras que, en los entrevistados de las otras organizaciones, la definición propia exhibía situaciones de heterogeneidad de actores, de dinámicas más desordenadas, a la vez que se manifestaban críticos al funcionamiento de Barrios de Pie, considerado por esas organizaciones como similar al de un partido centralizado.
- 9 Octavio, entrevistado de la organización, describía así su funcionamiento. También lo hacía Natalucci (2008b) en su análisis sobre la organización. El Movimiento Evita, por su parte, aparecía definido como teniendo un modo de acumulación exitoso pero a la vez caótico y como imposibilitado de convertirse en una estructura centralizada y con un rumbo más definido.
- 10 Delamata y Armesto (2005) concluyen, luego de trabajo de campo en la FTV de La Matanza, núcleo fundador de la federación, que allí observaron "que el componente delegativo de la re-

presentación social se había profundizado en desmedro de los aspectos participativos e igualitarios que conformaban el vínculo” (Delamata y Armesto, 2005:147). Los entrevistados de la FTV la consideraban como un movimiento con mayor amplitud que Barrios de Pie a la hora de incorporar nuevos miembros, pero cuya amplitud también terminaba siendo un problema para la cohesión y formación interna de la organización.

- 11 El Frente Transversal se concebía como un movimiento con mayor presencia sindical que las demás organizaciones sociales y cuyo desarrollo territorial había sido más tardío. Por otro lado, Mariano, del Partido Comunista Congreso Extraordinario (PCCE), partido que luego de haber integrado el movimiento Libres del Sur, se había desprendido de éste e incorporado en el Frente Transversal, describía a este último en esos términos, diciendo que tenía un carácter movimientista y que, a veces, si no estaba Depetri, no se hacían reuniones, y al no hacerse esas reuniones, no se tomaban decisiones, siendo la figura de Depetri tan gravitante que el Frente tenía dificultades para funcionar sin su presencia directa (Entrevista con Mariano, militante del PCCE, Ciudad de Buenos Aires).
- 12 Cabría aclarar que todas estas caracterizaciones no deberían ser tomadas necesariamente como modos en los que efectivamente se diferenciaban entre sí estas organizaciones en la práctica, sino que su significación radica en que constituían los ejes que las propias organizaciones reivindicaban o resaltaban en sus autodefiniciones y en la diferenciación respecto de los demás actores del sector.
- 13 Luego de las elecciones de 2005, el diario *Página 12* (30/10/05) relevaba 27 miembros de organizaciones sociales kirchneristas que habían sido electos como legisladores provinciales y como concejales distritales por el Frente para la Victoria. Todos ellos pertenecían a alguna de las cuatro organizaciones que toma este trabajo. Para una lista completa de los legisladores electos en esa ocasión en la provincia de Buenos Aires que provenían de organizaciones sociales, ver *Página 12* (30/10/05).
- 14 Todo ello en el marco del objetivo de “reconstruir el movimiento nacional”. Emilio Pérsico, dirigente del Evita, planteaba aquella noción en el Encuentro Nacional de la Militancia, en diciembre de 2006 en Lanús, diciendo que la gran fuerza que necesitaban para estabilizar el país los llevaba a incorporar contradicciones, y que ante la pregunta de compañeros de algunos distritos de cómo era posible que tuvieran que construir con ciertos “tipos”, él les decía que tenían que liberar al país y que para eso necesitaban fuerza, y que él sabía cuán contradictorio era.
- 15 Con la llegada de Scioli a la gobernación, en 2007, el Movimiento Evita perdería gran parte de los espacios que había conseguido dentro del estado provincial (siendo el más importante la vicejefatura de gabinete), así como la coordinación de algunos programas sociales, como el programa de promotores en Derechos Humanos. En el caso de Barrios de Pie/Libres del Sur, el Ministerio de Educación de la Nación los removería de la coordinación de programas sociales de alfabetización y educación.
- 16 El conflicto agropecuario consistió en una fuerte reacción de distintas entidades patronales agropecuarias (Sociedad Rural, Coninagro, CRA y Federación Agraria) y de grupos de productores rurales “autoconvocados” frente a una resolución del gobierno (la número 125) que establecía un nuevo carácter de las retenciones o aranceles a la exportación de soja: su movilidad en relación con el precio internacional de esta oleaginosa. La reacción incluyó paros de comercialización y numerosos cortes de ruta en distintas localidades del país en forma intermitente durante cuatro meses. Finalmente, la presidenta elevó un proyecto de ley al Congreso Nacional para ratificar la medida. El mismo fue aprobado en la Cámara de Diputados

- pero derrotado en la de Senadores: luego de un empate de votos entre los legisladores, el vicepresidente, Julio Cobos, lo rechazó.
- 17 Para una reconstrucción de su historia y principios organizativos a partir de una revisión de documentos y otros trabajos teóricos, ver Comelli *et al.* (2007).
  - 18 En realidad, siguiendo el relato de Dias Martins (2000), el MST emergió en 1979, con sus primeras ocupaciones de tierras, una de las más importantes teniendo lugar en Encruzilhada Natalito, Rio Grande do Sul. 1984 es la fecha en que el mismo se constituyó como movimiento nacional, en su primer Encuentro Nacional, en el que también se aprobó su himno y bandera. Ese primer encuentro también dio a luz a la consigna "La tierra para el que la trabaja y vive" (Piñeiro, 2004).
  - 19 En 1999, sin embargo, se generaría, en el propio seno dirigencial del MST, una organización política denominada Consulta Popular, que se proponía la formulación y debate nacional, aunque no la participación en elecciones. La relación entre el MST y Consulta Popular aparecía caracterizada de forma algo ambigua en las entrevistas, reconociendo que la Consulta estaba integrada por varios dirigentes del movimiento pero negando que fuese un brazo político del MST. Esa opacidad aumentaba al agregar a la ecuación la relación histórica del MST y el PT.
  - 20 Un ejemplo de esa política represiva es la denominada masacre de Carajás, ocurrida el 17 de abril de 1996. Ese día, tres mil familias sin tierra ocuparon la ruta PA-150, cerca de Eldorado dos Carajás, en Pará, para exigir al INCRA la expropiación de un latifundio (Macaxeira). Luego de ser cercadas por tropas de policías militares (PM), éstas abrieron fuego contra los manifestantes y 19 integrantes del MST fueron asesinados.
  - 21 Frente al conflicto, además, el MST firmaría un documento, en junio de 2005, junto con la Central Única de Trabajadores de Brasil (CUT), poco después de los primeros escándalos de corrupción del PT y la renuncia de José Dirceu. Se pronunciaba en él "contra cualquier tentativa de desestabilización del gobierno legítimamente electo, patrocinada por los sectores conservadores y antidemocráticos" (Leher, 2005:115. Traducción propia).
  - 22 Según el propio sitio online del MST, los campamentos en 2002, antes de la asunción de Lula, eran 526. En 2003 ascendieron a 633, en 2004 a 661 y en 2005 alcanzaban los 778. También pueden consultarse esas cifras de campamentos en tierras ocupadas en Boito, Galvão y Marcelino (2009).
  - 23 En junio de 2002 hubo una serie de afirmaciones y desmentidas por parte de distintos dirigentes locales del MST (Gilmar Mauro y Jaime Amorim) en torno a una eventual tregua del MST durante el último tramo electoral, de modo de no perjudicar las posibilidades de Lula, dado que el PT y el MST habían sido siempre asociados por la prensa brasilera. Lo cierto es que en enero de 2003, poco después de la asunción de Lula, el MST se reunía con el gobierno para reclamar que éste asentara a miles de familias acampadas.
  - 24 Se han utilizado nombres ficticios para todos los entrevistados salvo para Egardo Depetri, máximo dirigente del Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular. Al tratarse de una figura que había tenido una relación personal de muchos años con el propio presidente Kirchner, el vínculo y rol de su organización con el gobierno era, en gran medida, el vínculo personal de él mismo con Kirchner (vínculo que precedía, además, al nacimiento de la organización). Sus relatos estaban atravesados por ese elemento (su relación con el gobierno era descrita, por ejemplo, en primera persona singular mucho más que en términos de su organización) por lo cual, si hubiera colocado en sus citas un nombre ficticio, éstas habrían perdido sentido o bien habrían hecho evidente de quién se trataba. La riqueza de su relato radicaba precisamente en quién era él y en las características que había tenido su relación personal con el presidente.

Sus definiciones de pertenencia al oficialismo estaban mediadas por la misma. En todos los demás casos de entrevistados, su identidad fue preservada.

- 25** Con sentido estricto me refiero en este caso a un aspecto de lo que, de modo más general, he considerado como las definiciones de pertenencia al oficialismo. En otros términos, las definiciones de pertenencia en sentido estricto serían, como ya fue mencionado, los significados de pertenecer, dónde se ubica el nosotros, etc.). Las definiciones de pertenencia en sentido amplio refieren a una multiplicidad de interpretaciones y relatos de los entrevistados en torno al gobierno que han sido estudiados en la investigación más amplia en la que esta ponencia se enmarca (la forma de definir el vínculo, las condiciones en las que consideraban que existían o se encontraban en tanto miembros del oficialismo, la coexistencia con otros actores dentro del conjunto, las nociones sobre la propia función como miembros del oficialismo, etc.)

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Publicaciones recientes: "¿Partidos o personas? La conformación del conglomerado oficialista en los gobiernos de Lula, Kirchner y Lagos" (2007, en revista E-Latina); "La diversidad debajo de la mesa: El conglomerado kirchnerista en el distrito de La Matanza" (2009, en libro *Las urnas y la desconfianza ciudadana en la democracia argentina*); "Protagonista opositor, peronista desplazado: la CGT durante el gobierno de Raúl Alfonsín" (2009, *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*); "El MST en Brasil y las organizaciones sociales kirchneristas en Argentina (2005-2006). Roles, identificación y relaciones dentro del conglomerado oficialista" (2009, *Revista Socio-histórica. Cuadernos del CISH*); "Definiciones de pertenencia e identidades oficialistas en la Argentina de Néstor Kirchner y el Brasil de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva" (2011, en libro: *Ciudadanía y legitimidad democrática en América Latina*).

Temas de interés actual: militancia política, organizaciones sociales, sindicatos, partidos, liderazgos, identidades, bases de sustentación de gobiernos, elecciones.

## Young *Favela* Dwellers and Audiovisual Production: Representations and Self-representations

Lia de Mattos Rocha

**Abstract:** Intellectuals, policy makers and foreign visitants have historically stigmatized Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* as dangerous settlements but also celebrated them as exotic places with a rich and unique culture. While violence and exotics remain important representations of Brazilian *favelas*, new portrays but especially new actors have emerged in the last years, since residents of these territories have been able to present their cultural production in different spaces of consumption (television, music and movies industries). This article discusses how young slum dwellers, participants of *social projects* carried out by local non-governmental organizations, become producers of "alternative" images of *favelas*. The analysis reflects upon the production of images and representations by these young people about themselves and where they live, and how their production is linked to activities of nongovernmental organizations in those territories. I discuss how some of these initiatives are seeking public legitimacy as representatives of *favelas* dwellers, partly as a substitute for residents' associations that have been losing strength and recognition. The so-called *NGOs from within* bring the issue of self-representation into the *social projects market* by articulating two logics. On one hand, they represent *favelas* as a place of risk, which is part of what I will call *the social projects' repertoire*. On the other hand, they identify a "local culture", which must be valued as a way to ensure the residents' citizenship rights. By analyzing the case of the NGO TV Little Hill (TV *Morrinho*), located in a *favela* called Vila Pereira da Silva (also known as Pereirão), at Rio de Janeiro - Brazil, this paper explores how these two apparently conflicting logics are articulated in the discourses and actions of these young *favela* residents and their NGOs.

**Keywords:** Social Movements, Youth, Self-representation, Social and spatial segregation, Brazil.

### 1. Introduction

*Favelas* have always been stigmatized regions, portrayed as a "problem," but at the same time idealized as an exotic territory, apart from the city and birthplace of samba (and now also of Brazilian funk). Valladares (2005) describes in detail how the representation of these social spaces as a world apart - unhealthy, unsanitary and contagious (2005:37) - oriented public policies which range from removal to mechanisms of managing and controlling their population (2005:49). However, since the 1990s, a new perception about *favelas* emerged, reducing them to locus of drug-trafficking

violence, and its inhabitants to accomplices of the drug dealers, because they would have "chosen" to live under the "drug trafficking law" and not under "Brazilians laws" (Leite 2008:117). It is within such an understanding that part of Brazilian society begun to demand more repressive policies to fight crime in these territories (Leite 2005:66).

Increasing concern about urban violence during the 1990s originated different explanations for their causes and proposals for its solution, which were synthesized by Leite (2000:74) in two groups. One, highly visible in mass media and middle class discourses, demanded more order and repression, and arguing that *favelas* dwellers' rights could not obstruct the fight against criminals hiding in these communities. The other, largely supported by intellectuals, NGOs and some media professionals, argued that the fight against drug traffickers should combine more efficient public security initiatives with "policies to promote citizenship, aimed primarily at the youth living in these areas" (Leite 2000:74). Until today these two discourses compete for authority over the "*favela* issue" and have guided public actions. On the one hand, government has invested in repression and confrontation with drug dealers, resulting in daily deaths in the *favelas*. On the other hand, it has invested in actions that promise to create social inclusion of young *favelas* dwellers, such as those conducted by various NGOs, largely supported by State funding.

Beyond the local impacts of these initiatives, representations of *favelas* as the locus of poverty and violence stigmatizes residents as poor and/or dangerous. Among the *favelas* dwellers, probably is the youth who feel the heaviest burden of stigma, because they are considered the age group most prone to accede to the criminal career. Thus, today, young *favelas* dwellers personify the *favela problem*, as formulated by Machado da Silva (2002), and the majority of public policies in action in these places are focused on them, both social and repressive (Rocha 2011).

It is noteworthy that Brazilian social policies for the youth generally perceive this group as a "problem," even when they are not executed in the slums. However, many of these actions have as a goal to, directly or indirectly, constrain the actual or potential risk represented by these poor young, urban, and mostly black people. They consist mostly of activities held in NGOs located inside *favelas*, to occupy the youth "minds and hands" and to prevent them from "wandering through their neighborhoods streets", situations that are perceived by public officers and policemen (as well as by most adult *favelas* residents) as leading to illegal activities.

This perception over the poor urban youth was reinforced by media's focus on the "problem" of children living in the streets, young men involved in gangs, vandalism, graffiti, etc., during the 1990s (Sposito & Carrano 2003; Leite 2000). Thus, the Brazilian society turned its attention to the limited integration of these young people, mostly from lower classes and inhabitants of the suburbs and *favelas*, into the world of adults and the labor market, and demanded the intervention of both government programs and civil society in tackling this social problem. It is also dates back to this period the understanding that we were in "war for the salvation of youth from the clutches of crime, trafficking and violence" (Sposito & Carrano 2003:30').

The recent initiatives of *favelas*' dwellers to produce positive images about themselves and their places of residence are located in a symbolic dispute that, ultimately, determines who is "a good person" and who is not, who can be considered citizen and who cannot. Hence, they produce local initiatives for social intervention articulating training courses (to increase employability) and cultural production. The foundation of this cultural production is a "*favela* culture," that valorizes *favelas*, its inhabitants and their culture<sup>2</sup>, and through these initiatives these young people try to present themselves publicly as having value, as opposed to drug traffickers. The importance of presenting themselves as different from the bandits is explicit in TV Little Hill (TV Morrinho) Project website's: "Our goal is to bring positive change to our local community, but also to challenge the popular perception of Brazilian *favelas*. The belief that the slums are just dominated by drug trafficking and violence does not cover the entire community" (TV Little Hill Project's site 2011).

But how the *favelas* dwellers have been acting in the public space to enter in the symbolic dispute over their "image"? Which forms does this collective action take?

## **2. *Favelas* Politics "Yesterday and Today": from Residents Associations to NGOs**

*Favela* resident associations have traditionally fulfilled the role of mediators between those they represent (residents) and the state, even if its bargaining power has varied. It has been defined as a movement of gains and losses according to the political contexts that Machado da Silva (2002) termed *negotiated control*<sup>3</sup>. This function of mediation, however, often puts the residents associations as intermediating between government and drug trafficking (see Miranda & Magalhães 2002), generating denunciations of complicity, as well as of cooptation by government officers and corruption (Zaluar 2003; Leeds 2003).

The first *favelas*' resident associations, took place in a context of reaction to the proposed removal of slums to distant places of the city center, in the 1940s. By early 1960s, trying to contain *favelas*' growth, the city administration encouraged the formation of associations to act as state agencies within *favelas*, to "assist the government in the implementation of basic services and maintenance of internal order" (Pandolfi & Grynszpan 2002:243). The state government policy in this period ranged from *favelas*' removal to their urbanization, but the military coup d'état of 1964 strengthened removal projects, violently repressing any kind of collective action, intervening and weakening *favelas* resident associations movements. In this scenario, the associations began to act as government representatives in the *favelas*, managing public services and preventing the growth of slums. Some associations even started to defend removals (Burgos 2003; Pandolfi & Grynszpan 2002).

In late 1970s, with the Brazilian democratization process and the (re)emergence of social movements, the rate of *favelas* removal started to decrease, both because of the costs of the housing projects construction (where *favelados* were removed to) and



due to the pressure of *favela* resident movements. At this point *favelas* urbanization was their main demand, but the lack of specific policies for these areas led resident associations to relate to politicians through political patronage, trading benefits (individual and collective) for votes (Burgos 2003:39.).

The first Leonel Brizola's government (from 1983 to 1987) represented a change in the relationship between government and *favelas*. Residents associations' leaders now became government's interlocutors. Associations continued to play the roles of state agencies, as in the previous period (known as the "water tap politics"), but their demands were directly negotiated with the government, without the mediation of politicians. Tasks were assigned to the associations in public agreements with state agencies, which included the hiring of local workers to work in construction and maintenance inside the *favela*. For this hiring service, the residents association received a 5% fee of the overall public fund for the activity (Burgos 2003; Pandolfi & Grynszpan 2002). This type of relationship between associations and government strengthened many community organizations and its leaders, since being part of an local association could mean having access to resources, such as jobs, control over services, etc.

The close relationship between associations and government lasted through the 1990s, but was reframed as a "partnership" between civil society and government. That was the foundation of an urbanization project called *Favela-Neighborhood (Favela-Bairro)*, carried out by the César Maia administration, initiated in 1994. With *Favela-Neighborhood* policy, resident associations were managers of programs funded with public funds, and concentrated more and more power through the hiring of staff and services. The *Favela-Neighborhood* project also acirrated dispute among different associations for investments, since each *favela* had to defend their interests separately. As consequence, we observed the "undermining of all mobilizations and the depoliticization of claims, limited to small lobbies over technical-financial and administrative issues" (Machado da Silva 2002:232).

This logic of pulverization of investments has continued through this decade, either through the Programme for Growth Acceleration (*Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento*<sup>5</sup>), or through public policies that follows the installation of Pacifying Police Units (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*<sup>6</sup>). Despite a few differences, the format remains the same: focused actions, favoring some *favelas* over others. Resident associations continue to act as "partners" of the government, but with a participation exclusively in the project execution, not in its planning. Therefore, the relationship based on negotiated control remains, but association movement had their bargaining power significantly reduced.

Even if each individual association tries to keep its status as a mediator, their role as representants was weakened due to the constraints imposed by the armed groups in these communities: drug traffickers gangs, militia groups (Silva & Rocha 2008; Leeds 2003) and, more recently, with the occupation forces of Pacifying Police. In addition, drug gangs have assassinated or forced resident association leaders to leave their homes and neighborhoods<sup>7</sup>. These impediments, along with the already mentioned

allegations of authoritarianism and corruption (Zaluar 2003), weakened even further the legitimacy of resident associations' leaders during the 1990s and the 2000s.

At the same time, we can observe the emergence of new forms of participation in public space, such as local civil organizations, mostly non-governmental organizations. Landim (2005, p. 83) analyses the growth of foundations and nonprofit associations in Brazil (from 1996 to 2002), especially NGOs sector. She points out that this growth occurs in a known context of "(...) redefinition of the relations between state and society, changes in the modes of regulation of social bonding, changes in the workplace and in the forms of solidarity associated with them, increasing inequality and social disaffiliation, the dynamics of political and administrative decentralization, etc." (Landim 2005:77).

The emergence of new actors represents a change - but also a continuity in relation to resident association. On one hand, the growth of NGO activity in *favelas* is part of a broad transformation process, which combines changes in public space, public administration and sociability. On the other hand, for *favelas'* dwellers engaged in social activism, they are also an opportunity to continue their militancy, but as a profession (Landim 1993). This is the case of many former resident association leaders, who migrated from the more traditional collective action (for the reasons mentioned above) into the role of NGOs directors or managers.

The transition to more professional and institutionalized forms of organization is convenient to those who work on NGOs, but also to governments and international organizations that invest in them. But it should not be understood just as a passage from militancy in traditional formats (such as the resident associations) to a professionalized militancy. In the specific case of Rio de Janeiro, NGOs presented themselves as social actors with the necessary expertise to conduct the social policies directed to the *favelas*, from the contract of technicians to work in the city administration services (normally in precarious working contracts) to the "*social projects*" directed to save the *favela* youth from *social risk*. But NGOs are also increasingly taking the role of "informal" representants of slums dwellers - because they have no elected authority to represent, as reminded by Lavallo, Houtzager and Castello (2006).

It is important to stress that there are NGOs created by intellectuals, social workers, former political militants, etc., we can call them "NGOs from outside *favelas*", and NGOs created by *favelas'* dwellers: the NGOs from within. Nowadays some major NGOs from within enjoy a lot of visibility, including in the mass media. The most prominent NGOs have large and very successful projects in Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian states.

A key stated goal of these *NGOS from within* is to change the image of *favelas* and their residents. This goal explains the investment in projects related to audiovisual, music and other artistic performances that give visibility to the "*favela* culture." They state that these initiatives help fight the stigma against *favelados* and racism, and increase residents' self-esteem. At the same time, they also seek to intervene in the

local dynamics of violence, by "saving young people from crime and idleness" (Affro-Regae 2011). In addition, they acquired legitimacy to speak publicly for the *favelados*, through its main leaders<sup>9</sup>. Such legitimacy comes from the success of their projects, but also from the fact that they presented themselves, and are recognized, as the "good side" of *favelas*: they are not involved in crime (which they help to fight), they are engaged in social work, they represent the *favela* culture, they are artists, etc.

The case presented here, the NGO TV Little Hill (*TV Morrinho*) Project, is quite modest compared to these big organizations, but their activities have also achieved considerable visibility, especially abroad<sup>9</sup>. TV Little Hill Project is an NGO whose members are 13 young men from *favela* Pereirão<sup>10</sup> and 2 video makers "from the asphalt"<sup>11</sup>. TV Little Hill gathers different activities (video making, tourism, *social project*, art exhibitions) linked by Little Hill Model, which is a 300 m<sup>2</sup> model made from bricks and Lego dolls, representing different *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro and the drug factions that control them. I will describe the organization in the next section.

The impact of the TV Little Hill Project can be perceived in the personal trajectory of its young participants, who are now audiovisual professionals (directors, cameramen, editors) with many international stamps in their passports. In other words, they built for themselves a career as artists - albeit intermittently, as most artistic careers. Although it is difficult to measure if this experience can assure these young men a job in the formal labor market, their main gain is what John Urry calls network capital, defined as "the capacity to engender and sustain social relations with those people who are not necessarily proximate and which generates emotional, financial and practical benefit." (Urry 2007). Their work gave them status in their community, *Favela* Pereira da Silva, and brought to it visitants from all around the world, tourists interested in their work but also in doing social work with them (Freire-Medeiros 2009).

From the framework presented above, I will analyze the case of NGO TV Little Hill as an initiative on the political debate on representations over *favelas* and *favelados* through the analytical category of self-representation. I define self-representation as the representation produced by actors who intend to publicly present themselves in other terms than the ones used by society in general. In this case, self-representation refers to efforts made by *favela* dwellers to portray themselves in a positive way, since they consider that most representations disseminated in the mass media or used by the state apparatus (or other social groups) are not realistic, accurate or just. In these terms, this category sets up a dichotomy between a subaltern (or marginalized) representation and an upper classes (dominant) representation. This subject is extensively treated in postcolonial studies (see Edward Said 2007).

I argue that these NGOs from within, as TV Little Hill Project, seek to impact the place where they live through their social work, but they also want to challenge the ordinary perception over *favelas*, they want to promote *favela*'s cultural expressions, and therefore improve their neighborhoods self-esteem, they want to fight racism and violence, etc. Their participation in discussions over culture and identity is a form of entering the political arena, as defined by David Slater (2000:514). In short, they represent a

new format of collective action - though not in the traditional terms of "institutionalized politics".

Nevertheless, this particular configuration of collective action has a very specific format - the "*social project*". As I demonstrate in the following section, the "*social project*" provides a framework for the NGOs work that actually constrain their actions and proposals.

### 3. TV Little Hill presents "Life as it is": Culture, Politics and Risk

TV Little Hill Project is an NGO, but also a production company for films, a tourism agency, and a group of performers. As said before, it all started with a model of *favelas*, built by children out of bricks and inhabited by LEGO dolls, and used as scenario for role play games in which the mains characters were drug traffickers and policemen. This game, which started in 1997, has evolved to a 320m<sup>2</sup> model, and at the time of my fieldwork (between 2005 and 2008) ten young men, aged between 10 and 24 years, were involved in it. The model reproduces real *favelas* in the city that "belong" to different "crime factions"<sup>12</sup>. Each participant is the "owner" of his *favela*, in an analogy to the gang leaders of the trafficking bands that actually do control these places. He is responsible for building and maintaining it, and for the performance of its inhabitants.

When the young men started building the model and playing in it, *favela* Pereirão was an important point of drug sales in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. It was also the scenario for man armed confrontation between gangs of drug traffickers and the police (Soares 2000). Therefore, the model was a refuge for the young boys, offering them a place to be, instead of wandering aimlessly through the *favela*. Three years later the boys met two filmmakers, who arrived at the *favela* searching for a theme to make a documentary. In 2006 they inaugurated the NGO TV Little Hill Project, described in their press material as their partnership "apex." The NGO is responsible for managing many of the group activities, and also for raising funds for their projects. According to the group's website, the NGO is structured in four branches:

- a) Expo Little Hill: exposure of the model in artistic events, when they reproduce the original model in reduced dimensions and perform their stories;
- b) TV Little Hill: films and videos production company, who produces their own films or movies on demand;
- c) Tourism at Little Hill: guiding visits to the model, mostly for foreigners tourists; and
- d) Social The Hill: that offers professional training in the audiovisual field, with instructors being the members of the group themselves. It is important to stress that their projects had not found financiers, so far.

But before discussing further the NGO methods and actions, it is important to "enter"

the model. When one arrives at the model, what draws the most attention is its length. But when the young artists begin to perform - or as they call it, begin to play - one is surprised by the representation of drug trafficking that they present. Shootings, confrontations, negotiations, police corruption, all displayed with intonation and the slang traffickers use in their routine. Substantial part of the performance is about drug traffickers and those around them - girlfriends, accomplices, enemies and the police. Shortly, they reenact the traditional "game" (at least for the Brazilian children) of cops vs. bandits, but playing the role of bandits.



**Figure 1.** Picture of The Hill Model (Picture by Lia de Mattos Rocha).

The fact that the performance is about the everyday life of drug traffickers was not an issue to be "excused" by its participants. Quite the contrary; the performance is described as a "representation of reality," as stated the former NGO coordinator, Fábio Gavião: "There are no heroes on 'The Hill'. The boys represent Rio de Janeiro's reality, which is very violent. But all games are violent" (Interview to Lia de Mattos Rocha 2005).

Hence, the issue of urban violence is not denounced in their work, it's not thematized in moral terms; their goal is to portray reality, to present "life as it is," as they state in their website's. However, urban violence and drug trafficking is an issue in Brazilian society, as briefly presented in the first section of this paper. And it is an issue in *Favela Pereirão*, which is described by its dwellers as a *favela* "different from the others" because of its particular dynamics regarding the control of drug traffickers.

In 2000, the *Favela Pereirão* was occupied by the military police, as part of a public security program called The Peace Building Project ("Mutirão pela Paz"<sup>13</sup>). In the same year, the headquarters of the Special Police Operations Battalion ("Batalhão de Operações Especiais" - BOPE), part of the state of Rio's Military Police corporation, was transferred to street near the *favela*'s entrance<sup>14</sup>. After all of these events, this *favela* has since become "peaceful", with no conflicts between rival drug-trafficking gangs or between gangs and the police<sup>15</sup>. Residents say there is no more drug-trafficking there

and that nowadays the *favela* is a “peaceful place to live.” As a result of my fieldwork there, I understood that the “peacefulness” of *favela* Pereirão was more a discursive operation of *moral cleansing*<sup>16</sup> than a description of their reality, since the drug traffickers were present in the territory (even though they were not using heavy arms, as in other *favelas*). But for Pereirão’s dwellers, stating that their *favela* was “peaceful” and “different from the others” became an important part of their presentation as “good people”, as opposed to drug traffickers. Therefore, it was difficult to me to comprehend how the presence of a group of young men performing stories about drug trafficking was not a source of tension among dwellers and the TV Little Hill Project’s members. On the contrary, Pereirão’s inhabitants were proud of the young men activities, and of the attention their work was receiving from all around the world.

I came to understand how it was possible to have a representation of drug trafficking in *favelas* inside a “peaceful” *favela* when I started to analyze the NGO’s *social project*. In the context of their *social project*, designed to be used in fund raising activities, urban violence was described as a serious social problem, and not a representation of “life as it is.” Hence, in the performative art circumstances, urban violence was a portrayal of reality; but in the *social project* context it was an issue to be addressed by interventions in order to “save” Pereirão’s youth from the risks of criminality.

The same NGO coordinator who explained to me that “all games are violent” told me that its organization had prevented many young men from becoming drug traffickers. The president of the local resident association presented the NGOs initiatives as very important to prevent young men from “having bad ideas and doing bad things” (Rocha 2009). In their “business plan” (document also to be used in fundraising), the young men who created the model and performed all the NGOs activities were described as in “social risk”, meaning they could join drug trafficking gangs, if not stopped.

The concept of *risk* is quite important for sociological theory. For Giddens “Modernity is a risk culture” (1991:3). For Ulrich Beck (1992) we are increasingly living in a *risk society*, where the technological transformations makes impossible to completely understand what is going on. As a consequence, it creates a diversity of possible futures. Giddens (1999) stress that risk is different from hazard or danger, since our society is not intrinsically more dangerous or more hazardous than the previous one. In the risk society there is, at the same time, a negative and a positive side. On one hand, we no longer live our lives as determined by fate; we have choices that were not available before. On the other hand, it is a society increasingly more preoccupied with the future and with safety than before: “The idea of risk is bound up with the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling the future” (Giddens 1999:3).

“Social risk”, as used in the *social projects market*, is different from the concept presented above, and at the same time central in what I call the *repertoire of social projects*. As used by common sense, “social risk” means that there is a possibility -- a probability impossible to calculate -- that someone will enter in a situation of risk related to social problems. These social problems are violence (as victims or as agents of violence), drug abuse, sexual violence, etc. Poverty can be part of these group of

risks, but in general it is not an issue. As operated by the *social projects repertoire*, "social risk" means the possibility of young and poor person, mostly black men, to join a criminal gang. But if this young, poor black man is object of an intervention, such as a *social project*, he can escape this terrible fate.

Therefore, "social risk" is not distributed homogenously throughout society: it is concentrated among poor classes, living in poor territories such as *favelas*. Although it is used as a descriptive category (NGOs often described their public as "in social risk situation"), it replicates the stigma against poor people, especially *favelados*, in Brazil. NGOs who declare as their goal to fight racism and stigma against *favelas* use this category because they work inside what I call *social projects* market, using a *social project repertoire*. I will explain both concepts in the paragraphs below.

As said before, engaging in NGOs is perceived by social actors as a political engagement. Through the concept of *self-representation*, *favelados* gathered in NGOs can bridge the gap between culture, market and the political arena. However, NGOs "do politics" in a different way. The format of *social projects* defines content and form of this action. It functions in a market that is organized by supply and demand, valuing certain products over others. In this context, describing young poor *favelados* as individuals in "social risk situation" is more effective, in terms of successfully raising funds, than using more controversial categories. This term meets the general perception over *favelas* as places of danger and evil, therefore it is the core concept of the *social project repertoire*.

Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) describe what they call *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, characterized by its organization in networks and its continuous flow of actors between projects. This description is appropriated to analyze how the *social projects* market works. This market works through actions limited both in terms of space as time: they focus on territories (as opposed to universal social policies) and they tend to be over when funding stops. To assure the continuity of a *social project*, it is necessary to be part of different networks which will help the NGO to find another supporters. An entrepreneurial attitude is always required from those who intend to make a *social project* come true, but it is also valued the capacity to leave unsuccessful projects to engage in more promising ones.

Hence, *social projects* are the action format more appropriated to this *New Spirit of Capitalism*. But it also presents the best solution for the "urban violence problem", since it frames urban violence in the same terms as Brazilian society does: poor black *favelados* men are dangerous, or at least potentially dangerous, and they must be disciplined and controlled before they become criminals. That is why many NGOs *social projects* are funded by the Government, using Public Security Budgets.

Thus, there are two guidelines to NGOs work: one that values the young men who participate in its activities as gifted artists, and other that frames them as potentially dangerous. At first, I thought of them as contradictory. However, the success of several NGOs in engaging young people into "*social projects*" indicate that they fell, in

some level, “represented” by them. In TV Little Hill Project, the participants didn’t seem to be offended by their representation as “individuals in social risk;” they were more occupied in enlarging their boundaries, making their films and, as they state, helping to change people’s idea over *favelas*. In this sense, the *social project repertoire* was being used in an instrumental way, as a strategy to obtain what they needed: funds and visibility. But, at the same time, they were making films and performances in which *favelas* appear (not only, but also) as the scenario for drug traffickers and violent confrontations -- therefore, reinforcing the same old perception over *favelas* as *locus* of violence and crime. How to articulate, in analytical terms, these operations of *stigmatized representation* and *counter-discursive self-representation*?

#### 4. Conclusions

Gifted artists with rising careers, or *favela*’s dwellers with a new point of view over violence and stigma, TV Little Hill Project’s participants become “young men in situations of social risk” inside their own *social project*’s pages. We can say that they use the *social projects* repertoire as a strategic way to get attention to their work. Hence, they really live up to their motto: they know “life as it is”. They are competent actors operating inside the *social project* market. Being an artist, as well as being a *social project*’s participant, are effective moral cleaners for *favelas*’ dwellers. In TV Little Hill Project they are both. Still, they remain trapped by the identification operation that declares them “in social risk”.

Despite all the international recognition, they are young men who have to cope with an hyphenated identity: they are not only artists, they are *favela artists*. Many times, during their trips, they were forced to cope “with the ambiguity of being recognized - as talented and creative artists - and misrecognized - as iconic representatives of poverty in Brazil” (Freire-Medeiros & Rocha 2011).

Nevertheless, the TV Little Hill Project’s members, as well as from other *NGOs from within favelas*, are seeking a different place for themselves in the Brazilian highly hierarchized society. Citizenship, rights, participation in the political debates: all of that is denied to marginalized groups in Brazil. By presenting different representations over *favelados* and their culture [meaning “alternative” identities and values opposed to the general perception] these *NGOs from within* can create a bridge between marginalized groups and the political arena and enlarge Brazilian democracy. Through their work, TV Little Hill Project’s participants transposes Pereirão’s boundaries, offering a different image of young black *favelados* men. In this sense, they are the best product their NGO produces. This article is my way of accompanying them.

#### Abbreviations

**BOPE:** Special Police Operations Battalion (*Batalhão de Operações Especiais*).

**NGO:** Non-governmental Organizations.



## Methodological Appendix

The fieldwork presented here was conducted between 2005 and 2009, as part of my PhD research project. Mainly through observation and a small number of interviewees, I did an ethnographic description of Pereirão's sociability, paying special attention to the Resident Association and the NGO TV Little Hill Project. I preferred to use observation and ethnography as a strategy to avoid *favelas'* dwellers' resistance in speaking about violence and drug trafficking, the first goals in my research. However, the richness of the NGO work and the tension between them and the Resident Association became the focus of my work.

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## Notes

- 1 Sposito & Carrano (2003) argue that President Fernando Henrique's (1994-2001) choice of an Army General to be responsible for the national policies for the youth is symbolic of this intended war.
- 2 Souza (2006) analyses how a symbolic repertoire related to discrimination and racism, as the physical features of black women in the case she investigates, can be valued and carried out as an emblem, through the use of the category self-esteem.
- 3 Machado da Silva (2002) defines negotiated control as the subordination of *favelas* resident associations to the state apparatuses, but with the possibility for its leaders to negotiate the terms of this subordination, according to the balance of power between the two actors in each political context. New research results, however, argue that the most recent power dynamics are diminishing resident associations power to bargain (Cf. Silva & Rocha 2008).
- 4 The trade of social services for votes between politicians and *favelas* leaders was known as "the water tap politics" because this was the regular benefit offered by the politicians to *favelas*, and despite the small dimension of the benefit, it was very important in a neighborhood without a regular water supply.
- 5 The Programme for Growth Acceleration (*Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* - PAC) includes different projects in infra-structure, transport, housing, sanitation, energy, etc. Part of these projects is executed in some of Rio de Janeiro's *favelas*, and received the name of Community PAC or *Favelas PAC*. Cf. Ministry of Planning 2011.
- 6 The Pacifying Police Units (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora - UPP) are currently (June 2012) present in more than 30 *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro. They are military police stations inside *favelas*, with soldiers specially trained to do community policing. Following military occupation, a number of social programmes carried out by public or private sections are being executed in these "pacified" *favelas*. The impacts of UPPs are still being investigated.

- 7 A research made by the Human Rights Commission at the Deputies House (state level) in 2005 analyzed data on 800 directors of *favela*'s resident associations between 1992 and 2001, and concluded that 300 of them were forced to leave their neighborhoods and 100 were murdered, because of disputes with drug traffickers (Leite 2005b:382).
- 8 As an example, a president of NGO has a TV Show in a cable channel, and another one is employee of the most important Brazilian TV channel, Rede Globo.
- 9 In 2004, TV Little Hill participants went to Barcelona, to participate in the World Urban Forum; in 2007 they participated in the Venice Biennale. They also performed in many art expositions, such as Munich (2005), Oslo and London (2010), and Holland (2011).
- 10 The TV Little Hill Project is composed by: Lúcio Esteves, José Carlos Silva Pereira "Júnior", Luciano de Almeida, Marcus Vinícius Ferreira, Maycon Oliveira "Mc Maiquinho", Jesus Nicolas, Paulo Vitor da Silva Dias, Pedro Henrique, Rafael Moraes, Raniere Dias, Renato Dias, Rodrigo de Macedo and Cilan Oliveira.
- 11 In Rio de Janeiro, *favelas* were traditionally located on the city's many hillsides. Even though this is not necessarily the case today, they are still referred to as the "hill" in opposition to "the asphalt" which refers to the rest of the city's paved streets (many *favela* streets are still dirt paths), or, in other words, the non-*favela* part of the city.
- 12 Rio de Janeiro's drug traffickers belong to three major crime factions: Red Command (Comando Vermelho), Third Command (Terceiro Comando) and Friends' Friends (Amigos dos Amigos). The first crime faction Red Phalanx (Falange Vermelha) began at the dictatorship regime (1964-1985), when regular and political prisoners were kept together at Cândido Mendes' Prison. To more information, see Lima 2001; Misse 2007.
- 13 The Peace Building Project, implemented by the state government in 1999, aimed to "articulate state, municipal, and civilian social programs with the public-safety secretary. The main objective of this proposal was to create conditions for confronting drug trafficking using a logic distinct from that which prevailed up to then, which according to the government, had stimulated violent police incursions" (MIRANDA, and MAGALHÃES, 2000). Other *favelas* also were targeted for this new kind of intervention. A "*mutirão*" is any sort of collective effort to create better living conditions in a (generally poor) territory. Residents join together to build homes, install sewage pipes, garbage collecting, among other measures.
- 14 BOPE's mission is carrying out special operations for the military police, i.e., Public Safety in situations in which the military police doesn't have the capacity to intervene. BOPE operates in *favelas*, among other operations.
- 15 The pacification process that occurred in Pereirão is quite different from the experience of the Pacifying Police Units; though some similarities in its consequences for the residents' routines.
- 16 *Moral cleansing* can be defined as the *favelados*' efforts to differentiate themselves from vagabonds before and from drug traffickers, nowadays (Zaluar 1985; Machado da Silva 2008).

## **Subject Index**

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# Social Movements and Digital Media Trans-territorial Online Public Spheres in the Middle East and North Africa

Christina Schachtner

**Abstract:** Even in the first few weeks of the so-called “Arab Spring” in January 2011, digital media were identified as being essential instruments for organizing the political protests in the Middle East and North Africa. Yet digital media had already started to play a political role as arenas of discourse in which topics such as democracy, minority rights, gender and religion could be debated at least two to three years earlier. A critical online public sphere arose which had a transregional and global focus right from the start, as reflected in the self-image of one network actor when he explained: “In real life I’m a Saudi guy living in Saudi Arabia. But online I’m multinational, I’m multi-geographical”. This article presents the results of a study entitled “Communicative publics in cyberspace” investigating digital platforms which had been initiated in the Arab world, which is also where most of the contributions come from; this analysis is backed up by interviews with network actors and bloggers from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Following the concept of Nancy Fraser’s transnational public spheres (2007). I analysed the normative legitimacy and the efficiency of the communicative authority of digital arenas of discourse in the Middle East, identifying which political practices led to social movements in the digital sphere and which characteristics of digital media contributed to helping digital arenas of discourse turn into places where political resistance can develop.

**Keywords:** Social movements, trans-territorial online public spheres, Arab Spring

## 1. Introduction

This lecture addresses the connection between social movements and digital media, illustrated by the protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa. The empirical basis for discussion is taken from the findings of the ‘Subject Construction and Digital Culture’ study<sup>1</sup>, which analyzed political discourse in Arab online networks and blogs, and carried out interviews with Arab online actors. The online actors interviewed before and during the Arab Spring came from Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The analysis of online discourses primarily focused on Mideast Youth, an online network founded in Bahrain. Since Mideast Youth is linked to such international networks as Facebook, Twitter, CrowdVoice and a series of Middle East networks, it has a trans-territorial reach. The ‘Realigning Power Geometries in

the Arab World' conference provides a further point of reference. This conference, held in Leipzig in February 2012, was attended by around 60 scholars and researchers from the Arab world, invited by the Volkswagen Foundation/Germany.

According to Dieter Rucht, social movements are characterized by forms of protest evident as public actions "in which non-state groups and organisations advance a political and social concern and, in the process, express criticism or resistance" (Rucht 2012:6). This concept of protest includes critical discourse as a key element of social movements and that, in turn, is crucial in the analysis of Arab online discourse planned here. Moreover, such a view is compatible with the public sphere concept as elucidated in the work of Jürgen Habermas which is also congruent with my own research interests. For Habermas, the public sphere is always political; it presumes a separation of state and society, and, in principle, takes a critical view of state power, i.e., forms a political counterweight (Habermas 1990: 225 ff.).

In this lecture, I examine the question of how far trans-territorial public spheres develop as social movements in Arab networks which can effectively bring out diverse political views, and which role digital media play in this process.

In German-speaking countries, debate on the role of digital media in the formation of social protest has only just begun (see *Bürgerbeteiligung 3.0 2011*, published by Oekom). In contrast, against the background of the recent revolutionary events, awareness of the political significance of digital media in Arab countries has grown rapidly. As Tunisian media researcher Larbi Chouikha noted at the conference in Leipzig: "Communication technologies such as the Internet and the mobile phone greatly accelerated Ben Ali's flight and the fall of his regime" (Chouikha 2012:151).

To answer my question about the efficacy of political online public spheres in Arab networks, I additionally draw on another theoretical concept as well. Building on Habermas' work, Nancy Fraser has developed an approach to analyzing the efficacy of trans-national public spheres. Fraser has linked the political efficacy of transnational public spaces as trans-territorial public spheres, such as the Arab online public spheres investigated here, to two conditions: normative legitimacy and the efficacy of communicative power (Fraser 2007:226 2009: 77).

## 2. Normative Legitimacy

How far do the virtual discursive arenas in the Arab world represent normative legitimacy? According to Fraser, the normative legitimacy of trans-territorial public spheres has to be discussed in the context of inclusiveness and affectedness.

### 2.1. Inclusiveness

The question with regard to inclusiveness is who is acting in the trans-territorial discursive

sive arenas. Fraser points to the risk of dominance by “elites, who possess the material and symbolic pre-requisites for global networking” (Fraser 2007:240 / 2009: 88). She calls for, firstly, discursive arenas open to all who are affected by the issues at hand and, secondly, all interlocutors having roughly equal chances of expressing their views and placing issues on the agenda (Fraser 2007:247 / 2009: 93). This ideal may never be achievable, but the closer reality comes to it, the greater its political legitimacy.

The Arab discursive arenas investigated in our research are open to all. However, utilizing the participatory chances they offer requires economic resources as well as language and communication skills. The participants in these discursive arenas we have observed are primarily educationally advantaged young adults aged between 20 and 30. The Arab online public spheres we examined were influenced by a privileged class in an age group which forms the majority of the population in Arab countries, where the average age is about 26 years old.

Arab online actors recognised the risk of exclusive online public spheres reproducing precisely the offline exclusion mechanisms supposed to be compensated for in the online world. This is illustrated in remarks by Esra’a Al Shafei, founder of the Mideast Youth network. She noted: “There were so many people in the region they are not represented. The minorities, for example, atheists in the Middle East, Kurds, Bahais, members of other religions. So I wanted to do Mideast Youth in order to give minorities in the region a voice and so I founded it with this idea in my head” (online actor, 24, Bahrain). According to Esra’a Al Shafei, Mideast Youth sets out to provide a mouthpiece for critical voices from the entire region, an approach which indicates the network’s trans-territorial orientation. The desire to promote inclusion was also evident in taking the critical online discourse beyond virtual space into real spaces, where it linked up with protest on the streets. As Chouikha Larbi noted for the Tunisian revolution: “Via Facebook (...) those youths established types of action and mobilisation that were taken over into the ‘real’ everyday life by street protests, strike actions, riotous assemblies in front of public buildings, slogan and watchword shouting, the latest jokes, etc.” (Chouikha 2012: 152).

## 2.2. Affectedness

If citizenship can no longer be a sufficient principle for participation in trans-territorial public spaces, what can legitimise participation? According to Fraser, public opinion is legitimate when it is shaped and supported by those jointly involved in a “common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives” (Fraser 2007: 249); in brief, when it is based on the principle of affectedness.

Affectedness is evident from both the online discourses in Arab networks as well in the comments from our Arab interview partners. A cartoon on Mideast Youth says: “We grew up with 21<sup>st</sup> century culture and see the foolishness of old barriers and grudges.” Mobilising the affectedness of the young generation is a major concern among the online actors, as can be seen from the comments of 21-year-old female online actor



from the United Arab Emirates: "We wanted people to know 'look, we're the youth in the Middle East (...). We have the voice and we want it to be heard'" [female online actor 21, United Arab Emirates]. The principle of affectedness inherent in the criticism of ruling structures is sometimes taken to refer to the entire region and sometimes to individual groups similarly spread across the region. "There was a lack of freedom of speech in Middle East", explained an online actor from Bahrain, defining the lack of freedom of opinion as something affecting everyone. When the same online actor adds that "...we started inviting gay people to come in, gay or bisexual or transgender people to give interviews with Mideast Youth to talk about their life", then she is talking of the affectedness of certain groups, though these are similarly spread across the region.

### 3. Efficacy

According to Nancy Fraser, the question which arises when considering efficacy is how online discourses can be described as politically effective.

Fraser links the efficacy of communicative power to two conditions: (1) the translation of communicative power into binding laws and (2) the capacity of the public power to implement the discursively formed will (Fraser 2007:250 / 2009: 96/97). These conditions presuppose functioning democracies. However, functioning democracies are not a given in North Africa and the Middle East, but rather represent the objective which the social movements are striving towards. (Nancy Fraser is also aware that trans-territorial public spheres generally lack addressees and, in line with her model of transnational public spheres, suggests a need for transnational addressees answerable to transnational public opinion.)

Even if the pre-requisites for efficacy as defined by Fraser are often lacking in the Arab world, we can nonetheless ask the question of efficacious trans-territorial public spheres. In divergence from Fraser's argument, this can be examined at a different point, namely where and how political opinion is formed, i.e., in advance of formal law and its implementation. This is a reasonable approach since the way public discourse is shaped determines, together with other factors, the possibilities of translating political will into political reality.

In the public sphere networks in the Arab world which we investigated, three components could be identified which promise to turn virtual discursive arenas into a politically effective force: (1) criticism, (2) visions, and (3) solution strategies.

#### (1) Criticism

The leitmotif running through all the interviews we carried out with Arab online actors can be summarized as 'revealing taboos and breaking the silence'. This was not only evident in online commentaries and discussion contributions, but equally in videos, podcasts and newsletters, as Larbi Chouikha has described as the case in Tunisia. Tunisnews (tunisnews.net) is a daily newsletter distributed to over 10 000 Tunisians

every day by email, and further spread by traditional media such as Xerox copies and CDs (Chouikha 2012:153). In our study, we discovered that criticism throughout the region was directed to the lack of freedom and human rights, as well as the lack of rights for ethnic and religious minorities, women and those persons, such as homosexuals, who deviate from the propagated norms. According to a female blogger from Yemen, even simply writing about the three Arab-world taboos of politics, religion and sex is considered a provocation. The discursive transgression of these taboos in on-line arenas was signalled to the participants in the discussion by calls to refrain from criticism, threats, and actions ranging from blocking the blogs to arrest. The cultural scientist Ghada Alakhdar reported on the situation in Egypt: "Sensing the significance of social media, the internet was completely cut-off for a couple of days to control the revolution." (Alakhdar 2012:82). Despite such attacks, bloggers continued to post comments because the online actors consider it crucial to publish their criticism. As one online actor explained in relation to Yemen: "It's time for Yemen to be not hidden."

## (2) Visions

The formation of public opinion in virtual networks and blogs does not stop at criticism; visionary elements also emerge which point far beyond the status quo. The visionary appears in digital communication games initiated by questions such as 'What would you do if Saudi Arabia just has its first female president?' or 'What would you do if Kurdistan becomes a country in the Middle East with its own culture, with its own identity instead of being separated into four countries?' A different form of vision is favoured lifestyles which not only draw on a single cultural source, but many cultural sources (in the sense of mixed cultures). Here, the virtual public sphere was used as a field to experiment, as an online actor from Saudi Arabia explained: "In real life I'm a Saudi guy living in Saudi Arabia. But online I'm multinational, I'm multigeographical" (male online actor, 26 years old, Saudi Arabia).

Most obviously, the visionary remarks in the online discourses voice the desire for self-determination. The online actors' main concern is their own path into a different future. "This is a community", said one of the online actors, "that is created by Middle Easterners that represent us and not what other people are saying or thinking about us" (female online actor, 24 years old, Bahrain).

## (3) Solution strategies

Even before the Arab Spring, thinking about realising these visions belonged to the process of forming online public opinion. We are not able to say whether a revolution was already contemplated and even if it were, it would certainly not have been a topic expressed in a public discourse. The solutions discussed and advocated would not immediately be associated with a revolution, yet in retrospect can be seen to have an inherent revolutionary content. Education and learning were cited as the key means for social transformation, since they enable people to grasp and understand connections. A female online actor from Bahrain defined her idea of education as: "Learning is all about questioning what you're being told". Opening one's own mind both towards

the entire Arab cultural world and western democracies was seen as another strategy for change. This strategy is expressed not least in the multilingualism (Arabic, English, Farsi) of Mideast Youth or, for example, the creation of the CrowdVoice platform by Arab online activists, providing a space for social movements and tracking forms of protest from around the world.

Arab online actors rate the experience of difference highly since it fosters comparisons, an exchange of ideas, learning from others, and discovering new possibilities.

## **4. Digital conditions for a critical online public sphere**

"We use new media in order to fight against oppression – oppression against ourselves, oppression against minorities", explains Esra'a Al Shafei, the Mideast Youth founder. Arab online actors regard digital media as an indispensable instrument in developing conditions, namely normative legitimacy and efficacy, for a critical public sphere. In the following, I will outline three aspects related to the media which support a critical online public sphere (Schachtner 2012).

### **4.1. Internet – a place for reflection**

Communication technologies, as represented by digital media, encourage the practice of reflection. Communication requires experience, background knowledge, weighing up words in developing an argument, being aware of the arguments put forward by others and reacting to them. This process inevitably involves questioning, examining, re-considering, relativizing and expanding one's own perceptions and positions – in brief, reflecting on them.

Such processes can not only be encouraged by language as a means of communication, but also by images. During the Arab Spring, the image gained considerably in significance as a fast means of documentary communication on Arab platforms. Videos depicting events on Tahrir Square in Cairo or on Pearl Square in Manama transported the viewer(s) right into the heart of what was happening, in particular by presenting a reality hardly manipulated by film technologies. At the same time, the virtual space creates distance to offline events. This interplay between sensory proximity and distance contains the potential for a reflective practice which always bears within it the moment of resistance since, in principle, it challenges and questions and, in this way, lays the foundation for a critical public sphere.

### **4.2. Open-mindedness**

As transnational media, digital media support a quality only possible for human beings, and one which the Arab online actors regard as a central moment in a critical political public sphere: open-mindedness (Wulf 2006:135). As mentioned above, the

online actors are committed to an online public sphere providing space for cultural, ethnic, and religious differences. They regard the critical encounters with difference as a source of inspiration, not only personally, but also in reference to a global public sphere. In the trans-territorial exchange, they regard themselves as equal partners. As an online actor from Saudi Arabia put it: "In my blog I'm talking to the world. I'm trying to allow people to look at things especially in Saudi Arabia through Mideast Youth or through my blog to see the social and intellectual fabric of what makes Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia" (male online actor 26 years old, Saudi Arabia). The implication here is that one has something to offer for people outside the region which could also stimulate their own ideas and reflections.

### 4.3. Hybridity

Virtual spaces have hybrid structures in more than one sense. Here, I would like to limit my discussion to the facet of hybridity rooted in digital media's immateriality: the overlapping of the public and the private spheres. Since an online public sphere's constitution is not bound to a material location, I can participate in this public sphere from my home. This expands participatory chances and, at the same time, enables me to decide for myself when I want to be present in this public sphere; as long as I remain anonymous in cyber public space, I can return at any time to my private sphere. Immaterial cyber public space offers room for manoeuvre under the conditions in restrictive political systems which deny access to offline public spheres to particular groups and attempt to prevent counter-public spheres. It is hardly likely to be a coincidence that Arab women, often unable to move freely in offline public spheres, are so strongly represented in the discursive online political arenas, frequently playing a leading role, and using all possible digital media; as a blogger from Yemen put it: "I tweet, I blog, I skype, I chat, I sms" (female online actor, 26 years old, Yemen).

## 5. Conclusion

The political public spheres in Arab online networks analysed here form trans-territorial public spheres fostering an acknowledgement of difference, trans-territorial and trans-cultural exchange, ideas from outside, and common ground and new cultural mixes which transcend difference. Evaluated in terms of Fraser's criteria for the political efficacy of trans-territorial public spheres, affectedness is the most visible element in these public spheres. A young educationally advantaged Arab middle class cites the suppression of human rights, freedom and minorities as the core of this affectedness; behind it lies a desire for self-determined open-minded lifestyles, free from political and/or religious-cultural chains. On this level, there is a shared affectiveness across the region, even if the individual aspects of affectedness take different concrete forms in different Arab countries. By taking up and addressing this affectedness as a criticism of the prevailing political conditions in a divided public sphere, the online actors create a social movement with an open framework for action which is capable of absorbing different groups (Rucht 2012:12). In Dieter Rucht's terms, this

style of social movement which allows project-like, situational involvement is equally evident in the tendencies of young people in western countries who are politically involved (Rucht 2012:13).

In the Middle East and North Africa, digital media have not only started to play a role as an instrument of organising offline political protest now, but had already created spaces for reflection and dialogue years before, allowing an awareness to arise of what ought to change (Schachtner/Roth 2012:350). This awareness became a globally visible factor unable to be ignored politically any longer when it – as Rainer Winter has termed it – condensed into interfaces located between online public spaces and the sphere of political decision-making in the real world (Winter 2010:144): on Tahrir Square in Cairo, Pearl Square in Manama or Tripolis' Green Square. This confirms the ideas of Egyptian cultural scientist Sahar Abdel Hakim, who argues that discourses create reality. She writes: "In postmodern times we set ourselves the task of creating what we want through language that we organize as discourses with the intention of making it operate in place of reality as 'the real'" (Abdel Hakim 2012:70).

## Methodological Appendix

Research design: Grounded Theory

Primary data collection methods: Focused network analysis, interviews, visualisation

Sample size:       24 network analysis  
                       34 interviews  
                       51 visualisations

Study duration: 2009-2012

Age of interviewees: 8-32 years old

Countries involved in the research: Germany, Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Canada, USA, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

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## Notes

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Research interests: subject construction in virtual space, transculturality and digital media, online political resistance, cyberspace narratives.

## Movimientos sociales: revisitando la categoría identidad desde un enfoque espacial

Fernanda Torres

**Resumen:** Nos interesa en este trabajo discutir las identidades sociales y políticas (Giménez, 1996) configuradas alrededor de los movimientos sociales, pensando en su potencialidad analítica desde un enfoque espacial y específicamente orientado al análisis de la forma de protesta emblemática adoptada por los movimientos de desocupados en Argentina: el piquete. El concepto de *lugar* (Agnew, 1987) remite a configuraciones subjetivas de sentidos de apropiación y pertenencia, refiere al espacio definido y entendido en términos identitarios que, en estos casos, son identidades sociales y espaciales en un mismo movimiento. Por su parte, el concepto de *territorio* (Sack, 1986; Raffestin, 1993; Fernández, 2005) permite pensar en el poder y el control de un determinado espacio, marcando sus límites y la posibilidad de entrar y salir del mismo; remite a relaciones de fuerza, conflicto y disputa que nos ayudan a pensar la configuración de identidades políticas. Proponemos analizar la *práctica espacial* (Lefebvre, 1974) del piquete desarrollada por un movimiento de desocupados en Argentina, a través de los conceptos de *lugar* y *territorio* que suponen una herramienta para pensar las configuraciones identitarias sociales y políticas de los mismos. A través del análisis de dicha práctica analizamos los procesos de significación, de asignación de sentidos sociales que transforma el espacio en un *lugar*, en torno del cual se producen y recrean identidades sociales. Asimismo, nos interrogamos acerca de las formas mediante las cuales un espacio o un *lugar* se territorializa, se politiza y supone la transformación de una identidad social en una identidad política con inscripción territorial.

**Palabras clave:** Identidades políticas, identidades sociales, movimientos sociales, lugar, territorio

### 1. Introducción

Espacio, territorio, lugar, espacialidad, territorialidad... estos conceptos y categorías son frecuentemente citados en trabajos y tesis explicativas de diversos procesos sociales del pasado o el presente de nuestro mundo; no obstante lo cual, ésta presencia no es acompañada por la delimitación analítica de los mismos. Esta es una tarea que, al menos en el ámbito de los estudios sobre movimientos sociales, debe ser profundizada para poder hacer uso de estos conceptos con pertinencia, más aún cuando parte de nuestro horizonte explicativo está centrado en la conformación de sujetos e identidades colectivas.

Nos interesa indagar en los siguientes apartados que forman la presente ponencia, por el concepto de *territorio* y el concepto de *lugar*, entendiéndolos como dos dimensiones analíticas que exceden el nivel de generalidad de la categoría espacio y ayudan desde distintos ángulos a su operacionalización<sup>1</sup>. En especial, atendiendo al objetivo de analizar la imbricación entre la categoría espacial y los procesos de construcción de identidades colectivas sociales y políticas; para luego analizar dicha imbricación en el caso concreto de una forma de protesta social que han venido protagonizando diversos movimientos de desocupados (entre otros) en Argentina: el piquete. Este análisis empírico lo circunscribimos a una organización particular la Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados Aníbal Verón (CTD-AV).

Para esto, entonces, se vuelve necesario comenzar por problematizar el concepto de identidad con el cual trabajaremos.

## 2. El problema de la identidad

Retomo la discusión alrededor de los procesos de constitución identitaria, partiendo de un acercamiento no esencialista sino procesual y relacional de la misma. Una concepción de la identidad que sin dejar de considerarla, por tanto, como un resultado contingente e inestable de procesos, sentimientos y prácticas determinadas, tampoco desconoce la posibilidad de su definición y su potencial explicativo en tanto categoría que puede describir y analizar experiencias históricas y biográficas configurativas que han sedimentado, articulando la diversidad y desigualdad en modos de imaginación, cognición y acción que presentan elementos comunes. Esta versión experiencialista de la identidad, que coincide con la planteada por Grimson (2003), si bien retoma la visión constructivista, se diferencia de sus versiones más posmodernas porque enfatiza la posibilidad de la sedimentación.

Creo necesario, entonces, identificar la capacidad de los sujetos sociales de articular prácticas sociales y políticas en torno a una identidad que se erige y construye en relación a un *otros*, a un *ellos*, configurando históricamente una subjetividad colectiva que es el paso necesario hacia la posibilidad de la acción transformadora.

Por otro lado, coincidimos con los enfoques que han resaltado que la identidad no puede ser capturada por la noción de interés. Para Calhoun (1999) debe tenerse en cuenta que la identidad se define cada vez más en términos culturales y que muchas acciones colectivas emprendidas en las últimas décadas buscan construir o expresar una identidad más que conseguir algún objetivo de tipo material más asociados a la idea instrumental de la acción. Sugiere que las identidades y los intereses de los participantes en la acción colectiva no están objetivamente determinados, sino subjetivamente construidos, aunque bajo condiciones no sujetas al control individual. Acuerda en este sentido, con lo expuesto por Manuel Castells (1999:28) quien considera que la identidad refiere a la construcción de sentido, respondiendo a un atributo cultural o un conjunto de atributos culturales relacionados. Toma en cuenta la pluralidad de identidades que pueden atravesar a una misma persona pero considera que la fuente



de sentido siempre prioriza algún componente cultural sobre otros.

Por último, citando nuevamente a Calhoun, reconocemos que "(...) la identidad no es una condición estática y preexistente que pueda ser analizada como una influencia causal sobre la acción colectiva; tanto a nivel personal como colectivo la identidad es un producto variable de la acción colectiva" (Calhoun, 1999:79)

La identidad colectiva, entonces, surge del esfuerzo por resemantizar y resignificar nudos de sentido que no son "creados de la nada" sino que provienen de la propia historia colectiva. Pensemos en los sentidos históricamente construidos alrededor de la idea de trabajo que han predominado entre los sectores populares en nuestro país y cómo, si bien estos sentidos han sido reconfigurados luego de las transformaciones estructurales sufridas durante el neoliberalismo, no pueden negarse absolutamente. Por el contrario, los movimientos de desocupados han enfatizado a partir del propio nombre de sus organizaciones su reivindicación en tanto trabajadores, transformando su condición de desocupados en un adjetivo (contingente, provisorio) del sustantivo trabajadores: Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados; Coordinadora de Trabajadores desocupados, Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados.

En el caso de los movimientos sociales, además, el momento de la acción colectiva aporta nuevas percepciones y nuevos significados que deben ser distinguidos para pensar en la construcción identitaria del movimiento como tal. No sólo se alimenta del pasado sino que el momento de la acción y la propia experiencia colectiva en torno de dicha acción es la que permite la constitución de uno de los elementos constitutivos de la identidad: el *otro*. Los movimientos de trabajadores desocupados inscriben buena parte de la aparición colectiva del nosotros, la capacidad de transformar la primera persona del singular en plural, en la definición de la *otredad* frente a la cual se distinguen y definen. Y también frente al que se articula la acción social, es decir, no creemos que la propia acción colectiva construya identidad por sí misma, por el contrario, dicha acción debe suponer un *otro* frente al cual oponerse y reclamar y esa definición del *otro* no siempre es la misma, de ahí la necesidad de la corroboración empírica.

La alteridad, la acción (producto de la voluntad y la decisión colectivas) permiten pensar en la forma de construcción de la identidad en términos de movimiento social. Son atributos que en esta ponencia pensamos también para el referente organizativo que representa nuestra unidad de análisis y a los que les sumamos las definiciones espaciales como componentes centrales en dicha constitución identitaria. El espacio entendido en su doble dimensión de *lugar* y *territorio* nos permite introducir una distinción que también es necesaria realizar, la que permite definir las identidades sociales y las identidades políticas.

Aboy Carlés (2005) resalta la doble dimensión de la diferencia como componente indispensable para pensar la constitución de identidades políticas. La diferencia entendida como el límite que permite articular matrices sedimentadas de acción y la diferencia entendida como la ruptura y transformación de dichas matrices de acción. De

nuevo vemos la posibilidad de la contingencia y la permanencia casi como un “juego imposible”, donde no valen intentos por determinar su sentido a priori. Aboy Carlés define entonces la identidad política sobre la base de esta doble dimensión de la diferencia:

*“[...] como el conjunto de prácticas sedimentadas, configuradoras de sentido, que establecen a través de un mismo proceso de diferenciación externa y homogeneización interna, solidaridades estables, capaces de definir, a través de unidades de nominación, orientaciones gregarias de la acción en relación a la definición de asuntos públicos.”* Aboy Carlés, 2005: 121

De acuerdo a Giménez (1996, 1997), las identidades sociales pertenecen al campo de la construcción de “cultura subjetivada”, es decir, resultan de la interiorización peculiar de ciertos rasgos culturales por parte de los actores sociales que sirven para definir su unidad interna y su diferenciación externa; mientras que las identidades políticas surgen allí donde las identidades colectivas se orientan a la participación directa en el ejercicio del poder o a la intervención sobre los poderes públicos en términos de influencia y de presión.

Sobre ésta distinción analítica entre identidades sociales y políticas, aquí proponemos vincular los conceptos de *lugar* y *territorio*, que ampliaremos en los siguientes apartados, con el objetivo de allanar el camino para la comprensión de la relación espacio e identidades colectivas: el concepto de *lugar* remite a configuraciones subjetivas de sentimientos de apropiación y sentidos de pertenencia, refiere al espacio definido y entendido en términos identitarios y nos habla de aquellas identidades sociales que, en estos casos, son identidades *sociales* y *espaciales* en un mismo movimiento; por su parte, el concepto de *territorio* permite pensar en el poder y el control de un determinado espacio, marcando sus límites y la posibilidad de entrar y salir del mismo, remite a relaciones de fuerza, conflicto y disputa que nos ayuda a pensar la configuración de identidades *políticas*.

Consideramos fundamental la definición multidimensional del espacio para pensar la conformación de actores colectivos. Reivindicando una concepción social y relacional del espacio, entendemos que es la acción recíproca, la interacción social la que vuelve el espacio un territorio/lugar significativo. Y en tanto territorio/lugar social significativo es que puede pensarse en relación al proceso de construcción de una identidad social y/o política. Pero también consideramos que, como señala Auyero: “(...) lo espacial debe ser abordado no simplemente como producto de procesos sociales (esto es, el espacio como ‘socialmente construido’) sino también como parte de la explicación de estos procesos sociales (esto es lo social como ‘espacialmente construido’)” Auyero, 2002: s/p.

Con este objetivo, entonces, trabajaremos los conceptos de territorio y lugar como las dos formas analíticamente distinguibles para operacionalizar la categoría espacio, en pos de su uso analítico para la comprensión de los procesos de construcción de identidades colectivas.

### **3. Los lugares y las identidades sociales**

Desde mediados de la década del 70 en el mundo anglosajón a través de la geografía humanista de raíz fenomenológica, se puso el acento en el análisis del mundo vivido con especial énfasis en la cuestión del lugar. Para esta escuela el lugar es centro de significado y foco de vinculación emocional para las personas a la vez que puede ser identificado con un área delimitada y discreta. La carga simbólica de esta porción concreta del espacio es central, para algunos autores como Maffesoli (1990), donde el espacio es concebido como abstracto y el lugar asociado a significados y valores más concretos que son construidos con el paso del tiempo.

Doreen Massey (2005), desde una perspectiva diferente a la planteada por Maffesoli, propone un concepto de lugar en el cual la identidad pasa a ser un proceso de construcción en el que se involucra constantemente las relaciones con el afuera y permite considerar la posibilidad de conflictos en dicha construcción, dando por tierra con las pretensiones de unicidad y armonía que suponía la perspectiva humanista asociada a la comunidad. Por otro lado, la autora rechaza la necesidad de establecer fronteras precisas e inmutables para la identificación de los lugares, por el contrario, desde esta perspectiva se acentúa el carácter contingente y cambiante de los lugares y su posibilidad de superposición.

Si los lugares sólo son el producto de relaciones -entre el hombre y la tierra, y entre los hombres- y sobre todo de la conciencia de esas relaciones, los lugares y los no lugares no existen en forma absoluta. En el mismo orden de esta idea, los lugares pueden ser nómades y/o efímeros. Sólo existen gracias al sesgo de interacciones, viven el tiempo de una fiesta o de un mercado, o siguen a los que transportan su casa con ellos. El lugar es una potencialidad que crea la existencia humana y/o las relaciones sociales.

Sin duda el concepto de lugar se liga a una palabra clave: experiencia. La experiencia del sujeto "carga" de sentido al lugar; el lugar, entonces, es considerado como "acumulación de sentidos" o como "acumulación de significados". Esto trae consigo la dificultad metodológica de estudiar las subjetividades, más precisamente, la subjetividad espacial, al incluir en el análisis la construcción de sentidos que puede abrir la posibilidad, como veremos luego, de espacios de representación.

Agnew (1987) caracteriza el concepto de lugar a partir de tres dimensiones: localidad, ubicación y sentido de lugar. La localidad refiere a los marcos formales e informales a partir de los cuales se construyen las interacciones sociales cotidianas. La ubicación incluye la localidad sumándole los procesos económicos y políticos macro que operan a escalas más amplias y el tercer elemento, el sentido de lugar hace hincapié en las orientaciones subjetivas que se derivan de vivir en un lugar particular, respecto al cual se desarrollan sentimientos de apego a través de experiencias y memorias. Estos tres elementos funcionan en tanto momentos que se influyen y constituyen entre sí. Y si consideramos las identidades de los movimientos sociales como procesos complejos e inacabados pero referidos a un lugar particular, es decir como procesos

espaciales, es que debemos analizarlas como constituidas por los tres elementos de localidad, ubicación y sentido de lugar.

Concluimos que tanto la categoría *experiencia* como el denominado *sentido de lugar* son elementos centrales que nos ayudarán a comprender la espacialidad de las relaciones sociales y su incidencia en la configuración identitaria de los sujetos. Los lugares, entonces, permiten pensarse como dimensiones constitutivas de las identidades e inciden en tanto que determinación espacial en la configuración de las identidades sociales. Podemos, en este mismo sentido preguntarnos qué aportes introduce el espacio entendido como territorio para pensar dicha configuración.

#### **4. Los territorios y las identidades políticas**

Comenzaremos por recorrer la literatura abocada a la definición del concepto territorio y su potencial para el análisis de relaciones sociales, buscando identificar su aporte al análisis de las identidades y la constitución de actores políticos.

Partimos de la definición a la que llegan Schneider y Tartaruga (2006), luego de repasar el recorrido del concepto a través de los diversos referentes de las ciencias sociales, “[...]el territorio se define como un espacio determinado por relaciones de poder, determinando, así, límites ora de fácil delimitación (evidentes), ora no explícitos (no manifiestos)” Schneider y Tartaruga (2006: 64). Es decir, consideramos que la especificidad del concepto de territorio, a diferencia de la categoría de espacio, permite introducir la variable política al pensar el espacio construido en tanto territorio como producto de relaciones de poder, de dominación y resistencia.

El surgimiento del concepto de territorio se remonta a Friedrich Ratzel, geógrafo alemán de fines del siglo XIX, quien a pesar de introducir el análisis del papel del ser humano y las sociedades en la geografía, se mantiene dentro de los parámetros positivistas, darwinianos y desarrolla cierto determinismo natural. Pensó al territorio fundamentalmente con referencia al Estado.

En 1980, Claude Raffestin publica “Por una geografía del poder” en donde, considerando el pensamiento de Foucault, el autor sostiene que “[el] poder no se adquiere; es ejercido a partir de innumerables puntos;... [Las] relaciones de poder no están en posición de exterioridad con respecto a otros tipos de relaciones (económicas, sociales, etc.), pero son inmanentes a ellas.” (Raffestin, 1993: 53). El territorio se entiende como la manifestación espacial del poder fundamentada en relaciones sociales determinadas, en diferentes grados, por la presencia de energía –acciones y estructuras concretas- y de información –acciones y estructuras simbólicas.

Otro geógrafo, el norteamericano Robert Sack (1986) analiza la territorialidad humana en la perspectiva de las motivaciones. La territorialidad es una tentativa o estrategia, de un individuo o grupo para alcanzar, influenciar o controlar recursos y personas a través de la delimitación y control de áreas específicas – los territorios.

Más cerca de nuestras latitudes, el brasilero Marcelo Lopes de Souza en este mismo sentido enuncia que el territorio es el espacio determinado y delimitado por y a partir de relaciones de poder que define así un límite y que opera sobre un sustrato referencial, en definitiva, el territorio es definido por relaciones sociales. Tal como lo había sostenido Georg Simmel (1939) a fines del siglo XIX y principios del XX: "El límite no es un hecho espacial con efectos sociológicos, sino un hecho sociológico con una forma espacial" (Simmel, 1939: 216).

En general en el sentido apuntado por Raffestin, Sack o Souza puede haber varios territorios en un mismo espacio. Porque para que haya territorio, el límite debe ser usado para controlar su acceso; en términos generales podemos decir que tiene que existir una relación de poder, de subordinación actuando detrás.

Bernardo Mançano Fernández (2005) también coincide en que si bien todo territorio es un espacio (no siempre geográfico, puede ser social, político, cultural, cibernético, etc.); no siempre y no todo espacio es un territorio, son las relaciones sociales las que transforman el espacio en territorio y viceversa, siendo el espacio un a priori y el territorio un a posteriori; el espacio es perenne y el territorio intermitente.

El territorio desde la perspectiva de Fernandes, es un espacio fragmentado, controlado a partir de una relación social de poder. El ejercicio de dicho poder está dado por la imposición de un determinado código de inteligibilidad del espacio y ese poder es concedido por la receptividad. Ese espacio como fragmento, responde entonces a una representación construida a partir de una intencionalidad. La intencionalidad de las acciones es la que explica una forma de comprensión de un individuo, un grupo o una clase social para poder realizarse, materializarse en el espacio, la intencionalidad es una visión del mundo y se constituye en una identidad. Por esto, requiere delimitarse para poder diferenciarse y ser identificada. Y de esa manera construye una lectura parcial del espacio que es presentada como totalidad.

*"La producción de fragmentos o fracciones de espacios es el resultado de intencionalidades de las relaciones sociales, que determinan las lecturas y acciones propositivas que protejan la totalidad como parte, es decir, el espacio en su cualidad completa es presentado solamente como una fracción o un fragmento. (...) Así, la intencionalidad determina la representación del espacio. Por lo tanto, se constituye en una forma de poder, que mantiene la representación materializada y/ o inmaterializada del espacio, determinada por la intencionalidad y sustentada por la receptividad. Sin esa relación social el espacio como fracción no se sustenta."* Fernandes (2005: 3)

Esta aproximación teórica puede sernos útil para comprender los procesos de territorialización, desterritorialización y reterritorialización. Al pensar en estos *procesos geográficos* (Fernandes, 2005) podemos identificar la construcción de un espacio fragmentado a partir de la necesidad de un grupo de poder realizarse en dicho espacio, hacerlo inteligible y construir en forma simultánea una identidad. Y como la construcción de la identidad es siempre un proceso relacional, que se realiza y

construye frente a otros es que la dimensión espacial es entendida también como una producción construida oposicionalmente.

Podemos afirmar que el concepto de territorio supone un espacio determinado, controlado; supone construir un espacio en el cual se ejerzan relaciones de poder que permitan su control, la definición de quienes tienen acceso a él y quiénes no. El territorio, entonces, permite pensarse como dimensión constitutiva de lo político e incide en tanto que determinación espacial en la configuración de una identidad política.

Ahora bien, ¿es posible operacionalizar el concepto de espacio para el análisis de la constitución de los sujetos políticos, sin quedarnos en el abstracto campo de la teoría ni tampoco permanecer en la “llanura” empírica descriptiva que interprete al espacio en tanto “mero escenario”?

La construcción de *territorios y lugares* obedece a las interacciones y experiencias sociales que permitan su control en el primer caso y su apropiación subjetiva en el segundo. Creemos que la combinación de ambos conceptos es la que permite comprender la espacialidad como dimensión central y constitutiva de los movimientos sociales en tanto sujetos políticos y específicamente, de la constitución de la forma de protesta callejera característica de los movimientos de desocupados en nuestro país: los piquetes o cortes de ruta.

## **5. La Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados Aníbal Verón**

La Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados Aníbal Verón (CTD-AV) existe tal como hoy está configurada, luego de diversas rupturas que aquí no cabe reseñar, desde el año 2002; es una organización de carácter nacional, influenciada fuertemente por la organización política MPR Quebracho, ha mantenido una postura fuertemente confrontativa frente a los diversos gobiernos nacionales y provinciales desde sus inicios y desarrolla una estrategia de acción con una fuerte presencia callejera.

La CTD-AV actualmente posee desarrollo y presencia en diversas localidades de la Región Metropolitana de Buenos Aires (en adelante RMBA)<sup>2</sup>: Lanús, Quilmes, Alte. Brown, Ezeiza, Esteban Echeverría, San Vicente (Alejandro Korn), Fcio. Varela, Lomas de Zamora, La Plata, Merlo, Moreno, Luján, La Matanza, Malvinas Argentinas, 3 de Febrero, San Martín, Pilar, Tigre y Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires; y en algunas localidades de las provincias de Misiones, Chaco, Salta, Catamarca, La Rioja, San Juan, Santiago del Estero, Córdoba, Santa Fe, Río Negro y Chubut.

En las distintas localidades y barrios de la RMBA, donde la organización posee los datos más centralizados, administra alrededor de 3000 planes sociales de empleo, a los que habría que sumarle aproximadamente 1000 planes más de creación y gestión provincial en el interior, distribuidos en las distintas provincias donde la CTD tiene desarrollo.

Ha sido protagonista de diversos planes de lucha, cortes de calle en las diversas localidades donde existe, cortes de autopistas, acampes en la 9 de julio, movilizaciones, actos, etc. Siendo catalogada por los medios de comunicación, por la mayoría de los funcionarios gubernamentales con los que mantiene canales de diálogo y por algunos dirigentes de otras organizaciones políticas y de desocupados como una organización con una fuerte carga de intransigencia, de combatividad, de altos niveles de confrontación en términos discursivos y en sus metodologías de manifestación callejera. (Torres, 2006)

## 6. La forma de la protesta piquetera

El momento del piquete ha sido abordado en profundidad por diversas producciones bibliográficas en las ciencias sociales en nuestro país (Scribano, 1999; Barbeta y Lapegna, 2001; Svampa y Pereyra, 2003, por citar solo algunos). En este apartado me propongo analizar dicho *ámbito-momento* (Masseti, 2004) en tanto práctica espacial y como tal poder analizarlo en términos de territorio y lugar.

El piquete es un repertorio de acción de protesta utilizada por los trabajadores desde hace más de un siglo. Los piquetes como parte de la tradición obrera argentina regresan bajo nuevas circunstancias y nuevas definiciones. Consideramos, entonces, que debe ser resaltada la línea de continuidad que permite entender la emergencia de los piquetes de los desocupados como una reelaboración de una tradición de lucha que contiene no sólo una cualidad de reconocimiento en tanto eslabón de la lucha de los trabajadores y sentirse y definirse, entonces, como tales sino también en tanto metodología de combate, de barricada, de confrontación.

*"Estar en el corte...cómo te explico? Es lindo...porque nos sentimos fuertes, capaces de ganar, entendes? Es un lugar en donde por primera vez nos tienen que escuchar, no pueden hacerse los tontos porque es el lugar donde somos fuertes y saben que no tenemos nada que perder."* Entrevista a Francisco, participante de base, Malvinas Argentinas, CTD-RMBA.

Ahora bien, notables son también las diferencias que distancian esta analogía.

En primer lugar, ya no es el obrero, fundamentalmente fabril, el que protagoniza los piquetes, sino desocupados, que se consideran a sí mismos trabajadores pero que ya no lo son y la metodología de protesta lleva como principal demanda volver a su condición de tales. Son desocupados los que protagonizan los piquetes pero no lo hacen solos sino, generalmente, rodeados de sus familias. Sería, en verdad más ajustado decir: "no lo hacen solas", la mujer es quien rápidamente asume el papel central en la protesta de desocupados en casi todas las experiencias registradas; aunque, como veremos, no deja de haber excepciones.

Los piquetes de los desocupados tuvieron desde sus inicios una impronta familiar mucho mayor: son los desocupados como expresión de la exclusión social de familias

enteras del mercado laboral, representadas fundamentalmente por las mujeres de esas familias, por las madres y sus hijos jóvenes y pequeños.

Ya no estamos ante una fábrica, ahora el escenario es la ruta. Se construye la efectividad del piquete al impedir la circulación logrando así la atención de funcionarios públicos o de agentes privados ante los cuales se eleva la demanda asumiéndolos como responsables.

Por último, creemos imprescindible resaltar que, el corte de ruta supone la creación de un espacio novedoso, en tanto aporta al campo de construcción de redes, roles e identidades colectivas en torno a la organización de desocupados.

Uno de los elementos analíticos que emergen de nuestro trabajo de campo es que las personas, hayan o no participado de un piquete, de un corte de ruta o calle por tiempo indeterminado, crean un lazo de identificación con la organización a partir del mismo, recrean lazos de solidaridad y pertenencia con sus pares y se piensan parte de una experiencia de lucha que puede enunciar y relatar en tanto protagonista. Quienes se han sumado a la organización más recientemente, en momentos en los que este tipo de cortes se tornaron impensables para llevar a cabo al menos en la RMBA (sobre todo a partir del cambio de escenario luego de la "masacre" del Puente Pueyrredón, ya reseñada), se aferran a esa identidad, solidaridad y pertenencia a través de la reproducción de un discurso ya construido, de una presencia con una fuerza simbólica tal que refiere a prácticas que no han encarnado en forma personal pero que son apropiadas:

*"Yo desde que estoy en la CTD no se han hecho cortes, más que por unas horas en el centro...pero yo me siento igual un piquetero porque estoy en la seguridad de las marchas, con la capucha y el palo y porque sé que cuando haya que volver a hacer cortes yo voy a estar ahí...por lo que me han contado creo que me gustaría, porque es como ser el que manda en la calle...por lo menos mientras dura el corte, no?"* Entrevista a Martín, participante de base, La Plata, CTD-RMBA.

Si bien coincidimos con los autores que han resaltado la transitoriedad de ésta identificación, muy bien sintetizada con la frase "cuando vamos de piqueteros" (Ferraudi Curto, 2007) o "estar con los piqueteros" (Quirós, 2006) enunciación más habitual que "ser piquetero", no restamos por eso su potencialidad como espacio y como momento articulador de identificaciones. Tal como desarrollamos en el capítulo II la noción de identidad que defendemos no responde a una concepción cerrada e inmutable, sino que por el contrario es contingente y cambiante y encontramos en el momento del piquete un punto de condensación de los rasgos que la CTD como organización construye entre sus miembros como constitutivos de su perfil de lucha y combatividad. Por otro lado, la posibilidad de demarcar un espacio como territorio apropiado sobre el que se ejerce poder nos permite comprender la constitución de un espacio político que en su definición y defensa se imbrica la constitución de la organización como actor político.



No obstante esto, debemos señalar que el piquete en tanto que "estigma" también está presente entre los miembros base de la organización que en ocasiones dejan entrever su disconformidad o corrimiento respecto a dicho perfil de combatividad y lucha.

Evaluamos imprescindible, entonces, detenernos en la asimilación por parte de "la Aníbal Verón" de una metodología de protesta característica de los desocupados como es el "piquete". En este sentido, proponemos la hipótesis de que el "corte de ruta" actúa como un espacio de lucha territorial, se organiza como una práctica espacial que contribuye a la adopción de una identidad de la CTD como colectivo demandante de sus necesidades y reivindicaciones, y en tanto tales disputan no sólo por controlar el espacio y su acceso sino también por dotarlo de significado.

De modo similar, creemos que la construcción de una referencia propia por parte de los miembros de la organización también tiene estrecha relación con ésta idea de "piqueteros", organizando, a su vez, disputas y conflictos en torno a su significación frente a otras organizaciones de desocupados. En éstas disputas y conflictos es que se comienza a delinear la identidad política, la posibilidad de constitución de un nosotros que se define en términos de luchas por el poder, en este caso, el poder de dar nombre y definición a la acción colectiva, sintetizada en la idea del "piquete" incluso en los períodos en los que no se llevan adelante cortes de rutas.

## **7. Movimientos sociales: construcción de lugares y territorios durante la protesta**

"Somos los piqueteros", "Este es el movimiento piquetero", "¿Dónde nos vemos compañeros? En la ruta!" Estas son todas expresiones comunes de escuchar entre los dirigentes y miembros de organizaciones de desocupados que aluden al piquete como la traducción principal de ser un desocupado organizado en cuanto a metodologías de lucha se refiere.

La práctica del piquete se torna fundamental a la hora de pensar la territorialidad de la organización al plasmar la construcción o territorialización de la misma: se pelea por el control de un área o espacio, determinando sus límites y decidiendo sobre la circulación sobre el mismo, se controla la posibilidad de su acceso. Esta pelea tiene claros oponentes: el Estado, a través del cuerpo policial que le responde y también personificado en los funcionarios con los cuales se entablan los canales de negociación.

*"Y es en el corte cuando más nos sentimos poderosos porque ahí estamos plantados, hacemos del corte, de la calle como si fuera nuestra, es donde nosotros podemos mandar y ellos, los políticos, la policía nos tiene que escuchar, por más que a veces no nos den lo que pidamos..."* Entrevista a Perla, Coordinadora Moreno, CTD-RMBA

El piquete es, entonces un territorio porque claramente concretiza en el espacio el ejercicio de poder de la organización, marcando límites y controlando el acceso y la circulación a través de dicho límite. Pero también el piquete es un lugar y como tal es apropiado por los miembros de la organización en el proceso de construcción del *nosotros* que la sustenta, resta entonces que nos interroguemos acerca de las representaciones y sentidos que son construidos por los miembros de la CTD de la RMBA alrededor del piquete no ya en términos de territorio sino en términos de *lugar*.

De acuerdo a nuestro trabajo de campo, hemos podido comprobar que dicha construcción difiere de acuerdo al otorgamiento de sentido que es dado por cada quien dentro de un mismo movimiento o una misma organización.

Por empezar, diremos que un grupo fundamental dentro de la CTD-RMBA (y de casi todos los movimientos de desocupados) lo ocupa la mujer. Las mujeres de la CTD si bien no todas piensan o sienten igual, en su gran mayoría manifiestan respecto al piquete ciertas apreciaciones que son sorprendentemente elocuentes.

Diversos relatos de mujeres nos hablan de un proceso de cambio en la forma de entender, concebir y vivir el piquete: desde una posición de temor o aprehensión ante una práctica que se les aparecía como de excesiva exposición, el corte de calle o ruta; a partir de la necesidad y de la ausencia de caminos eficientes alternativos pasaron a aceptar esta forma de lucha, y a través de su práctica concreta la revalorizaron no sólo por su eficacia sino por su valor simbólico y social. El lugar de la mujer en el piquete si bien al comienzo estuvo restringido al cuidado de los niños y la organización de la comida o de las "comodidades" para pasar las horas en el corte, pronto fue asumiendo otras tareas organizativas y de representación: participación en las reuniones de coordinación con otras fuerzas políticas o sociales, articulación de alianzas, reuniones de negociación con autoridades o responsables políticos de cargos de gobiernos.

¿Cómo se explica esta transformación en el plano de las representaciones de las mujeres de la CTD y cómo se explica el proceso de cambio en las tareas materiales que llevan a cabo?

Sin duda, respecto al primer punto debemos pensar en los sentidos, relaciones y cambios subjetivos que involucra la práctica misma del piquete. Como ya dijimos, la práctica del piquete supone una apropiación del espacio, una delimitación de un área sobre la cual la organización pasa a "mandar" donde el control del acceso y el poder sobre dicha área se manifiestan, durante el tiempo que dure el piquete, en toda su potencialidad. Esta apropiación lleva consigo sentidos y subjetividades que necesariamente nos remiten a la construcción de una identidad en tanto nosotros que se opone a un "otros" y que pelea por un mismo objetivo, en esta construcción identitaria la apropiación del espacio nos remite, entonces a la idea de "lugar".

Las mujeres nos hablan de la revalorización de su rol, de su función en tanto madres, cocineras y organizadoras del hogar ahora transmutado en un hogar "público" ya no puertas adentro sino en el espacio común y a la vista de todos; pero también de su

capacidad de ofrecer el cuerpo para la resistencia y la defensa de ese territorio ganado. Saben que el número es una de las pocas variable que estos movimientos pueden utilizar como recurso de defensa ante un posible desalojo o represión y basta visitar cualquier barrio o acercarse a cualquier piquete o manifestación de las organizaciones de desocupados para notar que la presencia femenina es clara e indiscutiblemente la predominante. Las mujeres se perciben entonces como un factor de poder.

Por su parte, los jóvenes miembros de la CTD-RMBA tanto mujeres como varones pero aún más éstos últimos, se apropian del piquete a través de su rol en tanto miembros de la organización que aportan fuerza, disponibilidad horaria, noctambulismo pero también "aguante", capacidad de resistencia, experiencia callejera. El espacio para ellos está bajo su control. Esto puede verse con mayor claridad en la experiencia de la construcción de los cordones de autodefensa que actúan en los piquetes, marchas o cualquier manifestación pública que lleve adelante la organización.

Dicho grupo que funciona organizado como tal solo en la CTD de la región metropolitana, es una suerte de formación que pretende garantizar la seguridad del grueso de la columna de manifestantes ante posibles embates represivos. Implica una formación de cierta regularidad, que incorpora a poco más de media centena de miembros, la enorme mayoría de ellos jóvenes, que aparecerán públicamente con sus rostros tapados y portando palos en una clara actitud desafiante ante la posibilidad del enfrentamiento represivo. El importante despliegue que implica, nos lleva a la reflexión sobre los aditamentos que esta tarea tan particular suma en el proceso de subjetividad de sus miembros, la importancia que posee en términos políticos, pensando dicha tarea como una forma de expresividad emergente de "la parte de los sin parte"<sup>3</sup>, así como la disputa que encarna, aunque más no fuera en un plano simbólico, al poner en cuestión el monopolio de la violencia en manos del Estado. Sin duda representa una práctica espacial de control territorial que incluso tiene componentes corporales claros y directos.

Los hombres adultos de la CTD son notablemente los más débiles en términos numéricos respecto a las mujeres y los jóvenes pero podemos notar que su presencia en los piquetes es más habitual incluso que en las manifestaciones u otras acciones de protesta de la organización. De mis conversaciones con algunos de ellos he podido interpretar que el protagonismo y la exposición que supone el piquete para la construcción de la identidad y de la imagen pública de la CTD los incentiva a participar de la actividad y de la apropiación del espacio que a través de la misma se lleva a cabo.

Por último, los niños quienes aparentemente para los análisis de las organizaciones de desocupados más habituales no poseen demasiado interés, creo que en el caso del piquete y su desarrollo son centrales, otorgan al lugar las notas lúdicas y festivas que los niños suelen hilvanar a su alrededor pero también condicionan el lugar a ser apropiado por los mayores de diferente manera, no sólo es una escenario de pelea sino que se resignifica en términos familiares, posee características de lugar de crianza, lugar al que se traslada la familia entera, y como tal debe ser defendido y cuidado.

A su vez, estos “grupos” identificables en los piquetes que se desarrollan en la región metropolitana de Buenos Aires, no son los mismos que pueden ser encontrados en los piquetes que se realizan en localidades del interior del país, obedeciendo dichas diferencias a variables económicas y políticas de cada región pero junto con esto a diferentes construcciones y militancia del propio movimiento social en cada lugar.

## 8. Conclusiones

El piquete como forma de la protesta característica de los movimientos de desocupados en nuestro país, conlleva diferentes características: representa, por un lado, una osadía, un desafío y por otro, genera y reproduce lazos y gestos de solidaridad. Por ambos rasgos ofrece un momento excepcional para observar un fragmento del proceso de construcción de la identidad de los desocupados, destacando que dicha construcción tiene en el “momento” de la práctica espacial concreta de la acción de protesta un elemento trascendental.

Se trata de una osadía porque implica un desafío muy alto: con sólo los cuerpos impedir la circulación de vehículos, mercancías y personas y hacerlo mediante la clara infracción de una ley que expresamente prohíbe esta acción. La posibilidad represiva en esta modalidad de protesta siempre es elevada (los cortes protagonizados por la CTD, además, involucran, generalmente, altos niveles de confrontación) y la posibilidad de resistencia por parte de los piqueteros ante un intento de desalojo también.

Los protagonistas de la acción, los piqueteros, son personas que se definen a sí mismos por no tener demasiado por perder y, por ende, tampoco tienen demasiado para negociar, lo que supone una mayor posibilidad de recurrir a la confrontación directa para dirimir el conflicto.

Representa también una “osadía simbólica” la cual posee una importancia enorme. Recordemos que estamos hablando de personas que, en su mayoría no posee antecedentes previos de militancia y en muy pocos casos tienen experiencias organizativas previas. Generalmente se trata de mujeres que en muy pocas ocasiones anteriores han protagonizado prácticas y actividades que acarrearán el abandono del ámbito privado, familiar. Para estas personas sentirse protagonistas y parte de un grupo que los contiene, con el que se identifican, y llevan adelante actividades que le brindan prestigio, dignidad y confianza en la fuerza propia, supone un cambio en su subjetividad que reconocen como uno de las primeras “conquistas” que les da el piquete:

*“No tenemos otra opción que salir a pelear por las cosas que conseguimos. Si no peleamos contra este gobierno, contra todo este régimen que tenemos en contra, es imposible tener las cosas porque nadie nos da nada, (...) no es que estamos por gusto en la calle, en los cortes si tuviéramos fuentes de trabajo realmente como corresponde seguro que no estaríamos en la calle y que no seríamos todas las organizaciones que están, no? (...)Tengo la esperanza de que, no sé si mis nietos, pero quizás las otras generaciones lleguen a entender*

*que lo que estamos haciendo es para un cambio en la Argentina.*" Entrevista a Tejerina, Coordinadora de Lanús, CTD-RMBA.

*"Nosotros sabemos que es con el piquete como hemos conseguido las cosas, es gracias al piquete sino nunca nadie nos habría dado nada, pero además de las cosas, de los planes y eso... con el piquete pudimos sentirnos fuertes, sentir que podemos...y también, ¿viste? A mí por lo menos, me ayudó a darme cuenta que no es que estoy solo con mis problemas sino que estamos todos en la misma"* Entrevista a Oscar, Coordinador General Quilmes, CTD-RMBA.

"Sentir que podemos", "que nos respeten", "que en el barrio ya nos miran distinto", "que en la ciudad nos respetan" son todas evaluaciones del piquete, los cortes y las movilizaciones no sólo como vehículos para "conseguir cosas", es decir, exceden la evaluación instrumental y racional de formar parte de una acción que se pretende exitosa en base a un cálculo de costo-beneficio; sino del piquete como practica espacial que supone desnudar la situación de desigualdad por la que atraviesan los miembros de la CTD y su capacidad de reacción, de resistencia, de antagonismo frente a esa situación de desigualdad.

Ahora bien, más allá de las voces de los dirigentes y coordinadores, debemos decir que hemos recabado testimonios por parte de las bases de la organización donde el piquete no aparece señalado con esa carga positiva y orgullo, sino como una suerte de "carga" que les supone la actividad y la estigmatización que a veces sufren como consecuencia de dicha práctica: *"A mí a veces me cansa el piquete, hay veces que salimos todas las semanas...es mucho! Además, ponele....a mis hijos en la escuela les dicen 'hijos de piqueteros'"* Entrevista a Mónica, participante de base, Quilmes, CTD-RMBA. También podemos citar las palabras de otro participante: *"Acá en el barrio muchos nos critican por piqueteros, por "quilomberos" pero eso a mí no me importa porque la verdad yo prefiero ser piquetero y no chorro"* Entrevista a Pablo, participante de base, Villa 31, CTD-RMBA.

Este tipo de comentarios fueron ofrecidos por diversos miembros de la CTD aunque en forma tímida y solapada, coladas entre frases más acordes al relato "oficial" y posturas "formateadas" a lo que, entendemos, pensaban que nosotros esperábamos escuchar. También, fue usual encontrar frente al reconocimiento del estigma o la sanción social, la propia reivindicación de la metodología de protesta como única alternativa para reclamar sus necesidades.

De este modo, en casi todos los relatos acerca de los piquetes aparece el tema de la solidaridad, el piquete refuerza la construcción de un nosotros, la idea de sentirse parte, de construcción de la identidad que es reforzada e informada por la inscripción territorial y por los rasgos de confrontación y resistencia que lleva adelante la CTD.

Podemos ver, entonces como en el piquete vuelven a fundirse las dos categorías que presenté más arriba: territorio y lugar. Esta combinación puede observarse con mayor claridad en las palabras de un referente de la CTD quien habla del piquete y lo re-

laciona con el poder y el control pero también con la dignidad, el orgullo y la identidad:

*"(...) a los compañeros es una riqueza importante que le da el piquete, o sea, lo quieren defender a muerte, es defender su piquete, más allá de que tengas la capacidad o no, pero... o sea, es como que tenes poder por un ratito, viste cuando tenes poder?, la posibilidad de poder, de tener poder por un rato, eso es lo que pasa con el piquete, en el piquete se toma la decisión y se corta ruta ..."yo no te deajo pasar nada y me chupa un h..." o sea, salís a cortar ruta y vas a la ruta y cortas: y cortas, y que vengan a hablar con vos, "yo de acá no me voy" (...) el primer piquete de la CTD fue emotivo al mango, o sea, pasó por todo, por todas las pasiones de un ser humano, o sea, de alegría a tristeza, de tristeza a bronca, de bronca a dolor y de dolor a alegría, o sea era una cosa...y a victoria, todo el proceso lo tenías ahí y eso se refleja después en su trabajo, o sea, al otro día estás trabajando por ese piquete y es identidad: son piqueteros, o sea, son piqueteros, somos piqueteros, y da orgullo eso, muchos tienen vergüenza, por ejemplo mucha gente dice: los piqueteros como..., viste, los peligrosos, los compañeros se sienten re contentos con ser piqueteros, le decís piquetero y está orgulloso de serlo y vos vas al barrio y tienen todas las fotos de los cortes de ruta y lo bueno es que tomaron una identidad y esa identidad la van a defender a muerte"* Entrevista a Paulo, Coordinador General La Plata, CTD-RMBA

Podemos señalar entonces como comentarios finales que la práctica espacial del piquete representa un elemento que en tanto *ámbito momento* se podría definir como la posibilidad transitoria de constituir identidad política. Dicha posibilidad pudimos observarla entre los miembros que forman parte de la CTD en todas las localizaciones estudiadas, desde esta doble dimensión señalada: como proceso de constitución identitaria que refiere a una disputa espacial en dicha constitución y como momento de articulación de dichas identificaciones y prácticas sociales espaciales con la conformación de la organización en tanto actor político. El espacio es producido por, pero además explica, los lazos sociales, las solidaridades y los conflictos que toda práctica política engendra. La construcción de una identidad, de un nosotros por oposición a un otros y la posibilidad del antagonismo que dicha oposición supone debe ser entendida como una construcción espacial a la vez que social cuando entendemos el piquete como práctica y construcción espacial en términos de territorio y en términos de lugar.

## Abreviaturas

**CTD-AV:** Coordinadora de Trabajadores Desocupados Aníbal Verón

**MPR:** Movimiento Patriótico Revolucionario

**RMBA:** Región Metropolitana de Buenos Aires

## **Anexo metodológico**

La estrategia planteada para llevar a cabo la investigación en pos de los objetivos planteados y que da sustento a la presente ponencia es eminentemente cualitativa y apela, a su vez, al uso de fuentes secundarias para la reconstrucción teórica de las herramientas conceptuales utilizadas en el análisis empírico.

Se trata de un abordaje centrado en la descripción *densa* de la práctica espacial del piquete protagonizada por la CTD-AV de la RMBA, apelando a su interpretación a la luz de las categorías teóricas centrales construidas para tal fin. Para esto me valí, por un lado, del análisis de 8 entrevistas a los actores que son relevantes para mi estudio: referentes y miembros de la CTD-AV de la RMBA. Y, por otro lado, de las reflexiones obtenidas a partir de diversas notas de observación y observación participantes en dos piquetes protagonizados por la CTD.

### **Entrevistas realizadas**

- Francisco (49 años) Participante de base, Malvinas Argentinas CTD-AV RMBA. Entrevista realizada el 19/04/2007, en el penal de Marcos Paz donde permaneció 3 meses detenido luego de una movilización de la CTD.
- Martín (20 años) Participante de base, La Plata, CTD-AV RMBA, 26/06/2010
- Mónica (23 años) Participante de base, Quilmes CTD-AV RMBA. Entrevista realizada el 25/09/2010.
- Oscar (40 años) Coordinador General de Quilmes, CTD-AV RMBA. Entrevista realizada el 25/09/2010.
- Pablo (50) Participante de base, Villa 31, CTD-AV RMBA. Entrevista realizada el 05/04/2010.
- Paulo (27 años) Coordinador General de La Plata, entrevista realizada el 20/08/2009 y el 25/06/2010.
- Perla (43 años) Coordinadora de la CTD-AV de Moreno, entrevista realizada el 20/05/2010
- Tejerina (46 años) Miembro de la mesa de coordinadores de Lanús CTD-AV RMBA. Entrevista realizada el 22/03/2010.

### **Observaciones de piquetes**

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- 14 de septiembre de 2010. La Plata, acampe y corte de calles céntricas, frente a la casa de Gobierno de la Provincia de Buenos Aires en reclamo de planes sociales y la puesta en marcha de las cooperativas de empleo.

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## Notas

- 1 Seguimos aquí el esquema de análisis planteado por Retamozo para pensar la categoría hegemonía, quien distingue su funcionamiento en tanto categoría y en tanto conceptos, retomando el debate entre Zemelman y Dussel: "Es decir, entendemos por categorías una lógica formal teórica que propone herramientas para el abordaje analítico de fenómenos. Por concepto, en un nivel menor de abstracción, los diferentes contenidos posibles que adquiere una categoría implementada en la reconstrucción de un proceso particular y en función de una problemática específica." (Retamozo, 2011: 40)
- 2 La Región Metropolitana se refiere a un ámbito territorial que incluye la mancha urbana y los centros de diferente tamaño que se encuentran ubicados dentro de una línea imaginaria delimitada por niveles de interacción presentes o potenciales. El criterio seguido para la definición es funcional, entendiéndose al ámbito territorial como una unidad que genera una cobertura de flujos y relaciones cuyo eje es un área metropolitana. Para el caso de Buenos Aires, la Región Metropolitana, incluye además de los 24 Municipios de la zona metropolitana (Tigre, Malvinas Argentinas, José C. Paz, San Miguel, San Fernando, San Isidro, Vicente López, San Martín, Tres de Febrero, Hurlingham, Ituzaingó, Morón, La Matanza, Moreno, Merlo, Ezeiza, Esteban Echeverría, Alte. Brown, Florencio Varela, Berazategui, Lomas de Zamora, Quilmes, Lanús, Avellaneda), llamado comúnmente Conurbano Bonaerense, por lo menos a otros 17 más (La Plata, Berisso, Ensenada, Brandsen, Luján, Marcos Paz, Pilar, General Rodríguez, General Las Heras, Cañuelas, Presidente Perón, San Vicente, Islas de San Fernando, Zarate, Campana, Exaltación de la Cruz y Escobar).
- 3 Nos referimos a la expresión utilizada por J. Ranciere. Para ver más sobre una lectura posible del Movimiento Piquetero a la luz de la propuesta teórica de Ranciere sugerimos ver Muñoz, 2005.

## Índice de temas

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“La privatización de YPF en Comodoro Rivadavia. Algunas características y consecuencias sociales y laborales” en Trabajo y Sociedad N° 18. Santiago del Estero: Unes. 2012

“Territorio y lugar. Potencialidades para el análisis de un movimiento de desocupados”. Revista Geograficando N° 7. La Plata: UNLP. 2011

“Espacio, identidad y política en los movimientos de desocupados en Argentina, el caso de la CTD-Aníbal Verón” Tesis de doctorado publicada en memoria académica. La Plata: UNLP. 2012.

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## "We grew as we grew": Investigating Visual Methods with Three Young People over Time

Shannon Walsh

**Abstract:** Educational research indeed has the power to transform the society in which we live and the communities in which we work. We must not naively imagine that having the desire to make a change in people's lives will mean that that will be the case, as sometimes there may be surprising, unintended negative repercussions as well. Other constraints such as structural violence and institutional racism can also intersect with the possibility of making tangible change through educational research. Qualitative assessment with a longitudinal approach is one approach that can reveal both the impacts, and the limitations of educational research on social change. This paper discusses these issues through grounded examples from an HIV educational project that used visual methodologies with a group of youth in Cape Town, South Africa over a number of years. Almost ten years later we interview participants about what impacts the work has had on their lives. Each has traveled on different journeys and been faced with different constraints that has implications of the effectiveness of such work. Where are they now, and as adults, what do they have to say about the visual methodologies, memory and social change?

**Keywords:** AIDS, Longitudinal Research, Memory, Participation, Social Change, South Africa, Visual Methods, Khayelitsha

### 1. Introduction

As Bren Neale writes, "time is a complex and endlessly fascinating phenomenon, not simply the medium through which we do research, but an important topic of enquiry in its own right" (Neale 3: 2010). Indeed, we often do not have a chance to gain insight over time on the educational research we have undertaken. Time is a significant marker of change, and looking at the elements of what remains allows research to take on an entirely new form. Longitudinal assessment itself can pose problems, as questions of memory, perception, and the continual re-writing our own biographies come into play. Of course, it is impossible to precisely isolate the impacts of a particular educational project from the multitude of factors that shape any one person's life. These are significant obstacles in assessing affects through the life span of participants. Yet the question remains: How do experiences with educational, visual research for social change effect participants over the course of their lives? What can we learn from their self-reports? And further, what can we learn from taking a longitudinal approach to educational research, in which we move through time and space with participants, documenting their lives and the factors that affect their development? These ques-

tions form the basis of this article and the ongoing research I have been doing with a group of young people from Cape Town, South Africa. This is a preliminary reflection on how longitudinal approaches can offer insight into wider impacts and limitations of educational research using visual methodologies. While a small project like this cannot hope to make grand statements around impacts of this work more broadly, the reflections of key project participants point to some of what is unseen in educational visual research. It also can give some indication of what sticks, and the memories that weave their way into life stories and that can ground young people's possible futures. It begs the question how much of this kind of learning contributes to the building blocks necessary to become engaged adults and social agents?

Longitudinal viewpoints also highlight the political nature of educational research and how race, gender, class and other structural factors can never be wished away. These political factors will continue to be highly influential in any project. The balance must be maintained between an understanding that individual change is not alone sufficient, while at the same time valuing the wider transformative potential of educational work in people's lives and communities.

## 2. Background of the 'Soft Cover' Project

The background of this project begins ten years ago. In 2002 Claudia Mitchell and I ran a series of visual, educational and creative workshops with small group of South African young people aimed at understanding their perceptions about HIV and AIDS, beginning with a youth-centered conference at the Center for the Book in Cape Town.<sup>1</sup> The project was called "Soft Cover" and brought together young people with known visual artists, people living with AIDS, health practitioners, educators, graffiti artists and writers in an attempt to enliven HIV prevention efforts and to break the stigma around AIDS. It was the beginning of work with a group of racially diverse young people from Atlantis, Khayelitsha and Rondebosch that included creative writing workshops, participatory film-making projects, poetry, painting, interviews, ethnographic and qualitative visual research that continued over the next decade.<sup>2</sup>

The initial hunger with which young people wanted to tell their stories, to speak from their experiences, perceptions, curiosities, and fears about AIDS was intense. Their desire to speak to each other over race, gender and class lines was inspiring, as it was to watch how much they learned from each other. In those initial sessions, workshops and interviews, they explored questions of sexuality, gender, politics, community, friendship, race, privilege and poverty. The narratives they wrote in writing workshops attested to an unshakable hope – even in the face of grim realities and growing HIV infection rates and deaths. As Thozamile Vanto wrote in the published text "In My Life", which was created as part of writing workshops we conducted in 2003:

*"I grew up in the township called Gugulethu in the 1980s. That time was during the Apartheid era, and there was a lot of criminal activity in my life...I didn't stop my criminal activities when we moved away from Gugs and went to Khay-*

*elitsha. I continued to have street fights, and sometimes we stole goods. Then something happened to change my life completely. My best friend told me she was HIV-positive. ... It was a time of change, and something changed about me. She made me understand life and about HIV and AIDS, and other issues. .... I quit lots of things, and I took a big step in my life and quit being in a gang. ... Since that day I never looked back again. I'm still supporting her all the way through giving her love, care, understanding, openness, acceptance."*  
(Schuster 2003: 63)

Our goals, back in 2002, were quite modest, but as the relationships, commitment and excitement around the project grew we found ourselves watching a process unfold over a much longer period of time. The idea to trace the lives of our participants was one that emerged organically. The "Soft Cover" project, at first meant as a one-off series of workshops, quickly took on a life of its own as the experience of learning together continued to be exciting to everyone involved and increasingly collaborative and participant-led. As time passed, promising parts of our earlier assessments had to be rethought and placed in context as the economic, political and social environments in which the young people lived took their toll. The "Soft Cover" project became more and more a political project. We came to the debates and the workshops with an eye to critical thinking. As the young people shaped the agenda more we found ourselves facilitating video projects, for example, that challenged perceptions of race and AIDS in schools, or helping the Atlantis group do teach-in writing and drawing workshops with younger learners in their secondary school. It became clear to the group that for every educational project that might be able to give strength, knowledge and power there must also be real challenges to the larger systems of oppression and injustice that surrounded them. Throughout it all, we had an excitement that what we were doing could really be part of an agenda for social change, not only around HIV and AIDS, but also more broadly in the communities in which these young people lived.

### **2.1. Method: Looking Back over Time with Three Participants**

The "Soft Cover" project was small scale and qualitative, and included around fifty young people from Khayelitsha, Rondebosch, Atlantis, and Retreat and most active between 2002-2005. At the core of the project were 15 young people that stuck with it actively over the years. We used a number of different methods including formal and informal interviews, ethnographic observation, and visual methods such as drawing, painting, creative writing and filmmaking. For this article I draw on data that was collected in one-on-one interviews I conducted with participants in 2011 and 2012, as well as text from writing workshops done with the group in 2003 and video-taped interviews from 2004. Of course memory always has its pitfalls, grey areas, and possible romanticization, yet for this article it was important to reflect on what remains for the project participants themselves. In addition, ethics in a project like this is always complicated. As the young people saw themselves as activists and not only informants, they wished to be represented in films and in writing under their real names which was a challenge to the

traditional practice of protecting identities used in academic research. For this article, given that it will circulate primarily in academic circles and not necessarily be part of grassroots educational efforts, I have chosen to change the participants' names.

Looking at educational projects using visual methodologies over time has a great deal to offer in terms of situating the broader life stories of individuals into the social, historical and political frame in which they are part. In the realm of visual and educational research, there is a growing body of work that seeks to investigate aspects of memory and social change in education (Mitchell and Weber, 1999; Mitchell and Reid-Walsh, 2002; Weber & Mitchell, 2004; Mitchell, et al., 2011). In 2008 Ardra Cole and Maura McIntyre embarked on a long-term study that incorporated a variety of visual methods and qualitative research approaches to investigate Alzheimer's impact on patients and caregivers (McIntyre & Cole, 1999; Mitchell, 2008). Still, much of this work uses memory as a methodological tool, rather than tracing relationships between educational research and participants longitudinally through time. At Leeds University, professor Neale leads an exciting longitudinal research project, "Timescapes" which uses qualitative and visual approaches to explore "how personal and family relationships develop and change over time" (Neale, 2010: 4). As Neale explains,

*"there is a concern with how the life chances of young people are forged, enabled or constrained over time, both biographically – in terms of personal and relational factors, and historically – through wider structural processes, including shifting socio-economic and policy environments, and the structures of gender, generation, and locality."* (Neale, 2010: 4)

The connection between biography and structural process has been critical to thinking through how the "Soft Cover" group have changed and grown. These intersections are very present as we trace the group over time. Mapping the trajectory and histories of the project participants is part of a larger project to look at how these structural elements have affected their lives. For this article though the focus is rather on the memories, reflections and autobiographies that the participants construct based on being part of an educational and visual methods project. The three participants recorded here each have very different things to say about what remains, but each provides insight into some of the overlooked aspects of work such as this. These reflections are of course tempered with self-perception and memory, but provide a reflection on what remains, and how participants themselves view the impacts of this kind of work on their lives given that "as we live in the ever shifting present, we continually re-interpret the past, overwrite our biographies, and reframe our orientations to the future". (Neale, 2010: 5)

I focus here on three main aspects that emerged in our interviews ten years after the start of the project: the impacts on work decisions; the role of friendship and support; and the possibility to see elements of the social change agenda evolve from the personal to the community level. Excerpts here are from interviews with three participants who continued throughout the project: Tebogo, Kristy and Mike.

## 2.2. Findings: Work, Friendship and Activism

### Kristy

The connection between aspirations, life goals and the impacts of visual methods and educational research projects is certainly not easy to untangle. Yet as these young people discuss their current work and worth, they make connections to lessons and understandings of themselves and the world around them that emerged in those early workshops. Kristy was 26 when we did the following interview in December of 2011. She is now a government social worker, currently working in her hometown of Atlantis, a coloured township 40 km outside of Cape Town. Kristy reflected on how the educational experiences in "Soft Cover" that began for her as a teenager shaped her career choices later in life. Feeling defeated after secondary school, working in a cashier job, her options felt like they were running out. Miserable, she quit her job and started to look for a path out of her situation. She explains,

*"... I started to really research ... what it is that happens in social work, what job a social worker does and what other fields they go into. And I started to see a big co-relation between that and what we were busy doing [with "Soft Cover"] and I figured, ok, I really liked what we were busy doing, that made me feel free ...I didn't feel so claustrophobic and so tied up, because my personality is one where I don't like to feel tied up. And so I decided I would go and study."*  
(Interview Kristy 2011)

Kristy looks back on her own life now as a series of almost fated encounters, with the "Soft Cover" project a significant part of how her aspirations developed. She admits that,

*"being a part of the project changed my life dramatically. In a way that I would never have planned. So, maybe it was my destiny to be part of the project. When I look at the short [film] clip that we did, it's really a self-fulfilling prophecy. I mean, back then I didn't know what social work was, I didn't know it was something I would enjoy going into, or, you know, helping people or helping the community."* (Interview Kristy 2011)

The clip she refers to is part of a short film "Fire & Hope" I made with the group in 2004 in which they talk about their experiences as peer educators around HIV and AIDS. In that clip, seven years earlier when she was 17 years old, Kristy had said,

*"I've realized I can't change the past but I can change the future and I can help other people change their mind-sets, and I think I've done that in some way. You know, just talking to people about these things, AIDS, and stuff like that, it makes a difference. Even if you can convince just one person, 'it's out there, watch out' then that is enough for me."* (Fire & Hope video interview Kristy 2004)

As much as she is surprised at 26 years old about where she has ended up, she also speaks to how she stayed true to her own early aspirations,

*“When I look back ...I was about 16, just when we started the “Soft Cover” project...I wrote down ten goals in my life that I wanted to achieve. There are two left on the list. I still have the list. And I have achieved eight of those goals. So to me it is a big thing. It shows me that I have within myself the potential to do that.”* (Interview Kristy 2011)

The Timescales project found similar things about the projections young people had into their futures, which “hint at some realistic correlations between the forging of young people’s future aspirations, and their socio-economic backgrounds and circumstances, while allowing also for the role of human agency in confounding such correlations.” (Neale, 2010: 4)

### **Mike/Eva**

Mike was 26 when we did the following interview in December 2011. He is working for his father as a car mechanic, finishing his biochemistry degree by correspondence, and performing as his cross-dressing alter ego, “Eva”. “Eva” has been competing successfully in a number of local gay beauty pageants, as well as doing work at cabarets and lip-synching events in Cape Town. After a very rocky patch in his early twenties in which he lost a number of family members to violence in Atlantis, Mike reconnected to his activist side, choosing to conduct the interviews we did as “Eva”.

*“My life was suppose to become a little more quiet now after what I call ‘drag season’. As you move to the effective end of the year and all of the pageants start lining up, and culminating, to the goal of Miss Gay Western Cape... but it just didn’t... Eva’s been keeping me very, very busy. But I’m enjoying it. There are charity gigs we do, doing cabaret, so lip synching as well. So, ya, the money we raise at events we give to charities...various charities, and even get to get a word in or two about some issues that we face, and ya, so that comes in with creative emceeing...”* (Interview Mike 2011)

Mike clearly seems to have confounded much of his “background and circumstances” through his own agency and desire to make change and be politically active around his own identity. As much as the structural factors that surround him have affected his trajectory, his own agency has continually re-written his life story.

### **Tebogo**

Tebogo has also rewritten his narrative, though in quite a different way. Tebogo was 34 when I conducted the following interview in August 2011. He was still living in Khayelitsha, but now working as a successful IT specialist. At the beginning of the “Soft



Cover" project he had been one of the paid co-facilitators, but over time became as much a participant as a facilitator. He says,

*"... I got to learn quite a lot of things, and one of the lessons that came out of there, is that, as much as for me it was about the employment, then, it kind of pointed out, it's not always going to be about employment.... life can be about.... it can not be about that. Sometimes we just have to do things because it is the right thing to do. Whether what happens to the future of what we did, time will tell us, and as things stand now, it turns out to be an awesome thing, because, here we are. We may have lost some people along the way, we may have upset people along the way, but the bottom line is here we are. That says a lot about the character of the people who we are." (Interview Tebog 2011)*

This idea of 'character' and finding ourselves together was an aspect very present in the interviews. Friendship, support and community were key parts of what remained from the work we did together. It was also clear that these elements developed over time, and were only possible through the long-term dedication of the project participants. While this was not part of our original goals for the project, it highlights the fact that social change develops through connections and commitments, some of which are the direct result of trust that develops slowly. As Tebog explains,

*"... I think the friendship part, I think it came a little bit later in life. Because in the beginning it was really about work. It was about work, it was about accomplishing the project and it's goals, and I didn't even know what was going to happen after the project has finished...it was a big surprise when it actually, when we moved on, and we kept in touch, and we continued talking along the years. So, one thing that stands out the most out of everything that we did, I think it is the connections that we have built, and in the ability to trust in each other in everything we did, the encouragement...I mean we differ in many different ways, but we manage, in a way, to build ourselves to become a unit, or a circle..." (Interview Tebog 2011)*

In light of this sense of connection and friendship, one of the repeated criticisms was that we did not do enough to maintain the participants to continue with the project. In fact, a number of young people fell away for various reasons, and given the fact that we were working with almost no funding after the first couple of years, maintaining contact and following up where people's lives had gone was difficult. As Mike says,

*"I think that was what made the "Soft Cover" project such as success in my eyes, and that it was such a great experience because it was not just one snapshot, we worked at, and it was something that developed over time. We grew as we grew. We grew together, and....we grew together but apart at the same time, so it was all good... I think more people could have had the opportunities that we had, and the experiences...more attention could have been made to those who fell to the wayside." (Interview Mike 2011)*

The theme of friendship as central to what was successful about working together over time continued to emerge. As Tebogo argues,

*“Right there at the bottom [of the Freedom Charter] it says that “there shall be friendship” and I have never heard anyone in this country talking about friendship. It is there. It’s part of the declaration. There should be...There is going to be friendship. And we are talking about wealth, we are talking about peace, we are talking about democracy, we are talking about all these things, and no one is saying anything about friendship. Maybe that is the problem. We aren’t building friendships. We are building yards, we are building houses, we aren’t building friendships. Maybe, I don’t know, maybe we need to re-look into the Freedom Charter and start to work on that one element. There must be, there should be friendships. I mean what kind of person can we be if we don’t build friendships?”* (Interview Tebogo 2011)

Tebogo identified the project as being part of a way that participants could feel they belonged, beyond the difficulties of the world around him. He recalls,

*“the project came at a time where everybody was looking for something to fall back to. You know. We have had this big problem with unemployment, with HIV and AIDS, with the politics of Thabo Mbeki and his government, with high prices, with education, I mean everything was really in chaos, they still are ... so everyone was looking for somewhere to belong. So I think one of the strengths of the project was that ability, was to give us a place where we can belong.”* (Interview Tebogo 2011)

But Tebogo saw the project as tangible work, which existed beyond the realm of ‘activism’. While we understood our project as part of creating social change, he saw it as a ‘way out’ of traditional activism:

*“I mean, even with the project that we did...I think I went to it, not because it was a good project, or one of the best projects...in a way, it was a way out for me. It was a way out. It was a good way out in a sense that it brought material benefit to me. Because at the end of it, or my involvement with it, kind of helped me to live. So in a way it was a way out, and maybe I felt a little bit good about it, when you actually get appreciated, and rewarded for the hard work that you do, rather than simply thank you.”* (Interview Tebogo 2011)

For Mike and Kristy though, a stronger sense of social engagement has emerged over time. For Kristy, the idea that it is people’s experience as experts in their lives as a basis for social change is something she carries with her everyday as a social worker.

*“There is never a day when I meet a client and I have this attitude of ‘I know it all, I know all the answers, I know what we are going to do’. I always have this notion of ‘I know that you know what you want in life so let’s speak about that, let’s try to explore that and see how to make that a reality. That’s what I want*

*for you'. That's what I tell all my clients, as well. 'I don't go home with you, I leave'. I don't know what its like to live with a husband who beats you every day. I don't know what it's like to come to bed hungry. I don't know what it's like to now have money in my pockets, even though I do come from it, I can't say I could walk the walk. My parents always provided for me. They went out on a limb to provide for me. So I don't know what it is like to go to bed and have a mother tell me, you know, 'my son couldn't go to school today because there was no food last night and he was still hungry this morning and I didn't send him to school...' I mean, I don't know what that's like, but I can imagine it must be so hard, you know. Your pride your self-esteem, your obvious feeling of hunger, I can imagine, I can let myself into that. ... I always have in the back of my mind that, were I not a part of the "Soft Cover" project I would never been able to have done this. So I owe it to myself because I know I should do better now. Especially in my way of treating people. When it comes to policies, structuring, developing, those kinds of things, keeping in mind, people, their circumstances, themselves, it is so important. That is really the essence, because from the project that is really what I got. I, as an individual, developed myself in the project. Not vice versa." (Interview Kristy 2011)*

For Mike/Eva, the visual and creative aspects explored during the project, and the sense that everyday experience is valid, is something that becomes incorporates into life as "Eva".

*"I think coming out in drag and being out in drag, is really a tool for expressing myself, and in that way, also showing that it's okay to be yourself and to express yourself in a way that might not be a social norm. ... where "Soft Cover" fits into that is that I came to understand that process, led to [this expression]. I can see it as a platform, because of the way that we took things, ... just the writing about everyday life experience. The "Soft Cover" project showed that we can, [and] it actually means something to some other people. The stories we wrote other people could relate to. And that's something that we didn't know. I didn't know that people would actually need to feel that it's okay, and they need to relate to somebody else that is going through something similar ... I think that is the biggest thing that I take from the "Soft Cover" project ... is coming to feel comfortable with working with different mediums, and not just thinking that standing on a pedestal and saying a speech is the sum total of activism or doing your bit.... there is a whole creative process. I am not a painter or poet, but this is my creative outlet. So, using your individual strengths to do your bit." (Interview Mike 2011)*

At 17 Mike was not publically 'out', but during the video interviews we did for "Fire & Hope" in 2004 he discussed what sexuality meant for him, and the need for a safe space.

*"I think one of the biggest challenges is this whole thing about sexuality, who you are? When I am ready for sex? Should I do it? Shouldn't I? They've thrown,*

*like, the whole subject of sex in our face and now we have to deal with it. And in between that we still have to find out who we are too, so, it's like, kind of complicated. It just complicates life!"* (Interview Mike 2004)

### 3. Discussion

Certainly, one of the methodological issues of a project such as this one, built on a small scale which developed personal relationships between participants, project leaders, and researchers is that the divisions between those roles becomes blurred with time. As the project progressed, those who remained invested in the Soft Cover group (around 15 young people) became part of what Tebogo called the 'unit' or 'circle'. I was also transformed over time. This reciprocity is not necessarily a bad thing in terms of breaking down some of the hierarchy of the educational/research relationship, yet it is difficult to deal with neatly in assessing the data years later. Mike is quite right when he says "we grew as we grew". During our last phase of interviews I realized in 2002 I was the same age as Kristy and Mike are now. Indeed each of us have narratives and reflections to add to what a process like this can tell us about our goals around social engagement and social change.

Tebogo, Kristy and Mike point to ways that long-term, collective learning can be part of an emancipatory project of education. Mike and Kristy as adults find themselves working towards social change at the community level. This indicates that educational research can be a collective project, and not only individual, in impact. There is much criticism of a model of participation that focuses only on the individual and not the broader structural processes necessary to make lasting social change. This dichotomy between the individual and the collective, as shown from the "Soft Cover" work, is too stark. As Glyn Williams points out, "celebrations of 'individual liberation' and critiques of 'subjection to the system' both over-simplify participation's power effects. To re-politicise participation, empowerment must be re-imagined as open-end and ongoing process of building political projects at a range of spatial scales." (Williams, 2004: 557) It is important at the same time not to romanticize the impacts of change, nor its broader reach. I tend to agree with Kysa Nygreen (2010), who is wary of writing too much into small-scale education projects like "Soft Cover". She discusses how she resolved her dilemma of scale "by imagining the true impact" of the project

*"was not to be found in our collective action, but in the project's 'ripple effects' as students took what they learned into other areas of their lives. Given the intensive resources that went into [the project] – time, money, energy, and otherwise – this strikes me as a rather inefficient strategy for the kind of movement building that I assume to be necessary for achieving deep structural change".* (Nygreen, 2010: 24)

Nygreen goes on to argue that we must take seriously the issue of scale if we are committed to structural social change that goes beyond the individual. With these criticisms in mind, longitudinal approaches to visual and educational research still have

great insights to give into both the actual lasting impacts work aimed at social change, as well as the structural processes that intersect with the lives of participants.

While Kristy and Mike both integrate social activism into their everyday lives, Tebogo feels disappointed about the possibilities of activism in light of his own economic hardship, and lived experience. Tebogo is more cynical about what change we are able to make, and states quite bluntly:

*"I mean the reality of the matter is that I need money to live on. And activism is not going to give me this. I mean, not now. Like, here we are fighting for the future, but I'm hungry now, I'm starving now. So I kind of needed a solution to that. So I think for me, for me the change started to happen there, is like, now I'm empowered enough, I understand things and I understand, the vigor that I had to change things, that was not going to happen overnight. It was kind of defeating really when you actually see what you have been working hard for. It didn't make any difference. I mean, just a very small difference, but you would have hoped that people would have understood things the way that you do, and changed things the way you want things to change for all of us. So it's kind of defeating to see, actually, things are getting worse. So all the knowledge, all the education, the workshops, kind of went to waste. It was a drop in the ocean. I mean, you want one person to be infected with HIV everyday and you are having a thousand. And that is not very good. So I think...I kind of face reality. I mean why should I really care, so much, about this? When everybody else, it seems, they don't really care. Maybe I'm missing something here. Maybe if I take a step back I will perceive things differently... So I kind of needed to find those kinds of people and understand, how do they make their life and pursue their dreams without feeling guilty or terrible about the state in which our health system is." (Interview Tebogo 2011)*

Tebogo, unlike the others, was facing harder economic conditions, and had already been involved in activist work for much longer. These structural aspects are absolutely central to our findings. Many of the young people we lost along the way were consumed with the everyday realities that surrounded them, from violence, HIV infection, to difficulties based on race or class. But we might also ask, is it also Tebogo's hindsight, as Mark Freeman (2010) discusses, "discerning how one has fared in relation to one's own innermost standards and ideals." (Freeman, 2010: 35)

Ironically though, the first young people to drop away as early as 2003 were the white youth, who had a wide range of extra curricular commitments making our workshops less of a priority. Over time, those who were able to continue studying and to build on the substantive gains they had made as young people also had a clear bias towards race and class. While their own testimonies held that the visual educational research had real and lasting impacts on their lives in many cases, the sheer brutality of the factors of race, class and gender -- the economic and social factors that surrounded them -- also played a significant role that cannot be understated. Yet, from our interviews and reflections over the years, there were lasting impacts on a sense of confi-

dence built from friendship and support, life direction, and personal transformation in terms of commitment to social change. Clearly more work needs to be done, and methodological tools developed, to understand better about how we can map social change through time and scale in educational research.

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## Notes

- 1 This research was initiated by Professor Claudia Mitchell as part of a small grant through CHIR/CIDA. As time unfolded the research took on a life of its own, forming the basis for my Master's dissertation, and subsequent research, much of which did not have formal funding.
- 2 I have written about the project in a number of articles and chapters: Walsh, S. and C. Mitchell (2008). I'm too young to die: HIV, masculinity, danger and desire in urban South Africa. In Welbourn, A., with J. Hoare (Eds) HIV and AIDS. Oxford: Oxfam; Walsh, S. (2007) Power, Race and Agency: Facing the Truth with Visual Methodologies in De Lange et al (Eds.) Putting People in the Picture: Visual methodologies for social change. Netherlands: Sense Books; Walsh, S., Mitchell, C. (2004) Artfully Engaged: Arts Activism and HIV/AIDS work with youth in South Africa in G. Knowles, L. Neilsen, A. Cole and T. Luciani (Eds.), Provoked by Art: Theorizing Arts-informed Inquiry. Toronto: Backalong Books; Walsh, S, Mitchell, C., Smith, A. (2002) "The Soft Cover project: youth participation in HIV/AIDS interventions" Agenda: Empowering women for gender equity. Durban: Agenda Feminist Publishing. [53]

## About the Author

Shannon Walsh is a filmmaker, educator and writer currently living in Johannesburg. Her first feature documentary, *H2Oil*, was recognized by the Montreal Mirror as one of the top ten independent documentaries of 2009 for its urgent and poignant telling of the human and environmental devastation caused by Canada's tar sands. Her second feature documentary, *St-Henri, the 26th of August*, brought sixteen filmmakers to uncover the complexity and contradictions of everyday life in a Montreal neighbourhood. Currently she is finishing *Jeppe on a Friday*, a second neighbourhood documentary tracing the lives of 8 people in Johannesburg's inner city. Underlying all of her work is a focus on social justice and collaboration. In addition to making films, Shannon has facilitated popular education courses using visual methodologies around the world, and been the recipient of numerous awards, fellowships and prizes. Her recent publications include articles in the *South African Journal of Education*, *Oriental Anthropology*, and *Review of African Political Economy*. Walsh has a background in popular education and ethnography, and received a PhD from McGill University in 2010. She is currently a post-doctoral research fellow as part of the Research Chair in Social Change at the University of Johannesburg where she is completing her first monograph.

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## Lo “otro” de los movimientos sociales: hipótesis para pensar el Estado hoy

Nuria Yabkowski

**Resumen:** La situación actual de los países de la región suramericana invita a reflexionar, entre otras cosas, sobre la relación de los movimientos sociales con los gobiernos en particular, y con los Estados en general. Sobre todo cuando dicha situación se pone en contraste con los acontecimientos de una Europa en crisis. Si durante la época neoliberal la autonomía, la oposición y la resistencia parecían ser las únicas y naturales opciones de los movimientos sociales frente a los gobiernos, en la actualidad eso está, por lo menos, puesto en cuestión. En esta ponencia se tratará de reflexionar desde una perspectiva teórica sobre el Estado y el ámbito institucional mostrando, en primer lugar, la necesidad de revisar sumariamente algunas perspectivas clásicas sobre el Estado, para así, en un segundo momento, presentar algunas hipótesis sobre la arena político-institucional que nos parecen más productivas para comprender las situaciones actuales. De este modo se trata de contribuir a reflexionar sobre ese “otro” de los movimientos sociales con el que establecen una, o mejor, varias relaciones, dinámicas, cambiantes, que ya no pueden ser conceptualizadas simplemente en términos de cooptación o autonomía.

**Palabras clave:** Estado, movimientos sociales, institucionalización, kirchnerismo, reparación, derechos

### 1. Introducción: Estado y movimientos sociales

Que actualmente en Argentina los movimientos sociales no tienen la misma relación con el sistema político que durante los años del neoliberalismo parece una verdad autoevidente. Si existe cierto consenso sobre este punto de partida, las divergencias comienzan al emprender la caracterización de esta nueva relación. Así, algunos adoptan una posición en la cual los rasgos de los movimientos sociales durante el neoliberalismo pierden su carácter histórico para convertirse en la esencia de lo que los movimientos sociales deben ser. De este modo, la asunción de la separación entre lo social y lo político, para actuar desde y en el campo de lo social contra lo político o bien, haciendo un uso meramente instrumental del Estado; la apelación exclusiva a los formatos de acción directa; la dinámica asamblearia concebida como modalidad democrática que reivindicaba la participación contra las formas delegativas de la política, antes que características específicas que se correspondían con cierto momento histórico, se convierten en lo que todo movimiento social debe sostener si pretende continuar desarrollándose como tal. Por lo tanto, las mutaciones en sus gramáticas de acción y/o en su relación con el Estado, no pueden sino ser concebidas en



términos de una degradación del ser, tal es el caso de quienes apelan a la noción de cooptación. Como explica Ana Natalucci (2012), esta perspectiva sostiene esa división tajante entre lo social y lo político, en la cual la política se restringe al terreno institucional-estatal. Así, la única relación que puede establecerse con este espacio es instrumental y contestataria. Esto se articula con cierta visión respecto de los fines que naturalmente le corresponden a los distintos tipos de organización, de modo que solo a los partidos políticos les tocaría intentar transformar el sistema en su totalidad, mientras que los movimientos sociales se restringirían a introducir ciertos cambios en la estructura social, pero sin comprometer al sistema mismo (Pérez 2010).

Desde otra perspectiva, se asume que dichos rasgos ya descriptos corresponden a una *ethos participativo destituyente*, en el cual se rechazaba de plano el estatuto instituyente de la política, por lo que se prefería no tener relación alguna con el régimen político, o bien se pretendía su destrucción. Como sostiene Natalucci:

*"Aunque en un primer momento, ese estatuto sirvió para la propagación de la movilización y el cuestionamiento del modelo político delegativo y del económico excluyente, en un segundo se erigió como un serio obstáculo para la continuidad de la comunidad política"* (Natalucci 2012:6).

Teniendo esto en cuenta, la nueva posición que establecieron las organizaciones sociales pertenecientes al espacio kirchnerista implicó la redefinición de la relación con el régimen político "cifrada en la recreación de una matriz movimientista de participación y movilización" (Pérez y Natalucci 2010:100). En este mismo sentido se expresa Martín Retamoza cuando afirma que "la incorporación de las demandas de los movimientos sociales no supuso simplemente la cancelación de la potencia contestataria de los movimientos ni se agota en la administración por parte del sistema político de una demanda externa" (Retamoza 2011:8). Por todo ello no se puede comprender al actual simplemente como un momento de desmovilización, ya que la acción de las organizaciones se ha reorientado por comprender que la arena estatal-institucional también puede ser el lugar para que ellas hagan política, entendiendo que es allí donde las demandas se satisfacen consolidándose en políticas públicas y derechos.

Observamos entonces que cuando los rasgos de los movimientos sociales no se esencializan y la cuestión de la novedad no se reduce a la cooptación, surge una pregunta que nos resulta más pertinente sobre la posibilidad y el significado de un proceso de institucionalización de los movimientos sociales. No es casual sino producto de las circunstancias históricas que surjan este tipo de preguntas, que denota que al momento de la irrupción del orden instituido adviene la configuración de otro tipo de orden. Negarlo no solo sería un sinsentido, sino que implicaría, por un lado, negar el potencial propiamente político de la acción de los movimientos sociales, y por otro, suponer que ese otro orden sería más o menos igual con o sin la participación de estos movimientos en el proceso de toma de decisiones.

Ahora bien, insistimos que no es casual que esta misma pregunta surja también para las identidades políticas emergentes y, más precisamente, para la identidad populista.

## 2. La cristalización de una identidad política

Ahora bien, preguntarse por la cristalización de una identidad política y, más específicamente, por la cristalización de un pueblo, implica entrar en el debate sobre las complejas relaciones entre lo popular (que suele asumirse inestable) y las formas de su posible institucionalización.

En primer lugar, habría que responder si la cristalización de un pueblo no implica necesariamente que lo mismo suceda con su enemigo, teniendo en cuenta que aquí se concibe al pueblo como una identidad política que se constituye como un “nosotros” enfrentado a un “ellos”. Si la respuesta es afirmativa, tal vez deberíamos darle la razón a quienes acusan al populismo de tender hacia la sustancialización (tanto del pueblo como de sus enemigos) y, por ende, hacia el no reconocimiento de la legitimidad del otro. Este es el argumento esgrimido por quienes sostienen que existe una oposición excluyente entre populismo y pluralismo político (De Ípola y Portantiero 1981).

Sin embargo, hay por lo menos dos puntos que impiden llegar a esta conclusión. Por un lado, la cristalización no es idéntica a la sustancialización cuando se reconoce desde el principio el *carácter político* de las demandas, del pueblo que se conforma a partir de ellas y también (y sobre todo) de los enemigos de ese pueblo. Este reconocimiento (que puede leerse en clave lefortiana) es fundamental para comenzar a formular una respuesta a aquellas posiciones que sostienen que la lógica populista implica, necesariamente, la reificación del enemigo en una entidad concreta positiva, a partir de lo cual deducen que solamente el aniquilamiento del otro restauraría la justicia. Desde aquí no habría entonces diferencias importantes entre fascismo y populismo (Zizek 2008). Contra este argumento debe enfatizarse y resaltarse el carácter político (contingente) de las identidades, de la del pueblo y de la de sus enemigos, puesto que ello no sólo legitima el conflicto (lo que avala la posibilidad de procesarlo sin llegar a la aniquilación), sino que además recuerda la imposibilidad constitutiva de que el pueblo adquiera una identidad totalizada (Rancière 1996; Laclau 2000; Lefort 2004).

Entonces, si por pluralismo comprendemos el reconocimiento de la legitimidad del otro y, por ende, del conflicto que con el otro se puede entablar, no habría una incompatibilidad de principios, axiomática, entre populismo y pluralismo. Por otro lado, es cierto que si por pluralismo se comprende no sólo la legitimación del otro sino también, y sobre todo, la negación de una frontera antagónica que dé lugar a la conformación de un ellos y un nosotros, constituyendo, en cambio, un espacio homogéneo al interior del cual los elementos se relacionan sólo como diferencias, siendo todas ellas igualmente válidas (Laclau 2005:107-108), y negando así (o intentando hacerlo) el carácter hegemónico de la política; entonces sí el pluralismo y el populismo entran en tensión como dos lógicas distintas.

Por otra parte, el proceso de cristalización no sólo hace referencia a la intensificación (la menor preponderancia del carácter diferencial de las particularidades, la homo-

geneización), sino también a la extensión, a la incorporación de más y más particularidades. Y resulta razonable concebir que si la cadena de equivalencias popular se extiende, también lo hace la cadena de equivalencias de los enemigos del pueblo. De modo que la cristalización de una identidad popular es dinámica por definición, ya que en el proceso que la *plebs* (el pueblo, la parte de los sin parte diría Rancière<sup>1</sup>) intenta tomar el lugar del *populus* (la única totalidad legítima), ni una ni otra permanecen idénticos a sí mismos, lo que permite que algunas particularidades se incorporen y otras se desprendan de la cadena. Es decir que *la lucha por la hegemonía evita y combate la reificación del pueblo, pues de ello depende su supervivencia.*

Estas reflexiones esbozadas pretenden avanzar en una comprensión más precisa de qué significa cristalizar una identidad política. Asumimos que el proceso de cristalización se corresponde con el momento institucional de la representación, entendiendo que éste es el camino para sostener una identidad política en el tiempo (lo que, a su vez, habilitaría sostener y/o profundizar un proceso político transformador). Ahora bien, la permanencia no remite necesariamente a lo estático sino que, por el contrario, puede depender del carácter dinámico que habilita la extensión de la cadena de equivalencias.

Otro interrogante es si la cristalización de una identidad consiste en reducir los grados de ambigüedad e indeterminación en la definición del pueblo y de sus enemigos, y si una definición precisa no es en realidad tan constitutivamente imposible como la conformación de un pueblo total. Ante ello debería discutirse previamente si la cristalización es una cuestión cuantitativa, de mayores o menores grados de indefinición, o si se trata de una cualidad que no puede ser medida. Por ahora, lo que sí podemos postular es que si queremos desterrar toda idea de esencia o sustancia, toda referencia a un fundamento trascendente o positivo, la cristalización no puede remitir a la imagen de un núcleo duro, consolidado e imperturbable ante los giros de la historia, rodeado circunstancialmente de más o menos particularidades algo más volátiles y flotantes. De lo contrario, fácilmente dicho núcleo ocuparía el lugar del *fundamento último* del pueblo.

A modo de síntesis de este punto, podemos decir que la lógica populista, a través de la cual se conforma al pueblo como una identidad, impide por sí misma que se realice eso que Zizek llama su inherente "tendencia al fascismo" (2008). En primer lugar porque siempre quedará un resto heterogéneo que no se puede incorporar a la cadena de equivalencias que conforma el pueblo –lo cual puede leerse como una representación imposible por defecto, porque siempre hay algo que le falta, o bien como una representación imposible por exceso, porque siempre habrá algo que la excede y que permanecerá por fuera. En segundo término, es la constante incorporación de particularidades a la cadena de equivalencias, ese movimiento extensivo, el que impide la clausura y la totalización. Si la lógica populista resulta incompatible o no con el pluralismo dependerá de si la definición de éste niega o asume el carácter hegemónico de la política.

### 3. Revisando el sentido del Estado

Luego de estas reflexiones podemos decir que si la relación entre la arena institucional y la lógica populista debe repensarse, por no ser productivo para el análisis de nuestra realidad actual la oposición axiomática entre una y otra; que si los movimientos sociales han cambiado su relación con el sistema político, abandonando (en algunos casos, por supuesto, no en todos) ese *ethos* exclusivamente *destituyente* propio de los años neoliberales, entonces es inevitable pensar que ese otro polo, el Estado, también ha debido modificarse (por lo menos aunque no exclusivamente) como producto de esas novedosas interacciones.

Teniendo esto en cuenta, debemos revisar ciertas conceptualizaciones acerca del Estado para intentar comprender qué significa hoy esa relación y esa arena institucional, cuáles son sus potencialidades y sus límites, qué se puede esperar de ella, y qué papel puede tener en una política transformadora e igualitaria. Es decir, no se trata solamente de un ejercicio teórico, sino de una revisión de los marcos interpretativos de nuestra realidad a partir de los cuales otorgamos sentido y actuamos.

Comenzamos entonces por una breve crítica a la concepción liberal del Estado, que lo reduce a un polo de poder administrativo desde el cual se pueden lograr fines colectivos, pero siempre con el objetivo final de servir a los intereses privados de los individuos. Se presupone de esta manera una tajante separación entre Estado y sociedad civil, siendo esta última el único terreno para el desarrollo de la libertad individual, la cual debe ser resguardada de los posibles atropellos del Estado. Los derechos que constituyen al ciudadano se comprenden, de esta manera, como derechos negativos. El modelo liberal del Estado serviría entonces para comprender la historia política de la Europa del siglo XVIII, momento en el cual se expandieron los derechos civiles, pero resulta obsoleto para nuestra región y nuestro momento político.

Otro modelo para pensar el Estado es el que se correspondería con la época de la política de masas y los estados de bienestar. Se trata de un Estado amplio, complejo y extenso en su organización burocrática-institucional, con una fuerte intervención en la economía debido a la centralidad de su papel en el proceso de modernización y de desarrollo económico, pero también en lo que hacía a la inclusión social de las clases populares. Se configuraba así una sociedad con una matriz estado-céntrica, dado que la relevancia de las decisiones del Estado para la vida de los ciudadanos era enorme. Si bien algunos comprenden que en este modelo la política se constituía en el terreno donde se reflejaba la estructura social y se ponía en escena los conflictos que en ella se desarrollaban, nos parece más apropiada la interpretación de Juan Abal Medina y Facundo Nejamkis, quienes sostienen que esta característica de la política, o más bien, que esta relación entre lo social y lo político, se debe al "importante rol que el estado tenía en la pugna distributiva" (2004:122).

En una clave de lectura distinta, la teoría marxiana clásica del Estado nos propone comprenderlo como un poder que descansa sobre otras relaciones más fundamentales como las relaciones de producción basadas en la división del trabajo y la propiedad

privada. El Estado no sería más que la forma específica en que el interés común de una clase se presenta como el interés general de la sociedad, es decir que el Estado es una comunidad ilusoria. Retomando los primeros escritos, observamos que Marx realiza su ya conocida inversión de la teoría hegeliana: mientras que Hegel explicaba al Estado moderno como la realización absoluta de la Idea, como la suprema presencia de la libertad y de la razón consciente, Marx plantea:

"No debemos censurar a Hegel porque describe el ser del Estado moderno tal y como es, sino por presentar lo que es, como *esencia del Estado*. Lo racional es real, pero esto se halla precisamente en *contradicción con la realidad irracional* que es siempre lo contrario de lo que expresa y expresa lo contrario de lo que es" (Marx 1983:322 cursiva en el original).

Lo que aquí podemos leer es una concepción del Estado que se manifiesta de una forma contraria a lo que es, es decir, mientras que se presenta como la realización del espíritu racional (y por tanto de la libertad), como un ser ajeno e independiente de la sociedad civil, el Estado es para Marx una forma de las relaciones sociales que no surgen en otro lado más que en la sociedad civil, así la familia como institución, como particularidad, no depende del Estado, como generalidad, sino que el Estado depende de la familia y de la sociedad burguesa, lo que es lo mismo que plantear que depende de la sociedad civil. Esta inversión que aquí Marx realiza no sólo es el intento de colocar arriba lo que se hallaba debajo, sino que puede ser leída en términos de una crítica más radical, es decir, la crítica a la visión del Estado como la realización de la generalidad, negando con ello una identidad irreconciliable entre lo particular y lo general. Como bien plantea Marcuse, toda la teoría de Hegel desemboca en un Estado autoritario, pues considerando a la sociedad civil como el lugar donde se desarrollan todas las contradicciones absolutamente irresolubles y por ello imposibilitada de alcanzar la unidad, sólo una institución que se sitúe por encima de los intereses individuales y competitivos puede terminar con una sociedad anárquica, es decir, sólo subordinando la sociedad civil al Estado, entendido ahora éste como el único capaz de materializar el orden de la razón (Marcuse 1997). De esta forma, no sólo se identifican interés general y Estado, sino interés general e interés particular, pues este último no podría sobrevivir sin el primero.<sup>2</sup> Ante esto Marx replica:

"Pero Hegel parte de la premisa del Estado ficticiamente general, de la generalidad particular del Estado. La identidad que Hegel construye entre la sociedad civil y el Estado es la identidad de dos *ejércitos enemigos*, en que cada soldado cuenta con la posibilidad de convertirse en miembro del ejército contrario por medio de la 'deserción', y no cabe duda de que Hegel, así interpretado, describe certeramente la situación empírica actual" (Marx 1983:363 cursiva en el original).

Tenemos entonces aquí esbozada la inversión que realiza Marx, haciendo todo su esfuerzo por colocar la sociedad civil por encima del Estado, reestableciéndole su supremacía, (de aquí se desprenderá luego la idea del Estado como superestructura). Sin embargo, Marx continúa reconociendo la separación de estas dos esferas, pero esta

vez no como un dato a priori (y por tanto esencialista), sino como un dato empírico:

“[C]uando las ‘que se llaman teorías’ por él [Hegel] desdeñadas exigen la *separación* de los estamentos civiles y los políticos, y la exigen, además, con razón, ya que expresan una *consecuencia* de la sociedad moderna, en la que el elemento *político-constituyente* no es precisamente otra cosa que la efectiva relación real entre el Estado y la sociedad civil, su *separación*” (Ibid:387 cursiva en el original).

La *separación* es el elemento constituyente de la sociedad moderna. Se comprende entonces que el Estado por sí mismo no es una invención de la modernidad, sino su relación de separación y trascendencia con la sociedad civil. Entonces, mientras lo que Marx denomina el *Estado no político* constituye el elemento material o el contenido, el *Estado político* es el elemento formal: “La abstracción del *Estado como tal* pertenece al Estado moderno, porque la abstracción de la vida privada es sólo un atributo de los tiempos modernos. La abstracción del *Estado político* es un producto moderno” (Ibid:344 cursiva en el original).

#### 4. El Estado como productor de unidad

Esta visión a la que denominamos marxista clásica resulta incompatible con aquella propuesta para las sociedades de masas en la cual el Estado adquiriría una centralidad ineludible en la forma que adquiriría la sociedad. Es decir, en aquella conceptualización el Estado jugaba un rol irremplazable en la conformación de la comunidad política efectiva, y ya no ilusoria. Sin embargo, no toda la teoría marxista del Estado lo concibe en términos epifenoménicos. Por el contrario, pensadores como Norbert Lechner y John Holloway lo definieron como la forma de relación social históricamente construida que predomina en las sociedades capitalistas modernas. Así, el Estado puede ser entendido como la forma en que se constituyó el orden social, y todo orden presenta dos dimensiones, una estructura de distinciones y una forma de unidad (Lechner 1985). Mientras que la mayoría de los estudiosos se ha centrado en analizar el orden desde la primera dimensión, la segunda ha quedado relegada, postergando a su vez, con ello, el hecho de que el orden en tanto forma de unidad depende, necesita de una trascendencia. Sólo teniendo en cuenta esto último podemos comprender mejor la necesidad de que el Estado aparezca como el elemento trascendente, poder extraño y ajeno, elevado por sobre la sociedad civil (la cual sería el lugar donde se manifiesta la estructura de distinciones). Como antecedentes encontramos Antonio Gramsci (1999) y su concepto de *hegemonía* en contra de una concepción instrumentalista del Estado, para describir con él el proceso mediante el cual un poder particular deviene en orden general, entendiendo así el *espíritu estatal* como la producción y reproducción del orden social, en contra de cualquier atisbo de estatismo que pueda sugerir el mismo concepto de orden, de modo que “la existencia del Estado como instancia separada depende, pues, de la relación capitalista, y su reproducción depende de la reproducción del capital” (Holloway 1994:124).

Como analiza Lechner, el Estado aparece así como el momento sintetizador en una sociedad dividida, como la forma en que la sociedad puede ser capaz de forjar una representación de sí misma. Por más paradójico que resulte, la elevación del Estado por sobre la sociedad civil (su separación) es la condición para que una sociedad dividida se represente como unidad. Mientras que, al mismo tiempo, esta separación ya no es completamente ilusoria, sino una *abstracción real con efectos materiales*. Abstracción real (Colletti 1977) o fetichismo significan en este caso lo mismo, pues fetichismo implica la subjetivación de un producto social (el Estado) que aparece ahora dotado de vida propia, borrándose en este movimiento toda huella de su génesis social. Lo que se oculta o se olvida es la mediación, es decir, la relación de implicancia recíproca que existe, en este caso, entre ciudadano y Estado (Lechner 1985), al tiempo que lo que ocurre es un continuo proceso de *fetichización* (Holloway 1994: 131).

Comprender el Estado como relación social y, a la vez, como forma de unidad (que no es lo mismo que entenderlo como productor de pura homogeneidad), nos permite, por un lado, reposicionarlo como un objeto de estudio relevante. Por otro, sienta las bases teóricas para un análisis de las diferentes formas en que el Estado ha establecido esa forma de unidad. Esta perspectiva teórica se presenta entonces como adecuada y productiva para el estudio de esa sociedad de masas de matriz estado-céntrica. ¿Pero qué sucede cuando dicha matriz se desarma y adviene el neoliberalismo y lo que algunos llaman *la era de la fluidez*? ¿Es posible seguir pensando al Estado como productor de una unidad social simbólica cuando se han desmantelado sus capacidades regulatorias, se ha erosionado su infraestructura y se ha perdido el poder de penetración y presencia en la sociedad civil? ¿Podemos seguir hablando de unidad en una sociedad en la cual el mundo del trabajo ha perdido capacidad estructurante a favor de las prácticas de consumo cada vez más diferenciadas, en la cual la fragmentación social ha ganado terreno, donde las identidades colectivas se han tornado más flexibles, cambiantes, efímeras?

Ante estos interrogantes lo primero que debemos decir es que la erosión de las instituciones estatales (que se produjo sobre todo durante la década del 90 en Argentina) que son las encargadas de garantizar los derechos y las libertades de los ciudadanos, no significa simplemente la erosión del Estado o su ausencia, sino la reconfiguración de ese Estado y de su complejo institucional para constituirse en el mediador clave para la apropiación y redistribución del excedente económico a favor de las fracciones dominantes del capital y en detrimento de la clase trabajadora argentina (Forcinito 2005:103). Teniendo esto en cuenta, el Estado neoliberal no se retira simplemente dejándole al mercado el papel de constituir los lazos sociales. Si bien es cierto que el acceso a la salud, a la educación y a otros bienes que hacen a la constitución de un ciudadano pleno, durante los años 90 se ha mercantilizado, el Estado jugó un papel clave para que ello sucediera. En términos teóricos esto podría traducirse de la siguiente manera: el Estado como forma y relación social que instituye la sociedad como unidad no implica necesariamente la constitución de una sociedad homogénea, sino el establecimiento de un cierto orden en el cual las distintas partes se relacionen entre sí, incluso si esa relación es de separación y/o conflicto. Entonces, pensar el Estado como forma implica, en primer lugar, dar cuenta que hay una división origi-

naría de la sociedad que no puede ser anulada sino a riesgo de asumir como ideal una totalidad orgánica (que es a lo que aspira el totalitarismo), de modo que dicha división debe ser procesada para que la sociedad llegue a ser. Pero si entonces la unidad que se instituye es producto de una mediación, se tratará de comprender qué tipo de orden se establece de forma contingente en cada momento histórico, pero teniendo en cuenta que como condición ontológica la sociedad no puede prescindir de un momento y de un mecanismo en el cual la sociedad se representa y se unifica a sí misma. En esta conceptualización, la arena institucional del Estado es la forma histórica en que ese momento de fundación o refundación del orden social se expresa a través de la política, es decir, de su conjunto de normas, reglas e instituciones que irán determinando una estructura diferencial de probabilidades para la realización de los intereses de los distintos grupos sociales.

Desde esta perspectiva el Estado no se reduce a la esfera del poder administrativo (que tendería naturalmente a una configuración oligárquica) ni a su configuración institucional, por lo tanto la política estatal no implica necesariamente la conservación del *statu quo*.<sup>3</sup> Por el contrario, pensar la transformación social desde o con el Estado nos invita a articular una teoría del cambio que sea capaz de dar cuenta de los límites y los obstáculos para no caer en el puro optimismo de la voluntad, al mismo tiempo que nos permite revisar la noción misma de *instituciones*, ya que, desde esta perspectiva, no serían simplemente aquello contra lo que hay que chocar para derribar lo instituido, sino también un mecanismo que hace posible llevar a cabo, consolidar y defender un ordenamiento nuevo.<sup>4</sup>

## 5. Estado posnacional y precariedad institucional: una visión del proceso kirchnerista

Recordemos ahora que nuestra pregunta inicial trataba de comprender cómo el Estado en Argentina había sido afectado por las nuevas relaciones que entabla con otros actores, como los movimientos sociales, cómo fue afectado por los acontecimientos de 2001 y la forma en que fueron procesados desde 2003 en adelante con los gobiernos de Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) y Cristina Fernández (2007-2011, y 2011-). Aquí se abre entonces otro debate con aquellos que sostienen que la forma del Estado-nación ha perdido la centralidad de antaño para dar lugar a una forma *posnacional*, o yendo más allá, con quienes sostienen que en la era de la fluidez no sólo es posible sino deseable *pensar sin Estado* (Lewkowicz 2004).

“‘Posnacional’ no habla de ‘una época posterior a la desaparición de la nación’ sino de una en la que la nación adquiere una forma distinta a la que había adquirido con el Estado-nación (compuesta de públicos o gente, y no de clases o pueblo; formada por consumidores y no por ciudadanos [...])” (Hupert 2011:15).

Esta perspectiva es interesante porque intenta pensar al Estado dando cuenta de las transformaciones sociales que hablan de un cambio de época, en la cual ya no es po-



sible identificar un solo eje que estructure las luchas políticas, las identidades colectivas y los procesos de construcción de la subjetividad. Al mismo tiempo, no se propone abandonar por completo al Estado, sino repensarlo asumiendo la afectación de una época. Y todo ello en el contexto del proceso político argentino que comenzó en 2003 y que continúa, al que denominamos kirchnerismo. Para Pablo Hupert (2011), entonces, se trata de pensar al Estado posnacional, es decir, un Estado abierto a las potencialidades de la *infrapolítica* (entendida como la autonomía de los no-representables, y expresada con mayor claridad en los acontecimientos de diciembre de 2001 y durante buena parte de 2002), incluso y sobre todo en un contexto en el cual se publicita el retorno del Estado-nación: "Es estratégico desmentir que volvió el Estado-nación porque si volvió, se cierra lo abierto, se reducen los posibles, lo político no existe y los nosotros no podemos politizar ningún problema común" (Ibid:19). Esta irrupción de la infrapolítica en el Estado se observaría en algunas condiciones con las que se habría encontrado Néstor Kirchner al asumir la presidencia: la imposibilidad de reprimir, la imposibilidad de hacer ajustes y la imposibilidad de representar. Por esta razón, el gobierno –entendido como la ligazón entre la sociedad y el Estado– kirchnerista tiene uno de sus pilares en la gestión:

"La gestión es gestión de contingencias, y no administración de recurrencias. Si hay gestión no hay rutinas (ni las establecidas por ley ni las establecidas consuetudinariamente ni las que establecería una estructura social estable). Pero además, como vemos, todos los acuerdos acusan una validez provisoria, frágil, precaria. Si no puede haber rutinas en los procedimientos necesarios para gobernar, tampoco habrá instituciones. [...] Pero insisto, la precariedad institucional es el precio que el Estado actual debe pagar para seguir siendo Estado" (Ibid:92).

Lo que llama la atención es que dicho diagnóstico acerca de la relación entre Estado, gobierno y sociedad en el kirchnerismo coincida con una posición poco semejante (por lo menos en cuanto a la tradición teórica que sostiene el argumento) como la propia de Hugo Quiroga, para quien el kirchnerismo se caracteriza por ejercer el *decisionismo democrático*:

"En fin, el decisionismo democrático no es una mera sustracción de los poderes del parlamento, ni una pura acción del ejecutivo que 'roba' o despoja al órgano deliberativo de sus decisiones políticas para trasladarlas a la esfera presidencial. Es mucho más que eso. El decisionismo democrático es una *combinación del gobierno de los hombres, del gobierno atenuado del Estado de derecho y de la ausencia de poder de contralor*. Tal concepción del poder *antepone* la voluntad política del líder decisionista a las instituciones y a sus reglas" (Quiroga 2010:98 cursiva en el original).

Si bien es cierto que el argumento de Hupert no apunta al decisionismo, la idea de una gestión inherentemente no rutinizada implica un alto grado de decisión cotidiana por parte de quienes llevan a cabo el gobierno, aunque la valoración que de ello se hace no sea negativa per se ni se concluya de ello la existencia de un Estado de derecho ate-

nuado. Sin embargo, insistimos en que ambas posturas no reconocen grado alguno de institucionalización en el proceso político del kirchnerismo. Y en esto coincidirían con la postura de Laclau, cuando identifica al kirchnerismo con un proceso populista del cual se destaca casi exclusivamente su momento ruptural. Lo que entonces nos preguntamos, junto con Gerardo Aboy Carlés es lo siguiente: “No hay instituciones que sirven a esa ruptura?” (2010:33).

## 6. La institucionalización del kirchnerismo

Desde nuestra perspectiva, el kirchnerismo nos permite repensar una noción de Estado como relación social, como la forma histórica que adopta el necesario mecanismo de mediación de una sociedad originariamente dividida, pero en una época en la cual el Estado ya no tiene la centralidad en la configuración de las subjetividades de los ciudadanos. Sin embargo, resulta difícil no reconocer que desde 2003, en Argentina el Estado ha recuperado legitimidad como el conjunto de instituciones que puede intervenir en la vida de los ciudadanos garantizando derechos.

Entonces nuestra afirmación es doble: por un lado, sostenemos que el kirchnerismo ha llevado a cabo un proceso de cambio (aunque todavía no podamos garantizar qué tan profundo ha calado ni su capacidad para sostenerse en el tiempo), provocando una ruptura con muchas de las lógicas y sobre todo con los sentidos propios del neoliberalismo de los años 90, y que en ese proceso la idea de nación han tenido un papel central. Pues en su ruptura con “los 90” el kirchnerismo abre el pasado como modo de la reparación, y en esa reparación –urgente– recompone la comunidad política. Así, como nos dicen Gerardo Aboy Carlés y Pablo Semán, retorna una idea de nación que ya no se asocia al autoritarismo, a la homogenización cultural represiva y al integrismo católico, sino que se *encuentra*, converge con motivos democráticos. La nación aparece como el marco de reparación de una sociedad lesionada, de un pueblo dañado. El kirchnerismo se presenta como la promesa de recomposición comunitaria capaz de incluir a los excluidos y a los renegados por un pasado siniestro (Aboy Carlés y Semán 2006:91).

Por el otro, sostenemos que uno de los modos (aunque no el único, sí tal vez el que permita pensar la sustentabilidad del cambio) de llevar a cabo dicha ruptura implicó no ya una gestión no rutinizada de la contingencia, una institucionalización inherentemente débil, sino la implementación un modo de satisfacer demandas insatisfechas (y así reparar el daño) por vía institucional. Y este proceso no debería comprenderse como una excepción a la contraposición entre una lógica institucionalista y una lógica populista, sino la demostración que la frontera entre ellas es, en determinados procesos históricos, casi indistinguible.

El conjunto de políticas de derechos humanos (el impulso desde el Poder Ejecutivo para la derogación de las Leyes de Obediencia Debida y Punto Final; la recuperación de la ESMA como espacio para la memoria; la relación establecida con algunos organismos de derechos humanos) junto a un discurso presidencial que hacía suya la demanda por “verdad, memoria y justicia”, constituye uno de los ejemplos más

claros respecto del mecanismo de incorporación de una demanda y su satisfacción vía institucional. En este proceso nos encontramos con una demanda ya organizada como tal, sostenida a través de organizaciones consolidadas que, en muchos casos, han podido establecer vínculos entre sí llegando a conformar espacios más amplios, con una serie de prácticas y discursos que, si bien se renuevan, se han ido asentando con el tiempo.

También observamos las demandas que ya desde mediados de los años 90 vienen canalizando los movimientos de desocupados. Y podemos enumerar rápidamente algunas de las políticas que se han llevado a cabo desde 2003 en adelante tendientes a satisfacerlas: la no represión de la protesta social, el mantenimiento del Plan Jefas y Jefes y, luego, su progresivo reemplazo por otros como el Plan Familias por la Inclusión, el Seguro de Empleo y Capacitación, el proyecto de cooperativas "Argentina Trabaja" y, finalmente, la Asignación Universal por Hijo. Aquí también nos encontramos con un colectivo organizado que viene haciendo escuchar su voz desde los años 90.

En ambos casos, la incorporación de estas demandas no implicó ni la pura gestión administrativa de una exterioridad, ni la cancelación de la potencia contestataria de los movimientos sociales. Como afirma Martín Retamozo: "[el kirchnerismo] no buscó agotarlos sino gobernarlos (...). El kirchnerismo en este aspecto se nutre de los movimientos sociales sin absorberlos, en parte porque la posibilidad de renovar energías radica en mantener a los movimientos con capacidad de movilización" (2011).

Se puede observar en estos casos la articulación de una lógica populista y una lógica institucionalista, especialmente si tenemos en cuenta que la implementación de estas políticas públicas adquieren un sentido definido a través de la retórica presidencial, que inscribe tanto la lucha contra la impunidad y a favor de los derechos humanos, como las políticas de inclusión social, en un discurso (aquí en el sentido amplio que le otorga Laclau) contra el neoliberalismo, contra *los años 90*, colocando a los responsables de la exclusión y de la impunidad del otro lado de la frontera, enlazados en el campo político de los otros.

El movimiento GLTTB (Gay, Lésbico, Travesti, Transexual y Bisexual) y sus demandas por el reconocimiento de derechos igualitarios fueron incorporados (parcialmente) a través de la sanción del matrimonio igualitario y de la Ley de Identidad de Género. Y, como en el caso de los movimientos de desocupados, algunos de sus referentes pasaron a ocupar cargos públicos. Esto no impidió que ese colectivo continuara demandando, sino que le otorgó una nueva visibilidad, y generó una superficie de inscripción para algunas organizaciones.

## 7. Conclusiones: la experiencia de la ampliación de derechos

Teniendo esto en cuenta podemos decir que la satisfacción de las demandas a través de una vía institucional no implica necesariamente la mera administración de las necesidades, ni la imposibilidad de que en esas demandas continúe operando la lógica

de la equivalencia. Por esta razón los colectivos organizados que las sostienen no pierden por completo esa potencia contestataria, al tiempo que pueden formar “parte del pueblo”, identificándose con un campo político más amplio (el kirchnerismo) y reconociendo (en algunos casos) la conducción de Néstor Kirchner primero, y de Cristina Fernández después.

La posibilidad de que una identidad política, el kirchnerismo, pueda articular ambas lógicas resulta de especial importancia cuando ya no se trata, solamente, de pensar el momento de la refundación a través de la ruptura instituyente, sino de pensar el momento de la institucionalización de esa identidad, de la cristalización de ese pueblo.

El proceso político del kirchnerismo que comenzó en 2003 nos fuerza a revisar los marcos teóricos con los cuales pensamos las transformaciones políticas, sus límites, sus potencialidades, sus protagonistas, y sus mecanismos de realización. En este sentido, la relación de los movimientos sociales con el Estado ha sido el puntapié para repensar qué papel le puede tocar a la arena institucional en los momentos de consolidación de un cambio, pero también en el propio momento de ruptura.

Algunos investigadores como Levitsky y Murillo (2007) definen la fortaleza institucional a lo largo de dos dimensiones: la imposición o aplicación de las reglas, y la estabilidad de las mismas. Teniendo esto en cuenta, nos podemos encontrar con instituciones formales fuertes (alta estabilidad y alta aplicación), con instituciones formales estables pero débilmente impuestas, con instituciones formales inestables pero altamente impuestas, o bien con instituciones formales débiles (inestables y de baja imposición). Desde esta perspectiva, Murillo (2011) concluye que el kirchnerismo muestra una heterogeneidad de experiencias respecto de la institucionalidad de las reglas formales escritas, dado que encuentra distintos y relevantes ejemplos para ilustrar cada una de las combinaciones posibles entre la estabilidad y la aplicación de las reglas formales escritas.

Esta perspectiva ya nos muestra que, incluso desde una visión más cercana al neoinstitucionalismo, el kirchnerismo tiene un grado de institucionalización (y no de pura gestión de la contingencia) que debe ser reconocido. Sin embargo, dado que la estabilidad es una de las dimensiones que define la fortaleza institucional, existe una fuerte tendencia a conceptualizar el cambio en términos de debilidad. Y si bien es cierto que advierten que la inestabilidad no debe confundirse con el *cambio institucional normal* (Murillo 2011:266), ésta resulta una noción tan imprecisa que termina siendo improductiva. Pero no solo eso, sino que se deduce que todo cambio un poco más radical y un poco más veloz de lo que puede considerarse normal, se contradice axiomáticamente con la fortaleza institucional.

En cambio, si concebimos que las instituciones (en su definición más amplia que incluye a las reglas formales escritas pero también a las prácticas sedimentadas) pueden contribuir a la ruptura de un orden instituido, entonces la fortaleza institucional debería incluir una dimensión que sea capaz de “medir” la permanencia del cambio. Teniendo esto en cuenta, la ley de movilidad jubilatoria, la ley de matrimonio iguali-

tario, la ley de identidad de género, la ley de muerte digna, la derogación de las leyes de impunidad, son ejemplos de la fortaleza institucional del kirchnerismo, dado que cada una de ellas instaura un cambio que puede presuponerse con potencialidad para permanecer en el tiempo, ya que la forma de la ley se presupone más duradera que la forma de un decreto (como es el caso de la Asignación Universal por Hijo). Ahora bien, la ley de servicios de comunicación audiovisual tiene esa misma forma jurídica, y sin embargo es un claro ejemplo de las dificultades que existe para su aplicación, dificultades que pueden explicarse por las presiones que son capaces de ejercer las corporaciones económicas que se verían afectadas. Ahora bien, este tipo de ejemplos no son los que aparecen para ilustrar la idea de un *Estado de derecho atenuado*, puesto que implicaría reconocer que no solo los gobiernos son responsables de la fortaleza o la debilidad institucional de la política nacional.

Entonces, así como existen actores económicos poderosos que desde afuera del aparato estatal pueden debilitar la institucionalidad, la articulación de las organizaciones sociales con la arena institucional (desde sus prácticas o bien desde lugares en la estructura de funcionarios) pueden ser interpretada como una relación que hace a la fortaleza institucional, dado el interés que poseen en el mantenimiento de, por ejemplo, ciertas políticas sociales. Ahora bien, esto no debería llevar a la conclusión de que la fortaleza institucional depende de un aparato estatal ocupado por los grupos interesados, lo que sería un absurdo. Pero sirve a los efectos de mostrar las limitaciones de una definición estrecha del concepto en cuestión.

Proponemos así incorporar una dimensión que sea capaz de dar cuenta, por un lado, de la forma en que ciertos cambios son realizados, puesto que no es lo mismo una ley que un decreto, una norma respalda por una práctica, una práctica respaldada por una norma, o una práctica no respaldada por la norma. Marcamos una diferenciación sin que en ella se pretenda establecer un juicio de valor o una teoría prescriptiva del cambio. Pero es nuestra hipótesis que la permanencia del cambio dependerá, en cierto grado, de esta forma, aunque no exclusivamente de ello.

Teniendo esto en cuenta, sostenemos que la fortaleza institucional del proceso kirchnerista reside en que muchos de los cambios que ha producido han adoptado la forma de leyes (muchas de las cuales ya mencionamos), lo cual es importante, pero no suficiente. Para ser efectiva, para poder aplicarse o imponerse, necesita de cierto desarrollo de las capacidades estatales. Pero insistimos en que la cuestión no se reduce a ello. Una norma también necesita de la fuerza que proviene de la práctica, de la experiencia de la norma, del sentido que los distintos grupos de la sociedad hagan de ella. Y en esto el kirchnerismo ha producido un cambio que tiene potencialidad para sostenerse en el tiempo, porque la experiencia de esas leyes, de esas normas, es una experiencia en términos de ampliación de derechos. Es por ello que pensamos que el matrimonio igualitario (respaldado por ley) y la Asignación Universal por Hijo (respaldado por un decreto), por citar dos ejemplos jurídicamente distintos, tienen ambos la misma potencialidad de permanecer en el tiempo. Pues la posibilidad de su anulación no depende primariamente de los procedimientos para anular una ley o un decreto, sino de la posibilidad de enfrentarse a quienes han ganado un derecho.

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## Notas

- 1 Jacques Rancière (1996) denomina lógica policial a aquella que instaure y reproduce una regla del aparecer de los cuerpos, asignándoles nombres, lugares y funciones determinadas. Cuando ella opera, se conforma un orden de lo visible y de lo decible, en tanto que dicha regla define qué palabras serán entendidas como discurso y qué palabras sólo aparecerán como ruidos. Podríamos decir que la lógica policial es la que define la superficie discursiva o el campo de la representación como tal, aunque olvide y borre las marcas de la contingencia, las relaciones de poder que la han hecho posible. Y sin embargo, no todas las entidades son representadas, pues quedan fuera de la cuenta social las "partes que no tienen parte". Así, el momento en que "los sin parte" intentan irrumpir sobre esa superficie discursiva es el momento en que se activa la lógica política.
- 2 La crítica adorniana a Hegel resulta de vital importancia en este punto, puesto que manteniendo un pensamiento dialéctico, suspende el tercer momento, para evitar caer en el momento especulativo, pues este momento elimina de una sola vez tanto al sujeto como al objeto. Adorno sostiene que siempre hay un resto del objeto que no cae en la lógica del objeto: "Lo que media los hechos no es tanto el mecanismo subjetivo que los preforma y concibe, como la objetividad heterónoma al sujeto tras lo que éste puede experimentar. Ella escapa al círculo subjetivo primario de la experiencia, le está preordenada. (...) Sólo si en vez de conformarse [el sujeto] con el falso molde resistiera a la producción en masa de una tal objetividad y se liberara como sujeto, sólo entonces daría al objeto lo suyo. De esta emancipación depende hoy la objetividad y no de la insaciable represión del sujeto. (...) Lo mediado es hoy día antes subjetividad que objetividad y esta mediación requiere análisis con más urgencia que la tradicional." (Adorno 1975:173). Con ello, pretendemos decir que la llamada a la universalidad del Estado no tiene sus fundamentos en una objetividad, mientras que la particularidad de la sociedad civil tampoco es relegada a una subjetividad. Es por el simple hecho de que el sujeto es a su vez objeto, que eliminar las determinaciones subjetivas contradiría la primacía del objeto. Únicamente como determinado el objeto se convierte en algo y si el sujeto tiene un núcleo de objeto con mayor razón las cualidades subjetivas deben conservarse.
- 3 Alain Badiou, por ejemplo, sostiene que no hay posibilidad de transformación radical a tra-

vés y desde el Estado, En sus términos, ninguna política revolucionaria puede comenzar el proceso necesario de subjetivación política desde el Estado, puesto que la situación ideal es que el mismo no exista. De modo que el proceso de subjetivación sólo puede realizarse desde el Movimiento, en la relación constante entre el Movimiento y la Idea. Esto se comprende dado que la subjetivación revolucionaria necesita del acontecimiento, de la chance de que algo nuevo emerja en lo real, pero el Estado sólo puede ser comprendido como estructura o situación, dado desde allí se delimita lo posible y no puede nacer situación creativa alguna. Es por ello que los límites de una política transformadora llevada a cabo desde el Estado detendrá dicho cambio en los bordes del reformismo.

- 4 Esta posición implica un debate con la posición de Ernesto Laclau cuando postula una diferencia de carácter excluyente entre la lógica populista y la lógica institucionalista. Para un desarrollo de este debate se puede recurrir a Aboy Carles 2010, o también a Yabkowski 2012.

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## Comunidades de software libre en Argentina: algunas exploraciones y vectores de análisis

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**Resumen:** El trabajo presenta avances de investigaciones en curso que exploran y problematizan algunos aspectos referidos a comunidades y grupos de usuarios vinculados al software libre en Argentina. Pretendemos comprender estas formas de organización como parte constitutiva de un movimiento social que se constituye en el marco del capitalismo informacional actual y articula en él sus demandas. Sus propuestas giran en torno a formas alternativas de concebir las tecnologías en este dominio particular, centradas en valores libertarios, trabajo colaborativo en redes y la circulación ampliada del conocimiento que subyace a la escritura de código. Nos aproximamos así a una consideración de las tecnologías informacionales como bienes comunes o formas de tecnología social, que trascienden las finalidades estrictamente mercantiles y extienden la diversidad de motivaciones de creación y desarrollo de software hacia otros dominios. A partir de allí nos interesa explorar la configuración de algunas de las comunidades del movimiento software libre en Argentina. En base a entrevistas realizadas a miembros de estos colectivos y documentos generados en tales espacios, buscaremos reconocer cuáles son las formas de organización que se presentan, cuál es la participación de los nodos locales en redes globales más amplias, cuál es la inserción de estas comunidades en el medio local y cuáles las vinculaciones que se trazan entre sus participantes y otros actores e instituciones pertenecientes al sub-campo de la producción de software. Al mismo tiempo indagaremos acerca de las disputas específicas que se plantean en el medio local, así como las diferentes motivaciones que reúnen a las personas involucradas en este tipo de iniciativas. Buscamos así trazar algunos vectores de análisis que orienten la indagación dentro de un terreno de investigación aún relativamente inexplorado en la región.

**Palabras clave:** software libre, movimiento social, comunidades de usuarios, capitalismo informacional, tecnologías de la información.

### 1. Introducción

El presente texto muestra algunos avances vinculados a un proyecto de investigación sobre comunidades y grupos de usuarios de software libre en Argentina. Pretendemos comprender estas manifestaciones como parte constitutiva de un movimiento social que se constituye en el marco del capitalismo informacional actual y articula en él sus demandas.

En esta oportunidad nos detendremos sobre la comunidad Python Argentina (PyAr), una de las más activas en la región en los últimos años. En base a entrevistas en profundidad realizadas a algunos de sus miembros y documentos generados desde este colectivo, buscaremos reconocer cuáles son las formas de organización que se presentan, cuál es la inserción de esta comunidad en el medio local, cuál su relación con redes globales más amplias, así como cuáles son las motivaciones que reúnen a las personas involucradas en torno a este tipo de iniciativas.

El movimiento de software libre propone formas alternativas de concebir las tecnologías en el dominio particular de la informática. Estas se centran en valores libertarios, trabajo colaborativo en redes y una circulación ampliada del conocimiento que subyace a la escritura de código. Nos aproximamos así a una apropiación de las tecnologías informacionales que trasciende las finalidades estrictamente mercantiles y extienden la diversidad de motivaciones de creación y desarrollo de software hacia otros ámbitos. A lo largo de la presentación, apuntaremos a trazar algunos vectores de análisis que orienten la indagación dentro de un terreno de investigación aún relativamente inexplorado en la región.

## 2. El software libre como movimiento social

En la introducción nos referimos a las comunidades de software libre como una forma de movimiento social contemporáneo. Comenzamos entonces por presentar algunas definiciones que nos permitan aclarar el encuadre general del presente estudio. Partimos de algunas categorías centrales presentadas por Melucci (1996), quien construye un abordaje de la *acción colectiva* que permite explicar fenómenos recientes. Este autor define a la acción colectiva como: "un conjunto de prácticas sociales que involucran simultáneamente un número de individuos o grupos (1), que exhiben características morfológicas similares en una contigüidad de tiempo y espacio (2), implicados en un campo social de relaciones (3) y con la capacidad de las personas involucradas de otorgar y hacer sentido sobre lo que están haciendo (4)." (Melucci 1996: 20 [traducción propia])

Dentro de este espectro amplio de prácticas sociales, los *movimientos sociales* son definidos específicamente en base a tres elementos centrales: ellos involucran *solidaridad* (1), evidencian un *conflicto* (2) y representan algún tipo de *afrenta a los límites de compatibilidad del sistema* (3). (Melucci 1996)

Los lazos de *solidaridad* son, en primer lugar, un rasgo constitutivo de los movimientos sociales. Estos invierten una cantidad considerable de tiempo y recursos en generar y sostener sus vínculos internos, con lo que se diferencian notablemente de otras formas de acción colectiva más espontáneas, que toman la forma de una suma de individualidades, reclamos y/o demandas.

En segundo lugar, los movimientos sociales *hacen manifiesto un conflicto*. Melucci los define como "los que hablan primero" o bien como "profetas desencantados". Su

poder es en una importante medida “el poder de la palabra”, esto es, su capacidad de anunciar o evidenciar la potencialidad de procesos cuyas condiciones de posibilidad se encuentran inscritas en el momento presente. Se destaca así su capacidad de articular un discurso crítico acerca de la sociedad o alguna parte de ella. (Melucci 1996)

En tercer lugar, los movimientos sociales desafían *los límites de compatibilidad del sistema* en el que su acción toma lugar. Los movimientos plantean diferentes afrontas y Melucci presta especial atención al carácter antagonista de ciertas movilizaciones colectivas. Si bien ninguna acción podría calificarse como puramente antagonista, es decir opuesta o negadora de la totalidad del sistema en el que se encuentra inserta, encontramos diferentes grados de antagonismo o incluso acciones que no presentan ninguna incompatibilidad, dependiendo del fenómeno que se trate.

Los movimientos emergentes en las últimas décadas del siglo XX presentan una serie de características particulares, tanto alrededor de sus demandas y problematizaciones, como por el creciente peso de sus componentes simbólicos, su morfología de red, su renovada articulación entre lo individual y lo colectivo, entre otras. Varios autores reconocen en los “nuevos” movimientos sociales una de las formas que asume el contra-poder en las sociedades actuales (Castells 2007). Sus manifestaciones en común, tienen en muchos casos, una oposición al capitalismo global en alguna de sus múltiples manifestaciones o consecuencias.

En trabajos anteriores, intentamos caracterizar algunos elementos determinantes del capitalismo en su etapa actual, definiéndolo en términos de un capitalismo *informativo* (Castells 1997), *flexible y/o cognitivo*, retomando algunas nociones de Hardt y Negri (2002) y Blondeau et al. (2004). Destacamos así la creciente centralidad de los procesos de creación y manipulación de información en tanto fuente de productividad y de poder. El control de la información ha generado una serie de transformaciones complejas, entre las cuales, para los fines de la presentación, nos interesa resaltar: la privatización de dominios públicos, la proletarianización del trabajo inmaterial y el reforzamiento de regímenes de propiedad sobre los bienes informacionales. Las demandas y disputas del movimiento software libre, tal como lo presentamos, sólo pueden comprenderse en el marco de estas transformaciones marcadas, entre otros elementos, por el surgimiento de las redes virtuales como un nuevo espacio público, la privatización de la informática y su configuración como industria a nivel global, y la conformación de modelos comerciales concentrados y excluyentes, que restringen los usos posibles de consumidores o usuarios. (Zanotti 2011b)

A partir de estas afirmaciones, sostenemos que las comunidades y organizaciones vinculadas al software libre presentan varios de los atributos definitorios que nos permiten analizarlos en términos de lo que Melucci define como un movimiento social contemporáneo.

Ellos involucran, en primer lugar, formas de *solidaridad* evidenciables en la creación de comunidades, redes y colectivos que promueven el trabajo colaborativo. Tal como propone Tuomi (2006) quizás lo más llamativo del fenómeno del software libre no

sean tanto sus aspectos técnicos como sus potencialidades en lo que se refiere a los modos de organizar el trabajo y generar innovaciones en redes de participación. Los entornos virtuales, permiten construir relaciones, trabajar y compartir actividades cotidianas. Estos recursos a menudo se combinan con encuentros de co-presencia que combinan componentes rituales, identitarios y celebratorios, tal como han sido estudiados por Coleman y Hill (2005) y Coleman (2010).

Al mismo tiempo, ponen de manifiesto un *conflicto* central en torno a las formas de apropiación del conocimiento y la información, en un dominio sensible como lo es la producción de software. El movimiento libre postula la "libertad" de acceso, uso y apropiación del código que conforma los aplicativos informáticos. Esto posibilita modificar el software en función de necesidades concretas, mejorarlo o adaptarlo para nuevos usos, y poder compartir a su vez estas mejoras con toda la comunidad (Proyecto GNU 2011). La puesta en común de estas prácticas constituye el núcleo central de lo que algunos autores han definido como una *ética hacker* (Himanen 2001).

El software libre plantea así una serie de principios que establecen maneras alternativas de producir y relacionarse con las tecnologías. Este modelo se auto-define como una forma "ética" de entender el software (Stallman 2004). Con ello se refiere a una serie de valores que orientan el modelo técnico, entre los que se cuentan: pasión, conciencia social, anti-corrupción, lucha contra la alienación, igualdad social, libre acceso al conocimiento, valor social, reconocimiento entre semejantes, actividad, responsabilidad, innovación, creatividad, entre otros. Este modelo genera formas de organización de la producción más desconcentradas y una mayor autonomía tanto para sus desarrolladores como sus usuarios (Zanotti 2011a).

Mediante procesos de construcción orientados por valores, la disponibilidad del código fuente en el dominio público, la conformación de plataformas de trabajo colaborativo en red, y una serie de mecanismos que permiten multiplicar y gestionar una mayor diversidad de proyectos y motivaciones, el modelo libre está logrando redefinir el horizonte de desarrollo de la industria informática en su conjunto. La proliferación de este modelo y su extensión hacia otros dominios, puede leerse como una *manifestación contra-expropiatoria* que se erige frente a la concentración de las industrias culturales y tecnológicas (Dyer-Whiteford 2004). Con ello nos aproximamos al tercer elemento definitorio que plantea Melucci.

### 3. La comunidad PyAr

Tras proponer algunas definiciones centrales acerca de la problemática en cuestión, nos referiremos ahora a la comunidad seleccionada. Los Grupos de Usuarios de software libre o Linux User Groups (LUGs), son una de las formas más difundidas de organización entre los entusiastas del software libre. Diseminados a lo largo del globo, estos se conforman habitualmente en comunidades locales, nacionales y/o regionales. Aunque es difícil conocer su número exacto, en el caso de Argentina encontramos alrededor de unas 70 comunidades vinculadas al software libre<sup>1</sup>. La organización de

los grupos toma por base el ámbito local, desarrollos de software específicos, la promoción de lenguajes de programación o el apoyo a distribuciones libres particulares.

Casi todos estos grupos cuentan con su propio sitio web y su lista de distribución, así como otros recursos en-línea. Sin embargo, no todos mantienen el mismo nivel de actividad y se presentan diferencias en cuanto a su trayectoria: mientras que los primeros se conformaron hacia finales de la década de 1990, en la mayoría de los casos su creación es más reciente.

En general los grupos de origen territorial se refieren a la promoción del software libre en un sentido amplio. Por otra parte existen comunidades vinculadas a proyectos particulares. Dentro de este grupo encontramos aquellas vinculadas a lenguajes de programación, tal como es el caso de la comunidad Python<sup>2</sup>. Este lenguaje posee licencias de código abierto protegidas a nivel global por la Python Software Foundation, una organización sin fines de lucro que se encarga además de sostener la realización de ciertas conferencias y proyectos. La expansión de Python a nivel mundial fue acompañado de la proliferación de comunidades de usuarios regionales.

En Argentina, la comunidad local se comenzó a formar en 2004, por iniciativa de un pequeño grupo de entusiastas de este lenguaje que venían utilizándolo desde hacía algún tiempo para propósitos diversos. En un principio concentrados en Capital Federal, comenzaron a reunirse mensualmente para dinamizar el grupo y palear actividades. La lista de correo fue, al igual que en otras iniciativas de este tipo, el elemento fundacional del grupo. A través de este vía de comunicación, comienzan a incluirse posibles interesados e interactúan entre sí, así como proponer alternativas de organización y proyectos. La comunidad realiza diferentes actividades de difusión, desarrollo y soporte, tal como veremos a continuación:

*“Nuestro objetivo es nuclear a los usuarios de Python, de manera de centralizar la comunicación a nivel nacional. Pretendemos llegar a usuarios y empresas, promover el uso de Python, intercambiar información, compartir experiencias y en general, ser el marco de referencia local en el uso y difusión de esta tecnología.”* (Python Argentina sitio web)

La lista funciona como un espacio de ayuda mutua, con la finalidad de resolver problemas y dudas técnicas sobre tareas de programación y muchas cosas más. Junto con el sitio web, ambos ponen a disposición una serie de recursos importantes, desde charlas sobre diversos temas, manuales y noticias, hasta ejemplos de cómo programar en Python y una cartelera de ofertas laborales relacionadas con este lenguaje. La lista de correo permite al mismo tiempo atraer a nuevos miembros de la comunidad. A partir de la lista original comienzan luego a crearse nuevas listas más específicas relacionadas con proyectos o iniciativas colectivas. Es común por lo tanto que sus miembros estén suscriptos a una cantidad de listas que ha menudo se incluyen en comunidades diferentes, aunque participen más activamente en unas que en otras en función de los intereses.

En el caso de PyAr un elemento que resultó determinante fue su actividad en eventos que se organizaban desde otras comunidades ya consolidadas en aquel momento, como era el caso del Grupo de Usuarios de Software Libre de Capital Federal (CaFe-LUG) o el Grupo de Usuarios de Software Libre de Córdoba (GrULiC). Las CaFeCon, conferencias anuales organizadas por el primero, así como las Jornadas Regionales de Córdoba en 2007, fueron espacios que permitieron al grupo hacerse conocer y difundir sus actividades:

*"Después de poner stands ahí, la verdad es que la lista de correo explotaba y veíamos saltos de 50 personas. Pasamos de 35 o 40 personas hasta algunos centenares. Y después siguió creciendo de forma gradual. Y hay mucha rotación, porque por ahí hay gente que arrancó que ya no está en el grupo porque se dedica a otra cosa..."* (Entrevista no. 1)

Junto con el crecimiento y la ampliación de la participación en la lista, se fue diversificando el origen de los miembros de PyAr hasta llegar a involucrar activamente a personas de varias regiones del país. Los primeros impulsores de la comunidad apostaron fuertemente por generar una suerte de identidad "federal" en el grupo, lo que se acompañó de un esfuerzo por trasladarse hacia diferentes localidades para darse a conocer, participar de eventos y sumar nuevos participantes. Este carácter "nacional" que ha alcanzado la comunidad se diferencia de otros intentos de generar unidad entre diferentes grupos locales y, en general, del carácter más localista de ciertos grupos de usuarios que surgieron en sus espacios territoriales de origen.

*"..Python Argentina es de Argentina. Nada de Capital, Córdoba o Rosario<sup>3</sup>, es de todos lados. Y si alguien levanta la mano y dice que quiere organizar algún evento, tiene el lugar y puede meterle pilas, que lo haga. Sea de Salta, de Misiones, sea donde sea, la gente después termina yendo. Entonces la comunidad es muy distinta, tiene un abarcamiento geográfico más grande y la gente que es del núcleo le insiste al resto para que se mueva y haga las cosas. Se mueven muy distinto."* (Entrevista no. 2)

PyAr llegó así a ser una de las comunidades más grandes. En la actualidad su lista de correo cuenta con alrededor de 900 personas, de acuerdo a los entrevistados. Es la comunidad de un lenguaje de programación más grande de Argentina y la única que posee suscriptos de otros países, en su mayoría de América Latina y España. Los eventos y proyectos realizados le posibilitaron al mismo tiempo alcanzar una trascendencia a nivel internacional dentro de su área. PyAr es la comunidad Python de habla hispana más grande del planeta y fue la primera dentro de este grupo en organizar una conferencia nacional PyCon, con la presencia de invitados internacionales.

#### **4. La dinámica de la comunidad**

Hemos presentado brevemente el caso de PyAr. Nos detendremos a continuación en algunos aspectos relacionados a su modo de organización y las actividades llevadas

a cabo por este grupo. ¿Cómo se toman las decisiones al interior de la comunidad? Encontramos aquí varios elementos que resultan de interés para destacar.

Al igual que el resto de las comunidades de software libre, nos encontramos aquí frente a grupos de pares, en los cuales las personas se reúnen en función ciertos intereses en común. Su participación supone en general una inversión de tiempo y en ciertas ocasiones otros recursos, en función de objetivos que resultan valorables entre sus miembros. En base a estas premisas, existe una horizontalidad de base entre quienes conforman estos grupos respecto de las posiciones ocupadas y las posibilidades de intervenir sobre las cuestiones colectivas. Nos referimos además a comunidades que se organizan en torno a bienes intangibles, es decir no rivales, y en las cuales la comunicación se complementa entre instancias cotidianas no presenciales e instancias de encuentro presencial.

#### 4.1. Meritocracia: igualdad y jerarquía entre pares

De cualquier manera, la concreción de un determinado proyecto o la organización de un evento conllevan toda una serie de decisiones, división de tareas y responsabilidades para su concreción. Las comunidades se rigen en términos generales por criterios “meritocráticos”, que están determinados por el reconocimiento por parte grupo a sus miembros, en función del trabajo realizado, sus aportes, sus capacidades y su permanencia a lo largo del tiempo.

*“Yo soy uno de los que tiene una opinión que pesa dentro de PyAr, soy uno de los 10 o 15 de los cuales los que digo se escucha. Porque me hice mi propia meritocracia. La meritocracia es algo importante: los hackers te respetan si sos buen hacker. Fin de la historia. Vos hiciste mucho, te respetamos.(...) Cuando vos entrás a un grupo, cuando empezaste a formar parte de la comunidad.. sos “mugre”, sos “asquerosa cosa para ser pisoteada y hundido en el lodo!” [risas] No, no es tan así. Fue un poco irónico el chiste en realidad, pero el tema es que no te toman en cuenta en serio hasta que vos no producís cosas en serio. Tenés que demostrar lo que valés.” (Entrevista no. 3)*

Entre los participantes se plantea así una diferencia fundamental entre los novatos o “newbies” y los miembros nucleares o “cores”. Esta diferenciación entre los principiantes y los “pesados” se replica en las entrevistas, al igual que en otras comunidades de este tipo. Estos últimos son aquellos que han acumulado un cierto aprecio, respeto o prestigio dentro de la comunidad, la conocen desde hace tiempo y participan activamente en sus diferentes instancias. Lo anterior puede complementarse además con un mayor dominio técnico sobre las herramientas y tecnologías. Los recién iniciados, por su parte, deberán demostrar con acciones su valía y su compromiso para ganar el respeto comunitario.

Más allá de esta diferenciación, encontramos que los entrevistados identifican a PyAr como una de las comunidades más “abiertas”, esto es, entre las más proclives a la in-



corporación de nuevos participantes. Varios otros grupos suelen ser bastante expulsivos en este sentido, una vez alcanzada su configuración definitiva. Dentro de PyAr, uno de sus proyectos recientes -denominado "AdoptaUnNewbie"- apunta justamente a favorecer el apadrinamiento por parte de los más experimentados. (Python Argentina sitio web). Observamos así el surgimiento de jerarquías al interior de la comunidad, más allá de que sus límites son flexibles y no infranqueables.

La comunidad se estructura así a partir de un núcleo central de colaboradores y un espectro más amplio de personas que se vinculan con menor intensidad o se están incorporando recientemente. Aunque en principio todas las opiniones pueden hacerse escuchar, surgen a menudo liderazgos en torno a ciertos dominios. Estos son de todos modos siempre referidos a cuestiones puntuales y susceptibles de ser cuestionados. Desde la propia comunidad se sostiene además que estas jerarquías deben ser dinámicas, en el sentido de que deben favorecer la rotación y la delegación de actividades. Existen por otra parte decisiones más amplias que van determinando el rumbo o la orientación de la comunidad. Estas incluyen desde posicionamientos políticos, hasta la vinculación con otras comunidades, con asociaciones del tercer sector, etcétera. Lejos de estar exentos de disputas y tensiones, este tipo de decisiones pueden generar conflictos entre sus miembros, tal como veremos más adelante.

#### 4.2. "Comunidad, anarquía, subversión"

El funcionamiento de PyAr puede comprenderse a partir de tres principios que uno de sus miembros fundadores define como "comunidad", "anarquía" y "subversión" (Presentación Comunidad, Anarquía y Subversión). Estos tres términos, cargados de fuertes connotaciones, se materializan en una serie de pautas generales que promueven su organización. En términos de uno de sus participantes:

*"Es totalmente anárquico, no en el sentido de que sea desordenado sino de que no hay un poder central que determine el orden. Somos ordenados pero sin un poder central digamos. El que quiera empujar un proyecto lo empuja, y verá en función de si el proyecto es copado, si es un bien líder -entre comillas-, si la gente se copa y que se yo, si la gente se suma al proyecto o no se suma.(...) Y la subversión en el sentido de cambiar el orden, porque si vos seguís con el mismo orden con el que arrancaste te anquilosás, te quedás quieto, te solidificás y te terminás rompiendo porque no tenés flexibilidad para moverte. Pero si vos sos subversivo con vos mismo vas cambiando el orden de tu comunidad para que se adapte a lo que la comunidad quiere hacer. Entonces la comunidad va evolucionando."* (Entrevista no. 1)

La idea de evitar las jerarquías, desconfiar de pautas organizacionales rígidas y ser reacios a formar estructuras, se emparenta a los rasgos que propone Melucci (1996) para caracterizar los movimientos sociales contemporáneos. A esto se suma la máxima de "si vos proponés algo, hacelo vos", que implica una no-división entre quienes toman las decisiones y quienes llevan a cabo las tareas. En definitiva

la consecución de los proyectos queda definida por la capacidad de sus impulsores de dedicarle tiempo y esfuerzo a esa tarea, y sumar otras personas a participar. La “subversión” por último, se refiere a la capacidad del grupo para innovar sus propias prácticas, manteniendo la flexibilidad del colectivo.

Estos principios pueden verse puestos en práctica a la hora de planificar actividades que requieren de tareas de organización más puntuales:

*“Lo único que más o menos tenemos ordenado, por la escala, son los eventos más grandes del año: uno de ellos es la Conferencia Nacional de Python, la PyCon Argentina, que son dos o tres días. Es algo que realmente requiere de planificación. Para que te des una idea, es un trabajo que arranca nueve meses antes. Confirmamos quiénes van a ser los organizadores de las distintas propuestas, quiénes los organizadores locales. (...) Más que poder de gestión es mucha transpiración. No es un esfuerzo de una sola persona sino de un grupo de trabajo. Mientras haya un grupo de trabajo se va a seguir haciendo, porque es un evento realmente importante. Siempre es un grupo distinto, porque los organizadores siempre tienen que ser locales. El trabajo tiene que ser en el lugar donde se haga.” (Entrevista no. 1)*

Las conferencias organizadas periódicamente son momentos centrales de la vida de PyAr. Se trata de espacios en los que la comunidad se muestra a sí misma y se abre a la incorporación de nuevos miembros. Junto con la participación en otros espacios, permiten dar a conocer iniciativas que se están desarrollando, además de socializar e intercambiar experiencias sobre herramientas y tecnologías. Estas requieren de un gran esfuerzo para su concreción e involucran año tras año a participantes de diferentes localidades.

### **4.3. Eventos y proyectos**

La comunidad PyAr se destaca por los proyectos impulsados, ya sea colectivamente o entre alguno o varios de sus miembros. Entre los eventos organizados regularmente encontramos: PyCon, la conferencia anual de mayor envergadura que mencionamos anteriormente; PyWeeks, competencias internacionales de desarrollo intensivo de aplicaciones; PyDays, conferencias distribuidas entre las provincias; Python Bug Days, jornadas dedicadas a reportar errores y proponer soluciones en el código Python; PyCamps, campamentos que se realizan en un entorno campestre para programar de manera colaborativa durante varios días. Más allá del intercambio y el avance sobre diferentes proyectos, estos encuentros constituyen instancias de alta intensidad, espacios de re-actualización del vínculo comunitario y celebración. El encuentro cara-a-cara entre sus miembros, a menudo conectados a través de chats y listas de correo, otorga la posibilidad de conocerse personalmente.

Además de los eventos que organiza la comunidad, existen proyectos que tienen por objeto desde la promoción de este lenguaje, hasta el desarrollo de aplicativos y

soluciones libres para diversos ámbitos. Entre ellos encontramos la publicación de una revista sobre la comunidad local, la creación de herramientas para desarrollar video-juegos y diferentes tipos de aplicaciones, y más. A estos se suman iniciativas personales relacionadas con uno o más de sus miembros, que deben a la comunidad una parte importante de sus colaboraciones: desde aplicativos para programadores, hasta herramientas de comunicación y chat, sistemas de gestión administrativa, entre otros.

Al igual que otros grupos de software libre locales, algunos proyectos de PyAr buscan articular componentes sociales con objetivos propiamente técnicos. Este compromiso es parte de la agenda de la comunidad y se plasma particularmente en ciertos proyectos educativos y/o que buscan acercar soluciones tecnológicas que reduzcan la brecha marcada por las desigualdades sociales. Una de tales iniciativas es la *Cd-pedia*, una enciclopedia digital basada en Wikipedia que se entrega en formato de CDs o DVDs en zonas rurales o de bajos recursos que no disponen de conectividad a Internet. Esta logró conseguir apoyo de organismos gubernamentales para su distribución.

Otro proyecto en este sentido, constituido en una línea de trabajo a nivel global, apunta a ampliar la diversidad existente entre los desarrolladores de este lenguaje, buscando con ello paliar la desigualdad de oportunidades marcada por cuestiones de género, diferencias de inserción en términos regionales, económicos, entre otras:

*"La Python Software Foundation este año ha liberado una declaración de diversidad muy interesante. Porque en general las comunidades de programación y IT son bastante centradas en hombres, en blancos, en heterosexuales, de poder económico medio-alto, entre otras cosas. Entonces Python a nivel de diversidad está iniciando una movida interesante para incluir. Por ahí [la desigualdad en] las mujeres es como lo más visible, pero hay mil parámetros entre los cuales trabajar por la diversidad. Y este año ya empezamos realmente a hacer un calendario de fotos para hablar de la diversidad: doce fotos, una para cada mes, que hablen sobre la diversidad."* (Entrevista no. 1)

Estos proyectos, sumados a la realización de actividades conjuntas con organizaciones promotoras de la cultura libre, marcan una orientación que trasciende por momentos las iniciativas estrictamente técnicas en favor de otras de mayor amplitud. En su conjunto, estas manifestaciones dan cuenta de un sentido de empoderamiento asociado a la acción colectiva: *"es parte de cuánto se involucra PyAr en la sociedad, digamos. Somos un grupo de personas y tenemos la capacidad de hacer cosas. Tenemos realmente el poder de cambiar nuestra sociedad. Entonces laburemos"* (Entrevista no. 1).

## **5. Los participantes y sus motivaciones**

Una de las preguntas que no siempre resulta fácil de responder por parte de los pro-

pios miembros de la comunidad es acerca de las motivaciones que los involucran en este tipo de iniciativas:

*“Es muy raro lo que pasa en PyAr, porque hay un grupo de 30 o 40 personas que mantienen funcionando el grupo y generan cosas a partir de la nada. Las cuales no sabemos por qué carajo lo hacen, porque nosotros no entendemos. Hay proyectos que son zarpados. Y tenemos un núcleo de gente que hizo muchas cosas y que son reconocidas a nivel internacional por las cosas que hacen. Y no se por qué se reúnen, no se por qué hacen las cosas que hacen, no se por qué yo hago lo que hago. Supongo que es por lo que te decía: vos empezás por una cuestión práctica y terminás en una filosofía.”* (Entrevista no. 3)

¿Por qué estas personas destinan tiempo, esfuerzo y hasta dinero en promover tales actividades? Las respuestas a este interrogante son múltiples y complejas. Intentaremos esbozar algunos vectores de análisis que podrán ser profundizados en futuras presentaciones.

Destacamos en primer lugar lo que algunos denominan como *“motivos filosóficos”*. Estos a menudo se ligan a componentes *“altruistas”*, en el marco de una *“filosofía del dar primero”* asociada al bien común o a formas éticamente válidas de producir este tipo de bienes. Tal como se presenta en el fragmento citado previamente, estos motivos resultan más un punto de llegada que un punto de partida al interior de la comunidad. No serían en este sentido los que precipitan a sus miembros a sumarse a la misma, sino más bien el resultado de su socialización y permanencia en dichos espacios. La valorización de una cultura comunitaria y la militancia por alternativas libres, producidas colaborativamente entre pares y compartidas en intercambios de reciprocidad, son algunos de los elementos destacados entre sus miembros. Aparecen ligados a un reconocimiento de la centralidad que la informática, y en un sentido más general las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones, adquieren en las sociedades actuales. Junto con ello aparecen los riesgos y las advertencias hacia ciertas situaciones que generan dependencia, prejuicios o limitaciones para los usuarios.

Junto con tales principios aparecen una serie de *“motivaciones prácticas”*, vinculadas a las ventajas que ofrece el software libre y la utilización de las comunidades en tanto recursos. En particular nos referimos a las posibilidades técnicas derivadas de la apertura del código fuente de los programas, la amplitud de canales de información y documentación disponibles, el acceso a gran cantidad de aplicaciones, el bajo costo de su implementación, entre otras. El espacio comunitario brinda además la posibilidad de aprender y capacitarse en otras tecnologías que son incorporadas en los cursos de formación terciarios o universitarios.

*“Y bueno, yo entré por la parte de saber usar estas herramientas de QT [QT Development Frameworks]. Entonces el hecho de participar me hizo aprender un montón de cosas. Tanto Python como QT son cosas que en la facultad no se enseñan y que vos aprendés involucrándote en comunidades libres, en proyectos libres y cosas así. En proyectos copados, te sirve muchísimo. También*

*es una crítica a la facultad. Muchas de las cosas que te enseñan son cosas viejas ya o que están muy acotadas al mercado local. Y yo los trabajos que he conseguido, los conseguí por cosas que aprendí por fuera de la facultad.*" (Entrevista no. 4)

La participación en proyectos es una buena oportunidad de incursionar, capacitarse y experimentar con nuevas tecnologías. Estos recursos pueden llegar luego a convertirse en nuevas oportunidades laborales. La comunidad funciona en ese sentido como un espacio de socialización, donde se intercambian conocimientos y se entra en contacto directo con especialistas. La comunidad se constituye así en un auténtico capital social, donde sus miembros pueden además evaluar las destrezas de los demás y recurrir a ellos con fines laborales así como recomendar personas con las que han tenido un contacto previo. Es por ello que algunos de sus miembros definen su actividad dentro tales espacios como "el mejor currículum".

Para aquellos que se vinculan laboralmente con las tecnologías informáticas, la comunidad supone asimismo una suerte de "soporte técnico", un espacio de ayuda mutua para conseguir resolver problemas de diferente tipo relacionados con el desarrollo de software. De la misma forma sus miembros recurren a la comunidad durante la creación de proyectos libres, en la búsqueda de nuevos participantes, gente capacitada que utilice las aplicaciones a modo de prueba y recomiende mejoras, reporte errores en el código e incorpore correcciones o nuevas funcionalidades. La comunidad se torna así en un "parámetro de diseño", esto es, en una referencia para el trabajo de los programadores que enriquece la calidad de sus proyectos a partir de las observaciones y la colaboración de otros especialistas. El grupo se torna así en un ámbito de socialización de los proyectos y posibilita una difusión hacia un mayor número de usuarios.

Junto con las personas que desarrollan tecnologías libres como forma de trabajo, están aquellas otras que lo hacen durante su tiempo libre, ya sea porque "se divierten" con este lenguaje, les apasiona algún tipo de proyecto en particular o porque complementan sus tareas laborales habituales con iniciativas personales en donde pueden recurrir a una actividad más creativa, más innovativa y en sus propios términos, esto es, no restringida por las imposiciones o los requerimientos de un empleador determinado. Las tareas rutinarias y/o las bajas exigencias asociadas a cierto tipo de trabajos a menudo resultan frustrantes para ciertos desarrolladores entusiastas. Por el contrario, los espacios comunitarios aparecen relacionados a la experimentación con tecnologías, el aprendizaje como juego y la consecución de objetivos desafiantes.

De la mano de lo anterior, tal como lo anticipamos, la comunidad ofrece un espacio de socialidad y de reconocimiento al trabajo realizado y a las destrezas vinculadas con este tipo de tareas. Permite así tener a sus miembros, siguiendo la expresión de uno de los entrevistados, "un poquito más de fama". Junto con ello las comunidades representan la posibilidad de reunir y crear lazos de amistad entre personas que tienen intereses en común: se trata del hecho de "juntarse a tomar cerveza y hablar de tecnología". Aparecen aquí ciertos elementos de los que definiremos como *identida-*

*des geeks*<sup>4</sup>. En el encuentro se fortalecen tales intereses y se refuerza el componente identitario de las personas participantes.

Por último, la participación a lo largo del tiempo en estas comunidades puede suponer el acceso a otros recursos, tales como dinero o *sponsors* para la organización de eventos, pasajes y estadías para participar de conferencias en el extranjero, contactos con redes globales vinculadas a estas tecnologías e incluso acceso a posiciones en fundaciones y asociaciones.

En función de lo señalado, entendemos que se plantea una suerte de retroalimentación dinámica entre los motivos prácticos y los motivos filosóficos reconocidos por los participantes. Esta se relaciona especialmente con lo que Melucci (1996) identificó como una nueva forma de articulación entre lo individual y lo colectivo asociada a los movimientos sociales contemporáneos. Lejos de significar un sacrificio individual, la inversión en la comunidad sólo cobra sentido en tanto y en cuanto se produce una sinergia entre los objetivos colectivos y las motivaciones de sus participantes. Lo colectivo se construye así atendiendo a necesidades personales. Sin ese sentimiento de realización, el involucramiento en un colectivo carecería de sentido.

## **6. El lado oscuro de la comunidad: conflictos, endogamia, lucha de egos**

El recorrido realizado hasta aquí puede dar lugar a una imagen sobre-consensuada de la comunidad, en el que la unidad de intereses y objetivos de sus miembros excluyen la posibilidad de conflictos. Pero nada más alejado de la realidad. Si bien de acuerdo con los entrevistados el caso de PyAr se caracteriza por una impronta constructiva y en donde los conflictos pueden ser resueltos de formas relativamente pacíficas, encontramos en su relato diferentes elementos de disputa.

En primer lugar sobresalen ciertas diferencias en torno a los criterios que organizan dicho espacio. Como anticipamos, el hecho de tratarse de comunidades de pares hace que las bases de autoridad sobre el resto sean laxas y en muchos casos den lugar a cuestionamientos y críticas. Por otra parte, el estilo “*anárquico*” que gobierna la organización del grupo a menudo es puesto en cuestión en función de las dificultades que genera a la hora de alcanzar ciertos objetivos:

*“El problema es que para que un proyecto se concrete hay que trabajar en él. ‘Anarquía’ no significa no hacer las cosas, hay que gestionar los proyectos para que salgan y salgan bien. La gente que está en el software libre muchos quieren mantener esa estructura anárquica de: ‘eh vieja, mandame un mail!’ Y no se dan cuenta de que el software libre nunca se trató de eso. En ningún momento se trató de informalidad, la informalidad nunca tuvo nada que ver con esto.” (Entrevista no. 4)*

Esta “*informalidad*” aparece al mismo tiempo como un obstáculo a la hora de concre-

tar proyectos de mayor envergadura o interactuar con otras instituciones, ya se trate de empresas o del Estado.

Por otro lado, algunos de sus participantes reconocen que la comunidad es un espacio "muy endogámico" que, incluso contra la voluntad y los esfuerzos de sus propios miembros, a menudo plantea obstáculos para su apertura y vinculación con otros ámbitos. Esto aparece vinculado a una "lucha de egos" entre los diferentes participantes, que disputan su autoridad o el control de ciertas decisiones al interior del mismo: "es parte de una comunidad. Es muy endogámico todo y donde también es muy difícil controlar los 'ismos', los 'ego-ismos', los 'mi-mismos' y que se yo..." (Entrevista no. 5)

En relación a lo anterior, otro de los focos de conflicto señalados se relaciona con las "peleas internas" que a menudo pueden llevar a que se "destruya la comunidad". En varias trayectorias individuales, los entrevistados señalan su paso anterior por otras comunidades altamente conflictivas en las que este tipo de disputas terminaron perjudicando el desarrollo del grupo:

*"Yo creo que la diferencia importante de PyAr con otros grupos de software libre es esa. Si vos vas a otras comunidades normalmente tienen muchas peleas internas, fricciones internas, se terminan separando. O tenés un grupito con mucho poder que va llevando al resto a través de los años y cuando ese grupo se pone viejo en el sentido de que va cambiando la actividad o le va poniendo energía a otra cosa, la comunidad se frena y se desvanece, digamos, porque no tiene gente que le ponga pilas."* (Entrevista no. 1)

Algunos participantes señalaron que el caso de PyAr, por estar organizado en base a cuestiones técnicas y no por su localidad de origen o cuestiones políticas, puede resultar más constructivo y menos proclive a presentar este tipo de conflictos. En este sentido, se imponen más los criterios meritocráticos que la antigüedad de sus miembros o los vínculos personales con el resto del grupo. Existe además una oposición a la conformación de "élites", vinculada a las consecuencias negativas que esto implica para la existencia duradera del colectivo.

El interés de esta comunidad está determinado además por la "buena educación" de sus participantes, esto es, la disposición positiva para tratar a los recién iniciados, aún en ocasiones en que sus preguntas e intervenciones puedan resultar obvias o impertinentes dentro del grupo. Esto último facilita a su vez la apertura hacia nuevos miembros. Varios destacaron asimismo la buena "relación señal-ruido" de su lista de correo. Tal expresión técnica derivada de los sistemas de transmisión de datos, se refiere a la cantidad de información valiosa que se transmite por este medio en relación a aquellos otros contenidos que pueden resultar ofensivos, derivar en peleas y conflictos, o bien son considerados por la comunidad como fuera de los tópicos aceptados de discusión. Mantener niveles aceptables de "señal-ruido" supone, de este modo, la familiaridad de los participantes con ciertas pautas tácitas, compartidas y socializadas hacia el interior del grupo:

*"Si estás en PyAr, son cosas más técnicas. También son cosas de: 'che hice esto', 'logré hacer eso', 'Miren qué interesante este proyecto!'. Y se suelen banear [moderar] cosas como 'la presidenta blah, blah, blah'.. No es una lista para discutir eso. Aunque se arman unos quilombos tremendos también, pero hay un core de discusión más fuerte. (...) También están los que en la comunidad son los 'talkers'. Y en realidad son los que hacen más ruido y los que menos hacen. Los que mucho hablan pero no hacen nada."* (Entrevista no. 5)

Los "talkers", término que podríamos traducir como "charlatanes" son aquellos miembros que pretenden imponer sus puntos de vista o aquellos que discuten más de lo que efectivamente aportan a la comunidad. Retomamos nuevamente aquí la idea de meritocracia presentada anteriormente, como una máxima en función de la cual se plantea una no-división entre quienes proponen las actividades y quienes las llevan finalmente a cabo.

## 7. Conclusiones

El texto presentó algunos avances en relación a la exploración de posibles vectores de análisis acerca de las comunidades de software libre en Argentina. Buscamos caracterizarlo como un movimiento social contemporáneo, de la mano de ciertas categorías centrales presentadas por Melucci y otros autores. En este marco, interpretamos que la actuación del movimiento de software libre cobra sentido dentro de un capitalismo informacional y articula en él sus demandas.

Intentamos centrar la mirada en los grupos de usuarios, como una de las variadas manifestaciones que se presentan entre los entusiastas del software libre. Seleccionamos el caso de PyAr, comunidad que se conformó a partir del lenguaje de programación Python y se destaca por su crecimiento continuado hasta la actualidad, su alcance a nivel regional y una amplitud de iniciativas y proyectos. Observamos como fue el surgimiento local de este grupo y cuáles sus principales apuestas. Nos detuvimos luego en analizar algunas de las lógicas de funcionamiento y organización que marcaron su desarrollo. Destacamos aquí la valoración de criterios meritocráticos así como el surgimiento de ciertas jerarquías entre sus miembros. Al mismo tiempo remarcamos su renuencia a establecer pautas organizacionales rígidas, su descentralización y la extensión del trabajo voluntario, que orientan su funcionamiento cotidiano.

Nos detuvimos luego en las motivaciones alrededor de los participantes de esta comunidad. Encontramos que las mismas son múltiples, destacando los recursos generados y alimentados colectivamente que posibilitan a sus participantes el acceso a conocimientos, capacitación, posibilidades de creación y expresión, asistencia técnica, relaciones, reconocimiento, amistades, entre otros. Junto con ello se constituye un núcleo de intereses, la adscripción a determinados "motivos filosóficos" y se fortalecen ciertos componentes identitarios en relación al colectivo. Por supuesto que el funcionamiento de este tipo de grupos no está exento de conflictos. Tanto en PyAr como en el resto de las comunidades con las que pudimos tomar contacto, se presen-



tan disputas en torno a los modos como se organiza el grupo, la toma de decisiones y las jerarquías, así como los criterios que definen el vínculo y la interacción recíproca.

Las comunidades de software libre en la región constituyen un fenómeno reciente, aún no muy extensamente investigado por los científicos sociales. Su configuración da lugar a una multiplicidad de vectores posibles de análisis, tanto económicos, como políticos, sociales y culturales.

## **Abreviaturas**

**CaFeLUG:** Grupo de Usuarios de Software Libre de Capital Federal

**CaFeCon:** Conferencia del Grupo de Usuarios de Software Libre de Capital Federal

**GRULIC:** Grupo de Usuarios de Software Libre de Córdoba

**LUG:** Linux User Group

**PyAr:** Python Argentina

**SLUC:** Software Libre de la UTN Facultad Regional Córdoba

## **Anexo metodológico**

El proyecto sobre el cual el presente texto constituye un avance, se titula "La industria del Software en Córdoba: nuevos actores y formas de producción en disputa". El mismo constituye mi tesis doctoral en curso, desarrollada durante el periodo 2009-2013. El proyecto propone reconstruir la conformación de la industria del software en la región e identificar sus actores involucrados, sus relaciones y su vinculación con diferentes modelos de producción de software. La etapa actual investiga las comunidades y organizaciones de software libre locales. Proponemos reconocer las especificidades del modelo libre, las representaciones en relación a este y la inserción del mismo en el medio. El proyecto prevé la realización de las siguientes actividades: 1) Relevamiento de datos sectoriales; 2) Recopilación de artículos periodísticos; 3) Relevamiento de contenidos digitales y publicaciones de las comunidades y organizaciones locales de software libre; 5) Observación participante y registro de actividades; 6) Realización de entrevistas.

Los entrevistados son miembros de comunidades de usuarios y organizaciones promotoras del software libre locales. Entre ellos: *Fedora Ar*, *GRULIC*, *SLUC*, *Fundación Vía Libre*, *PyAr*. Para esta oportunidad se utilizaron las entrevistas pertenecientes a la comunidad *PyAr*. Se aplicó un muestro no probabilístico en bola de nieve, a partir de contactos iniciales pre-establecidos. En todos los casos se realizaron entrevistas semi-estructuradas con final abierto y se aplicaron módulos orientadores según cada grupo de entrevistados. Se planificaron 24 entrevistas a partir de cuatro redes. La realización de las mismas se realizó durante 2011 y principios de 2012.

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## Notas

- 1 El sitio web de Usuarios Software Libre Argentina (USLA) presenta un listado de los grupos de usuarios registrados, aunque en una revisión no exhaustiva pudimos observar que existen otros grupos por fuera de este listado. La enciclopedia digital Wikipedia también incluye un Anexo que incluye además asociaciones civiles, fundaciones y otros grupos vinculados con esta problemática.
- 2 "Python is a programming language that lets you work more quickly and integrate your systems more effectively. You can learn to use Python and see almost immediate gains in productivity and lower maintenance costs. Python is free to use, even for commercial products, because of its OSI-approved open source license. The Python Software Foundation holds the intellectual property rights behind Python, underwrites the PyCon conference, and funds other projects in the Python community" ([python.org](http://python.org) sitio web)
- 3 Se refiere puntualmente a las mayores ciudades del país, las que concentran al mismo tiempo el mayor número de centros de formación y personal vinculado laboralmente a los sectores informacionales.
- 4 La expresión geek se refiere de manera amplia a los sujetos fascinados por las tecnologías y la informática, así como a toda una "cultura", en tanto conjunto de elementos significativos, que los representa. Retratada recientemente en algunas series televisivas, la cotidianidad de los geeks está marcada por la ciencia ficción, los juegos de rol, cómics y video-juegos, entre otros elementos que definen tal estereotipo. En el mismo sentido, existe una asociación entre las tecnologías libres y la "cultura geek". De hecho el propio creador del Kernel Linux, Linus Torvalds, se describe a sí mismo como un geek: "I was a nerd. Geek. From fairly early on. I didn't duct-tape my glasses together, but I might as well have, because I had all the other traits. Good at math, good at physics, and with no social graces whatsoever." (Torvalds y Diamond 2001: 4) Varias definiciones en relación a los geeks coinciden en que el término estaba hasta hace poco tiempo asociado a connotaciones negativas o peyorativas.

## Índice de temas

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Capitalismo flexible  
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Movimientos sociales contemporáneos

## Acerca del autor

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## Tensiones entre movimientos sociales y gobiernos progresistas en América Latina: Las disputas por el territorio y los recursos naturales en Bolivia (2009-2011)

Juan Wahren

**Resumen:** A partir del conflicto acontecido en torno a la construcción de una carretera que atravesaría el *Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure* (TIPNIS) en la región subtropical de Bolivia se colocó en la agenda nacional e internacional la problemática de las tensiones existentes entre algunos movimientos sociales bolivianos –principalmente pueblos indígenas- y el gobierno del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Este gobierno, encabezado por Evo Morales, es uno de los procesos paradigmáticos de los denominados "gobiernos progresistas" de América Latina. Sin embargo, estalló un conflicto en el seno de los movimientos sociales que apoyaban al gobierno del MAS. En este trabajo, además de realizar una reconstrucción del conflicto del TIPNIS nos detenemos a analizar los conflictos territoriales alrededor de las tierras habitadas ancestralmente por el pueblo guaraní donde se encuentran las reservas más importantes de gas y petróleo de Bolivia. De esta manera, tomando los procesos de negociación, diálogo y conflicto en torno a los territorios habitados por el Pueblo Guaraní en el departamento de Tarija daremos cuenta de estas tensiones entre los discursos y prácticas "neodesarrollistas" planteados por el gobierno del MAS y las lógicas productivas y culturales propias los pueblos indígenas bolivianos en torno a los usos y sentidos alternativos que otorgan estas comunidades al territorio que habitan ancestralmente. En este sentido, analizar estas tensiones y desafíos planteados actualmente en Bolivia nos permitirán reflexionar acerca de uno de los ejes problemáticos que actualmente atraviesan a toda la región latinoamericana, es decir las tensiones entre movimientos sociales y "gobiernos progresistas" en torno al uso y sentidos que otorgan los distintos actores sociales a los territorios y recursos naturales.

**Palabras clave:** Movimientos Sociales, Desarrollo, Territorialidad, Recursos Naturales, Pueblos Indígenas.

*"Nuestra madre tierra, que fue regada con la sangre de nuestros antepasado, cobija la palabra, la memoria y la historia de nuestros pueblos, en ella vive nuestra cultura y descansan nuestros antepasados; por lo tanto, no es una mercancía, no es un bien que se compra y se vende."*

*"Resolución de la Asamblea Departamental del Pueblo Guaraní", 18 de junio de 2009, CCGTT – APG Tarija.*

## 1. Introducción

Con el conflicto acontecido en el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Secure (TIPNIS) –una reserva natural protegida- ubicado entre los departamentos de Beni y Cochabamba en Bolivia se colocó en la agenda nacional e internacional la problemática de las tensiones existentes entre algunos movimientos sociales bolivianos –principalmente pueblos indígenas- y el gobierno de Evo Morales, en torno a los diferentes usos y sentidos otorgados por distintos actores sociales a los territorios y los recursos naturales que allí se encuentran. El conflicto del TIPNIS aparece entonces como un caso paradigmático de la conflictividad social de Bolivia en la actualidad y, también, ilustra algunas de las tensiones que atraviesan los denominados “gobiernos progresistas” de América Latina, de los cuales el “proceso de cambio” liderado por Evo Morales en Bolivia es uno de los más importantes del continente.

El conflicto por la construcción de una carretera que atravesaría el territorio ancestral de diversos pueblos indígenas de la región del TIPNIS aparece como el emergente de una serie de conflictos socio- territoriales-ambientales que emergieron desde fines de 2009 en el país andino y que genera importantes tensiones entre el gobierno nacional y diferentes movimientos sociales indígenas, campesinos y ambientalistas. En este trabajo, retomamos algunos de esos conflictos poniendo especial énfasis en los conflictos protagonizados por la Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG) en torno a la recuperación, control y (auto)gestión de los territorios ancestrales en la región chaqueña del Departamento de Tarija<sup>1</sup>, al suroeste de Bolivia, los conflictos urbanos desatados a partir de una suba exponencial del precio de la gasolina a finales del año 2010 y el conflicto antes mencionado en torno al TIPNIS.

De esta manera, tomando los procesos de negociación, diálogo y conflicto en torno a los territorios y los recursos naturales entre los movimientos sociales y el Estado daremos cuenta de estas tensiones entre los discursos y prácticas “neodesarrollistas” planteados por el gobierno del MAS y las lógicas productivas y culturales propias los pueblos indígenas y campesinos en torno a los usos y sentidos alternativos que otorgan estas comunidades al territorio que habitan ancestralmente. En este sentido, analizar estos conflictos y desafíos planteados actualmente en Bolivia nos permitirán reflexionar acerca de uno de los ejes problemáticos que actualmente atraviesan a toda la región latinoamericana, es decir las tensiones entre movimientos sociales y “gobiernos progresistas” en torno al uso y sentidos que otorgan los distintos actores sociales a los territorios y recursos naturales.

## 2. Los *ciclos de protesta* de los movimientos sociales en Bolivia

En los últimos veinte años Bolivia ha sido un foco de atención de diversos análisis académicos y políticos por las novedosas irrupciones de movimientos sociales indígenas y campesinos que marcaron la agenda de movilización y acciones colectivas de protesta en resistencia a las reformas neoliberales que se desplegaron desde fines de la década del ochenta y durante la década de los noventa en toda la región latinoamericana.

Durante estos años podemos observar tres grandes ciclos de protesta (Tarrow, 2009), 1) El surgimiento de viejos/nuevos actores sociales, entre 1990 y el año 2000; 2) Las resistencias insurreccionales al neoliberalismo, entre el año 2000 y el 2005; y 3) Las acciones colectivas en el marco del "gobierno de los movimientos sociales", desde el año 2006 hasta la actualidad.

Las características generales de estos tres ciclos de protesta pueden resumirse en a) la profunda crisis de representación de los partidos políticos tradicionales y del propio andamiaje político-institucional de Bolivia con el correspondiente "hastío social" frente a la incapacidad de los partidos políticos de solucionar los problemas cotidianos de la población; b) la capacidad de los movimientos sociales de articular prácticas y discursos ligado a soluciones concretas para los problemas cotidianos de las poblaciones urbanas y rurales a partir de los propios anclajes identitarios y culturales de los pueblos que existen de manera yuxtapuesta y abigarrada en Bolivia que implican la creación de nuevas formas y lógicas de lo político "más allá" de lo institucional; y c) una resignificación de las relaciones entre los movimientos sociales y el Estado en el marco de un "proceso de articulación de alianzas entre diversos sectores de la sociedad" para la creación de nuevos espacios de participación política directa y autónoma en relación a cambios radicales en las normas institucionales que reconozcan e incluso promuevan estas nuevas formas de participación política (Chávez, Mokrani y Uriona, 2010). A estas características planteadas por estas autoras creemos importante incorporar la dimensión de la "territorialidad" (Porto Goncalves, 2002 y Manzano Fernandes, 2005) como un componente que atraviesa de manera transversal las acciones colectivas de protesta de los movimientos sociales.

En el primer ciclo de protesta aparecen nuevas demandas, con acciones colectivas resignificadas a partir del resurgimiento de estos viejos/nuevos actores sociales: los campesinos y los pueblos indígenas. La acción de protesta que inaugura este ciclo es la "Marcha por la Dignidad y el Territorio" en 1990 que protagonizaron los pueblos indígenas de tierras bajas que irrumpen en el escenario político boliviano luego de décadas de silenciamiento e invisibilización. Las demandas estaban vinculadas a exigencias en torno a la distribución de la tierra pero también a los modos de habitarla, es decir, se comenzó a plantear la demanda de territorio como una forma integral de recuperar la tierra, pero también una forma de producir, una forma de gobernarse, una forma de reproducción de la vida. Así, para la cosmovisión indígena, el territorio representa "un espacio de vida esencial para la reproducción social, cultural, religiosa, económica y política. El territorio es integral, una unidad que no se presta a división porque implica la pluralidad de recursos que lo pueblan, sea el suelo, el subsuelo o el aire; es la base de la subsistencia, un espacio vital multidimensional y no un bien comercial" (Fornillo, 2010:177). Las otras demandas se encontraban ligadas al reconocimiento de la cultura y de la existencia política de los pueblos indígenas de Bolivia.

Algunas de estas acciones colectivas de los movimientos indígenas de Bolivia -muchas de las cuales contaron con la activa participación de la APG- fueron las movilizaciones de 1996, 2000 y 2002<sup>2</sup> de los pueblos de las tierras bajas y las marchas cocaleras iniciadas en 1994 en defensa del cultivo y la comercialización tradicional de

la coca marcaron una continuidad de las acciones colectivas y demandas iniciadas a comienzos de la década del noventa con la paulatina incorporación a las movilizaciones de sectores populares del occidente, principalmente las organizaciones aymaras del sector rural como la CONAMAQ y del sector urbano como las comisiones vecinales de la ciudad de El Alto.

El principal *repertorio de acción* (Tarrow, 2009) de este ciclo fueron lo que aquí denominamos la “marcha larga”, que implica una movilización que recorre grandes distancias- cientos de kilómetros- desde comunidades remotas hacia el centro político de la república- la ciudad de La Paz- o alguna otra ciudad de importancia política y/o económica a nivel departamental o regional. Este tipo de movilizaciones no estuvieron exentas de cruentas represiones y enfrentamientos con la policía y otras fuerzas de seguridad pero aseguraban una importante cobertura mediática a los reclamos y en general generaban una amplia solidaridad de otros sectores populares y clases medias urbanas. En los finales de este ciclo de protesta comenzó a esbozarse la demanda por una Asamblea Constituyente, reclamo que se cristalizó en las jornadas de la llamada “Guerra del Agua” en Cochabamba en el año 2000 que dio inicio al segundo ciclo de protesta.

Este segundo ciclo de protesta -el “ciclo insurreccional”- se vio signado por la incorporación plena a las protestas sociales de los sectores populares del occidente. Por un lado, la confederación campesina (CSUTCB) conducida por Felipe Quispe de orientación “katarista”, por otro lado la consolidación de las organizaciones regionales indígenas quechuas y principalmente aymaras cuya organización principal es la CONAMAQ (García Linera, Chávez y Costas, 2008), y los sindicatos cocaleros, consolidados bajo el liderazgo de Evo Morales Ayma de orientación más “clasista” pero con cada vez mayores componentes identitarios indígenas a partir de la luchas por la defensa del uso y comercialización de la coca (Stefanoni, 2003 y García Linera, Chávez y Costas, 2008) como “cultivo ancestral” y, finalmente, la irrupción del complejo entramado social que dio lugar a la “Guerra del Agua” en Cochabamba entre sectores indígenas, campesinos, sectores medios urbanos, trabajadores industriales, docentes, profesionales, estudiantes, etc. que lograron frenar el proyecto privatizador del sistema de riego y agua de la ciudad de Cochabamba y el sector rural adyacente, dejó como saldo organizativo a la Coordinadora en Defensa del Agua y la Vida, a la vez que un aprendizaje insurreccional en todo el movimiento social boliviano (Ceceña, 2005, García Linera, Chávez y Costas, 2008).

A partir de este acontecimiento se logró, por un lado, derrotar un proyecto privatizador de la segunda oleada neoliberal en Bolivia; por otro lado, permitió articular de manera exitosa a un conjunto de organizaciones y actores sociales que hasta entonces venían protagonizando protestas y acciones colectivas de manera dispersa y con una débil articulación más cercana a la solidaridad que a la puesta en común de acciones concretas y demandas unificadas (Ceceña, 2005).

Además de la demanda contra la privatización de los recursos naturales -en este caso el agua- se comenzó a articular un discurso acerca de la soberanía popular en torno



a los territorios y los recursos naturales que influiría de manera contundente en las protestas venideras en torno a los hidrocarburos. Al mismo tiempo, en estas protestas se retomó y nacionalizó la demanda por una Asamblea Constituyente que diera cuenta de una nueva forma de relacionamiento entre gobernantes y gobernados en un país donde estallaban los mecanismos de dominación coloniales que habían supuesto la construcción de una nación mestiza que se resquebrajaba rápidamente con la emergencia de estos nuevos/viejos actores -los indígenas y campesinos- que venían a señalar la inviabilidad de un Estado nación que negara a la mayoría de su población, perteneciente a los múltiples y diversos pueblos y culturas que existían en el subsuelo boliviano de manera soterrada, yuxtapuesta, "abigarrada" (Zavaleta Mercado, 2008).

Masivas movilizaciones, cortes de rutas, huelgas de hambre, barricadas y enfrentamientos callejeros con la policía y el ejército boliviano, fueron parte del repertorio de acciones que desplegó el conjunto de actores involucrados en las luchas que conformaron este segundo ciclo de protesta. Protestas protagonizadas por viejos/nuevos actores sociales que ahora (re)cobraban su voz y su lugar en la política nacional desde una práctica y un discurso radical en las calles, en las rutas, en las quebradas, valles y montañas de una Bolivia sorprendida en pleno auge neoliberal.

Otra gran insurrección popular de este ciclo se produjo en el llamado "Febrero Negro" en el año 2003, cuando diversos actores sociales -incluida la policía que tuvo importantes enfrentamientos armados con el ejército en la zona céntrica de La Paz- se rebelaron en contra de las políticas de ajuste económico del gobierno de Sánchez de Losada propugnado a través de un "impuestazo" a los salarios de los trabajadores bolivianos. En los enfrentamientos callejeros entre manifestantes y el ejército, los primeros quemaron y saquearon diversos edificios públicos identificados con la "clase política" que se encontraba totalmente deslegitimada.

En octubre de ese mismo año se desarrolló el mayor conflicto de este ciclo de protesta, tanto por la magnitud de los enfrentamientos como por el alcance nacional de las protestas y sus consecuencias políticas. Estas jornadas, se originaron como protesta frente a la decisión del gobierno de exportar gas a través de puertos chile, así se amalgamaron sentimientos nacionalistas -Chile en la Guerra del Pacífico en el año 1879 arrebató a Bolivia la salida al Océano Pacífico- con la cuestión de los hidrocarburos que se encontraba ligada históricamente al sentimiento popular de soberanía nacional luego de la Guerra del Chaco. Frente a la negativa gubernamental de retroceder en esta decisión, las movilizaciones populares se fueron incrementando abarcando en primer lugar las ciudades de La Paz y el Alto, luego el resto de los departamentos altiplánicos para alcanzar en pocas semanas la totalidad del país movilizado bajo la consigna de frenar la exportación de gas vía Chile, pero sumando las demandas de nacionalización de los hidrocarburos y el llamado a una Asamblea Constituyente. De esta manera se conformaba la denominada "Agenda de los Movimientos Sociales" que marcaría la política boliviana por los siguientes años hasta la actualidad. En el marco de estos acontecimientos, el presidente Sánchez de Losada presentó su renuncia, asumiendo su Vicepresidente Carlos Mesa quien prometió llamar a un referéndum en torno a esta problemática para avanzar en una nueva Ley de

Hidrocarburos. Durante los años 2004 y 2005 continuaron las protestas sociales por la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos, la nueva Ley de Hidrocarburos surgida del referéndum de 2004 y propulsada por Carlos Mesa no contemplaba grandes cambios en la propiedad de los hidrocarburos aunque que aumentaba -en parte- la apropiación de la renta petrolera por parte del Estado.

El segundo ciclo de protesta se clausura a fines del año 2005 con el triunfo electoral del candidato del Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), Evo Morales, quien encarnaba, como dirigente histórico de los campesinos "cocaleros", a los movimientos sociales que habían protagonizado los ciclos de protesta desde principios de la década del noventa.

Los primeros años del gobierno del MAS fueron signados por enfrentamientos con los sectores dominantes de los departamentos del oriente boliviano, la denominada "Medialuna" que se oponían a algunas de las medidas más radicalizadas del gobierno de Evo Morales, como la reforma constitucional, la reforma agraria, la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos, entre otras medidas. Podemos afirmar que los movimientos sociales bolivianos comienzan un período de *latencia* (Melucci, 1994) donde las acciones colectivas en el espacio público se encontraron ligadas a la defensa del gobierno del MAS, del denominado "proceso de cambio", frente a los conflictos suscitados con los sectores dominantes de Bolivia. Recién en el año 2009 comienza a emerger una creciente tensión entre el gobierno "masista" y los movimientos sociales en torno a las disputas por los territorios y los recursos naturales.

Es en el año 2010 cuando se retoman algunas acciones colectivas de protesta -la primera de ellas protagonizadas por la APG- que rememoran el repertorio de acciones del primer ciclo de protesta durante la década del noventa: las "marchas largas", es decir, las movilizaciones que recorren decenas o centenas de kilómetros para llamar la atención sobre una determinada problemática, generalmente ligada a los territorios indígenas. Este tipo de acciones suelen tener un fuerte impacto en la opinión pública y en los medios de comunicación que suelen cubrirlas durante cada día de movilización, llegando muchas veces a las portadas de los periódicos regionales y de la prensa de alcance nacional. Así se desarrollaron dos importantes movilizaciones durante el 2010, la primera fue la "Marcha por la defensa del territorio ancestral y el respeto a los derechos indígenas" convocada por la APG de Tarija, más precisamente por las Capitanías de Yacuiba, Villa Montes y Karaparí, cuyas consignas principales eran: "Déjennos aire, tierra y agua, déjennos árboles y animales, déjennos vida"; "La tierra no nos pertenece, porque nosotros somos parte de la tierra" y "Bolivia *Yam-bae*<sup>3</sup>, sin dueños ni patrones". Esta fue la primera movilización de organizaciones indígenas de "tierras bajas" reclamando contra el gobierno de Evo Morales.

La segunda movilización de indígenas de "tierras bajas" en el año 2010 fue convocada por la CIDOB y abarcó a gran parte de las organizaciones indígenas de las tierras bajas. La APG a nivel nacional no se plegó a esta movilización pues obtuvo canales de negociación directos tanto con el ministros encargados de las temáticas de autonomía, medio ambiente, hidrocarburos y tierras, con quienes se reunieron en la ciudad de Camiri (Santa Cruz) semanas previas a la movilización anunciada por la CIDOB. Sin

embargo, la APG de Tarija decidió participar igualmente de la movilización sin el aval de su organización a nivel nacional.

Es así como durante el segundo mandato de Evo Morales - en el momento de su mayor legitimidad política institucional (fue reelecto en diciembre del año 2009 con el 64,2% de los votos)- es cuando comenzaron a sentirse con mayor fuerza algunas de las tensiones entre el gobierno y los movimientos sociales en torno a los usos y sentidos contrapuestos acerca del uso y la gestión de los recursos naturales y los territorios habitados por los pueblos indígenas.

Durante los primeros años de gobierno, el MAS cumplimentó, en parte, la agenda de los movimientos sociales: realizó el llamado a una Asamblea Constituyente y nacionalizó los hidrocarburos, así como estableció programas sociales de alcance nacional que comenzaron una lenta pero constante redistribución de la riqueza a favor de los sectores populares, así como se comenzaron distintas obras de infraestructura productiva, sanitaria, educativa y de caminos anhelados por el conjunto de la población.

Sin embargo, podemos afirmar que las demandas de los movimientos sociales sólo fueron cumplidas en parte. Por un lado, la Constitución aprobada luego de la Asamblea Constituyente con reformas matizadas por una negociación con los partidos opositores de derecha en el parlamento, dejó de lado muchas de las demandas de los pueblos indígenas y campesinos, aunque se reconoció el carácter "plurinacional" del Estado boliviano. Por otro lado, con la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos lo que se realizó principalmente fue una recuperación de las acciones de Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) que habían sido capitalizadas durante la etapa neoliberal, retomando así parte del control de la renta petrolera por parte del Estado, pero la gestión de las explotaciones y exploraciones hidrocarburíferas continúan, salvo algunas excepciones donde actúa directamente YPFB, en manos de empresas extranjeras principalmente Repsol YPF (España), PETROBRAS (Brasil) y PDVESA (Venezuela).

En este sentido, continúa abierto el debate del rol del nuevo "Estado plurinacional" en torno al creciente avance de los emprendimientos hidrocarburíferos en los territorios campesinos e indígenas, sobre todo en la región chaqueña y amazónica que es donde vislumbramos que se generarán la mayoría de los conflictos y tensiones entre los movimientos sociales, el Estado y las empresas multinacionales. Este cambio de viraje de las acciones colectivas de los movimientos sociales a partir de 2010, donde se vislumbran algunos cuestionamientos y enfrentamientos con el gobierno del MAS en torno a los territorios y los recursos naturales podrían implicar señales del nacimiento de un nuevo ciclo de protestas que ponga en crisis la legitimidad con la que contaba hasta ahora el gobierno de Evo Morales en el seno de los movimientos sociales en particular y en los sectores populares en general.

Estas tensiones que encontramos en Bolivia, se enmarcan en tensiones que atraviesan gran parte de los movimientos sociales de América Latina que se van conformando como "movimientos territoriales, caracterizados por lenguajes de valoración específicos respecto de la territorialidad que enfatizan la defensa y la promoción de la

vida y la diversidad” (Svampa, 2008:77). En el caso de Bolivia, el componente abigarrado de la sociedad habilita que algunos movimientos sociales irrumpen como un “flujo subterráneo de procesos sociales desarticuladores del orden estatal y económico nacional” (Tapia, 2008:53) en la escena política, a partir de formas de acción y de (auto) gobierno ancladas en esas otras sociedades que existen de manera yuxtapuesta y subordinada a la sociedad criolla/mestiza hegemónica del Estado-Nación boliviano. A estos movimientos sociales surgidos de conjuntos sociales específicos y culturas como los pueblos indígenas que desarticulan el entramado de la colonialidad además de la institucionalidad y las relaciones sociales y económicas hegemónicas Luis Tapia los denomina como “movimientos societales” (Tapia, 2008), aquellos movimientos sociales que no generan sus acciones colectivas desde la estructura moderna de la sociedad, sino a partir de “estructuras comunitarias de sociedades y culturas no modernas, pero que hacen política para demandar al gobierno una mayor integración y reconocimiento, es decir, para actuar en la principal forma política moderna, que es el estado-nación. Se trata de formas sociales y políticas de origen no moderno que se movilizan contra los efectos expropiadores de su territorio y destructores de sus comunidades causados por los procesos modernos de explotación de la naturaleza y de las personas” (Tapia, 2008:63). El desafío de la construcción de un Estado plurinacional es el de poder crear una nueva institucionalidad que de cuenta de esas “otras sociedades y culturas”, así como de las formas alternativas de habitar y practicar los territorios y de los modos de relacionamiento y utilización de los recursos naturales que allí se encuentran.

### **3. Tensiones en torno al “desarrollo” y al uso y la gestión de los territorios y los recursos naturales**

Podemos observar una tensión creciente dentro del llamado “proceso de cambio” boliviano entre una lógica “desarrollista”, ligada a un pensamiento moderno y capitalista, pero del que también han sido tributarias muchas de las formas conocidas de socialismo y sus variantes (con la excepción del llamado “ecosocialismo”) y una lógica ligada a las experiencias campesinas e indígenas que resignifican a la naturaleza como la *Madre Tierra* y plantean otras formas de relacionamiento con la Naturaleza y sus “Recursos Naturales” que implican necesariamente una crítica radical al modelo hegemónico de desarrollo, buscando en alternativas económicas, ambientales y sociales a las formas comunitarias de producción y autogobierno, tanto a escala local como a escala regional, utilizando los “recursos naturales” de manera sustentable y sin afectar los territorios habitados y practicados por los pueblos indígenas y comunidades campesinas.

La primera movilización de pueblos indígenas en reclamo de territorios y por la gestión de los recursos naturales fue protagonizada a mediados de abril del año 2010 por el pueblo guaraní del Departamento de Tarija organizado en la Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG). Esta organización protagonizó una movilización donde más de trescientos indígenas guaraní recorrieron a pie durante dos días casi cien kilómetros entre las ciudades de Yacuiba y Villamontes, retomando nuevamente el repertorio de

acción de la "marcha larga" característico de los ciclos de protesta anteriores. Las demandas de la APG consistían, principalmente, en la titulación de sus tierras ancestrales y en la defensa de los territorios indígenas y los recursos naturales adyacentes, entre los cuales se encuentra el Parque Nacional Aguargüe. En ese territorio la APG propuso establecer una "Pausa por la Madre Tierra" para frenar las explotaciones hidrocarburíferas en esa región. En un documento firmado por las autoridades del pueblo Guaraní exigieron "Una Pausa por la Madre Tierra que se traduzca en la suspensión definitiva de todas las actividades de exploración y explotación de hidrocarburos en el Parque Nacional Aguargüe y áreas de influencia, mismas que son parte de nuestro territorio ancestral y sobre las cuales el Pueblo Guaraní tiene derechos precedentes al Estado boliviano" (APG, 2010).

Al finalizar la "marcha larga" los guaraní realizaron una asamblea general de los marchistas con las comunidades de la zona de Villamontes. En el marco de las negociaciones que estaban manteniendo con el gobierno nacional se acercó hasta la asamblea quien en ese momento era el Ministro de Hidrocarburos de Bolivia, Luis Fernando Vincenti. El funcionario nacional expresó a la asamblea el gesto de "*buena voluntad del gobierno nacional de dialogar aún en el marco de una medida de protesta*" y comentó algunas de las propuestas de la asamblea con respecto a las demandas expresadas por los guaraní en torno a los hidrocarburos. En primer lugar afirmó que muchos de los beneficios de los hidrocarburos llegaban a los guaraní -como al conjunto de la población- por medio de las escuelas y hospitales públicos que si bien tenían sus problemas eran para todos los ciudadanos de Bolivia y que por otra parte se estaba trabajando en poder entregar un porcentaje de las regalías de los hidrocarburos directamente a los pueblos indígenas donde se encontraban parte de esos recursos. Por otro lado nombró distintas posibilidades de "*planes de desarrollo en las comunidades que se podrían realizar de manera conjunta entre el Estado y las empresas de hidrocarburos e YPFB con beneficios concretos para las comunidades*", como puestos sanitarios, construcción de escuelas, mejoramiento de caminos y accesos, celdas de energía solar para la electricidad, subsidios para actividades agrícola-ganaderas, etc. Por último, el Ministro planteó que la demanda de no realizar actividades de explotación hidrocarburíferas era "*inviabile e innegociable*" ya que las reservas comprobadas de gas allí existentes estaban comprometidas por acuerdos comerciales con la Argentina. Finalizando su intervención, el Ministro de Hidrocarburos de Bolivia afirmó que todas las actividades humanas contaminaban, "*incluso todas las personas cuando van al baño provocan contaminación ambiental*". A partir de allí, el proceso de diálogo se fue deteriorando paulatinamente pues la intervención del ministro fue considerada "*insultante*" por algunos de los presentes y donde además "*no se mostraba la voluntad de dialogar del gobierno si mantienen en pie avanzar sobre el Parque Nacional Aguargüe*". En este sentido, el funcionario gubernamental fue enfático en su intervención en la asamblea indígena: el Parque Nacional y las comunidades serían afectadas por la actividad hidrocarburífera pues esa región resulta clave para cumplir con los contratos de exportación de gas hacia la Argentina. La respuesta desilusionada de los guaraní allí presentes podría resumirse en la frase que expresó al ministro una de las participantes de la asamblea: "Usted nos habla de dinero y nosotros le estamos hablando de vida... de nuestra Madre Tierra".

Cinco días más tarde, durante la “Cumbre de los Pueblos por el Cambio Climático y los Derechos de la Madre Tierra”<sup>4</sup>, estas tensiones entre las lógicas del desarrollo planteadas por el gobierno y la defensa de los territorios y los recursos naturales por parte de algunos movimientos sociales, se expresaron en diferentes mesas de discusión de las diecisiete que se desplegaron durante la cumbre, aunque el lugar paradigmático para las críticas y contradicciones al gobierno boliviano en torno a sus políticas de “desarrollo” y la utilización de modo extractivo de los recursos naturales fue la denominada “Mesa Popular 18”. Esta mesa funcionó de modo paralelo al encuentro oficial ya que no fue aceptada por los organizadores y se convirtió principalmente en un espacio articulador y de difusión de las diferentes problemáticas socioambientales de Bolivia, principalmente aquellas protagonizadas por movimientos indígenas y campesinos en sus territorios. La Mesa fue convocada por el Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) y contó con la participación de la CIDOB, la APG de Tarija, la Asamblea por el Agua de Cochabamba y otras organizaciones urbanas, indígenas y campesinas que han protagonizado los diferentes ciclos de la protesta social en Bolivia en las últimas décadas. Sus principales discusiones giraron en torno a los conflictos territoriales y las alternativas al desarrollo capitalista que proponen los diferentes movimientos sociales, en este sentido la declaración final de la mesa expresa la intencionalidad de construir desde los movimientos indígenas, campesinos y populares las bases para la implementación de un “Nuevo Modelo de Gestión de los Recursos Naturales para revertir el Modelo de producción capitalista aún imperante en Latinoamérica, que radica en el desarrollo industrial y la consolidación de las transnacionales, fundado en la propiedad privada, el lucro individual y el consumismo, aspectos que han sido puestos en tela de juicio por las naciones y pueblos de América Latina. Los planes de desarrollo de estos gobiernos, entre ellos el boliviano, sólo reproducen el esquema desarrollista del pasado” (CONAMAQ, 2010). A la vez la crítica radical de estos movimientos sociales involucra también al gobierno del MAS y Evo Morales, significándolo como un gobierno “desarrollista” en el marco del conjunto de los gobiernos denominados “progresistas” de América Latina.

A finales del año 2010 se produjo un levantamiento popular en oposición al denominado “gasolinazo” donde por medio de un decreto gubernamental aumentaron las tarifas de la gasolina y el diesel, ajustando los precios del mercado interno de naftas con los mercados regionales a través de la eliminación de gran parte de los subsidios estatales, lo cual repercutió inmediatamente en el alza de los precios del transporte público, los alimentos básicos y generando una crisis en los depósitos bancarios. Las causas citadas por el gobierno para este sorpresivo y abrupto aumento en la gasolina fueron por un lado para frenar el contrabando de gasolina a países vecinos y para suspender los subsidios estatales a la producción de petróleo. Sin embargo, otra posible causa de este cambio se encuentra ligado a presiones de las empresas de hidrocarburos de obtener mejores rentabilidades en un mercado interno en expansión, rentabilidad que también sería aprovechada por la empresa estatal, YPFB, para continuar con el modelo de desarrollo productivista que, cada vez más, parece estar hegemonizando la política general del gobierno de Evo Morales. Luego de casi una semana de enfrentamientos en todo el país, pero principalmente en La Paz y El Alto, históricos bastiones del MAS, el gobierno dio marcha atrás con la medida y luego de

una declaración de Evo Morales planteando que "hemos decidido, en esa conducta de mandar obedeciendo al pueblo, abrogar el decreto supremo 748 y los demás decretos que acompañan a esta medida" (Erbol, 2010).

Al año siguiente, a mediados de 2011, estalló en la escena pública el conflicto anteriormente mencionado por el proyecto de construcción de una carretera que atravesaría un territorio indígena que además está protegido como parque nacional -el TIPNIS- en la región amazónica. Frente al avance del proyecto binacional entre Bolivia y Brasil, los pueblos indígenas del Beni, en alianza con otros indígenas de las "tierras bajas" agrupados en la APG y en la CIDOB, así como con el apoyo de poblaciones urbanas como Cochabamba y organizaciones altiplánicas como la CONAMQ emprendieron una "marcha larga", la VIII Marcha Indígena (en continuación de las protagonizadas en los ciclos de protesta anteriores) desde la zona afectada hacia La Paz reclamando la suspensión del proyecto y el respeto hacia la "Madre Tierra". Luego de varias semanas de debate político en los medios de comunicaciones, tensiones con funcionarios gubernamentales que se acercaron al recorrido de la movilización para entablar negociaciones y hechos graves de represión policial, se llegó a un acuerdo con el gobierno y el presidente Evo Morales anunció la suspensión, al menos momentánea, del proyecto de construcción de la carretera que atravesaría el TIPNIS. Al mismo tiempo llamó a una convocatoria a una "consulta popular" para decidir la suspensión definitiva del proyecto de infraestructura o la reanudación del mismo. Este desenlace momentáneo mantuvo en estado de latencia al conflicto hasta mediados del año 2012. En el mes de abril se organizó una nueva marcha de pueblos indígenas, la IX Marcha.

Luego de dos meses de movilización desde el TIPNIS hasta la ciudad de La Paz, permanecieron por quince días en la capital del país andino, realizando actos y encuentros con otros movimientos sociales, además de realizar campamentos y "cercos" a distintos ministerios y edificios públicos. Sin embargo no lograron ser atendidos por el presidente Evo Morales ni por funcionarios gubernamentales de alto rango. En momentos del cierre de este artículo, los marchistas habían decidido regresar a sus territorios y emitieron una declaración que afirmaba que de continuarse con el proyecto de construcción de la carretera en el TIPNIS y otros proyectos de "desarrollo" que el gobierno nacional impulsa a partir de la consulta popular que no es aceptada por los pueblos indígenas del TIPNIS por incorporar a votantes que no habitan esos territorios. El documento de la IX Marcha afirma que "se va a profundizar en un corto plazo el modelo de desarrollo extractivista y capitalista en Bolivia (...) consideramos a esta mala política y la decisión del Gobierno nacional de realizar una consulta ilegal y fraudulenta en el TIPNIS, como una verdadera amenaza a la democracia boliviana, a nuestro patrimonio natural y cultural, y una vulneración a los derechos de las naciones y pueblos indígenas originarios." (Opinión, 2012)

De esta manera, analizar estos conflictos sociales recientes en el país andino nos permite suponer que parece cada vez más difícil que existan cambios sustanciales en la política del gobierno nacional en torno a la gestión de los recursos naturales que tenga en cuenta las necesidades y demandas de la población y de los movimientos sociales por sobre las necesidades de las empresas transnacionales y estatales que, en

nombre del “desarrollo” vienen acorralando los territorios de los pueblos indígenas y campesinos, a la vez que avanzan directamente, como en el caso del “gasolinazo”, por sobre el poder adquisitivo de los sectores populares urbanos. En el caso del TIPNIS todavía es muy prematuro poder analizar los posibles desenlaces del conflicto pero éste claramente agudiza la tensión entre una mirada desarrollista desde la estrategia gubernamental del MAS y las miradas alternativas al desarrollo desplegadas por distintos movimientos sociales de Bolivia a partir de las nociones del *Sumak Kawsay* quechua y el *Sumaq Qamaña* aymara y el “Ñande Reko” de los guaraní<sup>5</sup>.

El “proceso de descolonización” de una sociedad vertical, racista y abigarrada como la boliviana no puede darse únicamente en los ámbitos del Estado y de la institucionalidad, sino que es un desafío que atraviesa a todos los colectivos sociales y a los individuos que componen esas sociedades yuxtapuestas y en tensión permanente. De esta manera, el derrotero que sigan las políticas acerca de los hidrocarburos, en relación a los territorios indígenas y campesinos en Bolivia definirá gran parte de este proceso de transformación social, cultural y civilizatorio en el país andino. Proceso que actúa como modelo paradigmático de las transformaciones sociales en América Latina en la última década (De Sousa Santos, 2010 y Svampa, 2010).

De este modo, la actividad hidrocarburífera continúa su avance en Tarija y cada vez más en otros departamentos del oriente como Santa Cruz, Pando y Beni. En los próximos años se vislumbra un mayor impulso de esta actividad por parte del Estado con la creciente intervención de YPFB e incluso con la posibilidad de reformar la ley de Hidrocarburos para fomentar la inversión de empresas extranjeras, lo cual implica, por ejemplo para el caso de la APG de Tarija la necesidad de tener que realizar nuevas acciones colectivas de protesta en defensa de sus territorios, así como para obtener el reconocimiento pleno de los mismos en el Itika Guasu, así como en otras regiones del Departamento de Tarija, especialmente en la región del Gran Chaco (Villa Montes, Karaparí, y Yacuiba).

En este sentido, la profundización de estas contradicciones entre estos dos “proyectos civilizatorios” comportan una serie de conflictos entre la estrategia desarrollista de parte del gobierno del MAS y algunos de los movimientos sociales indígenas, campesinos y originarios que son algunos de los principales soportes políticos del gobierno. La disputa y los sentidos otorgados por los pueblos indígenas al territorio cobran una dimensión estratégica en esta disputa por los recursos naturales- principalmente los hidrocarburos- pues implica una manera alternativa de habitar, practicar y resignificar esos territorios. Las empresas de hidrocarburos y los emprendimientos ganaderos y forestales aparecen entonces como el principal obstáculo para un uso pleno de los territorios en el caso de las comunidades indígenas y campesinas. En efecto, la conformación identitaria de los movimientos indígena y campesina se encuentra anclada en el territorio; por lo tanto no reconocer sus territorios implica negarlos e invisibilizarlos como actores sociales. En este sentido, nuestra hipótesis es que las disputas entre las empresas de hidrocarburos y las comunidades indígenas y campesinas pone en escena un conflicto por un espacio de vida entre actores que son mutuamente excluyentes. Las formas de habitar y practicar los territorios de las em-



presas multinacionales no pueden coexistir con las lógicas productivas y "mundos de vida" campesinos-indígenas que precisan una utilización material y simbólica de los recursos naturales y de la tierra imposible de practicar en un mismo territorio donde se aplican las prácticas extractivistas propias de la industria hidrocarburífera. El espacio de vida- el territorio- de los indígenas y campesinos es incompatible con las necesidades de producción y reproducción de las empresas de hidrocarburos o con otros modelos de desarrollo extractivistas y mercantilizadores de la tierra y los recursos naturales, sea a partir de actividades agrícola-ganaderas de mediana y gran escala, empresas mineras, emprendimientos forestales, etc. Y si de hecho conviven estas formas antagónicas en un mismo territorio, esto sucede de manera conflictiva, es decir, en permanente tensión entre el impedimento de un desarrollo pleno de las actividades de producción de los hidrocarburos y la desarticulación de diferentes lógicas comunitarias, productivas y culturales de las comunidades que, en el mejor de los casos, son suplidas por "planes de desarrollo" o compensaciones de las empresas de hidrocarburos y/o el Estado que de manera transitoria aplican políticas focalizadas de remediación de los impactos sociales y ambientales en las comunidades indígenas y campesinas.

## Conclusiones

En el actual contexto político boliviano con el gobierno del MAS, parecieran haberse desarticulado gran parte de las alianzas entre los distintos movimientos sociales, así como disminuyeron los momentos de irrupción y visibilidad de los movimientos sociales bolivianos que tendieron a privilegiar una relación directa- con tintes corporativos- con el Estado y el "gobierno de los movimientos sociales" encabezado por Evo Morales. En este sentido, creemos que las actuales disputas por los territorios y por los recursos naturales actúan como un nuevo núcleo articulador de las demandas de los movimientos sociales en Bolivia. Esta nueva articulación de los movimientos sociales les devuelve, potencialmente, espacios de autonomía y de profundización de los procesos de experimentación social que despliegan en los territorios, en el marco de las disputas por el uso y el sentido de los recursos naturales y de esos mismos territorios. El desafío del pueblo guaraní de Tarija -junto al de los otros pueblos indígenas de Bolivia que habitan territorios donde se encuentran hidrocarburos y otros recursos naturales valiosos para el mercado- se encuentra en la posibilidad de consolidar sus territorios y potenciar en ellos formas alternativas de practicarlos y resignificarlos de manera acorde a sus pautas culturales logrando un reconocimiento pleno para el manejo del territorio y los recursos naturales, lo cual implica también un alto grado de autonomía política. Bolivia aparece como una experiencia paradigmática en las disputas territoriales de América Latina ya que la presencia política de los movimientos sociales- y de los pueblos indígenas en particular- es muy importante; a la vez que el gobierno plantea interesantes políticas en defensa del medio ambiente y la "Madre Tierra" en el plano internacional al tiempo que impulsa un modelo interno "neodesarrollista" y extractivista de los recursos naturales. En este sentido, nuestra hipótesis es que el avance de las empresas de hidrocarburos, los emprendimientos del agro-negocio y otras industrias extractivas comportan un sentido y un modo de producir los

territorios excluyente con el modo de habitar y significar los recursos naturales que implica la territorialidad de los pueblos indígenas y campesinos bolivianos.

De este modo observamos cómo distintos sujetos sociales pueden elaborar y construir una forma determinada de apropiación territorial “contrahegemónica”, trastocando por lo menos algunas de las lógicas esenciales del sistema hegemónico en torno a los recursos naturales, es decir, construir nuevos usos y sentidos en torno a los recursos naturales, alejados de la lógica mercantilizadora del *sistema mundo capitalista colonial*. En efecto, estas formas de apropiación del territorio y los diferentes usos y sentidos otorgados a los recursos naturales ponen en discusión, diálogo y conflicto a diversos proyectos o modelos “civilizatorios” que contraponen formas de desarrollo ligadas a las lógicas del “sistema mundo moderno y colonial” con otras formas de relacionamiento con el territorio y los recursos naturales ligadas a los usos y costumbres indígenas y campesinas.

En este trabajo planteamos que no ha cambiado la lógica del modelo de desarrollo planteado por el gobierno del MAS para Bolivia que se encuentra inmerso en una lógica “mercantilizadora” de la Naturaleza-Madre Tierra, resignificándola como Recursos Naturales cuantificables y utilizables para el desarrollo del capitalismo sin tener en cuenta las implicancias sociales, culturales y ambientales de esta explotación. Así, las empresas de hidrocarburos que actúan en Bolivia continúan con el despojo de los “Recursos Naturales” aunque ahora, y esto no es un dato menor, parte de esa renta permite la redistribución de la riqueza para los sectores populares a través de los planes sociales o las inversiones en infraestructura y la consecuente creación de fuentes de trabajo genuino para los trabajadores.

Finalmente cabe destacar que esta tensión entre “desarrollismo” y formas alternativas existe tanto en el seno del gobierno del MAS como dentro de los propios movimientos sociales que tienen parte de su imaginario social anclado en lo que fue la Revolución del ‘52 y que fue el proceso que más se acercó a un modelo modernizador y desarrollista en el país andino. Estas tensiones forman parte del proceso de luchas y resistencias que protagonizaron los movimientos sociales en las últimas décadas. Pero esta mirada crítica sobre Bolivia ejemplifica también la posibilidad de construir nuevos rumbos en las relaciones con la naturaleza/Madre Tierra. En otros países latinoamericanos, como la Argentina, estas discusiones ni siquiera aparecen en los ámbitos gubernamentales. En estos casos la opción es clara: el modelo de desarrollo extractivista ligado a la soja transgénica, la minería a gran escala y la explotación hidrocarburífera en manos transnacionales es hegemónico y aparece como la única vía posible y deseable.

Por todo esto es que consideramos que la posibilidad de encuentro entre distintas experiencias campesinas, indígenas y de sectores urbanos de todo el mundo, tal como se dio, en parte, en la “Cumbre de los Pueblos por el Cambio Climático y los Derechos de la Madre Tierra” permiten rescatar viejas prácticas y formas de relacionamiento diferentes con la naturaleza/Madre Tierra, así como construir nuevos saberes y prácticas que establezcan relaciones de reciprocidad con la naturaleza/Madre Tierra

a partir de descolonizar tanto el Estado como el Poder y las formas de conocimiento que sostienen la dominación. Es en estas discusiones y tensiones desde donde podemos construir, potencialmente, las experiencias emancipadoras para nuestro continente, es decir, para Nuestra América.

## **Abreviaturas**

**APG** Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní  
**CCGTT** Consejo de Capitanes Guaraní Tapiete de Tarija  
**CIDOB** Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia  
**CONAMAQ** Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu  
**CSUTCB** Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia  
**MAS** Movimiento Al Socialismo  
**PDVSA** Petróleos de Venezuela S. A.  
**PETROBRAS** Petróleo Brasileiro S. A.  
**TIPNIS** Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécuré  
**YPFB** Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos

## **Apéndice Metodológico**

Este artículo fue realizado desde un enfoque cualitativo a partir del análisis de distintos documentos de organizaciones sociales y declaraciones de funcionarios gubernamentales en torno a los conflictos y negociaciones entre estos actores sociales en torno a los recursos naturales y los territorios indígenas. Asimismo, también se han realizado entrevistas a dirigentes sociales y funcionarios gubernamentales, así como se realizaron observaciones de movilizaciones, asambleas, negociaciones y otra instancias de encuentro entre movimientos sociales y funcionarios gubernamentales en el marco de trabajos de campo realizados entre 2009 y 2010 en Bolivia, principalmente en el Departamento de Tarija y en la ciudad de La Paz.

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## Fuentes

- Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní de Tarija (2009) "Resolución de la Asamblea Departamental del Pueblo Guaraní", 18 de junio de 2009, CCGTT – APG, Tarija.
- Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní de Tarija (2010) "Una Pausa por la Madre Tierra", 15 de abril de 2010, CCGTT – APG, Villamontes.
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Erbol (2010) "*Presidente escucha al pueblo y decide anular el decreto supremo del gasolinazo*", 31 de diciembre, Agencia de Noticias Erbol, La Paz, <http://www.erbol.com.bo/noticia.php?identificador=2147483938953>  
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## Notas

- 1 La Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG) fue fundada en 1987 como culminación de un largo proceso de reconstrucción de las redes organizativas del pueblo Guaraní (García Linera, Chávez y Costas, 2008, Orozco Ramírez, García Linera y Stefanoni, 2006) que había sido casi desarticulado tanto por el sistema de haciendas de la región como por los procesos migratorios de los mundos rurales hacia las ciudades que marcó gran parte del siglo XX, así como por la creciente dificultad del acceso a la tierra para el pueblo guaraní y, más recientemente, el arrinconamiento de las comunidades indígenas por parte de empresas petroleras y/o agroganaderas y forestales.
- 2 Esta movilización del año 2002, la "Marcha por la Asamblea Constituyente, por la Soberanía Popular, el Territorio y los Recursos Naturales" fue una de la más masivas de los pueblos de indígenas bajas, aparece como una acción colectiva bisagra entre los dos ciclos de protesta, pues si bien mantiene el formato de movilización de comunidades enteras desde zonas remotas hacia el centro político del país, recoge la nueva demanda de Asamblea Constituyente y logra articular en la práctica a organizaciones indígenas del oriente con organizaciones de pueblos indígenas altiplánicos, principalmente aymaras integrantes de la CONAMAQ. Para un relato pormenorizado de esta movilización y su influencia en la posterior convocatoria a una Asamblea Constituyente ver el trabajo de Romero Bonifaz (2005).
- 3 *Yymbae* significa "ser libre" u "hombre libre" en guaraní.
- 4 Esta cumbre fue convocada por el gobierno boliviano para proponer una agenda socio-ambiental alternativa en torno a la problemática del cambio climático a escala global. Con una convocatoria ligada a los "derechos de la Madre Tierra" y fuertes críticas al modelo de desarrollo capitalista como agente depredador del ecosistema planetario y principal responsable de las emanaciones de gases del denominado "efecto invernadero". Se desarrolló en el mes de abril de 2010 en la localidad de Tiquipaya, cercana a Cochabamba con la presencia de representantes de más de 45 países de diversos movimientos sociales, ONG's, gobiernos latinoamericanos, y otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil nacional e internacional.
- 5 *Sumak Kawsay* y *Sumaq Qamaña* se comprenden en castellano como "Buen Vivir", ligado a las cosmovisiones indígenas andinas, así como el *Ñande Reko* guaraní se entiende como "Nuestro modo de ser o estar en el mundo".

## Acerca del Autor

Juan Wahren es Licenciado en Sociología, Magíster en Investigación Social y Doctor en Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Es Jefe de Trabajos Prácticos de "Sociología Rural" y del "Seminario de Investigación sobre Acciones Colectivas y Movimientos Sociales de América Latina" de la Carrera de Sociología de la

Facultad de Ciencias Sociales (FCS-UBA) y Profesor invitado en la Universidad Nacional del Comahue. Es integrante del Grupo de Estudios Rurales (GER) y del Grupo de Estudios de los Movimientos Sociales de América Latina (GEMSAL) y Coordinador del Grupo de Estudios sobre Movimientos Sociales y Educación Popular (GEMSEP) del Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani (FCS-UBA). Es Becario Postdoctoral del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) y actualmente investiga acerca de las disputas de los movimientos sociales latinoamericanos en torno al territorio y los recursos naturales. Sus áreas de interés son los movimientos sociales -principalmente indígenas, campesinos, trabajadores desocupados y asambleas ambientalistas contra la megaminería- la sociología rural, la educación popular y la problemática en torno al "Cambio Climático".

## **Second ISA Forum of Sociology "Social Justice and Democratization"**

### **Research Committee on Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change (RC48) Program**

#### **Global Movements, National Grievances. Mobilizing for 'Real Democracy' and Social Justice Buenos Aires, August 1-4, 2012**

This program is interactive. If you click on the titles of RC48 panels and joint sessions you will be directed to their corresponding page in the Second ISA Forum of Sociology webpage. If you click on the titles of papers, instead, you will be directed to their abstracts.

#### **WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 2012**

##### **9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

- New trends and theoretical approaches in the field of social mobilizations and social change

Session Organizer & Chair: Benjamín TEJERINA

##### **10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

- Creativity, emotion and risk

Session Organizer & Chair: Helena FLAM

##### **12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

- Collective action and the rebirth of social movements for social and economic justice in Chile: Causes, demands and result in a global world

Session Organizer & Chair: Francisco BAEZ URBINA

##### **2:30 PM-4:00 PM**

- From alienation to empowerment - Part I

Session Organizer & Chair: Marvin PROSONO

##### **4:15 PM-5:45 PM**

- **General Opening Ceremony**

## **THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2012**

### **9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

- Democratization movements and human rights - Part I

Session Organizer & Chair: Sharon BARNARTT

### **10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

- Imagining futures: Social movements, publics, and contentious politics - Part I

Session Organizers: Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA, Markus S. SCHULZ and Benjamín TEJERINA

Chair: Benjamín TEJERINA

### **12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

- Visual representation of injustice and exclusion

Session Organizers: Malgorzata BOGUNIA-BOROWSKA and Piotr SZTOMPKA

Chair: Piotr SZTOMPKA, Co-Chair: Malgorzata BOGUNIA-BOROWSKA

### **2:30 PM-4:00 PM**

- From alienation to empowerment - Part II

Session Organizer:

Chair:

### **4:15 PM-5:45 PM**

- Democratization movements and human rights - Part II

Session Organizer & Chair: Sharon BARNARTT

## **FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 2012**

### **10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

- Movimientos sociales actuales en América Latina. Posturas frente a la arena político-institucional: Participación, oposición, articulación - Part I

Session Organizers: Antonia MUÑOZ, Fernanda Valeria TORRES and Lidia VILLAR

Chair: Fernanda Valeria TORRES

### **12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

- Imagining futures: Social movements, publics, and contentious politics - Part II

Session Organizers: Markus S. SCHULZ, Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA and Benjamín TEJERINA

Chair: Benjamín TEJERINA

- Movimientos sociales actuales en América Latina. Posturas frente a la arena político-institucional: Participación, oposición, articulación - Part II

Session Organizer & Chair: Antonia MUÑOZ

### **2:30 PM-4:00 PM**

- **RC48 Business Meeting**



**SATURDAY, AUGUST 4, 2012**

**9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

• Imagining futures: Social movements, publics, and contentious politics - Part III  
Session Organizers: Markus S. SCHULZ, Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA and Benjamín TEJERINA

Chair: Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA

• Movimientos sociales actuales en América Latina. Posturas frente a la arena político-institucional: Participación, oposición, articulación – Part III

Session Organizers: Antonia MUÑOZ , Fernanda Valeria TORRES and Lidia VILLAR

Chairs: Antonia MUÑOZ and Lidia VILLAR

**10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

• Acciones colectivas y luchas democratizadoras en Latinoamérica, Europa, y Norte de Africa / Collective Action and Democratization Struggles in Latin America, Europe, and Northern Africa

Session Organizer & Chair: Graciela DI MARCO

**12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

• Democratizing science and technology through protests and mobilizations for social justice

Session Organizer & Chair: Binay Kumar PATNAIK

• Social movements as embodied collective acts

Session Organizer & Chair: Tova BENSKI

**2:30 PM-4:00 PM**

• Strange bedfellows: Activist affinities across difference

Session Organizer & Chair: Deborah GOULD

**4:15 PM-5:45 PM**

• La voz en las calles iberoamericanas: Las manifestaciones públicas como modo de acción

Session Organizers & Chairs: Sergio TAMAYO and Michael VOEGTLI

## Panel Details

### NEW TRENDS AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

.....  
**Wednesday, August 1, 2012: 9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**RC47 Social Classes and Social Movements Session Organizer & Chair:**

**Benjamín TEJERINA**

- Emergence of a global social movement: World says “no” to inequality (Oral presentation)  
 Simin FADAEI, Humboldt University of Berlin
- Distributive grievances and socio-political blockages: The role of middle-class youth in the Israeli social protest movement (Oral presentation)  
 Zeev ROSENHEK, The Open University of Israel; Michael SHALEV, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- 21st century collective movements  
 (Oral presentation)  
 Antimo Luigi FARRO, Sapienza University of Rome
- Globalization and social movements in the last decade: De-coupling internationalization and institutionalization? (Oral presentation)  
 Geoffrey PLEYERS, FNRS/UC Louvain  
 & CADIS/EHESS
- State violence against protesters in Turkey  
 (Distributed paper)  
 Esin ILERI, CADIS/EHESS
- Seeking for social change, struggling for culture: Collaborative creation as political action and moral orders in the case of free culture movement  
 (Distributed paper)  
 Elisenda ARDÈVOL, Internet Interdisciplinary Institute
- Articulations among collective actions  
 (Distributed paper)  
 Graciela DI MARCO, Center of Studies on Democratization and Human Rights (CE-DEHU), Universidad Nacional de San Martín

**CREATIVITY, EMOTION AND RISK**

.....  
**Wednesday, August 1, 2012: 10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Helena FLAM**

- "Boss of your own belly". The creativity of the social protest for women's social justice in Sweden during the 1970s (Oral presentation)  
Eva SCHMITZ, University of Halmstad
- Artistic protest strategies: The critical art ensemble (Oral presentation)  
Nina PETER, Freie Universität Berlin
- "Jaia eta borroka": Political ethnographies of cultural activism amidst a context of illegalization in the Basque Country (Oral presentation)  
Ignacia PERUGORRIA, Rutgers University
- A small revolution: Young favela dwellers and audiovisual production (Oral presentation)  
Lia ROCHA, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
- Affects and the struggle for recognition:  
The national street population movement  
in Brazil (Distributed paper)  
Rosimeire SILVA, University of Coimbra

**COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE REBIRTH OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN CHILE: CAUSES, DEMANDS AND RESULTS IN A GLOBAL WORLD**

.....  
**Wednesday, August 1, 2012: 12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Francisco BAEZ URBINA**

- A specter haunts the neoliberal globe: Reworking the communist hypothesis through the Chilean student movement (Oral presentation)  
Gabriel CHOUHY, University of Pittsburgh
- La eleccion de Sebastian Piñera y la paradoja de una oposición creciente en contra del neoliberalismo de parte de la clase trabajadora urbana en Chile (Oral presentation)  
Caitlin FOX-HODESS, University of California, Berkeley
- El contexto sistémico y el factor generacional en los agravios y la política del movimiento universitario chileno (Oral presentation)  
Victor Daniel MUÑOZ TAMAYO, Universidad de Chile
- Chile 2011, desde el largo letargo a la acción colectiva (Oral presentation)  
Leonardo CANCINO PEREZ, Universidad Diego Portales
- Enfoques teóricos y metodológicos para el estudio de la acción colectiva en el resurgimiento de los movimientos sociales en Chile: El aporte de la sociología analítica (Distributed paper)  
Mauricio GARCÍA OJEDA, Grupo de Sociología Analítica y Diseño Institucional, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona
- Movimientos sociales en escena. El fin de los partidos, el renacimiento de la política (Distributed paper)  
Jaime GARRIDO CASTILLO, Universidad de La Frontera

**FROM ALIENATION TO EMPOWERMENT - PART I**

.....  
**Wednesday, August 1, 2012: 2:30 PM-4:00 PM**

**RC36 Alienation Theory and Research (host committee)**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Marvin PROSONO**

- Agency, empowerment and utopian visions (Oral presentation)  
Lauren LANGMAN, Loyola University of Chicago; Tova BENSKI, College of Management Studies
- Social theory and agency: The cave, social determinism and interdependency  
Francois DEPELTEAU, Laurentian University
- Learning and (de)alienation in social movements: Considerations from two case studies on anti-poverty community organizing  
Joseph E. SAWAN, University of Ottawa
- Work, alienation and subjectivity (Oral presentation)  
Giovanni ALVES, Universidade Estadual Paulista
- Crisis, alienation and self-management praxis  
Alberto L. BIALAKOWSKY, Cecilia M. LUSNICH, Demetrio TARANDA, Guadalupe ROMERO and Pablo D. ORTIZ, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires
- "Gender Technology" and "Self-technologies": An analysis of discourses and practices of contemporary self-help  
Lara FACIOLI, Universidade Federal de São Carlos

## **DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS - PART I**

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**Thursday, August 2, 2012: 9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Sharon BARNARTT**

- Mapping worldwide efforts to combat human trafficking (Oral presentation)  
Stephanie LIMONCELLI, Loyola Marymount University
- 2001 as the year of disability protests: Diffusion of the “Arab Spring”, political opportunity, or the UN convention? (Oral presentation)  
Sharon BARNARTT, Gallaudet University
- Disability rights movement in Spain: From the UN convention to the “indignation” in the streets (Oral presentation)  
Miriam ARENAS CONEJO, Universitat de Barcelona

## **IMAGINING FUTURES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLICS, AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS - PART I**

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**Thursday, August 2, 2012: 10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change**

**RC07 Futures Research (host committee)**

**Session Organizers: Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA, Markus S. SCHULZ and Benjamín TEJERINA**

**Chair: Benjamín TEJERINA**

- Fear abatement and oppositional mobilization: Comparative perspectives on democratic movements in repressive states (Oral presentation)  
Hank JOHNSTON, San Diego State University
- Democratizing futures: Radical imaginaries, police repression, and public engagements of the Occupy Wall Street movement (Oral presentation)  
Markus S. SCHULZ, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Imagining another world. The role of language and political imagination in shaping a transnational movement of movements (Oral presentation)  
Gabriele DE ANGELIS, Universidade Nova

## **VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF INJUSTICE AND EXCLUSION**

.....  
**Thursday, August 2, 2012: 12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**TG05 Visual Sociology**

**Session Organizers: Malgorzata BOGUNIA-BOROWSKA and Piotr SZTOMPKA**

**Chair: Piotr SZTOMPKA, Co-Chair: Malgorzata BOGUNIA-BOROWSKA**

- Injustice and exclusion revealed through photos (1898-1908) (Oral presentation)  
Rosa PEREIRA, Universidade Federal do Pará
- "We are all Khaled Said": Visual injustice symbols and activism (Oral presentation)  
Thomas OLESEN, Aarhus University
- Visual representation of de-urbanization: New downshifting communities in the near north of Russia (Oral presentation)  
Nikita POKROVSKY, Higher School of Economics
- Baring pain in the news media (Oral presentation)  
Miranda CHRISTOU, University of Cyprus
- Identity battles, social movement networks and political opportunity structures in the Basque public space: Bilbao's Aste Nagusia (2009-2010) (Oral presentation)  
Ignacia PERUGORRIA, Rutgers University
- Exclusión: La visión de los actores sociales (Distributed paper)  
Soledad SAMAMÉ, Iniciativa Social Blanco y Negro
- Visual approaches to social change in South Africa: What difference does it make? (Distributed paper)  
Shannon WALSH, University of Johannesburg
- Visual discourses of the university in Santiago de Chile: Higher education advertisement, wall paintings and graffiti (Distributed paper)  
Elisabeth SIMBUERGER, Universidad Diego Portales
- Cinema as a visual tool for immigrants' welfare (Distributed paper)  
Tülay KAYA, Istanbul University
- Photo-documentation and political participation: The role of photographic self-representation in Brazil and Bangladesh (Distributed paper)  
Fabiene GAMA, UFRJ - EHESS

## **FROM ALIENATION TO EMPOWERMENT - PART II**

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**Thursday, August 2, 2012: 2:30 PM-4:00 PM**

**RC36 Alienation Theory and Research (host committee)**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change**

**Session Organizer:**

**Chair:**

- How migrant women successfully appealed for a change of the anti-domestic violence law in Japan (Oral presentation)  
Nanako INABA, Ibaraki University
- Human security and emancipation: Measurements and issues (Oral presentation)  
Paulo KUHLMANN, State University of Paraiba; Fabiola FARO, State University of Paraiba
- Origen, mantenimiento y desafíos de los movimientos sociales antiprohibicionistas de las drogas (Oral presentation)  
Lukas PASOS, N/A

## **DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS - PART II**

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**Thursday, August 2, 2012: 4:15 PM-5:45 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Sharon BARNARTT**

- Transnational social movement as a governance babushka (Oral presentation)  
Helena FLAM, University of Leipzig
- El impacto de la movilización de familiares de víctimas de la violencia policial en Argentina (Oral presentation)  
Sebastian PEREYRA, Universidad Nacional de San Martin
- El movimiento social por los derechos de los niños y adolescentes en São Paulo: Su momento y su sitio en la construcción de la política pública de derechos (Distributed paper)  
Maria do Carmo ALBUQUERQUE, Universidade Bandeirante



**MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES ACTUALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA. POSTURAS  
FRENTE A LA ARENA POLÍTICO-INSTITUCIONAL: PARTICIPACIÓN,  
OPOSICIÓN, ARTICULACIÓN – PART I**

.....  
**Friday, August 3, 2012: 10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizers: Antonia MUÑOZ, Fernanda Valeria TORRES and Lidia VILLAR**

**Chair: Fernanda Valeria TORRES**

- Popular movements and patronage politics: Understanding demobilization processes in contemporary Argentina (Oral presentation)  
Pablo LAPEGNA, University of Georgia
- De la confrontación a la cooperación. Los cambios en las estrategias y marcos interpretativos del movimiento de derechos humanos de Argentina frente al "Kirchnerismo" (2003-2011) (Oral presentation)  
Enrique ANDRIOTTI ROMANIN, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata - CONICET
- Las organizaciones sociales en los conjuntos oficialistas: Identidades parciales y definiciones de pertenencia en el MST y en organizaciones sociales kirchneristas (primer gobierno de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva y gobierno de Néstor Kirchner) (Oral presentation)  
María Dolores ROCCA RIVAROLA, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires
- Marcos interpretativos en torno a los comedores populares en Lanús y la influencia en la toma de decisiones sobre este espacio (Oral presentation)  
Brenda PEREYRA, Universidad Nacional de Lanús
- Movimientos sociales y estado en el Kirchnerismo (2003-2009). La FTV y la gestión de políticas sociales (Distributed paper)  
Alejandro ROLDAN, Universidad de Buenos Aires
- Exceso y defecto: Movilización política e institucionalidad democrática. Un aporte Germaniano (Distributed paper)  
German PEREZ, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires

**IMAGINING FUTURES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLICS, AND  
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS - PART II**

.....  
**Friday, August 3, 2012: 12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

**RC07 Futures Research (host committee)**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change**

**Session Organizers: Markus S. SCHULZ, Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA and Benjamín TEJERINA**

**Chair: Benjamín TEJERINA**

- Social movements and digital media (Oral presentation)  
Christina SCHACHTNER, University of Klagenfurt
- Online environmental mobilization in Brazil: The Belo Monte future at cross-roads (Oral presentation)  
Marie Louise CONILH DE BEYSSAC, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
- The technologies of Internet in the contentious repertoires: Clues and signs of Avaaz in a multi-sited fieldwork (Oral presentation)  
Marcelo CASTAÑEDA, CPDA/UFRRJ
- Back to the future: Murals and conflict transformation in Northern Ireland (Oral presentation)  
Gregory MANEY, Hofstra University

**MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES ACTUALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA. POSTURAS  
FRENTE A LA ARENA POLÍTICO-INSTITUCIONAL: PARTICIPACIÓN,  
OPOSICIÓN, ARTICULACIÓN - PART II**

.....  
**Friday, August 3, 2012: 12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**  
**Session Organizer & Chair: Antonia MUÑOZ**

- Relations between NGOs, social movements and the state: Symbolic boundaries, institutionalization and legitimacy (Oral presentation)  
Maria Carolina DYSMAN, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro; Emmanuel RAPIZO, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
- Autonomia: Visiones de los autores y actores sociales (Oral presentation)  
Natalina RIBEIRO, Pontificia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
- Movimiento de la juventud negra y nuevos espacios políticos e institucionales: La lucha contra el "genocidio del joven negro" en los consejos y conferencias sectoriales en Brasil (Oral presentation)  
Danilo DE SOUZA MORAIS, UFSCar
- Presupuesto participativo y sus efectos sobre la sociedad civil en el caso de Porto Alegre (Oral presentation)  
Fernando SIMÕES NOGUEIRA, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
- Globalizaciones y nuevas diplomacias en las Américas. La implementación de políticas públicas para la inclusión de sociedades civiles en las agendas de política exterior, política internacional y agendas globales en Argentina y México (Oral presentation)  
Antonio ALEJO, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
- Resistencia e integración: La institucionalización de los movimientos sociales. Un estudio de caso de la organización barrial Tupac Amaru (OBTA) (Distributed paper)  
Pilar ALZINA, Universidad de Buenos Aires
- Problemáticas y desafíos regionales en contextos de desigualdad y dominación: Movimientos sociales ambientalistas en oposición y articulación con otros actores políticos (Distributed paper)  
Myriam BARONE, Universidad Nacional de Misiones

**IMAGINING FUTURES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLICS, AND  
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS - PART III**

.....  
**Saturday, August 4, 2012: 9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

**RC07 Futures Research (host committee)**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change**

**Session Organizers: Markus S. SCHULZ, Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA and Benjamín TEJERINA**

**Chair: Ligia TAVERA FENOLLOSA**

- New actors on stage: Analysis of the emergent forms of collective action in the European context (Oral presentation)  
Dora FONSECA, Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra - CES
- Prefiguring the future or repeating the past? Collectivist democracy and the struggle against oligarchy in the German left (Oral presentation)  
Darcy LEACH, Bradley University
- Building schools and futures with utopian social movements in Buenos Aires (Oral presentation)  
Meghan KRAUSCH, University of Minnesota
- Constructing political spaces: Experiences of the Uttarakhand women's federation, a rural women's movement in India (Oral presentation)  
Divya SHARMA, Cornell University
- Politics of the marginalized in the United States and South Africa (Oral presentation)  
Marcel PARET, University of California-Berkeley

**MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES ACTUALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA. POSTURAS  
FRENTE A LA ARENA POLÍTICO-INSTITUCIONAL: PARTICIPACIÓN,  
OPOSICIÓN, ARTICULACIÓN – PART III**

.....  
**Saturday, August 4, 2012: 9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizers: Antonia MUÑOZ , Fernanda Valeria TORRES and Lidia VILLAR**

**Chairs: Antonia MUÑOZ and Lidia VILLAR**

- Territorios disputados. movilización política y procesos de institucionalización en niveles locales de gobierno (Argentina, 1997-2011) (Oral presentation)  
German PEREZ, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani; Ana NATALUCCI, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani - CONICET; María Soledad GATTONI, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani – CONICET
- Tensiones entre movimientos sociales y gobiernos progresistas. Las disputas por el territorio y los recursos naturales del pueblo guaraní en Tarija, Bolivia (Oral presentation)  
Juan WAHREN, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires
- Political society, social movements and the Workers' Party in Brazil (Oral presentation)  
Charmain LEVY, Université du Québec en Outaouais
- De las prácticas articuladoras entre movilización social y gobiernos: Notas sobre las experiencias de Argentina y Bolivia en el siglo XXI (Oral presentation)  
Maria Virginia QUIROGA, CONICET-UNRC
- Lo "otro" de los movimientos sociales: Hipótesis para pensar el estado hoy (Distributed paper)  
Nuria YABKOWSKI, Instituto del Desarrollo Humano, Universidad Nacional General Sarmiento – Universidad de Buenos Aires - CONICET
- De la movilización a la institucionalización. La experiencia de organizaciones sociales de matriz nacional popular en el gobierno de la Provincia de Buenos Aires durante el periodo 2002 - 2010 (Distributed paper)  
Juan Ignacio LOZANO, Universidad Nacional de La Plata
- Environmental networks in state and society: A comparative view of the Southern Cone (Distributed paper)  
Ricardo GUTIÉRREZ, Universidad de San Martín

**ACCIONES COLECTIVAS Y LUCHAS DEMOCRATIZADORAS EN LATINOAMÉRICA, EUROPA Y EL NORTE DE AFRICA / COLLECTIVE ACTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION STRUGGLES IN LATIN AMERICA, EUROPE AND NORTHERN AFRICA**

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**Saturday, August 4, 2012: 10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)  
Session Organizer & Chair: Graciela DI MARCO**

- Movimientos democráticos en regímenes autoritarios de alta capacidad: Comparaciones desde el Medio Oriente, la Rusia y la China (Oral presentation)  
Hank JOHNSTON, San Diego State University
- Participación ciudadana, revueltas árabes e “indignados”, en el cambio social (Oral presentation)  
Sergio TAMAYO, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, México
- Los “indignados” toman las plazas. Del 19 y 20 de diciembre en los barrios porteños al 15M español: Similitudes y diferencias entre movimientos (Oral presentation)  
Noelia MONGE, Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- El movimiento ambiental en Monterrey: Acciones colectivas e identidad (Oral presentation)  
David PULIDO, Tec
- Movimientos sociales y derecho (Distributed paper)  
Gabriela DELAMATA, Universidad Nacional de San Martín - CONICET
- The indigenous movement in Brazil and the processes of collective action (Distributed paper)  
Eneida ASSIS, Universidade Federal do Pará

**DEMOCRATIZING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY THROUGH PROTESTS AND MOBILIZATIONS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE**

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**Saturday, August 4, 2012: 12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change**

**RC23 Sociology of Science and Technology (host committee)**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Binay Kumar PATTNAIK**

- Globalization of science and technology research & development (Oral presentation)  
Aqueil AHMAD, Walden University
- The risks of networking in Facebook for the 2012 Mexican national elections (Oral presentation)  
Esteban DAMIANI, Yes
- Studying science communications in India, through people's science movements (Oral presentation)  
Binay Kumar PATTNAIK, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur
- La tecnología en la transformación del sistema democrático  
Felipe ADDOR, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
- "Magic triangle" science - universities - high-tech business: The case of Siberia (Distributed paper)  
Anatoliy ABLAZHEY, Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Academy of Sciences, Siberian Branch
- The interface between digital democracy and public policy: The challenges of digital inclusion in Brazil (Distributed paper)  
Sayonara LEAL, University of Brasilia
- Assisted reproductive techniques: Moral judgments and mobilization for better access by gay couples and chronically ill people (Distributed paper)  
Catarina DELAUNAY, Centro de Estudos de Sociologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa
- Comunidades de software libre en Argentina: Algunas exploraciones y vectores de análisis (Distributed paper)  
Agustín ZANOTTI, CIECS (CONICET-UNC)

## **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS EMBODIED COLLECTIVE ACTS**

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**Saturday, August 4, 2012: 12:30 PM-2:00 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Tova BENSKI**

- Being the change: Performative acts in social movements (Oral presentation)  
Lois Ruskai MELINA, Union Institute & University
- “Fuck middle class... burning and looting tonight!”: Forging the activist’s body in contemporary Germany (Oral presentation)  
Bob KURIK, Charles University; Malte STIEBER, University of Bremen
- Talking bodies in public: Embodied activism and strategies for protest (Oral presentation)  
Begonya ENGUIX, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
- Fat, hairy, sexy. Contesting standards of beauty and sexuality in the gay community (Oral presentation)  
Nathaniel PYLE, University of California at Santa Barbara



**STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: ACTIVIST AFFINITIES ACROSS DIFFERENCE**

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**Saturday, August 4, 2012: 2:30 PM-4:00 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)**

**Session Organizer & Chair: Deborah GOULD**

- Building and crumbling of solidarity: An examination of the Dutch campaign in the run up to the G8 protests in Heiligendamm (Oral presentation)  
Marije BOEKKOOI, VU University Amsterdam
- The Brazilian homosexual movement and its impact on construction of anti-discriminatory policy agendas in the national constituent assembly of 1987-1988 (Oral presentation)
- Rafael DE SOUZA, Universidade de São Paulo  
Solidarity and tactical coordination in the German anti-nuclear movement: An event history analysis (Oral presentation)  
Darcy LEACH, Bradley University
- Transnational activism and national affinities: Building cross-sectoral solidarity in global justice movements (Oral presentation)  
Priska DAPHI, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

## **LA VOZ EN LAS CALLES IBEROAMERICANAS: LAS MANIFESTACIONES PÚBLICAS COMO MODO DE ACCIÓN**

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**Saturday, August 4, 2012: 4:15 PM-5:45 PM**

**RC48 Social Movements, Collective Actions and Social Change (host committee)  
Session Organizers & Chairs: Sergio TAMAYO and Michael VOEGTLI**

- Acción colectiva y estructura social neo-colonial: De identidades emergentes y clases sociales (Oral presentation)  
Pedro LISDERO, CIECS-CONICET-UNC / CIES; Lucas AIMAR, CIECS-CONICET-UNC / CIES
- Fuegos cruzados. sentidos en disputa en torno a un estallido social en la Provincia de Buenos Aires (Oral presentation)  
Evangelina CARAVACA, FLACSO-CONICET
- El peor crimen es el silencio (Oral presentation)  
Tatiana COLL LEBEDEFF, Universidad Pedagógica Nacional
- Desafíos y retos en la gestión de recursos naturales: Movimientos ambientalistas en la Provincia de Misiones en el marco de la construcción de obras hidroeléctricas (Distributed paper)  
Myriam BARONE, Universidad Nacional de Misiones
- Movimientos sociales: Revisitando la categoría "identidad" desde un enfoque espacial (Distributed paper)  
Fernanda Valeria TORRES, IDIHCS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata-CONICET



