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Relaciones Internacionales e Historia del Derecho

TESIS DOCTORAL

*Instituciones hegemónicas alternativas y
legitimidad. China y Estados Unidos en una
sociedad internacional en transformación*

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*Para María,
por recordarme siempre
lo verdaderamente importante*

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List of abbreviations

A2/AD s	Antiaccess/Area Denial
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIG	American International Group
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BASIC countries	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BP	British Petroleum
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
CINC	Composite Index of National Capability
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
COW	Correlates of War
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EBL	Energy Backed Loans
EU	European Union
FTAAP	Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
G2	Group of 2
G5	Group of 5
G7	Group of 7
G8	Group of 8
G8+5	Group of 8 plus 5
G20	Group of 20
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
gw	Gigawatt
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IEA	International Energy Agency
IR	International Relations
JAM-GC	Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank
NFU	Non First Use
NOC	National Oil Companies
NPT	Nonproliferation Treaty
OBOR	One Belt One Road
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
P-5	Permanent Five Members of the UNSC

PLA	People's Liberations Army
PLAAF	People's Liberations Army
PLARF	People's Liberation Army Rocket Force
PLASAF	People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
R&D	Research and Development
RATS	Regional Anti- Terrorist Structure
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDRs	Special Drawing Rights
Sinopec	China Petrochemical Corporation
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TPP	Transpacific Partnership
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHRP	United Nations Human Rights Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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INTRODUCTORY PART

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The present thesis aims to address what is considered as one of the most relevant objects of study of mainstream IR, namely, the debate around United States hegemony and the rise of China as a prospective revisionist power. This debate has been approached through different theoretical traditions, as well as more practical approaches based on several related disciplines as economics or political science. Moreover, IR has prominently addressed this debate through a profound analysis of the structure of the contemporary international society.

The present project is inheritor of a Master's Degree Thesis of this author that focused on the rise of China as a challenger power through a mainly neorealist approach. During the elaboration of this work, however, I realised that several phenomena related could not be fully explained by the framework I had chosen. At this crossword, I explored a more open and broad framework that allowed the inclusion of non-material variables that were excluded, both from a more broad realist tradition that included neoclassical realist approaches as well as English School recent developments. At that point, I realised that the complexity of this phenomenon called for a deeper and profound analysis that I hope have completed with the present thesis.

The starting point of this work is the broad agreement on the changing nature of the present structure of material power that is, at different degrees, eroding the

United States hegemonic leadership¹. The diffusion of power and the development of new poles or power hubs that China better exemplifies coincide in time with several signs of exhaustion of the United States hegemony.

Even though there is a wide consent in this changing nature of contemporary international society, the outcome of this process is less clear. Several authors defend the gradual shift towards a bipolar² or multipolar structure³, whereas others explore the possible hegemonic transition between the United States and China⁴.

However, the present thesis takes as a starting point a mixed notion of the international structure that reunited not only several material resources but also important non material or social aspects that raise its importance in contexts of unipolarity where the hegemon faces limited material constraints⁵. However, the start of the century, especially after the 9/11 attacks and the rise of terrorism, witnessed a more unipolar and hard foreign policy actions by the hegemon that caused a crisis on the until then multipolar nature of hegemony. As a result, the vision of a benign hegemon, provider of public goods and whose exercise of power was self-restricted, started to be questioned.

At this point, it was acknowledged that the erosion of the United States power was taken place not on the material structure, but on the field of political legitimacy. These events revived the interest on the study of hegemony from more broad theoretical perspectives, especially among those approaches that pay a special attention to several concepts related to ideas, expressly those related to the social construction of hegemony and its hegemonic legitimacy.

It is precisely on this perspective that the present thesis aims to be placed, on a broader and eclectic approach to hegemony that, simultaneously, questions the composition of the structure of the international system and approaches to the international society through social dynamics. Through these lenses, the institution of hegemony, based on primacy and socialised by institutional practices, identity reproduction and several legitimacy variables, faces several signs of disempowerment while there are signs of the construction of an alternative hegemonic institution.

¹ Vid. NYE, J. S., *The Future of Power*, New York, Public Affairs, 2011; BROOKS, S. G. and WOHLFORTH, W. C., *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009.

² SUBACCHI, P., "New power centers and new power brokers: are they shaping a new economic order?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, n° 3, 2008, pp. 485-498.

³ LAYNE, C., "The unipolar illusion revised", *International Security*, Vol. 31, n° 2, 2006, pp. 7-41; POSEN, B. R., "Emerging multipolarity: why should we care?", *Current History*, n° 108, 2009, pp. 347-352; BORROW, D. B., "The Implications of Constrained Hegemony", en D. B. BORROW (ed.), *Hegemony Constrained: Evasion, Modification and Resistance to American Foreign Policy*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008, pp. 261-273.

⁴ TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE, et. al., *Power Transitions. Strategies for the 21st Century*, Nueva York, Chatham House, 2000.

⁵ FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity. Why Being a Unipole Isn't All it's Cracked Up to Be", *World Politics*, Vol. 61, n° 1, 2009, pp. 58-59.

1.1. Statement of the research subject and objectives of investigation

The present thesis departs from a notion of an international society in continuous change⁶, a context where the United States institution of hegemony⁷ plays an important role. The notion of structure as a material and social construction unfolds also a differentiation between the definitions of primacy and hegemony. Understanding primacy as referring to a particular distribution of power, it is possible to argue that several of the works that address analysis of “hegemony” are, in fact, exploring the material characteristics and, hence, primacy. Hegemony, therefore, is not only material but social, as an institutionalised and legitimated practice of international society on situations of primacy⁸.

On these contexts, this work takes as a starting point the consideration that, nowadays, the United States holds a hegemonic position in international society. However, several events as the ones described before have eroded its power, although not in a material sense but on social facets. At the same time, China is rising in the material power structure and is focusing this growing material relevance on the construction of international social dynamics that could potentially develop on the construction of an alternative hegemonic institution.

However, several analyses of primacy consider that China’s sharp material rise constitutes a threat, not only to the U.S. hegemony but also to the international society as a whole. Precisely, that is the main reason explaining the necessity of social approaches that explore the social bases and legitimacy both of the United States institution of hegemony as well as China’s rising alternative.

The main objective of this thesis is the construction of an innovative and alternative theoretical framework to analyse hegemony and the processes of systemic change in international society. Departing from a profound exploration of materialist approaches, there is possible to identify several events and societal outcomes that are hardly explained through these lenses. Hence, this offers the starting point to build an eclectic approach that relies both on material approaches such as realism and, up to some point, liberalism, as well an innovative research on the Western academia, through constructivism and English School, and the three main theoretical projects

⁶ QIN Y., “International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, n^o 2, 2010, p. 138.

⁷ From the starting point of the thesis, it has been preferred to use the English School terminology that will be explained later on the theoretical part. Terms as “institution of hegemony” are useful because they depart from an hegemonic power and highlight the process of construction of a primary institution of hegemony similar to balance of power, for instance. Moreover, the use of this terminology aims to place this research on a specific field of study of the English School that breaks the anti-hegemonic investigations on this approach. As it will be addressed in Chapter 3, it is this precise “modern” English School where I place the contributions of Ian Clark, which offers new understandings that constitute the starting point to establish dialogues with other theoretical traditions such as constructivism or Chinese Schools.

⁸ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 34.

that are taking place on China, namely, Tianxia's worldism, Yan Xuetong's moral realism and Qin Yaqing's sino-constructivism. This exploration offers a wider analysis of the most important constituents of the institution of hegemony that have to be analysed on a more practical sense.

From this main objective, there are several secondary objectives that will test this proposed approach and that also deserve a closer attention. The first objective is to offer an innovative introduction to the Chinese School of international relations, highlighting both its debates with Western approaches as well as its synergies. This way, the present thesis wants to contribute to a decentralisation of the IR theory and challenge the Western dominance of the discipline⁹.

The second is to identify the recent changes that are already taking place on the global distribution of material power. Prior to a broader analysis of hegemony, it is necessary to tackle the material changes on the primacy of the United States regarding not only economics, but also military and energy variables. It should be noted, however, that these analyses have been often explored through realist approaches and, as a result, there will necessarily rely on several of its methodologies.

The third objective is to detect the more relevant tendencies in the international order derived from these material changes. Even though it is not the aim to foretell neither the future of these material bases nor the date of a possible power transition, it is necessary to identify the main weakness and strengths of the material resources of the United States.

Fourthly, it will aim to detect and describe the most prominent material characteristics of China's rise, the strengths of its economic model, as well as the destabilising factors. Moreover, its military modernisation will also be explored, as well as its strategies to confront and deter the United States military hegemony.

The fifth secondary objective is to examine closely the social bases of United States institution of hegemony. These social characteristics will be inevitably lined to the material bases of its primacy, as the institutionalisation of hegemony relies closely on the attractiveness, gains and sense of protection that this material power confers to other states. Hence, material and social bases of hegemony are not only related, but also mutually modifiers of the structure of gains within the international society. Along with these social bases of hegemony, the interests, values and principles that conform United States hegemony should be also studied, as it constitute vital clues on the socialised preferences on the international society.

Six, there will present Chinese growing identity construction as an emerging power. Due to its rapid growth and its non-interventionist practice of foreign policy,

⁹ ACHARYA, A., "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West", *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 39, n° 3, 2011, pp. 619-637; ACHARYA, A. and B. BUZAN, "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction" in A. ACHARYA y B. BUZAN (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, Londres, Routledge, 2010, pp. 1-25.

China is still constructing its role on the international society and aims to perform, at the same time, for two different audiences. On the one hand, China is bestowing itself with the role of leader of emerging states due to its material pre-eminence among the dynamic economies. Leading “the rise of the rest”¹⁰, several theories suggest that China is placing itself on the top of a hypothetical alternative social and material hierarchy that starts to permeate several principles, interest and values, as well as a growing set of institutions created to socialise its power. On the other hand, China is growingly involving in the great power practices and cooperating with the hegemon in several key international issues such as finance or climate change. This way, several analysis seem to suggest that China is in a process of transforming its identity, both as a responsible state and slowly leaks its interests, on a modest degree still, within the established institution of hegemony. These two conflicting identity strategies constitute key clues to approach to both the weaknesses and strengths of China as an alternative power.

Finally, the last objective investigates the accommodation process of China within U.S. hegemony, as well as China’s parallel development of several alternative institutions, alliances, identities and legitimacy practices to understand the degree of Chinese menace to United States hegemony. In other words, it should be answer if contemporary China has reformist or revisionist intentions, understanding that, in the international order, the hegemon is the only satisfied power¹¹.

1.2. Hypotheses

Relying of the established set of objectives, this research has been accomplished proceeding from the following hypotheses:

1. The present object of study, hegemony and hegemonic successions, needs the construction and application of new and innovative frameworks that include social structures and non-material factors such as institutionalisation, identity and socialisation and legitimacy as central aspects.

¹⁰ COLETTA, D., “Science, Technology, and the Quest for International Influence Science and Diplomacy: U.S. Hegemony and the Rise of the Rest”, *ISA-FLACSO Conference*, Buenos Aires, July 2014, <<http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/f169e87a-9289-4fa4-bd44-b0e8353b014d.pdf>>, [12th June 2016]; HOFFENBER, A., *The Rise of “the Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-industrializing Economies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001; ZAKARIA, F., “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, n^o. 3, 2008, pp. 18-43; LAGADEC, E., *Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Europe, America and the Rise of the Rest*, London, Routledge, 2012.

¹¹ As Mearsheimer notes, “there are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals”. MEARSHEIMER, J. J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Nueva York, Norton, 2001, p. 2.

2. China's ascent in material terms will approach parity with the United States in economic terms, due to its dynamism and U.S. economic maturity and China will growingly use this economic strength to modernise and develop nationally and to spur its investments on development abroad.
3. The United States hegemony faces a declinist phase as a result of its expansionism, unilateralism and the erosion of its hegemonic legitimacy.
4. China's identity as a rising power is inherently revisionist and it is starting to build its own alternative institution of hegemony based on its principles, values and interests.
5. The changes on material power distribution, along with the coexistence of two alternative hegemonic institutions, will drive international society towards a more conflicting and unstable phase as clashes of interest between the United States and China will also grown.

1.3. Methodological approach

This thesis is framed on the discipline of International Relations and, more concretely on IR theory, as it aims to reformulate and explore the boundaries of theoretical tradition to offer an innovative approach. The complexity of the theoretical framework derives precisely from the broad spectrum of the theories that are analysed.

Firstly, the analysis will depart from the realist tradition in its broad sense. As it is widely known, the neorealist tradition constitutes still today, not only the most studied theory, but also two main approaches to research on hegemony, namely Gilpin's Hegemonic Stability Theory and Organski's Power Transition Theory. Even though these theories refer to hegemony and unipolarity, balance of power theories will be also studied, as during several years there persisted the argument that the system was bipolar or was approaching to equilibrium¹².

Subsequently, there will be an exploration of the liberal institutionalism to understand the role of institutions on international society and how the hegemony and institutions interrelate. Moreover, Keohane's work broads Gilpin's notions of Hegemonic Stability and raises the question of the possible survival of the secondary institution that the hegemon has promoted even after its decline. However, the exploration of these theories will be addressed considering that U.S. hegemony did not disappear in the 70s decade, but entered in a new phase.

After the study of these two mainstream theories, the theoretical framework will shift towards studies that advance on a non purely material understanding of the structure.

¹² KRAUTHAMMER, C., "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, n° 1, 1990/1991, pp. 24-26; WALTZ, K. N., "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 25, n° 1, 2000, pp. 32-37.

The constructivist consensus on the definition of international politics as an arena constructed by ideas, norms and shared values raises the intersubjective variables to the front of the analysis. In a general sense, the approach of the thesis shares with constructivism the defence of the role of these variables and the evolution towards non-materialist analysis of international society. Moreover, the effects of the social structure have constitutive influence on how the actors see themselves, as the structure and the actors are mutually constitutive¹³. On the same vein, the synergies, shared concepts and divergences with the English School will constitute an enriching dialogue for the present approach. Even though the English School has been considered as anti-hegemonist from its beginnings, recent developments advance towards a theory of hegemony within the English School¹⁴. This exploration will offer, not only the conceptual base of this thesis, but also the development of the methodology of the practical part that will be later explained. Further studies on legitimacy, one of the main arenas of convergence between constructivism and English School, will also constitute an important object of study, as legitimacy will be one of the cornerstones of the analysis of the practical case.

In which constitutes one of the main innovations of this theoretical framework, the subsequent part will directly address the developments of three projects within the Chinese School of International Relations¹⁵. Through three main projects that rely on different philosophical traditions, there will advance towards a non-Western understanding of the international system. The first approach, Zhao Tingyang's Tianxia offers a native philosophical understanding of world governance, as well as an interesting analysis of ancient Chinese hegemony over East Asia. The second one, led by Yan Xuetong of the Tsinghua School, enriches the realist research program with the works of ancient Chinese philosophers. Finally, the sino-constructivist

¹³ COPELAND, D. C., "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism. A Review Essay" en S. GUZZINI and A. LEANDER (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander Wendt and his Critics*, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 3.

¹⁴ A proof of this fruitful attempt is Clark's article that refers to this. CLARK, I., "Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 15, n° 2, 2009, pp. 203-228.

¹⁵ Such an attempt is no absent of difficulties, not only linguistically (that have been progressively overcome as my knowledge of Chinese has modestly advanced simultaneously to this work), but also because of the novelty of several works on this issue. This author considers that this project of focusing on Chinese developments is not only innovative but also a work in-progress, because several Western scholars are starting to build bridges with their Chinese colleagues to spur dialogue. *Vid.* BUZAN, B. y ZHANG Y. (eds.), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014; CUI, S. and B. BUZAN, "Great Power Management in International Society", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 9, n° 2, 2016, pp. 181-210; VV. AA., "Beyond Geopolitics: Building a New Framework for Sino-American Relations", Tsinghua University, 2-4th November 2013, <http://cpost.uchicago.edu/conferences_workshops/past_conferences_workshops/beyond_geopolitics_building_a_new_framework_for_sino_american_relations/> [21st March 2016]; WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, "The Chinese and English Schools of International Relations: Comparisons and Lessons", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, n° 1, 2014, pp. 1-46.

approach led by Qin Yaquin¹⁶ explores a notion of international society that promotes mutually inclusive relations that challenge the Hegelian binary identity.

In the practical part of the thesis, the methodology will unfold on two main groups. Firstly, to analyse the material distribution of power, a quantitative approach has been chosen. Even if it has constituted a broad field of study, with several indexes that approach differently to power distributions¹⁷, some of the variables that include (population territory or iron and steel production, for example) have been discarded and variables and indicators related to energy and technology will have an important role. Through this quantitative examination, it will be possible to draw the state of the distribution of power or, to say in different words, if the United States does maintain its primacy over the system.

Secondly, the qualitative methodology will be used to provide a profound study of the most relevant social elements that have been identified in the theoretical part. The first element analysed will be the institutional order promoted by the hegemon and the alternative order that China is trying to establish. In the case of the United States, the process of accommodation of rising power and the distribution of gains within these institutions will be closely described, as well as the hegemon's clashes and non-compliance with the institutional decisions. In the case of China, despite examining how it interacts and gains status within the established hegemonic institution, there will be a broad examination of the institutional alternatives that China is promoting, with a special attention to the newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

The second element of the qualitative analysis will be a social approach to United States and Chinese identities on the international society. As Cronin explains, in the contemporary international society, the United States suffers "the paradox of hegemony", a tension between its role as a hegemon related to legitimacy and leadership; and its identity as a great power with impressive material power capabilities¹⁸. In the case of China, the tension is also evident, as it performs as the leader of the rising states, based on its growth of material capabilities, and a performance as a responsible state that bestows itself with the special responsibilities destined to great powers.

Finally, the third social element analysed will be the dynamics of legitimacy, examining deeply the hegemon's legitimacy through the methodology proposed by

¹⁶ Even though Qin does not define its approach as "sino-constructivism", this thesis will use this terminology coined by Moure. MOURE, L., "Orden internacional en transición y Relaciones Internacionales: Aproximaciones teóricas al declive hegemónico estadounidense y al ascenso de China como potencia global" en VV. AA., *Cursos de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2013*, Cicur Menor, Aranzadi, 2014, pp. 367-449.

¹⁷ Vid. SODUPE, K., *La Estructura de Poder del Sistema Internacional. Del Final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial a la Posguerra Fría*, Madrid, Fundamentos, 2002.

¹⁸ CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, nº 1, 2001, pp. 104-105.

Rapkin and Braaten as well as China's growing legitimacy, although this one should be addressed in a more modest study due to its temporal shortness.

Through this mixed methodology, that will be presented more in depth on Chapter 5 after the theoretical reviews, composes a eclectic study on this topic. Hence, the bibliography applied on the thesis will be as diverse, with a strong reliance on IR academic approaches, but also through official and institutional reports, economic analysis and media reports. Moreover, there will be a strong presence of Western academia, primarily anglosaxon, but also an important presence of Chinese sources, not only official ones but also from the native Chinese academia, mainly of them on its English translations but also several texts in Chinese.

1.4. Plan of the work

The present thesis has been organised in four main parts. The first part, the Introduction, presents a brief explanation of the research, stating the interest of the object of study and its contemporary relevance. Furthermore, it also delimitates the research subject and the theoretical approach selected, as well as the application of this theoretical approach to a practical realm. Moreover, it also states the objectives and hypothesis of the thesis, as well as summarising the methodologies selected and, finally, it presents a plan of the work.

The second part, the theoretical one, is composed by three chapters. Chapter 2 examines the main academic works of two of the more relevant research projects in the discipline, realism and liberalism, regarding hegemony and institutional cooperation.

Chapter 3 is devoted to offering a close investigation on the constructivist and English School research projects. In this vein, along with an interesting exploration of concepts such as the social structure of the international system and the notion of international society, the Chapter will also focus on the in-progress conceptualisation of hegemony within this research projects as well as the concept of legitimacy and how these two concepts interact.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the developments of IR in China. Despite the analysis of the three main theoretical projects (Zhao Tingyang's Tianxia, Yan Xuetong's moral realism and Qin Yaqing's sino-constructivism), the Chapter will also examine the process of construction of a Chinese School, the discussions around its scientificness and the native philosophical roots that base its developments.

The third part of the thesis consists on five chapters that compose the practical application of the theoretical part. Chapter 5 offers a broad description of the elements extracted from the theories to compose the methodology of the practical application. In other words, the Chapter reviews the two main groups of elements, material and social ones. Despite of presenting the variables and indicators that will be applied, it

will also describe at length the methodological decision that will guide the subsequent analysis.

Precisely, Chapter 6 will examine the continuities and changes in the material power structure, through economic, financial, energy and military quantitative analysis and an examination of strengths and weaknesses both for the United States and China.

Chapter 7 turns towards social values by analysing the set of secondary institutions established by the hegemon through three main organisations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Group of 20 (G20). Along with a description of the hierarchies within the organisations, there will also be examined the recent reforms and pushes for accommodation of China in these hierarchies and several processes of contestation within these organisations. Subsequently, the organisations that China is promoting are presented, with special attention to the project of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Chapter 8 continues the social analysis by approaching to the different set of identities that China and the United States perform, as well as the socialisation processes that take place among the different layers of international society.

Chapter 9 depicts to the legitimacy dynamics that take place within the institution of hegemony. Despite reviewing the importance of this concept, there is a deeper review of United States hegemonic legitimacy, as well as China's as a rising power.

Finally, Chapter 10 offers the main conclusions derived from the thesis organised around three main groups: theoretical, methodological and practical conclusions.

THEORETICAL PART

CAPÍTULO 2

PRINCIPALES VISIONES TEÓRICAS SOBRE LA HEGEMONÍA.

2.1. La perspectiva realista del sistema internacional: la política internacional como una lucha de poder

Indudablemente, el desarrollo teórico de la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales ha estado intrínsecamente unido al del realismo. Esta corriente teórica se ha convertido en central, tanto por la numerosa producción científica y académica de las distintas perspectivas realistas, como por su centralidad en los debates que constituyen la disciplina¹.

Si bien es posible distinguir varias corrientes dentro del realismo², la característica unitaria de todas ellas es su definición de la política internacional como una conti-

¹ WOHLFORTH, W. C., "Realism" en C. REUS-SMIT y D. SNIDAL (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 131; KEOHANE, R. O., "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" en R. O. KEOHANE (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 159.

² Dentro del paradigma realista se agrupan numerosas corrientes teóricas divergentes. No obstante, existe una continuidad teórica dentro del realismo en relación con sus premisas filosóficas. El hilo común queda patente en la continuidad de las consideraciones estatocéntricas y en la concepción de la política internacional como una lucha de poder. En este sentido, es posible realizar distintas clasificaciones entre los distintos realismos. La más extendida, y la que se utiliza a lo largo de esta tesis, es la que distingue entre (1) realismo clásico, (2) realismo estructural/neorrealismo, (3) neorrealismo defensivo, (4) neorrealismo ofensivo y (5) realismo neoclásico. MOURE, L., "El Realismo en la Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales: Génesis, Evolución y Aportaciones Actuales" en C. del ARENAL y J. A. SANAHUJA (Coords.), *Teorías de las*

nua lucha de poder³. Los orígenes de esta afirmación se remontan al primer debate de la disciplina. En el mismo, el realismo se contrapuso al hasta entonces dominante utopismo/idealismo, defendiendo la necesidad de reconocer que “el poder es un instrumento indispensable de gobierno”⁴. En esta línea, Herz definió el realismo como el pensamiento que toma en consideración las implicaciones para la política de los factores de poder y seguridad, inherentes a la sociedad humana⁵.

En ese ejercicio de observación de la realidad “tal como es”⁶, los realistas entienden las relaciones internacionales como un terreno conflictivo en el que los Estados dependen de sí mismos para garantizar su seguridad. El principio de anarquía constituye, por tanto, una de las piezas angulares del realismo, principalmente de la vertiente estructural. Esta consideración, sin embargo, no esboza un sistema internacional en un permanente estado de guerra, sino que considera que los Estados conviven en una continua competición por la seguridad, entendida en términos de suma cero⁷. La concepción del sistema internacional como anárquico establece un sistema de auto-ayuda en el que los Estados son los únicos garantes de su propia seguridad. En consecuencia, la anarquía crea una dualidad entre seguridad y poder que dividirá a la corriente neorrealista⁸.

2.1.1. El sistema internacional realista: anarquía y poder material

Desde sus inicios, el realismo ha definido la política internacional por oposición a la política nacional. Si la política interna era el terreno de la paz y la jerarquía, la internacional era el lugar del conflicto, la guerra y la anarquía. La naturaleza anárqui-

Relaciones Internacionales, Madrid, Tecnos, 2015, pp. 61-96; MOURE, L., *El programa de investigación realista ante los nuevos retos internacionales del siglo XXI*, Bilbao, Universidad del País Vasco, 2009; SODUPE, K., *La teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales a comienzos del siglo XXI*, Bilbao, Universidad del País Vasco, 2003; ARENAL, C. del, *Introducción a las Relaciones Internacionales*, Madrid, Tecnos, 2010. Sin embargo, esta visión coexiste con otras. Vid. por ejemplo, WOHLFORTH, W. C., “Realism... *op. cit.*”, p. 132, DONNELLY, J., *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 11-13.

³ Tanto destacados realistas clásicos como E. H. Carr o H. J. Morgenthau, como los neorrealistas continúan defendiendo que la característica principal de la política internacional es la lucha de poder. Vid. SCHMIDT, B. C., “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, nº 3, 2005, p. 542; BUZAN, B., “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?” en S. SMITH, K. BOOTH y M. ZALEWSKI (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 51.

⁴ CARR, E. H., *La Crisis de los Veinte Años (1919-1939). Una Introducción al Estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales*, Madrid, Catarata, [1939], 2004, p. 162.

⁵ HERZ, J. H., *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 18.

⁶ ARENAL, C. del, *Introducción a las Relaciones Internacionales... op. cit.*, p. 105

⁷ MEARSHEIMER, J. J., “The False Promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, Vol. 19, nº 3, 1994-1995, p. 9.

⁸ TALIAFERRO, J. W., “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” *International Security*, Vol. 25, nº 3 2000/2001, pp. 128-129.

ca del sistema internacional provoca que los Estados sólo puedan depender de sí mismos para garantizar su seguridad. En consecuencia, los Estados buscan maximizar su poder y así asegurar su supervivencia.

La premisa de la ausencia de una autoridad central es primordial para el realismo. Si bien el concepto de anarquía se ha revelado como esencial en los escritos de los realistas estructurales o neorealistas, los clásicos ya incluían consideraciones sobre las consecuencias de la anarquía en sus obras⁹. Según el realismo, la ausencia de una autoridad central que vele por su seguridad es la razón por la que los Estados necesitan maximizar su poder¹⁰. Este fenómeno, conocido como el principio de autoayuda, pone de manifiesto que los Estados no pueden depender de otros para garantizar su propia seguridad¹¹.

La relevancia del concepto de autoayuda o anarquía en el paradigma realista radica en las consecuencias teóricas de este elemento sistémico. En concreto, la anarquía establece los términos en los que se dan las interacciones dentro del sistema internacional, aunque estas interacciones no tienen ningún efecto sobre ella. La teoría estructural de Waltz, por ejemplo, retrata una relación unidireccional en la que la anarquía constriñe a los Estados sin ser afectada por ellos de ningún modo¹².

No obstante, el concepto de anarquía y sus consecuencias crean una línea divisoria en el seno del neorealismo. Concretamente, el desacuerdo se centra en los incentivos que ofrece la anarquía para la expansión. Los realistas defensivos opinan que los Estados no han de impulsar políticas expansionistas, ya que el sistema castigará su comportamiento. Bajo la anarquía, en opinión de los realistas defensivos, impera la lógica del dilema de la seguridad que provoca que el aumento de la seguridad de un Estado genere un decrecimiento en la seguridad de otro. La incertidumbre producida por el sistema anárquico desencadena la búsqueda de un aumento de las cuotas de poder por parte de los Estados. Si bien se trata de una estrategia de carácter defensivo, otros Estados pueden percibirla como ofensiva. Ante dicha circunstancia, deciden

⁹ En ocasiones se ha alimentado la falsa opinión de que los realistas clásicos explicaban el comportamiento de los Estados únicamente a través del argumento de la naturaleza humana. En esta línea, el propio Waltz afirmaba que el realismo clásico no concibe la estructura como una fuerza que moldea a las unidades. WALTZ, K. N., "Realist Thought, Neorealist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, nº 1, 1990, p. 34. Sin embargo, tal y como mencionan J. M. Parent y J. M. Baron, los realistas clásicos sí consideraban la estructura anárquica como causa de la búsqueda de poder. PARENT, J. M. y J. M. BARON, "Elder Abuse: How the Moderns Mistreat Classical Realism", *International Studies Review*, nº 13, 2011, p. 197. En este sentido, entre los realistas clásicos que incorporan nociones de anarquía y estructura encontramos: MORGENTHAU, H. J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Nueva York, Knopf, 1967, pp. 201-202; HERZ, J., *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 1962, p. 243; SPYKMAN, N. J., *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, Nueva York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942, p. 446.

¹⁰ MEARSHEIMER, J. J., *The Tragedy of Great Power...* op. cit., p. 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹² WENDT, A., "La Anarquía es lo que los Estados Hacen de Ella. La Construcción Social de la Política de Poder", *Revista Académica de Relaciones Internacionales*, nº 1, marzo 2005, p. 2.

aumentar también su poder, generando lo que Herz denominó como un “círculo vicioso de seguridad y poder”¹³.

Frente a esta perspectiva defensiva, los realistas ofensivos consideran que la ausencia de una autoridad central proporciona incentivos para la expansión. Bajo este prisma, los Estados, que buscan maximizar su poder relativo para garantizarse la seguridad, perseguirán políticas expansionistas siempre que los beneficios superen a los costes¹⁴. La búsqueda de poder que relata el realismo ofensivo convierte a los Estados en maximizadores de poder, en tanto que la mejor manera de asegurarse la supervivencia es convertirse en el Estado más poderoso del sistema, es decir, ostentar la hegemonía global¹⁵. Siguiendo esta lógica, las intenciones de todos los Estados serían revisionistas y, en consecuencia, perseguirían políticas expansionistas¹⁶.

Pese a las distintas brechas existentes en el seno del realismo, todas ellas coinciden en que el poder es el factor determinante en las relaciones entre las unidades del sistema¹⁷. Según J. Mearsheimer, los cálculos sobre el poder son la base de cómo los Estados perciben el mundo a su alrededor¹⁸. Sin embargo, pese a que el concepto de poder siempre se asocia al realismo, una de las críticas más recurrentes hacia esta corriente es la inconsistencia con la que define, mide y utiliza el término¹⁹.

No obstante, pese a la ausencia de consenso en la definición del concepto de poder, es evidente que la mayoría de los autores realistas abordan el término desde una sociología materialista. Tal y como relata A. Wendt, la corriente realista le otorga una importancia menor a las ideas, privilegiando la organización y naturaleza de las fuerzas materiales como las claves fundamentales de la sociedad²⁰. Los axiomas prin-

¹³ HERZ, J. H., *International Politics in the Atomic Age... op. cit.*, p. 231. Pese a que el dilema de la seguridad ha constituido uno de los argumentos principales del neorealismo y del realismo defensivo, su origen se encuentra en la obra de un realista clásico. Vid. HERZ, J. H., “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, Vol. 2, nº 2, 1950, pp. 157-180; HERZ, J. H., *Political Realism and Political Idealism... op. cit.* Sin embargo, en los últimos años algunos autores contemporáneos han realizado interesantes aportaciones a la obra de Herz. Vid. GLASER, C. L., “The Security Dilemma Revisited”, *World Politics*, Vol. 50 nº 1, 1997, pp. 171-201.; JERVIS, R., “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, Vol. 40, nº 1, 1978, pp. 167-214; JERVIS, R., “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 3, nº 1, 2001, pp. 36-60; SNYDER, J., “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914” en R. JERVIS, R. N. LEBOW y J. GROSS STEIN (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp. 153-179.

¹⁴ TALIAFERRO, J. W., “Security Seeking under Anarchy... op. cit.”, p. 128.

¹⁵ MEARSHEIMER, J. J., *The Tragedy... op. cit.*, pp. 21 y 34

¹⁶ SCHMIDT, B. C., “Realism and Facets of Power in International Relations” en F. BERENSKOETTER y M. J. WILLIAMS (eds.), *Power in World Politics*, Londres, Routledge, 2007, p. 56.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 43. A este respecto, B. Buzan afirma que es su enfoque centrado en la política de poder lo que le aporta continuidad a la tradición realista. BUZAN, B., “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?... op. cit.”, p. 51.

¹⁸ MEARSHEIMER, J. J., *The Tragedy... op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁹ SCHMIDT, B. C., “Realism and facets of power... op. cit.”, p. 43.

²⁰ Entre las mismas, Wendt destaca la naturaleza humana, los recursos naturales, la geografía, las fuerzas de producción y las fuerzas de destrucción. WENDT, A., *Social Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 23-26.

cipales que articulan la concepción de poder de los teóricos realistas, además, contribuyen a interrelacionar los conceptos de poder y seguridad, en tanto que la posesión de poder es sinónimo de seguridad y su adquisición es un juego de suma cero²¹.

Si bien la conceptualización del poder continúa siendo un debate latente tanto en el realismo como en el conjunto de la disciplina²², algunos autores apuntan que en Relaciones Internacionales se ha abordado el término poder en tres sentidos: como control, como capacidades/recursos y como objetivo²³. No obstante, la influencia de la teoría neorrealista ha provocado que habitualmente se considere que el paradigma realista abraza únicamente la definición de poder como recursos con el fin de operacionalizar el cálculo de poder de un modo objetivo y científico²⁴.

La consideración puramente materialista del poder es uno de los pilares del neorrealismo, que reduce la relación entre poder y estructura a una de causa-efecto. En su opinión, la dominación de las capacidades materiales se traslada directamente a una dominación sobre el sistema internacional²⁵. A efectos de esta proposición, el poder ha de ser un concepto único, homogéneo y medible. De este modo, el realismo ha construido el concepto de poder después de elaborar una teoría que necesita de su medición y cálculo. En consecuencia, no se ha conceptualizado el término de un modo plural, sino que se ha elaborado una definición tácita que sólo incluye los elementos susceptibles de ser medidos y clasificados que implícitamente son tratados como si fuesen el poder en sí mismo²⁶. En este sentido, K. N. Waltz enumera siete elementos que componen el poder, los dos últimos de carácter no tangible: población y territorio, dotación de recursos, capacidad económica, fuerza militar, estabilidad y competencia políticas²⁷. De un modo aún más concreto, R. Gilpin asegura que el poder está forma-

²¹ BERENSKOETTER, F., "Thinking about Power" en F. BERENSKOETTER y M. J. WILLIAMS (eds.), *Power in World Politics...* op. cit., p. 6.

²² WALTZ, K. N., "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics" en R. O. KEOHANE (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics...* op. cit., p. 333.

²³ SULLIVAN, M. P., *International Relations: Theories and Evidence*, Nueva York, Prentice Hall, 1976, p. 158. Tal y como argumenta K. Sodupe estas tres definiciones pueden reducirse a dos, dejando de lado la que considera el poder como objetivo. SODUPE, K., *La Estructura de Poder...* op. cit., p. 88.

²⁴ Tal y como afirma R. Little, esta tendencia es más que evidente en la teoría estructural. En ella, Waltz asume que el poder que un Estado posee puede ser calculado, y que ese cálculo depende del poder que poseen el resto de Estados del sistema. LITTLE, R., *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Models*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 183-184.

²⁵ KITCHEN, N., "Still in the American System: Structural Power and the Durability of Hegemony", BISA Conference, Manchester, 2011, p. 6

²⁶ BALDWIN, D., "Power and International Relations" en W. CARLSNAES, T. RISSE-KAPPEN y B. A. SIMMONS (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, Londres, Sage, 2002, pp. 179-180.

²⁷ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional*, Buenos Aires, GEL, 1979, p. 194. Si bien Waltz habla de recursos, C. Reus-Smit alerta de que esta consideración iguala recursos y capacidades. En su opinión, el movimiento de Waltz ha sido asumido por gran parte de la literatura de Relaciones Internacionales, pese a que la ecuación de "recursos = capacidades" sea incorrecta. Sin embargo, Reus-Smit distingue las capacidades como un elemento eminentemente práctico. Aunque los recursos pueden contribuir a dicha capacidad, la relación entre ambos conceptos es mucho más compleja de lo que demuestra la afirmación de

do por las capacidades militares, económicas y tecnológicas. Sin embargo, el propio autor afirma ser consciente de que esa misma definición deja fuera importantes elementos intangibles, que en su teoría asocia con el concepto de prestigio (moral pública, cualidades del liderazgo o factores situacionales, entre otros)²⁸.

Tal y como evidencian las definiciones previas, los realistas manifiestan una clara tendencia a recopilar los elementos intangibles del poder e incluirlos en un concepto *ad hoc* que no opera en sus cálculos sobre estructura de poder. Un ejemplo es la división que Waltz hace entre su concepción de poder y la definición de R. Dahl, de un claro carácter relacional²⁹. Waltz considera que la concepción de Dahl no es válida como definición de poder, sino de control. El autor argumenta que definiendo el poder de manera causal se confunde el proceso con el resultado³⁰. En este sentido, A. F. K. Organski adopta una perspectiva intermedia que liga poder y control. Para Organski, el poder se refiere a la habilidad de influenciar el comportamiento de otros de manera congruente con nuestros intereses³¹. El poder, en consecuencia, es algo más que la mera posesión de recursos. No es tanto un objeto, sino parte de una relación entre individuos o grupos de individuos³².

La omisión de la perspectiva relacional pone de manifiesto una de las carencias más importantes de la noción de poder de Waltz. Esa maniobra convierte el concepto de poder en un mero instrumento que permite elaborar análisis conforme a la estructura del sistema. La ausencia de una perspectiva relacional, además, olvida el carácter social del concepto de poder, en tanto que la posesión de recursos ha de ser reconocida por el resto de actores. Asimismo, el carácter multidimensional de las capacidades que componen el concepto para el realismo pone de relieve los problemas de conversión del poder³³. Es evidente que la posesión de recursos en un ámbito no asegura ganancias en otros. Además, la mera tenencia de recursos no garantiza la conversión de éstos en resultados; no siempre es el Estado más poderoso el que gana la guerra³⁴. La escasa fungibilidad del poder, en parte debido a la diversidad de las dimensiones que lo conforman, supone una dificultad añadida a la teoría neorrealista que, sin em-

Waltz. REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy", *International Politics*, Vol. 44, nº 2-3, 2007, pp. 161-162.

²⁸ GILPIN, R., *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 13-14.

²⁹ Concretamente, la definición de poder de Dahl define el término de la siguiente manera: "A tiene poder sobre B en la medida que puede lograr que B haga algo que de otro modo no haría". DAHL, R., "The Concept of Power", *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2, nº 3, 1957, pp. 202-203.

³⁰ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, p. 280.

³¹ ORGANSKI, A. F. K., *World Politics*, Nueva York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1965, p. 104.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

³³ BALDWIN, D., 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies', *World Politics*, Vol. 31, nº 2, 1979, p. 163.

³⁴ Tal y como afirma C. Layne, los recursos materiales no siempre se traducen completamente en los resultados deseados. LAYNE, C., "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited... op. cit.", p. 12.

bargo, ha de adoptar la perspectiva de poder material para encajar la teoría estructural que plantea³⁵.

La importante aportación de la teoría estructural al realismo está indudablemente influenciada por la capacidad de sistematizar y actualizar las premisas de los autores clásicos³⁶. A su vez, busca desterrar las visiones reduccionistas que tratan de explicar la totalidad del sistema examinando únicamente la interacción entre sus unidades³⁷. Waltz considera que este tipo de aproximaciones no permiten explicar los grandes cambios y continuidades de la política internacional³⁸. Por ello, apuesta por una teoría sistémica³⁹ que combina una aproximación teórica micro-económica con las raíces realistas basadas en conceptos materialistas como poder e interés⁴⁰. Sin embargo, el rasgo rupturista con el realismo tradicional radica en su pretendido carácter científico y su metodología⁴¹. Cabe recordar que Waltz consideraba a los primeros realistas como teóricos de la primera imagen, en tanto que señalaban la naturaleza humana como la clave para comprender los comportamientos y el conflicto. Sin embargo, Waltz ubica su teoría estructural en la tercera de las imágenes, ya que la capacidad de explicar los acontecimientos en el sistema internacional se encuentra en el nivel sistémico⁴².

³⁵ R. Aron fue de los más críticos con este aspecto. ARON, R., *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, Nueva Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2003. Años más tarde, Waltz respondió argumentando que el problema de la comparación entre el dinero y el poder no era el cualitativo, sino las dificultades de medición del poder. WALTZ, K. N., "Realist Thought, Neorealist Theory... *op. cit.*", p. 36.

³⁶ SODUPE, K., *La teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales... op. cit.*, p. 80.

³⁷ BURCHILL, S. "Realism and Neorealism" en S. BURCHILL, A. LINKLATER et. al (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 86.

³⁸ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, p. 98.

³⁹ La naturaleza sistémica de las obras de Waltz muestra una evolución desde sus primeros trabajos culminados con su obra principal, *Teoría de la Política Internacional*. Su pensamiento es un claro heredero de la tradición cientifista del segundo debate de la disciplina. No en vano, a lo largo de su libro Waltz realiza una defensa de los valores científicos frente a los tradicionalistas. Vid. WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, pp. 91-117. No obstante, la consideración de la teoría de Waltz como sistémica no está exenta de crítica. La concreta definición del concepto de sistema como el resultado de la estructura evidencia la confusión existente en la obra entre ambas ideas. La equiparación de sistema a estructura olvida la concepción de un sistema como un todo del que participan las unidades, la estructura y las interacciones. Por lo tanto, la teoría que presenta Waltz debe considerarse estructuralista y no sistémica. Siguiendo la definición de H. Bull y A. Watson sobre el sistema internacional, B. Buzan, C. Jones y R. Little apuestan por asumir presupuestos menos restrictivos a la hora de definir estos términos. Además, tanto B. Buzan como G. Snyder sugieren la inclusión de otras variables sistémicas, como la capacidad de interacción o los modificadores estructurales. BUZAN, B., C. JONES y R. LITTLE, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 29-30; BULL, H. y A. WATSON, *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 1; BUZAN, B., "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered" en K. BOOTH y S. SMITH (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 204-205; SNYDER, G., "Process Variables in Neorealist Theory", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, 1996, p. 169. Vid. SODUPE, K., *La Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales... op. cit.*, pp. 95-100.

⁴⁰ WENDT, A., *Social Theory of International Relations... op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

⁴¹ GUZZINI, S., *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*, Londres, Routledge, 1998, p. 127.

⁴² En concreto, Waltz afirmaba que existen tres tipos de variables causales que explicarían el conflicto: la naturaleza humana (primera imagen), la organización interna de los Estados (segunda imagen) y las

La premisa de Waltz de sustituir el pensamiento realista por la teoría neorrealista se basa principalmente en dos condiciones fundamentales⁴³: la permanencia de la anarquía como principio ordenador del sistema y la continuidad de la supervivencia como la preocupación primordial de los Estados.

Como ya se ha manifestado, la teoría del realismo estructural concibe el sistema como la suma de la estructura y las unidades interactuantes⁴⁴. Esta estructura, definida por la disposición de sus partes, existe autónomamente de los actores, y las diferencias entre éstos se deben a los efectos de la estructura.

En la concepción de estructura, Waltz incluye la distribución de capacidades entre las unidades. Si bien el autor rechaza la inclusión de atributos de las unidades en su análisis, considera que la distribución de capacidades es un elemento sistémico. Pese a que las capacidades sean un atributo individual, la disposición de los Estados dentro del sistema es para Waltz un elemento sistémico⁴⁵. Asimismo, las unidades que conforman el sistema son similares y tienen funciones semejantes moldeadas por la propia estructura anárquica⁴⁶. Dada la ausencia de diferenciación funcional, lo que distingue a las unidades es su capacidad para llevar a cabo funciones similares⁴⁷.

En consecuencia, la relación entre estructura y unidades es unidireccional. Waltz defiende que la estructura moldea a las unidades a través de procesos de socialización y competición, pero éstas no tienen ningún efecto sobre la estructura⁴⁸.

Según Ruggie, la definición del sistema en estos términos tan reducidos genera que la teoría obedezca únicamente a una lógica productiva. En su opinión, las únicas transformaciones que se contemplan en este modelo son los cambios en la polaridad (desde un sistema bipolar a uno multipolar y de nuevo a uno bipolar) y una transformación desde la anarquía a un poder centralizado y jerárquico⁴⁹.

En esta misma línea se manifiesta J. Donnelly. En su opinión, las estructuras políticas se definen por tres características principales: su principio ordenador (anarquía o jerarquía), la diferenciación de funciones de las partes y la distribución de capacidades. Aplicando este modelo a la teoría neorrealista, la premisa de la anarquía

variables sistémicas, es decir, la anarquía (tercera imagen). WALTZ, K. N., *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 1959.

⁴³ MOURE, L., "El Realismo... *op. cit.*", p. 75.

⁴⁴ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁴⁹ RUGGIE, J. G., *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation*, Londres, Routledge, 1998, p. 137. El concepto de estructura, tal y como lo define Waltz, ha sido un objeto de crítica constante de los enfoques reflectivistas. La concepción de una estructura que se relaciona de un modo unilateral de las unidades ha sido el punto de partida de muchas teorías constructivistas. Entre las aportaciones que tratan de superar este concepto reducido de estructura se encuentran: WENDT, A., *Social Theory of International Politics... op. cit.*; WENDT, A., "La Anarquía es lo que los Estados... *op. cit.*", HURD, I., *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007.

como un principio ordenador invariable genera determinismo en el resto de características mencionadas por Donnelly. Dicho de otro modo, la consideración de la anarquía anula la diferenciación funcional entre las unidades del sistema, provocando que las estructuras políticas sólo difieran en la distribución de capacidades. En consecuencia, el carácter de la estructura política que crea Waltz genera que la única variación entre distintos órdenes internacionales sea el número de grandes potencias que lo componen⁵⁰.

Asimismo, en su modelo sistémico, Waltz propone una relación unidireccional entre estructura y unidades. En esa relación, las unidades no tienen efecto alguno en la estructura, sin embargo, ésta sí afecta a las unidades. En este punto, Waltz distingue dos procesos principales. Según explica el autor, la estructura afecta la conducta dentro del sistema de manera indirecta a través de la socialización y la competición entre los actores⁵¹. Ambos procesos estimulan la semejanza entre los atributos y homogenizan las conductas. En primer lugar, la socialización provoca que ambos estén influenciados por la situación de la interacción. Se trata, más que de una relación bidireccional, de una social. En segundo lugar, la competencia genera un orden establecido dentro el cual las unidades enmarcan sus relaciones y actos autónomos; estos estarían constreñidos por ese orden que marca la competencia⁵².

El estructuralismo de Waltz constituye una herramienta necesaria y central para su teoría sobre el equilibrio de poder. La concepción de una estructura material en la que no intervienen las interacciones de las unidades genera patrones estables que, según Waltz, permiten entender las continuidades del sistema⁵³.

2.1.2. El equilibrio de poder en el sistema internacional realista

La aplicación de los principios fundamentales del realismo genera, de nuevo, una profunda división en el seno de esta corriente. El análisis de la distribución de poder del sistema internacional ha estado indudablemente dominado por las teorías del equilibrio⁵⁴. No obstante, el enorme crecimiento de Estados Unidos tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial y, sobre todo, durante las últimas décadas de la guerra fría, abrió una importante brecha para el desarrollo de teorías sobre la hegemonía. Tanto la concepción de equilibrio como la de hegemonía, pese a su carácter contrapuesto, han contribuido al enriquecimiento de los postulados realistas a través de un profundo debate

⁵⁰ DONNELLY, J., "Realism" en S. BURCHILL; A. LINKLATER et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 3ª Edición, 2013, p. 35.

⁵¹ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

⁵⁴ SODUPE, K. y L. MOURE, "Visiones sobre la hegemonía en el orden internacional actual", *Inguaruak. Revista Vasca de Sociología y Ciencia Política. Monográfico especial: Sociedad e innovación en el siglo XXI*, 2010, p. 84.

intraparadigmático centrado en analizar el impacto de la distribución de poder en las probabilidades de que estalle un conflicto interestatal. De hecho, ambas posiciones comparten las proposiciones que constituyen el núcleo duro del programa de investigación realista, aunque derivan de ellas hipótesis enfrentadas⁵⁵.

2.1.2.1. La distribución equilibrada del poder

A pesar del enorme impulso de K. N. Waltz a la teoría del equilibrio de poder, los orígenes de este concepto se remontan a autores clásicos de la teoría política⁵⁶. En sus inicios, la conceptualización del equilibrio de poder tomó forma bajo la sombra del sistema de Estados europeo del s. XVIII. En este sentido, el análisis del escenario internacional de la época permitió desterrar la visión de los grandes poderes como piezas de ajedrez, sustituyéndola por una de pesos en distintos niveles⁵⁷.

El equilibrio, de un modo general, se refiere a “un estado de las cosas tal que ningún poder está en una posición preponderante de forma que pueda imponer la ley a los demás”⁵⁸. No obstante, frente a esta definición unidimensional, los desarrollos teóricos posteriores en el realismo clásico avanzaron hacia una multiplicación de los significados. H. J. Morgenthau, por ejemplo, distinguía cuatro dimensiones del equilibrio de poder: (1) como política que aspira a un cierto estado de las cosas; (2) como un estado actual de las cosas; (3) como una distribución de poder igualada; (4) como una distribución cualquiera de poder⁵⁹.

Desde entonces, el concepto de equilibrio de poder ha evolucionado desde sus concepciones más clásicas de la mano de los debates de la disciplina y de las discusiones internas en el seno del realismo. En sus inicios, en el realismo clásico, el equilibrio

⁵⁵ Algunos análisis de las teorías realistas, como el de Di Cicco y Levy, consideran que tanto las teorías de las transiciones hegemónicas como el realismo hegemónico rompen con el núcleo duro del programa de investigación del realismo. Sin embargo, en la presente investigación se considera que la divergencia no se da en el núcleo duro del programa, sino en las hipótesis complementarias entendiéndose, por lo tanto, que existe un único programa de investigación realista. MOURE, L., *El Programa de Investigación Realista... op. cit.*; DI CICCO, J. M. y J. S. LEVY, “The Power Transition Research Program. A Lakatosian Analysis” en C. ELMAN y M. F. ELMAN (eds.), *Progress in International Relations Theory*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2003, p. 111.

⁵⁶ Es posible encontrar desarrollos teóricos del concepto de equilibrio de poder en las obras de, por ejemplo, D. Hume, N. Machiavelo o F. Guicciardini. Vid. HUME, D., *Political Essays*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994; GUICCIARDINI, F., *The History of Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989; MAQUIAVELO, N., *Historia de Florencia*, Madrid, Tecnos, 2009.

⁵⁷ WIGHT, M., *Power Politics*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1995, p. 168.

⁵⁸ VATTEL, E. D., *Le Droit des Gens. Ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle appliqués à la Conduite et aux affaires des nations et des Souverains*, Génova, Slatkine Reprints, 1983, Vol. 1, Cap. III., sección 47.

⁵⁹ MORGENTHAU, H. J., *Política entre las Naciones. La Lucha por el Poder y la Paz*, Buenos Aires, GEL, 1986, p. 209, n. 1. Además, tanto E. Haas como M. Wight realizan una distinción de los significados que toma este concepto. Vid. WIGHT, M., *Power Politics... op. cit.*, pp. 173-180; HAAS, E. B., “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda”, *World Politics*, Vol. 5, nº 4, 1953, pp. 442-477.

de poder era considerado una ley de la naturaleza, mientras que con el auge del behaviorismo se abogó por aproximaciones mucho más sistemáticas basadas en metodologías científicas. El rebrote de los estudios sobre el equilibrio de poder llegó con la aparición del realismo estructural, que desterró la idea del equilibrio como una ley natural y lo definió como un comportamiento de los Estados derivado de las presiones estructurales. Frente a esta perspectiva sistémica, los realistas neoclásicos abogan por la incorporación de variables del tercer nivel de análisis, como la política internacional de los Estados, con el fin de disolver la barrera entre los estudios estructurales y los análisis de la política internacional⁶⁰.

Pese a las divergencias, la práctica totalidad de las teorías del equilibrio sostienen que los Estados tienden a equilibrar frente a amenazas de hegemonía sobre el sistema⁶¹. Indudablemente, la irrupción de las visiones estructurales supuso la transformación más importante en las teorías del equilibrio. Sin embargo, los intentos neorealistas de afinar las ambigüedades e incoherencias en referencia a este término han tenido como consecuencia una restricción de los significados a los que hace referencia⁶². Para los realistas estructurales, el equilibrio supone la conclusión teórica principal del carácter anárquico del sistema internacional. De este modo, destierran la creencia clásica que consideraba el equilibrio como una ley de la naturaleza. Frente a esto, Waltz pretende demostrar cómo las acciones descoordinadas pero racionales de los actores reproducen la anarquía. Bajo esta perspectiva, el equilibrio es la cristalización de las relaciones de competición entre los principales polos del sistema⁶³. Según la postura de Waltz, con independencia de los objetivos particulares que persigan los Estados, la estructura les empuja a poner en práctica políticas equilibradoras que aseguran la reproducción del sistema internacional. En consecuencia, a la vez que se perpetúa la anarquía, se mantiene también la incertidumbre sobre el futuro con la que operan los actores, así como la necesidad de perseguir estrategias competitivas en el marco de un sistema caracterizado por la autoayuda⁶⁴.

En un mundo jerárquico, según Waltz, los Estados practicarían estrategias de *bandwagoning* o arrastre, ya que su alianza con el más fuerte no pondría en peligro su seguridad. Sin embargo, dada la naturaleza anárquica del sistema, los Estados más débiles se aliarán contra el más fuerte y equilibrarán el sistema⁶⁵. Si bien una alianza

⁶⁰ La evolución del concepto de equilibrio a través de los debates realistas tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial aparece desarrollada en detalle en la obra de R. Little. Vid. LITTLE, R., *The Balance of Power in International Relations...* op. cit., pp. 259-265.

⁶¹ LEVY, J. S. y W. R. THOMPSON, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999", *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, nº 1, 2005, p. 1.

⁶² Al hilo de esta consideración, R. Little defiende que el enfoque de Morgenthau en materia de equilibrio de poder es mucho más expansivo que el de las teorías posteriores elaboradas por K. N. Waltz o J. J. Mearsheimer. LITTLE, R., *The Balance of Power in International Relations...* op. cit., p. 91.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 193 y 196.

⁶⁵ WALTZ, K.N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional...* op. cit., p. 185-186.

con el más fuerte le proporcionaría al débil un aumento en su poder, una de las hipótesis principales del realismo waltziano recuerda que el poder es sólo un medio, mientras que la seguridad es el fin. Por lo tanto, esa búsqueda de la seguridad y la supervivencia será el factor determinante que impulsará a ese Estado a equilibrar. De este modo, las estrategias equilibradoras buscarán únicamente ganancias relativas, lo que impedirá la cooperación⁶⁶.

Por lo tanto, es posible afirmar que la prevalencia de situaciones de equilibrio está ligada con la continuidad de las dos condiciones necesarias para que se produzca: que perdure el carácter anárquico del sistema y que las unidades que lo conforman tengan como fin principal la supervivencia⁶⁷. Según Waltz, si los Estados desearan aumentar su poder por encima de todo (Estados como maximizadores de poder), se aliarían con el más fuerte (*bandwagoning*) y no se producirían equilibrios en el sistema⁶⁸. Sin embargo, frente a esta perspectiva, Mearsheimer reafirma la proposición principal del realismo ofensivo que asegura que los Estados son maximizadores de poder, no de seguridad, y buscan continuamente quebrar el equilibrio de poder en su favor. No obstante, las características geográficas y, especialmente, la dificultad de proyectar el poder a través de grandes masas de agua, genera, según Mearsheimer, que los Estados solamente puedan lograr la hegemonía a nivel regional y no global. Por lo tanto, si bien hay lugar para la unipolaridad en el contexto regional, el sistema internacional será equilibrado⁶⁹.

Los realistas del equilibrio no sólo consideran que dicha distribución de poder ha sido la mayoritaria a lo largo de la historia, sino que defienden que los equilibrios constituyen ordenaciones más estables que la unipolaridad. La estabilidad, determinada por la duración temporal de una estructura concreta y por el riesgo de guerra entre las grandes potencias, es mayor en la bipolaridad⁷⁰. Asimismo, la mayoría de los

⁶⁶ DONNELLY, J., "Realism... *op. cit.*", p. 38. Precisamente éste será uno de los puntos de fricción más importantes entre realistas y liberales.

⁶⁷ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, p. 178. Frente a esta afirmación, diversos estudios han afirmado que la hegemonía, y no el equilibrio, es la forma que ha dominado en el sistema internacional a lo largo de su historia. *Vid.* KAUFMAN, S. J., R. LITTLE y W. C. WOHLFORTH, "Conclusion. Theoretical Insights from the Study of World History" en S. J. KAUFMAN, R. LITTLE y W. C. WOHLFORTH (eds.), *The Balance of Power in World History*, Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp. 229-230; WATSON, A., *The Evolution of International Society*, Londres, Routledge, 1992, pp. 313-314.

⁶⁸ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁶⁹ La contraposición de las teorías de Waltz y Mearsheimer ha generado controversia en el seno del realismo. Snyder, por ejemplo, considera que se trata de teorías complementarias, la de Waltz centrada en los Estados conservadores o *statu quo* y la de Mearsheimer como explicación del comportamiento de los actores revisionistas. SNYDER, G. H., "Mearsheimer's World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security", *International Security*, Vol. 27, nº 1, 2002, p. 158. Sin embargo, tal y como apunta Little, se trata de una consideración errónea, en tanto que ambos autores parten de premisas distintas en lo que respecta a las motivaciones de los Estados (seguridad vs. poder), los efectos de la anarquía o el papel que el equilibrio de poder juega en ambas teorías. LITTLE, R., *The Balance of Power in International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁷⁰ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional... op. cit.*, pp. 237-250. Si bien en un principio Morgenthau defendió que la multipolaridad era más estable, posteriormente consideró que los polos de un sistema bipolar podían cooperar y asegurar la estabilidad. Asimismo, Bull, pese a no ser un teórico realista,

teóricos coinciden en señalar que los equilibrios bipolares son más estables que los multipolares. En un contexto de guerra fría, Waltz argumentaba que la estabilidad del sistema bipolar se asentaba sobre cinco pilares principales: la ausencia de periferias, el constante crecimiento de los factores incluidos en la competición, la continua presencia de presiones y crisis, la preponderancia de poder de ambos polos y la posesión de armas nucleares⁷¹. En la misma línea, Mearsheimer considera que los sistemas multipolares son más propensos a la guerra, especialmente aquellos que contienen hegemones potenciales⁷².

2.1.2.2. Modificaciones teóricas en el seno de la Escuela del Equilibrio: del equilibrio de amenazas al equilibrio de intereses

La versión estructural de la teoría del equilibrio de poder ha constituido el punto de partida para sucesivos desarrollos teóricos sobre el equilibrio. Destaca principalmente el planteamiento teórico de S. Waltz⁷³, que aboga por modificar la variable explicativa que determina el comportamiento de los Estados. Si Waltz afirmaba que éstos equilibraban ante las acumulaciones de poder, Walt asegura que lo hacen ante las amenazas. Pese a esta ligera modificación, Walt mantiene intactas las premisas fundamentales de la teoría waltziana. De hecho, no entiende los conceptos de poder y amenaza como independientes, sino que incorpora el poder a su teoría, pero lo subsume en un concepto más general de amenaza⁷⁴. Para Walt, el equilibrio, y no el *bandwagoning*, es el comportamiento más habitual de los Estados, y la distribución de poder continúa como una variable relevante. No obstante, refina las explicaciones estructurales de Waltz y añade variables correspondientes a otros niveles de análisis. En concreto, el autor cita el poder agregado, la proximidad geográfica, las capacidades ofensivas y la intención agresiva como los factores que constituyen la amenaza. Sin

consideraba que el aumento de polos incrementaba la complejidad de las interacciones. Finalmente, Waltz defiende explícitamente la mayor estabilidad de la bipolaridad. LITTLE, R, *The Balance of Power in International Relations... op. cit.*, pp. 256-257.

⁷¹ WALTZ, K. N., "The Stability of a Bipolar World" en WALTZ, K. N., *Realism and International Politics*, Routledge, Londres, 2008, pp. 100-103.

⁷² MEARSHEIMER, J. J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷³ No existe un consenso sobre la categorización de la obra de S. Walt en el seno del realismo. Algunos la sitúan simplemente dentro de la agenda investigadora del neorealismo, mientras que otros van más allá y la califican como una reformulación de la escuela del equilibrio de poder. Siguiendo el argumento de M. Barnett, en estas páginas la teoría del equilibrio de la amenaza será considerada como una reformulación de la teoría de Waltz. Si bien se centra en la extensa escuela del equilibrio (no sólo adherida al realismo) para desarrollar su teoría, Walt se sustenta en las premisas teóricas del realismo estructural impulsado por Waltz. BARNETT, M., "Alliances, Balances of Threats, and Neorealism. The Accidental Coup" en J. A. VASQUEZ y C. ELMAN (eds.), *Realism and the Balancing of Power. A New Debate*, New Jersey. Prentice Hall, 2003, p. 224.

⁷⁴ WALT, S., "The Progressive Power of Realism" en J. A. VASQUEZ y C. ELMAN (eds.), *Realism and the Balance of Power... op. cit.*, p. 62.

embargo, pese a que enumera los factores que la componen, no proporciona una definición concreta de la amenaza⁷⁵. Además, tal y como alerta M. Barnett, tanto Walt como otros autores neorrealistas incurren constantemente en el problemático comportamiento de recurrir a variables no materiales como enmendaciones *ad hoc* alejadas de las proposiciones centrales de esta corriente, sin pretender avanzar hacia una reformulación de estas premisas principales⁷⁶. Dicho de otro modo, los realistas sí incluyen en sus análisis factores que podrían ser considerados sociales o inmateriales, tal y como hace Walt incluyendo las intenciones agresivas como una de las variables del concepto de amenaza. Sin embargo, pese a la inclusión de esta variable no se observa ninguna crítica o reformulación de las proposiciones realistas principales que destierran los elementos inmateriales.

Del mismo modo, en la teoría del equilibrio de la amenaza se aprecia también una continuidad respecto a la teoría de Waltz, al permanecer la noción de que todos los Estados pretenden conservar el *statu quo*. Precisamente esta cuestión genera una división fundamental en las teorías sobre el equilibrio. Los teóricos realistas disienten en cuál es el móvil fundamental del comportamiento de los Estados. Tal y como se ha explicado en líneas anteriores, tanto Waltz como Walt afirman que la seguridad y la supervivencia son los fines principales de los Estados. Por el contrario, Mearsheimer señala que la maximización del poder es el objetivo principal de las unidades estatales, mientras que R. Schweller apunta al poder y la influencia como los fines fundamentales. Esta proposición condiciona esencialmente cómo estos autores califican la relación de los Estados con el sistema. La perspectiva de Waltz y Walt de los Estados como unidades *statu quo* ha sido fuertemente criticada por Schweller. Este autor argumentaba que, en un sistema internacional poblado por Estados satisfechos que sólo buscasen su supervivencia, las necesidades de seguridad serían mínimas y no habría dilema de la seguridad⁷⁷. Por ello, considera que en el sistema coexisten unidades con ambas actitudes, revisionista y conservadora⁷⁸. Mearsheimer va más allá y asegura que las unidades del sistema tienen todas ellas intenciones revisionistas, excepto el hegemon ocasional⁷⁹. Desde esa perspectiva, todos los Estados buscan inclinar la balanza en su favor⁸⁰.

⁷⁵ BARNETT, M., "Alliances, Balances of Threats ... *op. cit.*", p. 225.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁷⁷ SODUPE, K., *La Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales...* *op. cit.*, p. 108; SCHWELLER, R. L., "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, nº 3, 1996, p. 119.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁷⁹ A este respecto, Mearsheimer considera que Estados Unidos es en la actualidad un Estado satisfecho. Consolidado como hegemon en el hemisferio norte y consciente de las limitaciones geográficas para ejercer su poder globalmente, se ha transformado en un Estado satisfecho. Pese a la renuncia a una hegemonía global, Mearsheimer alerta de que el objetivo de Estados Unidos será asegurarse que no emerjan nuevos hegemones regionales en el resto del mundo. LITTLE, R., *Balance of Power in International Relations...* *op. cit.*, p. 237; MEARSHEIMER, J.J., *The Tragedy...* *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁸⁰ MEARSHEIMER, J.J., *The Tragedy...* *op. cit.*, p. 2.

La perspectiva mixta propuesta por Schweller da lugar a un interesante desarrollo teórico que diverge de la perspectiva estructural y se coloca en el marco del realismo neoclásico. Este giro teórico le permite cuestionar dos de los axiomas principales de la teoría estructural. En primer lugar, disiente de la concepción netamente material de la estructura, considerando que el determinante estructural principal no es el poder ni los recursos, sino los objetivos para los que se destinan. El fin al que se destinan esos recursos es la variable principal, si, por ejemplo, se emplean para dominar el sistema o para destruirlo⁸¹. En segundo lugar, Schweller refuta la centralidad explicativa que tiene el concepto de polaridad en el realismo estructural, que hace residir en esta variable la explicación del comportamiento de los Estados y la estabilidad del sistema internacional. Este autor considera que, en sí misma, la distribución de capacidades no determina la estabilidad del sistema, sino que ésta depende del equilibrio entre las fuerzas conservadoras y revisionistas en el propio sistema⁸². Como conclusión, Schweller propone un equilibrio de intereses, con un doble significado. Por un lado, a nivel de las unidades, se refiere al equilibrio entre los costes que un determinado Estado está dispuesto a pagar por defender sus valores frente a los costes que está dispuesto a pagar para extenderlos. Por otra parte, a nivel sistémico, hace referencia a la noción del equilibrio entre las fuerzas conservadoras y revisionistas dentro del sistema⁸³. De este modo, el planteamiento incorpora tanto las variables sistémicas propias del neorrealismo como las variables a nivel de la unidad, característica diferenciadora del realismo neoclásico⁸⁴.

La variación teórica propuesta por Schweller ataca también una de las hipótesis principales de los teóricos del equilibrio: la prevalencia de las estrategias equilibradoras frente a las de arrastre o *bandwagoning*. El autor considera erróneo considerar que ambas estrategias están motivadas por el objetivo de aumentar la seguridad. Desde su punto de vista, el equilibrio está ligado con el deseo de evitar o minimizar las pérdidas, mientras que el *bandwagoning* obedece a la oportunidad de obtener ganancias. La premisa de que equilibrio y arrastre son estrategias opuestas ha generado errores en la identificación de ambas, al relacionar el *bandwagoning* únicamente con las percepciones de amenaza⁸⁵. En la misma línea, M. Leffer trata de desmontar la creencia de que durante la guerra fría los Estados occidentales equilibraron frente a la Unión Soviética.

⁸¹ Esta hipótesis está directamente relacionada con la coexistencia en el sistema de Estados conservadores/*statu quo* y Estados revisionistas. SCHWELLER, R. L., "Bandwagoning for Profit. Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", *International Security*, Vol. 19, nº 1, 1994, p. 104.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁸⁴ En el mismo sentido, Battistella clasifica a R. Aron como el padre fundador del realismo neoclásico, definido precisamente por la noción de que la distribución de fuerzas en el sistema es solamente una de las causas que guían el comportamiento estatal. ARON, R., *Peace and War... op. cit.*, p. 98; BATTISTELLA, D., "Raymond Aron: a neoclassical realist before the term existed?" en A. TOJE and B. KUNZ (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics. Bringing Power Back in*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2012, pp. 117-137.

⁸⁵ SCHWELLER, R. L., "Bandwagoning for Profit... op. cit.", p. 74.

Por el contrario, afirma que siguieron una estrategia de arrastre hacia Estados Unidos, pero se trata de una táctica difícil de identificar para los realistas, que se limitan simplemente a enfrentar ambas prácticas⁸⁶.

Por otra parte, el orden internacional tras la guerra fría ha resucitado las críticas a la ausencia de referencias a la unipolaridad en las teorías sobre equilibrio⁸⁷. La persistencia en el tiempo de una situación de acumulación de poder ha intensificado la brecha entre las distintas teorías del equilibrio. En la inmediata posguerra fría, no existía consenso sobre el orden que emergería y las referencias a un orden claramente unipolar no eran de carácter explícito⁸⁸. No obstante, la noción de una "unipolaridad transitoria"⁸⁹ no evitó que aflorasen las críticas a la ausencia de consideraciones sobre la unipolaridad en las teorías del equilibrio. Si bien Waltz reconocía que el cambio de la multipolaridad a la bipolaridad es el más dramático del sistema internacional, resulta sorprendente que no contemplase un hipotético giro hacia la unipolaridad. Su ausencia evidencia, según Little, que el propio Waltz no ha comprendido el cambio que sufre la anarquía con las variaciones en la polaridad. Si lo hubiese hecho, en su opinión, hubiera resultado ineludible abordar la evidencia de que la unipolaridad constituye una tercera lógica estructural con consecuencias sistémicas más dramáticas que las dos anteriores⁹⁰.

Por su parte, otros realistas han optado por explicar la prevalencia de la unipolaridad debido a distintos factores, como la ausencia de un Estado capaz de hacer frente a Estados Unidos, la debilidad de las presiones estructurales que soporta la hegemonía o la estrategia de *offshore* de los Estados Unidos⁹¹.

Sin embargo, una de las aportaciones más interesantes a este respecto ha sido la distinción de R. Pape entre sistemas de equilibrio de poder y sistemas hegemónicos. En base a ella, el autor distingue también la unipolaridad y la hegemonía, caracterizadas ambas por la prevalencia de una única potencia. La unipolaridad estaría enmarcada dentro de un sistema de equilibrio de poder, ya que la potencia no es inmune a la posibilidad de que gran parte o todos los estados secundarios equilibren en su contra.

⁸⁶ LEFFLER, M. P., *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administrations, and the Cold War*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992, citado en R. ROSECRANCE, "Is There a Balance of Power?" en J. A. VASQUEZ y C. ELMAN (eds.), *Realism and the Balancing of Power... op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁸⁷ En el caso de Waltz, Little argumenta que la noción de que la unipolaridad daría rápidamente al equilibrio va en contra de su propio argumento estructural y refleja que los neorrealistas han sido incapaces de adoptar completamente las consideraciones de la lógica estructural. LITTLE, R., *The Balance of Power in International Relations... op. cit.*, pp. 193.

⁸⁸ SODUPE, K. y L. MOURE, "Visiones sobre la hegemonía... op. cit.", p. 83.

⁸⁹ KRAUTHAMMER, C., "The Unipolar Moment... op. cit.", pp. 24-26. En esa misma línea se manifestó también K. N. Waltz. Siguiendo una de las hipótesis principales de su teoría del equilibrio, que pronostica que la unipolaridad tenderá al equilibrio, Waltz vaticinó una multipolaridad emergente. WALTZ, K. N., "Structural Realism... op. cit.", pp. 32-37; WALTZ, K. N., "The Emerging Structure... op. cit.", p. 77.

⁹⁰ LITTLE, R., *The Balance of Power in International Relations... op. cit.*, pp. 192-193

⁹¹ WOHLFORTH, W. C., "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security*, Vol. 24, n° 1, 1999, pp. 5-41; MEARSHEIMER, J. J., *The Tragedy... op. cit.*

La hegemonía, sin embargo, es parte de un sistema hegemónico en el que el Estado más poderoso es más fuerte que la posible coalición de todos los poderes de segunda fila⁹².

En una situación unipolar, los costes de ejercer una estrategia equilibradora tradicional son demasiado altos, debido principalmente a la capacidad de la potencia para socavar la seguridad económica y militar del Estado equilibrador y a las dificultades que genera la globalización a la hora de transformar el poder económico en capacidad militar⁹³. Sin embargo, la multiplicación de herramientas de seguridad jurídica internacional que aseguran la soberanía y supervivencia de los Estados genera una relativa certeza respecto a la improbabilidad de que se produzcan estrategias de conquista o anexión. Ante esta situación, la estrategia más extendida es la de un equilibrio suave, una especie de acción equilibradora de bajo coste que no implica duras represalias por parte del hegemón: el *soft-balancing* o equilibrio suave⁹⁴. Este término se refiere a aquellas estrategias que no utilizan el enfrentamiento físico directo, sino que van dirigidas a aumentar los costes de las acciones de la potencia hegemónica y a minar su posición preeminente⁹⁵. Si bien el *soft-balancing* se basa en acciones *ad hoc*, esta estrategia puede derivar en un comportamiento equilibrador tradicional si la competición por la seguridad se vuelve más intensa y la amenaza crece⁹⁶.

El concepto de *soft-balancing* surgió a raíz del rechazo internacional a la guerra de Irak. En opinión de algunos autores, la unilateralidad de la actuación estadounidense constituyó un evento geopolítico crucial que anunció el inicio de una etapa de equilibrio contra hegemónico frente a Estados Unidos⁹⁷. Sin embargo, la ausencia de este tipo de acciones en los años posteriores ha generado la creencia en el realismo de que las acciones de *soft-balancing* emergen solamente cuando son compatibles con otros intereses del estado equilibrador⁹⁸.

De cualquier modo, la prevalencia de una distribución unipolar de poder ha provocado que las teorías del equilibrio reconfiguren sus hipótesis. A su vez, el cambio del contexto internacional ha convertido en necesaria la aplicación de teorías hegemónicas.

⁹² PAPE, R. A., "Soft Balancing Against the United States", *International Security*, Vol. 30, nº 1, 2005, p. 11.

⁹³ PAUL, T. V., "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance" en T. V. PAUL, J. J. WIRTZ y M. FORTMANN, M. (eds.), *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 3-4.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁹⁵ Entre las estrategias de *soft-balancing* se encuentran, por ejemplo, negar el acceso al territorio, utilizar las maniobras diplomáticas, fortalecer la economía e indicar la determinación de participar en una coalición equilibradora. PAPE, R. A., "Soft Balancing... *op. cit.*", pp. 36-37.

⁹⁶ PAUL, T. V., "Introduction... *op. cit.*", p. 3.

⁹⁷ LAYNE, C., "The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony" en T. V. PAUL, J. J. WIRTZ y M. FORTMANN, M. (eds.), *Balance of Power... op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁹⁸ BROOKS, S. G. y W. C. WOHLFORTH, *World out of Balance... op. cit.*, p. 95.

2.1.3. La distribución asimétrica de poder. La hegemonía desde la perspectiva del realismo

En el seno del realismo, la escuela del equilibrio ha constituido la corriente dominante para analizar el sistema internacional⁹⁹. Principalmente desde la irrupción del realismo estructural, las teorías del equilibrio en sus distintas formas ensombrecieron las aportaciones que analizaban las distribuciones asimétricas del poder. No en vano, desde la escuela del equilibrio se ha considerado que las distribuciones de poder unipolares constituían un fenómeno transitorio que derivaría de nuevo en una distribución bi- o multipolar¹⁰⁰. No obstante, el carácter hegemónico del sistema internacional tras la guerra fría disminuyó la influencia de las aportaciones de las teorías del equilibrio, que se han visto obligadas a ajustar sus hipótesis teóricas a la nueva realidad, principalmente analizando los porqués de la ausencia de equilibrio en el sistema. Por su parte, las teorías hegemónicas, enraizadas en propuestas teóricas nacidas en plena guerra fría, han resurgido gracias al consenso en lo referente al carácter unipolar del orden internacional post-guerra fría.

Pese a las distintas consideraciones sobre el sistema internacional, las teorías del equilibrio y de la hegemonía comparten el materialismo que caracteriza al núcleo duro realista¹⁰¹. El concepto de hegemonía desarrollado en el seno de esta corriente se asienta esencialmente sobre bases materiales. Sin embargo, ambas concepciones divergen al analizar qué tipo de orden es el que ofrece una mayor seguridad en el sistema. Al contrario que el realismo del equilibrio, los defensores de estas teorías entenderán que la presencia de un Estado hegemónico es la base de un orden estable¹⁰². De este modo, las teorías hegemónicas realistas coinciden en restarle importancia al concepto de anarquía y enfatizar la gestión jerárquica del sistema¹⁰³. En consecuencia, la importancia recae en los sistemas informales de normas a través de los que el hegemon utiliza su poder para controlar el sistema, manteniendo un orden que le es favorable¹⁰⁴. Tal y como señalan R. N. Lebow y B. Valentino, las teorías hegemónicas comparten una serie de hipótesis principales. En primer lugar, entienden que el sistema internacional está dominado por un único poder con la capacidad de imponer de un modo significativo un tipo de orden que le es beneficioso para su seguridad y bienestar material. En segundo lugar, las transiciones de poder son resultado de tasas diferenciales de crecimiento económico. Finalmente, las distintas posiciones teóricas

⁹⁹ SODUPE, K. y L. MOURE, "Visiones sobre la hegemonía... *op. cit.*", p. 84.

¹⁰⁰ WALTZ, K. N., "Structural Realism... *op. cit.*", pp. 32-37.

¹⁰¹ WENDT, A., *Social Theory... op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁰² GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, p. 50; ORGANSKI, A. F. K. y J. KUGLER, *The War Ledger*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 19; WOHLFORTH, W. C., "The Stability... *op. cit.*", p. 7.

¹⁰³ LEVY, J. S., "War and Peace" en W. CARLSNAES, T. RISSE-KAPPEN y B. A. SIMMONS (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, Londres, Sage, 2002, p. 355.

¹⁰⁴ LEVY, J. S., "Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace", en C. W. KEGLEY (ed.), *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections*, Nueva York, Harper Collins, 1991, p. 148.

coinciden en apuntar que una guerra resuelve los conflictos de intereses causados por esta transición¹⁰⁵.

Sin embargo, hay diferentes propuestas dentro de este enfoque. A efectos de un análisis más pormenorizado, podemos distinguir tres teorías hegemónicas en el seno del realismo, todas ellas con una visión del mundo en términos cíclicos: las teorías de transición de poder, las teorías de la estabilidad hegemónica y las teorías de ciclos largos¹⁰⁶.

2.1.3.1. Teoría de las Transiciones de Poder

Asentada en los trabajos de A.F.K. Organski, la teoría de las transiciones de poder ha tenido un importante desarrollo empírico en los últimos años¹⁰⁷. Si bien está encuadrada dentro el paradigma realista, los teóricos actuales prefieren simplemente denominarla como racionalista¹⁰⁸. Su objetivo principal comprende la explicación de cómo, cuándo y por qué ocurren las guerras, además de analizar su intensidad, duración, costes y consecuencias¹⁰⁹.

Pese a su marcado carácter realista, la teoría de las transiciones de poder traza una línea de separación clara con otros postulados de esta corriente al entender el sistema internacional de un modo jerárquico. No obstante, sí acepta la existencia de una anarquía condicionada, entendiendo que si bien los Estados satisfechos están constreñidos por el *statu quo* jerárquico, los insatisfechos no están limitados por ese orden y actúan como si la anarquía prevaleciera¹¹⁰. Aún teniendo en cuenta esta circunstancia, la visión del sistema dentro de esta corriente es el de una estructura piramidal, con el Estado más poderoso en la cúspide, por encima de los grandes poderes,

¹⁰⁵ LEBOW, R. N. y B. VALENTINO, "Lost in Transition. A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory" en K. BOOTH (ed.), *Realism and World Politics*, Londres, Routledge, 2011, p. 215. Si bien ambos señalan hasta siete puntos en común, se ha decidido simplificarlos en estos tres.

¹⁰⁶ LEVY, J. S., "War and Peace... *op. cit.*", pp. 354-355. Las aportaciones fundacionales de cada teoría se recogen en las siguientes obras: ORGANSKI, A. F. K., *World Politics... op. cit.*; ORGANSKI, A. F. K. y J. KUGLER, *The War Ledger... op. cit.*, GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*; MODELSKI, G., *Long Cycles in World Politics*, Londres, Macmillan Press, 1987. Si bien Levy incluye las teorías de ciclos largos en su análisis, a efectos de esta tesis se ha considerado no incluirlas por el notable declive que han sufrido en las agendas teóricas y su más que modesto desarrollo en la actualidad.

¹⁰⁷ Vid. ORGANSKI, A. F. K., *World Politics... op. cit.*; ORGANSKI, A. F. K. y J. KUGLER, *The War Ledger... op. cit.*; KUGLER, J. y D. LEMKE (eds.), *Parity and War. Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996; LEMKE, D., "Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective" en T.V. PAUL, J. J. WIRTZ y M. FORTMANN, *Balance of Power... op. cit.*, pp. 52-75; KUGLER, J. y D. LEMKE, "The Power Transition Research Program" en M. I. MIDLARSKY (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000, pp. 129-163.

¹⁰⁸ TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE et. al., *Power Transitions... op. cit.*, p. 6; KITCHEN, N., "Still in the American System... *op. cit.*", p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE et. al., *Power Transitions ... op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹¹⁰ LEMKE, D. y W. REED, "Power is not satisfaction", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, nº 4, 1998, p. 512.

los medianos y los menores¹¹¹. Se trata de estructuras que existen tanto a nivel global como regional, aunque la superestructura del sistema en su totalidad es la que prevalece. La imagen, por lo tanto, es la de numerosas estructuras piramidales a nivel regional, de carácter jerárquico, que a su vez están supeditadas a una de carácter global con las mismas características¹¹².

Además de su visión jerárquica, es posible destacar otros dos argumentos principales dentro de esta teoría¹¹³. El primero de ellos es que el crecimiento interno de los Estados influencia la política internacional. No obstante, la capacidad de crecimiento varía dependiendo de la madurez de cada economía. De este modo, la revolución tecnológica y los cambios políticos ayudarían a las sociedades desarrolladas a mantener tasas de crecimiento estables, pero que no les permiten mantenerse por encima de las economías en desarrollo, que crecen a un ritmo más alto¹¹⁴. Esta premisa constituye una de las bases de la teoría de transición de poder, en tanto que el Estado dominante, pese a crecer, no es capaz de mantener su supremacía ante el rival que tiene un crecimiento más rápido. El segundo de los argumentos señala que las consideraciones sobre el *statu quo* constituyen un determinante esencial en el estallido de los conflictos entre potencias. El Estado dominante, al asentar su primacía sobre el sistema, construye un orden internacional beneficioso tanto para sí mismo como para el resto de potencias que lo apoyan. En consecuencia, habitualmente el Estado emergente no está satisfecho con el reparto de ganancias de ese sistema y trata de modificarlo en su favor, dando lugar al conflicto.

En el análisis de las transiciones de poder, estos autores señalan tres elementos de especial importancia. El primero de ellos es el de paridad, que se refiere al periodo que comienza cuando el Estado emergente logra el 80% del poder del Estado dominante y finaliza cuando esa cuota alcanza el 120%. Dentro de la etapa de paridad se encuentra la segunda de las variables, el adelantamiento, que se refiere al punto exacto en el que las trayectorias de poder de ambos se cruzan y el desarrollo económico más dinámico del Estado emergente provoca que sobrepase al dominante. El adelantamiento, provocado por diversas causas, tales como el incremento de la productividad o la mayor competencia política, acrecienta en gran medida la probabilidad de conflicto entre ambos Estados¹¹⁵. No obstante, ninguno de estos conceptos (paridad y adelantamiento) es suficiente para explicar por qué algunas transiciones de poder son pacíficas, como la ocurrida entre el Reino Unido y Estados Unidos a principios del siglo XX. En este caso, la tercera de las variables es clave: la satisfacción. Los Estados

¹¹¹ BUSSMAN, M y J. R. ONEAL, "Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods? A Test of Power-Transition Theory", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol., 51, nº 1, 2007, p. 90.

¹¹² TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE et. al., *Power Transitions ... op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

¹¹³ LEMKE, D. y J. KUGLER, "The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective" en J. KUGLER y D. LEMKE (eds.), *Parity and War. Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 7-10.

¹¹⁴ TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE et. al., *Power Transitions... op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

entran en conflicto por diferencias en las preferencias y en las políticas y ambas razones derivan directamente del sentimiento de satisfacción¹¹⁶. En la mayoría de los casos, el Estado emergente ha ascendido y crecido una vez que el Estado dominante ha establecido el orden internacional. Por ello, busca reestructurar ese orden para así recibir unos beneficios que se ajusten a su recién adquirido poder. No obstante, el proceso de satisfacción es dinámico, una vez lograda la posición dominante el Estado emergente puede continuar insatisfecho o bien darse por satisfecho¹¹⁷.

Uno de los retos a los que se enfrenta la teoría de la transición de poder es cómo medir la satisfacción, la actitud de un Estado con el orden establecido. Algunos teóricos proponen identificar los beneficios de los que gozan tanto el Estado dominante como sus seguidores, pero de los que se le priva al emergente¹¹⁸. Estos bienes públicos que le son negados al Estado insatisfecho son, según J. Vasquez, la clave de que algunas transformaciones acaben en guerra y otras no¹¹⁹. Sin embargo, esta propuesta no es la única. Basándose en la consideración de que en el sistema internacional las alianzas son rígidas y estables¹²⁰, W. Kim y J. Morrow proponen que la satisfacción puede medirse por la cercanía entre las alianzas del Estado emergente y las preferencias de seguridad del hegemon¹²¹. Es decir, si el Estado emergente cuenta con aliados que el hegemon considera como Estados peligrosos o rivales en algún ámbito, puede considerarse que el emergente está insatisfecho. Sin embargo, si sus alianzas son cercanas a los países que apoyan el orden impuesto por el dominante, es probable que el Estado en ascenso esté satisfecho con el *statu quo*.

Teniendo en cuenta la variable de la satisfacción, es posible distinguir tres modelos de transiciones. El primero de ellos es el que retrata una transición con una alta probabilidad de conflicto, en la que el Estado dominante/satisfecho crece más lentamente que el emergente/insatisfecho. Si el Estado en ascenso logra la paridad, las po-

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹¹⁸ ONEAL, J. R., I. DE SOYSA y Y.-H. PARK, "But power and wealth are satisfying: A reply to Lemke and Reed", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, nº 4, 1998 p. 518; DICICCO, J. M., y J. S. LEVY, "Power shifts and problem shifts: The evolution of the power transition research program", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 43, nº 6, 1999, p. 690.

¹¹⁹ VASQUEZ, J., "When are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and Reformulation of Power Transition Theory" en J. KUGLER y D. LEMKE (eds.), *Parity and War... op. cit.*, pp. 50-52. Tal y como explican Siverson y Miller, los Estados satisfechos reciben seguridad, acceso a los recursos, ventajas comerciales y respeto por parte de otros Estados. SIVERSON, R. M. y R. A. MILLER, "The Power Transition: Problems and Prospects" en J. KUGLER y D. LEMKE (eds.), *Parity and War... op. cit.*, p. 59.

¹²⁰ Los teóricos de la transición de poder consideran que las alianzas son rígidas y guardan una estrecha relación con las consideraciones que cada Estado tiene sobre el *statu quo*: aquellos que están a favor se aliarán con el Estado dominante, mientras que los insatisfechos se colocarán del lado del emergente. Por el contrario, la teoría del equilibrio considera que las alianzas son flexibles, en tanto que los Estados deben poder responder a las amenazas en la medida que surjan y equilibrar ante ellas. LEMKE, D. y J. KUGLER, "The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective... op. cit.", p. 9.

¹²¹ KIM, W. "Alliance Transitions and Great Power War", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, nº 4, 1991, p. 842-843; KIM, W. y J. MORROW, "When do Power Shifts Lead to War?", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 36, nº 4, 1992, p. 912.

sibilidades de que estalle la guerra son altas, tal y como ocurrió con el Reino Unido y Alemania en las dos guerras mundiales. Por su parte, el segundo de los modelos describe una transición con una baja probabilidad de guerra, en el que ambos Estados están satisfechos con el *statu quo*. En este caso, el adelantamiento no amenaza la estructura del orden internacional existente, del mismo modo que ocurrió con la transición hegemónica entre el Reino Unido y los Estados Unidos en el pasado siglo¹²². Finalmente, la tercera es una transición con una muy alta probabilidad de conflicto, en tanto que ambos Estados están insatisfechos. Se trata de un hecho que nunca ha ocurrido a nivel global, pero del que sí existen antecedentes a escala regional, como las relaciones entre Egipto e Israel previas al establecimiento del *statu quo* actual de Oriente Próximo¹²³.

Sin embargo, la satisfacción no es la única variable a tener en cuenta para medir la probabilidad de la irrupción del conflicto. A este respecto, Kim considera que es más probable que estalle una guerra hegemónica cuando el poder del Estado emergente disconforme, que previamente ha recabado apoyos entre sus aliados, se aproxima al del dominante¹²⁴. La identificación del periodo temporal con una mayor probabilidad de que estalle el conflicto y la severidad de éste también han sido abordados por esta teoría. La vertiente tradicional, que sigue la corriente iniciada por Organski, considera que es más probable que las guerras ocurran después de que el Estado emergente adelante al dominante¹²⁵. Sin embargo, investigaciones posteriores disienten con este planteamiento. Éstas consideran que la probabilidad de guerra se incrementa antes del adelantamiento, pero la severidad de la misma disminuye en este periodo temprano. Por lo tanto, desde esa perspectiva, las guerras tras el periodo de adelantamiento son menos frecuentes, pero mucho más violentas, tal y como ocurrió en las dos guerras mundiales¹²⁶.

En cuanto a las consecuencias de estos conflictos, los datos estadísticos muestran que los Estados vencedores y neutrales únicamente sufren costes marginales en

¹²² Desde la perspectiva liberal se ha relacionado el carácter pacífico de la transición entre estos países con la teoría de la paz democrática, que argumenta que las naciones con este tipo de sistema político no luchan entre ellas. Vid. DOYLE, M., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, nº 3, 1983, pp. 205-35; DOYLE, M., "Liberalism and World Politics" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, nº 4, 1986, pp. 1151-69; RUSSETT, B., *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 38-40. Sin embargo, algunos teóricos de las transiciones de poder han argumentado que esta consideración forma parte de un argumento mayor: los Estados con sistemas políticos similares no luchan entre ellos. No obstante, desde la perspectiva de la transición de poder no se considera el tipo de sistema político de los Estados como la variable clave que determina el carácter pacífico de la transición de poder. En su opinión, la satisfacción con el orden internacional es la variable clave en el análisis de la ausencia de conflicto en algunas transiciones. TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE et. al., *Power Transitions... op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-24.

¹²⁴ KIM, W., "Alliance Transition... op. cit.", p. 833.

¹²⁵ ORGANSKI, A.F.K. y J. KUGLER, *The War Ledger... op. cit.*, p. 54; BUENO DE MESQUITA, B. y D. LALMAN, *War and Reason*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992.

¹²⁶ TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE et. al., *Power Transitions... op. cit.*, p. 29.

las contiendas, mientras que el poder de los perdedores se erosiona, al menos inmediatamente después del conflicto. Sin embargo, tras 15 o 20 años, los efectos de la derrota se disipan y los perdedores aceleran su recuperación hasta lograr el estatus previo al conflicto, un fenómeno conocido como el factor Phoenix¹²⁷. De este modo, pasado ese lapso temporal, se diluyen los efectos del conflicto y el sistema comienza a comportarse del mismo modo que lo hubiera hecho si no hubiese habido guerra¹²⁸.

El análisis de las distintas concepciones sobre las transiciones de poder evidencia la tensión existente entre las diversas generaciones de autores que constituyen el núcleo duro de esta teoría. En particular, resulta destacable la división existente a la hora de identificar qué variable ha de ser central. De los escritos fundacionales de Organski se concluye que la distribución de poder es el concepto fundamental¹²⁹. Sin embargo, autores más actuales han puesto el énfasis en la satisfacción como elemento esencial a la hora de explicar la conflictividad de la transición¹³⁰. A pesar de poner el foco en la satisfacción, habitualmente estos trabajos no abordan en profundidad el papel del Estado dominante en incorporar al Estado emergente/insatisfecho dentro el orden. De esta manera, sería posible transformar el inconformismo con ese orden y asegurar el carácter pacífico de la transición.

Finalmente, una crítica recurrente desde el propio programa de investigación consiste en la selección estadística realizada para refutar la teoría. Irremediamente, ese análisis se realiza *a posteriori*, por lo que la selección de datos está ya desde el inicio influenciada por los hechos históricos. Además, tal y como critican Siverson y Miller, dicha selección únicamente recopila los datos relacionados con los conflictos ocurridos entre las dos potencias (dominante y emergente). En su opinión, esto excluye del análisis estadísticas que refutarían algunos postulados de la teoría en su carácter más prescriptivo, como aquellos que se refieren a si una de las potencias debería haber tomado parte en algún conflicto que involucrarse a algún Estado menor¹³¹.

2.1.3.2. Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica

La irrupción del realismo estructural de Waltz en los años setenta tuvo su respuesta en el seno de las teorías de la hegemonía. Frente a las concepciones del equili-

¹²⁷ ORGANSKI, A.F.K. y J. KUGLER, "The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71, nº 4, 1977, p. 1347.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1364.

¹²⁹ ORGANSKI, A.F.K. y J. KUGLER, *The War Ledger... op. cit.*, pp. 24 y 27.

¹³⁰ *Vid.* KIM, W. "Alliance Transitions... op. cit."; KIM, W, "Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo", *World Politics*, nº 45, 1992; KIM, W. y J. MORROW, "When do Power Shifts... op. cit."; LEMKE, D. y S. WERNER, "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, nº 2, 1996; LEMKE, D., *Regions of War and Peace*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

¹³¹ SIVERSON, R. M., y R. A. MILLER, "The Power Transition... op. cit.", p. 67.

brio, la obra de R. Gilpin generó un tremendo impulso a las escuelas hegemónicas, a la vez que acercaba las Relaciones Internacionales a la economía política. Del mismo modo que Waltz tomó la teoría del oligopolio para describir el sistema internacional, Gilpin trasladó los postulados sobre la maximización de la utilidad marginal para explicar las dinámicas de poder en el sistema internacional¹³². Además, la perspectiva de Gilpin, aunque no rechaza la anarquía como principio ordenador del sistema, niega que las unidades sean funcionalmente iguales y considera que, al menos desde el siglo XIX, el sistema se ha caracterizado por una sucesión de hegemonías¹³³. Es necesario puntualizar que en la obra de Gilpin la concepción de la hegemonía no se realiza desde una perspectiva negativa. La hegemonía, en este caso, se refiere al liderazgo de un Estado sobre otros del sistema, primando unas nociones políticas, económicas, territoriales que favorecen sus intereses, principalmente los económicos y de seguridad. El hegemon, por tanto, ofrece bienes públicos globales, tales como seguridad o libre comercio, a cambio de ganancias¹³⁴.

La noción del hegemon como proveedor de bienes públicos globales y estabilizador ha sido también abordada desde perspectivas cercanas a la economía y por autores como C. Kindleberger y S. Krasner. En referencia a las aportaciones del primero de los autores, cabe destacar su análisis tras la crisis de 1929, en el que defendía que la gravedad de esta depresión estuvo motivada por la falta de un estabilizador que cumpliera ciertas funciones en la economía mundial. Bajo su perspectiva, la erosión de la hegemonía británica y las reticencias de Estados Unidos a tomar el timón provocaron que los Estados defendieran individualmente su interés nacional y desestabilizaran el interés público mundial¹³⁵.

La segunda de las perspectivas económicas engloba a aquellos que hacen una referencia más concreta a la influencia de la hegemonía en la estructura comercial y tarifaria internacional, entre los que destaca el trabajo de Krasner. En su opinión, la apertura comercial es más probable cuando el hegemon está en ascenso, ya que la preferencia del Estado dominante por una estructura abierta es mayor. Si bien es cierto que los costes y beneficios de la apertura comercial no se distribuyen simétricamente en el sistema, la preferencia del hegemon por esta estructura y el uso que hace de

¹³² MOURE, L., "Realismo... *op. cit.*", p. 21; GUZZINI, S., "Realisms At War: Robert Gilpin's Political Economy of Hegemonic War as a Critique of Waltz's Neorealism", *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI Working Paper Series*, nº 11, 2002, p. 2.

¹³³ Dicha consideración, por tanto, contraviene dos de los argumentos principales de las teorías de equilibrio: aquellas que consideran la anarquía como el principio ordenador del sistema internacional y las que defienden que el equilibrio es la forma mayoritaria de ordenación. GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, p. 144.

¹³⁴ GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, pp. 16 (n.6) y 144-145.

¹³⁵ Las cinco funciones citadas por Kindleberger son las siguientes: (1) mantener el mercado relativamente abierto para los bienes con problemas; (2) proporcionar préstamos a largo plazo anticíclicos; (3) estructurar un sistema relativamente estable de tipos de cambio; (4) asegurar la coordinación de las políticas macroeconómicas; y (5) actuar como prestamista de última instancia. KINDLEBERGER, C. P., *La Crisis Económica: 1929-1939*, Barcelona, Crítica, 1985, pp. 340-341.

sus recursos para que el resto de Estados la adopten (a través de recompensas o castigos) provoca que este tipo de medidas aperturistas sean mucho más probables en estructuras hegemónicas¹³⁶.

Si bien la importancia de las consideraciones económicas es más que notable, los trabajos de R. Gilpin y R. O. Keohane son los que han abordado el nexo entre hegemonía y estabilidad desde la teoría de Relaciones Internacionales. Aunque ambas obras tienen un enlace significativo entre ellas, la primera se sitúa en una perspectiva realista desde la cual se analiza cómo se produce la transición hegemónica y las bases que sustentan dicho poder, mientras que la segunda guarda una relación más estrecha con el liberalismo, en tanto que trata la viabilidad de los regímenes internacionales en contextos post-hegemónicos¹³⁷. Por ello, en las siguientes líneas se desarrollará la perspectiva de Gilpin, mientras que Keohane tendrá cabida en el apartado sucesivo.

A pesar de que la obra de Gilpin no contempla la naturaleza anárquica del sistema del mismo modo que lo hace Waltz, sus trabajos enraízan completamente con la perspectiva realista¹³⁸. Tomando como referencia el legado del filósofo griego Tucídides, este autor considera que, en esencia, las relaciones internacionales no han cambiado sustancialmente a lo largo de los años y continúan siendo una lucha por el poder y la riqueza en un contexto anárquico¹³⁹. Las dinámicas del poder, sin embargo, sí que varían. En opinión de Gilpin, el factor más importante para entender la política internacional no es la distribución estática del poder, sino las dinámicas de poder a lo largo del tiempo. De este modo, los cambios en el poder relativo producidos por las dinámicas económicas constituyen la variable fundamental¹⁴⁰. El poder, de nuevo, se revela como un elemento netamente material compuesto por las capacidades militares, económicas y tecnológicas de los Estados, pese a que Gilpin en más de una ocasión incluye la variable del prestigio en su análisis¹⁴¹. De hecho, el propio autor señala

¹³⁶ KRASNER, S. D., "State Power and the Structure of International Trade", *World Politics*, Vol. 28, nº 3, 1976, pp. 318 y 322.

¹³⁷ El propio Keohane reafirma su condición de teórico de la corriente institucionalista del liberalismo en un texto en el que, además, realiza una clara exposición sobre las diferencias entre las dos corrientes protagonistas del cuarto debate de la disciplina. KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "Institutional Theory as a Research Program" en C. ELMAN y M. F. ELMAN (eds.), *Progress in International Relations... op. cit.*, pp. 71-107.

¹³⁸ Tal y como explica Keohane, Gilpin acepta la totalidad del núcleo duro del programa de investigación realista. KEOHANE, R. O., "Theory of World Politics... op. cit.", p. 177.

¹³⁹ GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 93; KIRSHNER, J., "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 18, nº 1, 2012, pp. 54.

¹⁴¹ GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, p. 13-14. De hecho, Gilpin relaciona el prestigio con la noción de "poder sobre la opinión" que incluía Carr en su obra más importante. CARR, E. H., *La Crisis de los Veinte Años... op. cit.*, p. 164. Al contrario que Carr, Gilpin no incluye el prestigio dentro del poder sino que lo supedita al poder, afirmando que "la jerarquía del prestigio en el sistema internacional descansa en el poder económico y material. Desde esta perspectiva, el concepto de prestigio tienen que ver con las "percepciones de otros Estados sobre las capacidades de un Estado y su habilidad y disposición a utilizarlas" y en el terreno internacional juega un papel similar al de la autoridad en la esfera nacional. GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

a la jerarquía de prestigio entre los Estados como un componente de la gobernanza en el sistema internacional, junto con la distribución de poder, que constituye la primera y más importante forma de control. Desde su perspectiva, el prestigio en la política internacional es el equivalente a la autoridad en la política doméstica, asegurando que los Estados menores obedezcan los mandatos del Estado más poderoso. En un sistema hegemónico, el prestigio y el estatus en el sistema internacional son dos variables vitales para que el resto de Estados acepten este papel de liderazgo¹⁴².

Centrándonos en el concepto del cambio en el sistema internacional, tradicionalmente éste ha sido explicado en el realismo a través del crecimiento desigual, que genera transformaciones en la distribución de poder a escala internacional. Bajo esta lógica, los Estados buscarán maximizar su poder relativo, generando lo que Herz calificó como el dilema de la seguridad y el poder¹⁴³. En la medida que el poder de un Estado crezca, estará tentado a imponer un mayor control sobre el entorno internacional, con el fin de maximizar su propia seguridad¹⁴⁴. Si bien este postulado encaja con la propuesta de Gilpin, el autor no se centra en la distribución del poder, sino en la distribución de ganancias. Según su teoría, los comportamientos premiados y castigados por el sistema internacional coincidirán (al menos en un primer momento), con los intereses de los miembros más poderosos del sistema. Siguiendo la línea de Organski, Gilpin asegura que el desequilibrio entre el reparto de beneficios en el *statu quo* existente y la distribución real de poder en el sistema internacional constituye la condición para que se produzca un cambio, que a su vez transformará la distribución de costes y beneficios¹⁴⁵.

Según la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica, los Estados tratarán de cambiar el sistema internacional siempre y cuando los beneficios de hacerlo sean mayores que los costes¹⁴⁶. De este modo, los cambios en el poder inducirán también cambios en las relaciones entre los Estados y en el sistema internacional en el que éstas se producen. Una de las claves de la teoría es que estas dinámicas de cambio dentro del sistema internacional tienen una relación directa con la estabilidad. Tal y como apunta Gilpin, los sistemas internacionales estables son aquellos con una jerarquía de poder inequívoca que cuenta con un poder hegemónico indiscutible. En ellos, los cambios pueden tener lugar siempre que no amenacen los intereses vitales de los Estados dominantes. Por el contrario, los sistemas en los que los cambios económicos, tecnológicos o de otro tipo están socavando la jerarquía y la posición del hegemón son calificados como

¹⁴² GILPIN, R., *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 73; GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, pp. 29-31.

¹⁴³ HERZ, J. H., *Political Realism and Political Idealism... op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁴⁴ GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁴⁶ KEOHANE, R. O., "Theory of World Politics... op. cit.", p. 177.

inestables. En estos casos, algunas crisis pueden precipitar una guerra hegemónica que dé lugar a una nueva estructura internacional¹⁴⁷.

Evidentemente, la hipótesis anterior choca frontalmente con los postulados de la escuela del equilibrio. Si bien Gilpin admite la premisa waltziana de que la estructura condiciona la capacidad de los Estados para cambiar el sistema, ambos disienten en el grado de estabilidad de los distintos tipos de estructuras. Tal y como se explicó en páginas anteriores, Waltz considera los sistemas bipolares como los más estables, ya que minimizan la incertidumbre y los errores de cálculo, que son las principales causas de la guerra. Sin embargo, Gilpin disiente de la idea de estabilidad de Waltz, en tanto que ésta se refiere a una menor propensión a la guerra. Frente a esto, Gilpin propone una noción de la estabilidad que mida la propensión del sistema a que unas causas relativamente pequeñas desemboquen en unos efectos desproporcionadamente importantes. Por ello, Gilpin modifica en su teoría la premisa que contempla la incertidumbre y los errores de cálculo como causa de las guerras y defiende que es la certeza de obtener ganancias lo que impulsa a los Estados al conflicto¹⁴⁸.

La premisa de que el crecimiento desigual de los Estados es la fuerza fundamental de cambio provoca, en ocasiones, situaciones de conflicto. Estas dinámicas generan que el sistema jerárquico y sus elementos (la jerarquía de prestigio, los beneficios económicos), establecidos por el hegemón para maximizar sus ganancias, no siempre sean un reflejo de la distribución sistémica de poder. El crecimiento más dinámico de un Estado periférico, por ejemplo, puede provocar que éste se encuentre infrarrepresentado en las instituciones principales del sistema o que considere que las políticas sistémicas encabezadas por el hegemón le perjudiquen. La concepción cíclica de los hechos se refuerza en este punto, a través de lo que el autor denomina la ley del crecimiento desigual. En virtud de la misma, el Estado predominante acabará sufriendo un declive del poder, principalmente a través de tres procesos: el aumento y posterior decrecimiento de los márgenes de ganancias de la posición hegemónica, un aumento del consumo y decaimiento de la inversión por parte del hegemón y, finalmente, un proceso de difusión de las ventajas políticas, militares, económicas y tecnológicas por las que ha logrado su prevalencia.

Si bien dentro del sistema internacional acontecen numerosos cambios, aquellos que socavan la posición del hegemón son, para Gilpin, los determinantes básicos de las guerras hegemónicas¹⁴⁹. Trasladando esta perspectiva al relato de la Guerra del Peloponeso descrita por Tucídides¹⁵⁰, el hegemón recae en la figura de Esparta que comanda un sistema internacional estable, gracias a su potencial económico y su poder militar. El auge del comercio y del poder naval tras las guerras persas provocó

¹⁴⁷ GILPIN, R., "The Theory of Hegemonic War", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol., 18, nº 4, 1988, pp. 592.

¹⁴⁸ GILPIN, R., *War and Change...*, pp. 91-92.

¹⁴⁹ GILPIN, R., "The Theory of Hegemonic War... *op. cit.*", p. 592.

¹⁵⁰ THUCYDIDES, *The Peloponnesian War*, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, 2009, p. 13.

que, paulatinamente, el poder de Atenas fuese creciendo bajo el sistema erigido por Esparta. La expansión de la vecina Atenas y sus esfuerzos para transformar el sistema chocaron frontalmente con los de Esparta. Según el propio filósofo griego, el aumento de poder de Esparta y la alarma que esto despertó en Esparta convirtieron la guerra en inevitable¹⁵¹.

La importancia de la guerra del Peloponeso en el relato de Gilpin es indiscutible¹⁵², ya que de la misma derivan la gran mayoría de los argumentos sobre la guerra hegemónica. De hecho, Gilpin contrapone el concepto de guerra hegemónica de Tucídides con la explicación sobre la guerra que ofrece Waltz, considerando que el desacuerdo se debe a que, por un lado, Tucídides (y el propio Gilpin) y, por otro, Waltz, explican distintas guerras, por lo que ambas perspectivas resultan complementarias¹⁵³. De este modo, para Gilpin, la guerra hegemónica es un conflicto relacionado con las características estructurales del sistema y es consecuencia directa de la pugna existente entre el sistema internacional hegemónico (y sus componentes) y la distribución de poder real, de una naturaleza más dinámica. Sin embargo, Waltz retrata la guerra en el seno de un sistema anárquico dominado por los procesos de acción-reacción encabezados por los gobernantes que, en ocasiones, provocan una guerra o pierden el control de los hechos, y no existe nada que lo evite¹⁵⁴.

La guerra hegemónica es, por tanto, un conflicto que amenaza y transforma la estructura del sistema internacional. Su importancia no radica en sus causas inmediatas, sino en los intereses que en ella están en juego y el alcance de las consecuencias, principalmente la transformación de la estructura del sistema internacional¹⁵⁵.

Debido a la adopción de una concepción cíclica de la historia¹⁵⁶, Gilpin entiende la hegemonía y la guerra como un patrón recurrente. El proceso que da lugar a la gue-

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁵² De hecho, Gilpin ha subrayado la importancia de la obra de Tucídides en cuestiones que ocupan a los realistas contemporáneos GILPIN, R., "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" en R. O. KEOHANE (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics...* *op. cit.*, p. 306. Si bien la importancia de Tucídides en la literatura realista es indiscutible, Lebow señala que las lecturas que los realistas han hecho de la obra de Tucídides no siempre han sido las acertadas. En referencia a Gilpin, por ejemplo, Lebow señala que los realistas han malinterpretado el análisis que Tucídides hace de la guerra del Peloponeso, En su opinión, si bien Tucídides señala en un principio el crecimiento del poder de Atenas como la causa de la guerra, una lectura más profunda demuestra que la causa de la guerra fue que los espartanos sintieron amenaza su identidad por los cambios políticos, económico y culturales encabezados por Atenas. Esta lectura, además, hace tambalear la consideración del filósofo griego como realista, una noción prácticamente hegemónica en la gran mayoría de lecturas de la disciplina. A este respecto, Lebow apunta que Tucídides no debería ser considerado un autor realista, sino constructivista, en tanto que pone énfasis en las causas y motivos inmatriciales como la estructura doméstica, la cultura o las identidades. LEBOW, R. N., *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 66-67 y 113-114.

¹⁵³ GILPIN, R., "The Theory of Hegemonic War..." *op. cit.*, p. 593.

¹⁵⁴ WALTZ, K. N., *Man, the State and War...* *op. cit.*, p. 182.

¹⁵⁵ ARON, R., "War and Industrial Society" en L. BRAMSON y G. W. GOETHALS (eds.), *War: Studies form Psychology, Sociology, Antropology*, Nueva York, Basic Books, 1964, p. 359.

¹⁵⁶ Tal y como recoge Gilpin, Tucídides consideraba que hechos como al guerra del Peloponeso se repetirían a lo largo de la historia, debido en parte a que consideraba que la naturaleza humana tendría un

rra hegemónica comienza con un sistema internacional estable y jerárquico encabezado por un poder hegemónico. Este poder ha logrado la dominación del sistema gracias al excedente derivado de la explotación de ventajas económicas y tecnológicas, que destina a la inversión militar. Con el tiempo, el poder de uno de los Estados subordinados comienza a crecer en cotas muy altas, mientras que el Estado hegemónico no es capaz de aumentar el excedente derivado de sus ventajas económicas y tecnológicas al mismo ritmo que crecen los costes de mantener la hegemonía. La asimetría entre el reparto de beneficios en el sistema internacional y la distribución de poder real provoca que los intereses del Estado emergente entren en conflicto con los del dominante, y viceversa. La lucha por la primacía provocará una bipolarización del sistema entre los aliados de ambas partes, convirtiendo en suma cero todas las acciones: las que las ganancias de una parte supondrán pérdidas para la otra. A medida que el sistema se bipolariza, también se convierte en más inestable y cualquier pequeño suceso puede desembocar en una crisis que precipite en conflicto mayor. Ese conflicto, una guerra hegemónica, determinará quién es el nuevo hegemón y reconfigurará la jerarquía de poder del sistema¹⁵⁷.

Sin embargo, la perspectiva defendida por Gilpin y otros realistas resulta criticable en varios aspectos. En primer lugar, Gilpin se basa en una visión cíclica de la historia, vista como una sucesión de hegemonías a lo largo de los dos últimos siglos. No obstante, J. M. Hobson discute la consideración de Reino Unido como hegemón, subrayando que no cumplió una de las dos variables fundamentales de la capacidad hegemónica que subraya Gilpin: base de poder y la habilidad o disposición de trasladar ese poder al sistema internacional a través de la provisión de bienes públicos. Bajo la perspectiva de Hobson, la ausencia de la última de las variables convierte al Reino Unido en un imperio, y no en un hegemón. Esta consideración pondría en cuestión la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica en dos niveles principales: el carácter cíclico de la historia y la ausencia de referencia al Estado como variable individual¹⁵⁸.

Asimismo, esta teoría, así como la mayoría de teorías realistas, confiere una importancia determinante a los requerimientos del sistema (principalmente la lógica de la anarquía y la distribución de poder) en la toma de decisiones de los Estados, dejan-

carácter invariable en el futuro. GILPIN, R., "The Theory of Hegemonic War... *op. cit.*", pp. 591-594; GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op.cit.*, pp. 144-145 y 204-205; IKENBERRY, G. J. y M. W. DOYLE, "Conclusion: Continuity and Innovation in International Relations Theory" en G. J. IKENBERRY y M. W. DOYLE (eds.), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, Colorado, Westview Press, 1997, pp. 275-277. Gilpin no es el primer ni único autor con una visión cíclica de los acontecimientos internacionales. Vid. BEER, F. A., *Peace Against War. The Ecology of International Violence*, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1981; MODELSKI, G., *Long Cycles... op. cit.*; TOYNBEE, A. J., *A Study of History*, Londres, Oxford University Press, 1961; WRIGHT, Q., *A Study of War*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1942.

¹⁵⁷ GILPIN, R., "The Theory of Hegemonic War... *op. cit.*", p. 596-597.

¹⁵⁸ HOBSON, J. M., "Two Hegemonies or One? A Historical-Sociological Critique of Hegemonic Stability Theory" en P. K. O'BRIEN y A. CLESSE (eds.), *Two Hegemonies. Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, pp. 305-306.

do de lado las variables domésticas que, tal y como ocurrió en el caso de la Unión Soviética, a menudo adquieren una importancia notable¹⁵⁹.

Además, la aceptación del carácter hegemónico de los Estados Unidos no implica una aceptación de los postulados de la teoría, en tanto que otras perspectivas teóricas también defienden esta hipótesis. De hecho, Gilpin no ofrece un análisis empírico de sus postulados, solamente lo ilustra a través de ejemplos históricos que, como en el caso del Reino Unido, siempre pueden resultar debatibles. Bajo esta carencia se esconde otro defecto más profundo: la omisión de definir y describir ampliamente qué es un hegemón y que características ha de reunir¹⁶⁰. Finalmente, en la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica también pervive uno de las principales características de los desarrollos teóricos del realismo estructural: un interés únicamente en las variables sistémicas, sin incluir variables del nivel de las unidades estatales o los individuos.

2.2. El liberalismo: la centralidad de la cooperación a través de las instituciones internacionales

La tradicional contraposición de las teorías asociadas al liberalismo con los desarrollos realistas no supone una tarea sencilla. La principal razón es que la evolución de las teorías liberales en los últimos años ha evidenciado un progresivo alejamiento de lo que constituía el núcleo duro del programa de investigación liberal. En concreto, la aparición del institucionalismo en la década de los 80 puso en evidencia la necesidad de reconfigurar el mapa teórico de aquellas aportaciones que se asocian al liberalismo en su sentido más amplio. De hecho, en algunas ocasiones es más que evidente el divorcio entre las teorías liberales clásicas y las aportaciones institucionalistas/neoliberales, en parte por el acercamiento de estas últimas a los postulados de la corriente realista. Sin embargo, el análisis de las coincidencias y disidencias entre estas tres grandes familias teóricas es vital para configurar el mapa de la disciplina y para identificar las líneas de fricción que varían la visión de los fenómenos internacionales¹⁶¹.

La indudable diferencia entre las teorías liberales y las realistas es más que evidente al analizar el núcleo duro de cada una de las perspectivas, utilizando la metodo-

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

¹⁶⁰ KOHOUT, F., "Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 24, nº 1, 2003, p. 56.

¹⁶¹ En la presente tesis, se ha decidido englobar la teoría institucionalista dentro del mapa teórico del liberalismo. Si bien es cierto que no existe consenso al respecto, numerosos manuales de la disciplina incluyen la teoría institucionalista como neoliberal. *Vid.*, DIEZ, T., I. BODE y A. FERNANDEZ DA COSTA, *Key Concepts in International Relations...* *op. cit.*; BURCHILL, S., A. LINKLATER, A. DEVETAK et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations...* *op. cit.*; DUNNE, T., M. KURKI y S. SMITH (eds.), *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.

logía de Lakatos¹⁶². La tradición liberal, heredera del idealismo de entreguerras, mantiene la influencia de la filosofía política, con un claro nexo con autores como J. J. Rousseau o I. Kant. De un modo general, el liberalismo se ha caracterizado por entender lo internacional a través de tres claves principales: las instituciones internacionales, la política doméstica y la interdependencia económica¹⁶³. De este modo, la tradición liberal considera que los comportamientos estatales están influenciados por la relación que el propio Estado tiene hacia dentro (con su política interna y audiencia doméstica) y hacia fuera (con la sociedad transnacional de la que forma parte)¹⁶⁴.

Tal y como afirma A. Moravcsik, un análisis de aquello que caracteriza al núcleo duro liberal no sólo lo distingue de las concepciones realistas o constructivistas, sino también de la neoliberal institucionalista¹⁶⁵. A este respecto, el autor considera que son tres las principales premisas las que constituyen este núcleo liberal, cada una en relación con las tres imágenes que enumera Waltz¹⁶⁶. La primera de ellas se refiere a la naturaleza de los actores en la política internacional. En una concepción de la política de abajo hacia arriba, los liberales consideran que son los individuos racionales y los grupos privados los que se organizan para promover sus intereses. Sin embargo, esta dinámica no está ausente de conflictos, ya que estos intereses son distintos y, a veces, contrarios. Esta ausencia de una armonía de intereses provoca una fractura en el terreno liberal entre los factores que provocan ese conflicto. De este modo, el liberalismo se divide entre aquellos que consideran que el factor más importante son las diferentes creencias fundamentales (liberalismo de las ideas), la escasez de recursos materiales (liberalismo comercial) o las desigualdades en el poder políticos (liberalismo republicano)¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶² La obra de I. Lakatos ha sido habitualmente utilizada para discernir los distintos programas de investigación en la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales. Según la perspectiva de Lakatos, los programas de investigación reúnen una serie de teorías ligadas gracias a un conjunto de suposiciones que constituyen el núcleo duro: las premisas fundamentales. Además, el programa se compone de un cinturón protector de hipótesis auxiliares que son (re)ajustadas según aparecen nuevas evidencias. Finalmente, la heurística positiva recoge un conjunto de sugerencias encaminadas a completar y mejorar el núcleo duro, así como una heurística negativa, que marca las líneas rojas que contravienen el núcleo duro. LAKATOS, I., *La Metodología de los Programas de Investigación Científica*, Madrid, Alianza, 1983. Sobre la aplicación de la metodología de Lakatos a las Relaciones Internacionales Vid. MOURE, L., *El programa de investigación realista... op. cit.*; ELMAN, C. y M. F. ELMAN (eds.), *Progress in International Relations Theory. Appraising the Field*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2003.

¹⁶³ BROOKS, S.G. y W. C. WOHLFORTH, *World out of Balance... op. cit.*, p. 98.

¹⁶⁴ MORAVCSIK, A., "Liberal International Relations Theory. A Scientific Assessment" en C. ELMAN y M. F. ELMAN (eds.), *Progress in International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 161.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-167.

¹⁶⁶ WALTZ, K. N., *Man, the State and War... op. cit.*

¹⁶⁷ MORAVCSIK, A., "Liberal International Relations... op. cit.", pp. 161-163. No obstante, la clasificación de Moravcsik no es la única. R. O. Keohane, por ejemplo, distingue tres teorías liberales, siguiendo la línea de Kant: (1) liberalismo republicano (aquel que defiende que las repúblicas tienen una mayor inclinación para la paz), (2) liberalismo comercial (sostiene que las relaciones comerciales favorecen la paz) y (3) liberalismo regulatorio (subraya la importancia de las normas que gobiernan los intercambios entre los Estados como factor pacificador). Asimismo, Keohane entiende que su propuesta de institucionalismo

La segunda de las premisas está relacionada con la naturaleza del Estado. A este respecto, los liberales defienden que los Estados representan al conjunto de la sociedad doméstica, cuyas preferencias constituyen los objetivos que los líderes políticos persiguen en su política exterior. Las instituciones internas trabajan como correa de transmisión de estas preferencias domésticas a la política estatal.

En tercer lugar, la configuración de las preferencias expresadas en el apartado anterior da forma al comportamiento estatal en el seno del sistema internacional. A este respecto, es importante subrayar las distintas posturas de otras corrientes a la hora de identificar cuál es la característica decisiva que influye de mayor manera en las estrategias estatales. Como ya hemos comentado, la teoría liberal pone el foco en la distribución de preferencias, frente a la importancia del poder en el realismo, y posteriormente, el carácter central de la información señalado por el institucionalismo.

Con arreglo a la aseveración anterior, es evidente que la posición del institucionalismo en el mapa de la disciplina resulta, cuanto menos, controvertida. Podría decirse que los desarrollos del institucionalismo se colocan en una perspectiva intermedia entre el realismo y el liberalismo, pese a que es habitual que las aportaciones de los autores institucionalistas se coloquen bajo la etiqueta de neoliberalismo institucional¹⁶⁸. La aceptación de la mayor parte del núcleo duro realista por parte del institucionalismo ha provocado que, en ocasiones, se hable de una convergencia entre ambos, reduciéndolos a un único programa de investigación. Sin embargo, la teoría institucionalista también cuenta con una importante influencia de los postulados liberales, por lo que en adelante se la considerará como una evolución de la misma, entendiendo que la adopción de las premisas realistas se realizó, como aseveran R. O. Keohane y L. Martin, "más por conveniencia analítica y retórica que por convicción"¹⁶⁹. Para aclarar la posición media del paradigma institucionalista, resulta conveniente analizar los puntos comunes que comparte con cada uno de los extremos.

En lo que respecta a su relación con el liberalismo clásico, el institucionalismo se desliga de las visiones idealistas criticadas duramente por el realismo¹⁷⁰ pero comparte tres puntos principales con él: la noción del progreso acumulativo, la creencia de que se pueden lograr beneficios colectivos aplicando el razonamiento y la consideración de que éstos se pueden alcanzar a través de arreglos institucionales más eficaces¹⁷¹.

neoliberal constituye un tipo de teoría distinta, una cuarta categoría denominada liberalismo sofisticado que incorpora una perspectiva sociológica sobre los intereses y es, a su vez, una síntesis del liberalismo comercial y el regulatorio. KEOHANE, R. O., "International Liberalism Reconsidered" en J. DUNN (ed.), *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 175-176 y 183.

¹⁶⁸ KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "Institutional Theory... *op. cit.*", p. 75.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁷⁰ CARR, E. H., *La Crisis de los Veinte Años... op. cit.*

¹⁷¹ STERLING-FOLKER, J., "Neoliberalism" en T. DUNNE, M. KURKI y S. SMITH (eds.), *International Relations Theories... op. cit.*, p. 115.

Por otra parte, el institucionalismo acepta la práctica totalidad del núcleo duro del programa de investigación realista. Tal y como confirma Keohane, la teoría institucionalista comparte en su totalidad tres de los supuestos principales del núcleo duro realista, principalmente aquellas que retratan a los Estados como (1) principales actores que (2) se comportan de un modo racional y buscan maximizar sus ganancias así como (3) perseguir sus intereses, entre los que destaca la supervivencia¹⁷². Además, los institucionalistas aceptan la anarquía, aunque sólo de manera parcial, definida simplemente como la ausencia de una fuerza externa que asegure el cumplimiento de los acuerdos. La adopción de estas proposiciones realistas ha provocado que frecuentemente se haya tratado al institucionalismo como una mera modificación del realismo. Aunque el propio Keohane acepta que ambos programas de investigación son “medio hermanos”, justifica la decisión de aceptar las citadas premisas realistas en base a la conveniencia analítica y el efecto retórico, y no por una convicción profunda¹⁷³.

Pese a que habitualmente se ha señalado que la nota distintiva entre el programa institucionalista y el realista recae en el concepto de cooperación, existe también un importante punto de desacuerdo en las consecuencias de la anarquía¹⁷⁴. Ambas corrientes sostienen la naturaleza anárquica del medio internacional, pero el significado de este enunciado es distinto. La teoría institucionalista mantiene una visión más reducida que se desliga de la noción hobbesiana, al definirla simplemente como la falta de un gobierno común. La noción realista, sin embargo, va más allá y esboza un entorno internacional basado en la autoayuda, en el que los Estados dependen únicamente de sí mismos para garantizar su supervivencia y están dispuestos a usar la fuerza si es necesario. Obviamente, esta definición liga la anarquía con la seguridad y retrata a las unidades del sistema como defensivas¹⁷⁵.

En lo que respecta al segundo de los puntos de ruptura, las perspectivas de cooperación en el entorno internacional, el institucionalismo cuestiona una de las principales conclusiones realistas: la cooperación entre los Estados es escasa, excepto para evitar concentraciones de poder (equilibrio de poder) o en respuesta a amenazas

¹⁷² KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, “Institutional Theory... *op. cit.*”, pp. 74-75.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁷⁴ Si bien en estas páginas únicamente se han recogido dos puntos de discrepancia (la definición de anarquía y las perspectivas de cooperación), existen desacuerdos en otros ámbitos que refuerzan la noción de que ambos enfoques constituyen programas de investigación distintos. Como recuerda K. Sodupe, entre ellos cabe destacar, por ejemplo, la concepción sobre la posibilidad de progreso, el papel de las instituciones o la autonomía de lo político. SODUPE, K., *La Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales... op. cit.*, p. 137.

¹⁷⁵ La contraposición entre las nociones de la anarquía la recoge R. Powell, que también contrapone ambas definiciones. Concretamente, la primera de ellas, relacionada con la tradición liberal, fue acuñada por Axelrod y Keohane, mientras que la que se relaciona con los postulados realistas puede encontrarse en la obra de Stein. POWELL, R., “Anarchy in International Relations Theory. The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”, *International Organization*, Vol. 48, nº 2, 1994, pp. 330-331; AXELROD, R. y R. O. KEOHANE, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions” en R. K. OYE (ed.), *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 226; STEIN, A. A., “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World”, *International Organization*, Vol. 36, nº 2, 1982, p. 300.

(equilibrio de amenazas). Esta conclusión surge de la creencia realista de que la información que tienen los Estados sobre las intenciones/acciones de otros es escasa y de mala calidad. La escasez de información, unida al entorno anárquico y la noción de autoayuda que los realistas derivan de éste, dificulta la cooperación.

Sin embargo, los institucionalistas consideran que el entorno informacional no debe tomarse como un hecho, sino como una variable. Esta alteración permite modificar el entorno informativo en el que se relacionan los Estados. Por lo tanto, desde la perspectiva institucional, los Estados tratarán de mejorar el intercambio de información, siendo conscientes de que la incertidumbre impide el logro de acuerdos con ganancias mutuas. En esa tarea, cobra importancia el papel de las instituciones como monitorizadoras y transmisoras de dicha información¹⁷⁶, paliando los efectos de esta incertidumbre.

Sin embargo, ambas posturas teóricas llevaron el debate más allá. En el debate neo-neo teorizaron sobre la naturaleza de las ganancias que los Estados buscaban a través de la cooperación. Los realistas entendiendo que los Estados son actores posicionales, aseguran que están preocupados por el poder relativo. Tal y como explica Waltz, los Estados que se sienten inseguros se preguntan cómo se dividirán los beneficios, quién ganará más¹⁷⁷. En la misma línea, Krasner considera que las argumentaciones institucionalistas olvidan las consideraciones de los Estados sobre su poder relativo¹⁷⁸. Éstas derivan de la definición de anarquía realista y su impacto en las preferencias y acciones de los Estados que constituyen la mayor barrera para la voluntad cooperativa¹⁷⁹. Sin embargo, los institucionalistas retratan a los Estados como actores atomísticos preocupados por lograr ganancias absolutas. Con arreglo a esta creencia, los Estados cooperarán siempre que logren ganancias, sin importar las que logren el resto. La brecha entre ambos se basa principalmente en que los institucionalistas consideran que el fraude y la decepción son las consecuencias de la ausencia de una autoridad central, mientras que el realismo añade también la violencia y la supervivencia¹⁸⁰. Por lo tanto, la necesidad de garantizar la supervivencia y el carácter posicional de las unidades provoca en los Estados una necesidad de realizar cálculos sobre las ganancias de otros.

No obstante, un análisis más pormenorizado de ambas posturas evidencia que no están tan distantes. Si se acepta la preocupación sobre las ganancias relativas, exis-

¹⁷⁶ KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "Institutional Theory... *op. cit.*", pp. 81-82; GRIECO, J. M., "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" en C. W. KEGLEY (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1995, p. 152.

¹⁷⁷ WALTZ, K. N., *Theory of International Politics... op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹⁷⁸ KRASNER, S., "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier", *World Politics*, Vol. 43, nº 3, 1991, p. 366.

¹⁷⁹ GRIECO, J. M., "Anarchy and the Limits... *op. cit.*", p. 152.

¹⁸⁰ GRASA, R. y O. COSTA, "Where has the Old Debate Gone? Realism, Institutionalism and IR Theory" *IBEI Working Papers*, nº 5, 2007, p. 11.

ten dos posibilidades. La primera de ellas es considerar que esta preocupación varía con arreglo al entorno estratégico en el que se encuentra el Estado. Por el contrario, la segunda estima que esas ganancias no sufren variación a pesar de que cambie el entorno estratégico. Ante esta dicotomía, tanto los neorrealistas como los institucionalistas se decantan por la primera de las opciones¹⁸¹. Sin embargo, ninguna ha tratado de explicar en profundidad bajo qué condiciones varían estas consideraciones sobre las ganancias relativas¹⁸². Los avances en este sentido se reducen a los estudios sobre cómo afecta la distribución del poder a las perspectivas sobre ganancias relativas. A este respecto, es destacable la obra de D. Snidal, que en su análisis contrapone los sistemas bipolares y multipolares, subrayando la importancia de las ganancias relativas en situaciones de bipolaridad, así como su influencia sobre la cooperación. Del mismo modo, pese a que en los sistemas multipolares la importancia de las ganancias relativas se mantiene, la influencia sobre las perspectivas de cooperación es menor, ya que los desequilibrios en la distribución de ganancias están más amortiguados¹⁸³. De este modo, Snidal coincide con J. Grieco cuando apunta que el aumento del número de actores provoca una disminución de la preocupación de éstos por las ganancias relativas¹⁸⁴.

Tal y como demuestra este acercamiento de posturas, el debate entre ganancias relativas y absolutas avanzó hacia una complementariedad de posiciones. En opinión de R. Powell, es posible asumir ambas posturas, entendiendo que los Estados tratan de maximizar sus ganancias absolutas, pero que el entorno estratégico les induce a una preocupación variable por las ganancias relativas. Sin embargo, no son las ganancias relativas en sí las que dificultan la cooperación sino el entorno estratégico en el que se interrelacionan los Estados¹⁸⁵.

El diálogo entre ambos puso en evidencia varios puntos en común, principalmente en comparación con la brecha existente con los enfoques reflectivistas. De hecho, como pone de relieve Keohane en varias ocasiones, el programa neoliberal institucionalista es solo una teoría parcial que no se sostiene por sí misma, ya que trabaja siempre dentro de los límites de la realidad internacional marcados por el marxismo y el realismo¹⁸⁶. De hecho, el propio autor consideró que su objetivo teórico era complementar el realismo, enfoque válido para algunos análisis de la política internacional, con el enfoque de la interdependencia¹⁸⁷. Sin embargo, el análisis más

¹⁸¹ POWELL, R., "Anarchy in International Relations Theory... *op. cit.*", p. 335.

¹⁸² LEGRO, J. W. y A. MORAVCSIK, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?", *International Security*, Vol. 24, nº 2, 1999, p. 25.

¹⁸³ SNIDAL, D., "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, nº 3, 1991.

¹⁸⁴ GRIECO, J. M., "Anarchy and the Limits... *op. cit.*".

¹⁸⁵ POWELL, R., "Anarchy in International Relations... *op. cit.*", p. 336.

¹⁸⁶ KEOHANE, R. O., "International Liberalism Reconsidered... *op. cit.*", p. 192.

¹⁸⁷ KEOHANE, R. O. y J. S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*, Boston, Little Brown, 1977, pp. 23-24.

pormenorizado del neoliberalismo institucional pone de manifiesto que las premisas e intereses investigadores de los teóricos de esta corriente son de un claro carácter liberal. Por lo tanto, la permanencia de cierta agenda investigadora común entre ambos no evita que cada uno explique la realidad internacional adjudicando un distinto grado de importancia a determinados elementos¹⁸⁸.

2.2.1. Regímenes internacionales y hegemonía. La crítica liberal a la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica realista

Como se ha expuesto en las páginas precedentes, la inserción de la teoría neoliberal institucionalista dentro de la etiqueta liberal no recoge la compleja herencia de este programa de investigación dentro de la disciplina. Además de la influencia del pensamiento liberal, la corriente institucionalista está eminentemente marcada por dos de los debates de la disciplina¹⁸⁹. Por un lado, es destacable la influencia del acontecido en el periodo de entreguerras entre realistas e idealistas, que puso de manifiesto el fracaso de las ideas utópicas en el mantenimiento de la paz. Como herencia de esta contienda teórica, el neoliberalismo institucional ha identificado la debilidad de algunas de las nociones idealistas. En esta línea, por ejemplo, los institucionalistas rompen con el idealismo al diferenciar de un modo explícito los conceptos de armonía de intereses y cooperación. Concretamente, R. Axelrod y R. O. Keohane consideran que la armonía exige unos intereses comunes, mientras que la cooperación necesita de una mezcla de intereses conflictivos y complementarios que deben ir ajustándose a las preferencias del resto de actores¹⁹⁰. Con este movimiento, el institucionalismo se deshace del utopismo de la armonía de intereses y define una cooperación que no tiene que ser moralmente buena, alejada de la armonía como bien colectivo, que fue fuertemente criticada por los realistas clásicos¹⁹¹.

Por otro lado, la influencia del tercer debate entre realistas y transnacionalistas es más que evidente, no sólo por el papel de algunos teóricos institucionalistas. Si bien la crítica más reiterada desde el transnacionalismo al realismo fue su marcado estatocentrismo, los institucionalistas han admitido parcialmente este punto, aunque subrayando el papel de las instituciones como actores internacionales¹⁹². Sin embargo, los neoliberales recuperan la noción de interdependencia para colocarla en la base de su

¹⁸⁸ GRASA, R. "La Reestructuración de la Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales en la Posguerra Fría: el Realismo y el Desafío del Liberalismo Institucional", *Cursos de Derecho Internacional de Vitoria Gasteiz 1996*, Madrid, Tecnos/Universidad del País Vasco, 1997, p. 123.

¹⁸⁹ SALOMÓN, M., "La Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales en los Albores del Siglo XXI: Diálogo, Disidencia, Aproximaciones", *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, nº 4, 2002, p. 10.

¹⁹⁰ AXELROD, R y R. O. KEOHANE, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy... *op. cit.*", p. 226.

¹⁹¹ *Vid.* CARR, E. H., *La crisis de los veinte años...* *op. cit.*

¹⁹² GRIECO, J. M., "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation... *op. cit.*", pp. 156-157.

perspectiva teórica, considerando que ha de ser reforzada a través de un marco normativo e institucional¹⁹³.

Pese a la influencia de ambos debates en el desarrollo del neoliberalismo, el cuarto debate en el que participan ambas perspectivas neo crea una línea de ruptura clara con los anteriores. Tal y como argumenta Waever, la extrapolación del concepto de paradigma científico elaborada por T. Kuhn¹⁹⁴ durante el tercer debate provocó que la disciplina adoptara este enfoque metateórico, limitando el debate a una reafirmación de posiciones y no a un diálogo constructivo como lo fue el debate anterior¹⁹⁵.

De hecho, será este debate el que más marque a ambas corrientes y las impulse a enfrentar sus argumentos teóricos con hechos empíricos. Además, como ya se comentó en apartados anteriores, la aceptación por parte del neoliberalismo de una parte importante del núcleo duro neorrealista facilitó la comunicación entre ambos postulados, hasta el punto de extenderse la idea de la síntesis neo-neo¹⁹⁶. Sin embargo, la definición del sistema internacional liberal se aleja de la visión realista, ya que a las capacidades materiales se les suma una superestructura institucional¹⁹⁷. Por ello, pese a que el principal tema de diálogo sea el análisis de los efectos de las instituciones internacionales en el comportamiento individual de los Estados en un entorno anárquico, sus respuestas serán muy distintas¹⁹⁸.

2.2.1.1. Interdependencia y cooperación internacional. La estructura institucional del sistema internacional

La teoría institucional trata de abordar la principal anomalía del realismo: la extensiva y cada vez más institucionalizada cooperación en el entorno internacional¹⁹⁹. Sin embargo, al emprender esa tarea, el institucionalismo no cuestiona las cuatro principales premisas realistas señaladas en párrafos anteriores. A ellas, le añade una de las nociones principales del transnacionalismo, trabajada por Keohane y Nye: la interdependencia internacional²⁰⁰. La identificación de estas situaciones, caracterizadas por tener efectos recíprocos sobre los actores, evidencia la existencia de intereses entrela-

¹⁹³ KEOHANE, R. O., "International Liberalism Reconsidered... *op. cit.*", p. 183.

¹⁹⁴ KUNH, T. S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970.

¹⁹⁵ WAEVER, O., "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate" en S. SMITH, K. BOOTH y M. ZALEWSKI (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 155.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹⁹⁷ WENDT, A., *Social Theory... op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁹⁸ SMITH, S., "New Approaches to International Theory" en J. BAYLIS y S. SMITH (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 170.

¹⁹⁹ KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "Institutional Theory... *op. cit.*", p. 76.

²⁰⁰ La interdependencia en la política internacional se refiere a aquellas situaciones caracterizadas por provocar efectos recíprocos entre los Estados o entre actores en distintos Estados. KEOHANE, R. O. y J. S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence... op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

zados básicos para poner en marcha la cooperación. Sin embargo, los teóricos transnacionalistas son conscientes del enorme impacto de la interdependencia compleja²⁰¹ en las relaciones entre los Estados (y expresamente en las relaciones económicas) no ha eliminado el rol del poder²⁰². Más concretamente, la interdependencia ha puesto de manifiesto la existencia de redes de intereses transnacionales en continua negociación con la estructura de poder dominante en el sistema. Entre ambas posturas, Keohane y Nye colocan el papel de los regímenes e instituciones internacionales, producto no sólo de la interdependencia sino también de la estructura de poder internacional²⁰³.

La teoría institucionalista acepta la premisa realista que señala a la escasez de información como causante de la ausencia de cooperación. No se trata de que los Estados no quieran cooperar, ya que como explicó Morgenthau, uno de sus principales intereses es enmarcar sus relaciones sobre una base estable que permita identificar los comportamientos predecibles y las conductas exigibles con respecto a sus relaciones²⁰⁴. Sin embargo, la imposibilidad de estar seguros sobre el modo de actuar de los otros les lleva a no cooperar. Mientras que los realistas tratan la información como invariable, los institucionalistas consideran que su ausencia puede solucionarse proporcionándola de un modo institucionalizado, estableciendo estándares e identificando los puntos prioritarios²⁰⁵. En ese aspecto, las instituciones transforman el entorno informacional de las relaciones entre Estados, consiguiendo descentralizar y monitorizar el intercambio de información y reduciendo los incentivos del engaño. De hecho, Keohane considera que la única manera de aprovechar los incentivos a la expansión pacífica que otorga la apertura económica es a través de un marco de instituciones y normas que promuevan y garanticen esa apertura²⁰⁶. Según esta perspectiva, los regímenes e instituciones trabajan para paliar las tres principales dimensiones que afectan a la voluntad de los Estados a la hora de cooperar: la reciprocidad de intereses, la sombra del futuro y el número de actores²⁰⁷. Sin embargo, la cooperación no depende únicamente de estos tres aspectos de la teoría de juegos, sino también del contexto de normas compartidas en el que se produce la interacción²⁰⁸.

²⁰¹ El concepto de interdependencia compleja tiene tres características principales que lo diferencian de la independencia explicada en líneas anteriores: 1) las sociedades están conectadas por múltiples canales; 2) la agenda de relaciones interestatales está formada por una multiplicidad de temas que no están ordenados en una jerarquía clara; y 3) la fuerza militar resulta irrelevante para resolver los desencuentros. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

²⁰² KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discard in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 177-178.

²⁰³ KEOHANE, R. O. y J. S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence...* *op. cit.*, p. 21.

²⁰⁴ MORGENTHAU, H., "Positivism, Functionalism and International Law", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 34, 1940, p. 279.

²⁰⁵ KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "Institutional Theory... *op. cit.*", pp. 79-80.

²⁰⁶ Esta consideración niega la premisa del liberalismo comercial que defiende los efectos pacificadores del comercio. Para Keohane, estos efectos dependen del contexto institucional en el que se produce. KEOHANE, R. O., "International Liberalism... *op. cit.*", p. 183.

²⁰⁷ AXELROD, R. y R. O. KEOHANE, "Achieving Cooperation... *op. cit.*", pp. 238-239.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

Desde la perspectiva neoliberal, estas organizaciones constituyen conjuntos de normas y reglas relacionadas identificables tanto en el espacio como en el tiempo²⁰⁹. Como se ha puesto de relieve en líneas anteriores, las instituciones constituyen un intermediario entre las situaciones de interdependencia y la estructura de poder internacional. En opinión de los institucionalistas, estos organismos pueden generar cooperación gracias a cuatro cambios principales que realizan en el entorno contractual en el que se toman los acuerdos. En primer lugar, las normas e instituciones incrementan el número de transacciones que se realizan entre los Estados, desalentando el engaño por la existencia de reciprocidad, la sombra del futuro y las recompensas a los actores con mayor adhesión a los acuerdos. En segundo lugar, las normas vinculan a los Estados no sólo en el ámbito en el que trabajan, sino que crean una mayor interdependencia de manera transversal. Tercero, las instituciones son capaces de incrementar y monitorizar la información, desalentando así el engaño por la posibilidad de ser descubierto y proporcionando información puntual que permita identificar a potenciales tramposos. Finalmente, los regímenes e instituciones reducen los costes de transacción de los acuerdos individuales y resultan más atractivos, incluso para los Estados egoístas²¹⁰.

Sin embargo, las instituciones no son elementos creados en un entorno aséptico ajeno a las dinámicas del sistema internacional. Del mismo modo que en líneas anteriores era pertinente abordar como los neoliberales entienden las dinámicas de cooperación y ganancias en un entorno anárquico, también es importante entender la relación entre las dinámicas y las distribuciones de poder y su papel en las instituciones. Dicho de otro modo, los institucionalistas deben explicar si las instituciones son un mero reflejo de la distribución de poder tal y como lo entienden los realistas o, por el contrario, son entidades ajenas a estas dinámicas.

De un modo general, las normas de cualquier institución reflejan las posiciones relativas de poder de los miembros, lo que constriñe los espacios de negociación y afecta a los costes de transacción²¹¹. Si bien los institucionalistas consideran que el poder juega un papel importante en estas instituciones, niegan el razonamiento realista de que estas organizaciones son un simple reflejo de la distribución de poder, basadas únicamente en los cálculos interesados de las potencias y sin ningún efecto en el comportamiento estatal²¹². De hecho, Nye y Keohane admiten que las potencias hegemónicas habitualmente deciden cambiar las normas internacionales y las instituciones en vez de adaptar sus propias políticas a las normativas vigentes²¹³. Pese a que los regímenes internacionales nazcan y se establezcan en conformidad con esa distri-

²⁰⁹ KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, nº 4, 1988, p. 383.

²¹⁰ MEARSHEIMER, J. J., "The False Promise... *op. cit.*", p. 18.

²¹¹ KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "International Institutions... *op. cit.*", p. 387.

²¹² MEARSHEIMER, J. J., "The False Promise... *op. cit.*", p. 7.

²¹³ KEOHANE, R. O. y J. S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence... op. cit.*, p. 44.

bución de poder, desde el momento en que comienzan a trabajar influyen la manera en la que los actores utilizan esas capacidades. Según los institucionalistas, conforme avanzan en el tiempo, la distribución de capacidades es cada vez un factor menor en el propio régimen, y el poder sobre los resultados estará supeditado a las capacidades organizativas dependientes de todos los miembros²¹⁴. Por lo tanto, el poder y los regímenes constituyen una relación bidireccional en la que ambos influyen el ejercicio del otro.

La relación entre estas dos variables ha constituido un interesante objeto de estudio para los autores de esta corriente. El análisis de la influencia entre la hegemonía de los Estados Unidos y las instituciones creadas tras el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial abordado desde el institucionalismo trata de confirmar la premisa formulada en el párrafo anterior que destaca el papel del poder en la creación de las instituciones, pero que conforme evolucionan, se desligan de esta estructura e incluso son capaces de transformarla.

2.2.1.2. Relación entre la hegemonía y los regímenes internacionales

Como se ha mencionado en líneas anteriores, los institucionalistas aceptan (en parte) la consideración realista que defiende la influencia de la estructura de poder en la creación y configuración de los regímenes internacionales. El florecimiento en el periodo de la postguerra de numerosas instituciones internacionales con el impulso de Estados Unidos fortaleció la tesis realista. En consecuencia, los teóricos institucionalistas pusieron el foco en la relación entre la estructura de poder internacional y los regímenes, aprovechando la coyuntura internacional que comenzó a debatir el carácter de la hegemonía estadounidense. Por un lado, una parte importante de la opinión pública del país percibía la decadencia del poder del hegemon, mientras que en el resto de Estados se consideraba que Estados Unidos retenía la capacidad de imponer decisiones unilaterales y mantener sus privilegios en el orden internacional²¹⁵.

Hasta este momento, el papel del Estado hegemónico en el establecimiento de las instituciones había sido tratado en mayor o menor medida. Tanto los realistas²¹⁶ como el propio Keohane le otorgaron a la hegemonía un rol crucial en la fase de creación de los regímenes internacionales²¹⁷, convirtiendo de este modo a esta red institucional en un bien público que el hegemon proporcionaba²¹⁸. En un panorama interna-

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

²¹⁵ GUZZINI, S., *Realism in International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 152.

²¹⁶ Los realistas hegemónicos, pese a no mencionar expresamente el papel del hegemon en la creación de los tejidos institucionales, sí hacen referencia al rol de este Estado como proveedor de bienes públicos globales, que en ocasiones se distribuyen a través de instituciones/regímenes. Vid. GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, p. 144; KINDLEBERGER, C. P., *La Crisis Económica... op. cit.*, pp. 340-341.

²¹⁷ KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 49.

²¹⁸ GUZZINI, S., *Realism in International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 145.

cional en el que las tesis del declive de Estados Unidos comenzaban a cobrar fuerza, Keohane se pregunta hasta qué punto los cambios que en ese momento se estaban produciendo en los regímenes eran consecuencia de la transformación de la estructura de poder internacional. Desde su punto de vista, la erosión del poder material estadounidense durante la década de los 60 y parte de los 70 debió haberse transmitido también a los regímenes económicos creados por el hegemon²¹⁹. Sin embargo, en su análisis el autor percibe un efecto desigual en los distintos tipos de regímenes (principalmente los que se ocupan de tres ámbitos: finanzas, comercio y petróleo), concluyendo que durante la crisis de la hegemonía ha persistido una mayor cooperación de la que la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica hubiera previsto²²⁰. De hecho, Russett afirma que la decadencia o pérdida de poder de la hegemonía no evita el suministro de los resultados deseados en el seno de las instituciones, aunque considera que la erosión del poder hegemónico puede mermar la habilidad de promover nuevos niveles de cooperación que permitan abordar nuevos problemas²²¹.

No obstante, el resultado de la investigación mencionado en el párrafo anterior no constituye la aportación más relevante del trabajo de Keohane. La obra de Keohane es considerada como una de las primeras y más importantes críticas a la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica, principalmente a las aportaciones de C. Kindleberger, R. Gilpin y S. Krasner²²². Es posible afirmar que los trabajos de Keohane se colocan entre dos tradiciones teóricas, la teoría de los regímenes y la teoría desarrollada por los autores realistas. De la primera de ellas, el autor toma prestadas algunas nociones que explican cómo y bajo qué condiciones se crearon estas instituciones²²³. De la segunda, con una mayor influencia, Keohane estudia una de las proposiciones principales referentes al orden internacional creado por el hegemon: la proposición realista que afirma que los regímenes económicos internacionales dependen del poder hegemónico. Bajo esta perspectiva, una fragmentación del poder internacional supondría también una fragmentación del propio régimen²²⁴.

Sin embargo, Keohane defiende que esa situación puede ser enmendada a través de la cooperación internacional²²⁵, ya que ambos conceptos no son alternativos,

²¹⁹ KEOHANE, R. O., *Instituciones Internacionales y Poder Estatal. Ensayos sobre la Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales*, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1993, p. 118.

²²⁰ Concretamente, Keohane opina que, si bien la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica es relativamente adecuada para explicar los cambios en los regímenes petroleros, no ocurre lo mismo en el caso de los regímenes financieros y comerciales. De hecho, considera que no es útil a la hora de explicar la desintegración de normas específicas de la balanza de pagos del sistema de Bretton Woods o de la continua decaída del régimen comercial basado en el GATT (Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio, en sus siglas en inglés). KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 215.

²²¹ RUSSETT, B., "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?", *International Organization*, Vol. 39, n° 2, 1985, p. 222.

²²² CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 125.

²²³ KEOHANE, R. O., *Instituciones Internacionales... op. cit.*, p. 113.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

²²⁵ GUZZINI, S., *Realism in International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 145.

sino que coexisten en una relación simbiótica²²⁶. Dicho de otro modo, el poder hegemónico y los regímenes internacionales establecidos bajo condiciones de hegemonía se combinan. Por un lado, la hegemonía reduce los costes de transacción y mitiga la incertidumbre, en tanto que el hegemón es el encargado de asegurar la cohesión del sistema como un todo, Por otro lado, los regímenes le otorgan legitimidad a los estándares de comportamiento que ha creado y mantenido el hegemón²²⁷. De hecho, el Estado más poderoso consiente invertir parte de sus recursos de poder en la construcción de instituciones, a través de las que canaliza sus intereses y los del resto para persuadirles de que adopten su visión de orden internacional y accedan a su liderazgo²²⁸.

Asimismo, la definición de la hegemonía que construye Keohane dista de la elaborada por los realistas. Si éstos subrayaban los atributos que debía poseer el Estado hegemónico (acceso a materias primas, control de las fuentes principales de capital, un amplio mercado para las importaciones y ventajas en productos de alto valor añadido), Keohane les suma el elemento motivacional. De este modo, el hegemón se define como “un Estado suficientemente poderosos como para mantener las reglas esenciales que gobiernan las relaciones interestatales y está dispuesto a hacerlo”²²⁹. En la misma línea se manifiesta Russett, que propone identificar la hegemonía con el éxito en determinar y mantener unas normas esenciales y no con una determinada base de poder o un porcentaje de recursos²³⁰. La predisposición del hegemón a crear y mantener esas normas, además, guarda relación con la necesidad de adherirse a ellas para reforzar su compromiso con el orden internacional.

El movimiento del hegemón hacia una mayor institucionalización choca con la concepción realista que retrata el poder como intercambiable y defiende que los recursos materiales se convierten directamente en resultados. Además de resaltar el componente motivacional de la hegemonía, los institucionalistas consideran que el poder es una herramienta insuficiente para crear un orden económico internacional estable en el que florezca la cooperación²³¹. Si bien Kindleberger subrayaba la necesidad de que Estados Unidos hubiese utilizado su poder para estabilizar la economía antes de la crisis de 1929, Keohane considera que la noción única del estabilizador no es sufi-

²²⁶ KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 46.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 137. La construcción de un orden institucional que permita un ejercicio de la hegemonía más fuerte y/o prolongado es una idea que no sólo aparece en el institucionalismo de Keohane. De hecho, Ikenberry también la comparte en su análisis de la hegemonía estadounidense, así como algunos teóricos constructivistas y de la Escuela Inglesa. Vid. IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*

²²⁹ KEOHANE, R. O. y J. S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 44.

²³⁰ RUSSETT, B., “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony... op. cit.”, p. 213.

²³¹ KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 38.

ciente²³². En su opinión, el bien colectivo más importante ofrecido por los Estados Unidos durante su periodo hegemónico ha sido la creciente certeza sobre los futuros patrones de comportamiento, hecho que ha servido como impulsor de los procesos de cooperación a nivel internacional²³³. Si bien considerándolo un aspecto secundario, Gilpin también enlaza la provisión de bienes públicos con la legitimidad, aunque considera que el papel es en ocasiones débil o inexistente²³⁴. Sin embargo, sin la consideración de que la provisión de estos bienes le otorga legitimidad a su ejercicio de poder, resulta complicado explicar por qué el Estado más poderoso elige proveer de beneficios a otros en vez de perseguir sus intereses de manera individual²³⁵.

El análisis de la cooperación hegemónica pone de manifiesto, según el institucionalismo, tres problemas generales que es posible extender a la economía política internacional²³⁶. El primero de ellos es la innegable relación entre el poder y la interdependencia, que se extiende también al propio ejercicio del poder. Desde la visión de Keohane, gran parte de las relaciones que se dan en el marco de la economía política internacional hegemónica se aproximan al tipo ideal de la interdependencia compleja. El segundo problema es la conexión entre la hegemonía, los regímenes internacionales y la cooperación. En este punto, considera probado que estas variables son habitualmente complementarias e incluso asegura que la hegemonía de los Estados Unidos ha coexistido fácilmente con una cooperación extensiva. Sin embargo, cree que algunos de los más importantes bienes colectivos proporcionados por el hegemón no eran del todo públicos y colectivos, sino que eran distribuidos a destinatarios selectos que se comportaban de manera aceptable según sus estándares²³⁷. Finalmente, el tercero de los problemas es el mantenimiento de la hegemonía. En opinión del autor, una estrategia exitosa en el tiempo debe recrear las condiciones de la existencia de esta preponderancia, es decir, fortalecer la base nacional de recursos de poder que generan influencia y liderazgo²³⁸.

El último de estos problemas se analizará en el siguiente apartado. Abordará la construcción y socialización de un orden hegemónico internacional como base de la estrategia hegemónica, aplicada al caso de Estados Unidos.

²³² La noción del Estado hegemónico como creador del orden internacional, no solamente en el terreno económico, es una afirmación extendida en los teóricos de la estabilidad hegemónica. Dicho orden constituye el bien público principal que ofrecen los hegemones para legitimar su orden, según los institucionalistas.

²³³ KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 180.

²³⁴ GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, p. 34.

²³⁵ SNIDAL, D., "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", *International Organization*, Vol. 39, n° 4, 1985, p. 587.

²³⁶ KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 177.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 180. A este respecto, resulta particularmente interesante la aportación de Snidal sobre la Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica, con un amplio análisis sobre los bienes públicos que ofrece el hegemón. SNIDAL, D., "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory... op.cit".

²³⁸ KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, pp.179-180.

2.2.2. El liberalismo democrático. Construcción y socialización del orden hegemónico liberal

La corriente liberal moderna en la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales se ha caracterizado por una estrecha relación con los principios liberales de los siglos XVIII y XIX. Concretamente, en su estudio del orden internacional, los liberales consideran que la paz prevalecerá en un entorno dominado por la democracia frente a la aristocracia y el libre comercio frente a la autarquía²³⁹. De un modo general, es posible afirmar que la tradición liberal se ha caracterizado por explicar los eventos internacionales desde un planteamiento doméstico, sosteniendo que las condiciones internas de los Estados determinan el orden internacional²⁴⁰. La escuela de la paz democrática, que trata de investigar la relación entre un determinado régimen interno y la violencia internacional es un ejemplo de ello. Tras experimentar una notable efervescencia ante la tarea de explicar la ausencia de equilibrios contrahegemónicos frente a los Estados Unidos, la creciente expansión de las democracias liberales ha impulsado el estudio sobre la reducción del conflicto gracias a la expansión de esta forma de gobierno²⁴¹.

A través de la noción que señala a la democracia como el tipo ideal de ordenación interna, los liberales producen una doble argumentación, que ha sido calificada como una de las afirmaciones que más se asemejan a una ley empírica en Relaciones Internacionales²⁴². Dicha proposición considera que las democracias son menos propensas al conflicto que los Estados no democráticos y raramente se enfrentan entre ellas²⁴³. Sin embargo, tal y como recoge Chan, esta aseveración ha generado un debate sobre el mayor pacifismo de las democracias frente a otras formas de gobierno. Según el autor, dicho enunciado puede ser entendido en tres sentidos: (1) las democracias son más pacíficas que las no democracias; (2) ese carácter pacífico solo se extiende a las relaciones entre sistemas democráticos; (3) las democracias no son más pacíficas que el resto de regímenes²⁴⁴. No obstante, la literatura existente sólo apoya las dos últimas proposiciones, subrayando que la ausencia de conflicto es únicamente aplicable a los regímenes democráticos²⁴⁵. De hecho, tal y como señaló Doyle, el control constitucional, los intereses comerciales compartidos y el respeto por los derechos

²³⁹ BURCHILL, S., "Liberalism" en S. BURCHILL, A. LINKLATER, A. DEVETAK et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 58.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁴¹ FUKUYAMA, F., *The End of the History and the Last Man*, New York, Free Press, 1992, p. 48.

²⁴² LEVY, J. S., "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence" en P. E. TETLOCK et al., *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 270.

²⁴³ CHAN, S., "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, nº 1, 1997, p. 61.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁴⁵ *Vid.* DOYLE, M. W., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs... op. cit."; LEVY, J. S., "The Causes of War... op. cit."; RUSSETT, B., *Grasping the Democratic Peace... op. cit.*

individuales no solo promueve la paz entre sociedades individuales, sino que exagera los conflictos entre los países liberales y los que no lo son²⁴⁶.

Sin embargo, algunos autores defienden que el menor número de crisis iniciadas por los Estados democráticos guarda relación con que habitualmente son Estados satisfechos con el *statu quo*²⁴⁷. De hecho, en el actual orden internacional liberal, los cambios en la distribución de poder a favor de democracias liberales no son vistos de manera alarmante, mientras que una posible transición de poder en favor de un Estado no democrático sí lo es, y probablemente reciba una respuesta beligerante²⁴⁸. No obstante, etiquetar a las democracias como actores satisfechos con el sistema hace necesaria una deconstrucción del orden internacional actual. Es posible afirmar que, al menos, desde el siglo XIX, el sistema internacional contemporáneo ha estado encabezado por un Estado democrático al estilo liberal, primero el Reino Unido y después los Estados Unidos. En el hipotético caso de que existiera un orden internacional de carácter no liberal y liderado por un Estado no democrático, resultaría plausible afirmar que el carácter pacificador de la democracia en el terreno internacional estaría, cuanto menos, en duda²⁴⁹.

En el seno de la corriente liberal no existe un claro consenso en lo que respecta a los aspectos estructurales y normativos que tienen más peso en la llamada paz entre democracias. De hecho, tal y como recoge Burchill, los autores liberales apuntan a dos argumentos distintos a la hora de explicar este fenómeno. Los primeros consideran que las limitaciones constitucionales, la opinión pública, el Estado de derecho y la forma representativa de gobierno tienen un efecto pacificador en el comportamiento internacional de estos Estados. Por su parte, los segundos señalan como causa principal la preferencia normativa de las democracias liberales hacia el compromiso y la resolución pacífica de conflictos²⁵⁰.

Además de otorgarle una importancia notable a los valores democráticos como pacificadores, los nuevos desarrollos en el seno del liberalismo trasladan esa consideración sobre la ordenación estatal interna al sistema internacional. De este modo, autores como Ikenberry subrayarán la construcción y los procesos socializadores del orden hegemónico liberal.

Asimismo, el liberalismo constitucionalista²⁵¹ se sitúa en una vía media entre las aportaciones institucionalistas y las constructivistas. En la atención que le presta a

²⁴⁶ DOYLE, M. W., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs... *op. cit.*", pp. 324-325.

²⁴⁷ ROUSSEAU, D. L. et. al., "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988", *American Political Science Review*, nº 90, 1996.

²⁴⁸ CHAN, S., "In Search of Democratic Peace... *op. cit.*", p. 78; SCHWELLER, R. L., "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?", *World Politics*, Vol. 44, nº 2, 1992, p. 238.

²⁴⁹ CHAN, S., "In Search of Democratic Peace... *op. cit.*", p. 78.

²⁵⁰ BURCHILL, S., "Liberalism... *op. cit.*", p. 60.

²⁵¹ Se ha decidido denominar a esta teoría constitucionalista por el tipo de orden internacional que describe. Principalmente en los trabajos de G. J. Ikenberry, es evidente el interés hacia las formas constitucionales de ordenación hegemónica. *Vid.* IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*; IKENBERRY, G. J.,

cómo las instituciones ajustan la distribución de poder en un determinado orden político, Ikenberry concibe estas organizaciones como mucho más adherentes que la visión institucionalista²⁵². De hecho, considera que la fortaleza de las estructuras de relaciones elimina la posibilidad del engaño (la principal preocupación de los institucionalistas) o, en el caso de que ocurra, la robustez de la cooperación y las instituciones eliminarán sus consecuencias²⁵³. Por su parte, el liberalismo constitucionalista se distingue del constructivismo en señalar que la adhesión de las instituciones se encuentra en las interacciones prácticas entre actores, en las organizaciones formales e informales, en las normas y en las rutinas²⁵⁴. En contraste el constructivismo, ofrecerá una perspectiva de las instituciones como visiones del mundo difusas y socialmente construidas que atan y moldean el comportamiento estratégico de los individuos y los Estados²⁵⁵.

La aportación del liberalismo constitucionalista a las contribuciones precedentes deriva de su interés en explicar cómo el sistema internacional ha avanzado desde un orden hegemónico basado en regímenes e instituciones a un orden similar al constitucional. Si Keohane se centraba en las instituciones después de la hegemonía, Ikenberry defenderá que, tras la victoria en una gran guerra, las instituciones son la forma más adecuada que tiene el hegemón para perdurar en el poder²⁵⁶. La clave de ese orden constitucional, basado en una extensa red transnacional de organizaciones e instituciones, es su principio organizador: la legalidad. Dicho principio, según Ikenberry, se basa en la decisión del hegemón de moderar su poder a través de las instituciones internacionales que, a su vez, no pueden transformarse de un modo unilateral²⁵⁷. La creación de este tejido institucional, habitualmente tras un gran conflicto, obedece al interés del hegemón de mantener su poder. Su compromiso con ese orden le beneficia doblemente: en primer lugar, reduce los costes derivados del mantenimiento de dicha estructura en el seno del sistema y, en segundo lugar, le permite establecer acuerdos que le beneficiarán cuando su poder decaiga²⁵⁸. Dicho de otro modo, el Estado preponderante accede a restringir su poder en el periodo de mayor potencial para lograr el compromiso de los Estados secundarios hacia ese orden que, más tarde, le permitirá conservar su liderazgo cuando su poder decaiga. En consecuencia, modera las ganancias dentro del orden, pero también las pérdidas.

"Constitutional Politics in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, nº 2, 1998, pp. 147-177.

²⁵² IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

²⁵⁶ Es interesante el paralelismo que traza Ikenberry entre su libro y el de Keohane. A través del título (*After Victory*), Ikenberry subraya la importancia de las redes institucionales después de una guerra, en un claro guiño a la obra *After Hegemony*, de Keohane, que analiza la supervivencia de las instituciones tras el declive del hegemón.

²⁵⁷ IKENBERRY, G.J, *After Victory... op. cit.*, pp. 24, 30-31.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

La teoría constitucionalista se coloca en la quiebra del orden internacional que se produce tras una gran guerra como el punto de partida para el establecimiento del nuevo orden. Tal y como afirma Ikenberry, tras este conflicto emerge una nueva distribución de poder que genera oportunidades e incentivos en los Estados poderosos para establecer sus propios principios de orden internacional. Ante esa disyuntiva, el Estado más poderoso se encuentra ante la decisión de cómo relacionarse con el orden existente en ese momento, entre las tres alternativas con las que cuenta. La primera de ellas es comandar el orden internacional que impera en ese determinado momento, utilizando su dominio material para vencer los conflictos que se creen. En segundo lugar, puede abandonar y dejar pasar la oportunidad de comandar el sistema internacional²⁵⁹. Finalmente, la tercera de las opciones es transformar esa posición preponderante en un orden internacional que le permita extender su liderazgo²⁶⁰.

Basándose en un amplio análisis del orden internacional posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el autor distingue tres tipos de orden internacional: el equilibrio de poder, el orden hegemónico y el constitucional. Asimismo, es posible realizar paralelismos entre éstos y algunas teorías de Relaciones Internacionales²⁶¹. El orden basado en el equilibrio de poder, cuyo principio organizador es de carácter anárquico, confía en las estrategias equilibradoras de otros Estados como modo de moderar el poder de los Estados poderosos. Por su parte, el orden hegemónico, de naturaleza jerárquica, no restringe el ejercicio de poder del Estado que ostenta el liderazgo. De hecho, la estabilidad del sistema está asegurada gracias a la preponderancia de ese único polo. Finalmente, el tercero de los órdenes es de carácter constitucional y está basado en un *corpus* normativo del que emanan las instituciones encargadas de limitar el poder del Estado dominante²⁶².

Desde la perspectiva de Ikenberry, el fenómeno de la creación de instituciones tras la guerra pone de relieve la desconfianza de los Estados ante las estrategias de equilibrio de poder²⁶³. Dichas instituciones se convierten en el mecanismo de control en el orden constitucional, limitando la práctica del unilateralismo por parte del más poderoso y dificultando los cambios radicales en las orientaciones políticas de todos los actores, además de generar patrones en el ejercicio de poder y la solución de dis-

²⁵⁹ De hecho, el economista C. Kindleberger señala que ésta fue la opción que tomaron los Estados Unidos tras el progresivo deterioro de la hegemonía británica. Desde esa perspectiva, la falta de liderazgo de los británicos y la ausencia de voluntad de los Estados Unidos para tomar el mando en el terreno financiero fue una de las causas del Crack de 1929. KINDLEBERGER, C. P., *La Crisis Económica ... op. cit.*, p. 341.

²⁶⁰ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

²⁶¹ De hecho, la propuesta de un modelo de orden constitucional pretende desentrañar el "rompeca-bezas" que supone la duración de la hegemonía estadounidense y el orden liberal. En opinión de Ikenberry, la ausencia de un análisis fructífero en este tema obedece a la primacía de las perspectivas del equilibrio y de la hegemonía realistas a la hora de abordar el fenómeno. IKENBERRY, G. J., "Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order" en PAUL, T. V. y J. A. HALL (eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 123.

²⁶² IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

putas²⁶⁴. Sin embargo, el concepto de orden constitucional que retrata Ikenberry ha sido tachado de una suerte de “pseudo-multilateralismo” en tanto que el Estado hegemónico actúa unilateralmente en las disputas pero disfraza sus actos con una colaboración superflua de otros Estados del sistema, habitualmente aliados fuertemente comprometidos con ese orden liberal²⁶⁵.

El orden constitucional que describe Ikenberry debe contextualizarse con la tipificación de las variantes de orden hegemónico que realiza el autor. Concretamente, retrata tres tipos de orden: el orden basado en la dominación coercitiva, el que está basado en una mínima convergencia de intereses y el orden institucionalizado y asentado sobre procesos de interacción política desjerarquizados²⁶⁶. Frente al primero de ellos, que describe un orden imperial informal, el segundo guarda una estrecha relación con la hegemonía descrita por Gilpin en la que el Estado dominante provee de bienes públicos a los Estados secundarios²⁶⁷. Finalmente, el tercero, denominado como hegemonía abierta, es aplicable al caso estadounidense, un orden creado gracias al poder pero que trasciende esa característica, tal y como demuestra su capacidad para silenciar el impacto de los cambios en la distribución de poder²⁶⁸.

Desde la visión constitucionalista, una de las facetas más importantes del orden constitucional es el principio en el que se basa: la legalidad. No se trata solamente de un acuerdo sobre las reglas, normas e instituciones de ese orden, sino que dichas instituciones deben disfrutar de un alto grado de autonomía, evitando que sean únicamente el reflejo de unas determinadas fuerzas políticas o sociales y ahonden en las asimetrías del propio sistema internacional²⁶⁹. Estos acuerdos e instituciones se han enraizado lentamente en las estructuras políticas y sociales de los Estados participantes del orden, a través de procesos socializadores²⁷⁰. En lugar de ejercer su poder a través de la manipulación de los incentivos materiales, la hegemonía de Estados Unidos optó por alterar las creencias de los líderes de otras naciones hasta que internalizaran las normas y valores patrocinados por el hegemón y aceptaron el orden como propio²⁷¹. Para que estos procesos de socialización puedan llevarse a cabo, en primer lugar, el hegemón debe pretender reestructurar el orden de un modo más compatible con sus intereses y, en segundo lugar, las condiciones en los Estados secundarios de-

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁶⁵ El concepto de pseudo-multilateralismo es aplicado por C. Krauthammer para el caso de la hegemonía de Estados Unidos. KRAUTHAMMER, C., “The Unipolar Moment... *op. cit.*”, p. 25. Su pertinencia con el análisis de la aportación de Ikenberry la señala Schweller. SCHWELLER, R. L., “The Problem of International Order Revisited. A Review Essay”, *International Security*, Vol. 26, nº 1, 2001, p. 173.

²⁶⁶ IKENBERRY, G. J., “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, nº 5, 2001, pp. 196-197.

²⁶⁷ GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, pp. 16 (n.6) y 144-145.

²⁶⁸ IKENBERRY, G. J., “American Power... *op. cit.*”, p. 212.

²⁶⁹ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, p. 31.

²⁷⁰ IKENBERRY, G. J., “Liberal Hegemony... *op. cit.*”, p. 136.

²⁷¹ IKENBERRY, G. J. y C. A. KUPCHAN, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power”, *International Organization*, Vol. 44, nº 3, 1990, p. 285.

ben convertir a las élites en receptivas para la importación de estas ideas, tal y como ocurrió tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, con las necesidades financieras y de seguridad de Europa²⁷².

La estabilidad de un determinado orden internacional se refiere, en este caso, a la capacidad de éste para contener y superar las alteraciones de dicho orden. En este caso, es posible citar como fuentes de estabilidad la permanencia de las instituciones políticas, principalmente aquellas de índole constitucional sobre las que se basan las normas primordiales. Además, la estabilidad requiere que dichos organismos funcionen de modo autónomo y se aseguren de que ninguna parte es la continua perdedora en el terreno internacional²⁷³. De este modo, Ikenberry argumenta que la estabilidad ha permitido que los Estados Unidos mantengan su poder hegemónico pese a los cambios en las distribuciones de poder. Sin embargo, Schweller rechaza esta postura y defiende que la hegemonía estadounidense se ha mantenido por la ausencia de temor a Estados Unidos por parte de las democracias industriales y, además, por la carencia de capacidad material para equilibrar su contundente dominio en distintas facetas del poder²⁷⁴.

Asimismo, Schweller considera que el entramado institucional creado por los Estados Unidos tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial es una respuesta a la amenaza soviética y, más que crear un orden internacional (constitucional) que asegure su liderazgo, buscaba proyectar el poder de Estados Unidos de un modo más efectivo y tranquilizar a los aliados integrando la recuperación de Alemania y Japón en el seno de la alianza anti-soviética²⁷⁵. Si bien Ikenberry describe el origen de este orden como un intento de asegurar el poder de Estados Unidos, Schweller lo señala como causa de la creación de una coalición entre las democracias industriales occidentales para hacerle frente a la Unión Soviética. Por ello, pese a que los sucesos de 1989 pusiesen fin a la bipolaridad e inaugurasen la era unipolar, aún permanecen los problemas que en su origen estas instituciones pretendían atajar²⁷⁶. Ikenberry admite que durante la guerra fría la distribución de poder era de carácter bipolar, y la posguerra produjo dos tipos de orden. El primero de ellos de contención ante la Unión Soviética, basado en el equilibrio de poder, la disuasión nuclear y la competición política e ideológica y, el segundo, el orden liberal-democrático que reúne a las democracias industriales de Occidente alrededor de la apertura económica, la reciprocidad política y la gestión multilateral de este sistema político internacional liderado por Estados Unidos²⁷⁷. Por ello, lo que

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 292.

²⁷³ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

²⁷⁴ SCHWELLER, R. L., "The Problem of International Order... *op. cit.*", pp. 183-184.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Entre ellos, el autor destaca la voluntad de los Estados secundarios en mantener a Estados Unidos como garante de la seguridad en sus propias regiones así como para frenar el crecimiento de potencias regionales como China o Alemania. *Ibid.*

²⁷⁷ IKENBERRY, G. J., *Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition. Essays on American Power and World Politics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 177.

desapareció con la disolución de la URSS solamente fue ese orden de contención, el orden liberal se mantuvo e, incluso, se fortaleció.

Tal y como acertadamente señala Schweller²⁷⁸, la teoría construida por Ikenberry se basa en la analogía doméstica del orden constitucional regulado a través del derecho y las normas consensuadas, una premisa con una profunda raíz neoliberal e, incluso, idealista. Sin embargo, este mecanismo trabaja para conseguir un fin estratégico que podríamos relacionar con el realismo: mantener la primacía. No obstante, no logra trascender al ejemplo de la hegemonía estadounidense ni responde al rompecabezas sobre la pervivencia de las instituciones hegemónicas en un entorno de declive del hegemón que ya planteó Keohane.

²⁷⁸ SCHWELLER, R. L., "The Problem of International Order... *op. cit.*", pp. 184-185.

CAPÍTULO 3

LAS PERSPECTIVAS SOCIALES EN EL ANÁLISIS DE LA REALIDAD INTERNACIONAL. UN ENCUENTRO ENTRE EL CONSTRUCTIVISMO Y LA ESCUELA INGLESA

3.1. El constructivismo: una perspectiva social de la estructura internacional

La progresiva adopción de enfoques críticos con las corrientes mayoritarias realistas y liberales ha conocido su mayor influencia gracias a las teorías constructivistas. Sin duda, el éxito en la implementación de visiones alejadas del materialismo dominante queda patente a través del impacto del constructivismo en el debate con las corrientes racionalistas. Pese a su relativa juventud en la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales, los orígenes del constructivismo enraízan de un modo transversal con algunas de las más importantes tradiciones sociológicas y filosóficas europeas. Según recoge Reus-Smit, el reciente auge del constructivismo puede explicarse a través de una serie de factores interrelacionados. El primero de ellos es la invitación extendida desde los círculos racionalistas demandando a los autores críticos una construcción teórica que permitiera un análisis de las Relaciones Internacionales desde una perspectiva distinta. En segundo lugar, es posible apuntar al fracaso explicativo de los enfoques realistas y liberales con respecto al final de la guerra fría. Concretamente, la perspectiva realista vio cómo los sucesos posteriores a la desintegración de la Unión Soviética contravinieron las teorías del equilibrio ante la ausencia de un segundo polo

y, a su vez, refutaron las teorías hegemónicas que defendían el cambio de sistema internacional como la consecuencia de una guerra¹. En lo que respecta al tercero de los factores, Reus-Smit apunta a la importante generación de jóvenes investigadores que, en la década de los 90, apostaron por una perspectiva crítica que reconstruyera conceptos y variables que se consideraban consensuadas dentro del debate racionalista. Finalmente, como cuarto factor, es posible señalar la disposición de teóricos del *mainstream* hacia la inclusión de esta nueva perspectiva en los debates, abriendo el espectro de temas y, como consecuencia, impulsando al constructivismo hacia una posición central en las discusiones².

A pesar de tratarse de una corriente con una amplia heterogeneidad³, la mayoría de los desarrollos constructivistas mantienen que tanto el conocimiento como los significados están socialmente construidos⁴. Más concretamente, el carácter distintivo de la perspectiva constructivista se basa en tres pilares principales que guían sus desarrollos teóricos. El primero de ellos es el convencimiento de que la política internacional se basa en las ideas, normas y valores compartidos de carácter intersubjetivos. Esta postura les permite avanzar hacia la deconstrucción del concepto de estructura internacional como una variable eminentemente materialista. De este modo, proponen una perspectiva que destaca el rol de las ideas compartidas, así como el de la estructura de las ideas a la hora de restringir y modificar los comportamientos. En segundo lugar, los constructivistas consideran que esa estructura social no solamente influye en los actores de manera regulatoria, sino que tiene efectos constitutivos, transformando el modo en el que se definen a sí mismos. Finalmente, en tercer lugar, los constructivistas entienden que las estructuras de las ideas y los actores se constituyen mutuamente.

¹ KOLOWSKI, R y F. V. KRATOCHWIL, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System" en R. N. LEBOW y T. RISSE-KAPPEN (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 129.

² REUS-SMIT, C., "Constructivism" en S. BURCHILL, A. LINKLATER, A. DEVETAK et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations... op. cit.*, pp. 195-196.

³ Reus-Smit ordena las distintas tradiciones dentro del constructivismo atendiendo a tres debates principales. El primero de ellos es de carácter ontológico y distingue entre (1) los constructivistas inspirados por el institucionalismo sociológico, (2) aquellos influenciados por la teoría de la acción comunicativa de Habermas y, finalmente, (3) los constructivistas que se basan en los argumentos sobre conocimiento y poder de Foucault. Asimismo, el segundo debate se centra en los distintos niveles de análisis teórico que dividen la corriente entre los que sostienen (1) una visión sistémica, (2) holística o (3) del nivel de las unidades. Por último, el tercero de los ejes es el metodológico, distinguiendo entre aquellos que utilizan (1) una metodología interpretativa y (2) los que se decantan por la positivista. REUS-SMIT, C., "Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 4, nº 3, 2002, pp. 493-496. No obstante, existen diversas clasificaciones que se basan en criterios distintos para trazar el mapa del programa de investigación constructivista. Vid. ADLER, I., "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *The European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, nº 3, 1997, pp. 319-363; HOPF, T., "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 23, nº 1, 1998, pp. 171-200; PRICE, R. y C. REUS-SMIT, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism", *The European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, nº 3, 1998, pp. 259-294.

⁴ GUZZINI, S., "The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis", *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, nº 3, 2005, pp. 498-499.

Por una parte, las estructuras moldean los intereses e identidades de los actores, mientras que, por otro lado, estas estructuras son reproducidas y alteradas con las prácticas de los agentes⁵.

Tal y como se ha descrito anteriormente, la corriente constructivista nace de la crítica a las visiones racionalistas, que en su opinión obviaban las variables sociales y dibujaban una relación unidireccional entre la estructura y las unidades. Concretamente, el constructivismo disiente con las corrientes racionalistas dominantes en tres aspectos principales. El primero de ellos es la naturaleza de los actores. El racionalismo los retrata como unos egoístas atomísticos, mientras que el constructivismo los trata como profundamente sociales, entendiendo que sus identidades son construidas por las normas, valores e ideas del entorno social. En segundo lugar, para los racionalistas, los intereses de los actores tienen un origen exógeno y están profundamente determinados por la estructura anárquica en la que conviven los Estados. Sin embargo, los constructivistas consideran que estos intereses surgen endógenamente como consecuencia de las identidades socialmente articuladas. Finalmente, la tercera de las diferencias deriva del concepto de sociedad, que los racionalistas consideran como un terreno puramente estratégico, mientras que para el constructivismo es un entorno constitutivo que forma y transforma a los actores⁶.

Sin duda, la principal aportación del constructivismo al debate de la disciplina fue la inclusión de las variables no materiales en las estructuras. En su ferviente crítica a las corrientes racionalistas, el constructivismo ha sido capaz de aplicar una ontología alternativa que le ha permitido explicar algunos hechos internacionales que para las corrientes neorrealista y neoliberal eran anómalos⁷. En su debate teórico, el constructivismo inicia su crítica al neorrealismo desde el concepto de estructura sobre el que se asienta su núcleo duro. Si Waltz retrataba una estructura que se relacionaba con las unidades de un modo unidireccional, en tanto que condicionaba las identidades e intereses de éstas y determinaba su comportamiento, Hurd dibuja una relación más compleja. Desde su perspectiva, no solamente la estructura condiciona las identidades, sino que también el proceso de legitimación altera el carácter de estas, así como una serie de procesos que canalizan el poder y la información sobre las unidades, tales como los símbolos o las identidades. De este modo, la estructura se convierte en una variable más que, por sí misma, no es capaz de explicar el carácter de las unidades⁸.

Se trata de una estructura que es a la vez social y material, teniendo en cuenta que las distribuciones materiales no aportan información sobre el tipo de políticas y

⁵ COPELAND, D. C., "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism... *op. cit.*", p. 3. En la misma línea, Reus-Smit también describe el constructivismo como una teoría caracterizada por su énfasis en las estructuras normativas y materiales, el rol de la identidad a la hora de modelar la acción política y la relación co-constitutiva entre agentes y estructuras. REUS-SMIT, C., "Constructivism... *op. cit.*", p. 188.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁷ Además, el énfasis del constructivismo en el análisis empírico le ha permitido destacar en este aspecto en perjuicio de las teorías críticas. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁸ HURD, I., *After Anarchy... op. cit.*

comportamientos de un Estado, especialmente en un sistema unipolar en el que las restricciones a su poder duro son limitadas⁹. Para el constructivismo, estos recursos materiales únicamente adquieren significado a través de una estructura de conocimiento compartido¹⁰. De este modo, las variables intersubjetivas de las estructuras están por encima de las materiales¹¹, y los significados colectivos que las constituyen se convierten en el objeto clave del análisis. En este punto, el concepto de identidad cobra una especial relevancia como uno de los ejes centrales de la teoría constructivista.

Sin embargo, la elección de las identidades como objeto de análisis no está exenta de dificultades¹². A pesar de ello, constituyen un elemento fundamental en la construcción de las relaciones bidireccionales entre los agentes y las estructuras. De hecho, una de las preguntas centrales del constructivismo se refiere a la construcción de la identidad a través de la interacción. Esta significación social subraya la importancia de los procesos intersubjetivos, pero a la vez pone de manifiesto la pluralidad de identidades del sujeto en función de su interlocutor¹³. Por ello, los atributos materiales de los Estados no son suficientes para analizar la estructura internacional, también es necesario estudiar cómo interactúan las unidades¹⁴. En consecuencia, la estructura internacional no debe reducirse solamente a los elementos materiales y las ideas, es necesario una tercera variable, la agencia o factor humano, que se convierte en la “correa de transmisión de doble sentido” entre ambos elementos¹⁵.

Los significados colectivos construidos a través de la interacción juegan un rol fundamental en las estructuras organizadoras de las acciones estatales. La importancia de los significados intersubjetivos en las relaciones entre los actores es la clave para explicar, por ejemplo, por qué un Estado actúa de modo diferente dependiendo de su interlocutor. Las relaciones de amistad y enemistad, por lo tanto, no pueden ser únicamente entendidas en términos de distribución de poder material o anarquía, sino que necesitan de una articulación del concepto de estructura que incluya variables sociales.

Por ello, el estructuralismo neorrealista choca frontalmente con las aportaciones constructivistas; mientras los primeros consideran que este concepto está únicamente compuesto por las capacidades materiales, los segundos entienden que también está

⁹ FINNEMORE, M., “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure... *op. cit.*”, pp. 58-59.

¹⁰ WENDT, A., “Constructing International Politics”, *International Security*, Vol. 20, nº 1, 1995, p. 73.

¹¹ ZEHFUSS, M., “Constructivism and Identity. A Dangerous Liaison” en S. GUZZINI y A. LEANDER (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹² De hecho, M. Zehfuss sostiene que la rearticulación constante de las identidades hace difícil establecerlas como categorías explicativas. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹³ NEUMANN, I. B., *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 13.

¹⁴ WENDT, A., *Social Theory... op. cit.*, p. 148.

¹⁵ BEYER, C., “Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower: A Synthetic Approach”, *International Relations*, Vol. 23, nº 3, 2009, pp. 414-415.

formada por las relaciones sociales (principalmente por el conocimiento compartido, los recursos materiales y las prácticas)¹⁶. El énfasis de los constructivistas en la estructura, no obstante, no debe confundirse con una tendencia estructuralista al estilo del neorrealismo o el marxismo. Si bien es cierto que subrayan la importancia de este concepto en las identidades y los intereses, conceden una relevancia similar a las prácticas que mantienen y transforman dichas estructuras, sobre todo las no materiales, por lo que Reus-Smit propone denominarlos como “estructuracionistas”¹⁷.

La ruptura con la invariabilidad del concepto de anarquía retratado por el realismo es otra de las características principales del programa investigador constructivista. En tanto que las ideas son una variable de análisis y dada su naturaleza cambiante, Wendt considera que la anarquía únicamente adquiere significado en función de las expectativas y acuerdos que constituyen las identidades y los intereses¹⁸. Para Wendt, la lógica de la anarquía, de la cual deriva el principio de autoayuda, no existe del modo en el que la define el neorrealismo, no es dada ni es invariable. Es evidente que los Estados actúan de un modo diferente en sus relaciones con amigos y enemigos, pero la anarquía y la distribución de poder son insuficientes a la hora de explicar cuál es cuál¹⁹. Por lo tanto, en opinión de los constructivistas, no es la anarquía lo que define el sistema, sino los procesos que se dan dentro del mismo, en forma de actuaciones de los actores²⁰.

La negación de la invariabilidad de la anarquía refuta, a su vez, la concepción determinista del comportamiento estatal como uno basado estrictamente en la autoayuda. Como defenderá Wendt, el hecho de que el sistema esté caracterizado por la autoayuda no es debido a la anarquía o a la estructura, sino consecuencia de los procesos y actuaciones de los actores. Del mismo modo que la autoayuda no viene dada, la anarquía también es un concepto variable, puede cambiar al igual que lo hacen los procesos que la conforman.

Siguiendo esta línea, una parte importante del constructivismo adoptará la perspectiva de las culturas de la anarquía, definidas por los procesos que dentro de ellas tienen lugar, y que varían dependiendo de cómo los actores conceptualizan al otro. La primera de las culturas que retrata Wendt es la hobbesiana, describiendo un escenario en el que los Estados se asignan los unos a los otros el rol de enemigo y en el que la violencia se convierte en la herramienta principal de supervivencia. Este escenario define, según el autor, el sistema internacional hasta el siglo XVII y se asemeja al estado de naturaleza descrito por Hobbes. La segunda cultura, la lockeana, retrata el sistema internacional a partir del tratado de Westfalia, un escenario en el que los Esta-

¹⁶ WENDT, A., “La Anarquía es lo que los Estados Hacen de Ella... *op. cit.*”, p. 7; WENDT, A., “Constructing... *op. cit.*”, p. 73.

¹⁷ REUS-SMIT, C., “Constructivism... *op. cit.*”, p. 197.

¹⁸ WENDT, A., “La Anarquía es lo que los Estados... *op. cit.*”, p. 11.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

dos se ven como rivales que podrían usar la violencia pero que deben abstenerse de eliminarse los unos a los otros. Finalmente, la tercera cultura, la kantiana, está compuesta por Estados que se identifican como amigos y no utilizan la fuerza para solucionar los desencuentros, trabajando conjuntamente para frenar las amenazas conjuntas, asemejándose al escenario descrito por los teóricos de la paz democrática del liberalismo²¹.

La perspectiva constructivista aporta una interesante visión sobre el cambio, ya que la importancia que le otorga a las variables no materiales, los procesos y los significados se sustenta sobre una continua rearticulación. Por lo tanto, se diluye el determinismo de las posturas racionalistas, al retratar este proceso como resultado de factores sociales que afectan también a los elementos materiales²². Entendiendo que en la política, tanto nacional como internacional, son los actores los que reproducen o alteran los sistemas a través de sus acciones, estos sistemas no son inmutables, sino que se convierten en dependientes de las prácticas. Por lo tanto, los constructivistas entenderán que el cambio ocurre cuando los actores, a través de sus comportamientos, cambian las reglas y normas constitutivas de la interacción²³. De hecho, es posible distinguir dos tipos de cambio. El primero de ellos tiene lugar dentro de un marco de convenciones establecidas y no afecta a la reproducción de las estructuras sistémicas, sino que simplemente modifica los patrones de distribución, tal y como ocurre con los cambios en el equilibrio de poder. Por su parte, el segundo de los cambios es de una mayor índole, ya que altera las prácticas y convenciones constitutivas del sistema social, transformándolo por completo²⁴.

El programa de investigación constructivista, tal y como recogen R. Koslowski y F. V. Kratochwil, retrata a las instituciones como elementos de estabilidad, pero también como variables estratégicas para analizar el cambio. Esto se debe a la doble tarea de estas organizaciones, por un lado como reproductoras de sistema y, por otro, como establecedoras de parámetros rutinarios de elecciones no transformadoras²⁵. Estas estructuras constitutivas, tal y como las denomina Reus-Smit, forman conjuntos de creencias, principios y normas intersubjetivas encargadas de legitimar a los actores y proveerles de derechos y privilegios y, a su vez, son las responsables de definir las líneas básicas en las que debe llevarse a cabo la práctica internacional²⁶. Estas instituciones, en tanto que el sistema está compuesto por ellas, son descritas como prácticas constituidas por normas que determinan gran parte del sistema y, por lo tanto, el

²¹ La compilación de las culturas de la anarquía desarrolladas por Wendt aparece recogida en COPELAND, D. C., "The Constructivist Challenge... *op. cit.*", p. 6. De un modo más extenso, Wendt las expone en WENDT, A., *Social Theory... op. cit.*, pp. 258, 260-262, 279-280 y 298-299.

²² BEYER, C., "Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower... *op. cit.*", pp. 414-415.

²³ KOLOWSKI, R y F. V. KRATOCHWIL, "Understanding Change... *op. cit.*", p. 128.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

²⁶ REUS-SMIT, C., *The Moral Purpose of the State. Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 30.

cambio solamente puede ocurrir cuando estos elementos constitutivos (si no todos, al menos la mayoría de ellos) son modificados²⁷.

3.2. La escuela inglesa. La institucionalización de las identidades y los intereses en la sociedad internacional

La ubicación de la Escuela Inglesa en el mapa de las Relaciones Internacionales resulta una tarea tan complicada como controvertida. Desde el surgimiento de esta corriente en el seno del Comité Británico hasta su segunda oleada revitalizadora²⁸ a finales de los noventa, en ocasiones ha sido tachada como una variante británica del realismo dominante, desoyendo todas las críticas que ha vertido contra éste en todas sus formas²⁹.

Sin embargo, la omisión de la perspectiva de la Escuela Inglesa en los debates está siendo corregida en los últimos años gracias a una paulatina expansión de los teóricos que se adscriben a esta escuela de pensamiento y a una relectura de las obras fundacionales³⁰. Tal y como argumenta Buzan, la visión de la Escuela Inglesa ofrece un análisis de la estructura internacional alternativo, frente al foco en la política de poder del realismo, en las instituciones que abandera el liberalismo y en la lucha de clases marxista³¹. No obstante, como se ha abordado en páginas anteriores, algunos aspectos de la Escuela Inglesa son compartidos por los teóricos constructivistas, como la creencia de que la sociedad internacional está formada y moldeada por las ideas, valores, identidades y normas que son, en mayor o menor medida, comunes a todos³².

²⁷ KOLOWSKI, R y F. V. KRATOCHWIL, "Understanding Change... *op. cit.*", p. 134.

²⁸ A menudo se señala el discurso de B. Buzan en la Conferencia Anual de la Asociación Británica de Estudios Internacionales celebrado en 1999 como el punto de partida de esta oleada revitalizadora. En su exposición, el autor hizo un llamamiento a la reagrupación de la Escuela Inglesa y en los años posteriores abordó una profunda revisión de esta corriente. LINKLATER, A. y H. SUGANAMI, *The English School of International Relations. A Contemporary Reassessment*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 12.

²⁹ Sobre los puntos en común y los desacuerdos entre el realismo y la Escuela Inglesa, *vid.* LITTLE, R., "The English School vs. American Realism: a meeting of minds or divided by a common language?", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, nº 3, 2003, pp. 443-460.

³⁰ *Vid.* por ejemplo, BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society. English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004; DUNNE, T., *Inventing International Society. A History of the English School*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998; LINKLATER, A. y H. SUGANAMI, *The English School of International Relations... op. cit.*; SUGANAMI, H., "The English School, History and Theory", *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, Vol. 9, 2011, pp. 27-50; NAVARI, C. (ed.), *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; PELLA, J. A., "Thinking Outside International Society: A Discussion of the Possibilities for English School Conceptions of World Society", *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 42, nº 1, 2013, pp. 65-77.

³¹ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, nº 1, 2010, p. 7.

³² BELLAMY, A. J., "Introduction: International Society and the English School" en A. J. BELLAMY (ed.), *International Society and its Critics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 2.

En concreto, la perspectiva de la Escuela Inglesa disiente del realismo al tratar de explicar cómo los Estados tratan de controlar su búsqueda del poder en un contexto anárquico. Tal y como menciona A. Linklater, algunas perspectivas de la corriente han puesto demasiado énfasis en la inevitabilidad histórica de la evolución de los sistemas de Estados hacia sociedades³³. En consecuencia, el interés investigador no lo ubican en el surgimiento de dicha sociedad, sino en el origen del componente ético de la misma (sobre todo en el caso de los primeros autores adscritos a la corriente) y en explicar el rompecabezas del orden internacional. Con respecto a esta segunda cuestión, retratan dicho orden como un logro precario que puede estar en riesgo por la emergencia de poderes contrarios, y consideran que se deben centrar los esfuerzos en responder al reto de la transformación del sistema hacia uno que satisfaga las demandas sobre moralidad y justicia³⁴.

A la hora de abordar la perspectiva de la Escuela Inglesa es posible distinguir, al menos, dos características principales de su teoría. La primera de ellas es la opinión compartida de que existe una sociedad internacional, aunque los teóricos disienten en su origen, su forma actual o sus perspectivas de futuro. La segunda característica común es el consenso a la hora de señalar al pluralismo metodológico como el mejor método para estudiar este concepto³⁵.

No cabe duda de que la noción de sociedad internacional constituye la piedra angular de esta teoría. No en vano, es una idea presente en los dilemas centrales del pensamiento de la Escuela Inglesa: (1) estudiar el tipo de sociedad que es; (2), dilucidar los mejores modos de estudiarla e (3) identificar los desafíos principales y secundarios de la vida social y determinar si se cumplen³⁶.

En este sentido, los teóricos han abordado dichos dilemas a través de tres orientaciones distintas que interrelacionadas ofrecen una visión de conjunto de la sociedad internacional y de las Relaciones Internacionales³⁷. La primera de las orientaciones es la estructural, que busca analizar la configuración institucional de la sociedad internacional contemporánea. En esta primera categoría encontramos los trabajos de James y Manning, así como parte de la obra más importante de Bull³⁸. En segundo lugar, ha de subrayarse la orientación funcional que trata de analizar el funcionamiento y virtudes de esa estructura internacional. Esta tarea es abordada principalmente por Vincent, así

³³ Linklater cita, por ejemplo, a Watson, que defiende que tanto los sistemas pasados como el presente se desarrollan hasta el punto de que los Estados toman conciencia de los valores comunes y el sistema se convierte en una sociedad internacional. WATSON, A., "Hedley Bull, States System and International Societies", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 13, nº 2, 1987, p. 151; LINKLATER, A., "English School" en S. BURCHILL, A. LINKLATER, A. DEVETAK et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 95.

³⁴ LINKLATER, A., "English School... op. cit.", p. 95.

³⁵ BELLAMY, A. J., "Introduction... op. cit.", p. 12.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁷ LINKLATER, A. y H. SUGANAMI, *The English School... op. cit.*, p. 43.

³⁸ *Vid.* MANNING, C. A. W., *The Nature of International Society*, Londres, Macmillan, (1962) 1975; JAMES, A. M., *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*, Londres, Allen and Unwin, 1986; BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in International Politics*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, [1977], 2002.

como en parte de la obra de Bull³⁹. Finalmente, la tercera orientación es de carácter histórico, al estudiar la evolución en el tiempo de dicha estructura, ofreciendo un relato sobre la historia de la sociedad internacional y su progresiva expansión. Esta categoría aglutina trabajos tanto de los primeros teóricos de esta corriente, principalmente Wight, Watson y Bull, así como aportaciones contemporáneas como la de Little y Buzan⁴⁰.

Pese a que el concepto de sociedad internacional ha supuesto la aportación más trascendente de la Escuela Inglesa, hoy pervive un debate en el seno de la corriente sobre sus implicaciones. Actualmente, su definición continúa estrechamente ligada a Bull, que explicó que la sociedad internacional “existe cuando un grupo de Estados, consciente de sus intereses y valores comunes, forman una sociedad en el sentido de que se consideran unidos por una serie de normas comunes que regulan sus relaciones y de que colaboran en el funcionamiento de las instituciones comunes”⁴¹. Más recientemente, Buzan ha completado esta definición subrayando el importante rol que ejerce la aceptación de las normas más profundamente compartidas por los Estados, formando así un tipo de orden social determinado⁴².

En la misma línea de estas definiciones, el propio Bull, junto con Watson, define la sociedad internacional como un grupo de Estados que no solamente forman un sistema, en el sentido de que los comportamientos de los demás son un factor esencial en los cálculos, sino que también han establecido unas normas e instituciones comunes a través del diálogo, y reconocen el interés mutuo en mantener dichos acuerdos⁴³. El interés de esta definición recae en que combina la noción realista/hobbesiana del sistema internacional con la grotiana/Escuela Inglesa centrada en un orden socialmente construido⁴⁴. Además, los teóricos señalan que, pese a que los Estados formen una sociedad anárquica que carece de una autoridad central, existe un alto nivel de orden y la violencia interestatal no es tan habitual como pudiera sugerir la ausencia de un monopolio de la fuerza.

Incorporando ideas también apuntadas por los constructivistas, los desarrollos contemporáneos del concepto de sociedad internacional han descrito una doble función de la sociedad internacional basada en otorgarle capacidad de agencia. En primer

³⁹ Vid. VINCENT, R. J., *Nonintervention and International Order*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974; VINCENT, R. J., *Human Rights and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

⁴⁰ Vid. WIGHT, M., *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977; BULL, H. y A. WATSON (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society... op. cit.*; GONG, G. W., *The Standard of “Civilisation” in International Society*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984; WATSON, A., *The Evolution of International Society... op. cit.*, 1992; BUZAN, B. y R. LITTLE, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.

⁴¹ BULL, H., *La Sociedad Anárquica. Un Estudio sobre el Orden en la Política Mundial*, Madrid, Catarata, 2005, p. 65.

⁴² BUZAN B., “China in International Society... op. cit.”, p. 6.

⁴³ BULL, H. y A. WATSON (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society... op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁴⁴ BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, p. 9.

lugar, reconociendo su labor como socializadora de los miembros a través de instituciones y normas, estableciendo un marco de actuaciones y prácticas recurrentes legitimadas. En segundo lugar, en relación con la afirmación anterior, es posible señalar a esta sociedad como el elemento constitutivo de las identidades particulares de sus miembros, subrayando el carácter bidireccional de la relación entre agentes y estructura⁴⁵.

Es necesario puntualizar que el concepto de sociedad que propone la Escuela Inglesa en el ámbito internacional no es equivalente a la del interior del Estado. Dicho de otro modo, el propio Bull argumenta que no debe tomarse el Estado moderno como el ejemplo de la idea de sociedad, ya que una de las características principales de ésta a nivel interno es la prohibición del uso privado de la fuerza. De hecho, Bull cuestiona la validez del Estado moderno como ejemplo de sociedad y afirma explícitamente que la sociedad internacional es única, con cualidades particulares dependiendo de la situación de los Estados soberanos, y que aun así comparte alguna característica propia de las sociedades domésticas⁴⁶. Además, los Estados pueden disfrutar de los beneficios de una sociedad a nivel internacional sin necesidad de transferir sus poderes soberanos a una autoridad superior, es decir, manteniéndose el principio de anarquía⁴⁷. La presencia de una serie de normas reguladoras sí es una característica compartida. En el caso de la sociedad internacional, es posible distinguir dos niveles normativos. Las normas primarias son las encargadas de especificar como los Estados deben comportarse; el resto, de carácter secundario, determinan cómo estas normas primarias son creadas, interpretadas y reforzadas⁴⁸.

Si bien la sociedad internacional es considerada como la aportación más trascendente de la Escuela inglesa, es la interrelación de los conceptos de sistema internacional, sociedad internacional y sociedad mundial la que le proporciona una visión diferenciada. Esta distinción nace de la aportación de M. Wight en lo relativo a las tres tradiciones teóricas de la disciplina: realismo, racionalismo y revolucionismo⁴⁹. Con la evolución de la perspectiva de la Escuela Inglesa y su paulatina identificación como perspectiva intermedia, este mapa de las tradiciones se ha ido entrelazando con la prioridad que cada perspectiva le otorga a cada concepto. Lo interesante de dicha

⁴⁵ CLARK, I., "International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Power", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, nº 3, 2014, p. 320; DUNNE, T., *Inventing International Society...* *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴⁶ BULL, H., "Society and Anarchy in International Relations" en H. BUTTERFIEL y M. WIGHT (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations. Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 43 y 45.

⁴⁷ LINKLATER, A., "English School ... *op. cit.*", p. 92.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁴⁹ WIGHT, M., *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1991.

distinción es que la perspectiva de la Escuela Inglesa aúna estos tres elementos en su análisis, centrando la discusión en cuál de ellos es el que tiene una mayor relevancia⁵⁰.

Figura 1. Resumen de las tradiciones teóricas en Relaciones Internacionales a partir de las aportaciones de M. Wight, H. Bull, B. Buzan y A. Wendt⁵¹. Elaboración propia.

Las Tres Tradiciones de Relaciones Internacionales		
Hobbesiana/Realista	Grotiana/Racionalista/Escuela Inglesa	Kantiana/Revolucionista
Sistema Internacional	Sociedad Internacional	Sociedad Mundial

Tipos de Anarquía (Wendt)	Tipos de Sociedad Internacional (H. Bull)
• Hobbesiana	• Realista
• Lockeana	• Racionalista
• Kantiana	• Revolucionista

Estas diferentes tradiciones se distinguen principalmente por su metodología, ontología y epistemología⁵². La escuela hobbesiana, centrada en la política de poder, señala a la estructura y la anarquía como el centro del estudio de la disciplina. Los Estados son los únicos protagonistas en el eje ontológico, con una epistemología posi-

⁵⁰ Esta perspectiva es posible encontrarla, entre otros, en BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, p. 14; BULL, H., "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations" en WIGHT, M., *International Theory... op. cit.*, pp. xvii-xviii; DUNNE, T., "International Society – Theoretical Promises Fulfilled?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 30, nº 2, 1995, pp. 134-137.

⁵¹ WIGHT, M., *International Theory... op. cit.*, pp. 8-24; BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, pp. 23-26; BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, pp. 7-8; BUZAN, B., *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, Cambridge, Polity, 2014, pp. 14-15; WENDT, A., *Social Theory... op. cit.*, pp. 258, 260-262, 279-280 y 298-299. Vid. LINKLATER, A. y H. SUGANAMI, *The English School... op. cit.*, pp. 117-121; GARCÍA SEGURA, C., "La Escuela Inglesa y la Teoría de la Sociedad Internacional: Propuestas, Críticas y Reformulación" en C. del ARENAL y J. A SANAHUJA (Coords.), *Teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales... op. cit.*, pp. 275-278.

⁵² BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, p. 7. A este respecto, Little señala que el carácter distintivo y diferenciado de las realidades ontológicas que estudia la Escuela Inglesa (principalmente, sistema internacional, sociedad internacional y sociedad mundial) le lleva a abordar estos estudios con un pluralismo metodológico. LITTLE, R., "The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, nº 3, 2000, p. 395.

tivista y un marcado materialismo. La tradición grotiana, por su parte, pone el foco en los procesos de institucionalización de los intereses e identidades compartidos, así como en la creación y mantenimiento de normas, reglas e instituciones derivadas de dichos procesos⁵³. Si bien la ontología es estatal al igual que en la tradición realista, la epistemología es constructivista y la historia tiene un peso clave en la metodología. Finalmente, la tradición kantiana considera que la superación del sistema de Estados como el eje central de la disciplina, otorgándole una mayor importancia a los individuos, las organizaciones no estatales y la población mundial.

Por otra parte, la distinción entre los conceptos de sistema, sociedad internacional y sociedad mundial permite alejarse del estructuralismo y del énfasis en cuestiones sistémicas del realismo dominante. Más concretamente, la diferenciación entre sistema y sociedad, central en las discusiones de la Escuela Inglesa, constituye un punto de diálogo entre ambas corrientes. Tal y como explica Bellamy, el concepto de sociedad internacional es capaz de captar una paradoja hasta entonces infraestudiada: cómo los Estados que habitualmente persiguen sus propios intereses y valores, también son capaces de crear y compartir valores e intereses comunes, e incluso aprender del resto⁵⁴. Esta distinción, establecida ya por Bull, que en un principio parece crear una brecha entre ambas, constituye un debate aún latente. Para Bull, es posible hablar de sistema cuando dos o más Estados tienen el suficiente contacto e impacto en las decisiones de los otros, como para empujarles a actuar como partes de un todo⁵⁵. Si bien es posible que exista un sistema sin una sociedad, la sociedad siempre necesita estar sustentada en un sistema⁵⁶. De hecho, la definición de sociedad como un grupo con valores, normas e instituciones comunes ha provocado una tendencia a identificar a la sociedad como un paso inminente del sistema de Estados. Indudablemente, esta tendencia se debe a la tensión y confusión que alimenta Bull entre ambos conceptos, argumentando en algunas partes de su análisis que el sistema precede a la sociedad para reconocer en otras la necesaria coexistencia⁵⁷.

La inconsistencia en la distinción por parte de los autores clásicos ha generado un irremediable debate sobre la coexistencia o autoexclusión de ambos. La aportación de A. James, una de las más polémicas, considera que esta distinción es una falsa dicotomía. El autor defiende que no es posible que exista un contacto regular (como el que se retrata en los sistemas internacionales) sin la existencia de unas normas. Asimismo, también niega que la sociedad internacional se caracterice por los valores compartidos, recordando que todas las sociedades están constituidas por una pluralidad de

⁵³ Si bien algunas teorías neoliberales también ponen el foco en la institucionalización, Buzan argumenta que lo hacen con implicaciones puramente instrumentales, mientras que la escuela grotiana la aborda en clave constitutiva. BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁵⁴ BELLAMY, A. J., "Introduction... op. cit.", p. 2.

⁵⁵ BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁶ LITTLE, R., *The Balance of Power in International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁵⁷ LITTLE, R., "The English School and World History" en A. J. BELLAMY (ed.), *International Society... op. cit.*, p. 48.

valores en competición. Estos argumentos son para James suficientes para razonar que los patrones regulares de interacción que Bull atribuye a los sistemas también pueden darse en las sociedades y, por lo tanto, la dicotomía sistema-sociedad es falsa e innecesaria⁵⁸.

Frente a esta afirmación, Buzan defiende que, si bien la primera generación de teóricos no estableció la distinción con el suficiente rigor teórico, debe mantenerse esa dicotomía. Aunque comparte con James la afirmación de que las interacciones, tanto en sistemas como en sociedades, necesitan de las normas, cree que la sociedad se distingue del sistema por el sentido de la identidad compartida, logrado cuando los Estados establecen un reconocimiento mutuo de la igualdad soberana⁵⁹.

Tras analizar el fructífero debate entre los conceptos de sistema y sociedad internacional, es más que evidente la menor atención que ha suscitado la noción de sociedad mundial. La ausencia de una clara definición que contribuya a establecer una división entre los sistemas de interacción y los sistemas socialmente construidos ha provocado que, en ocasiones, la definición de sociedad mundial se convierta en un contenedor de algunas líneas teóricas infraestudiadas por esta corriente⁶⁰. Según la visión dominante, por sociedad mundial se entiende no solamente un grado de interacción entre todas las partes de la comunidad humana, sino una comunidad humana basada en intereses y valores comunes que constituyen el punto de partida sobre el que se construyen las instituciones y normas comunes⁶¹. En la misma línea, García Segura propone definirla como una “estructura social formada por las relaciones interhumanas y transnacionales que son ontológicamente distintas y deben analizarse separadamente” y que se relacionan con la sociedad internacional que constituye “una estructura social interestatal”⁶².

La definición de sociedad mundial abre también un interesante debate sobre el que no existe consenso aún: la necesidad de una unidad cultural o lingüística previa a la emergencia de la sociedad internacional. La línea defendida por Wight entiende que esta sociedad emerge en regiones con relativa homogeneidad cultural y lingüística,

⁵⁸ JAMES, A. M., “System or Society?”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, n° 3, pp. 269-288.

⁵⁹ BUZAN, B., “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School”, *International Organization*, Vol. 47, n° 3, pp. 327-352.

⁶⁰ En este sentido se manifiesta García Segura, afirmando que el concepto de sociedad mundial “es demasiado amplio y se convierte en un cajón de sastre sin unidad analítica”. GARCÍA SEGURA, C., “La Escuela Inglesa... *op. cit.*”, p. 284. Algunos desarrollos teóricos han tratado de solucionar esa carencia que retrata Buzan. Por un lado, Vincent siguió el camino marcado por Bull cuando acuñó la idea de sistemas políticos mundiales y trató de expandir el concepto de sociedad mundial para dar cabida a esas consideraciones. Por su parte, Dunne apostó por solucionar la cuestión expandiendo el concepto de sociedad internacional. BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; VINCENT, R. J., “Western Conceptions of a Universal Moral Order”, *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 4, n° 1, 1978, pp. 20 y 28-29; BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, pp. 276-281; DUNNE, T., “New Thinking on International Society”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 3, n° 2, 2001, p. 227.

⁶¹ BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, p. 279.

⁶² GARCÍA SEGURA, C., “La Escuela Inglesa... *op. cit.*”, p. 292.

mientras que Bull considera que no son una característica necesaria⁶³. En la misma línea, Buzan argumenta que pueden distinguirse dos modos de surgimiento de la sociedad internacional que recogerían estas dos visiones contrapuestas. El primero de ellos, de carácter civilizacional, estaría en la línea propuesta por Wight; el segundo, el funcional, encajaría con la idea propuesta por Bull. Desde ese punto de vista, el autor considera que, si bien todas las sociedades internacionales han surgido con arreglo a la vía civilizacional, es posible defender que la expansión de algunas de éstas ha tenido lugar de modo funcional. Así, es posible hablar de sociedades híbridas como la actual, basadas en círculos concéntricos que crean distintas relaciones. En el corazón de esta sociedad se encontrarían aquellos Estados, como los que componen la Unión Europea, que están unidos a través de una red de regímenes. En un segundo círculo se hallarían aquellos con altos niveles de interdependencia pero que tratan de preservar la potestad de elegir qué normas, instituciones y reglas aceptan, categoría en la que Buzan introduce a China, Argentina o India. Finalmente, fuera de estos círculos encontraríamos a los Estados excluidos de esta sociedad (o Estados paria) y aquellos que se auto-excluyen⁶⁴.

Discusiones teóricas como ésta son una evidencia de la redefinición continua del concepto de sociedad internacional. De hecho, las características atribuidas a ésta o, mejor dicho, su grado de (potencial) solidaridad, han creado una división entre la visión pluralista y la solidarista⁶⁵. El propio Bull estableció que el desacuerdo entre ambas perspectivas se basaba en tres cuestiones claves sobre el contenido de la sociedad internacional: el papel de la guerra, las fuentes del derecho internacional y el estatus de los individuos⁶⁶. En estas cuestiones, la visión pluralista defiende que los Estados no exhiben solidaridad, aunque sí son capaces de ponerse de acuerdo para lograr propósitos mínimos. Sin embargo, la perspectiva solidarista o grotiana considera que

⁶³ LINKLATER, A., "English School... *op. cit.*", pp. 89-90.

⁶⁴ BUZAN, B., "From International System to International Society... *op. cit.* En la misma línea de este argumento, Reus-Smit considera que el origen civilizacional de la sociedad internacional actual es manifiesto en la estructura constitucional moderna, basada en los valores hegemónicos de una comunidad de Estados de carácter liberal constitucionalista. Del mismo modo, indica que esta sociedad se ha expandido de un modo funcional, constituyendo una sociedad multicultural en la que estos Estados no occidentales han sido incentivados para actuar con arreglo a estas prácticas hegemónicas. REUS-SMIT, C., *The Moral Purpose of the State... op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

⁶⁵ Suganami considera que el debate entre pluralistas y solidaristas se debe a distintos juicios sobre la solidaridad o potencial solidaridad de la sociedad internacional, aunque otros autores extienden los puntos de fricción. SUGANAMI, H., "The International Society Perspective on World Politics Reconsidered", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 2, nº 1, 2002, p. 13.

⁶⁶ BULL, H., "Society and Anarchy... *op. cit.*", p. 52. Originalmente, la distinción entre pluralismo y solidarismo que establece Bull se centra en la contraposición de los trabajos de L. Oppenheim y H. Grotius sobre derecho internacional. Ambas se distinguen, de acuerdo a Linklater y Suganami, en su juicio empírico sobre el mundo: Grotius defendiendo que ya existía un alto grado de solidaridad y Oppenheim abanderando una perspectiva más escéptica. Posteriormente, esta distinción se extendió a las dos perspectivas contrapuestas sobre la sociedad internacional. *Vid.* LINKLATER, A. y H. SUGANAMI, *The English School... op. cit.*, pp. 59-68.

existe solidaridad entre los Estados con respecto al refuerzo del derecho en aspectos como las guerras justas e injustas o el derecho a la intervención humanitaria. Para Buzan, ambas perspectivas retratan dos modelos distintos de sociedad. La primera de ellas, la pluralista, con un menor *corpus* normativo e institucional compartido, que se centra en crear un marco para una coexistencia y competición que permita la gestión de problemas colectivos. En la vertiente contraria se encuentra la perspectiva solidaria, que retrata una sociedad con un alto grado de normas e instituciones comunes que, más allá de pretender una coexistencia y competición ordenada, busca la cooperación en un amplio abanico de temas que van desde aquellos que buscan las ganancias conjuntas a otros que persiguen el logro de valores compartidos⁶⁷.

En definitiva, el debate entre estas dos corrientes internas es el reflejo de la continua tensión existente en la Escuela Inglesa entre las nociones de orden y justicia en la sociedad internacional que se remontan a los debates clásicos. Tanto Bull como Wight consideraban al orden como una precondition para la justicia, aunque no existía consenso en la ecuación inversa⁶⁸. Este debate, relacionado con la combinación de igualdad y desigualdad en el seno de la sociedad internacional, pone de relieve la difícil reconciliación entre la sociedad internacional y la mundial. En definitiva, el debate se reduce a cómo los Estados se relacionan con las personas, subrayando los conflictos, por un lado entre los derechos de los Estados y los derechos de las personas y, por otro, entre la naturaleza y la potencialidad de la sociedad interestatal⁶⁹. Evidentemente, se trata de una cuestión cada vez más central en la corriente, principalmente en la agenda contemporánea preocupada por cuestiones relativas a los derechos humanos, el orden internacional, la responsabilidad de las grandes potencias o el principio de (no) intervención⁷⁰.

Además del debate interno dentro de la perspectiva de la sociedad internacional, tanto Bull como Wight pusieron de manifiesto la existencia de una lucha entre distintas tradiciones teóricas para hacer prevalecer su visión sobre cómo es la sociedad internacional. Aunque identificando las perspectivas con distintas etiquetas⁷¹, tanto Bull como Wight eran conscientes de la controversia que generaba la pregunta central de la primera generación de teóricos de la Escuela Inglesa: qué tipo de sociedad es la sociedad internacional. Para dar respuesta a esta pregunta, Bull enumera los objetivos

⁶⁷ BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, pp. xvii y xviii.

⁶⁸ Bull, por ejemplo, creía que la justicia era solamente una condición deseable en el orden. Sin embargo, Wight señalaba que los procesos descolonizadores pusieron en evidencia que en ocasiones la justicia constituye una condición previa al orden. BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, pp. 77-78; WIGHT, M., "Western Values in International Relations" en H. BUTTERFIELD y M. WIGHT (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*, Londres, Allen & Unwin, 1966, pp. 106-111.

⁶⁹ BUZAN, B., *An Introduction to the English School... op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁷¹ Bull dividía estas tradiciones entre (1) hobbesiana, (2) grotiana y (3) kantiana. Por su parte, Wight las identificaba como (1) realista, (2) racionalista y (3) revolucionista. BELLAMY, A. J., "Introduction... op. cit.", pp. 8-9.

que, según su perspectiva, ha de tener la sociedad internacional, en los que se observa la importancia transversal de la protección del principio de soberanía y la protección del Estado como principal actor de las relaciones internacionales⁷².

Es posible afirmar que el concepto de instituciones ha estado vagamente definido. Desde la perspectiva de Bull, constituyen un conjunto de hábitos y prácticas destinadas a la consecución de objetivos comunes, entre las que se encuentran cinco instituciones primarias: la diplomacia, el derecho internacional, el equilibrio de poder, la guerra y las grandes potencias⁷³.

La importancia de las instituciones en los desarrollos de la Escuela Inglesa es más que notable, principalmente debido a tres razones fundamentales. En primer lugar, complementa y da forma al contenido de la sociedad internacional, enriqueciendo la definición. En segundo lugar, apuntala el concepto de orden dentro de la perspectiva que constituye un pilar fundamental de la teoría. Finalmente, la forma de entender las instituciones que tienen la Escuela Inglesa le diferencia profundamente de las concepciones neoliberales y de la teoría de los regímenes internacionales⁷⁴. Además, la noción impulsada por Wight que subraya el carácter cambiante y evolutivo del listado de instituciones que componen cada sociedad internacional le otorga a esta noción una importante dosis de dinamismo y adaptabilidad a distintos contextos. De hecho, Clark aprovecha esta perspectiva para avanzar hacia una institucionalización de la hegemonía a través de la transferencia de algunas funciones que los clásicos le atribuyen a las grandes potencia.

3.3. La hegemonía como concepto social. Los procesos legitimadores e institucionalizadores como pilar hegemónico

Como se ha tratado en el capítulo precedente, el estudio de la hegemonía ha estado principalmente dominado por las perspectivas realistas y liberales. En consecuencia, las variables sociales han tenido un escaso protagonismo en las teorías hegemónicas mayoritarias. Sin embargo, en los últimos años las perspectivas no materialistas han comenzado a elaborar sus propias teorías sobre este fenómeno. En concreto, los desarrollos teóricos del constructivismo y la Escuela Inglesa, si bien parten de importantes diferencias teóricas y metateóricas, coinciden en destacar el papel de la

⁷² Concretamente, los objetivos que enumera son los siguientes: (1) la preservación del sistema y sociedad de Estados frente a los desafíos de crear un imperio universal y/o de socavar la posición de los Estados como principales actores de la política mundial; (2) el mantenimiento de la soberanía de los Estados; (3) la paz (entendida como ausencia de guerra) como la condición normal de las relaciones entre los Estados miembros; (4) la limitación de la violencia interestatal; (5) la salvaguarda de los acuerdos internacionales y (6) la estabilidad de la soberanía jurisdiccional de los Estados. BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, pp. 16-19.

⁷³ BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁷⁴ BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, p. 161.

legitimidad en el análisis de la hegemonía. Un análisis conjunto de ambas perspectivas permite ofrecer un análisis conjunto de las estructuras del sistema internacional atendiendo tanto a las estructuras de poder como a las de significado y valores sociales, avanzando así hacia una interrelación de ambas en una única estructura de poder social⁷⁵.

Por una parte, la visión social de la estructura internacional que abandera el constructivismo se traduce también en una versión de la hegemonía que dista de las concepciones racionalistas. Desde la perspectiva constructivista retratan una hegemonía que necesita del reconocimiento, respeto e incluso aceptación por parte del resto de actores del sistema para lograr un control social efectivo y duradero. Por lo tanto, el resto de Estados cuentan con la llave para el establecimiento de un orden estable, mientras que el hegemón deberá limitar su poder para asegurarse la legitimidad⁷⁶.

Frente a la visión racionalista de la hegemonía como un atributo de un determinado Estado, el constructivismo la entiende como un tipo de relación existente entre un grupo de Estados⁷⁷. De hecho, la dominación material del hegemón es vista de un modo conveniente siempre que provea al resto de bienes colectivos y no utilice su posición de forma abusiva. Así, el sistema evoluciona desde una situación de subordinación hacia una de jerarquía informal⁷⁸, permitiendo el tránsito desde una cultura hobbesiana de la anarquía hacia una lockeana o kantiana a través de la reducción de los comportamientos equilibradores y de auto-ayuda⁷⁹. La interrelación de ambas dimensiones (social y material) es la esencia de la hegemonía que, si bien descansa sobre bases materiales (fortaleza económica o poder militar, entre otras), se construye y se mantiene a través de la promoción de las ideas, con la articulación de determinados discursos e ideologías⁸⁰. En este sentido, el constructivismo se acerca a la perspectiva de las teorías críticas, cuando apuntan que la adopción de un conjunto de ideas dominantes promovidas por el hegemón es el pilar del orden hegemónico⁸¹.

Es posible afirmar que la perspectiva de la hegemonía en el seno del constructivismo trata de aunar tres conceptos que, aunque a veces entren en conflicto, conforman una compleja relación: las normas, el poder hegemónico y la legitimidad. La in-

⁷⁵ La distinción entre las estructuras de poder y las de significado la elabora M. Finnemore. Por su parte, Clark la recoge y apuesta por adoptar una visión compuesta bajo la denominación de poder social. FINNEMORE, M., *National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 2; CLARK, I., "International Society and China... *op. cit.*", pp. 319-320.

⁷⁶ FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*", p. 68.

⁷⁷ CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony... *op. cit.*", p. 107.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108; BRILMAYER, L., *American Hegemony. Political Morality in a One-Superpower World*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994, p. 115.

⁷⁹ BEYER, C., "Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower... *op. cit.*", p. 418.

⁸⁰ Beyer califica como hegemonía fuerte aquella basada en los atributos que se mencionan, en referencia a la ejercida por Estados Unidos. *Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁸¹ COX, R., "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method" en J. MARTIN (ed.), *Antonio Gramsci. Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers*, Londres, Routledge, 2002, p. 368.

terrelación entre estas variables dependerá, en parte, del modo en el que el Estado más poderoso decida administrar su propio poder. En esta línea, Hurd propone dos modos alternativos de ejercer la hegemonía⁸². El primero de ellos retrata un ejercicio hegemónico centrado únicamente en afianzar el poder y lograr los objetivos propios, reforzando la estructura jerarquizada. Por el contrario, el segundo modelo incluye la variable de la legitimidad como limitadora del poder, a través del cumplimiento de unas normas básicas ya legitimadas que generan un progresivo cambio de comportamiento en el hegemón.

Por otra parte, en el seno de la Escuela Inglesa también se ha abordado la hegemonía, aunque desde planos diversos. En su vertiente clásica, esta corriente consideraba la concentración de poder en un solo Estado como una amenaza a la sociedad internacional y defendía que el equilibrio de poder constituía una institución de dicha sociedad⁸³. Sin embargo, en los desarrollos contemporáneos se ha desterrado esta idea, avanzando hacia una teoría de la hegemonía en el seno de la sociedad internacional sustentada en dos conceptos principales: la legitimidad y la institución de la hegemonía.

Desde esta perspectiva, la visión de la hegemonía se alejaría de las consideraciones realistas, definiéndola no como una relación de dominación por medio de la fuerza material, sino como una de consentimiento a través de un liderazgo político e ideológico⁸⁴. En consecuencia, primacía y hegemonía se revelan como dos conceptos distintos. El primero se define como un simple reflejo de una distribución de poder en la que un Estado ostenta una posición privilegiada. El segundo, sin embargo, hace referencia a una práctica institucionalizada y legitimada en la sociedad internacional que, indudablemente, se da en situaciones de primacía material. Por lo tanto, es la dimensión institucional la que marca la línea divisoria entre ambos conceptos⁸⁵.

En la misma línea que la distinción anterior, Clark también establece una clara diferenciación entre las transiciones de poder y las sucesiones hegemónicas, para posteriormente señalar a estas últimas como objeto de su análisis. Desde su punto de vis-

⁸² HURD, I., *After Anarchy... op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

⁸³ Existen numerosas referencias al carácter anti-hegemónico de los escritos clásicos de la Escuela Inglesa. Vid. CLARK, I., "Towards an English School Theory... op. cit."; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 39-45; VIGEZZI, B., *The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985): The Rediscovery of History*, Milan, Edizioni Unicopli, 2005, pp. 240-241. De hecho, el propio Bull puso en duda la supervivencia de la sociedad internacional en el caso de un orden internacional hegemónico: "si se pretende mantener la sociedad internacional, ningún estado ha de estar en la posición de dominar al resto". BULL, H., "Society and Anarchy... op. cit.", p. 47. En la misma línea se manifiestan autores como Butterfield o Wight. BUTTERFIELD, H., "Balance of Power" en H. BUTTERFIELD y M. WIGHT (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations... op. cit.*, p. 142; WIGHT, M., "Western Values... op. cit.", p. 103. No obstante, los trabajos de Watson sí que aportan interesantes cuestiones sobre la hegemonía, constituyendo una de las escasas aportaciones de la Escuela Inglesa en este sentido previamente a las aportaciones modernas de Clark. WATSON, A., *Hegemony and History*, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 90.

⁸⁴ SIMON, R., *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction*, Londres, Laurence and Wishart, 1982, p. 21.

⁸⁵ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 34.

ta, las transiciones de poder se ocupan del aumento de las capacidades materiales de un Estado rival, señalándolo como requisito para revisar el orden internacional establecido. Por lo tanto, desde esta perspectiva, las teorías realistas (principalmente la teoría de la estabilidad hegemónica y la de las transiciones de poder) se clasificarían en la presente categoría. Sin embargo, las sucesiones hegemónicas subrayan la aceptación por parte del resto de Estados del orden internacional del Estado dominante como un constituyente en sí mismo del poder del hegemón. Esta distinción, por lo tanto, pone de relieve que, mientras las teorías de la transición se ocupan del conflicto internacional, las de la sucesión hegemónica abordan las condiciones necesarias para preservar el orden internacional ya establecido⁸⁶.

Basándose en estas consideraciones, Clark construye una teoría de las sucesiones hegemónicas en el seno de la Escuela Inglesa, otorgándole una especial importancia a la institucionalización del orden hegemónico. Pese al notable rechazo a la hegemonía en los escritos clásicos, Clark logra incluir la hegemonía entre las instituciones de la sociedad internacional, manteniendo el papel de las grandes potencias⁸⁷.

Tal y como se deriva de las posturas constructivistas y de la Escuela Inglesa, la legitimidad constituye la piedra angular de ambos desarrollos teóricos sobre la hegemonía así como la variable más importante a analizar. Si bien en ocasiones la aplicación del concepto es distinta, un análisis conjunto en torno a la legitimidad aporta un entendimiento más complejo del fenómeno.

3.3.1. La legitimidad y el reconocimiento social. Procesos y variables.

La legitimidad se ha convertido paulatinamente en uno de los temas de investigación más prolíficos de las corrientes de las que nos ocupamos. Tanto por su capacidad como puente con otras tradiciones teóricas⁸⁸ como por su vigencia tras los sucesos

⁸⁶ CLARK, I., "China and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, nº 1, 2011, p. 14.

⁸⁷ PINTADO, M., "Hegemonía y Legitimidad en un Mundo en Transformación", *Congreso Vasco de Sociología y Ciencia Política*, Asociación Vasca de Sociología y Ciencia Política, Bilbao, Septiembre 2015.

⁸⁸ El concepto de legitimidad, tal y como lo describe el constructivismo, propicia el diálogo investigador entre esta corriente y algunas de las aportaciones más recientes de la Escuela Inglesa. Vid. CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in the International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society...* op. cit.; DUNNE, T., "Society and Hierarchy in International Relations", *International Relations*, Vol. 13, nº 3, 2003, pp. 303-320; HURD, I., *After Anarchy...* op. cit.; REUS-SMIT, C., "Imagining Society... op. cit."; REUS-SMIT, C., "Power, Legitimacy, and Order", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, nº 3, 2014, pp. 341-359. No obstante, los análisis sobre la legitimidad no son exclusivos de estas dos corrientes. Las concepciones alternativas sobre el concepto de hegemonía generan distintas interpretaciones sobre la importancia de la legitimidad y de algunos atributos de ésta. Por ejemplo, los teóricos neoliberales y algunos realistas le asignan un rol relevante a la provisión de bienes públicos globales y, los neogramscianos subrayan el grado de consentimiento como un elemento central. RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, nº 1, 2009, pp. 118-119. Vid. COX, R., *Production, Power and World Order*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987;

posteriores a los atentados de 2001, es prácticamente imposible desligar el análisis de la hegemonía en clave constructivista/Escuela Inglesa del desarrollo teórico de este concepto. Esto se debe, principalmente, a un entendimiento propio de la hegemonía como el poder basado en el consentimiento, frente a la dominación que se asienta sobre la coacción⁸⁹.

Además, las concepciones políticas sobre la legitimidad enlazan directamente con las consideraciones que ambas teorías tienen sobre la estructura del sistema internacional, ya que la legitimidad es la base sobre la que se sustentan tanto el conocimiento compartido como las normas y reglas que conforman la cultura política del sistema internacional⁹⁰.

El concepto de legitimidad ha sido definido como una percepción o suposición generalizada de que las acciones de una entidad o actor son apropiadas y convenientes con arreglo a un sistema de normas, valores y creencias socialmente construido⁹¹. La legitimidad, entendida como un concepto inherentemente social, se refiere a una cualidad que se le adscribe a las identidades, intereses o prácticas de un actor, así como a las normas, reglas y principios de una institución⁹². En la misma línea, Hurd ofrece una definición del término relacionada con la creencia de un determinado actor de que una norma debe ser obedecida, de modo que transforma los cálculos estratégicos sobre cómo relacionarse con dicha entidad⁹³.

Estas definiciones llevan implícitas tres consideraciones distintas. La primera de ellas es que la legitimidad constituye una apelación normativa, es decir, las referencias a la misma definen aquello que es aceptable normativamente según las consideracio-

IKENBERRY, G. J., "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order", *International Security*, Vol. 23, nº 3, 1998-1999, pp. 43-78; IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*; IKENBERRY, G. J. y C. A. KUPCHAN, "The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power" en D. RAPKIN (ed.), *World Leadership and Hegemony*, Boulder, Rienner, 1990, pp. 49-69.

⁸⁹ REUS-SMIT, C., "Power, Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 348.

⁹⁰ Al poner de manifiesto este punto, Bukovansky define la cultura política como "un conjunto de proposiciones implícitas o explícitas que son compartidas por la mayoría de actores del sistema, referidas a la naturaleza de la autoridad política legítima, la identidad estatal y el poder político, así como las normas y reglas que derivan de estas proposiciones y que rigen las relaciones interestatales dentro del sistema internacional". BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 2.

⁹¹ SUCHMAN, M. C., "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches", *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 20, nº 3, 1995, p. 574.

⁹² REUS SMIT, C., "International Crisis... *op. cit.*", p. 159. Si bien algunos autores han abordado el término legitimidad en relación a las instituciones internacionales, tras los sucesos posteriores al 11 de septiembre se han extendido los análisis que lo relacionan con los Estados, más concretamente con el papel de los Estados Unidos como hegemonía en el sistema internacional. Vid. BUKOVANSKY, M., "Liberal States, International Order... *op. cit.*", pp. 175-193; CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in International Society... op. cit.*; DUNNE, T., "The Rules of the Game are Changing: Fundamental Human Rights in Crisis after 9/11", *International Politics*, Vol. 44, nº 2/3, 2007, pp. 269-286; FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*"; HURRELL, A., "Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle be Squared?", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31, nº S1, 2005, pp. 15-32; MORRIS, J. y N. J. WHEELER, "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force", *International Politics*, Vol. 44, nº 2/3, 2007, pp. 214-231.

⁹³ HURD, I., *After Anarchy... op. cit.*, p. 30.

nes personales. En segundo lugar, es un fenómeno social, ya que depende de las percepciones de otros sujetos, en tanto que la auto-legitimación es imposible de realizar. Finalmente los juicios sobre la legitimidad de un actor se realizan siempre con referencias implícitas al marco institucional, cuyas normas sociales, reglas y creencias moldean las consideraciones sobre esta cualidad⁹⁴.

Las distintas definiciones mayoritarias sobre el término legitimidad enumeradas anteriormente comparten, según Rapkin y Braaten, el énfasis en tres ideas distintas que componen lo que han denominado como nivel básico del concepto⁹⁵. En primer lugar, la noción de la legitimidad como una propiedad intersubjetiva que deriva de las percepciones y creencias de los actores y que, por lo tanto, es inherentemente social. En segundo lugar, la legitimidad va unida a un sentido de moralidad que le es atribuido a una institución, actor o norma, relacionado con su carácter apropiado, aceptable y justificable. Finalmente, el tercer factor con el que se relaciona la legitimidad es el consentimiento, que le es atribuido por parte de un actor al hegemon, entendiéndose que es el legítimo creador de las normas⁹⁶.

El carácter multidimensional del concepto de legitimidad y su enfoque eminentemente cualitativo multiplican las distintas consideraciones que se hacen del concepto. En esta línea, Rapkin y Braaten realizan una aportación interesante aplicando el enfoque de los parecidos de familia de L. Wittgenstein⁹⁷. Así, le añaden a las tres ideas del nivel básico (perceptual, moral/deber ser y consentimiento) un corpus de características de segundo nivel⁹⁸, aunque no es necesario que el sujeto legitimado/a legitimar cumpla todas ellas. Estas características de segundo nivel o fuentes de legitimidad están compuestas por tres grandes bloques que sirven para identificar, posteriormente, ciertos indicadores:

- 1) La legitimidad sustantiva. Deriva de la parte sustantiva y normativa del principio, norma o actor a legitimar. Descansa principalmente sobre los valores y normas compartidos y el entendimiento colectivo.
- 2) Constitucionalismo procesal. Se trata de la aproximación que se centra en el proceso. Es posible distinguir dos vertientes. La primera de ellas está centrada en el proceso de toma de decisiones y su carácter abierto, transparente y en consonancia con el interés general. La segunda pone el foco en la

⁹⁴ REUS-SMIT, C., "Power, Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 345.

⁹⁵ RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", pp. 120-121.

⁹⁶ El tercero de estos factores genera cierta controversia terminológica. De hecho, Clark prefiere utilizar la palabra consenso, argumentando que establece un criterio "menos exigente", pero Rapkin y Braaten defienden el uso del término consentimiento, que constituye una práctica activa, mientras que el consenso se refiere a un estado o condición. *Ibid.*, p. 121; CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

⁹⁷ WITTGENSTEIN, L., *Investigaciones Filosóficas*, Barcelona, Crítica, 1988.

⁹⁸ RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", pp. 122-126. A estas tres dimensiones de tercer nivel, Hurrell añade dos más: la experiencia especializada y la comunicación racional. HURRELL, A., "Legitimacy and the Use of Force... *op. cit.*", p. 22.

actitud/actuación del sujeto que dirige el proceso. En el caso del hegemon, los indicadores estarían directamente relacionados con su contención estratégica en el ejercicio de su poder, el autocontrol, la práctica política moderada y la alta adhesión al derecho internacional y a las instituciones internacionales.

- 3) La legitimidad de los resultados. Ésta se refiere al uso del poder hegemónico para lograr unos resultados exitosos. Estos resultados pueden tener un carácter más difuso (generalmente aquellos centrados en propiedades sistémicas como la paz, la estabilidad o el equilibrio) o concreto (una determinada intervención, el cambio climático).

Como ponen de manifiesto los tres puntos anteriores, es imposible desligar la legitimidad de las dos vertientes que intervienen en los procesos. Por un lado, el referente o actor que necesita y persigue la legitimidad, así como las políticas, ideas o acciones que los actores aceptan como legitimadas. Este primer sujeto se relaciona con los segundos, aquellos que otorgan la legitimidad, formando una relación social⁹⁹. La búsqueda de la legitimidad por ese Estado referente es particularmente aplicable a aquellos Estados cuyo poder les confiere la capacidad de ostentar el estatus de líder hegemónico¹⁰⁰. No obstante, no se adscribe únicamente al hegemon, sino que también es relevante para aquellos que se atribuyen un rol sistémico extraordinario, como la institución de las grandes potencias enunciada por la Escuela Inglesa. Esa responsabilidad, erigida alrededor del compromiso con la estabilidad del orden internacional, necesita de la legitimidad¹⁰¹.

Pese a que las teorías de la Escuela Inglesa y del constructivismo ponen el foco en variables marginales para las teorías racionalistas, ha de tenerse presente la relación de estas variables con el poder. De hecho, es preciso recordar que la legitimidad está estrechamente relacionada con el poder, ya que mientras que el poder en su vertiente material cambia el orden internacional, la legitimidad es la encargada de la construcción, mantenimiento y eventual disolución de dichos órdenes¹⁰². De hecho, la existencia en el sistema de una forma de gobierno considerada como la más poderosa y legítima hace referencia tanto a las condiciones materiales como a las culturales. Según sostiene Bukovansky, las condiciones culturales favorecen la acumulación de poder material. Por ello, la legitimidad no está solamente relacionada con el poder material, sino que constituye un aspecto crucial del propio poder. Esa legitimidad, a su vez, es consecuencia de su cultura, que deriva de su propia estructura interna. En consecuencia, la hegemonía no hace referencia únicamente a la existencia de un Esta-

⁹⁹ RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 117.

¹⁰⁰ SAMHAT, N. H. y R. A. PAYNE, 'American Foreign Policy Legitimacy and the Global Public Sphere', *Peace Review*, Vol. 18, nº 2, 2007, p. 252.

¹⁰¹ RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 118.

¹⁰² REUS-SMIT, C., "Power, Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 341.

do preponderante, sino que admite la presencia de una forma dominante de autoridad legítima¹⁰³.

Dado que se trata de un concepto eminentemente social, tanto en su naturaleza como percepción subjetiva como en su origen como atribución externa, la legitimidad tiene una fuerte influencia en las estructuras intersubjetivas internacionales. De hecho, trabaja a nivel de las unidades a modo individual, cambiando los intereses de los actores a través de procesos de internalización y, a la vez, a nivel estructural transformando la matriz de recompensas entre los que califican a una institución o actor como legítimo y los que no lo hacen¹⁰⁴.

A través de procesos de socialización, la norma, institución o práctica legitimada es internalizada por las unidades, incorporándose a su propia identidad e intereses. Siguiendo esta línea, es posible refutar la noción waltziana que afirma que es la estructura la que determina el comportamiento de las unidades dentro del sistema. Frente a esa concepción estructural, los constructivistas sostienen que los procesos de legitimación sí alteran y determinan el carácter de las unidades en ese sistema social. De este modo, la relación unidireccional entre estructura y unidades que defiende el neorrealismo se convierte en un vínculo bidireccional, concediendo que la estructura puede ser alterada por estos procesos. La legitimidad, por lo tanto, cambia el entorno estratégico en el que cohabitan los Estados, afectando a su comportamiento y modificando los cálculos que realizan sobre la estructura de recompensas¹⁰⁵.

Desde esta perspectiva, los procesos de internalización empoderan al actor legitimado de tres modos distintos. En primer lugar, le permiten contar con el apoyo activo de otros Estados, que invertirán activamente sus recursos voluntariamente. Esta actitud es una consecuencia directa de una internalización exitosa, que permite que la visión legitimada sea adoptada por los legitimadores como propia¹⁰⁶. En segundo lugar, cuentan con la ventaja de que el resto de actores actúan (normalmente) dentro de las normas y mandatos que ha establecido el actor legitimado, sus propias reglas del juego. Finalmente, los bajos niveles de oposición a sus prácticas le permiten beneficiarse de los reducidos costes del ejercicio del poder, con una escasa necesidad de recurrir a la coacción y al soborno¹⁰⁷.

Sin embargo, frente a los beneficios de la legitimación, este proceso también limita sus actuaciones como potencia preponderante. Para lograr esa legitimidad, el hegemón debe suavizar su poder y reconocer el de otros actores, en los que reside la potestad de otorgarle esa distinción. Además, la legitimación a menudo va acompa-

¹⁰³ BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics...* op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ HURD, I., *After Anarchy...* op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁰⁶ Los procesos de internalización guardan una estrecha relación con lo que Ikenberry y Kupchan denominaron socialización, ya que ambos dan como resultado la adopción de dichas visiones como propias por parte de los sujetos legitimadores/socializados. Vid. IKENBERRY, G. J. y C. A. KUPCHAN, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power..." op. cit.

¹⁰⁷ REUS SMIT, C., "International Crisis..." op. cit., p. 163.

ñada de un proceso de institucionalización del orden que obliga al hegemon a adherirse a un determinado *corpus* legal, normativo e institucional legitimado. Una vez establecida dicha red institucional, el Estado se ve constreñido por ese entramado normativo que es, en sí mismo, una fuente de legitimación. Sin embargo, las restricciones y limitaciones que ejercen estas instituciones y estructuras no siempre logran sus objetivos. Por ello, Finnemore apunta a la hipocresía como el tercero de los mecanismos limitadores del poder. Aunque estos comportamientos hipócritas le permitan contravenir las normas legitimadas, la autora considera que estas prácticas debilitan el respeto tanto hacia el Estado hegemónico como hacia los valores legitimadores de su poder¹⁰⁸.

Habitualmente, se retrata a las instituciones y organismos internacionales como un conjunto de normas, reglas y principios transformadores de las relaciones sociales. Como tales, cumplen un importante papel como legitimadoras de las prácticas del hegemon, pero también sufren los comportamientos hipócritas descritos anteriormente. Tal y como explica Reus-Smit, el poder político está profundamente arraigado en las redes de intercambio social y constitución mutua. En el mismo sentido, la legitimidad y las instituciones se erigen como las bases del poder político estable¹⁰⁹, ya que la institucionalización del poder del hegemon transforma la estructura social del sistema. Paulatinamente, estas instituciones se convierten en actores no estatales que van desligándose de sus creadores y ganando autonomía. Así, estabiliza y a la vez transforma el entorno internacional, a través del establecimiento de nuevas metas que se van convirtiendo en aceptables tanto para el hegemon como para el resto de Estados¹¹⁰.

Sin duda, la identidad del Estado hegemónico tiene una gran influencia sobre el orden internacional del que forman parte estas instituciones. De hecho, algunos autores consideran que el factor crucial que define el orden internacional no es la hegemonía, sino la identidad de Estados Unidos como democracia liberal¹¹¹. Las instituciones que conforman ese orden, a su vez, cumplen el papel de agentes legitimadores, y si el hegemon contraviene esas normas actuando unilateralmente, la legitimidad del orden internacional en su conjunto se ve poco a poco socavada. Según Cronin, este supuesto se aplica también a los casos en el que el hegemon ya no controla el sistema, similares a las situaciones descritas por Keohane en la teoría de los regímenes. No obstante, si bien el institucionalismo sostiene que dichas organizaciones sobrevivirán al declive, Cronin argumenta que esa premisa únicamente se sostiene en el caso de

¹⁰⁸ FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*", pp. 60-61.

¹⁰⁹ REUS-SMIT, C., *American Power and World Order*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p. 41.

¹¹⁰ FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*", p. 72.

¹¹¹ RUGGIE, J. G. (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 31; BURLEY, A-M., "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State" en J. G. RUGGIE (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters... op. cit.*, p. 126.

que el hegemon en declive continúe adhiriéndose a las normas y reglas de las instituciones, sin abordar el problema que supone que el propio hegemon viole el marco institucional establecido¹¹².

Este comportamiento sí ha sido abordado por el constructivismo, aunque llegando a conclusiones dispares. Aplicando el caso de las acciones unilaterales de los Estados Unidos bajo el gobierno de George W. Bush, Reus-Smit considerara que dichas actuaciones constituyen en sí mismas el detonante de una crisis de legitimidad¹¹³. Sin embargo, Hurd irá más allá y defenderá que estas acciones aparentemente deslegitimadoras forman parte de los esfuerzos del hegemon por legitimar nuevas normas, como la de la acción preventiva¹¹⁴. No obstante, ambas percepciones disienten porque se basan en distintas concepciones de la legitimidad. Por un lado, Reus-Smit la entiende como un fenómeno social basado en significados y valores intersubjetivos y construido a través de la comunicación social¹¹⁵. Por su parte, Hurd describe la legitimidad como el proceso que une la práctica estatal y las normas internacionales en una relación mutuamente constitutiva¹¹⁶. De cualquier modo, este tipo de comportamientos, además de ser contraproducentes por su capacidad deslegitimadora, también transforman la percepción que otros Estados tienen sobre el hegemon.

No obstante, ésta no es la única implicación del término identidad en las consideraciones sobre hegemonía. La importancia del concepto dentro de la corriente constructivista es evidente, en tanto que sostiene que las acciones y preferencias de los actores dentro de la estructura están directamente ligadas a sus identidades y a las que el resto de actores les atribuyen¹¹⁷. En la misma línea, los constructivistas entienden que las identidades y los intereses son aprendidos¹¹⁸ y reforzados en respuesta a los otros, es decir, es el proceso de interacción el que llena de significado a la identidad. Por lo tanto, la interacción con distintos sujetos produce una multiplicidad de identidades y el rol que el sujeto decide representar ante una determinada interacción está directamente relacionado con la identidad del otro sujeto¹¹⁹.

En el caso de orden hegemónico, el Estado más poderoso ostenta dos identidades o roles, una como gran potencia y otra como líder del sistema, entre las que a menudo se generan tensiones. En lo que Cronin ha denominado como paradoja de la hegemonía, existe una marcada tensión entre el rol del Estado como hegemon (una

¹¹² CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony ... *op. cit.*", p. 113.

¹¹³ REUS-SMIT, C., "Power, Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 348.

¹¹⁴ HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crisis of Legitimacy", *International Politics*, Vol. 44, nº 2/3, 2007, p. 194.

¹¹⁵ REUS SMIT, C., "International Crisis... *op. cit.*", p. 161.

¹¹⁶ HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*", p. 196.

¹¹⁷ HOPE, T., "The Promise of Constructivism... *op. cit.*", pp. 175 y 178.

¹¹⁸ WENDT, A. *Social Theory... op. cit.*, p. 327.

¹¹⁹ PINTADO, M., "Identidad y Alteridad en un Mundo en Transformación. Un Análisis de las Relaciones entre China y Estados Unidos", *Relaciones Internacionales*, nº 29, 2015, pp. 94-95, <<http://www.relacionesinternacionales.info/ojs/article/view/631/439.html>> [15 octubre 2015].

identidad relacionada con la legitimidad y el liderazgo) y su rol como gran potencia (relacionado con sus capacidades materiales). La dificultad de aunar ambas identidades y las prácticas asociadas a ellas se manifiesta cuando, por un lado, el resto de Estados esperan que el hegemón se comporte con arreglo al bien común de todo el sistema mientras que, por otro lado, las audiencias domésticas pretenden que actúe de acuerdo con el interés nacional. En consecuencia, esta paradoja genera situaciones contradictorias entre la tendencia del hegemón a tomar acciones unilaterales y su deseo de mantener la estabilidad del sistema al menor coste posible¹²⁰.

La estabilidad de este sistema no deriva, según Cronin, de sus capacidades materiales sino de su rol como líder, que dependerá de que actúe con arreglo a unos determinados límites. Además, el resto de Estados esperan que proporcione una serie de bienes colectivos y ejerza un rol de liderazgo a la hora de gestionar crisis, especialmente en materias económicas y de seguridad, pese a que éstas no dañen sus intereses¹²¹. No obstante, el comportamiento del hegemón debe estar condicionado por una serie de límites, estrechamente relacionados con los que establecía Bull para las grandes potencias: (1) el mantenimiento de la igualdad legal de los Estados, (2) el cumplimiento de las normas y la ausencia de actuaciones unilaterales que las violen, (3) una libertad de acción limitada a sus responsabilidades y (4) la progresiva incorporación de algunos Estados secundarios a la toma de decisiones¹²². Por su parte, el resto de Estados son conscientes que las posibilidades de un equilibrio material en un sistema hegemónico son reducidas. Por ello, una de las posibilidades de los rivales es debilitar la legitimidad del hegemón y construir visiones y valores alternativos que puedan resultar atractivos para otros Estados¹²³.

Si estas estrategias resultan exitosas, es posible que el hegemón se vea inmerso en una crisis de legitimidad. Entendiendo el proceso de legitimación como una construcción discursiva de sus propias imágenes y de la justificación de sus prácticas basadas en la estructura social, en el caso de que alguno de los factores (el discurso o la estructura) varíe, la legitimidad del actor/institución sufrirá una crisis. Dicho fenómeno, no obstante, es posible atajarlo a través de dos caminos diferentes. El primero de ellos es un proceso de recalibración que implicaría una paulatina reconciliación entre la identidad social del hegemón, la estructura social y las expectativas del resto de actores sobre su comportamiento. Este proceso culminaría cuando el actor cuente con la suficiente legitimidad para cumplir sus objetivos con la conformidad voluntaria del resto de actores. La segunda de las vías para atajar una crisis de legitimidad es sustituir esa fuente de liderazgo por el poder material, a través de la coacción e incurriendo

¹²⁰ CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony ... *op. cit.*", pp. 104-105.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 108 y 110-111.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111; BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, pp. 222-223.

¹²³ Tal y como demuestra la afirmación de Finnemore, las crisis de legitimidad no surgen únicamente del comportamiento del hegemón. FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*", p. 66.

en el incremento de costes derivado del mismo¹²⁴. De este modo, la hegemonía mutaría desde un sistema de jerarquía voluntaria a uno de dominación material, reduciendo la estabilidad del sistema e incrementando las necesidades materiales del hegemón para mantener su posición dominante.

En el caso de lograr superar dicha crisis manteniendo la legitimidad del sistema, el ejercicio del poder por parte del hegemón resultará menos costoso. Sin embargo, la legitimación de su ejercicio de poder no se realiza únicamente a través de sus acciones individuales. Es necesario entender el concepto de hegemonía, no solamente como un atributo individual, sino a través de la construcción de un orden determinado que facilita el ejercicio de poder por parte de ese Estado. La institucionalización de este liderazgo provocará que el sujeto legitimado no sea el propio hegemón, sino su institución hegemónica.

3.3.2. La hegemonía como institución de la sociedad internacional. Instituciones alternativas y sucesión.

La Escuela Inglesa, tradicionalmente centrada en los estudios sobre el equilibrio, presenta en su versión contemporánea un efervescente desarrollo en lo referente a teorías sobre la hegemonía que permite reforzar la relación entre este concepto y la variable de la legitimidad. Estas aportaciones constituyen un interesante contrapunto de las visiones realistas y liberales. Frente a la versión clásica, que encumbraba al equilibrio de poder y a las grandes potencias como instituciones de la sociedad internacional, este nuevo prisma retratará a la hegemonía como una institución parte de la sociedad internacional, y no como una amenaza para la misma¹²⁵.

Desde esta perspectiva, es posible contravenir aquellas argumentaciones que consideran que la hegemonía convertiría la estructura anárquica de la sociedad internacional en una jerárquica¹²⁶. A este respecto, Clark identifica un doble fenómeno: por una parte, la existencia de un concierto/anarquía horizontal entre los grandes poderes, por otra, una jerarquía vertical entre las potencias y el resto de Estados de la sociedad internacional, dando lugar a una perspectiva mixta¹²⁷. Por lo tanto, la presencia de

¹²⁴ REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis... *op. cit.*", pp. 163, 167 y 172.

¹²⁵ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹²⁶ Es posible encontrar diversas consideraciones de este tipo, desde la postura de Brilmayer, que entiende la hegemonía como "un acuerdo político jerárquico" o la de Ikenberry, admitiendo que en un orden internacional hegemónico las relaciones de poder están definidas por "el principio organizador de la anarquía". También existen posturas mixtas, como la de Nexon y Wright, que ponen de manifiesto el carácter híbrido del orden hegemónico, combinando principios anárquicos y jerárquicos. BRILMAYER, L. *American Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 19; IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, pp. 26-27; NEXON, D. H. y T. WRIGHT, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, nº 2, 2007, p. 256.

¹²⁷ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 48.

jerarquías formales o informales en el seno de la sociedad internacional no tiene por qué suponer la quiebra de la misma¹²⁸.

El desarrollo de una teoría de la hegemonía desde la posición teórica de la Escuela Inglesa permite abordar uno de los mayores problemas del orden internacional actual: encontrar un equilibrio entre el poder hegemónico de los Estados Unidos y los intereses generales del conjunto de la sociedad internacional¹²⁹. El carácter anti-hegemónico de los desarrollos clásicos de esta corriente supone uno de los retos principales a los que se enfrenta Clark a la hora de construir su teoría. En esta tarea, realiza una interesante analogía entre la institución de las grandes potencias tal y como la concibió Bull y su propuesta de una institución de la hegemonía. Cabe recordar que la institución de las grandes potencias se basa principalmente en la noción de la preponderancia colectiva que le permitió a Bull configurar una sociedad internacional que se beneficiase de un cierto grado de jerarquización en asuntos instrumentales (a través de mecanismos como el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas) pero eliminando cualquier figura dominadora como la de un hegemón. De hecho, las grandes potencias solo pueden cumplir con las funciones que se les asignan si éstas son aceptadas por una proporción suficiente de la sociedad internacional como para gozar de legitimidad, lo que Clark denomina como jerarquía vertical¹³⁰. De este modo, la propia institución de los grandes poderes tal y como lo conciben los autores clásicos refuerza la idea del carácter social de estas instituciones, en tanto que se trata de un estatus reconocido por el resto de la sociedad internacional, más allá de las capacidades materiales con las que cuenten los miembros de este club.

En opinión de Clark, en condiciones de preponderancia individual la sociedad internacional puede desarrollar una institución de la hegemonía que cumpla el rol que, de otro modo, está reservado a las grandes potencias¹³¹. Al incluir la hegemonía como una institución de la sociedad internacional, Clark hace un especial énfasis en distinguir los conceptos de primacía y hegemonía, y de este modo se distancia de las teorías de la hegemonía del realismo y liberalismo. Como ya se ha apuntado, la dimensión institucional que le otorga a la hegemonía es lo que marca la separación entre ambos conceptos. Así, la hegemonía se refiere a una práctica institucionalizada y legi-

¹²⁸ Esta conclusión es enunciada por Dunne en su análisis sobre los sucesos posteriores al 11 de septiembre de 2001. Sin embargo, no constituye una afirmación absoluta, ya que considera que en el periodo posterior a 2001 se puede afirmar que sí existe una sociedad internacional en el sentido más débil del concepto (principalmente, centrada en los valores compartidos y la interdependencia entre otros). No obstante, no se muestra tan tajante sobre la existencia de una sociedad internacional en la definición fuerte del concepto, que busca regulaciones que avancen hacia la eliminación del conflicto a escala internacional. DUNNE, T., "Society and Hierarchy... *op.cit.*, pp. 305-306.

¹²⁹ CLARK, I., "Towards an English School Theory... *op. cit.*, p. 204.

¹³⁰ BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, p. 220. En la misma línea se manifiesta Hurrell, cuando afirma que "la membresía en el club de las grandes potencias es una categoría social que depende del reconocimiento de los demás". HURRELL, A., "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, nº 1, 2006, p. 4.

¹³¹ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 46.

timada por la sociedad internacional mientras que la primacía únicamente hace referencia a una distribución de poder concreta¹³². Esa distribución de poder es crucial a la hora de determinar tanto la forma como la naturaleza cambiante de la sociedad internacional, e incluso conducir a un mayor o menor desarrollo normativo de dicha sociedad. Sin embargo, esa primacía material no determina el contenido normativo, algo que si hace la hegemonía¹³³.

Llevando esta dicotomía aún más lejos, es posible extender esta distinción a dos conceptos que en las teorías liberales y realistas han sido abordados sin establecer una clara distinción: las transiciones de poder y las sucesiones hegemónicas. En la misma línea de los conceptos previos, el autor considera que las transiciones de poder se centran únicamente en la dimensión material, al considerar la adquisición de unas mayores cuotas de poder por parte de un Estado rival como una condición para la revisión del orden internacional. Por el contrario, el concepto de sucesión hegemónica es útil para poner de relieve que la aceptación por parte del resto de Estados del modelo de orden propuesto por el Estado dominante es, en sí mismo, un constituyente efectivo del poder.

3.3.2.1. La institución de la hegemonía. Constituyentes y tipos.

Como ya apunta la distinción entre los conceptos de primacía y hegemonía, el último de estos términos no hace (solamente) referencia a una relación de dominación material. Tal y como apunta Cox, la idea de la hegemonía va irremediamente unida a una propuesta de un orden internacional determinado que se pretende liderar. Se trata de lograr un orden que tenga un carácter universal y que sea compatible con los intereses de otros Estados, para que éstos lo acepten¹³⁴. Por lo tanto, la condición hegemónica se traslada del Estado al propio sistema internacional, y no es una propiedad que pertenezca al hegemón¹³⁵. En consecuencia, se convierte en un “acuerdo social legítimo” que considera que el hegemón puede contribuir positivamente al orden internacional¹³⁶, y no suponer una amenaza. Además, en base a ese acuerdo, el Estado hegemónico no es un actor externo a ese orden que puede imponer su voluntad ante los débiles, sino que se rige igualmente por el modelo de orden que él mismo ha legitimado¹³⁷. Dicho de otro modo, la naturaleza hegemónica del orden internacio-

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹³³ MORRIS, J., “Normative Innovation and the Great Powers” en A. J. BELLAMY (ed.), *International Society... op. cit.*, p. 265.

¹³⁴ COX, R. W., *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 136.

¹³⁵ CERNY, P. G., “Dilemmas of Operationalizing Hegemony” en M. HAUGAARD y H. H. LENTNER (eds.), *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2006, p. 68.

¹³⁶ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹³⁷ BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 46.

nal pone de manifiesto la existencia de una forma dominante de autoridad legítima, que también constriñe el ejercicio de la hegemonía¹³⁸.

En consecuencia, las dinámicas legitimadoras de carácter cambiante constituyen el componente social clave de esta teoría. Si bien es cierto que esta hegemonía necesita de una situación de preponderancia material, es necesario atender a las dinámicas legitimadoras que le otorgan al proyecto del hegemón ese estatus. Esto guarda una estrecha relación con los dos modos de ejercicio hegemónico que establece Hurd¹³⁹. El primero de ellos se basa en afianzar la posición de dominación material que le ha permitido al Estado preponderante ostentar esa posición. Se trataría, por lo tanto, de un ejercicio de la hegemonía basado en el interés propio y cuya estabilidad se logra gracias a las ganancias derivadas de la posición hegemónica. El segundo de los modos de comandar el sistema es a través del liderazgo. En este caso, la preponderancia material es necesaria pero no suficiente. Como apunta Clark, “no es solamente algo que el hegemón posea o haga, sino algo que la sociedad internacional ve”¹⁴⁰.

Bajo esta perspectiva, la hegemonía constituiría una institución potencial de la sociedad internacional aplicable a condiciones de primacía material, convirtiéndola en un fenómeno compatible con el carácter anárquico de ésta¹⁴¹. En la misma línea, Agnew desliga el concepto de hegemonía con la preeminencia de poder material y la entiende como la unión de individuos, objetos e instituciones alrededor de unas normas y estándares culturales que emanan de los actores que ostentan los lugares de poder¹⁴². La hegemonía, por lo tanto, va más allá del poder material y constituye un conjunto normativo y cultural establecido por el actor más poderoso y que une a los distintos actores de la sociedad internacional. En consecuencia, la institucionalización de la hegemonía que propone Clark permite reforzar la imagen de la sociedad internacional como terreno de reconciliación entre los sistemas de relaciones del poder material y los marcos normativos compartidos¹⁴³.

Esta concepción diferenciada de la hegemonía, enraizada en la legitimidad internacional, queda patente en la propia definición del fenómeno. Clark entiende por hegemonía “la práctica institucionalizada de unos derechos y responsabilidades especiales conferidas por la sociedad internacional a un Estado que cuenta con los recursos para liderarla”¹⁴⁴. La asignación de derechos y responsabilidades al hegemón reafirma la diferencia con las situaciones de primacía y constituye una analogía con el rol asignado a la institución de los grandes poderes. Tal y como recoge Clark, el rol dirigente

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹³⁹ HURD, I., *After Anarchy... op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

¹⁴⁰ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁴² AGNEW, J., *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2005, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4; CLARK, I., “Bringing Hegemony back in: the United States and International Order”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, nº 1, 2009, p. 24.

de las grandes potencias implica dos tipos de normas, las primeras orientadas al concierto horizontal entre las propias potencias y las segundas destinadas a la jerarquía vertical establecida entre dichas potencias y el resto de miembros de la sociedad internacional. Sin embargo, en situaciones de predominancia individual el primer tipo de normas, relacionado con uno de los modos en el que las potencias contribuyen a la estabilidad del orden internacional, desaparecería. Del mismo modo, la institución de la hegemonía asumiría el rol de “dotar a la sociedad internacional de un cierto grado de dirección central en los asuntos que afectan al conjunto de la sociedad internacional”¹⁴⁵. En consecuencia, el carácter jerárquico que identificaban los autores clásicos entre la institución de las grandes potencias y el resto de la sociedad internacional se transfiere a la institución hegemónica.

La realidad internacional contemporánea ha dado lugar a distintos tipos de realidades hegemónicas que permiten elaborar una tipología de instituciones hegemónicas¹⁴⁶. Estos modelos hegemónicos permiten englobar distintos tipos de liderazgo y evidenciar sus coincidencias y disidencias. Concretamente, las dos matrices diferenciadoras son la composición de la hegemonía (singular o colectiva) y el ámbito al que se circunscribe (inclusiva o coalicional/exclusiva). Es necesario apuntar que estas taxonomías sobre la pluralidad de formas hegemónicas no pretenden esconder la relevancia de la distribución de poder, sino acentuar que estas distribuciones sufren la intermediación de contextos sociales y normativos diversos. Estos contextos provocan, entre otros, una variable conformidad con el liderazgo hegemónico y los desarrollos institucionales posteriores¹⁴⁷. En definitiva, se trata de poner de relieve la influencia de las distintas dinámicas de legitimidad que operan entre el hegemón y los grupos sociales que conforman la sociedad internacional¹⁴⁸.

Con arreglo a las dos matrices mencionadas anteriormente (composición y ámbito de circunscripción) es posible distinguir cuatro tipos ideales de hegemonía. La primera de ellas es la hegemonía colectiva inclusiva, un tipo que se corresponde con el liderazgo del Concierto Europeo (1815-1914)¹⁴⁹. El autor considera que, pese a las reticencias a considerar este periodo histórico como de tipo hegemónico, se trata de un liderazgo ejercido a través del control de las grandes potencias sobre la sociedad in-

¹⁴⁵ BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, p. 207; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹⁴⁶ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 59-61.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 61; CLARK, I., “Bringing Hegemony back in... *op. cit.*”, pp. 29-31; DONNELLY, J., “Re-thinking Political Structures: From ‘Ordering Principles’ to ‘Vertical Differentiation’ and Beyond”, *International Theory*, Vol. 1, nº 1, 2009, pp. 68-69. Del mismo modo, Simpson considera que el Concierto constituía una hegemonía legalizada, principalmente por cuatro razones: (1) la base legal/constitucional de la preeminencia; (2) la igualdad soberana entre las potencias; (3) el directorio de las grandes potencias actuando en un concierto y (4) la aceptación, a través del consenso desde abajo y por imposición desde arriba. SIMPSON, G., *Great powers and outlaw states: unequal sovereigns in the international legal order*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 67.

ternacional, desarrollando normas entre las propias potencias y se basa en el principio de legalidad¹⁵⁰. El segundo tipo es la hegemonía singular inclusiva, como la ejercida por el Imperio Británico (1815-1914) que se centró en la provisión de bienes públicos tales como la promoción de un sistema económico abierto, la preservación de los bienes internacionales o el mantenimiento del equilibrio de poder en Europa¹⁵¹. El tercero de los tipos de hegemonía es el singular coalicional, con el ejemplo del liderazgo estadounidense hasta 1971. Si bien fue establecida como una institución abierta a toda la sociedad internacional, en la práctica se circunscribía a un universo mucho menor, excluyendo al eje socialista¹⁵². Este modelo hegemónico se materializó a través de una red de instituciones internacionales que le abrieron la puerta a lograr unos altos niveles de legitimidad. Sin embargo, el ejercicio de la hegemonía a través de estos organismos es solamente uno de los modos para ejercer la institución de la hegemonía en lenguaje de la Escuela Inglesa¹⁵³. Finalmente, la tipología colectiva coalicional no cuenta con un ejemplo histórico concreto, aunque Clark afirma que es posible encontrar elementos tanto en el Concierto de Europa como en el caso británico, así como ofrecer una interesante línea de análisis de la sociedad internacional contemporánea¹⁵⁴.

Sin duda, tal y como reitera el autor, es necesario arrojar luz sobre el propio concepto de hegemonía antes de abordar el análisis de los cambios sistémicos de la sociedad internacional¹⁵⁵. Avanzar hacia una taxonomía dinámica como esta e identificar de un modo más concreto las dinámicas legitimadoras, en consecuencia, abren la puerta hacia un estudio más completo de estas transformaciones sistémicas.

3.3.2.2. Las transformaciones sistémicas. Emergencia de nuevos poderes y sucesiones hegemónicas

Tal y como se ha expuesto a lo largo del presente capítulo, la sociedad internacional contemporánea mantiene un carácter híbrido con respecto a su origen y expansión. Con arreglo a la misma lógica, es posible afirmar que esta sociedad se caracteriza por una “deformidad” resultado de dos fenómenos contrapuestos. Por un lado, los intereses y preferencias de los Estados poderosos siguen influyendo en gran medida en el devenir de la sociedad. Por otro lado, cada vez existe un mayor pluralismo de ideas y valores, así como de identidades políticas que buscan el reconocimiento dentro

¹⁵⁰ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹⁵¹ NYE, J. S., “Recovering American Leadership”, *Survival*, Vol. 50, nº 1, 2008, p. 64. KINDLEBERGER, C. P., *La Crisis Económica... op. cit.*, p. 341.

¹⁵² PARCHAMI, A., *Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana*, Londres, Routledge, 2009, p. 178.

¹⁵³ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹⁵⁵ CLARK, I., “China and the United States... op. cit.”, p. 13.

de esta sociedad¹⁵⁶. Ambas realidades se entrelazan con las transformaciones estructurales en el sistema internacional que reproducen, de nuevo, las dicotomías entre primacía/hegemonía que se han analizado en páginas anteriores. Al tratarse de fenómenos distintos, la Escuela Inglesa los aborda de forma distinta, si bien es cierto que en ambos es posible incluir la variable clave de la legitimidad. La tensión entre ambas perspectivas queda patente en la apreciación de Zhang, que apunta que “las transformaciones históricas del sistema internacional son entendidas de mejor manera en términos de unas estructuras normativas y sociales cambiantes en vez de como un simple resultado de la política de poder”¹⁵⁷.

La visión de las transiciones de poder en la sociedad internacional actual se ha centrado principalmente en la retórica del ascenso/desarrollo pacífico¹⁵⁸. Con una interesante revisión de los modelos de emergencia de nuevas potencias en el seno de la sociedad internacional, ésta se relaciona principalmente con su capacidad y voluntad de asumir las responsabilidades que el sistema internacional les atribuye.

El ascenso de nuevos poderes internacionales genera, como en el caso de China, dudas sobre el carácter revisionista de sus políticas como potencia mundial. En un contexto de una sociedad internacional marcada por la deformidad explicada previamente, es necesario distinguir dos factores, más allá de la habitual distinción entre Estados revisionistas y aquellos partidarios del *statu quo*. El primero de los factores es el grado de satisfacción del Estado en ascenso con su estatus en el seno de la sociedad internacional. Por norma general, los Estados en ascenso no están satisfechos con dicha situación, en tanto que la sociedad internacional aún no ha acomodado sus crecientes cotas de poder a la participación en las instituciones secundarias de la sociedad internacional. El segundo de los factores resulta más complejo de analizar, ya que hace referencia a la aceptación, por parte del Estado en ascenso, de las instituciones creadas por la élite de las grandes potencias de las que no formaba parte. La dificultad de analizar la satisfacción con esta estructura radica en la complejidad del mapa estructural e

¹⁵⁶ HURRELL, A., *On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 9-10; ZHANG, Y., “China and the Struggle for Legitimacy of a Rising Power”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 8, nº 3, 2015, p. 306.

¹⁵⁷ ZHANG, Y., “China and the Struggle... *op. cit.*”, p. 303.

¹⁵⁸ La retórica del ascenso/desarrollo pacífico surgió como respuesta al creciente discurso de la amenaza china que se extendió a principios del siglo XXI. En respuesta a esta recurrente práctica discursiva, los círculos cercanos al Partido Comunista Chino contraatacaron con una creciente referencia al ascenso pacífico de China. Una de las primeras referencias a este concepto la realizó Zheng Bijian, el subdirector de la Escuela Central de Partido (uno de los más importantes *think tanks*) ZHENG, B. *China's Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004*, 2003, <<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/events/20050616bijianlunch.pdf>> [8 de enero de 2016]. Sin embargo, el concepto de ascenso generó controversia y no resultó efectivo como contra-propaganda. Por ello, fue posteriormente sustituido por el “desarrollo pacífico”, tal y como lo enunció el ex presidente Hu Jintao. HU, J., “Full Text of Hu Jintao's Speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004”, <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm>> [8 de enero de 2016]. *Vid.* PINTADO, M., “Identidad y Alteridad... *op. cit.*”; JING, J., “Chinese and Western Interpretations of China's 'Peaceful Development' Discourse: A Rule-Oriented Constructivist Perspective”, *Journal of China and International Relations*, Vol. 2, nº 1, 2014, pp. 49-70.

institucional de la sociedad internacional¹⁵⁹. De hecho, tal y como recoge Buzan, en el caso de China es posible afirmar que su satisfacción con este corpus institucional es mixta porque, por una parte, apoya expresamente las instituciones pluralistas de coexistencia (tales como, la soberanía, la no intervención, el nacionalismo, la territorialidad, el equilibrio o la diplomacia), pero se opone a las instituciones relacionadas con los valores políticos solidaristas, de marcado carácter liberal, que están estrechamente relacionados con los derechos humanos, los valores democráticos e, incluso, el medioambientalismo¹⁶⁰.

El análisis histórico sobre la emergencia de nuevas potencias constituye también una importante aportación de la visión de las transiciones de poder mediante una visión constructivista/Escuela Inglesa. No obstante, lo reducido de los casos a estudiar constituye una carencia clave, unida a la subjetividad de este tipo de análisis como se pone de manifiesto en el caso del ascenso de los Estados Unidos¹⁶¹. Si bien el ascenso de otras potencias no fue pacífico (Alemania, Japón y la Unión Soviética), el caso de Estados Unidos podría calificarse como una perspectiva híbrida¹⁶².

Ante las dificultades clasificatorias, Buzan y Cox ofrecen una completa tipología sobre la emergencia de potencias, todo ello basándose en que el ascenso pacífico constituye un proceso bidireccional en el que, por un lado el Estado emergente se acomoda a las normas y estructuras existentes en la sociedad internacional y, por otro lado, las potencias realizan algunos cambios en éstas para ajustarlas a la nueva realidad¹⁶³. La taxonomía establece una distinción entre las dinámicas de ascenso bélico y pacífico. El primero de ellos se asemeja al modelo realista que asegura que el ascenso de una nueva potencia precipitará el conflicto. En contraste, el segundo de estos modelos, el ascenso pacífico es entendido como un proceso en el que el poder en desarrollo es capaz de lograr ganancias absolutas y relativas tanto en su posición material como social sin precipitar hostilidades importantes tanto con otras potencias como con los vecinos de su región¹⁶⁴. En el apartado del ascenso pacífico es posible distinguir varios grados

¹⁵⁹ Buzan realiza una interesante propuesta sobre las instituciones sugeridas por los distintos autores, así como una concepción propia. BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, pp. 174 y 187.

¹⁶⁰ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... op. cit.", pp. 16-17.

¹⁶¹ Tal y como explican Buzan y Cox, la emergencia de Estados Unidos como potencia hegemónica se produjo sin que mediase una guerra con el entonces Estado más poderoso, Gran Bretaña. Sin embargo, los autores señalan el carácter controvertido de la calificación de este fenómeno como un ascenso pacífico, teniendo en cuenta las tensas relaciones de Estados Unidos con Canadá o el Reino Unido, las guerras contra los nativos norteamericanos, así como con México y España y, por supuesto, el carácter intervencionista de sus políticas en la región de América Latina y el Caribe. BUZAN, B. y M. COX, "China and the US: Comparable Cases of 'Peaceful Rise'", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 6, nº 2, 2013, p. 112. Con respecto a las políticas de Estados Unidos hacia América Latina puede verse un análisis histórico en PINTADO, M., "La Presencia de Estados Unidos en América Latina. Hacia una Nueva Concepción de la Hegemonía Regional" en UGALDE, A. (Coord.), *Diálogos para el Estudio de América Latina en el siglo XXI*, Bilbao, Universidad del País Vasco, 2014, pp. 115-127.

¹⁶² BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... op. cit.", p. 15.

¹⁶³ BUZAN, B. y M. COX, "China and the US... op. cit.", p. 112.

¹⁶⁴ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... op. cit.", p. 5.

que van desde el cálido (con un comportamiento propio de una comunidad de seguridad), al templado (semejante a los patrones de interdependencia en materia de seguridad, con el miedo al conflicto atenuado a través de unas determinadas normas de conducta) y, finalmente, el frío (un ascenso en términos de política de poder pero sin llegar a una guerra “caliente”)¹⁶⁵.

No obstante, en estas apreciaciones sobre el ascenso de las potencias queda patente la ausencia de un análisis sobre las dinámicas legitimadoras. Tal y como recoge Zhang, el propio Wight ya señalaba que uno de los problemas fundamentales de la política es la justificación del poder¹⁶⁶. En esa tarea, argumenta Zhang, las potencias buscan sus propias estrategias legitimadoras diferenciadas¹⁶⁷. Por lo tanto, es indudable la importancia de la variable de la legitimidad en los procesos de cambio sistémico, aunque es posible entenderla de distintos modos¹⁶⁸. Según Bukovansky, la legitimidad y las luchas estratégicas de poder son “dos caras de la misma moneda”. Desde su perspectiva, es posible definir el cambio sistémico como una transformación de los parámetros de la legitimidad política, que provoca que las identidades de las unidades del sistema cambien progresivamente, a la vez, transforma las reglas que gobiernan la interacción entre estas unidades. De este modo, estos nuevos parámetros establecerán los términos que definirán los contextos de definición y ejercicio del poder¹⁶⁹.

Desde la misma perspectiva, es posible identificar la continuidad de un orden hegemónico (en el que existe una versión dominante de la legitimidad) por su interés no solo en socializar este orden sino en neutralizar los esfuerzos de las contradicciones culturales ya existentes y aquellas emergentes dentro y fuera del propio orden¹⁷⁰.

Por el contrario, el cambio sistémico está producido por la exitosa emergencia de estas visiones contrahegemónicas, que generan disputas sobre la legitimidad. Estos episodios, en definitiva, constituyen luchas para establecer los términos en los que los futuros Estados poderosos serán definidos y aceptados¹⁷¹. Asimismo, la posibilidad de producir cambios en el sistema deriva directamente de la naturaleza elástica de las normas sobre la legitimidad política, que permiten su manipulación, hasta el punto de convertirse en una fuente de cambio¹⁷².

No obstante, Bukovansky defiende también la existencia de cambios sistémicos que no modifican el liderazgo hegemónico. Entendiendo la hegemonía como una dua-

¹⁶⁵ BUZAN, B. y M. COX, “China and the US... *op. cit.*”, p. 112; BUZAN, B., “The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, nº 4, 2014, p. 403.

¹⁶⁶ WIGHT, M., *International Theory... op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹⁶⁷ ZHANG, Y., “China and the Struggle... *op. cit.*”, p. 314; FINNEMORE, M., “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*”, p. 84.

¹⁶⁸ ZHANG, Y., “China and the Struggle... *op. cit.*”, p. 304.

¹⁶⁹ BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, pp. 44-45 y 51.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

lidad indisoluble que implica tanto una determinada configuración de poder como una estructura de conocimiento compartido, la autora defiende que los sistemas hegemónicos pueden transformarse sin necesidad de que un Estado remplace a otro como hegemón. En este caso, se trataría de cambios sistémicos que nacen dentro de la propia cultura hegemónica y la transforman¹⁷³.

Por su parte, Clark considera que los principios cambiantes de la legitimidad aparecen tras una determinada lucha de poder y dan forma a la constitución de la sociedad internacional en un periodo histórico determinado como Westfalia, Viena o Versalles¹⁷⁴. La legitimidad, en definitiva, da lugar a una forma de poder que cobra especial importancia en un contexto hegemónico¹⁷⁵.

Si bien la inclusión de la legitimidad en los estudios sobre cambio sistémico es de vital importancia, la modificación clave que aporta Clark se refiere a la institucionalización de la hegemonía, empoderando dicho acuerdo institucional por encima del ejercicio de poder por parte de un único hegemón¹⁷⁶. Marcando una clara distancia con las investigaciones sobre primacía y transiciones de poder, el giro institucionalizador permite abrir el foco hacia una variable más completa del cambio sistémico: la sucesión de hegemonías. Esta visión permite completar el concepto de hegemonía a través de consideraciones normativas directamente relacionadas con el ejercicio de la hegemonía no a través del ejercicio de poder por parte del Estado dominante sino con la creación de un patrón de orden internacional aceptable y distintivo¹⁷⁷.

Asimismo, el concepto de sucesión también aporta un elemento distintivo a la teoría, a la vez que la enraíza con la teoría de Wight, que entendía las sucesiones hegemónicas, “no como una aberración” sino como “una característica integral del sistema”¹⁷⁸. Las sucesiones hegemónicas, en contraste con las transiciones de poder, no ponen únicamente el foco en los cambios en la estructura de poder material, sino en el modelo de orden internacional alternativo que la potencia en ascenso promueve. La aceptación de esa institución de la hegemonía por el resto de la sociedad internacional es, en esencia, un constituyente del poder efectivo del hegemón¹⁷⁹. En este proceso, de nuevo, cobra especial importancia el componente de legitimidad, confirmando el viraje de este concepto desde perspectivas morales en las teorías históricas previas a un concepto legal¹⁸⁰. Por lo tanto, Estado emergente necesitará que el resto de Estados y actores internacionales le otorguen la legitimidad a su modelo alternativo de orden, y su éxito dependerá de su potencial para desarrollar una institución hegemónica basa-

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

¹⁷⁴ CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in the International Society... op. cit.*; ZHANG, Y., “China and the Struggle... *op. cit.*”, p. 304.

¹⁷⁵ CLARK, I., “China and the United States... *op. cit.*”, p. 23.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁷⁸ WATSON, A., *Hegemony and History... op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁷⁹ MOURE, L., “Orden internacional en transición y Relaciones Internacionales... *op. cit.*”, pp. 409.

¹⁸⁰ ZHANG, Y., “China and the Struggle... *op. cit.*”, pp. 304-305.

da en el consenso internacional¹⁸¹. En definitiva, esta contraposición de instituciones hegemónicas alternativas constituye una disputa entre qué forma de gobierno constituye la más viable y competitiva, a través de nociones contrapuestas de legitimidad¹⁸².

¹⁸¹ CLARK, I., "China and the United States... *op. cit.*", p. 28; PINTADO, M., "Reformulaciones teóricas en torno a la emergencia de China: la construcción de una institución hegemónica alternativa", *Trabajos y Ensayos*, nº 15, 2012, < <http://www.dipriihd.ehu.es/revistadoctorado/n15/Pintado15.pdf>>, [30 de diciembre de 2015], p. 13.

¹⁸² BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 39.

CAPÍTULO 4

HACIA UNA TEORÍA CHINA DE LAS RELACIONALES INTERNACIONALES. EVOLUCIÓN, PROYECTOS TEÓRICOS Y PERTINENCIA PRÁCTICA

La progresiva descentralización de los estudios teóricos de Relaciones Internacionales y el creciente interés hacia perspectivas no occidentales ha puesto estos últimos años el foco en los avances de la disciplina en China. La atención hacia desarrollos teóricos no-occidentales se basa, principalmente, en una consideración de las ciencias sociales basada en el dualismo metodológico, que admite el papel del sujeto que ejecuta el análisis. Frente a esta posición, algunos autores mantienen una visión contraria que aboga por una lectura única y objetiva de la realidad que convertiría a las teorías de Relaciones Internacionales en perspectivas universales¹.

¹ REN X., "Toward a Chinese School of International Relations?" en WANG G. y ZHENG Y. (eds.), *China and the New International Order*, Nueva York, Routledge, 2008, p. 299. Snyder, por ejemplo, defiende que las posturas realista y liberal se presentan a sí mismas como paradigmas universales, mientras que los desarrollos chinos basados en el confucianismo únicamente son de aplicación en China o en el este asiático.

Indudablemente el carácter occidental y claramente estadounidense de la disciplina es un claro reflejo de la posición dominante de Estados Unidos en la jerarquía internacional de poder. De este modo, la academia refleja de forma mayoritaria unos desarrollos materialistas que Occidente impone al resto². Así, como disciplina etnocéntrica, aporta una inagotable fuente de legitimidad tanto a las políticas estadounidenses y occidentales como a actores, instituciones y proyectos determinados mientras que simultáneamente distorsiona y margina narrativas alternativas o disonantes³.

Debido a su tradición puramente occidental, esta visión no es capaz de ofrecer respuestas a cuestiones relativas a otras culturas y pone de manifiesto la necesidad de construir marcos alternativos basados en diversas herencias filosóficas e históricas⁴. De hecho, las constantes referencias a las raíces filosóficas occidentales refuerzan esa división entre los privilegiados creadores del conocimiento aquellos que desde la periferia son meros participantes y transmisores⁵.

En este escenario, los avances teóricos de la disciplina en China a lo largo de estos últimos años son considerados como “un caso único”⁶, principalmente debido a la relativa juventud de la enseñanza de Relaciones Internacionales en las universidades del Estado y a su desarrollo desigual⁷. En sus inicios, se caracterizó, primero, por un reflejo de las visiones marxistas-leninistas producidas, principalmente, por académicos soviéticos y, en segundo lugar, por la traducción y adopción de las visiones occi-

SNYDER, J., “Some Good and Bad Reasons for a Distinctively Chinese Approach to International Relations Theory”, Conferencia de la APSA, Massachusetts, 2008.

² VAN DER PIJL, K., “The Wages of Discipline: Rethinking International Relations as a Vehicle of Western Hegemony”, *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies*, Vol. 4, nº 1, 2012, p. 17.

³ NAYAK, M. y E. SELBIN, *Decentering International Relations*, Londres, Zed Books, 2010, p. 2.

⁴ WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, “The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*”, pp. 25-26; ARENAL, C. del, “Americanocentrismo y Relaciones Internacionales: La Seguridad como Referente” en C. del ARENAL y J. A. SANAHUJA (coords.), *Teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales*, Madrid, Tecnos, 2015, pp. 56-57.

⁵ YEW L., *The Disjunctive Empire of International Relations*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003, p. 11.

⁶ KRISTENSEN, P. M. y R. T. NIELSEN, “Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory: A Sociological Approach to Intellectual Innovation”, *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 7, nº 1, 2013, p. 19.

⁷ Si bien ya en la década de 1950 se estableció el primer departamento de Relaciones Exteriores en la Universidad del Pueblo Chino (Renmin University) y paulatinamente se extendió a otras tres instituciones educativas en la siguiente década, la Revolución Cultural (1966-1976) supuso un importante freno. Tras este *impasse*, ya en los años 80, se reforzó la enseñanza de la disciplina en las universidades, además de multiplicarse la publicación de revistas y libros y estimularse el intercambio académico con universidades occidentales. Tras la matanza de Tiananmen, el desarrollo no se detuvo gracias a la preocupación del gobierno por evitar el aislamiento internacional. Desde entonces, han proliferado los *think tanks* tanto públicos como privados que financian el intercambio y la investigación académica. Para un relato más extenso del desarrollo histórico de la disciplina en China, pueden verse SONG X., “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, nº 26, 2001, pp. 61-64; WANG Y., “China. Between Copying and Constructing” en A. B. TICKNER y O. WAEVER (eds.), *International Relations Scholarship around the World*, Nueva York, Routledge, 2009, pp. 104-108; QIN Y., “Why is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?” en A. ACHARYA y B. BUZAN (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, Londres, Routledge, 2010, pp. 28-32; GEERAERTS, G. y JING M., “International Relations Theory in China”, *Global Society*, Vol. 15, nº 3, 2001, pp. 253-259; NOESSELT, N., “Is There a ‘Chinese School’ of IR?”, *GIGA Working Paper*, nº 188, 2012, pp. 12-13.

dentales y sus paradigmas. Sin embargo, en la actualidad los estudios internacionales en este Estado ya no son “un reflejo pasivo de las relaciones entre China y el mundo, sino que crecientemente exhiben la búsqueda de una iniciativa propia” con el fin de expresarse “no en términos definidos por otros, sino en sus propios términos”⁸. Además, la rica y vasta historia de China abre “una importante vía hacia la exploración de ordenes mundiales alternativos” que no se basen únicamente en la historia europea u occidental⁹.

Es conveniente puntualizar que el debate sobre la contribución china a la disciplina no está principalmente orientado a la reformulación de conceptos asentados en la disciplina. Por el contrario, se centra principalmente en introducir en el debate una terminología independiente que favorezca la adopción de explicaciones alternativas sobre desarrollo internacional. Esta nueva terminología está asentada en el diálogo entre la filosofía tradicional china y elementos del materialismo histórico y dialéctico de su civilización¹⁰. De hecho, Wang considera que los desarrollos de la academia china mezclan el conocimiento local y los conceptos occidentales de la disciplina con el fin, no de expandir el conocimiento dentro de la academia, sino de establecer una perspectiva en línea con las visiones que tiene China del mundo¹¹. Debido a la relativa juventud de los desarrollos chinos, Noesselt propone denominarlos como “visiones del mundo” en lugar de tratarlos como marcos sistemáticos de análisis¹², ya que en vez de reflejar el mundo lo representan, permitiéndonos desarrollar un nuevo lenguaje de conceptos que abre la puerta a debatir de una forma comprensible la disciplina¹³.

Esta escuela china es posible ubicarla en tres sentidos dentro el contexto global de la disciplina. En primer lugar, surge como una respuesta al núcleo estadounidense de la disciplina, tratando de atajar discursos como el de la amenaza china con teorizaciones sobre retóricas como el ascenso pacífico o la armonía. En segundo lugar, la escuela china se inspira en los desarrollos de la semi-periferia europea, principalmente en la Escuela Inglesa y en algunos casos en el constructivismo, para abogar, en el primero de los casos por una perspectiva propia y autóctona y, en el segundo, por la adopción de perspectivas no puramente materiales. Finalmente, en el caso de la periferia, la escuela china huye de los paralelismos con otras aportaciones que también

⁸ WANG Y., “China. Between Copying... *op. cit.*”, p. 108.

⁹ ZHANG Y., “System, empire and state in Chinese international relations”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, nº 5, 2001, p. 63.

¹⁰ NOESSELT, N., “Is There a ‘Chinese School’... *op. cit.*”, pp. 11-12.

¹¹ WANG H.-J., “Being Uniquely Universal: Building Chinese International Relations Theory”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 22, nº 81, 2013, pp. 518-519.

¹² NOESSELT, N., “Is There a ‘Chinese School’... *op. cit.*”, p. 12.

¹³ GRIFFITHS, M. (ed.), *International Relations Theory for the Twenty First Century. An Introduction*, Londres, Routledge, 2007, p. 1.

avancen hacia la creación de conocimiento en los nuevos polos de poder a escala mundial, como India o Brasil¹⁴

La discusión sobre la existencia de una escuela china de Relaciones Internacionales conduce inevitablemente hacia las características que debe tener una teoría de este tipo. Para Qin Yaqing, el internacionalista contemporáneo de mayor popularidad en el país asiático¹⁵, ésta debe reunir tres elementos principales. El primero de ellos es que su crecimiento debe sustentarse sobre unas bases históricas, culturales, tradicionales y de experiencia contemporánea china. En segundo lugar, debe tener una vocación general, logrando la universalidad más allá de sus bases tradicionales. Finalmente, en tercer lugar, su núcleo teórico debe ser inconmensurable con respecto a otras teorías de la disciplina, centrada en una pregunta teórica central¹⁶. En opinión de Qin, es precisamente la ausencia de un consenso sobre cuál deber ser esa pregunta está lastrando el desarrollo de una escuela china. Por ello, el autor propone que esa pregunta enlace directamente con el problema central de la China actual: su relación con la sociedad internacional. Dicho de otro modo, Qin considera que ni el liberalismo ni el constructivismo, y mucho menos el realismo, han sido capaces de explicar los procesos de socialización pacífica de las potencias emergentes, principalmente por carecer de una perspectiva empírica, que una escuela china sí podría aportar¹⁷.

De este modo, además de aportar una perspectiva novedosa al debate, la adopción de esta pregunta de investigación culminaría la compleja relación identitaria que hasta ahora ha mantenido China con la sociedad internacional. Su diálogo con ésta y los cambios inmateriales y materiales que han tenido lugar en los últimos años a escala estatal y mundial, finalmente, retroalimentarían la emergencia de los desarrollos autóctonos¹⁸.

Sin embargo, la ausencia de un consenso sobre la pregunta de investigación principal no es el único problema que afronta para su desarrollo. El lugar privilegiado y hasta hace poco hegemónico de las teorías occidentales en la academia, las particula-

¹⁴ KRISTENSEN, P. M., "Navigating the Core-Periphery Structures of 'Global' IR: Dialogues and Audiences for the Chinese School as Traveling Theory" en ZHANG Y. y CHANG, S. (eds.), *Constructing a Chinese School(s) of International Relations: Ongoing Debate and Critical Assessment*, Londres, Routledge, 2016 (en prensa).

¹⁵ En una encuesta elaborada por Kristensen y Nielsen, los propios académicos chinos señalan a Qin Yaqing como la figura más prominente de la disciplina en el país, por delante de Wang Yizhou, Wang Jisi y Yan Xuetong. KRISTENSEN, P. M. y R. T. NIELSEN, "Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory... *op. cit.*", p. 23.

¹⁶ QIN Y., "Guoji Guanxi Lilun de Hexin Wenti y Zhongguo Xuepai de Shengcheng" (Pregunta central de la Teoría de Relaciones Internacionales y la Formación de una Escuela china), *Chinese Social Sciences*, nº 3, 2005, p. 166 citado en REN X., "Toward a Chinese School... *op. cit.*", p. 301.

¹⁷ QIN Y., "Why is There No Chinese... *op. cit.*", pp. 45-46; QIN, Y., "Development of International Relations Theory in China: Progress through Debates", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 11, nº 2, 2011, p. 234.

¹⁸ QIN Y., "Guoji Guanxi Lilun... *op. cit.*", p. 296.

ridades de la política china y la falta de una conciencia internacionalista en el ejercicio teórico también han lastrado su emergencia¹⁹.

4.1. El proceso de construcción de una escuela china. Entre el indigenismo y la internacionalización

Indudablemente, el proceso de construcción de una escuela china de Relaciones Internacionales está estrechamente relacionado con la necesidad de crear nuevos conceptos y marcos teóricos que expliquen su nuevo papel en la sociedad internacional. La importancia de reforzar teóricamente conceptos discursivos como el “ascenso pacífico”, la “armonía mundial” o el “modelo chino” les ofrece a los académicos la oportunidad de crear su propio sistema de conocimiento que explique este fenómeno desde dentro²⁰. Se trata, en definitiva, de impulsar la transición desde un *corpus* hegemónico de la teoría hacia un núcleo múltiple²¹. Por ello, pese a que la construcción de una teoría propia haya sido calificada como una “alternativa subversiva”²², es más enriquecedor considerarla como una respuesta a la aplicación de las teorías occidentales “universales” a la periferia asiática y china²³.

El proyecto de una escuela china ha de entenderse, por lo tanto, como una contribución de producción teórica basada en la cultura local, la tradición histórica y la práctica política. En esta tarea, Qin analiza el momento teórico en el que se encuentran los desarrollos chinos²⁴, distinguiendo tres fases principales. La primera de ellas es la fase preteórica, en la que existen esfuerzos individuales por acercarse a la disciplina pero aún no se encauzan hacia la creación de un paradigma teórico sistemáticamente construido, tal y como ocurrió en China hasta la década de los 90. En segundo lugar, se encuentra la fase de aprendizaje teórico, en la que brota una conciencia colectiva y se consensúa una agenda para, por un lado, introducir y analizar críticamente las teorías mayoritarias y, por otro, investigar hacia una crítica a éstas. En opinión de Qin, la

¹⁹ QIN Y., “Why is There No Chinese... *op. cit.*”, pp. 35-36. En la misma línea, Hüchel señala como causas el aislacionismo de China hasta hace unas décadas y su contraste con la cultura europea, claramente marcada por el movimiento ilustrado, que ha favorecido estos desarrollos teóricos posteriores. HÜCKEL, B., “Theory of International Relations with Chinese Characteristics. The Tian-Xia System from a Metatheoretical Perspective”, *Diskurs-Journal for Interventions in the Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol. 8, nº 2, 2012, p. 35.

²⁰ WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, “The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*”, p. 26; ACHARYA, A., “Dialogue and Discovery...*op. cit.*”, p. 625.

²¹ CUNNINGHAM-CROSS, L., “Re-imagining the World through Chinese Eyes: The Search for a ‘Chinese School’ of International Relations Theory”, BISA Conference, Manchester, 2011; CUNNINGHAM-CROSS, L., “Narrating a Discipline. The Search for Innovation in Chinese International Relations” en N. HORSBURGH, A. NORDIN y S. BRESLIN (eds.), *Chinese Politics and International Relations. Innovation and Invention*, Nueva York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 75-96.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ NOESSELT, N., “Is There a “Chinese School”... *op. cit.*”, pp. 5-6 y 8-9.

²⁴ QIN Y., “Why is There No Chinese... *op. cit.*”, pp. 32-35. Al este respecto, Wang considera que en China se ha superado la fase de “copiar” teorías occidentales y ha comenzado la fase de construcción. WANG Y., “China. Between Copying... *op. cit.*”.

escuela china se encuentra actualmente en la recta final de esta fase, con pequeños desarrollos hacia la tercera, que conllevaría la construcción de una nueva teoría con un núcleo teórico propio.

La controversia principal a la hora de comenzar la fase de construcción se refiere a la división entre los partidarios de indigenizar la teoría occidental existente o aquellos que apuestan por una construcción propia. La primera de las propuestas pretende incorporar al *corpus* teórico occidental elementos “con características chinas” en un guiño a la fórmula de “socialismo con características chinas” de Deng Xiaoping. La inclusión de las características chinas, en opinión de sus partidarios, debe servir a los intereses nacionales del Estado y trabajar por la consolidación del estatus de China en los asuntos internacionales. Si bien no confronta directamente ni con los principios de la tradición marxista-leninista china ni de las teorías occidentales, se distingue de ellas a través de la aplicación de la filosofía tradicional autóctona²⁵. La apuesta por una teoría con características chinas, no obstante, constituye también un proyecto de resistencia frente a la influencia occidental. Más concretamente, Liang Shoude la definió en sus inicios como una teoría basada en tres temas, entre los que aparece la soberanía estatal como columna vertebral: (1) los derechos estatales por encima de los derechos humanos, (2) la interrelación entre economía y política y (3) las reformas y el desarrollo como clave para la paz mundial²⁶. En la misma línea se manifiestan otros teóricos chinos, que en una clara tendencia pacifista apuestan porque la teoría con características chinas esté definida por una clara apuesta por las gentes pacíficas del mundo y la promoción de los Cinco Principios de Coexistencia Pacífica²⁷.

Tal y como recoge Song, paulatinamente se fueron levantando más voces contra la propuesta de las características chinas, argumentando su marcado carácter ideológico y político, la falta de cientifismo académico, la excesiva orientación a la práctica política en lugar de hacia la construcción teórica y el atraso que suponía tal perspectiva aislacionista²⁸. La decadencia del proyecto permitió un paso adelante en la perspectiva teórica a adoptar, apostando por avanzar hacia una escuela de pensamiento propia bajo el ejemplo de la Escuela Inglesa. Con un mayor consenso y con bases más sólidas, la llamada hacia una escuela propia pretendía avanzar hacia una creación teórica oficial que demostrara que los académicos chinos no trabajan en “absorber y trasplantar ideas” sino que tienen un espíritu de pensamiento independiente²⁹.

²⁵ LIANG S., “Constructing an International Relations Theory with ‘Chinese Characteristics’”, *Political Science*, Vol. 49, nº 1, 1997, p. 31.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

²⁷ *Vid.* SONG X., “Building International Relations Theory... *op. cit.*”, p. 68.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

²⁹ REN X., “Toward a Chinese School... *op. cit.*”, p. 294.

En esta tarea, Qin enumera tres tipos de enfoques dentro de esa escuela china³⁰. El primero de ellos es el clásico, que trata de explicar la estrategia internacional y diplomática de los líderes chinos a través de una teoría clásica marxista, un enfoque que paulatinamente ha sido empujado a los márgenes. En segundo lugar, se encuentra la aproximación tradicional, que trata de incorporar el pensamiento antiguo chino y la teoría política tradicional china para explicar el orden internacional actual. Dentro de esta perspectiva es posible encuadrar dos de las aproximaciones más importantes. La primera de ellas, la de Zhao Tingyang, aborda desde una visión filosófica utópica el sistema Tianxia y su visión del mundo como un todo englobado en un único sistema. En segundo lugar, en esta visión tradicional también tienen cabida los desarrollos de Yan Xuetong. Este autor no es partidario de desarrollar una escuela distintiva, sino que busca aportar una perspectiva diferenciada dentro de los marcos teóricos occidentales³¹, incorporando conceptos del pensamiento chino a las teorías hegemónicas realistas³². Finalmente, el tercero de los enfoques, el integrativo, es el más popular y utiliza una combinación de teorías chinas y occidentales para explicar el mundo y la visión de China dentro del mismo.

4.2. Un acercamiento a las escuelas chinas de Relaciones Internacionales a través de tres proyectos teóricos autóctonos

Como se ha descrito en líneas anteriores, es posible enumerar tres posibles vías de desarrollo del embrión de las teorías chinas³³. Sin embargo, todas ellas convergen en una estrecha relación con la tradición cultural y filosófica china, así como en la búsqueda de respuestas en torno a la relación de la China contemporánea con la sociedad internacional. En consecuencia, tratan de encajar esas ideas autóctonas dentro de la disciplina teórica aunque de un modo distinto. Tal y como explica Qin, se distinguen en el *fanxiang geyi* (反向格義) o interpretación analógica, que hace referencia a

³⁰ QIN Y., "Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu de jinbu yu wenti" (El estudio de la Teoría de Relaciones Internacionales en China: Progreso y problemas), *World Economic and Politics*, n. 11, 2008, pp. 18-19 citado en WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, "The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*", p. 15.

³¹ YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 257.

³² La consideración de Yan como un autor realista enlaza con su visión racionalista. Dentro de esta corriente, Moure le define como "un realista neoclásico ofensivo". MOURE, L., "Orden internacional en transición y Relaciones Internacionales... *op. cit.*", pp. 422-423.

³³ El análisis de los desarrollos teóricos en China evidencia que no puede hablarse de una única teoría. Cada una toma objetivos e hipótesis distintas y se basa en diferentes visiones filosóficas e históricas. WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, "The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*", p. 18. La característica embrionaria de las teorías chinas está tomada de QIN Y., "Development of International Relations theory... *op. cit.*", p. 252.

la utilización de un determinado esquema conceptual³⁴. En este caso, es posible distinguir los tres proyectos teóricos en base a esa interpretación analógica distinta.

El primero de los enfoques es el denominado como anverso, que parte del pensamiento chino como base teórica. Interpreta un mundo “mundializado”, un sistema conceptual completamente chino que comprende conceptos tradicionales tales como el *tianxia* (天下, traducido como “lo que está bajo el cielo”³⁵) o el vínculo familiar confuciano. En segundo lugar, encontramos el enfoque reverso, que aplica un sistema conceptual extranjero enriquecido con aportaciones de la cultura filosófica y política china. Si bien esta teoría refuerza la idea de un sistema internacional jerárquico, trata de sentar las bases hacia una comprensión mayor que permita la hegemonía internacional china. Finalmente, el tercero es el enfoque interactivo, que aplica simultáneamente marcos occidentales y chinos, con el objetivo de construir “un diálogo intercultural, reflexivo y crítico”³⁶.

En consecuencia, la distinción entre estos esquemas conceptuales permite poner de manifiesto la presencia de una pluralidad de voces que invitan a hablar de los desarrollos chinos no de un modo singular sino subrayando su carácter heterogéneo³⁷. Por ello, será necesario abordar los postulados teóricos de cada una de ellas por separado.

4.2.1. El enfoque anverso. Mundialismo y aplicación de los principios del Tianxia al sistema internacional contemporáneo

Los desarrollos realizados dentro del considerado como enfoque anverso, adoptando la terminología de Qin Yaqing, enraízan con la voluntad de gran parte de los académicos chinos de convertir a China en productora del conocimiento. De hecho, Zhao Tingyang, el máximo exponente de la escuela mundialista, considera que para convertirse en una potencia mundial no basta con el desarrollo económico, sino que

³⁴ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global: una teoría china de las relaciones internacionales”, *Revista CIDOB d’ Affers Internacionals*, nº 100, 2012, p. 70. El concepto de *geyi* lo toma Qin de Liu Xiaogan. Vid. LIU X., “Fanxiang Geyi’ yu Zhongguo Zhexue Yanjiu de Kunjing– yi Laozi Zhidao de Quanshi Weili” (Un dilema de la interpretación analógica reversa. Ejemplos de estudios de Lao-Tsé). *Journal of Nanjing University. Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences*, nº 2, 2006, p. 76-90.

³⁵ Si bien Tianxia significa literalmente “bajo el cielo” (天 *tian* “cielo” y 下 *xia* “debajo”), se ha adoptado la traducción al castellano que utilizan algunos textos de referencia sobre este tema. Vid. QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, p. 71; MOURE, L., “Orden internacional en transición... *op. cit.*”, pp. 417-422.

³⁶ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, p. 67.

³⁷ WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, “The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*”, p. 18. Yan también se manifiesta en contra de una escuela única, al afirmar que “es imposible que una sola escuela de pensamiento o teoría represente la totalidad del pensamiento chino”. En su caso, sin embargo, es contrario al establecimiento de teorías propiamente chinas, defendiendo desde una postura monista la universalidad del conocimiento. YAN X, *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, p. 254.

hay que prestar atención a la creación de conocimiento. Por ello, desde su perspectiva, China debe construir nuevos conceptos y estructuras mundiales para lograr ese estatus³⁸.

Concretamente, Zhao se remonta a la dinastía Zhou (1080-221 a. C.) que, tras llegar al poder siendo mucho menos numerosa que otras tribus, estableció una particular visión del mundo. Después de constatar su poco potencial para convertirse en el poder hegemónico, optaron por explorar otros medios para mantener su liderazgo³⁹. El denominado como sistema Tianxia fue la vía para mantener su poder, un sistema supranacional cuya influencia trascendía a la del imperio⁴⁰. De hecho, la propia denominación ya sugiere dicho carácter. Tianxia (literalmente, bajo el cielo) puede ser interpretado de dos modos, según expuso Liang. En primer lugar, como el propio mundo que comprende todos los reinos y ámbitos del mismo, haciendo referencia a una realidad que contrasta con la de nación. La segunda de las interpretaciones va más allá y sugiere que no solamente se refiere a esta realidad contrapuesta a la nación, sino que hace referencia a unas determinadas concepciones del mundo⁴¹.

Sin embargo, frente a esta definición dual, más recientemente Zhao ha expuesto que es posible interpretar el Tianxia como la combinación de tres significados: la tierra del mundo (como sentido geográfico), todas las gentes del mundo (como sentido social y cultural) y la institución mundial (como sentido político). Por ello, dada la inseparabilidad de estos tres elementos, Zhao considera el actual como un “no mundo”, dada la ausencia del tercero de los significados, una institución mundial⁴².

Como ya se ha apuntado, el Tianxia tiene su origen en la incapacidad de los Zhou para controlar las tribus del imperio, aún no unificado. Ante esta situación, optaron por una perspectiva de política global, en vez de centrarse en una local. Esta política se basaba en tres principios de un marcado carácter mundialista. El primero de ellos es que las soluciones exitosas a los problemas de la política mundial deben ser abordados a través de un sistema universalmente aceptado, y no recurriendo a la fuerza. En segundo lugar, este sistema universal estará justificado políticamente siempre que proporcione el mayor bienestar común en el mundo. Finalmente, dicho sistema funcionará si crea armonía entre todas las naciones y culturas⁴³.

³⁸ ZHAO T., “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia)”, *Social Identities. Journal for the Study of Race*, Vol. 12, nº 1, 2006, p. 39; ZHAO T., “A Political World Philosophy in terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)”, *Diogenes*, Vol. 56, nº 1, 2009, p. 17.

³⁹ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, p. 71.

⁴⁰ WANG M., “All under heaven (tianxia). Cosmological perspectives and political ontologies in pre-modern China”, *HAU. Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, Vol. 2, nº 1, 2012, p. 338.

⁴¹ Tal y como explica Wang, en su exposición Liang contraponen la traducción china de ambas interpretaciones, la primera de ellas representada por el “shijie” (世界) o mundo y la segunda con “shijie sixiang” (世界思想) o concepciones del mundo. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁴² Si bien la interpretación de estos tres significados la realiza el propio Zhao, su interrelación con los distintos sentidos disciplinares es de elaboración propia. ZHAO T., “A Political World Philosophy... *op. cit.*”, p. 9; WANG Y., “China. Between Copying... *op. cit.*”, p. 111.

⁴³ ZHAO T., “A Political World Philosophy... *op. cit.*”, p. 8.

Indudablemente, la perspectiva del Tianxia busca trascender el internacionalismo y caminar hacia el mundialismo. No cabe duda de que se trata de un sistema fuertemente jerárquico, que prioriza el orden, la ética y la gobernanza de las élites por encima de la libertad, el derecho, la democracia y los derechos humanos⁴⁴. Precisamente en ese carácter jerárquico se refleja la influencia de la visión confuciana de la familia como el vínculo integral más importante de la sociedad china. Desde esta perspectiva, Qin define el sistema Tianxia como “una familia ampliada” en el que su principio rector es ese vínculo familiar⁴⁵.

De hecho, este sistema constituye una especie de “hogar-mundo” en el que conviven un gobierno mundial y otros subestados. El primero se ocupa de las cuestiones globales (orden, leyes y reglas universales), así como del arbitraje de los conflictos entre los subestados. Éstos, por su parte, gozan de una gran autonomía, principalmente en asuntos políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales⁴⁶.

Más concretamente, el sistema Tianxia se basa en seis principios filosóficos, tal y como recoge Wang⁴⁷. El primero de ellos es que el mundo debe ser una entidad política, de otro modo el sistema político estará incompleto. De este principio se deduce, como ya se ha apuntado, que la ausencia de una institución global convierte al actual en un “no mundo”. En segundo lugar, el mundo ha de ser la entidad política suprema en términos de autoridad y soberanía, dado el carácter jerárquico de los distintos niveles de gobernanza que le preceden. En tercer lugar, la gobernanza del mundo ha de ser a través de una institución mundial, en este caso un imperio universal. En cuarto lugar, las instituciones políticas, en todos los niveles, han de estar regidas por los mismos principios políticos de carácter universal. En quinto lugar, la legitimidad de la institución mundial debe estar basada en la ética. Finalmente, y en relación con el anterior, la justificación ética de la gobernanza política es la representación de los corazones de las gentes del mundo.

Como se deduce de lo anterior, Zhao elabora su teoría basándose en un enfoque mixto en el que combina dos elementos claramente interrelacionados: una determinada visión política de la China Imperial combinada con la perspectiva confuciana de la familia. Bajo lo que ha sido denominado como un cosmopolitanismo patriótico que

⁴⁴ CALLAHAN, W. A., “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or New Hegemony?”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, nº 4, 2008, p. 753.

⁴⁵ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, p. 73. De hecho, el vínculo de la familia no es ajeno a las Relaciones Internacionales. Agathangelou y Ling retratan la disciplina como una casa colonial que se anuncia a sí misma únicamente a través de la identidad del padre que trata de imponer el orden en medio de la anarquía y el desorden. AGATHANGELOU, A. M. y L. H. M. LING, “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, nº 4, 2004, pp. 21-49. Además, Cunningham-Cross ha aplicado estos desarrollos al tema que nos ocupa, analizando la inclusión y exclusión de determinados discursos. En ese sentido, Cunningham-Cross concluye que la escuela china es a la vez cómplice y víctima de la perpetuación de estas dinámicas. CUNNINGHAM-CROSS, L., “Re-imagining the World through Chinese Eyes... *op. cit.*”, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁶ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, p. 72.

⁴⁷ WANG Y., “China. Between Copying... *op. cit.*”, p. 112.

combina los *a priori* contrarios discursos nacionalistas y cosmopolitanistas⁴⁸. De este modo, sus desarrollos se han centrado en actualizar el principio normativo de las relaciones internacionales de la China antigua y contraponerlo con el sistema internacional contemporáneo caracterizado por la importancia de la estructura anárquica y el principio de soberanía⁴⁹. Las diferencias entre ambos son patentes desde los términos primarios que estructuran ambos sistemas: el sistema político occidental en clave de individuos, comunidades y naciones-Estado; el sistema chino, por el contrario, formado por familias, Estados y el Tianxia⁵⁰.

La sumisión del elemento estatal a uno global no es más que la evidencia de la concepción civilizacional del pensamiento chino. Frente a un sistema internacional occidental basado en la soberanía, el pensamiento chino subsume la concepción jerárquica de este principio en una perspectiva más global. Esto le permite colocarse como el centro de esa civilización, asignando las posiciones concéntricas al resto en función de su índice de civilización, marcado principalmente por su conformidad con los valores y ritos de la civilización china⁵¹.

De hecho, el análisis de Zhang va más allá y rastrea las raíces políticas e históricas del sistema actual, comparando las estructuras constitucionales de la antigua Grecia, la China Imperial y la sociedad moderna de Estados⁵². En el caso de la China Imperial, Zhang subraya la concepción del mundo como civilizacional del confucianismo, entendiendo el principio organizativo de la soberanía como una jerarquía concéntrica. Esta visión tuvo su aplicación práctica a través de la institución del sistema de tributos que colocaba a China en el centro y otorgaba posiciones al resto en función de su grado de civilización⁵³. Frente al modelo de la sociedad moderna, en la que el propósito moral del Estado se centra en potenciar los propósitos del individuo, el modelo de la China Imperial cristaliza esa visión propia de la civilización a través de la promoción de la armonía social y cósmica.⁵⁴

Sin embargo, no se debe olvidar la importancia histórica del encuentro de China con la sociedad internacional europea. Culminada en las Guerras del Opio (1839-1842 y 1856-1860), la intensificación del comercio entre China y los poderes europeos

⁴⁸ CALLAHAN, W. A., "China's Strategic Futures. Debating the Post-American World Order", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 52, nº 4, 2012, p. 633.

⁴⁹ CARLSON, A., "Moving beyond sovereignty? A brief consideration of recent changes in China's approach to international order and the emergence of the Tianxia concept", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 20, nº 68, 2011, p. 89.

⁵⁰ ZHAO T., "All-Under-Heaven and Methodological Relationism. An Old Story and New World Peace" en F. DALLMAYR y ZHAO T. (eds.), *Contemporary Chinese Political Thought. Debates and Perspectives*, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2012, p. 51.

⁵¹ ZHANG Y., "System, empire and state.... *op. cit.*", pp. 56-57.

⁵² *Ibid.* El concepto de estructuras constitucionales lo toma Zhang de Reus-Smit, que las describe como complejos de metavalores que definen la identidad social del Estado y los parámetros de la acción estatal legítima. REUS-SMIT, C., *The Moral Purpose of the State... op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁵³ ZHANG Y., "System, empire and state.... *op. cit.*", p. 57.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

encabezados por el Imperio Británico fueron paulatinamente desgastando la fuerza del sistema chino. Si bien el sistema Tianxia se adscribe únicamente al reinado de las dinastías Zhou, son muchos los especialistas que afirman que el sistema de tributos que puso posteriormente en marcha la dinastía Qin (221-206 a. C.) es una forma de institucionalización de la idea del Tianxia⁵⁵. De cualquier modo, es posible afirmar que la entrada de los líderes europeos en la esfera de influencia china provocó la ruptura del sistema chino. Gong apunta que tanto la admisión de pleno derecho de las misiones diplomáticas europeas en China, como los acuerdos de Nanking (1842) y Tianjin (1858/1860) que establecieron una igualdad soberana entre China y los Estados europeos quebraron el ya debilitado sistema chino. Las relaciones soberanas con Europa y la injerencia cada vez mayor de estos Estados en China degradaron el Imperio hasta convertirlo en un Estado soberano al estilo occidental⁵⁶.

De hecho, si bien la obra de Zhao es generalmente tachada de utópica, no es menos cierto que busca una aplicación práctica estableciéndola dentro de un marco analítico e institucional. En opinión de Hückel, esta aplicación debería estar basada en

⁵⁵ Varios autores argumentan que el sistema de tributos, que se extendió desde la dinastía Qin (221-206 a. C.) hasta principios del s. XX, está íntimamente relacionado con la idea de Tianxia, en tanto que mantiene la concepción de China como centro del mundo civilizado. De hecho, el mapa del sistema de tributos, dividido en círculos concéntricos que clasifican a las distintas comunidades en base a su proximidad geográfica y su grado de civilización conforme a los valores chinos, se asemeja mucho a la concepción globalista de la dinastía Zhou (1080-221 a. C.). QIN Y., "Why is There No Chinese... *op. cit.*", p. 36; CALLAHAN, W. A., "China's Strategic Futures... *op. cit.*", p. 629; ZHANG Y., "System, empire and state... *op. cit.*", p. 53; SUZUKI, S., *Civilization and Empire. China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society*, Londres, Routledge, 2009, pp. 36-39. Sin embargo, también resulta interesante la visión de Zhang Feng, que aplica una perspectiva de la Escuela Inglesa para analizar las sociedades internacionales pre-modernas en Asia Oriental. En su aportación, el autor desliga el sistema de tributos con la visión del Tianxia de la dinastía Zhou, sino que considera que es una institución propia de la dinastía Qin que se extendió tanto a través de la sociedad internacional sinocéntrica dominada por la hegemonía china (*fanshu* 藩屬 como otra sociedad simultánea más igualitaria en la que existían rivalidades y mayores equilibrios de poder (*diguo* 敵國). ZHANG F., "International societies in pre-modern East Asia: a preliminary framework" en B. BUZAN y ZHANG Y. (eds.), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 29-50. Igualmente, es posible encontrar interesantes análisis con un carácter empírico e histórico sobre el sistema de tributos. Vid. ZHOU F., "Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System", *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4, nº 2, 2011, pp. 147-178; ZHANG Y. y B. BUZAN, "The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5, nº 1, 2012, pp. 3-36; ZHANG F., "Rethinking the 'Tribute System': Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics", *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, nº 4, 2009, pp. 545-574.

⁵⁶ GONG, G. W., "China's Entry into International Society" en H. BULL y A. WATSON (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 176-177. Como bien apunta Gong, estos tratados supusieron las primeras relaciones formales de China con Occidente, un periodo de "tratados desiguales", en términos chinos, que finalizó en 1943, cuando se completó la "civilización" de China hasta convertirla en miembro de la sociedad internacional. Ambos tratados son de especial importancia por su trascendencia posterior. El primero de ellos, el Tratado de Nanking (1842), firmado entre el Imperio británico y la dinastía Qing, puso fin a la primera de las guerras del Opio y acordaba la apertura de cinco puertos y una relación directa entre ambos imperios. En la práctica, el último de los puntos ha sido considerado como la admisión de la soberanía de otros Estados por parte de China. El segundo de los tratados, el de Tianjin (1858-1860), fue más allá, estableciendo residencias diplomáticas permanentes de los poderes europeos en China, abriendo Tianjin al comercio y la residencia extranjera y cediendo Hong Kong a los británicos.

la hibridación de las características de los sistemas chino y griego, colocando como sujeto central a las gentes del mundo en vez de a los Estados soberanos⁵⁷. En este sentido, la obra de Zhao ofrece un interesante contrapunto entre, por un lado, el orden wesfaliano como sistema horizontal basado en la igualdad soberana y, por otro lado, el de la China antigua o Tianxia, que favorece la jerarquía a través de un patrón de orden mundial determinado. Recalcando esta perspectiva eminentemente crítica con el orden heredero de Westfalia, Zhao contrapone la tradición política de la antigua Grecia con la china, argumentando que si bien la primera, base política occidental, se centraba únicamente en la *polis*, el principio del Tianxia tenía una eminente perspectiva mundialista⁵⁸.

La construcción de un orden inclusivo como el Tianxia, en el que no se considera que existan intrusos/marginados, genera que si bien existen otros sujetos extraños en el espacio y tiempo, no hay un alter, un opuesto⁵⁹. Esta concepción enraíza perfectamente con las corrientes filosóficas mayoritarias de la China antigua, que evitaban explícitamente las conceptualizaciones dualistas, en tanto que consideraban a los opuestos como complementarios, no pudiendo existir los unos sin los otros⁶⁰. Los razonamientos centrados en las relaciones y no en la naturaleza de los individuos, propios de la escuela confuciana, refuerzan la convicción de que la existencia del yo está supeditada a la existencia de otros, en tanto que es esa relación la que define a los sujetos⁶¹. Por lo tanto, se trata de un sistema entre diferentes, compuesto por los civilizados (aquellos que asimilaban la cultura china, basada principalmente en rituales) y los bárbaros. El objetivo principal del Tianxia es, en consecuencia, la transformación (*hua* 化) que cambia a ambos, transformando a los enemigos en amigos a través de la atracción y no de la conquista⁶². Sin embargo, no se debe olvidar que se trataba de un orden jerárquico en el que China constituía el centro, protector de la periferia, que estaba subordinada al centro⁶³. De hecho, pese a que Zhao afirme explícitamente que el sistema Tianxia no tiene “forasteros”, su exposición del mundo evidencia que ese centro institucionalmente erigido utiliza las dinámicas de exclusión e inclusión jerárquica para marginar a sujetos como Occidente o a aquellas naciones periféricas, obviando además los efectos de una hipotética automarginación de quienes quieren permanecer fuera de ese sistema⁶⁴.

⁵⁷ HÜCKEL, B., “Theory of International Relations... *op. cit.*”, p. 59; CALLAHAN, W. A., “Chinese Visions of World Order... *op. cit.*”, p. 751.

⁵⁸ ZHAO T., “A Political World Philosophy... *op. cit.*”, p. 7.

⁵⁹ QIN Y., “Why is There No Chinese... *op. cit.*”, pp. 41-42.

⁶⁰ BLEIKER, R., “East-West Stories of War and Peace: Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese Philosophy” en S. CHAN, P. MANDAVILLE y R. BLEIKER (eds.), *The Zen of International Relations. IR Theory from East to West*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 182.

⁶¹ ZHAO T., “All-Under-Heaven and Methodological Relationism... *op. cit.*”, p. 49.

⁶² ZHAO T., “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ... *op. cit.*”, p. 34.

⁶³ ZHAO S., “Rethinking the Chinese World Order: the imperial cycle and the rise of China”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 24, nº 96, 2015, p. 973.

⁶⁴ CALLAHAN, W. A., “Chinese Visions of World Order... *op. cit.*”, pp. 754 y 756.

Al igual que con las concepciones sobre identidad y alteridad, la dicotomía entre guerra y paz no es para Zhao la solución a los conflictos, como sí lo es la armonía. Se trataría de construir correlaciones fiables basadas en el beneficio mutuo junto con la aceptación de los valores del otro. La armonía se trata, en su opinión, de un objetivo mucho más ambicioso que la paz, que sería únicamente un derivado de dicha armonía⁶⁵. Es importante recalcar que la inclusión del concepto de armonía en el Tianxia hace referencia a uno de los términos más esenciales del pensamiento tradicional chino.⁶⁶ En este caso, hace referencia a un modelo de cooperación ideal, entendiéndola como una dependencia y mejora recíproca⁶⁷.

En la estructura internacional actual, con un énfasis en las características diferenciadores de los Estados individuales y la anarquía, no es posible lograr esa armonía por la ausencia de una visión sistémica global. Sin embargo, su propuesta de aplicación inspirada en el sistema Tianxia facilita la unión de los intereses proporcionando la orientación y la identidad común necesaria. La propia estructura, que se irradia desde el centro, moldea a las unidades⁶⁸.

El carácter co-constitutivo de la relación entre la estructura y la familia como unidad recuerda, como apunta Hückel, a las aportaciones de Wendt y Giddens en torno a la teoría de la estructuración. Sin embargo, en ésta los agentes y la estructura sí tienen ontológicamente una existencia distinta, ya que la concepción de estructura es más amplia. En el Tianxia, ambos constituyen una misma entidad, la familia es parte de la estructura y no existe agencia⁶⁹.

Esta estructuración del sistema evidencia que, en vez de proponer un sistema post-hegemónico, la voluntad de Zhao es retratar una nueva hegemonía global irradiada desde ese centro de la estructura, donde la gobernanza jerárquica de la China imperial es actualizada para un ejercicio en el siglo XXI⁷⁰. La distinción se centra en que, si bien los imperios occidentales eran ejercidos a través de la dominación, en este caso su perspectiva pretende impulsar una integración basada en el principio de armonía⁷¹.

⁶⁵ ZHAO T., "All-Under-Heaven and Methodological Relationism... *op. cit.*", p. 48.

⁶⁶ HÜCKEL, B., "Theory of International Relations... *op. cit.*", p. 42. Si bien los orígenes de este término son antiguos, es indudable su vigencia en el discurso actual en China, tanto a nivel de la academia como de la práctica política. *Vid.* CALLAHAN, W. A., "Remembering the Future — Utopia, Empire, and Harmony in 21st-Century International Theory", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, nº 4, 2004, pp. 569-601; CALLAHAN, W. A., "China's Strategic Futures... *op. cit.*"; BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... *op. cit.*"; PINTADO, M., "Identidad y Alteridad en un Mundo en Transformación... *op. cit.*".

⁶⁷ ZHAO T., "A Political World Philosophy... *op. cit.*", p. 14.

⁶⁸ HÜCKEL, B., "Theory of International Relations... *op. cit.*", p. 51.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

⁷⁰ CALLAHAN, W. A., "Chinese Visions of World Order... *op. cit.*", pp. 749-750; SCHWELLER, R. L. y PU X., "After Unipolarity. China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline", *International Security*, Vol. 36, nº 1, 2011, pp. 60-61.

⁷¹ ZHAO T., "A Political World Philosophy... *op. cit.*", p. 17. Según explica Colás, en el caso chino es evidente la importante influencia de los imperios anteriores en el actual Estado, pero la diferencia entre ambos, imperio y nación-Estado, radica en su distinta organización del espacio político. En el caso imperial,

Además, la perspectiva de Zhao evidencia una percepción bastante simplista de los valores de legitimidad y justicia sobre los que se sustenta la institución mundial del Tianxia⁷². Sin duda, la perspectiva del autor es más filosófica que propia de las Relaciones Internacionales, mostrando un carácter utópico no muy común en la academia contemporánea, de la que no es especialista. De hecho, Zhao no explica de un modo sistematizado el modo en el que se estructura esa institución mundial ni cómo se llega a ella, simplemente ensalza su utilidad como armonizadora. Además, obvia los conflictos derivados de la implantación de dicha institución y el difícil camino hacia la armonía, construyendo, según Paltiel, un proyecto con poco interés en términos de la práctica de la política internacional⁷³. Igualmente, en cuanto a la armonía, un concepto muy desarrollado en la filosofía de la China Antigua, Zhao también omite los desarrollos de este concepto en las teorías occidentales, obviando los desarrollos que en este sentido ha aportado la corriente liberal. De hecho, Zhao retrata conscientemente a la academia occidental únicamente en términos realistas-hobbesianos, facilitando así sus críticas⁷⁴. En ese propósito inclusivo y armonizador, Zhao acaba cayendo en su propia trampa y construye una relación entre alter y ego que se revela como mutuamente excluyente, atacando así las bases de su propia teoría.

4.2.2. El enfoque reverso de la Escuela Tsinghua. Una teoría del realismo hegemónico con características chinas.

En contraste con la perspectiva del Tianxia, los desarrollos teóricos de la Escuela Tsinghua y de su investigador más notable, Yan Xuetong, están eminentemente ligados con las teorías occidentales de la disciplina. Partiendo de la creencia de Yan sobre el carácter universal del pensamiento científico⁷⁵, su visión monista de las Relaciones Internacionales moldea de forma definitiva la teoría de esta escuela. Los trabajos teóricos de Yan se caracterizan por interpretar tanto los asuntos globales como el comportamiento de China en la sociedad internacional a través de una construcción teórica importada de las mayoritarias corrientes estadounidenses⁷⁶. Concretamente, Moure le define como “un realista neoclásico-ofensivo que entronca teóricamente con

las fronteras son abiertas, mientras que la nación-Estado necesita de unas fronteras claras y limitadas. COLÁS, A., *Imperio*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2009, pp. 35-36.

⁷² RAVAGNOLI, V., “The Chinese View of World Order: The Evolving Conceptualization of *Tianxia* (All-Under-Heaven)”, Tesis Doctoral, Instituto de Tecnología de Georgia, 2007, pp. 80-81.

⁷³ PALTIEL, J. T., “Constructing Global Order with Chinese Characteristics: Yan Xuetong and the Pre-Qin Response to International Anarchy”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4, nº 4, 2011, p. 382.

⁷⁴ ZHANG F., “The *Tianxia* System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia”, *China Heritage Quarterly*, nº 21, 2010, < http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/tien-hsia.php?searchterm=021_utopia.inc&issue=021 > [18 marzo 2016].

⁷⁵ YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, p. 254.

⁷⁶ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... op. cit.”, p. 75.

las teorías de la estabilidad hegemónica occidentales⁷⁷. Indudablemente, la aplicación de un marco importado facilita el diálogo entre la perspectiva Tsinghua y los desarrollos occidentales, clave en la intención de Yan de aportar una visión china a teorías ya existentes. Dicho de otro modo, es posible afirmar que su aportación va encaminada a la adición de hipótesis auxiliares al núcleo duro realista, completando a través de un análisis autóctono una teoría que considera universal.

Concretamente, los trabajos de Yan parten de un marco analítico importado a través del que analiza las ideas de filósofos anteriores a la dinastía Qin, como Confucio o Lao Tse⁷⁸. La reinterpretación de la tradición filosófica de esa época, conocida como la Edad de Oro, pretende ofrecer herramientas teóricas basadas en el pensamiento antiguo para analizar la realidad internacional contemporánea de manera innovadora. Concretamente, el análisis se centra en cómo los pensadores políticos de la época abordaron las cuestiones del orden y jerarquía, subrayando de qué modo estas aportaciones pueden ayudar a comprender los fenómenos actuales. Sin embargo, en dicha tarea, el autor a menudo tiende a exagerar las semejanzas entre ambas realidades y a oscurecer las diferencias⁷⁹. Como objeto de su análisis, el propio Yan cita el aprendizaje del pensamiento previo a la dinastía Qin de modo que permita repensar la estrategia de la emergencia de China para evitar errores como los soviéticos o japoneses⁸⁰.

Es posible afirmar que los trabajos de la escuela Tsinghua exploran dos horizontes teóricos interrelacionados. El primero de ellos es el análisis de la filosofía antigua a través de un marco teórico contemporáneo. En esta tarea, Yan se centra en el análisis del poder de estos autores y utiliza una metodología y terminología propia de las ciencias occidentales para clasificar estas obras⁸¹. El segundo horizonte teórico, profundamente ligado, analiza la estructura jerárquica del sistema internacional y los tipos de liderazgo ejercidos por los Estados más poderosos. De este modo, el primero de los proyectos teóricos entronca con el realismo neoclásico ofreciendo un análisis del poder al estilo de los autores clásicos y sin olvidar las variables no sistémicas del análisis. El segundo, por su parte, dialoga directamente con las teorías hegemónicas re-

⁷⁷ MOURE, L., "Orden internacional en transición... *op. cit.*", pp. 422-423.

⁷⁸ QIN Y., "Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*", p. 75. En concreto, Yan Xuetong analiza los trabajos de los siguientes siete filósofos chinos: Guanzi, Lao Tse, Confucio, Mencio, Mozi, Xunzi y Hanfeizi.

⁷⁹ PALTIEL, J. T., "Constructing Global... *op. cit.*", p. 386; WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, "The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*", pp. 30-31. No en vano, la obra más importante de Yan Xuetong en inglés se titula *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*.

⁸⁰ YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁸¹ Concretamente, para clasificar a estos autores clásicos, Yan aplica categorías epistemológicas tales como materialismo o idealismo y tres niveles de análisis (individuo, Estado y sistema) tomados de la teoría de Waltz, como el mismo admite. YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, p. 205. Contrastándolo con la metodología autóctona aplicada por Zhao y su sistema Tianxia, resulta evidente el fuerte legado occidental de la teoría de Yan. Éste se hace obvio cuando, por ejemplo, compara la distinción de Xunzi entre los conceptos de autoridad humana, hegemonía y tiranía con las tres culturas de la anarquía de Wendt. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

alistas, principalmente con los trabajos de Gilpin⁸², en tanto que Yan considera el sistema internacional como jerárquico en términos de poder, normas y responsabilidades, una característica que contribuye al mantenimiento de un orden internacional no conflictivo⁸³.

Como se ha manifestado en líneas anteriores, los desarrollos de la Escuela Tsinghua se caracterizan por analizar los desarrollos teóricos antiguos a través de un marco actual importado. En este caso, Yan utiliza el poder como eje conductor, en una característica claramente realista. Según apuntan Cunningham-Cross y Callahan⁸⁴, la elección del pensamiento previo a la Dinastía Qin obedece a tres razones principales. La primera de ellas es que Yan cree que los conocimientos adquiridos a partir de estos textos pueden contribuir a la teoría de Relaciones Internacionales contemporánea. En segundo lugar, el autor compara el estudio de éstos y su relación con la actualidad con la importancia de autores como Tucídides en la teoría occidental. Dicho de otro modo, el estudio de los clásicos chinos permite establecer continuidades entre el pasado y la actualidad e identificar problemas específicos de los distintos sistemas internacionales⁸⁵. Finalmente, en opinión de Yan estos textos son una guía para el reto del ascenso de China, tanto para su política exterior como para el resto del mundo, aportando la experiencia del éxito y fracaso de los poderes emergentes en esa época⁸⁶.

Concretamente, el proyecto pre-Qin se centra en explicar cómo entendían el poder estos antiguos pensadores. En opinión de Yan, éstos apuntaban a los factores políticos, económicos y militares como los más importantes y habitualmente señalaban la capacidad política como la base integradora del poder del Estado⁸⁷. De hecho, Yan toma a Xunzi como antecedente para afirmar que el poder político desempeña un rol movilizador del poder económico y militar⁸⁸. En este punto, Yan entronca la teoría de Xunzi con la realidad contemporánea al afirmar que, precisamente, el fracaso de la Unión Soviética y su desintegración refrenda esta afirmación del filósofo chino, ya que las causas de su disolución no fueron ni económicas ni militares, sino políticas. De

⁸² MOURE, L., "Orden internacional en transición... *op. cit.*", pp. 422-423. Cunningham-Cross y Callahan también subrayan el carácter realista del pensamiento de Yan, reflejado en la importancia que le otorga al poder en el sistema internacional, conformado por variables económicas, políticas, militares y culturales. CUNNINGHAM-CROSS, L y W. A. CALLAHAN, "Ancient Chinese Power, Modern Chinese Thought", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4, nº 4, 2011, pp. 355-356. Asimismo, el propio Yan habitualmente define sus desarrollos teóricos bajo la etiqueta de realismo moral. YAN X., "Political Leadership and Power Redistribution", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 9, nº 1, 2016, pp. 1-26.

⁸³ QIN Y., "Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*", p. 78.

⁸⁴ CUNNINGHAM-CROSS, L y W. A. CALLAHAN, "Ancient Chinese Power... *op. cit.*", pp. 352-353.

⁸⁵ YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought ...op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

hecho, Xunzi coloca el poder político como base del poder duro, ligando esta capacidad política con la corrección de las políticas del propio Estado⁸⁹.

Sin duda, el concepto de poder político es la pieza clave tanto para Xunzi como para Yan. En sus propias palabras, el poder político se basa en la capacidad de los gobernantes y ministros para movilizar los recursos. Dicho de otro modo, es el poder de maniobrar políticamente consistente la movilización de los recursos al servicio del poder económico, militar y cultural⁹⁰. En consecuencia, para Yan, el poder político tiene un efecto multiplicador, mientras que el económico, militar y cultural tienen efectos menos drásticos⁹¹.

Por lo tanto, la idea del poder se sustenta en el concepto de liderazgo moral. La moralidad, para Yan, es el centro del poder político, la fuente de la que emerge y la característica que dota al sujeto de la legitimidad que le permite perdurar en el poder. Constituye una clara referencia al realismo clásico de Morgenthau que Yan toma con el fin de resucitar el significado moral de la acción política⁹². El segundo, el liderazgo, enlaza con el carácter del poder que describe Xunzi, entendiendo que los distintos modos de liderazgo pueden llevar a la pérdida de poder político. A modo de ejemplo práctico, Yan considera que en el caso de la China actual, debería trasladarse el liderazgo moral del Partido Comunista a los oficiales que ostenten la misma naturaleza moral y que implementen políticas justas⁹³. De hecho, Yan va más allá y afirma que la moralidad tiene una importancia aún mayor para el Estado que ostenta el poder, en este caso Estados Unidos⁹⁴.

El concepto de moralidad ha alcanzado en los últimos tiempos una importancia vital en la obra de Yan, hasta el punto de lanzarse a elaborar las bases de una corriente realista etiquetada como "realismo moral" a partir de algunos de los postulados más importantes del programa de investigación occidental⁹⁵. A través de este último desarrollo, el autor consigue encajar sus trabajos en un enfoque distintivo pero inclusivo que dialoga de un modo directo con las proposiciones realistas contemporáneas e inserta su aproximación en los márgenes del debate realista⁹⁶. En concreto, estos cua-

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

⁹⁰ Esta definición la recoge Qin a partir de fragmentos de la obra de Yan. QIN Y., "Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*", p. 77; YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, pp. 101, 117 y 138.

⁹¹ El propio Yan acuña una ecuación en la que evidencia que el poder político multiplica al resto: Poder político = (poder militar + poder económico + poder cultural) X poder político. QIN Y. y YAN X., "Pensamiento Chino y Relaciones Internacionales: Dos Miradas", *Documentos CIDOB*, Asia nº 28, 2013, p. 14. Desde su perspectiva, el poder político constituye el único elemento operacional, mientras que el resto (poder militar, político y cultural) son recursos relevantes en la medida que son utilizados por elementos políticos como los gobiernos. YAN X., "Political Leadership... *op. cit.*", pp. 12-13.

⁹² Vid. MORGENTHAU, H. J., *Escritos sobre Política Internacional*, Madrid, Tecnos, 1990, pp. 92-98.

⁹³ CUNNINGHAM-CROSS, L y W. A. CALLAHAN, "Ancient Chinese Power... *op. cit.*", pp. 356-357.

⁹⁴ QIN Y. y YAN X., "Pensamiento Chino y Relaciones Internacionales... *op. cit.*", p. 14.

⁹⁵ YAN X., "Political Leadership... *op. cit.*", pp. 10-16.

⁹⁶ Si bien la obra de Yan utiliza un claro lenguaje realista y comparte las principales características de este programa de investigación, no es menos cierto que el realismo prioriza los desarrollos occidentales y, más concretamente, estadounidenses. Sin embargo, Yan ha logrado incluir su perspectiva en algunas

tro corolarios principales derivados de las anteriores aportaciones e investigaciones del autor le permite explicar porqué en algunas transiciones de poder el Estado emergente prevalece pese a tener un poder material menor⁹⁷. La primera de las proposiciones del realismo moral defiende que la búsqueda del interés es la dinámica principal tanto de la acción estatal como de la evolución normativa a nivel internacional. Sin embargo, no es la única dinámica. El propio Xunzi enfatizaba la importancia de otros elementos de carácter aprendido. Así, distinguía entre *xing* (性) o naturaleza innata y *wei* (伪) o las percepciones y naturaleza aprendidas. En referencia a estas últimas, Yan subraya la influencia de variables tales como la prioridad de determinados elementos del interés nacional o las estrategias. El segundo lugar, el realismo moral considera que la naturaleza del poder como elemento de suma-cero propicia conflictos estructurales entre un Estado emergente y uno dominante, ejerciendo también una presión sistémica en el primero de ellos debido a su creciente rol internacional. En tercer lugar, Yan considera que tanto las mejoras como las erosiones en el liderazgo político de los Estados transforman la fuerza nacional de éstos. Esto se debe al carácter multiplicador del poder político, que posibilita que los recursos del poder ganen en importancia. Por lo tanto, el liderazgo político tiene unos efectos directamente transformadores en la fuerza material de un Estado. Aplicando esta consideración a las transformaciones sistémicas a escala internacional, es posible deducir que los distintos modelos de liderazgo en los Estados dominante y emergente tendrán un papel relevante al determinar el orden internacional. Finalmente, en cuarto lugar, Yan subraya que en el sistema internacional de carácter anárquico, todos los Estados adoptan el principio de autoayuda para asegurar su supervivencia, pero aplican distintas estrategias. Esto se evidencia, por ejemplo, al observar cómo distintos tipos de Estados dominantes impulsan diferentes normas internacionales o, cómo adoptan estrategias diferentes para asegurar su supervivencia. Esta consideración, sin embargo, refuta uno de los principios de la teoría waltziana que rechaza la existencia de una diferenciación funcional entre las unidades del sistema internacional⁹⁸.

En relación a esta última argumentación, la obra de Yan también explora los distintos tipos de liderazgos. Si bien considera el sistema como jerárquico, no está de acuerdo con la escasa atención que los teóricos de la estabilidad hegemónica le otorgan a la relación entre la naturaleza del poder hegemónico y la estabilidad del sistema en su conjunto. De este modo, como veremos más adelante, la moralidad del Estado

fases del debate sobre el ascenso de China, aunque con una presencia mucho menor que el de las aportaciones estadounidenses. Para profundizar en el debate de Yan con algunos autores realistas puede verse los diálogos de la Conferencia celebrada en la Universidad de Tsingua, en colaboración con la Universidad de Fudan y la Universidad de Chicago, que reunió a expertos chinos y estadounidenses, entre los que destacan el propio Yan, John Mearsheimer, Robert Pape, Sun Xuefeng o Andrew Moravcsik. Vid. VV. AA., "Beyond Geopolitics... *op. cit.*".

⁹⁷ YAN X., "Political Leadership... *op. cit.*", p. 16.

⁹⁸ WALTZ, K. N., *Teoría de la Política Internacional...* *op. cit.*, pp. 111 y 145.

líder está íntimamente relacionada con la estabilidad del sistema y la durabilidad de su liderazgo⁹⁹.

Basándose, de nuevo, en la obra de Xunzi, realiza una tipología de liderazgos con arreglo a la moralidad y al modo en el que se ejercen. Si Wendt define el sistema internacional en función de las interacciones y las normas que estas generan, para los filósofos antiguos chinos es el tipo de monarca que reina el que tiene un impacto distinto en las relaciones y esos distintos tipos de liderazgo influyen a su vez los procesos de evolución normativa de la sociedad internacional¹⁰⁰. Por lo tanto, Yan explora cómo la variable independiente del tipo de liderazgo, a través de la interacción entre el Estado líder y el resto, influye a la variable dependiente, las normas internacionales. De este modo, la variable del tipo de liderazgo estará definida por la naturaleza de la práctica política del líder, sin constituir categorías estancas. De hecho, el autor considera que los cambios en el tipo de liderazgo pueden ser resultado de tres cambios distintos: aquellos de carácter interno dentro del propio régimen, los propios cambios de régimen o las transiciones entre un Estado y otro en el liderazgo¹⁰¹.

El papel de la moralidad en la teoría de la Escuela Tsinghua queda claramente reforzado con estas aportaciones. De hecho, según Yan, la moralidad moldea el poder, dando como resultado dos escenarios muy diferentes. En el primero de ellos, la legitimidad de un Estado se refuerza o erosiona en función de si va a favor o en contra de la moralidad internacional, aunque su fuerza material no cambie. En el segundo escenario, la legitimidad varía en función de si el Estado actúa conforme a la moralidad, pero también se transforma el poder nacional¹⁰².

⁹⁹ YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

¹⁰⁰ YAN, X., "International Leadership and Norm Evolution", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4, nº 3, 2011, p. 233.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 247-248.

¹⁰² YAN X., "Political Leadership... op. cit.", p. 2.

Figura 2. Comparativa entre distintos aspectos del poder en la Teoría de Relaciones Internacionales, la teoría del filósofo chino Xunzi y las culturas de la anarquía que enumera Wendt. Elaboración propia

Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales Contemporáneas	Naturaleza de las relaciones de poder	Cooperativa
		Competitiva
		Beligerante
	Grado de poder	Dominante
		Subordinado
		Participativo
	Contenido del poder	Político
		Económico
		Militar
Xunzi	Naturaleza del poder (Carácter)	Autoridad Humana
		Hegemonía
		Tiranía
Wendt	Culturas de la anarquía/ Naturaleza del sistema Internacional	Hobbessiana
		Lockeana
		Kantiana

En concreto, el autor enumera tres tipos distintos de liderazgo, basados en la obra de Xunzi: tiranía, hegemonía y autoridad humana¹⁰³. En primer lugar, la tiranía (*qiang* 強) es la peor de las tres y aquella que inevitablemente desembocará en el desastre y el declive¹⁰⁴. Está basada principalmente en el poder militar y obedece sobre todo a las normas de la política de poder, generando un orden internacional inestable. El segundo tipo, la hegemonía (*ba* 霸), es un modelo con una reducida exigencia moral (mucho menor que en el caso de la autoridad humana) y que se basa en el poder material y las alianzas estratégicas. En este caso, el hegemón debe proteger las necesidades de seguridad de sus aliados. Así, el líder aplica un doble estándar, por una parte utiliza la moralidad para relacionarse con los aliados y, por otro, prioriza la política de poder en sus relaciones con los enemigos¹⁰⁵. Finalmente, el tercero de los modelos es el

¹⁰³ YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, pp. 71-72 y 74-75; QIN Y. y YAN X., "Pensamiento Chino y Relaciones Internacionales... op. cit.", p. 15. Si bien la obra de Yan se basa en la compilación de los escritos de Xunzi realizada por Wang Xiangqian (en chino), es posible encontrar una compilación de sus escritos realizada en inglés, aunque desde otra perspectiva. Vid. WANG X. (ed.), *Xunzi jijie* (Collected Notes on the Xunzi), Pekin, Zhonghua, 1988 (1891); HUTTON, E. L. (ed.), *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014.

¹⁰⁴ YAN, X., "International Leadership... op. cit.", p. 137.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

de la autoridad humana (*wang* 王), que retrata un liderazgo con un alto grado de poder moral que gobierna gracias a haberse ganado “los corazones del resto de los Estados”¹⁰⁶. El liderazgo de la autoridad humana mantiene el orden internacional de tres modos distintos. En primer lugar, se erige como un buen ejemplo de prácticas morales acorde con las normativas internacionales. En segundo lugar, promueve la internalización de unas determinadas normas premiando a los Estados que actúan conforme a ellas. Finalmente, castiga a los Estados que las violan. De este modo, el orden internacional establecido por la autoridad humana se refuerza continuamente¹⁰⁷.

Evidentemente, la teoría de la Escuela Tsinghua tiene una clara orientación práctica. Si bien el propio Yan ha calificado las relaciones entre China y Estados Unidos como de una “amistad superficial”, no es menos cierto que también ha subrayado la imposibilidad de que ambos se enfrenten en una guerra de escala global¹⁰⁸. Yendo más lejos, Yan también ha subrayado el carácter beneficioso de la competencia entre ambos Estados para el sistema internacional en su conjunto. De este modo, “la competición entre China y Estados Unidos proporcionará al mundo dos modelos de desarrollo, ambos en un proceso de mejora constante gracias a los esfuerzos de cada país por ofrecer un modelo más avanzado que el de su competidor”¹⁰⁹. Además, la distinción entre el concepto de hegemonía, con el que recurrentemente relaciona el liderazgo estadounidense contrasta con su visión de China como Estado emergente, basado en la moralidad, al estilo del liderazgo de la autoridad humana. En este caso, la importancia que Yan le otorga al concepto de poder político es una clara heredera de la visión humanista de los desarrollos de los filósofos de la antigua China, que el autor trata de incorporar al debate realista, con una vertiente claramente cientifista¹¹⁰. En esta línea, manifiesta que esa moralidad hoy en día se hace patente a través de un mayor grado de responsabilidad internacional. Por ello, la autoridad moral en la sociedad internacional contemporánea no se mide solamente a través de un importante número de aliados, sino también en la capacidad de movilizar el apoyo nacional e internacional a través de un buen sistema político¹¹¹. De nuevo, el poder político se muestra como elemento multiplicador frente a los recursos materiales.

A modo de conclusión, es posible apuntar que una de las características más enriquecedoras de la obra de Yan son sus aportaciones prácticas sobre los principios políticos que deben perseguir China en los próximos años. Según Zhang, estas aportaciones pueden clasificarse en tres niveles. En el primero de ellos, el que hace referencia

¹⁰⁶ BELL, D., “Introduction” en YAN X., *Ancient Chinese Thought... op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁷ YAN X., “Political Leadership... op. cit.”, p. 23.

¹⁰⁸ YAN X. y QI H., “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China-US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5, 2012, pp. 105-127; CREUTZFELDT, B., “Yan Xuetong on Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony”, *Theory Talks*, nº 51, 2012.

¹⁰⁹ QIN Y. y YAN X., “Pensamiento Chino y Relaciones Internacionales... op. cit.”, p. 17.

¹¹⁰ CUNNINGHAM-CROSS, L y W. A. CALLAHAN, “Ancient Chinese Power... op. cit.”, p. 360.

¹¹¹ CREUTZFELDT, B., “Yan Xuetong on Chinese Realism... op. cit.”.

a la gran estrategia global, Yan opina que China debe convertir la hegemonía en el objetivo principal de su política exterior, presentando su propia visión universal. En segundo lugar, a nivel de la política exterior, sus esfuerzos deben enfocarse en demostrar su responsabilidad como potencia, promoviendo una mayor apertura de la sociedad internacional y expandiendo su poder político. Finalmente, en el tercer nivel, Yan propone establecer unas estrategias específicas para la emergencia de China, centradas principalmente en la creatividad a la hora de abordar problemas estratégicos y en el refuerzo y ampliación de la política de alianzas¹¹².

La utilización de un marco teórico similar al occidental, su lenguaje y sus conceptos importados, así como la aplicación de una bibliografía conocida en la disciplina estadounidense facilitan enormemente el diálogo entre la Escuela Tsinghua y las corrientes *mainstream*, principalmente en las investigaciones sobre la emergencia de China como potencia internacional. Sin embargo, como destaca Qin, a nivel interno en ocasiones su análisis de los pensadores chinos y su aplicación al marco actual puede resultar “simplista”¹¹³.

4.2.3. El enfoque interactivo y la importancia de los procesos y las relaciones. Qin Yaqing y el constructivismo relacional

El tercero de los proyectos teóricos, el enfoque interactivo o constructivismo procesal, nace de un descontento sobre cómo las teorías occidentales han omitido o malinterpretado los procesos de socialización de las potencias emergentes. Por ello, Qin Yaqing explora las teorías occidentales y las utiliza en la construcción de su teoría, de carácter mixto. De este modo, su construcción teórica constituye simultáneamente una crítica y una interesante aportación principalmente a las teorías constructivista y de la Escuela Inglesa.

La revisión de las tres teorías mayoritarias del *mainstream* occidental evidencia, en opinión de Qin, la omisión del elemento social con más significado del sistema internacional: las relaciones. Si bien la teoría liberal institucionalista pone el foco en las instituciones, se centra en el momento en el que culmina el proceso con el establecimiento de este régimen. En el caso del constructivismo, Qin admite que si bien presta relación al proceso, lo hace como una variable dependiente de la estructura y los agentes¹¹⁴.

Además, el enfoque interactivo contrasta la visión racionalista de las perspectivas occidentales con una perspectiva relacional propia del pensamiento chino. La

¹¹² ZHANG F., “The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of International Relations”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5, nº 1, 2012, pp. 98-101.

¹¹³ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, p. 79.

¹¹⁴ QIN Y., “Relationality and processual construction: bringing Chinese ideas into international relations theory”, *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 30, nº 4, 2009, p. 7.

relacionalidad, además de estar presente desde la filosofía antigua, también supone una conceptualización fundamental de la gobernanza para el confucianismo¹¹⁵. Las teorías racionalistas, desde la misma perspectiva, prestan más atención a las estructuras, obviando los procesos, y por ello tienden a producir análisis estáticos y a menudo no son capaces de explicar el cambio¹¹⁶.

La teoría procesual de Qin está compuesta por dos aproximaciones particulares a sendos dilemas de los desarrollos teóricos de la disciplina. El primero de ellos dialoga directamente con la Escuela Inglesa, al proponer un enfoque distinto de la sociedad internacional. El segundo va más allá y propone una epistemología alternativa al racionalismo imperante en gran parte de la disciplina. Concretamente, Qin aboga por la relacionalidad derivada de la cultura china, que retrata las relaciones alter-ego como inclusivas.

El debate sobre el carácter de la sociedad internacional enlaza con la especial relación entre las escuelas chinas y la Escuela Inglesa. Tal y como afirman Wang y Buzan, ambos proyectos comparten su posición como contrapeso a las teorías del *mainstream* estadounidense. Sin embargo, la clara vocación global de la Escuela Inglesa aún está por desarrollar en el caso chino. A pesar de ello, ambos proyectos comparten importantes intereses teóricos y conceptuales que alimentan el debate. Entre ellos, Wang y Buzan enumeran la importante orientación normativa con claras referencias a la historia y teoría política, el interés en la sociedad internacional de la antigua China como modelo de sociedad internacional no occidental, la emergencia de China y su impacto en la sociedad internacional global y regional o la interrelación de los principios de anarquía y jerarquía¹¹⁷.

Los nexos en común entre ambas perspectivas y el importante calado del concepto de sociedad internacional entre los académicos chinos proporcionan las bases para un enriquecedor debate en torno al concepto enunciado por Bull. Si bien Qin considera la valía de la idea de sociedad internacional para la comprensión de las relaciones internacionales, también critica su carácter estereotipado, estático y marcadamente eurocéntrico¹¹⁸. Estas características, además, se hacen más evidentes cuando la sociedad internacional global o europea se encuentra con otra de carácter regional, cuyos miembros aún se encuentran en proceso de acomodo a nivel global¹¹⁹. Según Qin, este problema es consecuencia de la adopción de un enfoque mayoritario que retrata la sociedad internacional como una entidad. Esta perspectiva subraya la necesidad de una homogeneización de las normas e instituciones de los miembros de la

¹¹⁵ De hecho, la idea de la relacionalidad supone uno de los ejes principales del clásico texto oracular "Libro de las Mutaciones", uno de los conocidos como Cinco Clásicos del confucianismo. Vid. QIN, Y., "Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*", p. 80.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81-82.

¹¹⁷ WANG, Y. y B. BUZAN, "The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*", pp. 2 y 44.

¹¹⁸ QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", p. 134.

¹¹⁹ Vid. BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... *op. cit.*".

sociedad internacional hacia aquellas adoptadas por los poderes más importantes. La adopción de los principios que componen el conocido como “estándar de civilización”, son un claro ejemplo de estos procesos de homogeneización en los que el alter sufre un proceso excluyente de integración. Esta homogeneización produce un cambio en la identidad y la integración genera una nueva síntesis derivada de la victoria de un sujeto sobre el otro¹²⁰. Esta visión, en opinión de Qin, imposibilita la existencia de una sociedad internacional global y crea sociedades regionales entre sujetos cuya homogeneidad es, de inicio, alta¹²¹. Curiosamente, estas sociedades regionales acaparan mayor atención investigadora cuando mayor es su diferencia frente a la sociedad occidental global, como en el caso de Asia Oriental. De hecho, en el estudio de ésta, el propio Buzan admite que esta sociedad regional tiene un nexo de unión muy fino y levemente integrado, dada su ausencia de homogeneidad¹²².

Frente a esta perspectiva estática, Qin propone entender la sociedad como un proceso de complejas relaciones intersubjetivas en movimiento¹²³. Esta visión procesal se basa en una dialéctica complementaria que hunde sus raíces en el pensamiento chino de la antigüedad. La conocida como dialéctica china o *zhongyong* (中庸)¹²⁴ constituye un contrapunto a la visión hegeliana de las relaciones alter-ego, que las retrata como inherentemente conflictivas. Se trata de un concepto de raíces confucianas y que para Qin constituye una parte importante del conocimiento básico chino¹²⁵. La vía mutuamente inclusiva del pensamiento recoge como eje la esencia epistemológica racionalista en su base con dos polos opuestos que interactúan, pero las relaciones entre ellos no tienen porqué estar marcadas por el conflicto¹²⁶. El carácter inclusivo de las relaciones entre los sujetos constituye la piedra angular de la dialéctica china a lo largo de un proceso marcado por la armonía. Frente la visión hegeliana de la tesis y la antítesis, la dialéctica china está compuesta por co-tesis que interactúan y se complementan, dando lugar a una síntesis que combina e incluye a ambas tesis pero que es a

¹²⁰ QIN Y., “International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*”, pp. 141-142.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹²² BUZAN, B. y ZHANG Y., “Conclusion: the contest over East Asian international society” en B. BUZAN y ZHANG Y. (eds.), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 219.

¹²³ QIN Y., “International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*”, p. 145.

¹²⁴ Tradicionalmente, el concepto de *Zhongyong* es definido como “tomar la vía media”, aunque también implica connotaciones sobre lo apropiado de las acciones que se llevan a cabo. *Ibid.*, p. 287, n. 9. Para Wang, la noción confuciana del *zhongyong*, incluye en su seno dos conceptos. El primero de ellos, *zhong*, es la centralidad y el equilibrio; el segundo, *yong*, hace referencia a la universalidad y la armonía. WANG Q., “Cultural Norms and the Conduct of Chinese Foreign Policy” en HU W., G. CHAN y ZHA D. (eds.), *China's International Relations in the 21st Century. Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts*, Boston, University Press of America, 2000, p. 146.

¹²⁵ QIN Y., “International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*”, p. 288. El concepto de conocimiento básico consiste en expectativas intersubjetivas y disposiciones que únicamente se adquiere a través de la práctica. ADLER, E. y V. POULIOT, “International practices: introduction and framework” en E. ADLER y V. POULIOT (eds.), *International Practices*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 16.

¹²⁶ QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, pp. 82-83.

la vez diferente de ambas¹²⁷. El proceso cumple, en consecuencia, un rol esencial facilitando que las identidades se definan y redefinan en el seno de estas relaciones, transformándose ambas, huyendo de la homogeneidad y avanzando hacia una identificación positiva de todos los sujetos.

Por lo tanto, una visión de la sociedad internacional como proceso permite considerar a las normas e instituciones no como herramientas para gobernar o controlar el comportamiento de los actores individuales, sino como armonizadoras de las relaciones entre los miembros de la sociedad¹²⁸. Como consecuencia de esta visión de procesos, Qin Yaqing aboga por la construcción de una corriente teórica a la que denomina constructivismo procesal. La etiqueta constructivista nace de la visión social de esta corriente, de la que disiente en su modo de construir las relaciones. En el caso chino, se trata de un proceso marcado por la relacionalidad, ganando así en dinamismo teórico. Esta teoría sistémica, a través de un enfoque que subraya la importancia de las prácticas intersubjetivas entre los actores, recalca el papel de los procesos sociales en el desarrollo normativo e identitario a nivel internacional¹²⁹.

El enfoque procesal, además, se define a través de sus tres características principales. La primera de ellas destaca el carácter simbiótico y mutuamente constitutivo de agentes y proceso. Las relaciones entre proceso y agentes no son lineales sino que tienen un carácter circular, como el *yin yang*, que es considerado la metarrelación más importante. En lugar de una causalidad lineal e instrumental, se trata de una constitución singular y holística. En segundo lugar, el proceso construye la intersubjetividad, es decir, el comienzo de la interacción es lo que le da sentido y va generando un conjunto de prácticas sociales y procesos relacionales que dotan a la interacción de significado. Finalmente, la lógica del propio proceso tiene en su base la dialéctica china, que aboga por la inclusión y heterogeneidad de los actores¹³⁰.

La consideración de las identidades y las instituciones como pilares clave de la sociedad internacional hace necesario un análisis sobre tres elementos principales que dan pistas sobre los supuestos y comportamientos de los actores¹³¹. El primer concepto es el *he* (和), que puede traducirse como armonía o la acción de combinarse, y que se refiere a la complementación de esos dos opuestos mediante el proceso, llegando a la síntesis. Por lo tanto, el proceso, el círculo que rodea al *yin yang*, cumple la función armonizadora. El segundo concepto es el *shi* (勢) o la dirección del proceso de cambio en el que el actor actúa. Esta tendencia, además, aporta pistas sobre el contexto, y en el caso de la sociedad internacional contemporánea, Qin considera que está dominado por los conceptos de paz, cooperación y desarrollo. Finalmente, el *bian* (变), el cambio

¹²⁷ QIN Y., "Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China's International Strategy", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, n° 3, 2014, p. 293.

¹²⁸ QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", p. 138.

¹²⁹ QIN Y., "Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*", p. 82.

¹³⁰ QIN Y., "Relationality and processual construction... *op. cit.*", pp. 9-10.

¹³¹ QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", pp. 147-149.

o transformación, subraya la mutación de los actores en el seno del proceso, no contra su tendencia sino a favor de ella.

El particular enfoque que propone Qin permite su aplicación práctica en el concepto de gobernanza relacional, abordando directamente la cuestión de cómo gobernar desde una perspectiva menos normativa y más procesal. Se trata de un modelo de gobernanza que confronta directamente con la visión racionalista basada en las reglas y normas. No obstante, la visión de Qin aporta un interesante punto de vista para comprender el modelo de gobernanza propuesto por China y que ya comienza a advenirse a través de las distintas acciones multilaterales que promueve. Si bien el enfoque racional de la gobernanza pone el foco no solo en las normas, que son consideradas como cruciales, sino también en las reglas informales y los procesos, la gobernanza relacional las toma como la variable crucial.

Por lo tanto, el concepto de gobernanza relacional se define como un proceso de negociación de acuerdos socio-políticos que gestionan relaciones complejas dentro de la comunidad con el fin de generar orden y estimular los comportamientos recíprocos y cooperativos. Todo ello basándose en la confianza mutua que se genera por el entendimiento compartido de determinadas normas sociales y morales¹³².

Tal y como pone de manifiesto esta definición, la gobernanza relacional se caracteriza por varios rasgos distintivos¹³³. El primero de ellos es que el concepto no hace ninguna referencia al control, sino que subraya la importancia de la negociación. Por ello, si el control se caracteriza por un proceso unidireccional entre el que lo ejerce y el que lo sufre, en el caso de la negociación se trata de una relación multidireccional entre los sujetos, creando una red de relaciones y procesos. En segundo lugar, la conclusión anterior ya evidencia que la gobernanza es retratada como un proceso dinámico que se coordina y consulta constantemente dada su naturaleza cambiante e incierta. En tercer lugar, el gobernado no es el actor a título individual, sino el complejo de relaciones. No se trata, por lo tanto, de equilibrar el poder, sino las relaciones. Finalmente, como deja entrever la definición, la confianza constituye el pilar clave de la gobernanza relacional y la pieza que la conecta con la filosofía tradicional china.

De hecho, el enfoque confuciano entiende la gobernanza como el establecimiento y mantenimiento del orden por medio de la auto-disciplina y el dominio de sí mismos basándose en la moralidad y la confianza mutua cultivada a través de las relaciones¹³⁴. Desde esta perspectiva confuciana, la buena gobernanza se define por tres características principales: está estructurada a través de distintas relaciones (*“chaxuge-*

¹³² QIN Y., “Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*”, p. 85; QIN Y., “Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4, nº 2, 2011, p. 133.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ QIN Y., “Rule, Rules, and Relations... *op. cit.*”, p. 137.

ju” 差序格局 o patrón de la diferencia), en un entorno poblado por personas nobles (“*junzi*” 君子) que tiene la confianza como la norma moral más importante¹³⁵.

Este modelo de gobernanza se basa principalmente en la visión interconectada de las relaciones que Qin deriva de la dialéctica china. A través de los procesos de mediación y coordinación se avanza hacia la armonización. La moralidad, constituida como pilar y garante de la buena gobernanza, guía a los actores hacia una evolución practicada a través de la virtud, y sus relaciones avanzan hacia esta armonía¹³⁶.


El carácter distintivo de la gobernanza relacional se resalta a través de la comparación con la habitual gobernanza internacional. Se trata de dos modelos complementarios que se enriquecen con la coexistencia. Sin embargo, es cierto que por sus raíces eminentemente asiáticas, la gobernanza relacional se aplica en mayor medida en esta región. El primer rasgo distintivo entre ambas formas de gobernanza es su énfasis en las relaciones sociales y las prácticas de los agentes sociales, pese a su complejidad. El aspecto positivo de esta distinción es que reduce los costes de transacción y por si misma refuerza el intercambio voluntario de información. En segundo lugar, la unidad de análisis no es el actor individual, como en la perspectiva racionalista, sino aquellas relaciones contextualizadas en un espacio y tiempo determinado. El énfasis de las normas en la perspectiva racional busca controlar los atributos negativos de los actores a título individual. Sin embargo, la perspectiva relacional ensalza el papel de la dialéctica china para que las relaciones transformen al actor y le hagan trabajar hacia la consecución del interés común. En definitiva, se trata de estimular la cooperación para reforzar esa red encaminada a lograr resultados de ganancia mutua. En tercer lugar, se trata de una gobernanza orientada al proceso, que aboga por el mantenimiento de esas relaciones pese a la ausencia, al menos inmediata, de resultados. Este proceso, según la perspectiva china, ya tiene efectos transformadores para los actores involucrados. En cuarto lugar, el papel crucial de la confianza es un rasgo distintivo frente a la perspectiva racionalista que, considerando a los actores como egoístas, necesita que los acuerdos estén vinculados normativa y legalmente¹³⁷.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-136.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

Figura 3. Comparación entre los conceptos básicos de los distintos enfoques de gobernanza.
Elaboración propia.



La representación de estos modelos de gobernanza contribuye a complementar la dualidad entre los conceptos de la dialéctica china y la visión racionalista/hegeliana. De hecho, el propio Qin considera que, a la hora de abordar lo que entiende como uno de los mayores retos teóricos de la disciplina, las relaciones entre la identidad de china y la sociedad internacional se reproducen habitualmente esas dualidades. Por una parte, la visión hegeliana/racionalista mantiene que para lograr el objetivo del ascenso pacífico, China debería aceptar las instituciones primarias y cambiantes de la sociedad internacional, a pesar de que algunas confronten con su identidad¹³⁸. La situación, por lo tanto, es la de un alter que es transformado por el ego, homogéneamente, sin que el ego sufra variación alguna. Por otra parte, la visión relacional basada en la dialéctica china entiende la sociedad internacional no como una entidad estática, sino como un proceso. Las relaciones entre ambos sujetos (la sociedad internacional en su conjunto y China) serán transformadoras para las dos partes avanzando hacia una síntesis armónica derivada de la continua reconstrucción y reajuste de las identidades¹³⁹.

Al igual que en el caso de la gobernanza, resulta interesante y enriquecedor avanzar en la contraposición de los binomios proceso-entidad, legalidad-sociedad o racionalismo-relacionalidad. No obstante, esta tarea necesita ser abordada incorporando las perspectivas no occidentales, en este caso chinas, y facilitando un nexo

¹³⁸ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... *op. cit.*".

¹³⁹ QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", pp. 142-143.

común de entendimiento entre ambas como el que realiza Qin. Si bien el estudio de perspectivas más autóctonas en sus referencias culturales e históricas, como el Tianxia, resultan enriquecedores, no es menos cierto que los enfoques puente como el de Qin Yaqing o, incluso, la Escuela Tsinghua abren la puerta a un diálogo más enriquecedor.

METHODOLOGICAL PART

CHAPTER 5

HEGEMONY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSAL TOWARDS A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As the previous chapters have stated, there is a wide range of lenses to conceptualise and analyse hegemony. Needless to say, some of these visions are considered rivals or even antagonistic. However, the aim of this research is to converge different paths towards a more comprehensive and complete approach to hegemony that dissolves the barriers between paradigms. In doing so, it is particularly useful to think about research not as dividing, but as a bridge building practice, tackling such important topics through an analytical eclecticism. As Sil and Katzenstein suggest, these eclectic approaches stimulate the transgression of theoretical boundaries both in the research questions and in the perspectives of the discipline¹. This way, it will be possible to identify logics drawn in different paradigms and bear with the complexity of some phenomena as the present one².

In the previous chapters, this project has examined seven theoretical traditions with competing ontologies and epistemologies towards a complete analysis of how

¹ SIL, R. and P. J. KATZENSTEIN, *Beyond Paradigms. Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

hegemony is understood in the discipline. Often build on opposition to other theories, paradigms usually highlight several faces of the phenomenon while obscuring others. Moreover, IR as a discipline often bears with several events that do not necessarily fit into the expectations of theories³. Taking that into account, it is possible to argue that an eclectic framework has more chances to minimise these anomalies by opening the analytical scope.

In the case of hegemony, different approaches stand into different definitions of the term that, hence, provide different answers. Therefore, it should be clearly stated which question will be addressed and what each term means. As a starting point, in the following chapters hegemony will be understood as an eclectic concept bringing together features highlighted by different theoretical traditions. Concretely, for the purpose of this research, hegemony will be understood as an institution of the international society. Hence, an English School framework will be applied, even though contributions of other schools of thought will be incorporated to enrich and criticise this view. Under this approach, hegemony is defined as a relation of social and informal hierarchy build on a legitimised and socialised international order. This order is mainly composed by a strong institutional network and a dominant set of identities, interests and practices underpinned by an extraordinary portfolio of material capabilities and resources⁴.

Even if the definition mentions material resources as a source of hegemonic power like realists do, the present project does not understand them as the main components of hegemony. Material capabilities constitute the cornerstone of primacy or unipolar structures⁵. As Ikenberry argues in the case of the United States after WWII, the new redistribution of power offers to the unipole a broad bunch of choices including domination, transformation or abandonment⁶. Whatever the unipole decides, the

³ The end of the Cold War and the advent of unipolarity, for example, caught several scholars by surprise. As a result, some delayed for years the proclamation of unipolarity. Examples include prominent scholars such as Waltz, Kaplan or, to some point, Krauthammer. *Vid.* WALTZ, K. N., "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", *International Security*, Vol. 18, nº 2, 1993, pp. 44-79; KAPLAN, R. D., *The Coming Anarchy. Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*, New York, Random House, 2000; KRAUTHAMMER, C., "The Unipolar Moment... *op. cit.*". However, as Battistella rightly points out, concerning the distribution of power resources "unipolarity actually is a historical era, and not merely a short moment". BATTISTELLA, D., "The Post-Cold War Order as a One-Dimensional World", *Colección de Estudios Internacionales*, Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, nº 12, 2012, p. 12.

⁴ For the composition of this definition, I have relied mainly on several conceptualisations of the concept considered as constructivist or English School's. *Vid.* CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*; BEYER, C., "Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower... *op. cit.*"; BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*

⁵ Hegemony and unipolarity/primacy are terms commonly seen as synonyms. However, unipolarity and primacy describe a situation of preponderance of capabilities. Hegemony, in contrasts, defines a unipolar configuration in political and economic terms that results in a structure of influence. WILKINSON, D., "Unipolarity Without Hegemony", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, nº 2, 1999, pp. 143; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁶ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

outcomes are not automatic, agency is involved. In this case, the transformation of these power disparities into hegemony constitutes a conscious strategy of order creation and institutional restraint.

In this process, the unipole's identity, interests and recurrent practices are in some way translated into the progressive institutional web. Although it was constructed with a global ambition, the postwar order was liberal and Western in its identity and practices. It can be argued that the creation of a normative and institutional order is a probe of the impossibility of maintaining system stability only through material power and the provision of public goods. Institutional binding offers stability and reduced leadership costs to the hegemon, but at the same time restraints the exercise of its power. To achieve these gains, the unipole needs to socialise and legitimise this order. As Clark remarks, the legitimating practices under hegemony do not legitimate a particular state's exercise of power, but the order it has built⁷.

Even if this definition brings together several aspects highlighted by the main theories analysed in the previous chapters, there can be identified several points of disagreement between them than may contribute to the enrichment of the concept.

5.1. Material and social variables in the analysis of international society. Converging perspectives

The main approaches of the discipline are usually divided by its emphasis on material or social factors. Even if the materialist perspective led by realism constitutes the main lens to analyse the international, the end of the Cold War has boosted many social analysis to the main debates. The materialist approach's principal works portray hegemony as a result of the accumulations of high amounts of material power. Even if this approach has been usually attached to the realist tradition in its broader sense, it is undeniable that the material analysis has commonly been used as a ground to develop other theories, such as neoliberalism. As Ikenberry put it, polarity and power distributions only offer a description of national capabilities but cannot explain the political formation that the hegemon builds around these material assets⁸. In other words, if the possession of several material capabilities was the sole indicator, the results will only determine the polarity of the system or, more precisely, to what extent it remains the United States' primacy over the system.

The second perspective, focused on social variables, has been explored from a great range of theories that have added different social variables to their analysis. At this point, it is important to remember that in the present thesis different kinds of

⁷ CLARK, I., "China and the United States... *op. cit.*", p. 24.

⁸ IKENBERRY, G. J., *Liberal Leviathan. The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012, pp. 46-47.

social variables have been explored within the liberal, constructivist, English School and Chinese Approaches (mainly in the theory of relationality by Qin Yaqing but also in Yan Xuetong's Moral Realism). It is widely known that an analysis of systemic transformations and, more precisely, of hegemony and rising states must tackle the question of how the order has been constructed by the dominant nation. Material capabilities cannot determine nor the exercise of power, neither the building of the hegemonic order⁹. In the task of disentangling the superstructure of the United States hegemonic institution, several variables must be addressed through a qualitative methodology. Following Clark's works on hegemonic institutions, it is possible to point that legitimacy will play a crucial role¹⁰, not forgetting the importance of socialisation or identity.

Undoubtedly, analysis of material distributions of power provides interesting information about the structure of the system and the constraints faced by great powers. Even constructivist admits that changes in the distribution of power matter, because they produce changes in great powers' attitudes towards the normative structure, pushing them to defend, oppose or even boost new norms¹¹. However, in cases of high imbalances of power as the present one, materialist analyses say little about the international order build by the powerful state. It is true that material preponderance or primacy offer multiple opportunities to the dominant state to spread its influence and strength, but there is a need to legitimate it and construct a hegemonic status¹². As Colas states, hegemony was exercised not only through material domination through military and diplomatic means, but reproduced through the importation of "American management techniques, labour relations and forms of recreation"¹³.

Therefore, primacy constitutes the first and compulsory step towards hegemony, but a materially dominant state does not always become a hegemon. In other words, hegemony is a socially achieved status, built on rights, consent and legitimacy. Moreover, this distinction unfolds what it is usually called as hegemonic decline in two (intertwined) phenomena. The first, related to primacy and the inability of the dominant state to maintain itself as a world leader in terms of resources and capabilities. The second one is the crisis of the social order build by the hegemon to sustain its position. Both faces of the same coin, hegemony needs primacy, but primacy does not

⁹ IKENBERRY, G. J., *Liberal Leviathan... op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹⁰ Vid. BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*; CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in the International Society... op. cit.*; FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure... op. cit.;" RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, D., "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... op. cit."

¹¹ YOUNG, A. R., "Perspectives on the Changing Global Distribution of Power: Concepts and Context", *Politics*, Vol. 30, nº 1, 2010, p. 4; PRICE, R., "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines", *International Organization*, Vol. 52, nº 3, 1998, p. 635.

¹² HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... op. cit.", p. 204.

¹³ COLÁS, A., "Hegemony" in F. BERENSKOETTER (ed.), *Concepts in World Politics*, London, Sage, 2016, p. 207.

necessarily imply hegemony. Thus, any analysis of hegemony must address both realities: the power structure and the social order¹⁴.

In this vein, it is necessary to advance towards a reconciliation of material and social approaches to understand, as Beyer notes, US predominance in a multidimensional way¹⁵. Material power should be understood as the way to achieve the monopoly of the production of cultural, social and symbolic capital justified and legitimised through multiple social structures¹⁶.

As Guzzini rightly noted, the nature of international society does have an impact on the value of abilities, resources and the relevant issue areas¹⁷. Understanding the contemporary environment in a complex way –not just as a hobbesian order, but with mixed characteristics of Lockean and Kantian societies– any materialist view should understand power resources as, at the same time, hybrid and in constant evolution.

Moreover, what materialist lenses cannot explain is the character and the relationship between emerging powers and the international order. Materialist scholars tend to portray rising states as potentially dangerous, understanding that rising powers will like to use their material status to overturn the system. However, as others point out, the dissatisfaction of the rising state cannot be taken for granted. At this point, it is possible to agree with Schweller and Pu when they highlight that the future international order and a hypothetical rise of unipolarity depends directly on the roles played by emerging powers. In this vein, they draw three alternative options, going from support to the order and sharing of responsibilities, spoiling and dismantlement of the existing order and replacement, and finally, a free rider behaviour that gets the privileges of this power position without contributing to global governance¹⁸.

Definitely, states' attitudes towards the international system are not solely materially determined. One can argue, as some realist did, that states with growing capabilities will definitely be revisionist, but as the hegemonic succession between United Kingdom and the United States exemplifies, some transitions can be progressive and peaceful. Therefore, the rise of the conflict not only depends on how the emergent state behaves, but also how the former hegemon manages its decline.

At this point, the identities that the rising state performs gain special attention. However, it is necessary to have in mind that great powers' rise not only involves the emerging state, but also the relation between this state, on the one hand, and the he-

¹⁴ The distinction between power structure and social order as components of hegemony is developed by Barry Buzan. BUZAN, B., *The United States and the Great Powers. World politics in the twenty-first century*, Cambridge, Polity, 2004, p. 148.

¹⁵ BEYER, C., "Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower... *op. cit.*", p. 414.

¹⁶ SCHWELLER, R. L. y PU X., "After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*", p. 49.

¹⁷ GUZZINI, S., "From (alleged) unipolarity to the decline of multilateralism? A power-theoretical critique" in E. NEWMAN, R. THAKUR and J. TURMAN (eds.), *Multilateralism under challenge? Power, international order and structural change*, New York, United Nations University Press, 2006, p. 124.

¹⁸ SCHWELLER, R. L. y PU X., "After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*", p. 42.

gemon and the international order it has build, on the other. Therefore, it constitutes a two way process that cannot be isolated. As Buzan and Cox summarise, rising power can emerge conflictively or peacefully. The conflictual scenario, as drawn by realist, supposes that emerging powers will try to overturn the system to gain the most. On the contrary, the peaceful model, whether positively or negatively, involves a war free scenario, although the negative peaceful rise may involve growing threatening. What this taxonomy suggests is that for peaceful rise to be achieved, the authors maintain, the rising power should be able to get both material and social gains in absolute and relative terms without the need to precipitate an open war¹⁹. Undoubtedly, the hegemon has in its hands the chance to accommodate the rising power and balance the gain and status inequality to improve rising state's satisfaction with the system, but it will inevitably narrow the gap between both states' relative power distribution and conflict with the hegemon's own interests.

5.2. The role of institutions in international society. Construction, change and accommodation in institutionalised social orders

The international order constructed around the hegemon's dominance is a topic of special concern for various IR scholars. As Clark's points out, hegemonic legitimacy is bestowed no to the actor itself, but to the institutional order it has built around its power²⁰. However, that order may have different characteristics and suffer transformations in response to the changing systemic dynamics. As a response to the latest changes in the distribution of power, scholars hold the expectation that these changes will challenge the US liberal institutional order²¹. It should be noted that the order build by the hegemon is not only rooted in institutions, but also in informal norms, meanings and behaviour. Therefore, institutions constructed by the hegemon are not the only important objects of study, but also the underlying doctrines of this institutional net.

The concern about institutions builds a bridge between the social approaches of the English School and constructivism, on the one hand, and the liberal approach, especially in the analysis of the contemporary liberal order, on the other. On the contrary, realism does not pay much attention to institutions, understanding them as a result of power distributions and created for selfish purposes²². However, it is possible to agree that institutions are, at first, created to achieving these selfish outcomes, mainly for locking the leadership in the system by a wide institutional practice. As even critical theorist admit, hegemony, is extremely linked to the model of interna-

¹⁹ BUZAN, B, y M. COX, "China and the US... *op. cit.*", p. 112.

²⁰ CLARK, I., "China and the United States... *op. cit.*", p. 24.

²¹ YOUNG, A. R., "Perspectives on the Changing Global Distribution of Power... *op. cit.*", p. 4.

²² MEARSHEIMER, J. J., "The False Promise of International Institutions... *op. cit.*", p. 7.

tional order that the hegemon wants to lead²³, a project in which institutions are essential tools. Going further, in the international society approach, Clark suggest that hegemony can be defined as a “legitimated social arrangement” in which institutions play a crucial role²⁴. So, rather than as a way to administrate hegemony, institutions must be taken as its cornerstone.

Nevertheless, the institutional practices make these institutions less dependent of the hegemon, at least apparently. As Keohane concluded, international regimes can survive hegemony²⁵. However, that conclusion seems, at least, risky, as the survival of regimes is highly linked to the character of the new international order that arises after the decline of the hegemon. In other words, it must be theorised to what extend will the new unipole support the institutions that mirror a share of gains related to the old distribution of power. It may be possible to envisage a gradual irrelevance of the institutions or the rise of new institutional frameworks that serve the same needs but that accommodate better to the new world order.

Moreover, the important question to be addressed is to what extend do international norms and institutions constraint material power²⁶. This way, it is possible also to question the impact of changes in material distribution on the institutional and normative structure of the international society and the accommodation of rising powers to the existing system. Needless to say, institutions are an important point of analysis of a state’s compliance with the status quo. A pro status quo power, in a few words, agrees both with the institutions of the international society and also with its status within them. Therefore, as these regimes reflect an unbalanced distribution of power, rising states do not usually agree with its status and try to improve it and push for a redistribution. Hence, they constitute unequal grounds of negotiation and not a multilateral structure as is sometimes pretended.

The hypothetical process of accommodation to the new poles, especially China, may involve a change in the conception of governance. In the western understanding, governance is focused on institutions, both formal and informal, and processes conceived to guide and restraint states’ activities²⁷. However, it is not a unique conception of governance. As Qin suggests, relational governance is more rooted in Confucian cultures as a form of governance that does not govern actors but relationships. With its multidimensional character, it is not about control, but about negotiation²⁸.

²³ COX, R. W., *Approaches to World... op. cit.*, p. 136.

²⁴ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 4. It should be noted that Clark makes a distinction between primary institutions of the international society (war, international law, balance of power or hegemony, among others) and secondary institutions (or international organisations).

²⁵ KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*

²⁶ CLARK, I., “International Society and China... op. cit.”, p. 317.

²⁷ KEOHANE, R. O. and J. S. NYE, “Governance in a globalizing world” in R. O. KEOHANE (ed.), *Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 202.

²⁸ QIN Y., “Rule, Rules, and Relations... op. cit.”, p. 133.

As this comparison shows, the identity of the ruling elites is embedded on the character of the international order. Therefore, different actors have different relationship with the order, as the share of status and the participation is unequal. Therefore, understanding the performative role of institutional networks provides clues of the satisfaction of a state with the status quo. In other words, institutions are of special concern to analyse the accommodation of rising powers to the existing order and their relations with the institution of hegemony.

Any approach to the institutional scenario in situations of hegemony should, firstly, consider institutions as organisations in constant evolution that develop their own logics as they become more stable²⁹. For the purpose of analysing hegemonic institutional context, it should also be noted the context in which they are born and how this context is transformed after the creation. It is possible to argue that this pre-institutional context is defined by a situation of material primacy of a state for a period that is usually characterised as post conflictual³⁰. In this specific moment, the most powerful power decides to institutionalise its exercise of power through a set of regimes, organisations and norms which are profoundly influenced by its interests and identities. In the afterward of the WWII, for instance, United States promoted the regulation of the international economic and financial systems through the Bretton Woods institutions. This institutional complex, even if created through agreement with other 43 countries, reflected the capitalist and liberal identities of the United States and served to their interest, especially in commercial, monetary and financial terms.

Accordingly, the leading state will achieve several goals with the construction of these institutional networks. On the one hand, and more evidently, it binds secondary states into a certain post-war order that offers predictable patterns of behaviour and reduces uncertainty³¹. On the other hand, and more importantly, it constitutionalises, socialises, legitimates and decentralises its exercise of power. At the same time, it establishes a certain hegemonic narrative of the international society that contains concrete meanings and boundaries that marginalise other actors and narratives.

Once institutions became the grounds of negotiation and some regular patterns of contacts are established, they influence, in different ways, both actors and the international context. The development of a constitutional international order, in terms of Ikenberry and Clark, transforms primacy into hegemony. The outcomes on the international arena can be summarised in the following five. First, as liberals advanced, institutions transform the contexts of cooperation. The availability of more and better information increases trust and multilateral cooperation, as the multiplication of actors does not necessarily imply an increase of cheating options. Secondly, institutions


²⁹ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, p. 42; FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*", pp. 68-69.

³⁰ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*

³¹ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, p. 51.

also provide instrumental legitimation to certain hegemonic decisions, as the United States has done, for example, through the establishment of multilateral forces with NATO members for several military conflicts. Thirdly, institutions also become sources of contestation to the hegemon, for example, through veto in the UN Security Council. Fourthly, they also constrain the exercise of hegemonic power. They set the boundaries on the exercise of material power, but they also offer different alternatives to the hegemonic state. In the view of Brooks and Wohlforth, constraints emerged from institutions, especially reputation, are minimal³².

Figure 4. *The international institutional order. Construction and outcomes in hegemonic orders. Own elaboration.*



However, their analysis focuses more in the direct constraint, obviating the long term erosion of the hegemon's legitimacy. As Finnemore affirms, the hegemon feels

³² BROOKS, S.G. y W. C. WOHLFORTH, *World out of Balance... op. cit.*

the constraints of institutions through punishment and trap and, as a response to it, develops hypocritical behaviours, eroding its legitimacy³³. Finally, institutions shape the actors' identity, values and interest³⁴ by promoting, for example, a more important status inside the organisation. This accommodation strategy is usually mentioned as a way to promote China's turn into a status quo power. However, the case study should address to what extent contemporary institutions perpetuate the Cold War power distribution and whether they are still reluctant to adjust their power-sharings

5.3. Stability in the international society. The role of hegemony and the prospects of continuity and change

The stability of the international system is an issue of special concern, considering the anarchical character of the system. In a general sense, stability is linked to the structure of the system, considering some distributions as more stable. Proponents of the Hegemonic Stability Theory pointed to the power inequality as a source of stability, defending that the hegemon plays an important role maintaining the system and providing global public goods such as security or economic order³⁵. Moreover, Gilpin stated that hegemony, not anarchy, constituted the organising principle of the system at least for two decades³⁶.

However, in the realist tradition the balance of power theories continued to link bipolarity with stability, as a source of restriction on the great powers. Hegemonic and balance of power approaches, despite these confronting arguments, converge on pointing to a particular structure of the system as the source of stability. However, for Gilpin hegemony needs prestige to overcome the logic of the balance of power. This way, other powers will understand that the hegemon will restrain its power and provide public goods. In other words, the less powerful states decide that they gain more with the rule of the hegemon than with confrontation and balancing. As Power Transition Theory proposes, satisfaction constitutes a key variable in continuity and change, but at the same time is a slippery unit of analysis.

³³ FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*", p. 61.

³⁴ KATZENSTEIN, P. J., *The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 22; DUVALL, R. D. and A. WENDT, "Institutions and International Order: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s" in E.-O. CZEMPIEL and J. N. ROSENAU (eds.), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1989, p. 60.

³⁵ Even Carr was convinced that the "working hypothesis of an international order was created by a superior power". CARR, E. H., *La Crisis de los Veinte Años...* *op. cit.*, p. 298. In the same vein, realists as Wohlforth affirm that the more broad is the concentration of power on the hands of the hegemonic state, the more stability and order in the international system. WOHLFORTH, W. C., "The Stability of a Unipolar World... *op. cit.*", p. 23.

³⁶ Gilpin refers to the two decades before the publication of his book, *War and Change* in 1981. GILPIN, R., *War and Change...* *op. cit.*, pp. 7 y 144.

In the same vein, in the realist school, some refuted balance of power theories and declared that it was not polarity, but the balance between status quo and revisionist forces in the system what makes a system stable³⁷. Again, this statement goes back to the consideration of rising power as a risk to the system. That constitutes a point of convergence in most hegemonic theories and also for some of the pro-balancing scholars. However, the rise of a new power and the distribution of power are not the only variables to consider. As Schweller points out, when explaining the practices of bandwagoning, even if these dynamics push the system in the direction of change, this change may not always mean a more unstable system³⁸. Moreover, he also contends that modern realists tend to assume that states would pay higher costs to protect the values they already possess (a status quo position) but would take lower risks to improve their position in the system (revisionist)³⁹. Undoubtedly, this dichotomy goes back to the realist debate over which one is states' primary goal, security or power. Yet, this distinction is false to the extent that ignores the changing goals of emerging states, the evolution of their interests and its possible accommodation in the system and future satisfaction.

Therefore, the source of stability is not the pattern of power, but the relationship between the power distribution and the international order. Even if the previous approaches may seem as contradictory, they refer to different orders. In this vein, Ikenberry distinguishes between three orders which variable sources of stability. In the case of balance of power, there are the balancing practices; in hegemonic orders the unipole and in constitutional orders is the normative corpus in which the power limiting institutions are based⁴⁰. However, in constitutional order it may be argued that institutions per se are not a source of stability, is the legitimacy bestowed to the order of which these institutions take part that assures the stability of the system. Therefore, legitimacy, and not institutions, is the source of stability of the system⁴¹.

Even if we admit that a concrete power patten generates stability, what does not automatically generate is a society⁴². With the absence of a society and a common culture, conflict will be permanent, because even if the system is stable and has a regular pattern of behaviour, different conceptions of how the society should be are in conflict. That is to say, if we analyse the post-war periods with an English School lens, we will not totally agree with Ikenberry's description of these periods as terms used by the victorious great power to construct an order and provide stability. Without refut-

³⁷ KIRSHNER, J., "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism... *op. cit.*", p. 58; SCHWELLER, R. L., "Bandwagoning for Profit... *op. cit.*", p. 93.

³⁸ SCHWELLER, R. L., "Bandwagoning for Profit... *op. cit.*", p. 92.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁴⁰ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

⁴¹ REUS SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 170.

⁴² NAVARI, C., "What the Classical English School was Trying to Explain, and Why its Members were not Interested in Causal Explanation" in C. NAVARI (ed.), *Theorising International Society... op. cit.*, p. 45.

ing that, these periods can also be seen as struggles to establish which principles of legitimacy will be hegemonic in the system as happened after WWII. Later, these principles will constitute the cornerstone of the new born international society. Therefore, the order is not the direct aim, but the outcome of the stabilisation of these legitimacy principles⁴³. So, if we consider that both hegemony and legitimacy constitute social phenomena that involve values (considered to a different extent depending on the theory)⁴⁴, we can conclude that there cannot be stability without the shared values that make possible these bunches of legitimate principles and sanction them as hegemonic and hence, not even international society.

However, this emphasis on shared values must not be misunderstood with the notion of the standard of civilisation, prominent among English School Scholars in the last century. It is possible to draw a link to the school prominent work on *The Expansion of International Society*. In this work, despite the attention given to the case studies, for Bull and Watson the individual analyses serve to a more important research question: the new international system. Even if they dedicate a chapter to the emergence of the new international society, the work does not properly address the biggest uncertainties about the global international society, not even its existence, formation or consistency⁴⁵. This gap makes it necessary to address these questions in the case of the contemporary international society: to what extent it is universal? Does it have any entry requirements as in previous centuries? The character of international society is again linked to stability, as the inclusion and accommodation of new or peripheral powers in this society and the socialisation of the society itself are a crucial issues to provide continuity and also to assure that change is less dramatic. The very existence of this society implies shared norms and institutions which, in reality are usually established by a great power to assure its order. Therefore, this conclusion, besides reinforcing Clark's asseveration that the English School and hegemonic analysis are complementary, also strengthens the argument that this society in its universal sense would be better achieved under hegemony. In a hypothetical case of a struggle for systemic dominance, different sets of norms, regimes and alternative hegemonic institutions based on confronting identities anticipate a fragmentation of the globally spread entity of international society. Change, in this case, cannot be explained just as a power transition, but as a hegemonic succession⁴⁶.

As Clark contends, it is at least questionable the right of the declining hegemon to keep on institutionalising an order at its own shape expecting that the eventual

⁴³ ZHANG, Y., "China and the Struggle for Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 305.

⁴⁴ CLARK, I., "How Hierarchical can International Society be?" in K. BOOTH (ed.), *Realism in World Politics*, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 277.

⁴⁵ VIGEZZI, B., *The British Committee... op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁴⁶ CLARK, I., "China and the United States... *op. cit.*", pp. 13-14.

successor will simply adapt to it⁴⁷. In this case, the order will not constitute a source of stability, but of conflict, as a struggle between two alternative hegemonic institutions. In the event of a lack of agreement on the definition of the legitimate hegemonic institutions and as a cause of the transition in progress, it may be possible to witness a fragmentation of international society toward different legitimacy principles and confronting considerations of how international order should be.

5.4. Methodological proposal towards a composed understanding of hegemony. The role of material and social variables

The hybrid nature of the actual contemporary international society and its changing nature complicate any analysis of its structure. Concretely, the present society is hybrid both in its origins and in its expansion. As Hurrell notes, this society is defined by a “deformity” resulted from two phenomena. On the one hand, the interests and preferences of the great powers have an important influence in the society and, on the other, there is growing pluralism of ideas, values and identities that seek recognition within the society⁴⁸.

The changing nature of the society is supported by four main reasons. The first one is the multiplication of non-state actors and their growing relevance in the system. Even if the state continues to be the most important actor for the majority of IR scholarship, the geopolitical relevance of these new poles of power grows dramatically, particularly in the case of terrorist groups, transnational corporations and cities, among others. Secondly, the society of states is evolving towards a less Western ruled society with the emergence of new poles of power. The economic rise of emerging economies and their influence as poles of dynamism is gradually translating to the political sphere. Thirdly, the concept of power has evolved towards less materialist definitions, opening a research ground for new notions as influential as soft power. Moreover, more classic theoretical concepts such as diplomacy, institutions or identity have vividly resurged and its influence spreads both within the system and also among political leaders⁴⁹. Finally, economic interdependence and globalisation have

⁴⁷ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 191; NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES (NIDS), *East Asian Strategic Review*, Tokio, The Japan Times, 2009, p. 127.

⁴⁸ HURRELL, A., *On Global Order... op. cit.*, pp. 9-10; ZHANG, Y., “China and the Struggle for Legitimacy... *op. cit.*”, p. 306.

⁴⁹ On the redefinition of classic concept such as diplomacy, Cornago’s works constitute a step towards a broad and modern understanding of one of Bull’s institutions of international society. *Vid.* CORNAGO, N., *Plural Diplomacies. Normative Predicaments and Functional Impertatives*, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013; CORNAGO, N., “Diplomatic Knowledge” in C. M. CONSTANTINOUS, P. KERR and P. SHARP (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*, London, SAGE, 2016, pp. 133-146; CORNAGO, N., “Paradiplomacia y redefinición de la seguridad internacional: dimensiones de conflicto y de cooperación” in F. ALDECOA and M. KEATING (eds.), *Paradiplomacia: las relaciones internacionales de los gobiernos regionales*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2000, pp. 55-78. Moreover, on approaches that examine the regional sub-state

erased Cold War's considerations about the poles of influence and even the most antagonistic states maintain strong economic relations.

5.4.1. *The materialist analysis of hegemony*

Despite the transformations that are shaking international society, power distribution constitutes one of the most important variables in IR. The literature around power dynamics and distribution generally agrees in the difficulties to make power measurable. Needless to say, historically power has been one of the most contested concepts among the literature, and the ways to measure it are, at least, plural. Moreover, any aggregated analysis of power must tackle the question of power fungibility, as different power resources are not interchangeable⁵⁰. However, the alternative analyses also pose problems. On the one hand, the relational power approach, developed by Dahl, despite being useful, has been usually accused of mixing the concepts of power and control⁵¹ and poses some difficulties to be studied. On the other hand, the concept of structural power, defined as the ability to establish the rules and influence other actors, is specially focused on the economy and regime theory that has not completely spilled over to the IR literature. Moreover, this last concept is profoundly influenced by the distribution of capabilities within the system, so both approaches are, in some way, interrelated⁵².

The role of the distribution of power and the structure of the international system has been a particular concern of realism. As Barnett and Duvall rightly affirmed, rival theories have just confronted argumentatively realists' concepts of power, but have not tried to construct their own definition of the concept and, at the same time, have strongly neglected to explicitly explain how it operates in their own theories⁵³. With its interest rooted as back as in Ancient Greece's philosophy, Thucydides believed, in Gilpin's words, that "the hierarchy of power among these states defined and maintained the system and determined the relative prestige of states, their spheres of influence, and their political relations"⁵⁴. Even though power has been understood in different ways among realist⁵⁵, it is undeniable that it constitutes the cornerstone for all the realist school. In neorealism, power was given even a stronger relevance. In

diplomacy, see CRIEKEMANS, D. (ed.), *Regional Sub-State Diplomacy Today*, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010.

⁵⁰ BALDWIN, D., "Power Analysis and World Politics... *op. cit.*", p. 180.

⁵¹ DAHL, R., "The Concept of Power... *op. cit.*", pp. 202-203.

⁵² HART, J. A., "Power and Polarity in the International System" in A. N. SABROSKY (ed.), *Polarity and War. The Changing Structure of International Conflict*, Colorado, Westview Press, 1985, pp. 25 and 30.

⁵³ BARNETT, M. and R. DUVAL, "Power in International Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 59, n° 1, 2005, p. 41.

⁵⁴ GILPIN, R., "The Theory of Hegemonic War... *op. cit.*", p. 595.

⁵⁵ See Chapter 2 for a profound analysis of how power is conceptualised within the realist tradition.

Waltz words, international politics is a reflection of the distribution of power⁵⁶. In the same vein, Gilpin specified that the important factor was not the static power distribution, but the evolution of the dynamics of power relations⁵⁷. Thus, power is not such important in absolute terms, but in relative ones.

At this point, it is possible to tag the distribution of power among great powers as a crucial variable for the materialist analysis. Great powers are usually defined by the combination of capabilities in several scopes ranging from economic strength, military budget or technology⁵⁸. In contrast, Levy offers a less materialist vision, maintaining that great powers can be identified by three main characteristics. The first is their huge military capability and their projection of power abroad. As a result, great powers tend to be strategically self-sufficient and have strong foreign policy targets. Secondly, their concept of security is not only regional but global. Finally, they have both the capacity and the assertiveness to defend their interests globally⁵⁹. This composed conceptualisation of great powers supports the present multidimensional analysis that will start, but not finish, with the material structure.

By turning to a more analytical definition, Levy avoids the criticism towards materialist views, leaded by Waltz, which tend to wrongly equate capabilities and resources. In Reus-Smit's view, some of the components of Waltz' lists are resources, and just two can be equated as capabilities (economic and military strength)⁶⁰. Therefore, most of IR literature assumes the equation that sees capabilities and resources as synonyms and analyses power just in terms of the addition of all of them.

Despite of analysing each variable individually, it is also interesting to apply an index that offers a broader picture of the structure of international society. In the power transition literature, the Correlates of War (COW) project launched its own index to determine the outbreak of war caused mainly by power transition⁶¹. As a result of this project and applying different variables (population, military personnel, military expenditures, energy consumption and iron and steel production), it came up a Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) that ranked the states on the basis of

⁵⁶ WALTZ, K. N., "Structural Realism... *op. cit.*", p. 27.

⁵⁷ GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁵⁸ Waltz, for example, lists the following variables: size of population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; military strength; political stability; and competence. WALTZ, K. N., *Theory of International Politics*, London, McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 131.

⁵⁹ LEVY, J., *War and the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1983, pp. 11-19.

⁶⁰ REUS SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 161-162.

⁶¹ The main works in the COW Project are Singer's introductory books that enunciate which variables and indicators will be included in the analysis. SINGER, J. D., *The Correlates of War*, New York, Collier Macmillan, 1979; SINGER, J. D. and P. DIEHL, *Measuring the Correlates of War*, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1991. For applications of the Correlates of War to power transitions see, for example, SOYSA, I. de, J. R. ONEAL and Y.-H. PARK, "Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, n° 4, 1997, pp. 509-528; HOUWELING, H. and J. G. SICCAMA, "Power Transitions as a Cause of War", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, n° 1, 1988, pp. 87-102; LEMKE, D. y S. WERNER, "Power Parity... *op. cit.*

its aggregate share of capabilities⁶². As Chan points out, the index was not very sensitive to economic changes, due to the importance given to variables such as population and the omission to adapt to the technological changes. As a result of that, the author maintains, this index did not reflect the decline of USSR power during the 1970s and 1980s and has lost most of its validity for the study of power transitions both in the 21st century and in the second half of the 20th⁶³. Therefore, Chan proposes an alternative measure that comprises economic power (through the indicator of GDP in US dollars on Purchasing Power Parity standard), defensive power (military expenditures in current US dollars) and technological power (total number of internet hosts)⁶⁴.

In the present case study, geographical variables such as population and territory have been consciously excluded. As relative stable variables, they tend to bias the data by exaggerating the index of large and highly populated states such as Russia, China, India or the United States. It is not to say that they do not play a role as a factor of national power, but definitely is not a crucial one⁶⁵.

In the same vein, with the purpose of offering the first steps to advance towards an index that matches contemporary changes in international society, important attention will be pay to technological developments, both in the field of general innovation and to technologies of the military sector. In the latter, it is possible to state that, even if years ago the number of national troops was one of the most important indicators of each state's national military strength, recent developments in the military research and development sector provide the opportunity to develop a more lethal military with less personnel.

That being said, the aggregate power of a state is highly influenced by its economy. In the globalised world, national economy continues to be the most important material factor, even if its influence has diffused. Countries' economic strength determines most of the budget spend on military or social targets and also modifies their international strategy. Following economic variables, military, energy and technological ones will be individually addressed.

⁶² CINC includes the ratios of countries' (1) total population, (2) urban population, (3) iron and steel production, (4) primary energy consumption, (5) military expenditure, and (6) military personnel. It is, in fact, a multiple index that reunited demographic, industrial and military variables. On a broad and depth explanation of the distinction between simple and multiple index as well as the main contributions in each type, see SODUPE, K., *La Estructura de Poder del Sistema Internacional... op. cit.*, pp. 96-104.

⁶³ CHAN, S., *China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory. A Critique*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 12.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁶⁵ Chan is also a supporter of this claim. In his analysis, he has found that the addition of these variables has sometimes biased past analysis, as in the case of the United Kingdom. *Ibid.*, p. 2. Even if several leading scholars continue to include them in their analysis, the present thesis understands that in the contemporary era both variables maintain relatively stable figures, unless a sudden loss of territory or population happens as a result of a war, for instance.

Figure 5. Summary of selected material variables and indicators.

SECTOR	VARIABLE	INDICATOR	SOURCE(S)
ECONOMY	National economy's strength/size	GDP at market prices in current dollars	World Bank
	Strength of trading sector	Balance of Payments in current market prices	World Bank
		Growth rates of imports and exports	World Bank
	National Investment in the technological sector	Expenditure on R&D percentage of GDP	World Bank
	Technological competitiveness	High technologic goods exported on current U.S. dollars	World Bank
ENERGY	Energy effectiveness/productivity	Energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per \$1000 GDP in constant 2011 PPP	World Bank
	Energy dependency	Energy imports (percentage of energy used)	World Bank
MILITARY	Military expenditures	Military budget in current U.S. dollars	SIPRI, U.S. Defence Department
		Weight of military expenditures on national GDP (percentage)	SIPRI, U.S. Defence Department, World Bank

5.4.1.1. Economic, financial and technological variables

Economic trends and the dynamism of national growth are usually marked as the most important variables of material power. Economic strength has been labelled as the most convertible form of power⁶⁶. As Kirshner says, changes in the global economic map are one important source of international political conflict, as economic change is believed to redistribute relative power among states⁶⁷.

Needless to say, the size of a state's economy is the cornerstone of great power status, and the economic surplus dedicated to military and technology is a reinforcing factor for rising powers⁶⁸. Due to the more important role of emerging markets in the global economy, it is also important to look at the dynamism of the economy and its annual growth rate. As several authors argue, an economy's ability to growth is directly related to its maturity. Even if the technological revolution and reliable political environments maintain stable growth rates among developed societies, they are strongly confronted by developing economies whose growth-rates are far more dynamic⁶⁹.

The measure of national economies and its international comparison has been commonly addressed through the use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indicators. However, there are several measurements for this task and lately there has been a wide controversy due to the different results that each one offered. Since the World Bank (WB) revised its indicators in the last decade, the measurement of GPP in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms has witnessed a strong rise. As the Asian Development Bank (ADB) explains, this measure, "adjusts for differences in purchasing power of local currencies"⁷⁰. With an admitting margin of error of 5%, the WB advises to use this index to group economies, for example, in terms of their income, rather than ranking international economies⁷¹. Moreover, several economic analyses point out that the PPP is particularly troublesome in the case of larger countries with diverse prices between regions⁷². As in the case of China, the difference between urban areas (where most of the data is collected) and poorer rural areas creates an overestimation of ac-

⁶⁶ LAMPTON, D. M., *The three faces of Chinese power: might, money, and minds*, California, University of California Press, 2008, p. 114.

⁶⁷ KIRSHNER, J., "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism... *op. cit.*", p. 54.

⁶⁸ GILPIN, R., "The Theory of Hegemonic War... *op. cit.*", p. 596.

⁶⁹ TAMMEN, R. L., J. KUGLER, D. LEMKE et. al., *Power Transitions... op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁷⁰ ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, *Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures*, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 2007, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/270056-1255977254560/Asia&Pacific_2005Report.pdf> [25th April 2016], p. 8.

⁷¹ WORLD BANK, "Global Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures – 2005 International Comparison Program", *World Bank*, Washington DC, 2008, <<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/icp-final.pdf>> [25th April 2016], p. 6.

⁷² DEATON, A. and A. HESTON, "Understanding PPPs and PPP-based national accounts", *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, Vol. 2, n° 4, 2010, pp. 1-35

tual prices⁷³. As a result, economists tend to believe that PPP based index is not a proper tool for comparison, especially in cases like China⁷⁴.

Therefore, the GDP measure will be calculated in terms of nominal considerations. This way, the GDP at market prices in current dollars will not reflect the effects of inflation⁷⁵. Unlike in the WB data, the index offered in the following chapter will include, in the case of China, both the figures of the mainland and also of the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao.

In the economic section, the dynamics of trade will be also addressed. Needless to say, exportations have been an important variable for the rise of new powers and, in the way of becoming a mature economy, the balance of payments usually tends to equalise. Moreover, the relations between imports and exports provide a tool to identify imbalances in a national economy, as continuous trade deficits need strong injections of external capital in the domestic economy.

In this case, the indicator selected will be the balance of payments in current market prices. It is also important to examine the growth rates of both imports and exports to identify a tendency in each economy.

As it has been enunciated, the present project prioritises technological variables among geographical and demographical ones. It is not only that technological systems constitute a part of the international system, but also, as Herrera argued, produce a social, economic and political change⁷⁶. Therefore, the transformative power of technology can be said to be a source of international change and, moreover, an important facet of national power. However, how to operationalise technological variables is sometimes a slippery issue⁷⁷. Moreover, it has been decided to include technological variables within the broader scope of economic variables, understanding that it constitute an important source of innovation on national economy and also a relevant indicator of a country's national development.

Hence, in the practical application, technological developments will be addressed via two main indicators. Firstly, the government expenditure on research and

⁷³ FEENSTRA, R. C. et al., "Who Shrunk China? Puzzles in the Measurement of Real GDP", *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 123, n° 573, 2013, pp. 1101. In the case of China, the prices were collected in 11 municipalities and extrapolated by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. WORLD BANK, *Global Purchasing Power Parities... op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁷⁴ Even admitting that the data provided by the World Bank is "reasonable", Wolf and Pillingm strongly proclaim that they "don't mean that China is the largest economy". WOLF, M Y D. PILLINGM, "China: on top of the World", *Financial Times*, 2nd May 2014. *Vid.* FERGUSON, Y. H., "Rising powers and global governance. Theoretical perspectives" in J. GASKARTH (ed.), *Rising powers, global governance, and global ethics*, London, Routledge, 2015, pp. 21-40.

⁷⁵ This measure can be found, for example, in CHAN, S., *China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory... op. cit.*

⁷⁶ HERRERA, G. L., *Technology and International Transformation, The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Change*, New York, State University of New York, 2006, p. 3.

⁷⁷ Because of the novelty of several technological innovation, it is really difficult to select technological variables and indicators that offer a determinant and reliable data on an extensive period of time.

development (R&D) measured by the percentage of national GDP. It is true that this indicator constitutes only one part of the R&D investment, as private companies are, nowadays more than ever, important investors in this area. Secondly, there is important to trace exportations in high technology goods, as it reveals how competitive and innovative the national technology industry is.

5.4.1.2. Energy variables

Besides the strong association between energy, geopolitics, foreign policy and diplomacy, this concept has also important implications in power status. As realist have remarked, resource shortage and reserves' insecurity may lead to a security dilemma⁷⁸. Thus, states pursue, on the one hand, improving the efficiency of their energy consumptions and, on the other, assuring their energy security. Therefore, energy variables can provide interesting information in two different ways. First of all, energy consumption and the composition of each country energy mix is a strong sign of the country's future energy needs. Even if this indicator can provide interesting information, it says merely nothing about power. Secondly, energy indicators, particularly those linked to GDP, are useful to reveal a country's energy productivity and efficiency. In this vein, data linking GPD production and energy consumption reveal the technological and innovative character of a country, especially of its industry. In this particular case study, it will be applied the indicator of energy use per 1000 \$ of GDP.

Even if excluded of the data, energy consumption and energy imports are also significant variables to analyse a country's national portfolio. However, towards an international comparison, productivity is by far a more determinant variable.

5.4.1.3. Military variables

As Robert Art rightly pointed out, military force is integral to foreign policy⁷⁹. Used forcefully through its physical use or peacefully through intimidation, military power is a vital component of the great powers' capabilities portfolio. Usually, military power is only described in its destructive sense⁸⁰, but in addition, it includes others such as the ability to back up threats in coercive diplomacy, the capacity to protect

⁷⁸ GARRISON, J. A., *China and the energy equation in Asia. The determinants of policy choice*, Colorado, FirstForumPress, 2009, p. 2.

⁷⁹ ART, R. J., "The Fungibility of Force" in R. J. ART and K. N. WALTZ, *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics*, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, 2006 (1973), 6th Edition, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Mearsheimer, for example, strongly supports that "great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military asserts to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world". MEARSHEIMER, J. J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 5.

and the provision of international assistance⁸¹. Therefore, the role of military power in the great power status is not only related to its capacity to win a war, but also to protect allies or to provide assistance in accidents or disasters.

Consequently, military expenditure and the size of an army continue to be a crucial facet of great power status. However, it must be noted that recent technological developments have expanded the effectiveness to kill with less personnel. The lethality of weapons has only increased since World War II. The superiority of the US army, not just in terms of numbers, but also of technology, supports the counter-hegemonic claims towards military modernisation. For this reason, military budgets of states should be understood not only as efforts to consolidate a stronger army, but also as an attempt to modernise their capabilities to match those of the hegemon.

An analysis of military power needs to start from state's annual military expenditures. However, this data is not totally reliable. Military issues continue to be sensible topics and budget are usually released in accordance to governments' interests. Therefore, data had to be taken carefully, as budgets do not always include all the categories of military expenditure⁸². In this case, military power will be analysed, firstly, by the national expenditures in current US dollars and, secondly, by the weight of the military budget in national GDP.

5.4.2. *The Social analysis of hegemony*

The present project aims to highlight the complex and hybrid nature of the concept of hegemony. Even if material variables have been presented as relevant on the study of state's role, it is also necessary to understand them on a broader social picture. It is not only necessary to contextualise material variables within the dynamics and practices of international society. Moreover, how states decide to organise, understand and project them has a vital explanatory power. On this vein, in methodological terms, there are three poles of social variables to advance towards a complete examination of hegemony in international society. The first one addresses the institutional practice of hegemony, through an analysis of the regimes and organisation promoted by the hegemon from 1945 and its actual accommodation, as well as the nascent web of non-hegemonic institutions that are gradually concentrating alternative practices. Secondly, identity and socialisation practices will be addressed, paying special attention to the multiple identities that both the United States and China hold, as well as

⁸¹ NYE, J. S., *Soft power: the means to success in world politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 42.

⁸² In the case of China, for example, the military expenditure proclaimed by the Chinese Government excludes some categories as, for instance, the procurement of foreign weapon systems. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, "Annual Report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2014", *Government of United States of America*, Washington D.C., 2014, p. 43.

the processes of socialisation, accommodation and confrontation. Finally the third pole will advance towards an analysis of the legitimacy practices that take place within international society, which are highly influenced by material, institutional and identity variables.

5.4.2.1. Institutional order

Even if institutions usually constitute a controversial object of study in international politics, the contemporary international society's growing institutional network supports, at least, addressing them as an important variable of the international. One can agree that institutions are a reflection of the distribution of material capabilities and that serve the interest of the dominant states, as neorealists have more than once stated. However, that seems a too simplistic argument to omit them in the analysis. Liberals' emphasis on institutions as the way to strengthen cooperation fails in the same mistake as the realist one. As Reus-Smit argues, neither of these perspectives can explain why some institutions endure changes in the balance of power and why institutions that may seem conflictual emerge in the same structural conditions⁸³.

The case study will take advantage of different methodological tools to offer a broad map of the contemporary institutional practice and outline future institutional scenarios. Firstly, it is necessary to tackle the contemporary liberal international order, its main institutions, the most recurrent patterns of institutional order and the global character of this order. Moreover, it is also interesting to focus on United States' participation in this order and its preference towards, for example, bilateral or multilateral cooperation depending on the area. As Mastanduno argues, U.S. institutional practices are driven by pragmatism, switching to bi or multilateral patterns depending on the nature of its foreign policy targets and the opportunities and constraints of the international context⁸⁴.

Secondly, Chinese participation in this international order must be addressed. As Buzan affirms, it is important to think about how best to characterise the relationship between China and the international society⁸⁵. In other words, it has to be contrasted Qin's opinion that maintains that China is increasingly pro status quo, not just instrumentally, but ideationally, as it accepts the values underlying the international society⁸⁶. Following Buzan, the dualism between status quo and reform-

⁸³ REUS-SMIT, C., "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions", *International Organization*, Vol. 51, n° 4, 1997, p. 556.

⁸⁴ MASTANDUNO, M., "Institutions of Convenience: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Pragmatic Use of International Institutions" in G. J. IKENBERRY and T. INOBUCHI (eds.), *The Uses of Institutions: the U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 31.

⁸⁵ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... *op. cit.*", p. 16.

⁸⁶ QIN Y., "Nation Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on the Interaction between China and International Society", *SIIS Journal*, n° 2, 2003.

ism/revisionism comprises two questions at the same time: on the one hand, if China is satisfied with its status in the international society and, on the other, whether it accepts or contests the institutions of the society.

The task of disentangling Chinese participation in the liberal institutional order should be addressed both quantitatively and qualitatively, through its participation in the institutions, its vote-share, its contribution to the budget (if there is any), and its decision-making. Moreover, it should be analysed the discursive use of institutions, in positive, neutral or negative sense and the importance in the nations' foreign policy goals. To accomplish these objectives, three main institutions have been selected, each one belonging to different areas and related to different primary institutions as described by Buzan: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) related to the institutions of market and financial liberalisation; the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a secondary institution of great power management and war; and the Group of 20 (G20), with a more transversal nature that can be related with great power management, diplomacy and market⁸⁷. However, prior to analysing states' behaviour and strategies in the context of these institution, it should be examined each institution's resistance to change and its own paths to reform, if possible. Firstly, in the case of the UNSC, it constitutes the less reformable of all the three institutions selected, but as both states share a similar status, there is not a strong push for accommodation from the Chinese side. The study of these institutions, hence, address directly each state's ideas of foreign policy and the values they want to spread abroad. In other words, it provides clues of the model of international society that each state pushes for. Analysing not only discourses but also China's and United States' veto power strategies, therefore, indicates the red lines that each will not cross. Secondly, the IMF is a reformable institution but it requires consent. As an economic institution, its role in an hegemonic succession is vital not only in material terms, but also social, as it one of the tools to spread through reform a new idea of the international order. In this case, vote relocation and the changing role of both economies within the regime are issues of special concern. Finally, the G20 is the more flexible institution as it is an informal forum. However, its interest lies in its hybrid composition, formed, on the one side, by the hegemon and its supporters as developed countries and, on the other, the rising economies, with China in command. Therefore, the G20 can be seen as an arena of change and continuity between the status quo and the reformist in which important issues of tension are discussed.

As a third main point, Chinese institutional building strategies will be studied, as an alternative to the hegemonic international order. For that purpose, the main driving principles to this strategy and the serving interest will be outlined. In other

⁸⁷ It should be noted that in Buzan's summary of contemporary international institutions there is no mention to G20, or either groups related. However, it has been included as an institution in which the struggle between traditional great powers and rising powers is more than evident. BUZAN, B, *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, p. 187.

words, the alternative institutional frameworks constitute a basic clue to disentangle how China sees the world and which strategies will it follow in the future. In recent years, China has outlined which can be considered as the first steps towards this alternative institutional framework, with the launch of initiatives as the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), but also with the strengthening of bilateral cooperation and regional cooperation especially in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Therefore, both the creation of these institutions and their goals and also U.S. responses to this strategy should be carefully studied.

5.4.2.2. Identity and socialisation

In IR analysis, the role of identity gains special relevance in certain contexts defined by its complexity. Far from the ontological security that characterised the Cold War, the actual context is increasingly uncertain due to the rapid transformations of the international system. Identities, along with institutions and legitimacy, transform and give meaning to the distributions of power. Therefore, identities constitute important elements in the two-way relationship between agents and structure.

In the specific case addressed in the present thesis, identities play different roles. In a general sense, identities serve three main social functions: they tell the subject how is it, they tell the rest who the subject is and, finally, they tell the subject who are the rest⁸⁸. However, the role of identities in this case becomes more complex. The relations between different subjects is usually understood as a Hegelian alter and ego relationship, where the alter transforms the ego's identity. In other words, this type of relation mirrors the victory of one of the subjects over the other. In great power relationships and power transitions, the Hegelian pattern is represented by portraying the rising challenger as a threat, both the identities of the hegemon and the rising power being exclusive. The struggle for the great power status, therefore, is an exclusive relationship with only one victor.

As a result, the Western IR widespread view misunderstands emerging countries' processes of socialisation that could break the forecasted spirals of power struggles in the international society. As an alternative, Qin Yaqing proposes the *zhongyong* (中庸) or Chinese dialectics, an inclusive relationship in which both subjects interact and complement themselves, giving rise to a new synthesis. The process plays an essential role, helping to the definition and redefinition of identities in the course of these relationships. Hence, as Wendt affirms, identities are always relational. The link between, on the one hand, actors' preferences and actions and, on the other, their identities and the ones they attribute to others, is an indivisible tie in the case of our

⁸⁸ TAJFEL, H., *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 255.

discipline⁸⁹. Moreover, identity definitions, as tools to distinguish alter and ego, involve specific definitions of which interest and threats affect national security⁹⁰.

Even if identities are important for every state, they matter in a different ways. In the case of the United States, as the hegemon of the system, its role implies the clash between two identities, as Cronin rightly illustrated⁹¹. The first one is its identity as a hegemon, related to notions of legitimacy and leadership; the second is its great power identity, connected to its material capabilities and its believed exceptional nature. Both maintain a tension between the audiences they relate to, international and domestic, and the clashing interests they demand. Therefore, it is important to address the identities the United States plays in international society and which type of actions corresponds to each of them. Moreover, following Yan Xuetong's works on the types of leadership, there must be addressed what type of leader is the United States, ranging from a tyrannical leadership based on military power, an hegemony founded in material power an strategic alliances and, finally, a model of human authority with a high degree of moral power⁹².

In the case of China, its label as a rising power leads, at least for realist theories, to tag it as a revisionist and as a threat to the system's stability. In these theories, a rising power has been purely defined by its increasing material capabilities. However, as Miller suggests, "rising powers are distinguished by very specific kinds of domestic beliefs"⁹³. Rising powers, as candidates for great power status, will have an increasing influence in the international structure, the mayor processes and even the future developments of the international system. The development of a more inclusive category of rising power, with the addition of beliefs, identities and interests, makes it possible to analyse Chinese future aspirations as a great power and its engagement with international responsibilities⁹⁴. To advance an analysis of China's identity as a rising state, it is interesting to analyse the three types of behaviour that usually these states accomplish⁹⁵. Firstly, emerging powers seek to acquire more material capabilities to match those of the status quo states. The material approach will explore China's national power dynamics and their relative weight related to other states. Secondly, rising powers' national interests expand from a regional scope to a global one and become more complex. Therefore, its implication in the institutions and diplomatic arenas increases and its grand strategy evolves in that particular direction. Thirdly,

⁸⁹ HOPF, T., "The Promise... *op. cit.*", pp. 175 y 178.

⁹⁰ KATZENSTEIN, P. J, *The culture of national security... op. cit.*, pp. 18-19; BOOTH, K., "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist" in K. KRAUSE and M. C. WILLIAMS (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 88.

⁹¹ CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony... *op. cit.*", pp. 104-105.

⁹² YAN X., "International Leadership... *op. cit.*".

⁹³ MILLER, M. C., "The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Power", *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 9, n° 2, 2016, p. 211.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

rising states witness an increasing internal recognition of its growing status and wish to extend into external audiences. For this purpose, they usually develop communicative acts towards a reaffirmation of their role and their growing interests.

An analysis of identity, in this case study, will provide the foundations of the alternative hegemonic institutions that both states propose. It will help in the identification of clashes and convergences and will provide the perfect starting point to determine the prospects to establish a legitimate hegemony.

5.4.2.3. Hegemonic legitimacy

Legitimacy plays a crucial role in international society as the base of shared knowledge and the normative structure of the system⁹⁶. As it has been stated previously, it constitutes an essential factor in the international system and constitutes a vital concept to understand hegemony⁹⁷. Moreover, as a practical concept, legitimacy is inherently linked to the other three constitutes of hegemonic power: material resources, institutional order and identity. Firstly, although usually misunderstood, the relationship between the material resources of power and legitimacy is quite relevant. Material resources, in relative terms, have been usually considered as the unique source of power.

However, researchers that understand power as relational rather than relative stress the contribution of legitimacy to compulsory power by inducing voluntary compliance within the international society. Under this statement, power is not material, but social, because legitimacy is perceptual and, moreover, these perceptions are rooted in other social variables such as norms, beliefs and values⁹⁸. Two reasons strength this point. Firstly, legitimacy is linked to the institutions and regimes as well as to the normative structure, not only because the perception of an actor as legitimate is made within the boundaries of these norms, but because of the role of the institutional structure as a legitimising field. In other words, institutional participation is often a tool to gain legitimacy, as well as a recurrent violation of international norms and counter-institutional practice can eventually lead to legitimacy crisis.

⁹⁶ BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁹⁷ Vid. CLARK, I., "Bringing Hegemony back in... op. cit."; CLARK, I., "Towards an English School Theory... op. cit."; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*; BUKOVANSKY, M., "Liberal States, International Order... op. cit."; BUKOVANSKY, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*; FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... op. cit."; IKENBERRY, G. J. y C. A. KUPCHAN, "The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power... op. cit."; MOURE, L., "Orden internacional en transición... op. cit."; PINTADO, M., "Hegemonía y Legitimidad... op. cit."; RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, D., "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... op. cit."; REUS SMIT, C., "International Crisis... op. cit."; REUS-SMIT, C., "Power, Legitimacy... op. cit."; ZHANG, Y., "China and the Struggle... op. cit."

⁹⁸ BUKOVANSKI, M., I. CLARK, R. ECKERSLEY et al., *Special Responsibilities. Global Problems and American Power*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 69-70.

Secondly, identities and legitimacy constitute two permeable fields. As legitimacy, especially in its substantive variant, is profoundly influenced by the actor's values, the identities above these values influence the perception of an actor as legitimate. That is, the identity it plays in certain contexts will profoundly influence others' perceptions. For instance, when the United States decided to contravene international norms and intervene in Iraq, it played its role as a great power to its internal audiences, instead of its identity as a hegemon bestowed with special responsibilities. This way, the practices derived from these actions undermined its legitimacy and, for some authors, generated a crisis or soft balancing behaviours⁹⁹. On the same vein, legitimation processes transform and determine the units in the social system, constituting not only a two-way process but a mutually transformative one.

Therefore, the analysis of legitimacy will inevitably derive from some of the conclusions drawn from other variables. However, legitimacy should be understood in its deeper sense. It is possible to identify two narratives of the concept in its relation with hegemony, the superficial and the constitutive. The superficial narrative highlights the notion of legitimate domination achieved with the internalisation by secondary states of norms and principles socialised by the hegemon. This process, as defined by Ikenberry and Kupchan, results on the internalisation of these norms and principles that guide these states' conceptions of order¹⁰⁰. However, this notion only highlights the direct returns of legitimation and defines the process as unidirectional, missing the transformative effects of legitimacy on the hegemon's identity and the institution of hegemony as a whole. On the contrary, the constitutive notion understands legitimacy practices as dynamic and continuously contested narratives that transform endlessly the hegemon and secondary states' identity, as well as the international society.

As a consequence of this complexity, any analysis accomplished from the constitutive perspective will inevitably face methodological difficulties. Despite the difficulties derived from the social character and normative references of legitimacy, any constitutive notion must capture the transformative dynamics of legitimacy both in actors and in structures. In the present legitimacy analysis, there will be two referents (the United States and China) and the same dispensers of the legitimacy (i.e. the majority of the states in the international society)¹⁰¹. For that research purpose, it is helpful to apply Rapkin and Braaten taxonomy on the dimensions of legitimacy to identify the variables and indicators of the analysis, summarised in Figure 6¹⁰².

⁹⁹ PAPE, R. A., "Soft Balancing Against the United States... *op. cit.*"; REUS SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*"; HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁰ IKENBERRY, G. J. y C. A. KUPCHAN, "The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power... *op. cit.*", p. 49.

¹⁰¹ Even though the analysis will focus both on the United States and China separately, it should be noted that the current institution of hegemony can be analysed more in depth, while China's alternative institutions needs to be approached on a more general sense.

¹⁰² RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, D., "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*".

Figure 6. Summary of selected variables and indicators to analyse legitimacy dynamics

SOURCE	VARIABLE	INDICATOR
SUBSTANTIVE	The source of conflict in the international society between referents and dispensers.	On the contexts of the Iraq war, the clashes are a result of different values or different policies.
	Main idea that drives the International Society project.	Identification of the privileged values of the International Society for each referents and its concurrence with the dispensers'.
CONSTITUTIONALISM PROCESS 1	The existing tension between great power and hegemonic identity.	What is the main driver of its foreign policy: self-interest of special responsibilities?
	Implication of other states in its policies.	The implication of other states in concrete initiatives (in this case, the War on Terror) and the nature of the process (uni, bi or multipolar, open or close and hierarchical or balanced).
CONSTITUTIONALISM PROCESS 2	The state's role in the world. It implies, among others, self-restraint, reduced returns to power, moderation in policy, adherence to international law, institutional binding.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adherence to international law (quantitative and qualitative involvement). - Institutional participation. - Role as a great power. Its involvement in special responsibilities.
OUTCOME	US/ China's influence in the world.	Map of core and periphery.
	Different leadership models and its compliance.	Pew Research surveys.

The first dimension is substantive legitimacy, directly related to shared values and norms, as well as shared knowledge. Concretely, it is composed of common goals, principles and values that serve as justifications of any initiative or action¹⁰³. As substantive values are used as referential in hegemon's action, it must be addressed if clashes between the hegemon's and secondary states regarding particular policies are driven by differences in values or interest. To address the question of substantial legitimacy, two variables should be assessed. Firstly, it must be analysed if the differences between the referents and the dispensers of legitimacy are based on different values or different policies. In other words, it is necessary to resolve if these clashes between referents and International society are a result of differences in values (as, for example, constant references to human rights) or policy behaviour. Secondly, there must be tackled the main values of the idea driven international society for the different referents, as well as its resemblance with those of other states.

Understanding legitimacy not only as something substantive but also as procedural highlights the importance of the decision process on legitimation. This process, in the contemporary institutional frame, is constitutional as its open to participation and mitigates the asymmetries of power, in Ikenberry's view¹⁰⁴. The procedural dynamic is divided into two levels, one related to the accessibility of the decision-making process and, the other related to strategic restraint in its broader sense. Regarding the first procedural constitutionalism, two variables may derive. Firstly, the existing tension between conflicting identities of the referents. As it has been addressed before, actors compile different identities with sometimes conflicting values¹⁰⁵. The second variable is related to the implication of the dispensers of legitimacy in the policies and initiatives launched by the referents. Consequently, it must be analysed to what extent the states of the international society participate in concrete initiatives of the hegemon in the context of the War on Terror. Therefore, as an indicator, it should be investigated what is the main driver of foreign policy: the referents self-interests or the special responsibilities they are bestowed with by the international society¹⁰⁶.

Regarding the second procedural constitutionalism, related to strategic restraint, it advances in the study of the referents role's in the world, implying issues of

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, IKENBERRY, G. J., "Institutions, Strategic Restraint... *op. cit.*"; IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*

¹⁰⁵ As Cronin illustrated, the hegemon plays different identities to different audiences. On the one hand, it is a hegemon for international audiences and should act as a responsible power. On the other hand, it plays the role of a great power, especially in its material sense, for the internal audiences that sometimes demand a more interest driven role. CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony... *op. cit.*".

¹⁰⁶ The notion of special responsibilities, as developed by Bukovanski et al., is understood as a type of hierarchy profoundly related to the normative and ideational structures. They are defined as a "differentiated set of obligations, the allocation of which is collectively agreed and they provide a principle of social differentiation for managing collective problems in a world characterised by both formal equality and inequality of material capability". BUKOVANSKI, M., I. CLARK, R. ECKERSLEY et al., *Special Responsibilities... op. cit.*, pp. 13 y 16.

self-restraint, reduced returns on power, moderation in policy, adherence to international law or institutional binding. There can be identified several indicators in this issue, such as the state's adherence to international law or, in other words, its involvement both in quantitative and qualitatively (the number of treaties signed or its role as leader or follower, for example), its institutional participation outlined in previous chapters or its role as a great power bestowed by some special responsibilities.

Finally, the third legitimacy dynamic is related to the effectiveness of the state's exercise of power. Obviously, this will be more easily addressed in the case of the hegemon, but as China is still a rising power in progress, there should be investigated through projects more than outcomes. This way, two variables are identified: the referents influence in the world, operationalised by an analysis of the formal and informal alliance map; and the different leadership models' compliance withing global society through surveys and statistical data

The application of this complex methodology will offer a multidimensional and multilevel understanding of the legitimacy of the confronting hegemonic institutions led by the United States and China. Understanding legitimacy as a concept with continual references to material capabilities, identities and institutions, the final analysis about conflicting hegemonic institutions will summarise the whole case study by offering a complete understanding of both models and the responses of the members of the international society.

PRACTICAL PART

CHAPTER 6

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL POWER STRUCTURE. UNITED STATES' PRIMACY AND THE RISE OF CHINA

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 20th century inaugurated an era of extreme dynamism in the international material power structure. The multiplication of the number of states and the global spread of the capitalist economic model, along with a relatively peaceful environment among great powers stimulated the rise of the rest. The attractiveness of emerging markets, most of them located in East Asia, along with the end of the Asian financial crises have encouraged and vividly multiplied the flux of capital to the region.

Undoubtedly, these changes in the economic sphere have turned into a growing interest in the region and also an increasing relevance of these emerging states, especially in the case of China. Its impressive economic rates and its growing international interests have prompted its participation in leading international political forums. Indeed, its inclusion on the great powers' club has shaken not only the economy and finance, but also the international system as a whole. However, it should not be forgotten that the material transformations occurred in the present century should be understood under a U.S.-led international system. Its role as a hegemon, although

sometimes contested, is the main characteristic of the international structure, even if these recent changes have propelled the declinist thesis¹.

Moreover, some scholars point out that the power transition between both states has already taken place². On the contrary, others offer a slightly moderate view, underlining the prospects for a future transitional scenario, but remembering the still hegemonic character of the system. Even if these views seem contradictory, this is because they are usually based in different measurements and often underanalyse the context in which several data is framed³.

Therefore, it is important to offer a range of data centred on the most important facets of power in the contemporary international system. Indicators such as iron production, coal consumption or demography have been gradually replaced by others focused on recent industrial and technological changes, such as national investment on research and development or technological competitiveness, sectors that offer opportunities both to the challenger state to lead a new technological revolution and to the leading state to rejuvenate its economy through innovation⁴.

¹ The rise of the thesis of the hegemonic decline in this century can be seen as a revival. In fact, it is possible to identify two periods on the rise of these views. The first one, as Cox notes, arose in the late 1970 when "the notion that the United States was in serious trouble, and could easily go the way of all other great powers in the past, had achieved something close to an intellectual and political consensus". COX, M., "Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New United States Hegemony", *New Political Economy*, Vol. 6, n° 3, 2001, p. 313. Several internal problems, such as a crisis in political leadership (the Watergate case and Nixon resignation, mainly) and other international issues derived from the changing order (the Vietnam war, the increasing complexity of the interdependent global economy and the multiplication of challenges abroad) sparked the first declinist wave. *Vid.* KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*; COX, R. W., *Production, Power and World Order*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987; CALLEO, D., *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1987; KISSINGER, H., *For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980*; London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981; GILPIN, R., *War and Change... op. cit.*; KENNEDY, P. M., *The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York, Random House, 1987. The second wave, in the first decade of this century, was stimulated by the rise of new powers and the economic crisis, as well as notions of overextension. *Vid.* TODD, E., *After the empire: the breakdown of the order*, London, Constable, 2004; WALLERSTEIN, I., *The decline of American power*, New York, New Press, 2003; LACHMANN, R. (ed.), *The United States in decline*, Bingley, Emerald Group, 2014. A complete review of both eras can be found in COX, M., "Whatever Happened to American Decline?... op. cit."; COX, M., "Is the United States in decline—again? An essay", *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, n° 4, 2007, pp. 643-653; COX, M., "Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?", *International Relations*, Vol. 26, n° 4, 2012, pp. 369-388; ITZKOWITZ, J. R. and M. BECKLEY, "Correspondence: Debating China's Rise and U.S. Decline," *International Security*, Vol. 37, n° 3, 2012-2013, pp. 172-181.

² The analyses that argue that the transition has already taken place equate national power with the possession of massive troops, a large population and an important manufacturing industry. However, others based in per capita incomes or new technologies diverge from this thesis. CHAN, S., "Is There a Power Transition between the U.S. and China? The Different Faces of National Power", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, n° 5, 2005, p. 701.

³ RAPKIN, D., and W. THOMPSON, "Power Transition, Challenge and the (Re)Emergence of China", *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, Vol. 29, n° 4, 2003, p. 335.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-325.

It should not be forgotten that economic variables remain vital to great powers and are crucial in power transitions, although there are other relevant indicators. In the globalised world, trade and financial strength are quite relevant, along with a growing interest in energy dependency and productivity. Certainly, the geopolitical links between energy and power politics are now stronger than ever, and its relevance will only increase due to the growing scarcity of resources and its location in geopolitically volatile areas such as the Middle East or Africa. In addition, the military portfolio is the last resource to review. Undoubtedly, it remains a key variable of great power status, but indicators focusing on troops' size or military personnel must be completed with budget data and, more importantly, with the nation's development of new military technologies and new defence strategies.

6.1. A macroeconomic analysis of the hegemonic succession: national growth, financial structure and trade

Over the last sixty years, the United States has held a continued domination of what Strange called the world's production structure that has sustained its leadership in the global economy. In other words, its position as the biggest market for manufactured goods and its influence in global economies through credit due to the role of the dollar as global currency have underpinned and reinforced its mastery⁵.

The rise of new poles of economic power, especially centred in the East Asian region, has obscured the stability of the United States economy. Despite the economic slowdown after the crisis, the American economy has not stagnated yet. However, it is true that it perpetuates several weaknesses that have been softened by its leading role as hegemon. In other words, the chance to redirect the global economy and its institutions towards its interests and its influential role as economic partner have alleviated some crises and maintained its image as an economic giant. Indeed, as Black highlights, even if the Asian financial crises of the 90's not only did not hit the United States hardly, but emphasised its strengths, it should not be forgotten that some of these problems arose, in part, as a result of several imbalances and defects caused by the U.S.-led capitalism⁶.

Even with the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2008, imploded in its own financial system, the United States has managed to maintain its economic primacy. In fact, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) only contracted for two years, and after that

⁵ STRANGE, S., "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony", *International Organization*, Vol. 41, n° 4, 1987, pp. 566-568.

⁶ BLACK, J., *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony. The World Order since 1500*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 202.

period recovered its growth to nearly pre-crisis figures⁷. What is more striking is that, after the globalisation of the financial slowdown, the leadership of U.S.-led economic institutions continues, despite the crisis of the neoliberal capitalist order. As Ikenberry noted, it is true that the crisis “has served to tarnish the American model of liberal capitalism”⁸. Critical scholars go further and proclaim that the material bases of American hegemony are “broken” and the social, ideological, political and institutional dimension of hegemony are “severely undermined”⁹.

In the case of China, the crisis performed differently. The country raised impressively in the first decade of the century, with a more than 10% growth rates between 2003 and 2007. Even if the economic downturn slowed its economy, it can be said that the country was relatively insulated from the centre of the crisis, protected by its financially strong banking system and its large foreign reserves¹⁰. However, Chinese dependency on trade raised doubts about its immunisation. In 2009, the worst analyses were confirmed with a slowdown of Chinese exports of the 10% as a result of the global trade crisis, but recovered in the following years showing again signals of a crisis in 2014, but maintaining positive figures¹¹.

Even considering the important consequences and partial imbalances resulting from the economic crisis, figures show the growing trajectories of both economies. On the one hand, the United States’ economy presented several signs of slowing down that were contained through an ambitious stimulus program amounting \$U.S. 800 billion¹² and it is annually ranked as one of the ten most competitive economies in the world¹³. In spite of its position as a mature economy, it has not followed a traditional pattern of decline and has been able to “rejuvenate” through innovation, leading technological areas and the information technology¹⁴.

On the other hand, China continues the growing dynamic it has sustained since 1978. With a highly competitive industry, it achieved high rates of growth and became

⁷ Concretely, the United States GDP decreased 0,5% and 4,2% in 2008 and 2009, respectively, but later increased its rates, achieving 2,4% of growth in 2010, according to the World Bank data. WORLD BANK, *World Bank Open Data*, <<http://data.worldbank.org/>> [7th July 2016].

⁸ IKENBERRY, G. J., *Liberal Leviathan... op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁹ SAULL, R., “Rethinking Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the World Economic Crisis”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, n° 2, 2012, p. 335.

¹⁰ WHALLEY, J., “The Impacts of the 2008 Financial Crisis in China” in J. WHALLEY (ed.), *China’s Trade, Exchange Rate and Industrial Policy Structure*, Singapore, World Scientific Publishing, 2013, p. 11.

¹¹ For instance, in 2014 exports grew 3,96% according to the World Bank data. WORLD BANK, *World Bank Open Data... op. cit.*

¹² The stimulus program was carried on by the Obama administration as soon as it took office. The Chinese government also approved a stimulus package earlier, almost as big as the American one. GARRETT, G., “G2 in G20: China, the United States and the World after the Global Financial Crisis”, *Global Policy*, Vol. 1, n° 1, 2010, p. 31.

¹³ SCHWAB, K. and X. SALA-I-MARTÍN (eds.), “The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016”, Geneva, *World Economic Forum*, 2015, <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/Global_Competitiveness_Report_2015-2016.pdf>, [15th June 2016].


¹⁴ RAPKIN, D., and W. THOMPSON, “Power Transition, Challenge... op. cit.”, p. 324.

the second world economy. Even if it maintains an important industrial sector, in the wage of the new century it has diversified its role in the global market, as a buyer and investor. With the decline of imports and the increase of labour costs, the communist government has multiplied its efforts to strength and enlarge the middle class and raise the internal demand. Its rise continues, although the government is determined to turn to a more “sustainable growth”, with a moderate economic development based on an increasing internal consumption and the production of highly valuable goods and services.

The emergence of new economic poles and the slowdown of developed economies have slightly changed the global economic leadership. After the United States and China, Japan and Germany are the third and fourth world economies, but with less than a half of China’s GDP. The supremacy of the United States and China in economic terms is absolute, both together accumulate more that 35% of the world’s GDP. There is no doubt that the global economy is highly influenced, or even dominated, by the interactions between both countries, to the extent that some foretell that “[a] de facto G2 is emerging almost by default, even though neither China nor the U.S. will give their relationship this grandiose title”¹⁵.

Figure 7. Gross Domestic Product at market prices in current U.S. dollars.

Source: World Bank.



¹⁵ GARRETT, G., “G2 in G20... *op. cit.*”, p. 29.

6.1.1. The rise of China in the context of United States hegemony. Trends, opportunities and vulnerabilities

The dynamics of China's growth have been issues of special interest among international scholarship. Its rise as the second world economy confirmed its role as an economic leader and a pole of attraction for foreign investment. As several theorists highlight, developing economies tend to have bigger growth rates than mature ones, due to their dynamism. Suddenly, they face a structural turn when they have completed the transformation from a rural economy to a mostly modern urban one. This turning point slows the growth rates and makes compulsory the undertaking of a structural change¹⁶. However, in the case of China, even if its rural-urban transformation is still in progress¹⁷, the government has launched a response plan much earlier. Indeed, after the crisis, the 12th Five Year Plan (2011) under the leadership of Hu Jintao highlighted the need to become less dependent on foreign investment and exports and the necessity to foster domestic demand. This last goal, aimed to adapt to "a more balanced growth model" works towards the achievement of a demand-based economy where domestic consumption is the main driver, as in mature economies like the United States'¹⁸. Reforms should also be accomplish towards the improvement of the

¹⁶ NAUGHTON, B., "Economic Growth. From High-Speed to High-Quality" in J. FEWSMITH (ed.), *China Today, China Tomorrow. Domestic Politics, Economy and Society*, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010, p. 68.


¹⁷ According to the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2015 there were 277,47 millions of migrant workers in China. Therefore, one of every three employees was a migrant. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, "Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2015 National Economic and Social Development", 29th February, 2016, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201602/t20160229_1324019.html> [6th June 2016]. Even if China's growth is often related to the mobility of rural citizens to urban areas, it must be noted that until 1990 rural-urban mobility was tightly controlled by the communist government through the *hùkǒu* (户口), a household registration system that provided more rights (mainly food coupons in the beginning) to local citizens. In 1990, due to the labour demands, the government loosed it, but some restrictions remain, such as less eligibility to education or lack of access to unemployment, health care and pensions. *Vid.* KNIGHT, J., DENG Q. and LI S., "The Puzzle of Migrant Labour Shortage and Rural Labour Surplus in China", *Discussion Paper Series. Department of Economics*, n° 494, July 2010, Oxford University, <http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper494.pdf> [6th June 2016]; GOLLEY, J. and SIN M., "Has China run out of surplus labour", *China Economic Review*, Vol. 22, n° 4, 2011, pp. 555-572; WANG X. and N. WEAVER, "Surplus labour and Lewis turning points in China", *Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies*, Vol. 11, n° 1, 2013, pp. 1-12; NIELSEN, I. and CAI F., "Demographic Shift and Projected Labour Shortage in China", *Economic Papers*, Vol. 26, n° 3, 2007, pp. 231-248; CAI F., DU Y. and WANG M., "Human Development Research Paper 2008/09 Migration and Labour Mobility in China", *Human Development Reports Research Paper*, United Nations Development Program, July 2009, <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdrp_2009_09.pdf> [6th July 2016].

¹⁸ CHINESE GOVERNMENT, *12th Five Year Plan*, Beijing, 2011. <<http://www.cbchina.org.cn/cbchina/upload/fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf>>, [15th June].

capital's efficiency and productivity, the promotion of more sectors independent of public investment and the building of a more reliable legal infrastructure¹⁹.

It cannot be denied that in the recent Chinese history, the Communist Party has succeeded in mobilising all its resources towards the goal of economic growth, resulting in an absence of economic crisis²⁰. In fact, in the presentation of the 13th Five Year Plan (2015), President Xi Jinping declared that it will be necessary a 6,5 percent of annual GDP growth during this period to “build a moderately prosperous society by 2020”, doubling the 2010 per capita income both for rural and urban citizenship²¹.

Figure 8. GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank Data.



It is true that the United Nations have celebrated Chinese efforts to take 500 million people out of poverty²², reducing the poverty gap ratio at \$1,25 a day in PPP

¹⁹ JACQUES, M., *When China rules the world: the end of the western world and the birth of a new global order*, New York, Penguin Press, 2009, p. 166; ODOM, W. E., *America's inadoertent empire*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 150.

²⁰ NAUGHTON, B., “Economic Growth... *op. cit.*”, pp. 72 y 80.

²¹ CCTV NEWS, “Xi expounds on guideline for 13th Five-year Plan”, Beijing, 3rd November 2015, <<http://english.cntv.cn/2015/11/03/ARTI1446559744633822.shtml>>, [14th June 2016].

²² UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN CHINA, “Poverty Reduction”, <<http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/ourwork/povertyreduction/overview.html>>, [13th June 2016].

from the 21% of the population in 1990 to a 1,3% in 2011²³. However, differences in this field are still huge compared with other leading economies, highlighting that in some aspects China still mixes characteristics of a developing and developed country.

As the comparison between national and per capita GDP shows, impressive national economic figures cannot obscure its relatively underdeveloped characteristics. Therefore, in the coming decades, the country will still combine features of a developed and developing country. In aggregate terms, China is definitely a huge economy, but in per capita variables it can be considered a poor country²⁴. Hence, resource redistribution should be addressed, as it constitutes one of the main weaknesses of the economy and demands inclusive policies to be solved, working to cut the gap between urban and rural communities and also between the industrial working class and the high-middle classes²⁵.

Nevertheless, this is not the only challenge. The Chinese government is already deeply immersed in the demanding task of transforming the structural bases of its economy. Its once successful model, based on a highly productive and cheap national industry and the exportation of goods with low value added is gradually showing signs of decline and has externalised its production to other Asian countries. Therefore, even if the Chinese industry maintains its attractiveness and productivity, the increase of labour costs has pushed some corporations to move²⁶. Moreover, some of the reasons that propelled the economy and the national industry (mainly the fluxes of foreign investment and the disappearance of tariff barriers)²⁷ and raised their productivity have now decreased. As a result of these transformations, China has expanded its roles in the global economy. In the past century, it mainly played the producer role, attractive in the trade system, but targeted as a characteristic of a country in development. However, due to its huge external currency reserves, in this century it has positioned itself as a buyer and investor. In this vein, the creation of new institutions of investment, mainly in Asia, is also used as a tool to create confidence and also to gain alliances²⁸.

As Saull expressed, the vulnerabilities of the Chinese economy are not derivative of its trade relations with the U.S., but rooted on its growth model²⁹. Two reasons support that statement. Firstly, the overcapacity of the Chinese growth model, espe-

²³ UNITED NATIONS STATISTIC DIVISION, "Poverty Gap Ratio at \$1,25 a day in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), percentage of the population", *Millennium Development Goals Database*, <<http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>>, [7th July].

²⁴ LAMPTON, D. M., *The three faces of Chinese power... op. cit.*, p. 115.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

²⁶ According to the American Chamber of Commerce in China, one out of four U.S. firms in China has moved or is planning to do so due to the rising labour costs. AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, *China Business Climate Survey*, Beijing, American Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016.

²⁷ JACQUES, M., *When China rules the world... op. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁸ LAMPTON, D. M., *The three faces of Chinese power... op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.

²⁹ SAULL, R., "Rethinking Hegemony... op. cit.", p. 326.

cially represented in the construction sector. And secondly, its dependency on exports as a source of growth, domestic peace and political stability generates a massive accumulation of dollars that, in practice, involve a strategic economic subordination to the U.S.³⁰ An alternative less export dependent model also involves risky scenarios, as the need of a bigger economy based on internal consumption make compulsory to address a further economic liberalisation³¹. Moreover, other defects must be solved, such as corruption in the public administration and companies³², the inefficiency of some sectors, the social stratification and difference between the coast and the interior, and the exploitation of workers by economic elites³³. Even if other defects include its overexposure to trade and external investment, that some considered to be a risky dependence on international events³⁴, the crisis has tested the government's capacity to recompose the economy and make it less dependent.

6.1.2. Technology and Research and Development as new variables in the international system. China's challenge to United States technological hegemony.

The transformations on the international society produced by the Third Industrial Revolution have inevitably changed the hierarchy of the sources of material power. As the previous chapter stated, demographical and industrial variables have become less influential, while technological and Research and Development (R&D) investment has raised to the front line of the analysis. Moreover, economic welfare is pretty determined by R&D activities and technological progress is now extremely linked to the growth of the population living standards³⁵ and technological developments have accelerated changes in international hierarchies.

Even if Chinese economic take-off was primarily spurred by its low-value added industry, the qualitative step of the Chinese economy in these recent years towards the production of high technology goods is worth highlighting. The increasing economic openness of the country's economy, along with the important size of the internal market and the proximity to dynamic economies has positively affected in China's technological developments.

³⁰ HUNG, H-F., "Rise of China and the Global Overaccumulation Crisis", *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 15, n° 2, 2008, pp. 151; HUNG, H-F., "America's Head Servant?", *New Left Review*, Vol. II, n° 60, pp. 5-25.

³¹ SAULL, R., "Rethinking Hegemony... *op. cit.*", p. 326.

³² ODOM, W. E., *America's inadvertent empire... op. cit.*, pp. 150-151.

³³ HALPER, S., *The Beijing Consensus. How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Basic Books, 2010, p. 138.

³⁴ JACQUES, M., *When China rules the world... op. cit.*, p. 159.

³⁵ GAO J. and G. H. JEFFERSON, "Science and Technology Take-off in China?: Sources of Rising R&D Intensity", *Asia Pacific Business Review*, Vol. 13, n° 3, 2007, p. 357.

At the same time, some scholars have expressed that the U.S., as a system leader, has been capable to revitalise its position through economic innovation and the development of new technologies³⁶. Undoubtedly, the innovation ability along with this profitability constitutes the most important facet of a successful production industry, that later becomes routinised and externalised to peripheries³⁷. Even if the argument of reinvention can be considered as valid, it is highly biased to state that the United States has done so.

As Chase-Dunn and Reifer point out, “new lead industries are important as the bases of hegemonic rises because they have huge spin-offs for the national economies” and spur growth. At the same time, they acknowledge that scientific innovation reproduces and strengthens the international hierarchy, spreading the developments cyclically, first to the centre, then to the semi-periphery and, finally, to the periphery³⁸. Moreover, scientific innovation is highly beneficial for the state as it generates attraction, increases successful diplomacy (which is more relevant in the case of rising powers) and raises cooperation in global challenges³⁹.

Figure 9. Technology and R&D indicators. Compiled by the author based on the World Bank Data.

	<i>Research and Development investment (% GDP)</i>	<i>High technological exports (% of world's)</i>	<i>Patents (% of the world's)</i>	<i>Internet users per 100 inhabitants</i>
China	1,93 % *	751,3 \$ billion (35,68%)	801.329 (46,77%)	49,3 *
United States	2,80 %	155,6 \$ billion (7,39%)	285.096 (16,64%)	87,4

* Data excludes Hong Kong and Macao.

³⁶ RAPKIN, D., and W. THOMPSON, “Power Transition, Challenge... *op. cit.*”, pp. 323-324.

³⁷ CHASE-DUNN, C. and T. REIFER, “US Hegemony and Biotechnology: The Geopolitics of New Lead Technology”, Riverside, *The Institute for Research on World Systems University of California*, 2002, <<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3s38g8m5>> [13th June 2016].

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ COLETTA, D., “Science, Technology, and the Quest for International Influence... *op. cit.*”.

Nevertheless, the United States' position in that hierarchy is not as hegemonic as it was, as the previous figure shows. In terms of internet users, the gap between both countries is still huge⁴⁰. Other indicators, however, draw a different map. Chinese mastery on research and development, measured in patent applications and the high-technology exports is undeniable, with far less public investment. China holds almost half of world patent applications and a third of the world's high technology exports. Although China has rapidly sophisticated its exports' structure towards more technological sectors, a triangular trade structure is still present in the process. Saying it differently, China's still imports several technological components to develop or assemble the final products, mainly from other Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea or Taiwan⁴¹. However, the growing number of patents suggests an innovation process in progress, started with learning from Asian countries processes and United States' technological mastery to a step forward to become a technological leader. In fact, re-innovation has played an important role in the government technological policies; recently turned towards a prioritisation on key domestic innovation programs⁴².

As data confirms, China is close to concluding its transition in the productive sector from a low cost manufacturing industry to sectors with a high-value added industries. At the same time, the country is promoting new sectors and innovation with a highly effective research and development community as well as establishing high-tech poles. Some of the innovations are closely linked with the main problems that the country will face in the future, such as pollution, new energies or industrial reconversion.

In the case of the United States, its market size has underpinned its extraordinary technological industry. In its "third growth spurt", based on information technology, the US has confirmed its ability to maintain a high technological society⁴³, but its mastery is now shared with several European and Asian countries.

6.1.3. Financial and commercial interdependence. The links between the hegemon and the rising challenger

Any analysis of the Chinese economy is extremely linked to the U.S. economy, to the extent that some have called this interdependent relationship as an economic

⁴⁰ However, in the special administrative regions data differs, with 74,56 users per 100 inhabitants in Hong Kong and 69,78 in Macao. WORLD BANK, *World Bank Open Data... op. cit.*

⁴¹ KUROIWA, I., "Value Added Trade and Structure of High-Technology Exports in China", *IDE Discussion Paper*, n° 449, Chiba (Japan), March 2014, <http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/1302/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.449_kuroiwa.pdf> [14th September 2016].

⁴² MU R. and QU W., "The development of science and technology in China: A comparison with India and the United States", *Technology in Society*, Vol. 30, n° 3-4, 2008, p. 326.

⁴³ RAPKIN, D., and W. THOMPSON, "Power Transition, Challenge... *op. cit.*", p. 324; CHASE-DUNN, C. and T. REIFER, "US Hegemony and Biotechnology... *op. cit.*".

version of the mutual assured destruction⁴⁴. In fact, the hegemon's economy is "addicted" to borrowing dollars and consuming Chinese goods and, at the same time, China depends on these lending and exporting⁴⁵. However, this situation should not be surprising, as is similar to the dynamics of the Bretton Woods system. Under this system, the United States had the option to finance its deficits abroad, instead of adjusting domestic budgets. At this point, the United States key partners' dollar reserves (mainly accumulated by exportations) were lent to the U.S. that, at the same time, maintained its economy open to other countries' goods⁴⁶. This imbalance, supported by the dollar's role as exchange currency, leads to what Triffin defined as an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, the country needs to incur deficits to assure international liquidity in its role as the economic hegemon. But, on the other, it has to maintain the confidence in its currency that can be undermined by these deficits. Therefore, American leaders need to maintain a balance, trying to keep deficits on a rational level⁴⁷. It can be said that this situation constitutes the economic version of what Cronin labelled as "the paradox of hegemony", the tension between the United States role as the hegemon and its role as a great power⁴⁸.

The links between Chinese and United States' economies is more than evident, especially in trade⁴⁹. The United States is characterised as a consumer economy, a role that generates high trading imbalances that are only sustainable because of the dollar's position as the world currency. As Mastanduno expressed, the dollar's functions as international reserve and exchange currency offers the country "the privilege of living beyond its means"⁵⁰. External deficits and domestic debt, even if still sustainable due to U.S. economic hegemony, make the economy vulnerable to foreign investment, a privilege that has been a constant in recent history⁵¹. However, the loyalty of the first international dollar holder, China, cannot be taken for granted.

⁴⁴ HALPER, S., *The Beijing consensus... op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴⁵ COHEN, S. D., "The Superpower as Super-Debtor: Implications of Economic Disequilibria for U.S.-Asian Relations," in A. TELLIS and M. WILLS (eds.), *Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, Interdependence, and Security*, Seattle, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006, p. 30.

⁴⁶ MASTANDUNO, M., "System Maker and Privilege Taker. US Power and the International Political Economy", *World Politics*, Vol. 61, n° 1, 2009, pp. 127-128.

⁴⁷ TRIFFIN, R., *Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960.

⁴⁸ CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony... op. cit.", pp. 104-105.

⁴⁹ In 2015, in the United States, Chinese goods were the most imported ones, 17,5% of the country's total imports and China was the third destination for US-produced goods, 5,13% of the total. In the Chinese case, imports from the US constituted the 8,95% of the total, being the second import country, and Chinese exports to the US ranked the first, 18% of the country's total. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, *Top U.S Trade Partners, 2015*, Census Bureau. Economic Indicators Division. <http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf>, [10th June 2016]; INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE, *Trade Map. Trade Statistics for International Business Development*, <http://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry.aspx>, [10th June 2016].

⁵⁰ MASTANDUNO, M., "System Maker and Privilege Taker ... op. cit.", pp. 125-126.

⁵¹ Interesting reviews of U.S. historical dependency can be found on COHEN, S. D., "The Superpower as Super-Debtor... op. cit."; MASTANDUNO, M., "System Maker and Privilege Taker... op. cit."

Moreover, some academics have warned that the international power of the dollar is decreasing due to a variety of reasons⁵². Among them, it is possible to emphasise two. First of all, the role of China as the major holder of U.S. treasury bonds, estimated at \$1244,6 billion dollars, a 19.8% of the total⁵³, is a tricky double-edged sword for the U.S. Even if China gradually joined Japan as national debt investor due to their huge dollar reserves, it also constitutes a negotiating argument, as it has the ability to decrease U.S. liquidity. However, this action could be as harmful for China, as U.S. domestic consumption will probably sink and the dollar will depreciate. More subtle methods, hence, will be far more effective, as preventing American protectionism measures or acquiring strategic assets⁵⁴. Eventually, it would be highly difficult for the U.S. to find a lender of the size of China in an eventual case of withdrawal. Secondly, the Chinese government is pushing to increase the role of the renminbi⁵⁵ as an international currency complementary to the dollar's mastery. Although recent developments have proven to be successful, it is a second line currency after the dollar and along with the other three (pound sterling, yen and euro).

Nevertheless, the Chinese monetary policy is an issue of special concern for the U.S., calling for a revaluation of the renminbi. As McKinnon and Schnabl argue, these calls are based on the wrong idea that exchange rates serve as a tool to control trade balance⁵⁶. Instead of these recurrent claims, the authors suggest that the U.S. should "improve the national investment-saving balance and reduce America's trade deficit" through some politically difficult measures⁵⁷.

However, China's monetary policies are more disposed to maintain the national currency linked to the dollar, a privilege that has stimulated its economic growth. The government has been more determined to push for the inclusion of the renmimbi in the basket of major currencies of the IMF that determines the value of Special Drawing

⁵² MABEE, B., *Understanding American Power. The Changing World of US Foreign Policy*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 176.

⁵³ UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, "Portfolio Holding of U.S and Foreign Securities", May 2016 <<http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt>> [10th June 2016].

⁵⁴ DREZNER, D. W., "Bad Debts. Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics", *International Security*, Vol. 34, n° 2, 2009, p. 16.

⁵⁵ This thesis distinguishes between the notions of renminbi (人民币 *rénmínbì*, translated as people's currency) and yuan (元 *yuán*). Although academically the terms are often mistaken, there are not synonyms. The renminbi refers to the currency while the yuan is the unit and in common Chinese language is sometimes replaced by kuai (块 *kuài*, that refers to a piece of something).

⁵⁶ MCKINNON, R. and G. SCHNABL, "China and Its Dollar Exchange Rate: A Worldwide Stabilising Influence?", *The World Economy*, Vol. 35, n° 6, 2012, p. 669. As the authors explain, this was a correct view after the WWII, when economies were less interdependent. The use of exchange rates to control trade was one of the main arguments that made Meade won the Nobel Prize on Economy in 1951. MEADE, J.E., *The Balance of Payments*, London, Oxford University Press, 1951. However, the growing interdependence and the globalisation of trade and finance make this statement obsolete.

⁵⁷ MCKINNON, R. and G. SCHNABL, "China and Its Dollar Exchange Rate... *op. cit.*", p. 668.

Rights (SDRs)⁵⁸ and stimulate its internationalisation. However, this move involves a risky increasing of the value of the currency, hurting exportations and competitiveness and could eventually produce an unofficial deregulation of the financial system⁵⁹. On the positive side, even if it will reduce its potential to export, it will generate more interests for domestic savers and therefore foster domestic consumption, one of the goals of the government. The internationalisation of the renminbi also provides an international recognition of the status of the Chinese economy that may eventually lead to the inclusion of the renminbi as one of the secondary reserve currencies.

In this context, China's decision to give the United States a 259 billion yuan (around \$38 billion) quota to invest in its country bonds and financial assets⁶⁰ constitutes a step forward in strengthening both countries economic relations. Under the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor programme, launched in 2011, the Chinese government has given this investment allowance to other countries, but never at this scale (excluding Hong Kong's). Therefore, this move towards deepening financial relations will also encourage the internationalisation of the renminbi, reinforcing Chinese monetary policies described before.

As a conclusion, it is necessary to highlight the ties between both economies, as China's rise has occurred in the institutional and material context of U.S. preponderance. The two main economies are intertwined in macroeconomic terms, especially in trade, research, private and public investment and finance. This fact complicates any move, as it may trigger a sort of domino effect in other fields. It is possible to conclude that macroeconomic trends show an important challenge to United States economic supremacy by China, supported by a rising national economy, a strong trading system and a growing modern research and technological environment. On finance, the process becomes more complicated, as China is strongly engaged in the dollar's supremacy. However, the process of internationalisation of the renminbi is the starting point of a process of globalisation and engagement by China in the financial structure that confronts the United States economic status quo not only in material terms, but also in institutional ones.

⁵⁸ According to the IMF, the SDR is an "international reserve asset" created to supplement member countries' official reserves. Since October 2016, the value of this reserve asset is based on a five-currency basket, including the US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling and Chinese renminbi. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, "Factsheet. Special Drawing Right (SDR)", 6th April 2016, <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm> > [10th June 2016].

⁵⁹ MALLABY, S. and O. WETHINGTON, "The Future of the Yuan. China's Struggle to Internationalize its Currency", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, n° 1, 2012, pp. 135-146.

⁶⁰ CHINA DAILY, "China to grant RQFII quota to US: official", 8th June 2016, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-06/08/content_25651416.htm> [13th June 2016].

6.2. The energy equation and its global implications. Hegemonic reproduction and contestation

The international and geopolitical role of energy is only increasing with the scarcity of resources and the emergence of new markets whose consumption is dramatically rising. In this context, the rise of China as the second world's largest economy has strongly restructured the world energy markets. However, China and the rest of the emerging countries are not the only culprits of the rise of consumption. The United States, unlike the European Union, has failed to decrease its energy consumption and its CO₂ emissions.

Together with the environmental and economic consequences of these energy market transformations, in this topic the geopolitical movements of countries are the issues of special concern⁶¹. For instance, the international turbulences and the conflicts in the Middle East have pushed governments to lock contracts with specific countries, a policy in which China has proved to be particularly successful. Moreover, as most of Chinese oil imports arrive by sea, the government has launched several projects to assure the supply, such as new routes through pipelines or the creation of strategic reserves.

However, this Chinese policy has generated international concern, especially from the United States, worried about Chinese international energy movements that may contribute to scarcity and to a rise in prices, but also because this increasing Chinese involvement often includes dealing with countries that the United States considers sensitive, such as Iran, Russia or Venezuela.

The energy consumption scenario has suffered a profound restructuration, not only with the change of the mayor consumer (from the United States to China), but also with a continuum increase of world consumption. Only in six years, from 2008 to 2014, the world consumption has raised more than a 10%, pushed by the rising consumption of the Non OECD countries that counted more than 22% in the same period⁶². Furthermore, together the United States and China account for the 41% of the total world consumption, therefore, any energetical and environmental global policy needs to be approved by both of them⁶³.

⁶¹ The growing interdependence on this issues ask for more complex and coordinated strategies and, as a result, "actors who are able to bring their geoeconomic and geostrategic strategies into sync have a higher chance of reaching their goals". CRIEKEMANS, D., "Where Geoeconomics and Geostrategy meet. The troubled relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation" in J. M. MUNOZ (ed.), *Advances in Geoeconomics*, London, Routledge, 2017, p. 121.

⁶² Figures calculated using the data provided by British Petroleum (BP). In the case of China, data has been calculated adding the figures of Hong Kong. BRITISH PETROLEUM (BP), *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2015, <<https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf>> [21st June 2016], p. 40.

⁶³ As an example of common policy engagement, there can be mentioned the negotiations prior to the Conference of Paris (2015). In the previous year, both countries' leaders met in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit and advanced to a close position to present to the conference and avoid a

As the International Energy Agency (IEA) expresses, Chinese weight in the energy environment is huge, in positive and negative terms. On the one hand, China is the world largest coal producer and consumer, which generates high amounts of pollution. In fact, coal is the first source of energy in the country, amounting more than the half of total national consumption. On the other hand, positive steps have been made in term of renewable energy and, according to the IEA, China “deploys more renewable power generation capacity than any other country” and, since 2017, has an emission trading scheme for the power sector and heavy industry to reduce the consumption of coal⁶⁴. Actually, the IEA believes that “the golden age of coal in China seems to be over” as estimations suggest a decline in the country’s energy mix from 29% to 27% from 2014 to 2020, due to the economic slowdown and the structural reforms⁶⁵. Moreover, the environmental consequences of the excessive reliance on coal on the country’s energy mix have become an issue of special concern for the government after several grave episodes⁶⁶. The limitations on the construction of coal fired energy plants have been complemented by stimulus on renewable energies. The power plants under construction are, over a 50%, based on renewable and the 13th Five Year Plan forecast doubling the land based wind capabilities and tripling the solar by 2020⁶⁷

hypothetical blockage. TIME, “The APEC Summit Closes With a ‘Historic’ Climate Deal Between the U.S. and China”, Beijing, 12th November 2014, <http://time.com/3577820/apec-climate-change-barack-obama-xi-jinping-greenhouse-gas/> [21st June 2016]; XINHUA, “China, U.S. issue joint statement on climate change”, 12th November 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/12/c_133784841.htm [21st June 2016].

⁶⁴ INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), *World Energy Outlook 2015. Executive Summary*, Paris, OECD/IEA, 2015, <<https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2015SUM.pdf>> [20th June 2016], p. 2.

⁶⁵ INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), *Coal. Medium-Term Market Report. Market Analysis and Forecast to 2020. Executive Summary*, Paris, OECD/IEA, 2015, <<https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTCMR2015SUM.pdf>> [22nd June 2016], p. 14.

⁶⁶ There have been several episodes of pollution alarm in Chinese big cities that made necessary to cut back or even suspend industrial production. In December 2015, the government declared a red alert twice in Beijing due to the high amount of harmful particles in the air that multiplied seven times the World Health Organisation standards. THE GUARDIAN, “Beijing issues first pollution red alert as smog engulfs capital”, Beijing, 7th December 2015, <<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/07/beijing-pollution-red-alert-smog-engulfs-capital>> [6th July 2016]; THE GUARDIAN, “Beijing’s smog ‘red alert’ enters third day as toxic haze shrouds city”, Beijing, 21st December 2015, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/21/beijings-smog-red-alert-enters-third-day-as-toxic-haze-shrouds-city>> [6th July 2016].

⁶⁷ INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) and CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL, *Next Generation Wind and Solar Power. From Cost to Value*, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2016, <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/NextGenerationWindandSolarPower.pdf> [22nd June 2016], p. 31.

However, the dominance of fossil fuels in Chinese energy mix is not the only problematic issue. As Chinese leaders admit, the rising energy demand threatens seriously the country's developments, both in internal and international terms⁶⁸. In fact, from 2008 to 2014, China's energy consumption has risen a 34%, while the United States' has decreased 1%, and the Asian country has become the world largest energy consumer. The rise of the demand is a multicausal phenomenon, derived mainly from the sustained demographical rise, the emerging middle class' resource improvements and, more importantly, the development of the energetically highly demanding construction and manufacture sectors⁶⁹. Even if consumption is an issue of concern, the main problem in the Chinese case is its low energy efficiency as, in comparison with developed countries, it needs to use more energy to produce the same unit of GDP⁷⁰.

The United States, by contrast, has a higher energy efficiency (although not at the scale of the EU) and is slowly diversifying its strategies and promoting renewable energy, not only for environmental concerns, but also to reduce its dependency on imports and assure its energy security⁷¹. In fact, the United States still maintains an extreme dependency on fossil fuels that constitute the 86% of its primary energy use, only three points below China's⁷². In the United States, the stimulus program for renewable energies takes shape especially through financial incentives, taking advantage of its natural resources as it is considered "one of the richest countries in terms of renewable energy portfolio", but still strongly dependent on government policies in this issue⁷³.

6.2.1. Energy security assurance in a changing energy environment. From geopolitics to diplomacy in a demand-rising world

The interaction scenario between both countries raises two issues of special concern: first, energy security and competence and, secondly, environmental concern. Although both clearly intertwine, it is true that each of them accomplishes especial dynamics that need individual attention. The rise of new energy needs among emerging powers has spread the geopolitical dimensions of energy policies. Energy, in many

⁶⁸ GARRISON, J. A., *China and the Energy Equation in Asia... op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21-22.

⁷⁰ According to World Bank data, China needs to use 226,11 kg of oil equivalent per \$1.000 GDP (calculated in constant 2011 in PPP). By contrast, the United States uses 134,83 and the European Union only 93,29 kg.

⁷¹ ASLANI, A. and K.-F. V. WONG, "Analysis of renewable energy development to power generation in the United States", *Renewable Energy*, Vol. 63, 2014, p. 153.

⁷² By contrast, the European Union's dependency on fossil fuels is 75%, dominated by oil. Figures calculated from British Petroleum (BP) statistics on primary energy consumption by fuel. BRITISH PETROLEUM (BP), *BP Statistical Review of World Energy... op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁷³ ASLANI, A. and K.-F. V. WONG, "Analysis of renewable energy development... op. cit.", p. 160.

different ways, constitutes an influential point in national security, from supply disruption and resource competition to terrorism funding or the control of energy resources in producing countries⁷⁴. In particular, Chinese rising oil needs, due to the industrial and automobile sectors' consumption, the necessity to reduce coal dependency and the low energy efficiency, generate political tensions and contribute to the rise of the prices⁷⁵.

The influence of the notion of energy security continues to grow in policymaking. Moreover, it is not solely related to energy policies, but intertwines with several aspects of national and foreign policy. Related to energy strategy, there can be identified five windows: foreign policy, energy security, environment and climate change, economic growth and market forces⁷⁶. As Emerson points out, these five windows usually present overlapping interests, to the extent that sometimes the making of certain policy decisions prompt changes in others, as in the development of ethanol as an alternative fuel, the importance of technological innovation or the nation's economic and military strength constitute key issues to assure energy security⁷⁷.

The concept of energy security comprises several notions, among which supply reliability, adequacy and reasonable market prices stand out⁷⁸. In the view of Chester, four dimensions should be addressed under a broad definition: availability, adequacy of capacity, affordability and sustainability⁷⁹. Through political measures, governments try to avoid short and long term risk, although each of them requires different policies. Among China, for example, the government has been more inclined to undertake geopolitical measures to address long term risks such as the adequacy of supply and of infrastructure. More concretely, since the boom of oil consumption started in 1993, the Chinese government has tried to set up alternative energy supplies, especially of oil and gas, diversifying its reliance in Middle East producers and strengthening ties with African and Latin American countries, as well as with Central Asian neighbours where United States influence is lower.

⁷⁴ Several authors provide different ways in which energy, mainly oil, influences international security, focusing on the United States' case. *Vid.* COLGAN, J. D., "Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War," *International Security*, Vol. 38, n° 2, 2013, pp. 147-180; CRANE, K. et al., *Imported Oil and U.S. National Security*, California, RAND Corporation, 2009; GLASER, C. L., "How Oil Influences U.S. National Security: Reframing Energy Security", *International Security*, Vol. 38, n° 2, 2013, pp. 112-146.

⁷⁵ BEIRNE, J. et al., "Global oil prices and the impact of China", *China Economic Review*, Vol. 27, 2013, pp. 39 and 42. Although pointing to China's rising demand as a factor on the rise of oil prices, authors also indicate other reasons, such as OPEC's management, speculation, the rising global demand or the strong economic growth, among others.

⁷⁶ EMERSON, S. A., "Is a New US Petroleum Strategy Coming into View?" in VV. AA., *China, India and the United States. Competition for Energy Resources*, Abu Dhabi, Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2008, p. 477.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

⁷⁸ BIELECKI, J., "Energy security: is the wolf at the door?", *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, Vol. 42, n° 2, 2002, p. 237.

⁷⁹ CHESTER, L.. "Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic nature", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 38, n° 2, 2010, p. 891.

The growing needs of fossil fuel of emerging countries have raised a particular concern among developed countries. The need to lock long term contracts with energetically rich countries has pushed for a more proactive diplomacy and geopolitical approach to the phenomenon. In this case, China and the United States diverge in an important point: the national energy reserves. Even if the United States are far from being self-sufficient, it is true that they hold more broad reserves of natural gas and oil. Moreover, the United States major gas and oil imports came from countries considered as geopolitically stable, especially Canada and Mexico. On the contrary, in the Chinese case, producing countries are considered geopolitically troublesome, because of their internal political situation or the situation of the area, as it happens in Iraq, Angola, Saudi Arabia or Sudan.

In energy security, China has chosen “a politically-driven and geostrategic (rather than economic) approach, due to the domestic structure of its political economy that generates a politicised approach to energy and economics. The government, in this case, backs state owned energy enterprises with economic and political assistance to assure economic and political stability⁸⁰. Therefore, this situation pushes China to lock energy contracts not just economically, but also offering political support to the producers. In the future, the major question is if both the United States and China will be able to obtain the sufficient energy resources that their economies demand peacefully⁸¹. In the 21st century, marked by the 2001 terrorist attacks and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Dorraj argues, U.S. influence in the Middle East region has declined, while China’s investments, trade and influence has sharply risen. However, the rising power still depends strongly on the United States presence and security in the region to import energy, with questions its superpower status⁸². On the contrary, the United States is still capable of using its naval power to coerce the distribution of energy worldwide⁸³.

China’s energy strategy differs with the United States’ on the strong control of the companies involved in energy trade. It can be said that the Chinese National Energy Strategy rest in three pillars whose actions are governmentally controlled: public diplomacy, National Oil Companies (NOC) and banking. All these three work towards ensuring an adequate energy supply that secures China’s economic growth⁸⁴. The first pillar, diplomacy, centres its efforts in establishing strong diplomatic ties with developing countries, focusing in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa

⁸⁰ LEE, J., “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, n° 3, 2012, pp. 75-76.

⁸¹ DORRAJ, M. and J. E. ENGLISH, “China’s Strategy for Energy Acquisition in the Middle East: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation With the United States”, *Asian Politics & Policy*, Vol. 4, n° 2, 2012, p. 174.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 174 and 182. As Dorraj and English defend, this reliance in U.S. provision of security questions China’s ability to defend its economic interests abroad.

⁸³ HUGHES, L. and A. LONG, “Is There an Oil Weapon? Security Implications of Changes in the Structure of the International Oil Market”, *International Security*, Vol. 39, n° 3, 2014/2015, p. 154.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

under the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence that guide its foreign relations: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression, non interference in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. The diplomatic relations with energy producing countries usually constitute the first step towards stronger ties with certain states, marked by diplomatic gestures. The second pillar, National Oil Companies, have had an important international expansion due to the need to import oil. The biggest three companies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), are among the top Chinese national companies and have improved their productivity after the 1998 re-organisation undertook to "create a clearer division of labour" among the three of them that has proven to be advantageous⁸⁵. The Chinese energy companies have successfully complemented their practice with the national banking system, the third pillar, as Chinese energy strategy often complements its deals with important packages of investment in infrastructure and beneficial trade agreements. Moreover, the Energy Backed Loans (EBL) constitute a growing trend in this topic and "strengthen the supplier-buyer relationship" as well as "solidify China's future access to oil and gas"⁸⁶.

Figure 11. United States and China's oil imports percentage by country. Countries in italics are OPEC members. Source: U. S. Energy Information Administration

U.S. Oil Imports by country of origin in 2014		Chinese Oil Imports by country of origin in 2014	
1.	Canada 37%	1.	<i>Saudi Arabia 16%</i>
2.	<i>Saudi Arabia 13%</i>	2.	<i>Angola 13%</i>
3.	Mexico 9%	3.	Russia 11%
4.	<i>Venezuela 9%</i>	4.	Oman 10%
5.	<i>Iraq 4%</i>	5.	<i>Iran 9%</i>
6.	<i>Kuwait 3%</i>	6.	<i>Iraq 9%</i>
7.	Russia 3%	7.	<i>Venezuela 4%</i>
8.	Colombia 3%	8.	<i>United Arab Emirates 4%</i>

⁸⁵ SHAMBAUGH, D., *China Goes Global. The Partial Power*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 166.

⁸⁶ DORRAJ, M. and J. E. ENGLISH, "China's Strategy for Energy Acquisition... *op. cit.*", p. 176.

The case of the Middle East is especially illustrative on the different position of China and the United States in the energy map. Even if China has exploited profitable deals with Latin American and African countries, the transportation cost of these fuels is considerably higher and, in some cases, most of the oil is heavy and more difficult to process¹. Therefore, the deals with Middle East and Central Asian producers constitute an important part of Chinese energy strategy. In 2014, China imported from the Middle East area more than a half of its oil and a third part of its gas, and in the same period, the United States imported just a fifth of its oil and less than 1% of its gas. Undoubtedly, the hegemon has successfully diversified its energy imports towards more stable energy environments as Canada or Mexico, and it is less reliant on the Middle East's oil and gas. At the same time, China needs to lock contracts in these areas to fulfil its growing energy needs that the IEA predicts will grow, at least, until 2040².

The importance of the region on the China-United States balance of power transcends the energy politics as China sees its dealings as a way to counterbalance United States hegemony³. This statement is related to the important transition on the geopolitics of oil, especially palpable in this region⁴. Even if, for example, United States bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia remained healthy, its influence and trust declined in the first decade of the century, together with a legitimacy crisis after Iraq and Afghanistan wars. However, As Dorraj and Liu note, the rise of China as a major trading partner and investor in the area does not constitute a zero-sum game scenario, because all parts gain mutual economic benefits in bilateral relations and, hopefully, the Chinese involvement may contribute to the stability of the area⁵.

6.2.2. The global fight against climate change in the context of hegemonic succession. Environmental issues, renewable energies and global compromises

On the field of environmental concern, both countries are the world top polluters and their involvement in sustainable energy constitutes a key issue for the whole international community. Efforts to diversify and decarbonise the national energy mix are made, but their success is still moderate. Both states have strong needs of fossil

¹ This is the case of, for example, the oil extracted in Brazil and Venezuela.

² INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), *World Energy Outlook 2015*, Paris, OECD/IEA, 2015, p. 71.

³ DORRAJ, M. and J. E. ENGLISH, "China's Strategy for Energy Acquisition... *op. cit.*", p. 176; CURRIER, C. L. and M. DORRAJ, "The Strategic Implications of China's Energy Engagement with the Developing World" in C. L. CURRIER and M. DORRAJ (eds.), *China's Energy Relations with the Developing World*, New York, Continuum, 2011, p. 4.

⁴ CURRIER, C. L. and M. DORRAJ, "China's Quest for Energy Security in the Middle East: Strategic Implications" in C. L. CURRIER and M. DORRAJ (eds.), *China's Energy Relations... op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73. On the role of China as a stabiliser in the area, Dorraj and English have argued that, for example, Chinese growing involvement in Iraq's oil industry may serve as an incentive for Beijing to work for stability. DORRAJ, M. and J. E. ENGLISH, "China's Strategy for Energy Acquisition... *op. cit.*", p. 186.

fuels, especially oil in the U.S. case and also coal for China. Therefore, further efforts need to be made on the development of renewable energy sources, a field in which Chinese efforts have been more than significant⁶.

The geopolitical concerns on China's energy needs are specially influenced by its excessive reliance on fossil fuels. Together with the United States, both countries are responsible of 41% of world CO₂ emissions to the atmosphere⁷ and climate politics need the implication of both. However, their starting point is quite different. The United States, still a huge polluter, gets 12,05% of its energy from alternative and nuclear sources, while in the Chinese case this percentage declines to 4,75%⁸. Moreover, China is still a developing economy whose energy consumption is predicted to rise, while the U.S., as a mature economy, shows more stable figures. Therefore, the Chinese consumption statistics are worrying and, as population wellbeing improves, the pollution may rise as well.

In the pursue of sustainable development in China, there is a tension between several issues that complicates any move. On the national issues, there should be taken into account topics as economic growth, energy supply, environmental protection and public health, together with global problems such as climate change or the previously analysed energy security⁹. The economic trend, together with a poor energy efficiency, poses tremendous challenges for the Chinese government on environmental issues, as pollution has caused several health warnings and is proven to be harmful for the national economy¹⁰. Even if the government is launching policies to improve the environmental situation (advanced coal technologies, energetically efficient buildings, green vehicles and more advanced industrial technologies), the country's reliance on coal as the primary energy resource is unlikely to change in the short term, as it is a national resource that China does not have to import and is not affected by the market's fluctuations. Considering the difficult national scenario, several actors have called to redefine the term alternative energy and adapt it to its particular national case. This move will result in a double temporal definition that, in the short

⁶ As Criekemans suggests, the compulsory task of developing renewable energies both in the U.S and in China has the potential to empower regional and local governments. CRIEKEMANS, D. "Post-Copenhagen from a geopolitical perspective: the US, China and Europe", *American Diplomacy*, 12th April 2010, <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0406/comm/criekemans_copenhagen.html> [13th September 2016].

⁷ According to the World Bank data, in 2011, both countries were responsible of the 41,46% of CO₂ emitted to the atmosphere, China accounting for the 26,15% and the United States for 15,31%.

⁸ Data extracted from the World Bank Data, concerning clean energies that do not produce carbon dioxide when they are generated, including hydropower, nuclear, geothermal, and solar power, among others.

⁹ MA, L. et al., "Alternative energy development strategies for China towards 2030", *Frontiers of Energy and Power Engineering in China*, Vol. 3, n° 1, 2009, p. 2.

¹⁰ Reports argue that the total cost of air and water pollution in China amount to 6,5 and 2,1 % of GDP between 2000 and 2010. CRANE, K. and Z. MAO, "Costs of Selected Policies to Address Air Pollution in China", California, *Rand Corporation*, 2015, p. 3.

term (until 2030) will involve “to meet the huge energy demand and improve environment and public health as a complement of conventional incumbent energy” and, in the longer (2030-2050), will conclude with a “transition to sustainable energy system”¹¹.

To meet official target to produce at least a 15% of overall energy consumed from non-fossil fuels¹², the government relies on a rising production of hydroelectric, wind and solar power¹³. Considering the costs of increasing the production capacity on the population and the complexity of the projects, the task seems as demanding as necessary. However, signals look optimistic, as the IEA admits that wind and solar power development reached a “significant momentum” on 2015, when “renewables represented over 50% of net additions to power capacity” in China¹⁴.

In the case of the United States, the development of new renewable energy production has been boosted by former president Obama’s New Energy for America Plan, launched on 2009, with projects to reduce greenhouse gas emission on a 80% by 2050¹⁵. As some experts have warned, this plan must address the diversification of the energy mix carefully, as in the U.S., coal remains the cheapest electricity generation resource for residential use and a too drastic shift could increase prices and hurt economic growth¹⁶. Either way, this policy guideline projects to produce a quarter of electricity generation from renewable energies by 2025. In renewable energies, hydroelectric is the first source in the U.S., but it has a huge potential in solar power production¹⁷. This plan, politically transversal, comprises loans and encourages packages that have been launched with the collaboration of other departments. Moreover, the project links with the certainty that the “the U.S. is one of the richest countries in terms of renewable energy portfolio”, but “commercial development of renewable energy systems is highly dependent to the utilisation costs and government policies”¹⁸.

The national policies of both states have been complemented with an unblocking of the international joint climate change policies. These “cooperative competitors” have pushed towards global agreements on this topic in the last forums, especially

¹¹ MA, L. et al., “Alternative energy development strategies... *op. cit.*”, p. 3.

¹² XINHUA, “China unveils energy strategy, targets for 2020”, Beijing, 19th November 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/19/c_133801014.htm [18th July 2016].

¹³ The government wants to increase hydroelectric capacity from 280 GW in 2013 to 350 GW in 2020; wind power from 76 to 200 GW; solar power from 15 to 100 GW and biomass from 10 GW in 2014 to 30 in 2020. RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, *Renewables 2014: Global Status Report*, Paris, Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, 2015.

¹⁴ INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) and CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL, *Next Generation Wind and Solar Power... op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁵ GIGLIO, R. S., “The Obama-Biden New Energy for America Plan: Existing Technologies Contribute to Energy Goals”, *Strategic Planning for Energy and the Environment*, Vol. 29, n° 4, 2010, p. 28.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁷ ASLANI, A. and K-F. V. WONG, “Analysis of renewable energy development... *op. cit.*”, p. 154.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

before the Paris Conference on 2015, where Barack Obama and Xi Jinping called for a new global climate agreement and the joint ratification of the agreement constituted an illustrative example of this new cooperation¹⁹. However, this joint adventure has just started and is highly influenced to the national political changes on both countries especially on the United States under the Trump Administration. As Lewis admits, “there clearly can be no solution to global climate change without the United States and China, and such a solution will depend on the ability of these two countries to see eye to eye”. The trust building of the relationship is still in progress, but progresses in low carbon technologies have been promising²⁰. Undoubtedly, energy cooperation could be one of the most collaborative issues for both countries to build trusting and cooperative identities.

6.3. The military and defence scenario. United States’ return to the Pacific to contain China’s rise

The military rebalance in the Asia-Pacific area in this century has been among the most debated issues in military and international relations scholarship²¹. Particularly, the balance of military and strategic forces of the major powers in the region has opened a vivid debate about the role of the hegemon in its region and its relations with the rising challenger. Issues of special interests have been the Chinese growing defence annual budgets and the modernisation of its military, as well as the United States’ strategic decision to inaugurate what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called “America’s Pacific Century”²².

These movements occur in a region that is facing a “geopolitical transition” as the changes on the new millennium urge for realignment in the U.S.-led alliance system that has dominated the region in the previous decades²³. The new rising economic poles, among which China is the more prominent one, are no longer just emerging markets, but also great powers in progress, at least in political and military terms.

¹⁹ TIME, “The APEC Summit Closes With a ‘Historic’ Climate Deal... *op. cit.*”.

²⁰ LEWIS, J. I. “The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship.” *China Environment Series*, n° 11, 2010, p. 25.

²¹ *Vid.* DOBBINS, J., “War with China”, *Survival. Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 54, n° 4, 2012, pp. 7-24; FRIEDBERG, A. L., *A Contest for Supremacy. China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 2011; GLASER, C. L., “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation”, *International Security*, Vol. 39, n° 4, 2015, pp. 49-90; KAPLAN, R., *Asia’s Cauldron. The South China Sea and the end of a stable Pacific*, New York, Random House, 2014; SILOVE, N., “The Pivot before the Pivot. U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia”, *International Security*, Vol. 40, n° 4, 2016, pp. 45-88.

²² CLINTON, H., “America’s Pacific Century”, *Foreign Policy*, 11th October 2011, <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>> [4th August 2016].

²³ LIFF, A. P. and G. J. IKENBERRY, “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma”, *International Security*, Vol. 39, n° 2, 2014, p. 55.

Even if some conclude that this phenomenon will inevitably lead to a racing military competition and a high scale conflict²⁴, others point to the unlikelihood of a bilateral armed conflict between the United States and China²⁵.

Undoubtedly, to address the changing security and military balance of the Asia-Pacific, two different approaches are necessary. Firstly, there should be analysed the state of the question in the region, focusing on both states' militaries and the recent developments. Military expenditures, changing foreign policy approaches and strengths and weak points of military developments constitute topics of special interests in this part. Secondly, there should be examined the driving forces behind these military changes, especially the changing strategic views of both states and the doctrines developed more recently, paying special attention to the Antiaccess/Area Denial and Air-Sea Battle Doctrines.

It cannot be denied that the dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region is accompanied by a circle of rising military budgets, mostly caused by the changing material distributions, the region's economic growth and the surging military expending²⁶. Moreover, the region is the common arena of the states involved in what has been named as the most important bilateral relations in contemporary international politics: the dynamics of conflict and cooperation between China and the United States. Besides, several latent conflicts still endure in this region, including North Korea, China-Taiwan relations or the South China sea maritime disputes, and their escalation could constitute a high risk of bilateral crisis. Therefore, it is necessary to address, on the one hand, the changing dynamics in United States military primacy, the debate about its military role as well as the best way to contain China and, on the other hand, the development of China's military modernisation and its growing defence role in the area due to different national interests.

6.3.1. The United States' pivot to the Pacific. Confronting foreign policy strategies to contest China's rise.

The global material primacy of the United States is crucially underpinned by its military power. At present, it is the only country that holds the ability to project its influence all around the globe. Moreover, it possesses what Posen called "command of the commons" that constitutes a "key military enabler of the U. S. global power posi-

²⁴ Vid. MEARSHEIMER, J., "China's Unpeaceful Rise", *Current History*, Vol. 105, n° 690, 2006, pp. 160-162; BERNSTEIN, R. and R. H. MUNRO, *The Coming Conflict with China*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1997; MENGES, C. C., *China: the gathering threat*, Tennessee, Nelson Current, 2005. For a review of pessimist and optimist views about the U.S.-China relations, see FRIEDBERG, A. L., "The Future of U.S.-China Relations. Is Conflict Inevitable?", *International Security*, Vol. 30, n° 2, 2005, pp. 7-45.

²⁵ MONTGOMERY, E. B., "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific. China's Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection". *International Security*, Vol. 38, n° 4, 2014, p. 131.

²⁶ LIFF, A. P. and G. J. IKENBERRY, "Racing toward Tragedy?... *op. cit.*", p. 52.

tion" as it facilitates the exploitation of other power resources²⁷. This dominance offers an unparalleled advantage for the United States military²⁸ and its hegemonic role is still a guarantee of the freedom of trade and navigation.

The mastery of the United States military is unquestionable, as it has been along all the unipolar era. As Montgomery summarises, "the United States has needed to mobilise and deploy its units over an extended period of time, deploy and sustain them over air and sea lines of communication stretching across continents, and gain access to overseas facilities capable of accommodating its expeditionary forces and their large logistical 'tail'"²⁹. The multiple compromises that the hegemon has maintained over its unipolarity have raised questions about the sustainability of this strategy. During the Cold War, the threatening otherness of the Soviet Union prompted and sustained the military mastery and the grand strategy of primacy. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet threat, the United States' mastery was no longer in question and the hegemon had to face a redefinition of its foreign strategy, with great implications for its actual military power.

At the end of the Cold War, four major competing ideas about the United States' foreign policy were on debate: cooperative security, primacy, selective engagement and isolationism. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was no question when a mix between cooperative security and primacy was materialised³⁰. Based, on the one hand, on arms control, cooperative security institutions and the Western technological superiority and, on the other, on preventing the emergence of a new rival power, the grand strategy gained consensus among both Democrats and Republicans, giving birth to the era of liberal hegemony³¹.

Nevertheless, the frustration after the Afghanistan and Iraq wars has raised questions about the adequacy of this strategy to secure the United States and, simultaneously, prevent the rise of China. Moreover, liberal hegemony depends on several U.S. power advantages that are coming to blur³². On the one hand, primacy optimistics promote a deep military engagement that has the ability to deter possible challengers due to the cost of competing with the U.S., leaving soft-balancing as the only viable alternative. On the other hand, the advocates of retrenchment call for an off-shore balancing strategy, avoiding the huge costs of maintaining a primacy strategy

²⁷ POSEN, B. R., "Command of the Commons. The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony", *International Security*, Vol. 28, n° 1, 2003, pp. 7-8. As Posen notes, "command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States". *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁸ MONTGOMERY, E. B., "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific. China's Rise and the Future of the U.S. Power Projection", *International Security*, Vol. 38, n° 4, 2014, p. 123.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

³⁰ POSEN, B. R., *Restraint. A New Foundation for U. S. Grand Strategy*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2015, p. 6.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-10.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 165.

and calling for a “scale back” in the nation’s security commitments, sharing the burdens with allies and responsible regional powers³³.

At present, the materialisation of the United States Defense Strategy, based on the Quadrennial Defense Review, rests on three mutually reinforcing and interdependent pillars: protecting the homeland to deter and defeat attacks; build security globally to provide stability; and project power and win decisively³⁴. In sharp contrast to the previous strategy of 2010, which was fundamentally a wartime strategy, this one focuses on longer term objectives and on the prevention of conflict³⁵. In this vein, the Asia-Pacific region will remain importantly linked to the U.S. national interests. Accordingly, by 2020, a 60 per cent of the United States Navy will be stationed in the Pacific, completed with additional air forces and the relocation of army personnel currently in operation on Iraq and Afghanistan, towards the objective of achieving a more geographically distributed force posture in the region³⁶. United States turn to the Pacific is, therefore, nearly materialised.

6.3.2. China’s military modernisation in a U.S.-led Asia-Pacific. A quantitative and qualitative step forward

The issue of the Chinese military expenditures and the modernisation of its army have constituted a topic of special concern for academics, military theories as

³³ MONTGOMERY, E. B., “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific... *op. cit.*”, pp. 119-120. Posen and Ross also have examined the debate on U.S. grand strategy. POSEN, B. R. and A. L. ROSS, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”, *International Security*, Vol. 21, n° 3, 1996/97, pp. 5-53. On the side of the primacy optimistic and pro-engagement, *vid.* BROOKS, S. G., G. J. IKENBERRY and W. C. WOHLFORTH, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, *International Security*, Vol. 37, n° 3, 2012/2013, pp. 7-51; BROOKS, S. G., G. J. IKENBERRY and W. C. WOHLFORTH, “Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, n° 1, 2013, pp. 130-142; ART, R. J., “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement”, *International Security*, Vol. 23, n° 3, 1998/1999, pp. 79-113; ART, R. J., “Selective Engagement in the Era of Austerity” in R. FONTAINE and K. M. LORD (eds.), *America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration*, Washington, Center for a New American Security, 2012, pp. 15-27. However, these are strongly contested by the proponents of retrenchment and off-shore strategy proponents. *Vid.* POSEN, B. R., *Restraint... op. cit.*; POSEN, B. R., “A Grand Strategy of Restraint,” in M. A. FLOURNOY and S. BRIMLEY (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*, Washington, Center for a New American Security, 2008, pp. 81-102; MEARSHEIMER, J. J., “Imperial by Design” *National Interest*, n° 111, 2011, pp. 16-34; PREBLE, C. A., *Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009; LAYNE, C., *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006; LAYNE, C., “America’s Middle East Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing Has Arrived”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, n° 1, 2009, pp. 5-25; BETTS, R. K., *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2012.

³⁴ UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014”, Virginia, United States Department of Defense, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf> [5th August 2016], p. v.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

well as the media³⁷. Even if the modernisation of its army has gained attention only recently, especially in the present century, the turning point in the Chinese defence strategy can be dated as back as 1995/1996. Between these years, the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the involvement of the United States in this conflict with a massive mobilisation of war resources highlighted the necessity of transformations in the Chinese defence doctrines to address the changing scenarios. Traditionally, the Chinese have deployed the majority of their military resources to the continental defence against an invading force. However, after the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Crisis, the Chinese army has strengthened its air and maritime defence and has successfully increased the costs of involvement for the United States in an eventual regional crisis³⁸.

This turning point was politically complemented with the publication can be seen as completed with the launch of the first White Paper on Military Strategy by the Communist Government, stating that the basic point in military preparation should be a focus on local wars in conditions of modern technology, highlighting the importance of maritime military. Moreover, this White Paper offers an overview of the future developments of the Chinese forces. Firstly, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy should be "in line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defence and open seas protection", emphasising the importance of the sea protection in the future to underpin the growing national economic (imports and exports, energy supply) and political interests (national stability, protection against international interference, reinforcement of the Chinese territorial claims) that depend on the freedom of navigation. On the same line, the government officially admits that "the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned". Secondly, and complementarily, the PLA Air Force shall also update and meet "the strategic requirement of building air-space capabilities" to conduct both offensive and defensive operations³⁹.

Undoubtedly, the "substantial resources" that China is devoting to its defence, mainly centred in the naval, air, missile, spatial and C4ISR capabilities, but also ground forces, have contributed to transform the PLA into a professional and competitive force⁴⁰. Even if the annual increasing of the Chinese defence budgets has raised Washington's worries, the national investments on military departments constitute a slippery issue. The non-inclusion of several military-related investments and the artificially lower budgets have been recurrently pointed out. However, this is not ex-

³⁷ See, as an example, SHAMBAUGH, D., *Modernizing China's Military. Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, California, University of California Press, 2002; SCOBELL, A. and A. J. NATHAN, "China's Overstretched Military", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, n° 4, 2012, pp. 135-148.


³⁸ MONTGOMERY, E. B., "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific... *op. cit.*", pp. 130-131.

³⁹ MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, "China's Military Strategy", Beijing, May 2015, <<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2014.htm>> [3rd August 2016].

⁴⁰ CHASE, M. S. et al., *China's Incomplete Military Transformation. Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2015, p. 15. C4ISR capabilities refers to Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

clusive to the Chinese case. Even the United States does not include several defence related investments in the budget of the Department of Defence⁴¹.

Figure 12. Military expenditures of the four major investor countries in current U.S. dollars.
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).



The following military modernisation strategies will likely remain in progress in the future years as long as there is not any major internal and external event that alters this trajectory. Definitely, internal issues (such as a national economic slowdown, a growing social instability, an increase of terrorist attacks in China or a violent awake of the Tibet and Xinjiang conflicts) and external ones (changes in U.S.-China relations, a growing rivalry with India, or changes in key actors for China such as North Korea, Russia, Taiwan or Japan) can reorientate Chinese strategic targets as well as its military developments.

An important part of the military developments have been assigned to the naval section. By 2015, the PLA Navy was formed by more than 300 units⁴² and the army

⁴¹ In the case of China, out of the defence budget it is possible to find the military related aspects of the space program, the revenues for military-owned commercial enterprises, recruitment bonuses or the provincial military base operation costs. In the United States, nuclear weapons are funded through the Department of Energy and the veterans' benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs. CHINA POWER, "What does China Really Spend in its Military?", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, <<http://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/>> [2nd August 2016].

is strongly modernising the fleet by retiring old units and replacing it with new ones, fostering not only a quantitative but also qualitative step forward. The acquisition and building of new submarines are illustrative examples. By the same year, China had 68 submarines, among which 9 are nuclear ones⁴³. Even if their capabilities are more focused on the regional area, it is true that the recent development of submarines designed in China (the Yuan and the Jin class ones) has contributed to a force modernisation still in progress. Moreover, the Navy is developing new surface combatants capable of reaching further areas to complement the new naval strategy that wants to reach more distant waters as the Mediterranean, the Indian ocean or the Atlantic, that constitute strategic routes for China's naval trade and energy supply. The construction of military supporting facilities in Djibouti is a crucial measure towards this end, as the near Mandeb Strait constitutes an important oil route between the Red Sea and the Aden Gulf and it is situated in a particularly unstable region, especially due to piracy and the instability of Somalia.

Besides, the Air Force (PLAAF) has accomplished an "ambitious modernisation program" similar to the navy, decreasing the number of aircrafts, but increasing the quantity of modern ones, reaching 2.800 aircrafts, among which 1.400 are fighters⁴⁴. On the same vein, the Rocket Force (PLARF, previous known as Second Artillery Force or PLASAF) has reached a more sophisticated nuclear arsenal that is capable to reach regional and continental objectives (among which stands the U.S.). Reports state that it "has deployed the world's most numerous, diverse and comprehensive conventional ballistic and cruise missile force"⁴⁵. Indeed, Chinese nuclear status deserves a more in-depth analysis. China became the last legitimated nuclear state in 1964, and it is an active member of the global nuclear order, not only by its presence on the Non-proliferation Regime from 1992, but also due to its stickiness on a policy of Non First Use (NFU)⁴⁶.

⁴² OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, "The PLA Navy. New Opportunities and Mission for the 21st Century", Washington, Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015, <http://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081058-483> [3rd August 2016], p. 13.

⁴³ The Chinese Navy is divided in three fleets. The North Sea Fleet holds 3 nuclear attack submarines and 25 diesel ones; the East Sea Fleet just 18 diesel ones and the South Sea Fleet holds two nuclear attack, 4 nuclear ballistic missile ones and 16 diesel submarines. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴⁴ CHASE, M. S. et al., *China's Incomplete Military Transformation... op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁶ PINTADO, M., "China's responses to a nuclear order un crisis. Perspectives from a changing international society", *Conference of the BISA Global Nuclear Order Working Group*, Birmingham, 17-18th September 2015. A broad historical analytical review of Chinese nuclear program and its involvement in the Non Proliferation Regime can be found in GARRIDO, V., "China, Potencia Nuclear: Programa Nuclear y Política de No Proliferación y Control de Armamento" in Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN), *China en el Sistema de Seguridad Global del Siglo XXI*, Monografías del Ceseden, nº 108, January 2009, <http://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/Galerias/destacados/publicaciones/monografias/ficheros/108_CHINA_EN_EL_SISTEMA_DE_SEGURIDAD_GLOBAL_DEL_SIGLO_XXI.pdf> [14th September 2016]; HORSBURGH, N., "Change and innovation in Chinese nuclear weapons strategy", *China Information*, Vol.

However, its commitment to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the nuclear order does not blur a dissatisfaction and growing concern about the consequences of the crisis on this order⁴⁷. Special mention deserves Chinese fears that the order's crisis will prompt a US nuclear hegemony, instead of a more representative order⁴⁸. In fact, hegemon's moral exceptionalism highly influences the global nuclear order, legitimising (or deslegitimising) the possession of nuclear weapons according to the identities, threats and interests constructed by the United States and Western states. Therefore, these dynamics have severely corrupted the order and the NPT, using them to impose disciplinary measures "in the name of constitutional compliance with universal precepts, but also in the name of Western values, interests, and order"⁴⁹.

Its growing dissatisfaction has not disentangled China's commitment to retaliation and nuclear order's institutionalisation, especially regarding to the North Korean proliferation challenge⁵⁰. In national terms, nuclear weaponry remains a high level strategic issue for the government that simultaneously reasserts the self-defence nature of its arsenal and commits to the NFU doctrine, but also prioritises avoiding the U.S. to achieve a nuclear strategic primacy⁵¹. The unbalance between both states' nuclear arsenals remains huge⁵², but China still maintains its retaliatory capabilities. Therefore, it can be said Chinese efforts of modernisation and diversification of its nuclear arsenal (fostering, for example, the renewal and substitutions of the missiles that carry the nuclear fuel) are strongly backed with a growing commitment to its own

26, n° 2, 2012, pp. 185-204.

⁴⁷ Three main causes of the crisis are noted: proliferation, changes in U.S. nuclear posture and the institutional deadlock. PINTADO, M., "China's responses to a nuclear order un crisis... *op. cit.*"; HORSBURGH, N., *China and Global Nuclear Order. From Estrangement to Active Engagement*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 121-122.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁴⁹ RITCHIE, N., "Legitimizing And Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons" in J. BORRIE and T. CAUGHLEY (eds.), *Viewing Nuclear Weapons Through a Humanitarian Lens*, Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2013, p. 54. This nuclear order evolves and reproduces as a social structure, as well as its change through resistance. *Vid.* RITCHIE, N., "Global nuclear order: hegemony and resistance", *Conference of the BISA Global Nuclear Order Working Group*, Birmingham, 17-18th September 2015.

⁵⁰ HORSBURGH, N., *China and Global Nuclear Order... op. cit.*, p. 120. Even the U. S. government has highlighted the vital role of China in the Six Party Talks. The former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas J. Christensen pointed that "almost none of the progress (...) would have been possible without China's active engagement in the process". CHRISTENSEN, T. J., "Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, n° 3, 2009, pp. 94-95.

⁵¹ MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, "China's Military Strategy... *op. cit.*"; CUNNINGHAM, F. S. and M. T. FRAVEL, "Assuring Assured Retaliation. China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability", *International Security*, Vol. 40, n° 2, 2015, pp. 48-50

⁵² According to the data compiled by the Arms Control Association for 2016, Russia possess 7.300 warheads (among which 2.800 are retired), the United States 7.100 (2.500 retired), France list third with 300 warheads, followed by China (260) and United Kingdom (210). Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons Possessors' figures are more modest: Pakistan holds 120 warheads, India 110, Israel 80 and North Korea just eight. ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance", August 2016, <<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat> > [14th September 2016].

nuclear values such as NFU, a preference towards multilateralism and non-proliferation, as well as the construction of a multilateral nuclear order.

Finally, the Chinese cyberwar capabilities constitute the last subject on the country's military modernisation and have become a topic of substantial interest in recent years. The usefulness of these cyber capabilities is varied: it allows collecting data for potential operation, can constrain or slow adversaries' response time and it can serve as a force-multiplier when it is combined with kinetic attacks⁵³. However, in the Chinese case, some experts admit that its capabilities have been overestimated, pointing out that "China's military cyber capacity cannot live up to its aggressive doctrinal aspiration"⁵⁴. Nevertheless, the cyber attacks inevitably increase the risk of conflict escalation, not only in the bilateral case, but also involving other American allies such as Taiwan or Japan.

Despite the profound effort of modernisation, some weaknesses still prevail, most of them related to the human capital, as insufficient education and technical proficiency or corruption, as well as technically related weaknesses such as shortfalls in joint operation capabilities, logistic and maintenance⁵⁵.

6.3.3. Confronting military strategies of China and the United States. Antiaccess/Area Denial versus Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons

As the developments of both states suggest, the Asia-Pacific region is witnessing two conflictual dynamics in the military realm. On the one hand, the United States has declined to pursue a strategy of limited accommodation and has focused its efforts in preserving the geopolitical status quo⁵⁶. Simultaneously, on the other hand, China is trying to develop defence capabilities that match its economic modernisation to protect its interests and underpin its great power status. Therefore, the region shall be committed to "find ways to engage in strategic restraint, peacefully address conflicts of interests, and manage nascent rivalries"⁵⁷.

Through both Obama administrations, the United States has deployed what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton named "forward-deployed diplomacy"⁵⁸ that worked to strengthen the regional security ties with its allies and, at the same time,

⁵³ OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016", Washington, *Department of Defense*, 2016, p. 64.

⁵⁴ LINDSAY, J. R., "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity. Fiction and Friction", *International Security*, Vol. 39, n° 3, 2014/15, p. 44; BRENNER, J. and J. R. LINDSAY, "Correspondence. Debating the Chinese Cyber Threat", *International Security*, Vol. 40, n° 1, 2015, pp. 191-195.

⁵⁵ CHASE, M. S. et al., *China's Incomplete Military Transformation... op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁵⁶ GLASER, C. L., "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?... op. cit.", p. 49.

⁵⁷ LIFF, A. P. and G. J. IKENBERRY, "Racing toward Tragedy?... op. cit.", p. 53.

⁵⁸ CLINTON, H., "America's Pacific Century... op. cit."

has reinforced its military presence. This way, the United States tries to maintain its regional role as “resident power, security provider, and leader”⁵⁹. In other words, there can be observed a double approach to China under Obama’s presidency: reaffirming and strengthening cooperative ties while simultaneously establishing a strong and credible American presence across Asia to encourage constructive Chinese behaviour and to provide confidence to regional leaders who wish to resist an eventual Chinese regional hegemony⁶⁰.

The complexity of the relations between both states has raised concern among IR scholarly to the extent that some have claim that the Asia-Pacific dynamics are driving towards a security dilemma⁶¹. Relying on the distinction made by Liff and Ikenberry⁶², it can be concluded that in this specific case the most important variable to identify whether it is a security dilemma and its type is to observe the driving of both states’ action. To say it differently, it must be addressed whether Chinese and United States’ actions are status quo oriented or want to push for a transformation. Scholarly has normally agreed in targeting United States moves in the region as stabilising and status quo oriented, while Chinese modernisation are usually pointed as destabilising and conflictual⁶³. However, it can be said that both countries have mixed growing military presence in sensible areas with intense and growing cooperation not only in the military realm.

Remarkable sources of cooperation include agreements on Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) that have contributed to reduce the risk of military encounters. These measures cover plenty of case that could eventually escalate into an active conflict such as the notification of major military activities, the behaviour of military personnel during air and sea encounters, the safety of air and maritime encounters, the rules

⁵⁹ LIFF, A. P. and G. J. IKENBERRY, “Racing toward Tragedy?... *op. cit.*”, p. 57. Measures as the United States-Philippines agreement to let the U.S. the partial use of five bases in the Asian country, near the disputed Spratly islands, can be seen as examples of this new U.S. strategy. THE WASHINGTON POST, “These are the bases the U.S. will use near the South China Sea. China isn’t impressed”, Washington DC, 21st March 2016, <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/21/these-are-the-new-u-s-military-bases-near-the-south-china-sea-china-isnt-impressed/>> [8th August 2016].

⁶⁰ MANYIN, M. E. et al. “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia”, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 28th March 2012, <<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf>> [10th August 2016], p. 18.

⁶¹ CHRISTENSEN, T. “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict”. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, n° 4, 2002, pp. 7-21.

⁶² The authors present a typology of security dilemmas among which they distinguish the traditional one and a modified one. On the one hand, the traditional security dilemma is characterised by unstable security relations between potential rivals, but both status quo defensive-oriented. On the other hand, the modified type presents the same outcome, but at least one of the states wants to produce changes in the status quo, therefore producing a clashing of interests. LIFF, A. P. and G. J. IKENBERRY, “Racing toward Tragedy?... *op. cit.*”, pp. 63-64.

⁶³ CORN, T., “Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics”, *Small Wars Journal*, June 2010, <<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/449-corn.pdf>> [11th August 2016]. However, other authors redefine the concepts of revisionist and status quo, proposing more precise analysis. *Vid.* SCHWELLER, R. L., “Bandwagoning for Profit... *op. cit.*”, pp. 72-107.

of surface to surface encounters, the observation of military exercises and activities and the military notification mechanism⁶⁴.

However, cooperation is not the only dynamic in both countries bilateral relations. The changes in material distribution have prompted an identification of both states as potential military rivals, which has led to the development of military strategies to respond of each other's movements. The specific environment of the Asia-Pacific region, with vast water and filled with islands, makes it a complicated theatre of operations. As it has been previously expressed, the Chinese army is strengthening its navy, as it considers the sea power the cornerstone of its defence strategy. The modernisation of missiles and its military technology it is a reality in the case of China. As U.S. officials admit, "China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world" with an expanding force both in number and in type⁶⁵. This leading force has an important power projection that can be maximised in combination with the proper strategy.

In this case, Chinese officials have deployed an Antiaccess/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy based on changing the conditions of warfare that the U.S. army has been accustomed to face. In fact, A2/AD consists in two different strategies that in practice serve as complementary. The first one, Antiaccess, affects the rival forces' movements to a conflict theatre, slowing its deployment in this zone or even obliging the rival forces to operate far from the theatre. The second, Area Denial affects to manoeuvre within the theatre, impeding the normal progress of operations⁶⁶. It can be said that the A2/AD strategy is defined by its lack of indications of attack and no warning. The attacking country will probably employ all domains (space, cyberspace, air, sea and land) in its strategy and United States and allies' territory could be directly attacked⁶⁷. The employment of this strategy will also expose the vulnerabilities of older systems, diminish the influence of some capabilities in which the U.S. holds advantage and, as a conclusion, raise the political and economic costs of conflict⁶⁸.

⁶⁴ UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *Memorandum of Understanding Between The United States of America Department of Defense and the People's Republic of China Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism*, Washington and Beijing, 31st October and 4th November 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingOnNotification.pdf> [12th August 2016].

⁶⁵ UNITED STATES NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat", Wright-Patterson AFB, *National Air and Space Intelligence Center Public Affairs Office*, 2013, p. 3.

⁶⁶ UNITED STATES AIR-SEA BATTLE OFFICE, "Air-Sea Battle Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges", May 2013, p. 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶⁸ MONTGOMERY, E. B., "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific... *op. cit.*", p. 129.

However, the United States has deployed its own strategy to face a situation where A2/AD strategy is developed. In fact, these Chinese strategies are not new⁶⁹, but recent technological developments have increased its utility and efficacy. In response, the United States has developed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), renamed in 2015 from what was previously developed as Air-Sea Battle. Although not much official information has been dropped about JAM-GC, the Air-Sea Battle, better documented, is said to be the base of the new strategy. The elaboration of Air Sea Battle concept proved the need to develop “networked, integrated forces” that demand “the application of cross-domain operations across all the interdependent war fighting domains” to destroy A2/AD capabilities⁷⁰. Even if Air-Sea Battle is a military strategy and an operational doctrine, its aim is not to win a war, but to settle the most favourable conditions for the operations⁷¹. This strategy also works on a strategic level, protecting what are named as the strategic priorities of the U.S. in the region in case of conflict⁷². Therefore, integration constitutes the main goal of the U.S. forces on the Asia-Pacific region, as its main fear towards China is no longer a symmetrical fight matched through military modernisation, but “their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options”, as former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates admitted⁷³.

The hegemon’s concerns do not focus specially on a direct attack against the United States mainland, but to its allies, most of them located on the A2/AD potential area. Moreover, in the Chinese view, this alliance system, which seems to be strengthening with the resurgence of U.S. Pacific Century, is considered as a strong sign of containment against the rise of China⁷⁴. Some of the United States’ strong ties in the area touch sensible territories for China. In addition to the special relationship with Taiwan⁷⁵, the ties between Japan and the United States are worrisome for China.

⁶⁹ As Montgomery notes, these strategies had been used before by the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries, by Germany against the British before WWI or in the Soviets’ plan to attack the United States’ European allies during the Cold War. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

⁷⁰ UNITED STATES AIR-SEA BATTLE OFFICE, “Air-Sea Battle Service Collaboration.. *op. cit.*”, p. 4.

⁷¹ VAN TOL, J., M. GUNZINGER, A. KREPINEVICH and J. THOMAS, “AirSea Battle. A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept”, Washington, *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)*, 2010, p. 10.

⁷² These priorities include defending national territory and bases, defend key allies, protect United States’ and allies’ maritime trade while interdicting Chinese trade and neutralising or even defeating Chinese military forces. *Ibid.*, p. 10. Some of these strategies have also been studied individually, as the possibility of imposing a peripheral naval blockade to China’s trade, but its development out of a joint strategy appears at least difficult to achieve. *Vid.* MIRSKI, S., “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct, and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 36, n° 3, 2013, pp. 385-421; MONTGOMERY, E. B., “Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirksi,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 36, n° 4, 2013, pp. 615-623.

⁷³ GATES, R., “Speech at the Air Force Association Convention”, National Harbor, 16th September 2009, <<http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1379>> [9th August 2016].

⁷⁴ LIFF, A. P. and G. J. IKENBERRY, “Racing toward Tragedy?... *op. cit.*”, p. 66.

⁷⁵ Even if the United States, officially, “does not support the independence of Taiwan”, the Department of State declares its commitment to assist Taiwan in the maintenance of its defensive capabilities.

Along with the territorial disputes with Japan concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the rising China still maintains cautious relations with this country due to past rivalries, specially the invasion of Manchuria in the context of the WWII. Moreover, the rise of China has coincided with a Japanese relative decline economically and politically, and this regional power transition has increased tensions. The Japanese decision to allow its army to operate overseas after a 70 years ban⁷⁶ can be seen as a measure to contain China as well as a response to unofficial U.S. claims to an active engagement from Asian allies. The role of Japan in the U.S.-China relations cannot be undermined as, for example, any Chinese action in the Senkaku/Diaoyu considered by the Japanese as an aggression may involve a U.S. engagement in the dispute, due to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty⁷⁷.

The territorial disputes of the South China Sea islands are a second issue of potential conflict. Even if in this case, the issue does not involve any of the first range U.S. allies in the region⁷⁸, the hegemon's concerns are based on two principles considered priorities in its foreign relations: fostering the stability of the region and assuring the freedom of navigation in the area. Therefore, any attempt on the Chinese side to unilaterally occupy or exploit the islands could foster a U.S. further movement, but a cold conflict as the present one is unlikely to push the hegemon to take a stronger position.

Despite the important points of friction in the area, as well as the confronting strategies of both states, the mutual economic interests serve as a restraint of military conflict. Even if reciprocal suspicions among both states are at play with their identification as potential military rivals, the complexity of the politics in the Asia-Pacific call for cooperation.

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, "U.S. Relations with Taiwan. Fact Sheet", U.S. Department of State, Washington, 12th February 2015, < <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm>> [10th August 2016].

⁷⁶ BBC NEWS, "Japan to allow military role overseas in historic move", Tokyo, 18th September 2015, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34287362>> [10th August 2016].

⁷⁷ The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty states that "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes". JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, 19th January, 1960, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html> [10th August 2016]. As the Senkaku/Diaoyu are considered national territory for Japan, this agreement extends to the protection of these islands. On the complexity of the China-Japan relations and the influence on the United States, see BUSH, R. C., *The Perils of Proximity. China-Japan Security Relations*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

⁷⁸ As Washington priorities suggest, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea can be considered as prior allies in the Asia-Pacific. Even if Taiwan is also involved in some of the South China Sea disputes claims, these can be seen as rooted in Taiwan's claims as the legitimate government of China. Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam, as well as China, are the more active participants in the dispute.

CHAPTER 7

THE CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL HEGEMONIC ORDER. INSTITUTIONAL REPRODUCTION, ACCOMMODATION AND CONTESTATION

The architecture of the institutional order and its relation with power over different cultures has been an issue of study of IR from different theoretical traditions. Therefore, the multiplication of international institutions in all their forms after WWII has constituted a paradigmatic and broad case study. Even realists, who have claimed that institutions merely reflect the distribution of material power, have studied the articulation of United States' material primacy through an institutional order¹. Other traditions have crossed the boundaries of materialism to explore the role of regimes as independent actors, instruments of the exercise of material power or tools of legitimation.

Undeniably, the institutional order is highly influenced by a dominant narrative of the international society produced and reproduced by the great power(s). However, the evolution of these organisations develops several fields of internal contestation

¹ *Vid.* GRIECO, J. M., "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation... *op. cit.*"; MEARSHEIMER, J. J., "The False Promise... *op. cit.*"; SNIDAL, D., "Relative Gains and the Pattern... *op. cit.*".

that alter the reproduction of this hegemonic narrative. In the case of changing material and social power dynamics, institutions become interesting grounds of collision between the prevalent hegemonic dynamics of the dominant state and the growing alternative approaches to international politics. At some point, the hegemon, seeking to bind the hegemonic hierarchy and gain legitimacy, has to face a rising state's push for status, accommodation and/or contestation.

The present chapter will address the institutional order in a practical way by linking the historical development of this order with a constructivist/English School framework. An understanding of hegemony as something more complex than pure primacy rests, on its first part, on institutional order. The chapter will firstly address the complementation between hegemony and institutions, highlighting the link between the primary institutions of the international society and the international regimes that derive from them. In a second part, the chapter will focus on the current institutional order through the participation of the United States and China in three selected institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Group of 20 (G20). Through this analysis, dynamics of socialisation, legitimation and contestation will be identified. Finally, on a third part, the chapter will analyse the external contestation to this order through Chinese attempts to build an alternative institutional order.

7.1. The contemporary liberal institutional order. An international society perspective

The contemporary institutional order, inheritor of the power disparities derived from WWII and consolidated in the Cold War, is profoundly influenced by its two main defining characteristics: its hegemonic and liberal nature. Firstly, this order is hegemonic, as it was created by the United States to serve its interests and lock its prominent position within international society. Understanding hegemony as a practice that confers "special rights and responsibilities" to this leading state², the institutionalisation provides an opportunity to reproduce and secure this privileged position, as well as decentralise the exercise of power. These special responsibilities that in practice constitute a hierarchy cannot be understood without the normative and institutional architecture³. Secondly, the U.S. liberal identity permeates and reproduces on

² CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 149.

³ CLARK, I. and C. REUS-SMIT, "Liberal internationalism, the practice of special responsibilities and evolving politics of the Security Council", *International Politics*, Vol. 50, n° 1, 2013, pp. 38 and 41; BUKOVANSKI, M. et al., *Special Responsibilities... op. cit.*, p. 13. The authors define special responsibilities as "a differentiated set of obligations, the allocation of which is collectively agreed" that "provide a principle of social differentiation for managing collective problems in a world characterised by both formal equality and inequality of material capability". *Ibid.*, p. 16.

the institutions founded on liberal values as capitalism, free trade or globalisation. The successful reproduction of these values, along with a stable international society and the end of the Cold War, has underpinned global capitalism as a universal value, to the extent that it now constitutes the main source of consent among great powers⁴.

The realist tradition has portrayed institutions as mere reflections of the distribution of material power within the system. With the presence of hegemony, for this tradition, institutionalisation has the purpose of softening the effects of the self-preservation practices of the hegemon⁵. Liberals have positioned themselves against this logic, defending that, even if power plays an important role, institutions have their own logics and become more independent. Although these analyses differ, they share a similar understanding of hegemony as a material phenomenon⁶. However, defining hegemony as purely material (at least at its base) blurs its normative and cultural nature that gains recognition and legitimacy among the rest of the members of the international society. These social components of hegemony bestow the order, and not the actor, with recognition and transform hegemony in a legitimate social agreement within international society⁷.

As Cox manifests, hegemony is linked to a certain proposal of order that the actor wants to lead⁸. In a context of break of the previous order, e.g. after major wars, the opportunity to succeed on the realisation of this proposal raises, because the correlation of material power changes and the principles of order and legitimacy are changing⁹. At this point, the end of WWII provided the best seeds for the growth of an institutionalised hegemonic order, after the futile attempts after the WWI. This time, the United States was committed to a certain type of leadership that, due to the exclusive identities with the Soviet Union, involved an important commitment with Europe. The alignment of the Western states with the U.S. gave the definitive push to the institutional order that it was proposing.

Definitely, the contemporary international society mixes pluralist and solidarist characteristics. According to Buzan's distinction, a solidarist international society has a more developed and broad norms, rules and institutions looking for cooperation and not only for coexistence, which is mainly a pluralists aim. The multiplication of issues of cooperation does not only include those searching for common gains, but

⁴ CUI, S. and B. BUZAN, "Great Power Management... *op. cit.*", p. 191.

⁵ SNYDER, Q. Z., "Integrating rising powers: liberal systemic theory and the mechanism of competition", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 39, n° 1, 2013, p. 214.

⁶ For example, Keohane and Nye define hegemony as a situation in which "one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so". KEOHANE, R. O. y J. S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence...* *op. cit.*, p. 44. This definition, as Keohane explains, reunites the realist notion of power as material preponderance and a category that the author names as "state decisions" that stand between power capabilities and outcomes. KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony...* *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁷ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society...* *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁸ COX, R. W., *Approaches to World Order...* *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁹ CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in the International Society...* *op. cit.*, p. 8; IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory...* *op. cit.*, p. 3.

also others that seek the achievement of shared values¹⁰. In many ways, the post-1945 evolving international society was highly characterised by its pluralism, resulting in coexistence institutions. But, with the end of the Cold War and the growing power of the Western states, new norms have reflected a shift towards a solidarist character. Pretended universalism has generated new concepts and issues, such as environmental or human rights, as well as non-traditional security¹¹, developing a mixed solidarist-pluralist international society with clear universalist pretensions.

However, these solidarist elements of the society, that lie in the founding nature of secondary institutions, generate tensions between those states who share the hegemon's preferred narratives and values and those who contest them. This contestation suggests, as Buzan argues, that in the event of a collapse of Western hegemony, the pluralist elements of this society will mostly remain, but solidarist components will probably change, evolve or even reduce to more regional or transnational domains¹². Therefore, understanding the dynamics beneath the creation of the order as well as the identities, values and interests it reflects shows the main lines that guide many international organisations.

7.1.1. The global character of the order and the international organisations. Primary and secondary institutions of the international society

The recent theorisation of hegemony within the international society approach is highly linked to international organisations. In the traditional understanding of international society, Bull identified five primary institutions (balance of power, great powers, diplomacy, war and international law) that serve different functions in a non-hegemonic international society¹³. However, in situations of hegemony as the actual one, Clark proposes the inclusion of hegemony as one of these primary institutions. This proposal is backed by the argument that in these situations of hegemony, the leading state's primacy transforms the institution of great powers. The institution of great powers is based in two types of norms: a horizontal concert between the great powers and a vertical hierarchy between the great powers and the rest of the international society. Under hegemony, this horizontal concert disappears and the hegemon

¹⁰ BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, pp. xvii-xviii.

¹¹ CUI, S. and B. BUZAN, "Great Power Management... op. cit.", p. 203.

¹² BUZAN, B., *An Introduction to the English School... op. cit.*, p. 177.

¹³ Although Bull's proposal constitutes the central point among which main discussions on primary institutions depart, Buzan extends "the classical Westphalian set" to seven institutions, by adding sovereignty and territoriality to Bull's proposal. Moreover, he suggests that this set could be extended by the addition of nationalism, human equality and/or market. BUZAN, B., *An Introduction to the English School... op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

enjoys a prevalent position in the vertical hierarchy¹⁴. This change is mainly articulated through the institutional order of the international society, and specially in key security, economic and financial institutions. However, in the heart of several regimes and organisations, this horizontal concert is still reproduced, as it happens on different degrees in the United Nations Security Council (the five permanent members), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (the quota of industrialised Western states and Japan) or more informal regimes as the environmental ones. But this horizontal concert is subsumed to the hierarchical vertical concert, where the hegemon stands above other great powers and can make itself prevail.

However, Buzan suggest that it was the institution of balance of power, and not great powers, the one who suffered more with U.S. prevalence. The new hegemon took advantage of the managerial role of great powers to claim its privileges, but the events after the 9/11 and the turn to unilateralism vividly resurged the ashes of pure material primacy. The movement was so extreme that some even suggested that the hegemon was approaching to the limits of international society¹⁵. Buzan and Albert deny the disappearance of the institution of great powers that, according to their classification of primary institutions by its functional role, shares the same category as hegemony, both as stratificatory institutions¹⁶. At the same time, Buzan defends the dynamism of the institutional map, admitting that “there can be no fixed set of primary institutions (or sectors, or function systems) because they are emergent from the complex processes of human society”¹⁷.

Anyway, the point made by Clark works both at the level of primary and secondary institutions. On the one hand, the author highlights the rise of hegemony as a primary institution and, on the other, the creation and socialisation of several secondary institutions or organisations¹⁸. This primary institution, in complementation with the others, is the real source of order¹⁹ while international organisations play an operational function and are the expression of a certain hegemonic strategy. Even if the institutional web is a tool of legitimation of U.S. leadership, it is the primary institution what provides the key legitimacy and guides the main principles of the order.

Constructivist developments on institutions complement English School's. Reus-Smit defends that what he names as “the constitutive hierarchy of modern inter-

¹⁴ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 48; CLARK, I., “Towards an English School Theory... op. cit.”, pp. 205, 220 and 222.

¹⁵ DUNNE, T., “Society and Hierarchy... op. cit.”, p. 314; LASMAR, J., “Managing great powers in the post-Cold War world: old rules new game? The case of the global war on terror”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 28, n° 3, 2015, p. 407.

¹⁶ BUZAN, B. and M. ALBERT, “Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 16, n° 2, 2010, pp. 315-337; BUZAN, B. and M. ALBERT, “Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42, n° 4-5, 2011, pp. 413-425.

¹⁷ BUZAN, B., *An Introduction to the English School... op. cit.*, p. 175.

¹⁸ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

¹⁹ BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society... op. cit.*, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

national institutions” is primarily defined by the constitutional structures of this society. These structures are the metavalues that define what is considered as legitimate statehood and rightful state action. Fundamental institutions (multilateralism or international law, for example) are derivative from these metavalues and constitute the elementary rules to alleviate coordination and collaboration problems derived from anarchy. Finally, these fundamental institutions translate themselves practically as issue specific regimes or international organisations²⁰.

This notion can be considered as complementary to the English School one, even if the concepts of fundamental institutions and primary institutions are not totally comparable. However, Reus-Smit’s understanding can be complemented with recent pushes towards a broadening of the complex of primary institutions. Nowadays, English School scholars have broadened Bull’s classification and completed it with master institutions as the market or the equality of people²¹. Moreover, Buzan suggests distinguishing between master and derivative primary institutions, a contrast that could also be made on Reus-Smit’s proposal.

This classification is helpful on clarifying the origins of each organisation, as well as its dependence in the hegemon’s leading role. It is possible to argue that institutions that are highly dependent on the institution of hegemony (or great power management, in Buzan’s understanding) will suffer more the decline of the hegemon. In this vein, the NATO could be defined as the most hegemony-dependent institution, while UNSC and G20 having more autonomous behaviour. Moreover, in the case of the UNSC, the managerial role of great powers still prevails, as it will be addressed in the practical analysis.

²⁰ REUS-SMIT, C., “The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions”, *International Organisation*, Vol. 51, n° 4, 1997, pp. 557-558.

²¹ A complete overview of the evolution of the candidates for primary institutions can be found at BUZAN, B., *An Introduction to the English School... op. cit.*, pp. 182-187.

Figure 13. Buzan's classification of primary and secondary institutions. Analysed secondary institutions have been shaded. Source: BUZAN, B., *From International to World Society... op. cit.*, p. 187.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY		
Primary Institutions		Secondary Institutions
Master	Derivative	
Sovereignty	Non-Intervention	UN General Assembly
	International Law	Most regimes
Territoriality	Boundaries	Some Peacekeeping ops.
Diplomacy	Bilateralism	Embassies
	Multilateralism	UN Conferences, G20
Great Power Management (Buzan) Hegemony (Clark)	Alliances	NATO, G20
	War	UNSC
	Balance of Power	
Equality of People	Human Rights	UNHRP
	Humanitarian Intervention	
Market	Trade liberalisation	GATT, WTO
	Financial Liberalisation	IMF, WB, G20
	Hegemonic Stability	G20
Nationalism	Self-determination	Some Peacekeeping ops.
	Popular sovereignty	
	Democracy	
Environmental stewardship	Species Survival	UNFCCC
	Climate Stability	Kyoto protocol

7.1.2. Institutional order and hegemony. The rise and legitimation of a dominant narrative

The post-1945 international order has been usually defined as constitutional, characterised by its multilateralism, reciprocity, legitimacy and high institutionalisation²². This order has not just served the goals of fostering cooperation and trust, but has also served as a “mechanism of political control” for the United States to restraint its power in a form that attracts other states towards an established set of relations that reinforce its hierarchical role²³.

As Keohane and Nye rightly expressed, hegemonic states usually opt to transform international norms and institutions instead of adapting their own policies to the existing international environment²⁴. Norms and institutions emerge as sources of consensual order derived from different interrelated dynamics. It can be argued that some norms and institutions emanate directly from critical changes that highlight the necessity of an institutional action, as environmental policies, for example. However, the hard corpus of contemporary institutional map derives from a given distribution of power within the system, in this case a hierarchical one. Undeniably, the hegemon’s normative and institutional preferences are not only a result of national policy calculations, but also influenced by subnational groups, elites and, to a lesser extent, imitation²⁵.

In the case of a hegemonic institutional order as the present one, the analysis needs to be focused on how the post-1945 distribution of power translated into a constitutional order and how did the United States influence its nature. Moreover, it should also be addressed how the regimes and organisations interact with hegemony and, also, what will be their future in the case of decline or diffusion of the hegemon’s power.

The creation of a certain pattern of order after a major war is directly influenced by the goals that the preponderant actor wants to achieve. In the case of the United States, its postwar project was marked by three global strategies that served national purposes: the construction and diffusion of a global capitalist system; the creation of both global and regional collective security systems and, finally, the strengthening of

²² IKENBERRY, G. J., *Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition... op. cit.*, pp. 130-131; IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, p. 20.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

²⁴ KEOHANE, R. O. y J. S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence... op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁵ This argument derives from Kacowicz enumeration of the reasons of norms’ emergence. Concretely, the author considers that norms emerge as: (1) responses to critical changes in the international environment; (2) results of imitation and emulation; (3) creations through international processes stimulated by subnational groups; (4) outcomes of a given distribution of power in the system; (5) derivations from the prominence of a potential rule or from the coherence between the role and a normative order; and (6) results of the action of moral (normative) entrepreneurs. KACOWICZ, A. M., *The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881-2001*, Indiana, University of Notre Dame, 2005, p. 28.

the international trade regime²⁶. The creation of an institutional web and a normative framework is considered as the main public good provided by the hegemon, along with the achievement of these three goals. However, the main achievement for the United States has been the socialisation of these national goals (as long as it has been the main beneficiary) into international society's.

The pre-institutional order, just after the WWII, was inaugurated with the peace agreements that positioned great powers in the top of the hierarchy. Even if United States' material primacy was undeniable, with a strong economy and the possession of the nuclear weapons, the special responsibilities were given to the allied great powers (United States, France, United Kingdom and Soviet Union). However, this great power concert was marked by a strong mistrust and a growing ideological bipolarity.

The United States' project of institutional order took advantage of its prominent position and its alliance with Western powers to build an order highly influenced by its identity. The identity of the United States as a liberal democracy permeated in the nature of the institutional order, not only institutionally in form of rules but also rhetorically. Moreover, international institutions and regimes directly served and established the goals that the U.S. was pursuing. Therefore, the hegemon achieved the establishment of a global capitalist system based on the Bretton Woods agreements (especially, the gold-dollar standard and institutions like the IMF and the WB), along with a trade hierarchy through the WTO and GATT and alliances like NATO and several bilateral agreements that established collective security systems.

Undeniably, the United States has used the institutional order in different ways. However, it is possible to argue that in the afterwards of WWII, it pursued two main goals through this order-building strategies. On the one hand, it wanted to legitimate and socialise its exercise of power. Through institutions, the hegemon was capable to bind other states (even weaker ones) by restraining its power through several normative and institutional corpuses. On the other hand, institutions constitute a significant tool to establish a hegemonic narrative within the international society, based on a certain identities, values and interest. This way, the hegemon transformed its national issues into global.

The building of the institutional order has, as Ikenberry called it, a constitutional nature²⁷. Even if the hegemon is at the top of the order, it is limited by the institutions and norms, and stability is provided not (only) by its preponderance, but by the limits on the returns to power²⁸. The successful establishing of this order has three main pillars²⁹. First, the existing shared agreement over the principles and rules of

²⁶ MUCHIE, M. and LI X., "The Myths and Realities of the Rising Powers. Is China a Threat to the Existing World Order?" in LI X. (ed.), *The Rise of China and the Capitalist World Order*, New York, Routledge, 2010, p. 53.

²⁷ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

order. It can be said that this afterwar consensus legitimised the principles of hierarchy, embedded in the dual one-four scale of special responsibilities, with the United States at the top with the U.K., France, the Soviet Union and latter China in a secondary scale. Secondly, the institutional order constrains and limits the exercise of power, obliging the hegemon to act within a specific institutional framework of its making that gains a grade of autonomy. However, the argument of institutional constraints has been contested, both theoretically and practically. On the one hand, theorists have pointed that it is not a constraint, but an instrument to maintain a favourable multilateral reputation that has been inoperative in the case of the hegemon's security policies³⁰. On the other, in the practical domain, the U.S. unilateral action on Iraq out of the institutional frame constituted a clear defeat to the constitutional order. Finally, the third pillar of the constitutional order is the wider political system in which is embedded, where struggles over principles happen.

However, a notion of the institutional order as constitutional may blur the effects of this order on the rest of the international society. Even if there exists a certain grade of consent about the principles that constitute the order, when these principles are put into practice they do not simply regulate state behaviour and incentivate a certain pattern of policies. Moreover, they serve as constitutive patterns of behaviour for states and other actors and define their identities³¹. This is not the only outcome that the hegemon extracts from the order. Despite creating and sustaining a favourable environment for cooperation, through strengthened informational channels that promote trust, institutions also serve as instruments of reward. A way of reward is, for example, a promotion on the status, locking it on a hierarchy of benefits that maintains the U.S. on top. In addition, institutions offer a "laundry service" by legitimating individual policies and, consequently, the core institutions of international society³².

In a context of changing power dynamics as the contemporary one, the institutional order becomes one of the main arenas of contestation and response. Even China has not stated a clear position towards the order, showing several signs of contestation combined with instrumental accommodation. The role that the rising power decides to play is also vital. In Schweller and Pu's opinion, emerging states have to choose between being supporters (assuming the share of responsibilities and the co-managing of the order), spoilers (the ones who want to destroy the existing order and replace it), and shirkers (who want the privileges of power but do not want to play an active role in global governance)³³. In the case of China, the notion of rightful resis-

³⁰ BROOKS, S.G. y W. C. WOHLFORTH, *World out of Balance... op. cit.*, p. 149.

³¹ KATZENSTEIN, P. J., *The Culture of National Security... op. cit.*, p. 22; WENDT, A. and R. DUVALL, "Institutions and International Order... *op. cit.*", p. 60; REUS-SMIT, C., "The Constitutional Structure of International Society... *op. cit.*", p. 561.

³² CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 166-167. As Clark explains, referring to the United Nations Security Council, this laundry service sustains "the myth about the fundamental principles of organisation of international society itself". *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³³ SCHWELLER, R. L. y PU X., "After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*", p. 42.

tance coined by the authors is especially accurate. According to the definition, the emerging state may accommodate itself on the short term and, on a longer one, when it holds an expanded economic and military power and a greater influence, it will confront the existing order and build an alternative one³⁴. In the English School terminology, after a growing involvement in the current order, the rising power will aim to build an alternative hegemonic institution according to its interest, values and identity that may eventually gain the legitimacy of the rest of the international society³⁵.

Therefore, the rise of China has challenged the existing order, and the country itself has debated between accommodation and confrontation. On the one hand, China chooses to accommodate to foster its national growth and, once achieved, institutional status is easier to obtain. On the other hand, and simultaneously, China pushes for a growing deslegitimation of U.S hegemony, denouncing its unilateralism, looking for an expanding role in emerging countries and fostering the creation of new international organisations³⁶. Moreover, China has been expanding its involvement on international organisations and diplomatic relations to improve its power projection, gaining more influence, transforming the agenda, and, more importantly, expanding its influence in defining and socialising the main norms ruling international affairs³⁷.

It can be argued that contestation to the existing order could be articulated in two domains: internally in the regimes and organisations, or external to this regime architecture. Usually, both strategies are developed together simultaneously to reinforce the contestation rhetoric. In the internal domains, contestation strategies generate less conflict, because the hierarchy of power owes the capacity to silence, deslegitimate or even omit them. Three strategies can be identified; firstly, discursive contestation, which is a recurrent strategy in the case of middle and small powers. Secondly, this contestation is sometimes channelled through pushes for internal reform in institutions, as it happens in the case of emerging powers in multilateral forums³⁸. Finally, the more intense form of contestation within institutions is polarisation that implies the formation of blocks, as it happened prior to the Iraq war.

This internal contestation sometimes derives on action from the outside of the regime architecture. Greatest contestation generates growing disparities and mistrust in the cooperation environment and complicates the achievement of consensus on global issues. Moreover, if a rising power is not satisfied, it tries to build an alternative

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³⁵ CLARK, I., "China and the United States... *op. cit.*", p. 28; PINTADO, M., "Reformulaciones teóricas en torno a la emergencia de China... *op. cit.*", p. 13.

³⁶ SCHWELLER, R. L. y PU X., "After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*", p. 53.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54-56.

³⁸ In the case of India, for example, these calls for reform have had a moderate success on its calls to redesign the "Bretton Woods architecture", an experience that demonstrates that these tasks are better channelled through coalitions like the BRICS. EFSTATHOPOULOS, C., "India and global governance: The politics of ambivalent reform", *International Politics*, Vol. 53, nº 2, 2016, pp. 254.

institutional order, socialise it among other members of the international society and try to address its own goals that sometimes overlap the hegemon's.

In cases of contestation, the international order usually evolves in three distinctive ways. The first possibility is the continuation of the existing order with the status quo power resisting to accommodate the rising requests of emerging powers. This attitude will inevitably lead to more contestation, both internally and externally. Secondly, the emerging powers could recognise their inability to accommodate in the present order and decide to shape it from new alternative institutions that they construct and slowly integrate allies. In this case, established powers would resist to this new architecture and would push their allies not to collaborate. Finally, the third possibility involves coevolution and coexistence of both parts, working together on global governance³⁹.

However, this contestation dynamics can and should be alleviated through dynamics of accommodation towards rising powers. As Bukovansky addresses, even social theories on the discipline should be aware that the socialisation processes are not a one-way practice. In the process, both the hegemon and the rising power are transformed, as well as the institutional order and the international society where both interact⁴⁰. This bestows "moral responsibility" both on the hegemon and the aspiring power, that have to identify common ideas to develop practices of accommodation, admitting that institutions alone cannot automatically accommodate the changes in international society⁴¹. In the case of the transition between the United Kingdom and the United States, these common ideas were based on a shared vision of liberalism both in politics and economics, and the transition was nearly automatic due to the growing leadership that the U.S. acquired after the economic crack of 1929.

The practice shows that the relationship between the U.S. and China is not so easy to accommodate. The Obama administration, both with Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao, has managed to constitute a growing agenda of issues where both great powers understand that their bilateral cooperation is vital (environmental sustainability, terrorism or economics and finance) and, as a consequence, gradual changes have been introduced on key institutions, with the consent of the U.S, as it will be addressed in the next section.

³⁹ MUCHIE, M. and LI X., "The Myths and Realities of the Rising Powers... *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁴⁰ BUKOVANSKY, M., "The responsibility to accommodate. Ideas and change" in T. V. PAUL (ed.), *Accommodating Rising Powers. Past, Present, and Future*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 88. The bilaterally transformative process of accommodation resembles the one proposed by Hurd to illustrate the relationship between the international structure and individual actors. HURD, I., *After Anarchy... op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁴¹ BUKOVANSKY, M., "The responsibility to accommodate... *op. cit.*, p. 87.

7.2. Institutional order in practice. The struggle between United States' hegemonic narrative and Chinese contestation

The practice of the institutional order constitutes an important arena of socialisation and contestation of the hegemonic narrative. International regimes or organisations are based on primary institutions and shared metavalues that hold a high level of consent within the members of international society. However, the autonomy that regimes gain with practice gives rise to confronting narratives and strategies, as well as growing calls for transforming the share of power and the distribution of votes within the organisations. The rules that govern international institutions, such as voting systems or veto power, constitute the institutionalisation of certain power relations and the hierarchies and alliances beneath them⁴². For the purpose of offering a broad study, the present chapter will analyse three distinct organisations.

The first institution will be the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), considered as the expression of great power management in international society. The analysis of the Council addresses the aim of this chapter in two different ways. Firstly, it witnesses the struggle between two primary institutions (great power management and hegemony) and unfolds how United States' rhetoric and practice subsumes the rest of the great powers under its hierarchy. Secondly, the Council is one of the main arenas in which rising powers try to contest United States' hegemony internally, both through the opposition to its narrative and actions, and also by pushing for reform.

The second institution analysed will be the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created under the Bretton Woods agreements and recently reformed to adapt its internal power distribution to the changing international society. The interest of this organisation lies in its importance on economic governance, but also serves as an example of a recently reformed organisation that has partially recognised China's current role. Even if the IMF is not the easiest institution to reform⁴³, its recent changes have not only transformed the institution, but also China's accommodation within the system. The reforms do not just imply changes on the distribution of power within the organisation, but also on the conditionality of the loans and the credit mechanisms⁴⁴.

Finally, the third institution will be the Group of 20 (G20), the most recently created institution, in 2008, as a response to traditional Western powers' inability to address the global economic crisis. Moreover, the G20 has encouraged cooperation between the U.S. and China in key international issues (economic governance or cli-

⁴² SLAUGHTER, A.-M. and T. HALE, "Transgovernmental Networks and Emerging Powers" in A. S. ALEXANDROFF and A. F. COOPER (eds.), *Rising States, Rising Institutions. Challenges for Global Governance*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 58.

⁴³ Within the ones analysed, the UNSC can be targeted as the more reluctant to reform and the G20-like institutions as the easiest to reform, with the IMF as the middle-ground one

⁴⁴ LÓPEZ-JACOISTE, M. E., *El Banco Mundial, el Fondo Monetario Internacional y los Derechos Humanos*, Pamplona, Gobierno de Navarra, 2013, pp. 53 and 55.

mate change) to the extent that they have reached important agreements prior to global summits to foster consensus. Although the G8 is still an important forum, this new organisation has gained legitimacy as an institution whose members are equal and represents both traditional and rising powers.

7.2.1. *United Nations Security Council. Hegemonic hierarchy and great power management*

The United Nations Security Council constitutes “the most powerful international institution in the history of the nation-state system”, both in its goals as a guarantor of global peace and security and also in the members it reunites, the five great powers⁴⁵. Strongly embedded on the structures of international society by its symbolic power and bestowed with international authority, it seems reasonable to argue that the present U.S. hegemony expresses itself within the UNSC⁴⁶.

However, two important questions derive from these notions. Firstly, it is possible to question the extent of United States’ hegemonic role within the Security Council. Even if the five permanent members hold legally the same rights according to the chapter, in practice the distinctness of U.S. behaviour suggest a hierarchical role. The Council is one of the main important pieces of United States’ “liberal internationalist hegemony”⁴⁷. As Finnemore expresses, the institutionalisation of power changes the social power structure and diffuses the hegemon’s power, therefore creating alternatives to the unipole⁴⁸ and possibly that is the reason why is difficult to establish a direct relation between hegemony and this organisation.

It is possible to argue that U.S. hegemony plays a double role in relation of the UNSC. On the one hand, it is part of the collective coalitional hegemony led by the great powers towards the rest of international society, bestowed in the P-5. On the other hand, the U.S. is the singular coalitional hegemon on the three-level hierarchy,

⁴⁵ CRONIN, B and I. HURD, “Introduction”, in B. CRONIN and I. HURD (eds.), *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 3.

⁴⁶ HURD, I., “Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council”, *Global Governance*, Vol. 8, n° 1, 2002, p. 39; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 149. Cronin and Hurd define authority as “a relation among actors within a hierarchy in which one group is recognised as having both the right and the competence to make binding decisions for the rest of the community”. CRONIN, B and I. HURD, “Introduction... op. cit.”, p. 6. On the same vein, Finnemore also defines authority in a similar way: “authority is the ability of one actor to induce deference from another. (...) Authority must be conferred or recognised by others. Consequently, institutionalising power in authority structures necessarily involves some diffusion of that power”. FINNEMORE, M., “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure... op. cit.”, p. 69.

⁴⁷ PUCHALA, D. J., “World Hegemony and the United Nations”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7, n° 4, 2005, p. 571.

⁴⁸ FINNEMORE, M., “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure... op. cit.”, p. 69 and 72.

with the U.S. on top, followed by the other great powers and with the rest of the states beneath them⁴⁹.

The second question regards the constraints that the Security Council exert over the United States' hegemony and whether these constraints could be used by other powers to erode hegemony. The veto power makes, in Kirsh opinion, inoperative the Council's constraint action. However, as the Resolution 1441 (2002)⁵⁰ and the following events demonstrated, even if the Council is not capable of stopping the unipole's actions when it decides to go alone, its reluctance to legitimate the actions in Iraq did have a cost on the hegemon.

As it has been previously expressed, the constraints imposed by the UNSC are practically inoperative for the five permanent members. On the same vein, the great powers have the ability to act at its own or in coalitions, outside the mandate of the Council. However, great powers usually recur to the Council in cases of willingness to act militarily, under the legal authority bestowed by the chapter 7 of the charter, even if they do not have any guarantees of success of their position and that this decision usually delays the process.

As Clark informally expresses, the great powers resort to the Council to take advantage of its "laundry service" that legitimates individual state policies⁵¹. Moreover, the approval of the Council assures a burden and risk sharing, reduces the threat perceptions among home and abroad citizens and pushes the continuity of cooperation⁵². However, when states fail to obtain the approval of the Council for their actions, great powers can decide to act unilaterally outside the mandate of international law.

Two important historical resolutions illustrate the opposition or omission of the UNSC to legalise the unipole's use of force on Iraq⁵³. Specifically, they did not oppose to U.S. action, but they stopped a step before U.S. wills and pushed the unipole to act alone. It also evidenced the fracture between the United States' understanding and defence of the use of force that fractured the Western block⁵⁴. The Security Council non-legalisation of the invasion of Iraq raised international concern in three different ways. Firstly, it was defined as a source of internal contestation in the form of "soft

⁴⁹ This distinction is based on Clark's ideal types of hegemony. *Vid.* pp. 61 and 150.

⁵⁰ UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1441 (2002)*, New York, 8th November 2002, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1441%282002%29> [19th October 2016].

⁵¹ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.

⁵² VOETEN, E., "Delegation and the nature of Security Council Authority", in B. CRONIN and I. HURD (eds.), *The UN Security Council... op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁵³ UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1441 (2002)... op. cit.*; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1483 (2003)*, New York, 22nd May 2003, <<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement>> [19th October 2016].

⁵⁴ As Glennon argues, the notion of the use of force does not only generate divergences between the West and the rest of international society, but also between the hegemon and the Western block. GLENNON, M. J., "The UN Security Council in a Unipolar World", *Virginian Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44, 2003/2004, p. 97.

balancing” to “delay, frustrate, and undermine” U.S. military intervention through institutions, among other means⁵⁵. However, the ambiguity of the resolution led to a corruption of the text by the U.S. and the U.K., practically defusing the soft balancing practice⁵⁶. States opposed to intervention, even if they did not authorise the legislation of the use of force, could not even block it, as the draft was withdrawn by the U.S., U.K. and Spain. They were also unable to stop the intervention, therefore having an inoperative constraint. As Voeten explains, the U.S. holds the greater bunch of options outside the mandate of the UNSC. These outside options, ending with a credible threat of intervention, usually serve as pressures among other permanent members to cooperate or at least not to veto several issues, so as to avoid a non controlled action outside the UN mandate. Therefore, the presence of outside options and the United States’ capacity to activate them reduces the equality and leverage of veto power and increases U.S. ability to lock other states in multilateral compromises in its favour⁵⁷.

Secondly, the inability of the United States to take advantage of the “laundry service” of the Council raised the costs of the conflict and, for some analysts, generated a crisis of legitimacy⁵⁸. These crises occur when “the level of social recognition that its identity, interests, practices, norms or procedures are rightful declines to the point where it must either adapt (...) or face disempowerment”⁵⁹. Even if the events following the Resolution 1441 (2002) showed an absence of compliance with U.S. ac-

⁵⁵ Pape defines soft balancing as “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements has already been a prominent feature of the international opposition to the U.S. war against Iraq”. PAPE, R. A., “Soft Balancing... *op. cit.*”, p. 10. On the same vein, Paul links explicitly the concept with waltzian theory. “Soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms build-up, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening”. PAUL, T. V., “Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power... *op. cit.*”, p. 3. However, Pape’s definition is more accurate to describe the soft-balancing strategies defined in this case.

⁵⁶ The main point of controversy over the Resolution 1441 (2002) regards its threat of “serious consequences” if Iraq failed to meet its disarmament obligations. For the U.S. and the U.K., this phrase constitutes an automatic authorisation to the use of force, while opposing states defended the need of a second resolution to activate expressly the article 42 that involved the use of force. COCKAINE, J. and D. M. MALONE, “The Security Council and the 1991 and 2003 Wars in Iraq” in V. LOWE et al. (eds.), *The United Nations Security Council and War. The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 398. For a deeper legalist analysis of the resolution, see BYERS, M., “Agreeing to Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and Intentional Ambiguity”, *Global Governance*, Vol. 10, n° 2, 2004, pp. 165-186.

⁵⁷ VOETEN, E., “Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, n° 4, 2001, pp. 845, 848 and 850-851; VOETEN, E., “Delegation and the nature of the Security Council... *op. cit.*”, p. 50.

⁵⁸ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 151. Issues of legitimacy will be broadly discussed in Chapter 9.

⁵⁹ REUS SMIT, C., “International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*”, p. 157.

tion in Iraq among important actors of international society, it is also true that the hegemon carried on with its practice and later achieved the Council's recognition of the Coalition it led as a Provisional Authority with a central role on Iraq's political and constitutional reconstruction⁶⁰. Moreover, Hurd frames the war on Iraq on a wider strategy of the United States towards norms, especially those involving pre-emption. For the author, this behaviour should not be portrayed as a crisis of legitimacy, but as a revisionist behaviour seeking to legitimise new norms⁶¹.

Finally, the non resolution to legalise the Iraq war and U.S./U.K. decision to go alone raised concerns about the role of the Security Council in the hegemonic international society. This failure illustrates, on the one hand, the Council's inability to constrain the hegemon's use of force and, on the other, to respond to the new global security challenges⁶². Even if the previous claims are antagonistic, they highlight the profound crisis that the intervention on Iraq produced on the institution, a result of the Council's relations with the hegemon that is, at the same time the "greatest opportunity and challenge" for the institution⁶³. In practice, the United States is the only actor that can credibly threaten to intervene militarily without the support or approval of the organisation, a situation that positions the U.S. hierarchically above the rest of the permanent members⁶⁴.

As it has been accused more than once, its architecture makes the Council practically incapable to act as a constraint on great powers' action and slowly moves towards a forum to act in conflicts where the five permanent members do not have direct interests. That way, the institution serves as a good tool for great powers when it acts in compliance with their wishes and, when it does not, it is just considered as an irrelevant forum. As the veto record proves, the five great powers use it for blocking resolutions involving their interests' or they allies'. Even if the use of veto has declined after the demise of the Soviet Union, it is also true that issues like the Israel-Palestinian conflict continues to be blocked because of the use of veto by the United States.

The records on the use of veto show that, by large, the United States has been the most recurrent user. On the other side, China has been the less veto-prone member, with just nine vetoes since 1971, more inclined to abstain in issues that do not

⁶⁰ Even if this resolution is not considered a "post facto validation" of the action as it happened after NATO intervention in Kosovo, it established the grounds of future action on Iraq, considering the U.S. and U.K. as the central legitimised actors in these processes. COCKAINE, J. and D. M. MALONE, "The Security Council and the 1991 and 2003 Wars... *op. cit.*", p. 402.

⁶¹ HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*", p. 194.

⁶² A great review of both critiques can be found on MORRIS, J. and N. J. WHEELER, "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy...*op. cit.*", pp. 214-231.

⁶³ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 151-152.

⁶⁴ VOETEN, E., "Delegation and the nature of the Security Council... *op. cit.*", p. 50.

harm directly their interests, erasing its image as an obstructing power⁶⁵. However, China, together with Russia, has recurrently used the pocket veto, a threat to use the veto in previous informal meetings, usually between the five permanent members, that usually pushes for the withdrawal of the resolution⁶⁶. The use of this pocket veto in form of strong resistance during the negotiating process pursues two main outcomes that have been usually achieved by China. The first is to take the proposal out of vote, because the drafting states decide not to bring it to a vote, as it happened over Sudan in 2007 and Burma in 2009. The second outcome is more cooperative, as it achieves a modification or softening of the proposal to gain China's support, as in the case of North Korea over the Resolution 1874 (2009)⁶⁷.

In general, Chinese diplomacy in the UN Security Council can be targeted as successful on managing its main difficulty in the institution: maintain a balance between its national interest and its international position. In other words, China recurrently needs to manage several risks on its material interests derived from regional instability but, at the same time, needs to portray itself as a responsible great power and reduce the political costs of its actions towards great powers, especially the United States and Russia⁶⁸.

However, the use of veto is not the only issue on the Security Council relation with great powers. The continuous pushes for reform on the membership of this institution have reached its peak after 1993, with the definition of alternative reforming models. Even if attention has been focused on new members, the scope of the reform includes also calls for transparency and the possession of the veto. On these reform projects, China sees a risk to lose its voice as the only country in development with veto power⁶⁹ and does not want to see a potential regional rival on the group of per-

⁶⁵ OKHOVAT, S., "The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform", *Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies Working Paper*, n° 15/1, University of Sydney, December 2011, <https://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf> [6th October 2016], p. 15.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16. This is the case of the Sri Lankan struggles between 2009 and 2011, as well as some attempts to condemn the Syrian conflict (together with the pocket veto, other Resolutions were expressly vetoed); in the case of the Iranian nuclear program, the Chinese and Russian threat to use the veto softened the Resolution. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-20. A total of four Resolutions concerning the Syrian conflict were vetoed by Russia and China. *Vid.* UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 348 (2014). Draft*, New York, 22nd May 2014, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_348.pdf> [19th October 2016]; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 538 (2012). Draft*, New York, 19th July 2012, <<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2012%20538.pdf>> [19th October 2016]; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 612 (2011). Draft*, New York, 4th October 2011, <<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2011%20612.pdf>> [19th October 2016].

⁶⁷ WUTHNOW, J., *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council*, New York, Routledge, 2013, pp. 39-40.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 130.

⁶⁹ COOPER, A. F. and T. FUES, "Do the Asian Drivers Pull their Diplomatic Weight? China, India, and the United Nations", *World Development*, Vol. 36, n° 2, 2008, p. 299.

manent members. Therefore, China advocates for an expansion on membership only for developing countries and without veto, excluding the candidatures of Germany, and especially, Japan⁷⁰. On the same vein, China has been ambiguous towards India's candidature, while the United States has supported its membership⁷¹.

Nevertheless, Chinese position evidences two main features of a broader picture. Firstly, China erected itself as the representative of the developing and non-Western countries. With the dissolution of the blocks of the Cold War and Russia's difficulties to attract non-Western countries, China's non interference policy, along with huge investment on developing countries and its first line status in the main international forums have strengthened its status as the leader of the rest. However, the successfulness of other countries' demands, especially India's, has the potential to blur its status and also to make compulsory to agree on a developing world's position with India. Therefore, Beijing is more prone to back reform proposals that include other developing countries such as Brazil or African countries. Secondly, its status as a permanent member with veto power constitutes a cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy (as it is for other permanent members) and it is unlikely that China or another permanent member will back any proposal of enlargement of the veto holders. Moreover, most of the G4 members find the opposition of at least one permanent member⁷² and United States opposition on the G4 is strongly market by the abstention of three of its members on the Resolution authorising the sanctions and non-fly zone in Libya in 2011⁷³. Therefore, any attempt to reforms seems to be blocked. Although the U.S. still holds a pre-eminence in the UNSC, China seems to be satisfied with the status quo at the institution and is growingly becoming a more active member. As the analysis of

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ India's campaign for a permanent membership on the UNSC has been channelled through the Group of 4 lobby, along with Japan, Brazil and Germany, and, simultaneously, on the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum. Even if India's position was firstly inclined towards a permanent membership with veto power, it lately softened its demands to a permanent seat with no veto. EFSTATHOPOULOS, C., "India and global governance... *op. cit.*", p. 245. On this vein, China has been quite ambiguous to support India's demands, even if in a visit to India, Chinese state Councillor Tang Jiaxuan recognised that "we hope to see India playing a larger and constructive role on the Security Council. SRIVASTAVA, S., "Beijing boosts Delhi's bid for UN Council seat", *Asian Times*, New Delhi, 12th April 2005, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FJ26Df01.html> [10th October 2016]. The United States has lately been more supportive, with former President Obama declaring that "I look forward to a reformed UNSC that includes India as a permanent member". BBC NEWS, "Obama backs India on permanent UN Security Council seat", 8th November 2010, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11711007>> [10th October 2016].

⁷² India confronts Chinese ambivalence, while the United States opposes to a third European country holding a permanent seat (Germany), along with the strong opposition of China towards Japan.

⁷³ OKHOVAT, S., "The United Nations Security Council... *op. cit.*", p. 34. The Resolution 1973 (2011) on the establishment of a ban on flights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya airspace was adopted with the positive vote of ten members and five abstentions (China, Russia, India, Brazil and Germany). UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1973 (2011)*, New York, 17th March 2011, <http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf> [17th January 2017].

the UNSC demonstrates, it is difficult to reach a balanced agreement on institutional reform. Despite the accommodation to new distribution of power, the UNSC also faces the difficult task of establishing a balance between the changing taking place on the international society and the international public law that the Council represents⁷⁴. However, the IMF highlights the positive consequences of reform, as well as China's adaptation to a non radical accommodation that maintains U.S. leadership.

7.2.2. *International Monetary Fund. The diffusion of a liberal global capitalist model*

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with the World Bank (WB), constitutes the main institutional instrument of the United States financial and economic hegemony. The Bretton Woods system and the Washington Consensus inaugurated an era of the supremacy of the liberal capitalist hegemony that has successfully socialised nearly all the state-system into their view. Even if the influence of the institution has shifted during its history, it constitutes a recurrent forum in moments of crises and crackdowns. However, three main events can be pointed as important turning points not only for the IMF but also to the mastery of the U.S. capitalist led model. Firstly, the monetary instability created by the U.S. government during the Vietnam war inundating the world economy with an enormous dollar flux. This generated a step back on the Bretton Woods system, as the hegemon was not longer able to restore fixed exchange rates, a crisis aggravated by the 1973 oil crisis. Even if the hegemon's inability to restore fixed dollar-gold exchange rates did not sink U.S. monetary and financial hegemony, it did erase the Bretton Woods system and confirmed that there was not viable alternative to the dollar supremacy⁷⁵. Secondly, the U.S. influence exerted via IMF failed to consistently address the Asian Financial Crises and restore economic growth, and despite of its inability to provide solution, it was also an important part of the problem⁷⁶. Thirdly, the 2008 economic crisis, exploited in the United States and then globalised, was addressed not by the IMF, but through another institution with no practical autonomy from states: the Group of 20. This inadvertent movement is a practical step back to state led economic advises, articulated through a bilateral solution from the U.S. and China (external deficit control from the former and external surplus control from the latter)⁷⁷. In addition, in the Pittsburgh Summit, the G20 launched a communiqué that outlined the strategies for reform the IMF and WB, to push the Doha Round and to prompt a post-Kyoto climate change

⁷⁴ LÓPEZ-JACOISTE, M. E., "¿Cambios en el orden internacional tras Kosovo, 11-S, Afganistán, Irak...?", *Memoria y civilización: Anuario de Historia*, nº 11, 2008, pp. 211-212.

⁷⁵ MASTANDUNO, M., "System Maker and Privilege Taker... *op. cit.*", pp. 134-135.

⁷⁶ BLACK, J., *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁷⁷ GARRETT, G., "G2 in G20... *op. cit.*", p. 37.

agreement⁷⁸, erecting itself as the cornerstone of the reforms to accommodate emerging powers.

Even with a variable influence among the global economy, the IMF is still functional to U.S. hegemony. However, its influence is more notable on blocking than on raising issues. In the one hand, after the recent reforms, the U.S. still holds an “effective and practical veto power”, and even if other coalitions of states could also exert it, but are not able to articulate a consensual position⁷⁹. On the other hand, the U.S. has a more modest success on raising issues and gaining support from them on the IMF. It usually relies on other institutions or diplomatic means (bilateral relations or the G7/20 as well as other multilateral forums) and addresses a question when it holds the sufficient support⁸⁰. As a conclusion, it is possible to say that the hegemon does exert an important influence in the reform processes, pushing for the maintenance of the privileges of Western powers and the status quo that sustains the economic, financial and political hegemonic power. Even if this influence permeates to the daily practices of the institution, it is more difficult to identify an explicit influence on the lending practice, for example. More than a U.S. promotion institution, the IMF could be defined as a pseudo-autonomous institution that sustains a continuistic pro-hegemonic and capitalist narrative that benefits directly to the U.S.

However, the global financial crisis and the emergence of more dynamic rising economies caused disruptions in this narrative. As the addressing of the global financial crisis through a more flexible and dynamic forum exemplifies, “the IMF is changing more slowly than the global economy”⁸¹. Even considering the last reform, the institution is still reluctant to admit dissent or distinct rhetoric at its core. Despite China’s strong convergence with many of the principles that gave rise to the IMF, its success on developing its economy without the assistance of the institution raises concerns among the institution, as well as within the Western powers. However, China has not showed any sign of strong contestation within the institution, on the contrary, has pushed for a slow reforming pattern that is respectful with the core hegemonic narrative of the institution. This recent effort of accommodation has been considered as “the limits of the politically acceptable” institutional reform for the hegemon⁸².

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Several important decisions should be taken with, at least, the 85% of agreement and the hegemon still holds a 16,54% of the vote quota. This is the case, for example, of the triple alliance of European most important economies (Germany, United Kingdom and France) and also developing countries. WOODS, N., “The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank and the IMF” in R. FOOT, S. N. MACFARLANE and M. MASTANDUNO (eds.), *US Hegemony and International Organisations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 111.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ FERDINAND, P. and J. WANG, “China and the IMF: from mimicry towards pragmatic international institutional pluralism”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, n° 4, 2013, p. 904.

⁸² LESAGE, D. et al., “IMF reform after the crisis”, *International Politics*, Vol. 50, n° 4, 2013, pp. 565-567 and 572.

Even if the latest transformations have strengthened the position of China within the institution and also on the global economy, it has not been a revolutionary reform, but a significant one, as China wanted⁸³. This moderate posture is reinforced by China's preference towards more state-led forums, such as the G20, and its willingness to change the IMF towards a less prescriptive organisation and less intrusive through Western-influenced policies, more focused on crisis-intervention⁸⁴.

The positive evolution of China's status within the organisation could be measured by three variables suggested by Ferdinand and Wang. Firstly, its ability to place its director on the managing board of the organisation, composed by 24 executive directors. Secondly, the quota of capital and the quota of votes that holds after the last reforms. And, finally, the national workers that work for the institution, especially in higher levels.

The recent reform that came into force in 2016 gave China the privilege of electing its own director on the executive board, composed by 24 directors. This right is only exercised by eight countries, the rest of the directors (16) are chosen by groups of states and take care of the organisation's "daily business"⁸⁵. This constitutes a *de facto* recognition of China among the big world economies, as well as a share of responsibility among Western powers. Moreover, the inclusion of the renminbi in the basket of major currencies of the IMF that determines the value of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) supposes another big step towards the accommodation as one of the biggest financial and economic powers within U.S.-led institutions. Although this new role on the renminbi does not blur the dollar's supremacy, it constitutes a prior step that, in the future, could involve the inclusion of the renminbi among the second reserve currencies.

Secondly, with the recent reform, China's quotas and voting share have increased by a 60%⁸⁶, becoming the Fund's third largest member after the U.S. and Japan. Even if this constitutes a quantitative step forward, it also exemplifies how a less dynamic economy as Japan has a higher status due its historical commitment to U.S.-led capitalist institutions. Moreover, in their latest reform, the U.S. still holds its veto power and, even if it has diminished its quota and voting share, the main losers on the reform were European countries that lost their overrepresentation.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 567-568.

⁸⁴ FERDINAND, P. and J. WANG, "China and the IMF... *op. cit.*", p. 905.

⁸⁵ INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), "Governance Structure" <<http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm>> [13th October 2016]. Concretely, the countries that can elect their own directors are the United States, Japan, China, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Russia and Saudi Arabia.

⁸⁶ Previously to the Singapore reforms, China held a 3,718% of the quota and 3,651% of vote power. The reform accomplished in 2008 slightly improved its position, raising the quota to a 3,996% and the vote power to 3,806%. However, the reforms proposed in 2010 that came into force in 2016 did importantly improve China's position, reaching a quota of 6,394 % and a vote power of 6,071%. *Vid.* FERDINAND, P. and J. WANG, "China and the IMF... *op. cit.*", 897-898.

Finally, an examination on the nationality of the Fund staff is more revelatory. Even if figures have evolved in the term examined (2008 to 2015), the overrepresentation of United States' personnel is obvious. Chinese personnel have nearly tripled, but have a huge underrepresentation among top chiefs and directors (6 Chinese and 66 U.S. citizens)⁸⁷. As figures show, the IMF is still too Western not only in its policy advice and its orientation, but also in its personnel.

Figure 14: IMF Personnel by nationality. Data based on IMF Diversity Reports of 2008 and 2015⁸⁸.

IMF PERSONNEL COMPARISON				
	A01-A08	A09-A15	B01-B05	Total
U.S. 2015	146 (32,2%)	300 (16,6%)	66 (19%)	512 (19,6 %)
U.S. 2008	138 (24,9%)	329 (21,9%)	74 (22,9%)	541 (22,7%)
China 2015	8 (1,8%)	93 (5,1%)	6 (1,7%)	146 (4,4%)
China 2008	7 (1,3%)	46 (3,1%)	1 (0,3%)	54 (2,3%)

Despite the modest rise of China's decision power and managing influence in the institution, this state's growing international status has inevitably influenced several actions not only of the IMF, but of nearly all the global financial institutions. Firstly, China's impact in developing countries in Africa, Latin America and East Asia as an alternative development model has transformed the IMF strategy. It has changed not only the institution's approach, but also these states' dependency towards the IMF and WB assistance⁸⁹. Secondly, rising economies, as well as several

⁸⁷ INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), *Diversity Annual Report 2015*, Washington, 5th February 2016, <<https://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2015/index.pdf>> [14th October 2016], pp. 56-64. For example, Greece and Belgium also have 6 nationals among B01-B05 personnel, and other countries have quite more than China: Netherlands (9), Canada (13), France (15) Italy (19), India (20), Germany (28) and United Kingdom (38).

⁸⁸ Personnel are divided by its grade position: A01-A08 groups mainly assistants; A09-A15 is composed by economists and researchers and, finally, B01-B05 reunites top chiefs and directors. *Ibid.*; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), *Diversity Annual Report 2008*, Washington, 21st August 2009, <<https://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2008/index.pdf>> [14th October 2016], pp. 23-28.

⁸⁹ David Dollar, the former WB country director in China, estimated that "very soon, China is likely to be a more substantial provider of concessional assistance to Africa than the World Bank's flagship assistance program". CHIN, G. T., "China's Rising Institutional Influence" in A. S. ALEXANDROFF and A. F. COOPER (eds.), *Rising States, Rising Institutions. Challenges for Global Governance*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 93.

East Asian states have worked on alternative or complementary mechanisms far from the IMF sphere. These initiatives usually have China's involvement, as active promoter or even the sole creator, as it will be discussed later.

Therefore, while the United States and European powers are showing moderate initiatives to accommodate China, these attempts are far from being revolutionary. China still holds a second rank position on the IMF after the U.S. and Japan that still holds a great influence in the institution. This situation, along with China's special relations with developing countries, have created a strong incentive for this rising state to start building its own institutional net, that firstly accommodates its allies and, gradually incorporates several Western states. Moreover, the rise of the G20 as an alternative forum diversifies China's accommodation and fits better with Chinese demands.

7.2.3. The Group of 20. A new institution of accommodation in the context of the global economic crisis

The explosion of the global economic crisis in 2008 and the impossibility to address the problem through the usual management strategy (the G8/IMF) raised the importance of new forums to manage international governance. Moreover, the creation of this institution and its growing role addresses three specific issues. Firstly, the use of the G20 as the global forum to address the financial crisis responded to great powers willingness to gain greater influence in the global economy. Even if the IMF, as well as other instruments, has hierarchies of power beneath them, there are not direct national instruments, to the extent that government leaders diffuse the country's representation on the IMF personnel. Through the G20, presidents and prime ministers have voice, control the agenda and reinforce certain international hierarchies. Secondly, the creation of the G20 fosters the participation of rising powers as equals in global governance and stimulates their contributions to stability packages. As the hegemon's move from the G8 towards the G20 evidences, the industrialised status quo powers were not longer able to foster economic development and restore the pre-crisis growing pattern without the assistance and participation of rising dynamic economies. Finally, the creation of the organisation shows the preference towards small elite forums that are quite more flexible than the IMF, and are usually used to address specific problems (climate change through the G8+5 or the global economic crisis in the case of the G20)⁹⁰. Moreover, as Alexandroff and Kirton note, this informal club composed by states clearly benefited by the globalisation and

⁹⁰ For example, the latest reform of voting and quota of the IMF took six years to come into practice, and still maintains a grade of hierarchy. In contrast, the different Gx forums hold a great flexibility and usually develop extensions, as the G8 did with the G8+5, first informally in the 2003 meeting in France and latter in 2005 in the U.K. as a formal cooperation group.

economic openness includes two questions neglected by other institutions: equality among its members and legitimacy, as it reunites Western and non-Western countries⁹¹. Nevertheless, it is an example of a “self selected” forum where great powers exercise what Zürn has defined as “executive multilateralism”⁹².

Therefore, the empowerment of the G20 reached its peak on the 2009 summit hosted by Barack Obama in Pittsburgh, when leaders designated the G20 as “the premier forum” for international economic cooperation⁹³. The establishment of the G20 is one of the main movements that have bestowed China with managing role, together with the hegemon, on the global financial crisis, as well as in the future international architecture⁹⁴. Not only did the leaders empower the forum, but also agreed to start the reforms on the Bretton Woods institutions to accommodate rising economies. The inclusion of rising states in the centre of global economic governance clearly expresses that Western powers’ call for a bigger involvement of emerging economies and also test their involvement as responsible stakeholders, which in practice recognises their nature as reformist, but not revisionist states⁹⁵.

However, emerging economies’ accession to this governance system constitutes a tacit acceptance of the hierarchy that they, as second rank powers, have faced and criticised until this moment⁹⁶ and their role as outsiders or “the rest” could be called into question. Therefore, the creation of the G20 reinforces and underpins the English School traditional understanding on the directorial role of great powers⁹⁷. On the one

⁹¹ ALEXANDROFF, A. S. and J. KIRTON “The ‘Great Recession’ and the Emergence of the G20 Leaders’ Summit” in A. S. ALEXANDROFF and A. F. COOPER (eds.), *Rising States, Rising Institutions. Challenges for Global Governance*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 179.

⁹² The phrase “self selected forum” was coined by Anthony Payne for the G8. PAYNE, A., “The G8 in a changing global economic order”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, n° 3, 2008, p. 527; PAYNE, A., “How many Gs are there in ‘global governance’ after the crisis? The perspectives of the ‘marginal majority’ of the world’s states”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, n° 3, 2010, p. 738. As Zürn explains, executive multilateralism was the traditional operative behaviour after the WWII but, as the author suggests, the actual globalised world calls for a “socially consented multilateralism”. ZÜRN, M., “Introduction: Law and compliance at different levels”, in M. ZÜRN and C. JOERGES (eds.), *Law and Governance in Postnational Europe. Compliance behind the Nation-State*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 37.

⁹³ G20, “G20 Leader Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit”, Pittsburgh, 24th-25th September 2009, 50th point, <<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communiqu0925.html>> [18th October 2016].

⁹⁴ ALDEN, C. and A. C. ALVES, “China’s Regional Forum Diplomacy in the Developing World: Socialisation and the ‘Sinosphere’”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 26, n° 103, 2017, pp. 151-152.

⁹⁵ COOPER, A. F., “The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested ‘steering committee’ for the world”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, n° 3, 2010, p. 750.

⁹⁶ KAHLER, M., “Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, n° 3, 2013, p. 725.

⁹⁷ Clark summarises the English School’s understandings on great power’s role and adapts them to a situation of hegemony. CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 48. However, even if admitting Clark’s thesis on hegemony, the management of the global economy still maintains several roles for the great powers and it is not only dominated by the hegemon’s leading hierarchy. As Buzan and Cui point out, global economic governance is now “the first priority for great power management” based on the post-Cold War “powerful shared interest in managing the global economy” CUI, S. and B. BUZAN, “Great Power Management... op. cit.”, pp. 191 and 200.

hand, it establishes and horizontal concert among the G20 members that are equality treated, and expands this concert from Western industrialised states to semi-peripheral rising powers attracted to the centre. On the other hand, it reinforces the hierarchy between this great powers and the rest of the system, silencing their critics⁹⁸. Therefore, the inclusion of the G5 countries⁹⁹ is not an example of democratisation and multilateral management of the global economy, but a recognition by the industrialised countries that they are not able to govern without these rising states' help. It constitutes an update of the concentration of power that is in charge of the world governance reforms made always from the top of the hierarchy¹⁰⁰.

The first three summits of the new group (Washington 2008, London 2009 and Pittsburgh 2009) were the emergency responses to the global economic crisis. The hegemon's call to reorganise the leadership hierarchy was developed both inside the G20 (through several successive summits as well as ministerial level meetings) and outside the G20 (with a reform of the IMF and an expansion of the Financial Stability Board)¹⁰¹. These summits served as an "effective catalyst" to foster domestic stimulus packages as well as new financing options for the Bretton Woods institutions¹⁰². China and the United States led the attempt to foster development through nearly identical public investment packages, an example of what some have named as "a de facto G2"¹⁰³. The commitment of both states of the economic governance through the G20 is one of the most prominent experiences of how they insert their bilateral diplomatic efforts through multilateral forums to reach strategic commitments¹⁰⁴. Moreover, as Garrett expresses, the accommodation of China is a forum of this nature successfully encourages the country's participation as a responsible stakeholder, but avoids asking the rising state to play a leadership role that may not be able or willing to take¹⁰⁵.

China's rising status among the G20 has reached its peak with the hosting of the 2016 summit in Hangzhou. Even if the event did not reach to as clear commitments as the first three, it constitutes another step on China's accommodation on the great power club, a strategy towards China that the United States' diplomacy under Obama

⁹⁸ For example, the UN General Assembly became one of the main resistances to the G20, as Cooper notes. On the same vein, the Global Governance Group could be enumerated as another responding initiative that reunited middle powers discontent with their exclusion of the management of the crisis. COOPER, A. F., "The G20 as an improvised crisis committee... *op. cit.*", pp. 751-752.

⁹⁹ The G8+5 was officially launched on the 2005 G8 summit, with the inclusion of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.

¹⁰⁰ COOPER, A. F., "The G20 as an improvised crisis committee... *op. cit.*", p. 743; ENGLISH, J., R. THAKUR and A. F. COOPER (eds.), *Reforming from the top: a leaders' 20 summit*, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2005.

¹⁰¹ ALEXANDROFF, A. S. and J. KIRTON "The "Great Recession... *op. cit.*", p. 184.

¹⁰² COOPER, A. F., "The G20 as an improvised crisis committee... *op. cit.*", p. 741.

¹⁰³ GARRETT, G., "G2 in G20... *op. cit.*", pp. 29-30.

¹⁰⁴ Examples include the APEC Summit and, more recently, both states' commitment to sign Paris agreement on the G20 Summit in Hangzhou.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

administration has pursued in international organisations recently. Prior to the summit, Chinese president Xi Jinping expressed its commitment with the transformation of the organisation from “a mechanism of crisis response to one of long term governance” that broadens its agenda not only with short-term issues but with deeper long-term ones¹⁰⁶. However, the results of the Summit were, at least, modest, due to the difficulties to continue a forward path and take measures to prevent crises, as well as foster equal and sustainable development.

Even if the multilateral management of the global economy is a fixed pattern, the new configuration that reunites rising and traditional powers may generate a more diffused and fragmented financial order, based on non-global agreements and national solutions¹⁰⁷. Moreover, the rising alternative institutions led by China are multiplying the organisational map, generating several institutions with overlapping or even conflicting interests.

7.3. Chinese alternative hegemonic institution's early stages. Hegemonic contestation and rising influence

In the previous pages, there has been analysed both China and U.S. relations with the existing institutional order. The present part aims to address how the Chinese-lead institutions fit in the existing order; in other words, if these institutions overlap, contest or complement the traditional ones and if the growing number of members includes traditional status quo powers or it is only composed by rising and development states. This last indicator will point out if these status quo states' membership is a sign of containment and control of the institutions or, on the contrary, these states are legitimating these institutions or even China's alternative institutional building.

Moreover, the analysis of Chinese participation on the Western-led global institutions evidences two different processes in Chinese historical participation. As Johnston notes, China's participation in international institutions from 1980 to 2000 was marked by a process of internalisation or, in Chin's words, a one-way socialisation based on processes of learning the existing institutional norms and practices¹⁰⁸. After this period, China has not just focused on its own socialisation, but has pushed for

¹⁰⁶ EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, “Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China On the 2016 G20 Summit in China At the Working Lunch of the G20 Summit”, Antalya, 16th November 2015, <<http://www.chinaembassy.org.sa/eng/zgyw/t1315774.htm>> [20th October 2016].

¹⁰⁷ CHIN, G. T. “Remaking the architecture: the emerging powers, self-insuring and regional insulation”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, n^o 3, 2010, pp. 694-695.

¹⁰⁸ CHIN, G. T., “Two-Way Socialization: China, the World Bank, and Hegemonic Weakening”, *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. XIX, n^o 1, 2012, p. 214; JOHNSTON, A. I., *Social States. China in International Institutions 1980-2000*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. xiv and xvi.

reform and change within these institutions, both from the inside of the organisations, but also from the outside thanks to its growing influence and the multiplication of Chinese-lead regional forums. As Chin explains, this new era is marked by a two-way process of socialisation¹⁰⁹ or, in Schweller and Pu's words, two dimensions of resistance coping pragmatically with the existing order to accommodate to U.S. hegemony and, simultaneously, contesting U.S. legitimacy from the inside and outside of this order¹¹⁰.

An analysis of China's growing institutional influence inside and outside the Western dominated institutions should inevitably address in which stand is China putting more efforts: in reshaping the Western institutions and coordinating the world from them or, on the contrary, in using its learning in this institutions to propose new frames and organisations that include its values and interests from the beginning¹¹¹.

In its thinking beyond the existing global order, China has actively pursued a strategy of multiplication of regional institutions created by its mandate. Following former president Hu Jintao's call to "make international relations more democratic and jointly build towards a harmonious world"¹¹², China's increasing participation in international organisations has been complemented with a growing and active leadership role, especially in regional forums focused on security and economic development. The building of these alternative institutions is based on the success of the Chinese model in developing countries and aims to extend this influence using its huge economic surpluses to reorientate investment and public policies to sectors that benefit its growth. For example, calls for regional investment on infrastructures in Asia look for a reorientation on development strategies that have been growingly focused on education and poverty reduction towards an increase investment on infrastructure that will benefit Chinese trade and national construction industry.

This alternative institutional corpus is an interesting movement towards the establishing of alliances and spheres of influence, as well as a way of legitimising and socialising China's model while it pressures Western institutions towards reforms. The global institutional network is inherently based on a vision that defines human progress as a result of democracy and individual liberties. On the contrary, there is a Chinese notion, growingly attractive to developing countries, that understands human progress extremely linked to economic growth¹¹³.

This multilateral dialogue within the South, articulated primarily through a heterogeneous set of regional institutions, embodies a different set of norms, usually

¹⁰⁹ CHIN, G. T., "Two-Way Socialization... *op. cit.*", pp. 214-215.

¹¹⁰ SCHWELLER, R. and X. PU, "After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*", p. 52.

¹¹¹ CHIN, G., "China's Rising Institutional Influence... *op. cit.*", pp. 99-100.

¹¹² HU J., "Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity", *Statement on the United Nations Summit*, New York, 15th September 2005, <<http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15/china050915eng.pdf>> [2nd November 2016], p. 8.

¹¹³ KORNBERG, J. F. and J. R. FAUST, *China in World Politics. Policies, Processes and Prospects*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p. 257.

related to Chinese Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (non-conditionality, equality, mutual benefit, non-interference in internal affairs) and supported by financial institutions and funds where China is usually the main contributor¹¹⁴. This way, it wants to socialise its norms and practices that will be gradually internalised, simultaneously becoming a more reliable and legitimised global normative power. Three steps compound this process. Firstly, the establishment of local and regional dialogues that evaluate the preferences and expectations of the participants, so as a readjustment of national strategies. Secondly, the building of trustful relations that promote learning environments and socialisation opportunities for states. Finally, the last step involves the active construction of communities of practices that reinforce the two previous steps and evaluate their accurateness¹¹⁵.

In fact, Chinese efforts to build a durable and strong regional and global institutional network reflect its aspirations to transform and lead the rules of cooperation¹¹⁶. However, the goals behind these efforts are not straightforward. On the one hand, the strengthening of cooperation, especially in its own region, assures the peaceful environment that China needs to secure its economic growth and international expansion, which also reinforces its efforts to a peaceful internal environment. On the other hand, the success of these institutions, which are inevitably linked to this Asian country and its visions of the world, may also serve as a model of attraction to other countries. Through the establishment of new institutions, China can permeate its own preferences in the form of institutional practices, norms and procedures, as well as influence the main guiding interest, values and preferences of the organisation¹¹⁷. The growing importance of these institutions also serves as a platform for the relations with other organisations from which it is excluded, like the ASEAN.

¹¹⁴ ALDEN, C. and A. C. ALVES, "China's Regional Forum Diplomacy... *op. cit.*", p. 152.

¹¹⁵ KAVALSKI, E., "The struggle for recognition of normative powers: normative power Europe and normative power China in context", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 48, n° 2, 2013, p. 261.

¹¹⁶ ALDEN, C. and A. C. ALVES, "China's Regional Forum Diplomacy... *op. cit.*", p. 157.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Figure 15: A map of China-led International Organisations



The progressive involvement of China in the creation and promotion of regional and global institutions has suffered an impressive multiplication in the present decade. Therefore, these organisations' map is continuously changing, and the relation among different organisations, as well as their success, is still uncertain. Moreover, these institutions often coexist with certain regional institutions that have a marked relation with the United States and its closest ally, Japan. Nevertheless, it can be said that Chinese institutional efforts mainly articulate into two different issues: security cooperation, and economics and development.

These organisation for security cooperation, among which the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and, to a lesser extent, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) are the most prominent ones, build on a particular Chinese vision: the New Security Concept. This notion shows a resistance to the U.S. and other major powers' intromission in regional affairs and has a strong influence of the famous Chinese Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence, that date back to the Bandung Conference. Specifically, this New Security Concept is based on "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation" and aims to achieve, peace, mutually beneficial cooperation and prosperity, as well as "expand the definition of

security to include political, defence, diplomatic and above all economic considerations"¹¹⁸.

The organisations related to economics and development also build in a different model of growth and aim to strengthen Asian regional ties through common goals of development. This is the case of organisations as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the different organisations reunited around the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. These institutions, along with Chinese bilateral diplomacy, want to motivate regional interconnectivity through infrastructure, with China as the hub¹¹⁹. As a further analysis suggests, the relations of collaboration among these organisations, especially the ones related to development, will inevitably mark the success of the institutional projects.

7.3.1. *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. A tool to spread China's influence through Central Asia*

The creation of the SCO, promoted by Kazakhstan and latter also by China, inaugurated the specific institutions in the Asian region that were created in opposition to the hegemon's institutional practices. However, this opposition does not mean an active confrontation, but an organisational practice that it is not affected, and usually explicitly rejects, U.S. institutional influence and security strategies. Even if it has a highly transversal nature, it is true that security-related issues have been the priority, specifically fighting against the "three evils", namely, terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Officially, the organisation is defined as a "regional organisation for non-traditional security"¹²⁰. In a common mistake, the SCO is considered as the Asian equivalent to NATO, but the SCO is an organisation whose members want to address commonly several problems that they share, whereas NATO is also an alliance united against an external adversary¹²¹. Or, in other words, SCO is not an alliance, but a partnership¹²², and resembles more to ASEAN than to NATO.

Even if the bilateral relations between China and Russia constitute the core force of the organisation, it should be noted that both countries' involvement on the organisation is quite unequal. On the one hand, China has played an active role, pri-

¹¹⁸ TRAYER, C. A., "China's 'New Security Concept' and Southeast Asia" in D. W. LOWELL (ed.), *Asia-Pacific Security. Policy Challenges*, Canberra, Australian National University, 2003, p. 89.

¹¹⁹ YU, H., "Motivation behind China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank", *Journal of Contemporary China*, <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245894>>, p. 2.

¹²⁰ SONG, W., "Interests, Power and China's Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23, n° 85, 2014, p. 85.

¹²¹ CHIN, G., "China's Rising Institutional Influence... *op. cit.*", pp. 88-89.

¹²² CABESTAN, J.-P., "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Central Asia, and the Great Powers, an Introduction. One Bed, Different Dreams?", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 53, n° 3, 2013, p. 434.

marily driven by internal concerns. On the first year, the organisation focused on border delimitation, especially between both great powers regarding their borders. In fact, for China the SCO plays an important role on assuring the stability on the Xinjiang province, shutting the borders and cutting the collaboration of other states with the uigurs¹²³. Moreover, the SCO provides an excellent opportunity for China to extend its influence and, on a more pragmatic way, strengthen economic and energy cooperation. On the other hand, for Russia the SCO serves as an institution that extends the post-soviet environment towards China. It is economically interesting for Russia, who portrays the organisation as an anti-U.S. alliance while, at the same time, prioritise forums and institutions exclusively formed by former soviet republics where its influence has no contestation. In spite of this preference, Russia admits the functional role of the organisation on security issues among members and considers it as a platform of contestation to the role of the U.S. in the region, especially, in Afghanistan. It has also been argued that the SCO is used by Russia to limit China's influence in the Central Asian region by weakening the organisation and pushing for irrelevance¹²⁴. Even if it is true that Russia could have done more to strengthen the SCO, its preference to other organisation is understandable. In others institutions as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Russia holds an incontestable leadership, with middle powers such as Kazakhstan and Belarus on a second place¹²⁵.

Hence, the SCO has internalised this duality of interests and has reached a modest success. On the positive side, practical instruments as the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) have been established, prompting the sharing of intelligence information to fight against cross-border terrorism. Moreover, China has favorably expanded its economic and energy cooperation with Central Asia, and has successfully isolated the Xinjiang issue¹²⁶. It should be admitted that the members of the organisation have developed a differentiated multilateral intergovernmental institution that has profitably implemented those principles of the Shanghai spirit (sovereignty, non-interference in other countries' affairs, mutual respect, trust, equality and highly successful win-win cooperation)¹²⁷.

¹²³ HU, R., "China and Central Asia: The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)", *The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs*, n° 11, 2004, p. 136.

¹²⁴ CABESTAN, J.-P., "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation... *op. cit.*", p. 429.

¹²⁵ Even if the Kazakhstani government is considered as a middle power, this government's institutional promotion cannot be discarded, especially its active role in the creation of the SCO and the EAEU. However, its movements usually converge with those of the Russian government, suggesting an active partnership that favours Russia's interests.

¹²⁶ Examples of economic cooperation include the expansion of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, as well as the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, not to forget the access of Chinese companies to these markets. These issues should not be disentangled from the Xinjiang issue, as major pipelines cross this region and its stability is vital.

¹²⁷ CABESTAN, J.-P., "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation... *op. cit.*", p. 434.

However, the success of the SCO has not been so neither for China nor for the organisation. From a national perspective, even if it has served to several Chinese internal issues, China has not been able to take advantage of its distinct “decolonising model of economic development”¹²⁸ to become a dominant power in the Central Asian region, mainly because the traditional ties of the countries with Russia, but also because of the existing fears to China¹²⁹. In the organisational level, it should be reminded that the SCO is still too centred in the internal problems of the countries and has not articulated a regional shared identity with all of its members, which is one of the main strengths of the institutional network that the U.S. leads.

Moreover, these problems will possibly increase with the enlargement of the organisation and the access of India and Pakistan as full members. Even if at first this enlargement may seem as an added difficulty on the formulation of this regional identity, the access of India, and Pakistan to a lesser extent, may help to relax the sino-russian bilateralism. On the same vein, even if Chinese leadership and influence will likely decline, it would also unblock Russia’s pushes to weaken the organisation and result on a strengthened SCO that will surely benefit China on the medium and long term. However, the lack of a shared identity may condemn this institution to a mere instrumental role. More recently created institutions as the AIIB or the OBOR explicitly look for a shared identity grounded on a distinct path of development that could eventually spread to the SCO.

7.3.2. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. A new model for development through regional cooperation

It can be said that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) constitutes one of the main projects for China’s regional multilateralism in Asia, as well as a key actor in its socialisation strategy. The AIIB has three main drivers that prompted its creation. Firstly, the nascent discontent with international economic institutions, especially those focused on development that have ignored most of Asian demands and at the same time have limited its loans and toughen the conditions of access. Secondly, the Bank is a response to the inability of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to address the infrastructure needs of the region that this organisation has numbered on a \$750 billion annual investment¹³⁰. And, finally, the Bank constitutes a Chinese attempt to become a major donor not just in bilateral development but also through multilat-

¹²⁸ DADABAEV, T., “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Regional Identity Formation from the Perspective of the Central Asia States”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23, n° 85, 2014, p. 113.

¹²⁹ CABESTAN, J.-P., “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation... *op. cit.*”, p. 430

¹³⁰ XING Y., “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and China’s Role in Regional Economic Governance”, *East Asian Policy*, Vol. 8, n° 25, 2016, p. 28.

eral forums. Moreover, it is a tool to strength its soft power in the region and offer new projects and markets to its huge infrastructure industry.

Undoubtedly, this initiative wants to address an evident imbalance in the region: the huge need of infrastructure that coexists with a historical accumulation of savings and an important economic capacity due to the boom that have enjoyed the region's economies¹³¹. The launch of the AIIB, despite its Chinese nature, has attracted lots of attention not only from regional partners, but also from European countries, with the accession of United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy or Spain. Excluding the United States and Japan, it can be said that the AIIB has achieved a great success in reuniting the main economic powers around this regional institution¹³². United Kingdom decision to join the AIIB is considered one of the turning points of this institutional building. The hegemon's closest ally wanted to enter in the huge construction market that the AIIB wants to control, but the British decision raised concern in Washington, as the U.S. government considered that the Bank will confront with the existing mechanisms and will suppose a cornerstone on the future Chinese power projection¹³³.

The creation of the Bank settles one main difference from the core global institutions, namely, the novelty of China's unique centrality on the AIIB, as the state that sets the agenda and priorities. More relevant, Beijing's role is likely to influence the Bank towards an investment patter that will sharply differ from the ones that liberal economic global institutions reproduce, promoting a shift from a U.S.-led unipolar vision of development and economics towards a multipolar global economic governance¹³⁴. However, there are important continuities in comparison with other economic institutions, mainly on the internal functioning of the organisation. Despite of the novelty of a non-resident board, the internal structure of the AIIB resembles the ones of the WB or ADB. There is a will to cut the costs of the institutions, towards a sustainable and effective institution¹³⁵, that will be mainly founded through Chinese capital (from the initial capital stock of \$100 billion, China has committed to contribute with \$29,8 billion).

Due to the youth of the institution, it is quite early to evaluate its success. Even if the first projects have been approved¹³⁶, the success of the AIIB will depend both on

¹³¹ ELEK, A., "The potential role of the Asian Infrastructure and Development Bank", *East Asian Forum*, 11th February 2014, <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/11/the-potential-role-of-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/>> [28th October 2016], p. 1.

¹³² Only six of the G20 members have not joined the AIIB, most of them U.S. allies, namely, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Argentina, as well as the United States.

¹³³ YU, H., "Motivation behind China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiatives... *op. cit.*", p. 10.

¹³⁴ CHIN, G. T., "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Governance Innovation and Prospects", *Global Governance*, Vol. 22, n^o 1, 2016, p. 11; XING Y., "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank... *op. cit.*", p. 25.

¹³⁵ CHIN, G. T., "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank... *op. cit.*", p. 15.

¹³⁶ The first four projects are on the verge to start. One of them is exclusively funded by the AIIB (on Bangladesh, with \$262 million investment), and other three are collaborative (in Indonesia, in partnership

the progress of the scheme but also on its coordination with other institutions. The relation of this new bank with the existing Bretton Woods institutions (mainly the WB and the ADB) has raised especial concern. In the case of ADB, which is highly influenced by the U.S. and Japan, the coexistence of both organisations should be based on an equal collaboration between both of them. It is likely that the projection and success of the AIIB will push the ADB towards a less WB influenced agenda, at least in cooperative projects. Moreover, the AIIB could be in a position to challenge and contest the standards of development that the ADB has established in the region¹³⁷.

Although the AIIB is one of the main institutional projects of China, it will inevitably respond and coordinate with other Chinese projects. It is likely that the AIIB will help on the development of the project One Belt, One Road (OBOR) by promoting infrastructure investment on key sectors for the cohesion of the Silk Road Economic area¹³⁸. On this vein, the New Development Bank's (NDB or the BRICS Development Bank¹³⁹) will also be a key partner, both to the AIIB and to the OBOR initiative. Hence, one of the main challenges that the AIIB will confront is the way it manages to coordinate and collaborate with this different organisations and to become the central institution on this map, mainly through the financial and political push that the Chinese government does.

Therefore, the AIIB should not be defined solely as a development bank "with Chinese characteristics", but as the centre of an institutional project that aims to transform and subsume the U.S./Japan led initiatives and the regional hegemonical financial and economic patterns. For this purpose, the Bank should become a platform for discussing a different regional cooperation and establishing new consensus on main issues such as trade liberalisation, capital mobility or financial market integration¹⁴⁰. Eventually, these Chinese-led initiatives may contribute to establish these agreements far from the U.S. hegemonic model and seed the grounds for the further construction of an alternative hegemonic institutions led by China.

with the WB, with a total of \$1.743 million investment; in Tajikistan, in partnership with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development with a \$105,9 million investment; and in Pakistan, together with the ADB with a \$273 million investment).

¹³⁷ JAKUPEC, V. and M. KELLY, "The Relevance of the Asian Development Bank: Existing in the Shadow of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank", *Journal of Regional Socio-Economic Issues*, Vol. 5, nº 3, 2015, p. 38.

¹³⁸ In fact, the OBOR is already an effective instrument for China on the task of attracting investment. According to the Ministry of commerce, on 2016 an 8,5% of Chinese total foreign investment was channelled through the OBOR initiative, amounting a total of \$14,58 billion. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, "Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of Commerce (February 9, 2017)", Beijing, 10th February 2017, <<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201702/20170202515626.shtml>> [17th February 2017].

¹³⁹ For deeper references to the New Development Bank, see BERMEJO, R. and M. E. LÓPEZ-JACOISTE, "El Banco de Desarrollo de los BRICS", *Revista Española de Derecho Internacional*, Vol. 67, nº 2, 2015, pp. 248-253.

¹⁴⁰ XING Y., "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank... *op. cit.*", p. 26.

7.4. United States' multilateralism and China's alternative institutions. Coexistence and conflicting arguments

An analysis of institutions as actors of international society reveals its nature not only as instruments of cooperation but also as multilateral organs where identities, status, material power, socialisation and legitimacy dialogue. The importance of institutions on the analysis of hegemony highlights the two faces of power politics that coexist in these processes: material distributions of power and ideational and normative factors. Even if material power has an important influence in the great power status within institutions, ideational factors such as identity, socialisation and legitimacy directly transform institutions and norms.

This duality is also reflected in the rise of China, not only characterised by an impressive growth of material power, but also by social and ideational factors. In Zhang's words, the acceptance and recognition of China as part of the great powers club, as well as the sharing of responsibilities on the international society provides China with a limited but influential ground to transform the institutional and normative environment¹⁴¹.

The influence of material capabilities in institutional practices is not limited to the internal status. On the case of U.S. material power, Foot et al. identify two distinct dynamics that generate tension on the hegemon's behaviour¹⁴². On the one hand, its impressive power resources generate a "take it or leave it" attitude on the hegemon, as it has the certainty that it can accomplish any task on its own. Even if it is true that in military and security issues the hegemon is not constrained by institutions, the process of globalisation has pushed the hegemon to promote multipolarity and global cooperation in economic, financial and environmental issues.

As Mastanduno explains, United States' approach to economic institutions has changed during the Cold War. In the 70's and 80's, it experienced a shift to bilateralism after constructing the most important financial and economic institutions. However, the end of the Cold War was reinforced by a turn to multipolarity and also by a strengthening of existing organisations (WTO, APEC). These shifts show, in the author's opinion, that the hegemon's preference towards a particular type of relationship is mainly driven by the objectives it wants to address and the regional and global opportunities and constraints it faces¹⁴³.

The post-2008 environment is also in line with this pragmatism. The hegemon has practised a growing cooperation with China in economic and environmental issues, but has strengthened its unipolarism and hypocrisy on security cooperation. On

¹⁴¹ ZHANG X., "A Rising China and the Normative Changes in International Society", *East Asia*, Vol. 28, n° 3, 2011, p. 236.

¹⁴² FOOT, R. et al., "Introduction" in R. FOOT, R. et al. (eds.), *US Hegemony and International Organizations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 11.

¹⁴³ MASTANDUNO, M., "Institutions of Convenience... *op. cit.*", p. 31.

the other hand, the U.S. is aware of institutions' assistance to preserve the international status quo and takes advantage of it not only to legitimize its actions, but also to set its interests as global goals.

The hegemon's institutional practice reinforces its identity as an exceptional member. It is an exceptionalism based on its unilateralism and immunity to international criticism, a pretended universality of identity and interests, strong domestic processes that can sometimes contradict global compromises and an understanding of institutions as optional¹⁴⁴. Due to this exceptionalism, U.S. exercises the above described "division of labour" in cooperation, sometimes dealt through institutional frames and other through bilateral or unilateral actions. Even with this ambivalence, the hegemon is aware of the positive sides of multilateralism to its leadership, extremely multiplied by its high immunity to the institutional constraints¹⁴⁵.

Due to its exceptionality, U.S. influence is huge even in forums and institutions in which it does not take part, which it can reinforce (as in the case of the EU or ASEAN) or weaken and discredit (as recent attempts towards the AIIB show). In the case of global institutions in which the hegemon actively participates, they hold an important autonomy but are usually constrained by the overwhelming material and vote power within them. In this vein, a point made by Russett is really relevant. Understanding Keohane's claims that institutions could survive after hegemony and continue providing outcomes¹⁴⁶, Russett warns that the decline of the hegemon may make difficult to promote new levels of cooperation capable to address new and more complex problems¹⁴⁷, as it happens with economy or climate change, as well as transnational terrorism.

The strong solidarist characteristics of the international society promoted by the hegemon, which has paid relevant attention to individual rights and democracy and liberty promotion, constituted a great challenge to accommodate China in its early stages, mainly after 1970s. The task to meet the "standard of civilisation" was accomplished through an unilateral accommodation strongly pushed by the international hierarchy. However, China's growing material power has made it stronger to turn this unilateral accommodation to a new process of change within the system. Therefore, nowadays China holds what Buzan has called mixed satisfaction towards the international society, with a strong support towards pluralist institutions of coexistence and

¹⁴⁴ LUCK, E. C., "American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from the 1990s" in R. FOOT et al. (eds.), *US Hegemony and International Organizations... op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁴⁵ FOOT, R. et al., "Introduction... op. cit.", p. 1. The authors support this claim with a quote of the former Director of the Policy Planning Staff under the Bush administration, Richard Hass that manifested that "multilateralism need not constrain our option[s], done right, it expands them".

¹⁴⁶ This discussion is broadly studied in the second chapter. Main works include KEOHANE, R. O., *After Hegemony... op. cit.*; KEOHANE, R. O., *Instituciones Internacionales y Poder Estatal... op. cit.*; KEOHANE, R. O. y L. MARTIN, "International Institutions... op. cit."

¹⁴⁷ RUSSETT, B., "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony... op. cit.", p. 222.

an attitude of contestation and opposition towards those that reinforce liberal solidarist values¹⁴⁸.

China's preference towards pluralist institutions marks its promotion of new organisations and regimes, with a clear resemble of its bilateral diplomacy that promoted development without any reference to national sovereign issues. Moreover, these new institutions rarely settle an open confrontation with the hegemon or its institutions, publicly promoting multilateralism and cooperation. However, some of these organisations actually confront the U.S.-led cooperation model, especially in development and security cooperation and seek to discredit and erode the model that the hegemon has promoted over the years.

It could be argued that recent Chinese push for new institutions constitutes an attempt to complete its process of accommodation. As Bukovansky argues, this process should be done through a search of common ideas by the dominant and rising powers¹⁴⁹. In the case of China, its accommodation was done through a process of institutional socialisation, with a growing involvement in global forums. Adopting Qin's terminology, the process of socialisation was not mutually transformative, but homogenising, and only transformed and integrated one of the subjects, China, as a result of the victory of one subject (the Western international society and the U.S.) over the other¹⁵⁰.

This practice is grounded on "complacency about the character, depth and sources" of the order that omits the possibility that rising powers may seek a development of an alternative system or, at least, a profound reform of the existing one¹⁵¹. In other words, it is a way of socialisation that only understands the rising power as a "norm taker" and failures to accommodate it as "norm makers"¹⁵², a definition that better fits due to recent Chinese attempts to build alternative institutions.

In its attempts to construct alternative institutions of global governance, China is pushing for an accommodation of middle and small powers that shows an important compromise towards the mutually inclusive processes that Qin describes, but also maintains a hierarchical role as financier and voter that resembles some hegemonic practices. In institutions, it could be concluded that China still reproduces some hegemonic and hierarchical practices to promote its alternative model. The practices of "mutually inclusive" processes, however, work less on institutions and more on the levels of identity and socialisation, as it will be addressed in the next chapter.

¹⁴⁸ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... *op. cit.*", p. 17.

¹⁴⁹ BUKOVANSKY, M., "The responsibility to accommodate... *op. cit.*", p. 87.

¹⁵⁰ QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", pp. 141-142.

¹⁵¹ BUKOVANSKY, M., "The responsibility to accommodate... *op. cit.*", p. 94.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 8

IDENTITY AND SOCIALISATION THROUGH RELATIONALITY. CHINA AND U.S. RELATIONS AS SOCIALISATION IN PROGRESS

As the previous chapter has advanced, identities and socialisation play an important role on the analysis of states' institutional practice. However, the logic of identity underlies not only in states' institutional practice on international society, but also in their willingness to legitimate certain narratives and rules, as chapter 9 will address. Despite their influence among material and social variables, identity and socialisation processes have been usually understudied, due the difficulties of taking them as explanatory categories¹ and the prevailing monolithic understanding of identity and otherness in the discipline. The influence of the Hegelian notion of otherness as mutually exclusive has permeated not only among realism, but on the majority of the discipline; therefore, it continuously reproduces exclusive notions of us and other theoretically and practically².

¹ ZEHFUSS, M., "Constructivism and Identity... *op. cit.*", pp. 92-114.

² Lebow offers an excellent description of how the hegelian view has permeated in the discipline and in international practice, as well as how it has been contested by liberals based on the kantian tradition. LEBOW, R. N., "Identity and International Relations", *International Relations*, Vol. 22, n° 5, 2008, pp. 473-492.

However, relying on alternative theoretical traditions, it is possible to argue that identities not only are not conflictual, but also could be inclusive, transformative and mutually socialised. On this task, several theories and scholars (mainly ascribed to constructivism, English School and different Chinese schools) converge and overlap in different ways, as it will be expressed in the first part of the chapter. Inevitably, notions of leadership, reproduction of identity and socialisation will be central, but a precise interpretation of the character of the contemporary international society in which this identities and process coexist is compulsory.

In a practical sense, the second part of the chapter will interpret and examine the different identities that both China and the United States produce and reproduce. At this point, it is accurate to adopt Cronin's notion of the paradox of hegemony that understands that the hegemon plays two identities in the international society, one as the hegemon itself (related to leadership and legitimacy) and another as a great power (related to power politics and, in Clark's view, primacy)³. The application of this dual-identity both to China and the U.S. will contribute to the understanding of the sometimes conflictual narratives they play, as well as identifying possible synergies and constructing non-hostile structures.

Finally, taking into account the described identities, the processes of socialisation will be studied on a processual model that addresses both states' influence in one another, as well as in the international society as a whole. Departing from the constructed notion of relational governance and processual relationality, it will be interpreted how both states socialise each other producing a new synergy, through a taxonomy of interests that highlights the differences in four different issues: global financial market and globalisation; bilateral trade; global leadership; and environmental issues.

8.1. An innovative approach towards identity. Relationality and two-way socialisation in a changing international society

Across the Western tradition of the discipline, identity and otherness have been usually based on the Hegelian notion of alter and ego. Even though Kantian approaches have gained important support among liberals, understanding identity relations as non-conflictual, its developments have neglected the mutually transformative nature of interaction between non-equals. Rooted on a Hegelian notion, realism and neorealism consider otherness towards other countries as a key constituent of national identity in an international system characterised by self-help. Therefore, states' inter-

³ CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony ... *op. cit.*", pp. 104-105.

ests are reduced to a main one, namely, guaranteeing their own security⁴. On the liberal tradition, proponents of theories as the Democratic Peace have a strong kantian influence and have developed an updated notion of otherness based in the liberal nature of the self and illiberal and authoritative notion of the other, therefore creating a dichotomy that reinforces the self's identity towards the threatening otherness⁵.

Differences aside, both realists and liberals in the broader sense understand identity through an ethnocentric and conflictual point of view. It is true that the definitions of identity, as a tool to distinguish the self and the other also contain specific definitions of interest, values and threats. However, the nature of identity should be understood as a process in motion that interacts, transforms and confronts with others in a constant change. Liberal and realist approaches, taking identities as given, assure the subject's ontological security⁶, as states know who its ally is and who its enemy. Alternative approaches as constructivism consider that, as identities are continuously changing and reproducing, this ontological security derives from patterns of behaviour generated by interaction and ascribed roles that produce a stable knowledge structure⁷.

Constructivism has developed an interesting focus on identity through a simple definition of the term as "the understanding of oneself in relationship to others". Moreover, the key factor is an understanding of identities as "social and relational (...) defined by the actor's interaction with and relationship to others"⁸ that raises the im-

⁴ LEBOW, R. N., "Identity and International Relations... *op. cit.*", p. 487; HOPF, T., "The Promise of Constructivism... *op. cit.*", p. 176.

⁵ LEBOW, R. N., "Identity and International Relations... *op. cit.*", p. 476. On this vein, Suzuki offers an interesting vision on how Chinese national identity is built towards Japan's, highlighting the role of victimhood on China's. SUZUKI, S., "The importance of 'Othering' in China's national identity: Sino-Japanese relations as a stage of identity conflicts", *The Pacific Century*, Vol. 20, n° 1, 2007, pp. 23-47.

⁶ The concept of ontological security refers to the security on social relations. It describes a situation in which the self feels secure, as the context of the interaction is under its cognitive control. In other words, it is a context that reproduces the experiences and expectations of the self. MITZEN, J., "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, n° 3, 2006, pp. 341-370; STEELE, B., *Ontological security in international relations. Self-identity and the IR state*, London, Routledge, 2008.

⁷ A broad analysis on how identities are studied in different traditions applied to the case of China and the United states could be found on PINTADO, M., "Identidad y Alteridad en un Mundo en Transformación... *op. cit.*". On a more general way, different scholars have addressed the role of identity, among which Katzenstein and Booth offer interesting approaches. KATZENSTEIN, P. J., *The culture of national security... op. cit.*; BOOTH, K., "Security and Self... *op. cit.*".

⁸ BARNETT, M. N., "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, n° 1, 1999, p. 9. It is important to note that among constructivists there coexist multiple understandings of identity. There are usually divided on two groups. On the one hand, there are conventional constructivist that address how national identity determines state's interests and behaviours, applying a positivist epistemology and pointing that there is a causal relations between identities and interests. On the other hand, there are critical constructivist that rely on a post-positivist epistemology to explain how the narratives of national identities become dominant and establish the limits of legitimate political action. MCDONALD, M., "Constructivism and Security" in P. WILLIAMS (ed.), *Security Studies. An introduction*, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 62-63.

portance of interactions and the environment in which takes place. However, a state does not hold a single identity, it holds several identities of different kind that it decides to play or discard depending on the other, the character of the interaction and the environment.

Hence, the multiplicity of identities highlights the biased character of a priori oppositional conceptions of identity. As Hopf suggests, it is true that the self and the other have differences, but the real academic challenge is to unfold how this difference is treated⁹. For this purpose, a turn towards theories such as constructivism and English School is nearly obvious, but it is also an opportunity to explore the accuracy of Chinese theories (sino-constructivist's exploration of inclusive relationships and also moral realism's leadership models).

The first step on this development is to understand the identity of the self as multidimensional, composed of several roles that the agent decides to play. Different types of identity involve diverse interests and call for different processes of recognition. Among the four types that constructivism enumerates (identity of existence, identity of type, identity of role and collective identity), the last two are highly dependent of outside recognition and require further analysis¹⁰. Both are dependent of others and, therefore, of the international society. Hence, the application of the concepts of role and collective identity to the case of China and the United States is especially convenient. Taking what Cronin has named as "the paradox of hegemony"¹¹ as the departing point, it is possible to notice the two different identities that the U.S. holds.

The first is U.S. role as the hegemon that could be identified as a role identity. Role identities exist only in relation of others and are extremely dependent of culture. In relation to this, Clark's definition of hegemony as an institutionalised and legitimated practice¹² clearly relates to the social nature of role identity. The hegemon's interests and values influence how this role identity is reproduced, as well as which kind of leadership type decides to play. Relying on Chinese ancient philosophy, Yan Xuetong identifies three types of leadership that are manifested through foreign policy behaviour. The first one, tyranny, refers to states whose foreign policy behaviour is extremely power-politics driven. It is based on strength and military strategies and inevitably generates enmities. Secondly, human authority refers to states guided by moral norms and constitutes the best type of leadership. Finally, hegemony, mixes characteristics of both, constitutes a human authority for allies and a tyranny for ene-

⁹ HOPF, T., *Social Construction of International Politics. Identities and Foreign Policies*, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, New York, Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 7.

¹⁰ The enumeration of the four kinds of identity relies of Feng's, that slightly transform Wendt's description. FENG Y., "The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the US", *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 1, n° 1, 2006, p. 88; WENDT, A., *Social Theory of International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 224.

¹¹ CRONIN, B., "The Paradox of Hegemony ... op. cit.", pp. 104-105.

¹² CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 34

mies.¹³ For Yan, the United States reproduces a hegemonic leadership, with a strong material pre-eminence, while China lacks material preponderance to overcome the hegemon and, more importantly, has a poor alliance system. Therefore, if China wants to succeed, it has to offer a better leadership model than the U.S., based on human authority, to gain others' support¹⁴. However, Yan's typology shows a romantic preference towards the concept of human authority that was also present in Xunzi's work. The importance of morality does not blur the clashing interests that states usually present, but defends that the success of an internal model has the potential to raise China to the pre-eminence on the system.

At this point, it is accurate to point out that China also plays a role identity in the international society. It is an identity as a rising power¹⁵ that involves certain relevant beliefs regarding its path to obtain a great power status that derive in new narratives, such as China's dream or peaceful development. The reproduction of the narrative, as will be explained in the second part of the chapter, does not only transform the role identity of the state, but also others' perceptions, and does inevitably mark its in-progress great power identity.

Secondly, going back to United States double and conflicting identities, Cronin points to its identity as a great power, related to its material capabilities and to Clark's definition of primacy¹⁶. Undoubtedly, the identity as a great power is related to hegemony, but transcends it, as it establishes a club with other states. In other words, while hegemony was an exclusive identity, only held by the U.S., the identity as a great power is shared and reproduced within a group as a collective identity. Moreover, it could be argued that even China also holds this identity, but in a different (and sometimes conflicting) way. It should be noted that great power constitutes a collective identity and not a type identity, as type identities are intrinsic to actors and exist even in the absence of others¹⁷. Even if both states' material capabilities do not need external recognition, the identity as a great power also involves certain social characteristics, namely, the practice of special responsibilities. The inclusion on the club of great powers is not automatic, it is a membership that should be accepted and reinforced through practice. In this vein, China's membership among the club of great powers has been an issue of special concern. Its lack of involvement on foreign affairs

¹³ QIN Y. y YAN X., "Pensamiento Chino y Relaciones Internacionales... *op. cit.*", p. 15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Even if the identity as a rising power is defined as a role identity, it should be noted that China and other states have also pushed to transform it into a collective identity. However, it is still a second rank identity, as China prefers to reproduce itself as a leader of the rising states (role identity), while exploiting the collective identity of these rising power just as an internal cohesion tool within the group.

¹⁶ In Clark's view, primacy refers only to a unipolar distribution of power, while hegemony implies institutionalisation, legitimacy as well as a social relation among states. CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 34. This topic is broadly discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

¹⁷ WENDT, A., *Social Theory of International Relations... op. cit.*, p. 226.

before the Hu Jintao's leadership raised concerns that still prevail on the capacity of the country as a responsible stakeholder, as it will be later discussed.

Hence, for the U.S., its identity as great power clashes with its role identity as hegemon, as sometimes its interests are conflictual. In this cases, the United States, must decide which identity it plays. As in the case of the Iraq war, the hegemon decided to activate its great power identity and confronted the one public goods it has provided as a hegemon, international institutions. This behaviour, in practice, eroded hegemony, showing the difficult balance between both identities, that are reproduced both nationally and internationally.

The relevance of the role and collective identities of both states is more evident in their interactions. Obviously, the identity that each state decides to play in a certain moment activates different interests and generates differentiated processes of interaction and possible socialisation. For example, United States promotion of free trade on the Pacific area through the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) constituted an effort to strengthen the provision of one of the most relevant public goods that the hegemon has provided. Even if it excluded China, it should be framed on the activation of its identity as a hegemon. However, its willingness to withdraw from the treaty and its promotion of bilateral agreements are related to its identity as a great power, and confronts its interests as hegemon as well as erodes its leadership. In response to this, China has decided to reinforce its identity as a rising power with growing international responsibilities that aims to assure free international trade and global development, and in practice has contributed to socialise its rising power identity (or, in Yan's terminology, as a human authority) while contributing to the hegemon's discredit¹⁸.

As this example shows, the importance of interaction and socialisation goes beyond identities and usually involves daily international practice. The dynamics of identity relationship could not be divided from how international society is understood. Theories that define identities as exclusive are based on an understanding of international society as an entity. Identity change, under this view, generates a new synthesis that results in homogenisation. In sharp contrast, Qin proposes to define international society as a process, therefore transforming "the understanding of identity formation and institutional acceptance"¹⁹. Defending that "identity, like society, is

¹⁸ In the 2016 APEC Summit held in Peru, President Xi Jinping stressed China's commitment to global development and free trade through multilateral inclusive agreements, in contrast to United States' calls for bilateralism. Moreover, Xi multiplied its efforts to foster the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) that involves all the APEC members and at the same time announced more openness on Chinese economy: "For any regional trade arrangement to gain broad support, it must be open, inclusive and beneficial to all. We need to put in place a framework for regional cooperation featuring equal consultation, joint participation and shared benefits. Closed and exclusive arrangement is not the right choice. (...) We will pursue an opening-up strategy with greater resolve and foster a wide-ranging, deeper and multi-faceted environment of opening-up". GLOBAL TIMES, "Keynote speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the APEC CEO Summit", Lima, 19th November 2016, <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1019023.shtml>> [22nd November 2016].

¹⁹ QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", p. 141.

becoming rather than being”, Qin defines international society as process of intersubjective relations in continuous motion²⁰. At these point, Qin’s theory points to the process as the key to achieve a positive transformation of identities²¹.

Hence, this process of socialisation that gains attention differs from the usual one-way socialization that was shown, for example, on emerging states dynamics to reach the standard of civilisation. Qin proposes that the process should be symbiotic and inter-constitutive, with a circular and holistic constitution, containing Chinese dialectics of change and inclusiveness that differ from the Hegelian ones²².

Mainstream theories of socialisation have focused on a unidirectional patter of socialisation that aimed to change the socialisee by making it achieve a compliance with the existing international society. As Epstein notes, this process is characterised by infantilisation, as the socialiser presumes that the socialisee “holds no prior legitimate authority” or that its identity needs to be modelled²³. A closer look at the processes of socialisation, especially those involving rising powers, evidences the absence of analysis of the impact of the socialisee in the socialising states and also in the environment in which the process takes place, the international society²⁴. Therefore, emerging states like China have completed the first round of socialisation by acquiring the Western exigency of the “standard of civilisation” and are now pushing to achieve the second way of socialisation, its transformation of the socialised Western states and the whole of the international society. As Thies notes, the case of China evidences the coexistence of both notions of socialisation and competition, being at the same time an emerging and emerged country, or, in other words, being defined sometimes as pro-status quo and other as reformist or even revisionist²⁵.

In this second wave of socialisation, there exists an opportunity to apply the notion of relational governance. Against the rational governance model of the first socialisation, relational governance is constituted of a process of negotiation of socio-political agreements to rule the complex relation beneath the international society.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

²² QIN Y., “Relationality and processual construction... *op. cit.*”, pp. 9-10.

²³ EPSTEIN, C., “Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 13, n° 2, 2012, p. 142.

²⁴ PU X., “Socialisation as a Two-way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5, n° 4, 2012, p. 345.

²⁵ THIES, C. G., “China’s Rise and the Socialisation of Rising Powers”, *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 8, n° 3, 2015, p. 287. *Vid.*, TERHALLE, M., “Reciprocal Socialization: Rising Powers and the West”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 12, n° 4, 2011, pp. 341-361. Along with this debate between status quo and revisionist, Suzuki identifies a parallel tension between those who call for an Occidentalism that assumes Western dominance and ask for more steps to adequate to its standard and others that understand that China has to build its own great power identity without taking into account the Western standards. SUZUKI, S., “Journey to the West... *op. cit.*”.

This way, order derives from a reciprocal and cooperative behaviour that is reinforced by mutual trust and a shared understanding of social norms and human morality²⁶.

Relational governance discards the rationalists' focus on structures and concentrates on processes and its units of analysis, relations. Relations between two opposing individuals (or states) do not need to be conflictual. On the contrary, relational governance understands that both can evolve together to form a new harmonious synthesis that reunited elements of the two. In Chinese tradition, the more representative example of this kind of relation, or metarrelation in Qin's terminology, is the yin-yang, which through an interaction based on the *zhongyong* or mutually inclusive way, both poles achieve harmony²⁷.

This approach is particularly accurate in emphasising the importance of processes and not outcomes. Relations and processes are the most transformative on identities, whereas outcomes usually suppose more static and positional. In the case of China, for example, its process of socialisation into the Western international society was traumatic, with strong homogenisation forces. Even if it successfully integrated, achieving the outcome, the process was so traumatic that it is still recurrent in Chinese rhetoric²⁸.

The blur of the differences between the agents and objects of socialisation constitutes a first step to establish this alternative perspective prior to the last steps of accommodation of rising powers into the global international society. However, it is true that in the early stages of development of rising powers, socialisation usually occurs in a one way pattern. Once emerging states do meet the requirements of Western states, the process is considered as complete. Nevertheless, the second stage of socialisation is still in progress, and starts once these emerging states have a growing influence in the system, mainly acquired by forming alliances with other states. This way, they gain sufficient influence to construct and progressively socialise its alternative vision to transform the international system, although always at the margins, as the hegemon maintains a strong control and influence on the system²⁹.

²⁶ Qin distinguishes expressly rational and relational governance, as it is described in depth in Chapter 4. On the one hand, rational governance has a legal character and is based on rationality, egoism and contractual rules. On the other hand, relational governance has a social nature and is based on relationality, morality and trust. QIN Y., "Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*" p. 85; QIN Y., "Rule, Rules, and Relations... *op. cit.*", p. 137.

²⁷ QIN Y., "Cultura y pensamiento global... *op. cit.*" pp. 82-83.

²⁸ Processes of socialisation into the European International Society differed from one state to another. As Zhang remembers, Japan and Siam's socialisation involved also recognition of their equality, sovereignty and independence by European states that decided to decline their extraterritorial privileges in these Eastern countries. However, in the case of China, its adaptation to meet the European requirements was, at least, traumatic, in a process that has been termed as "the century of humiliation". Moreover, Western powers decided not to withdraw from China until 1943, even if the country had met most of its requirement to "civilise" several years before. ZHANG Y., "China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of 'Civilization'", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, n° 1, 1991, p. 6.

²⁹ PU X., "Socialisation as a Two-way Process...*op. cit.*", pp. 354-355, 360 (n. 102).

Therefore, the second stage of the socialisation processes is also an opportunity for the rising state to socialise its alternative vision of the international society. Through transformation within the society, the emerging state permeates its interest and values that would be present of the alternative international society that it prefers. This is not to say that all emerging powers want and do construct this alternative international society. Only states with the sufficient material and social power that feel themselves constrained and harmed by the distribution of gains in the system will decide to accomplish this task. At this point, one of the main questions that should be addressed is to what extent China is taking advantage of this second stage of socialisation to spread and construct its own alternative international society and deslegitimate the current one dominated by the United States.

8.2. The United States in international society. The balance between hegemony and great power status

It is widely known that the nexus between national and international politics in the United States usually gets blurred. Interests in both realms are often related, conflictual or reinforced. Moreover, American foreign policy decisions have traditionally addressed questions of identity and answered questions as complex as “who we are”³⁰. The Cold War period was particularly useful in reinforcing both realms. The existence of a common and consensuated threat created unity through a permanent state of alarm thanks to the ontological security provided by this conflict. However, the end of the Cold War supposed an ontological anxiety over a new role in global politics and, more importantly, over the disappearance of the confronting narrative³¹. However, it did not produce an automatic break in the narrative of the self of the U.S. Even if it was highly dependent of the oppositional USSR, it missed the opportunity to restructure its narrative in a non-oppositional way but, on the contrary, it decided to look for another adversary that was inconsistent until the 2001 terrorist attacks gave rise to Islamist radical terrorism as the threatening other³².

Therefore, the end of the Cold War has exacerbated the tension between, on the one hand, its identity as a benign hegemon, related to multilateralism, institutional practice and the provision of public goods and, on the other hand, its systemic primacy, that activates unilateral, exceptional and elitist practices. As a result, the hegemon combines rhetorics of multilateralism and equality with others activating its rights to act unilaterally arguing its exceptional nature.

³⁰ MAY, E., “Who we are?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, n° 2, 1994, p. 135.

³¹ GUZZINI, S. (ed.), *The Return of Geopolitics to Europe. Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 45-46.

³² CAMPBELL, D., *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

8.2.1. *The United States as benign hegemon. Liberal multilateralism through institutional cooperation*

United States' material primacy has successfully achieved a socialisation of its hegemonic model to all the international society. The socialisation of the liberal hegemonic order has translated the importance of constitutionality, liberalism and democratic values through and institutional multilateral network that has also suffered the hegemon's exceptionality. This way, after WWII, the multiplication of institutions that culminated in the end of the Cold War raised the rhetoric of benign hegemony. Despite its enormous power resources, the hegemon is not seen as threatening, but as "an indispensable ally"³³.

However, these calls of benevolence are not rooted in the distinctiveness of U.S. ideas about liberty or individual rights³⁴. Against these romantic claims of benevolence, this author understands that benign hegemony is based on the practice of multilateralism, human rights and liberty through a constitutional order that restrains the hegemon's power. Even in the sharpest era of United States interventionism, the hegemon has employed the argument of liberty.

In the exercise of hegemony, the United States has to cope with the integrated global order it has created, based on the multilateral institutions, international law practices and the dialogue between the diverse states and non state actors that have multiplied after the WWII³⁵. Undoubtedly, the hegemon has the capabilities to promote consensus in multilateral issues and has an exceptional ability to prompt a committed international society³⁶. Due to the exercise of this capacity and the growing international society that the hegemon constructed versus its threatening soviet other, the U.S. has sometimes been considered as a benign hegemon. However, perhaps the most important characteristic to describe it was not its multilateral or institutional engagement, but its compromise to restrain the exercise of its power. With an extensive portfolio of material capabilities, it is its commitment to the solidarist elements of this hegemonic international society what restrains its power. As Ikenberry explains, "the distinctive way in which democracy and international institutions have provided

³³ BATTISTELLA, D., "The Post-Cold War Order... *op. cit.*", p. 15.

³⁴ However, Kitchen and Cox claim that there exists an assumption that the U.S "would be seen as benign because, quite simply, the United States is benign – a truth that rests on distinctively American ideas about the special nature of their own nation and the universality of ideas of liberty". KITCHEN, N and M. COX, "Illusions of Empire and the Spectre of Decline" in I. OARMAR et al. (eds.), *New Directions in US Foreign Policy*, New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 242.

³⁵ RUGGIE, J. G., "Doctrinal Unilateralism and its Limits: America and Global Governance in the New Century", *Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative*, Harvard University, Working Paper No. 16, 2006, <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_16_ruggie.pdf> [15th December 2016], p. 1.

³⁶ KOH, H. H., "America's Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism" in M. IGNATIEFF (ed.), *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 119.

the United States with mechanisms to make itself less threatening to the rest of the world"³⁷ are the base of the notion of benign hegemony.

Moreover, despite its restraint on its exercise of power, the hegemon takes advantage of several techniques to attract and socialise other states onto its order. The provision of public goods has been among the main techniques, and could be divided in two. Firstly, the international economic order, that reunites around the Bretton Woods system and comes into practice in two level, namely, a capitalist alliance between the hegemon and Europe, Japan and some East Asian States and, in another level, through an authoritarian capitalism in the third world. Secondly, the U.S. has provided an international political order characterised by a collective defence equilibrium and alliances in political and military level between its allies, while at the same time promoting and sustaining authoritarian political regimes that converge with Western interests³⁸.

Besides these techniques, Ikenberry highlights the capacity of institutional co-operation and the stability of constitutional orders to sustain and reinforce hegemony³⁹, in which the dynamics of legitimacy play a crucial role. Therefore, once the order does not serve the hegemon's interest, its identity as a benign hegemon begins to blur and exceptionalist and unilateral practices appear. However, the U.S. continues to invoke this identity in its practices and argues that its unilateral actions, as in Iraq, reinforce its provision of global security and assure a more peaceful, libertarian and humanitarian future for these nations. These claims, reinforced through theoretical works about the prospects of democratic peace generate tensions that erode both the constitutional order and the role of the U.S. as a benign hegemon.

This tension manifest U.S. willingness to maintain the constitutional order that locks its exercise of power and provides long term benefits by constraining the direct gains it could obtain with a unilateral hegemonic action. However, the dichotomy between national and international interests practiced through unilateralism and multilateral constitutionalism beneath this tension is false, because in practice is this multilateral constitutionalist what provides more benefits to the hegemon and, more importantly, with less costs. However, if the tools through which the U.S. influences this order (institutions, capitalist world order, globalisation) collapse or are gradually eroding, the mediation of the constitutional order disappears and the hegemon opts to function as a unipole.

The importance of the strengthening of the identity of benign hegemon and the practices related to the constitutional order transcend U.S. hegemony. The contemporary international society in transition needs to take advantage of these tools to reform itself and accommodate new powers as well as new dynamics and practices. The plas-

³⁷ IKENBERRY, G. J., "American Power and the Empire... *op. cit.*", p. 194.

³⁸ MUCHIE, M. and LI X., "The Myths and Realities of the Rising Powers... *op. cit.*", p. 54.

³⁹ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*

ticity of this constitutional order is, therefore, vital, as well as U.S. commitment to it. When its exercise of power was distant, indirect, ideational and institutional, the U.S. enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy that has been eroding because of its exceptional and interventionist exercise of power after the 9/11⁴⁰.

8.2.2. United States as a unilateral hegemon. American exceptionalism and foreign policy.

Even considering the youth of the U.S. as a nation, the country's national identity has an important articulation and (re)construction of its identity based on an exaltation of its values. In these processes, foreign policy plays a key role on feeding back this dynamic. Exceptionalism, as well as unilateral practices, constitutes the dominant rhetoric, although the derivative anti-americanist rhetoric is also prominent and has gained special attention in recent years⁴¹.

In Crockatt's opinion, both exceptionalism and anti-americanism are interrelated phenomena. In his view, after the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was an exaltation of American exceptionalism. In response to it, anti-americanism arose as a consequence of the unilateral actions derived from exceptionalism⁴². However, both exceptionalism and anti-americanism have different roots. On the one hand, exceptionalism expresses a sentiment of distinctiveness of American identity and culture that sometimes even considers the U.S. as a civilisation whose main achievements are the spread and defence of modern society's values and liberties.

On the other hand, anti-Americanism relates to the image of the U.S. that external actors have. Concretely, Katzenstein and Keohane define it as "a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the U.S. and of American society in general" drawing on "cognitive, emotional, and normative elements"⁴³. However, several authors consider that these negative opinions are based on the legitimacy bestowed to the U.S.

⁴⁰ BEESON, M. and R. HIGGOTT, "Hegemony, institutionalism and US foreign policy: theory and practice in comparative historical perspective", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, n° 7, 2005, p. 1176.

⁴¹ Prominent works on this topic include KATZENSTEIN, P. J. and R. O. KEOHANE (eds.), *Anti-Americanism in World Politics*, New York, Cornell University Press, 2007; HOLLANDER, P. (ed.), *Understanding Anti-Americanism. Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad*, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2004; BERMAN, R. A., *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem*, California, Hoover Institution Press, 2004; CROCKATT, R., *America Embattled. September 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Global Order*, London, Routledge, 2003; ROSS, A. and K. ROSS (eds.), *Anti-Americanism*, New York, New York University Press, 2004.

⁴² CROCKATT, R., *After 9/11: Cultural dimensions of American global power*, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 13-14.

⁴³ KATZENSTEIN, P. J. and R. O. KEOHANE (eds.), *Anti-Americanism... op. cit.*, p. 12.

hegemonic institution⁴⁴, understanding the phenomenon from a social and institutional vision, while Katzenstein and Keohane rely on a socio-physiological approach.

The belief on a nation's exceptionality is a emotion that is spread across the world in all countries. As several authors highlight, British, French, Germans, Japanese or Chinese also stress this sentiment of exceptionality that has crossed nation-state boundaries⁴⁵. However, in no so many places there exist a sense of exceptionality so rooted in politics, economics and society as in the United States. Paraphrasing Ruggie's famous quote, what is more important in this case is *American* exceptionalism⁴⁶. In other words, it can be argued that American exceptionalism presents differentiated and even exacerbated characteristics that differ from other national brands of exceptionalism, and this distinct attributes influence in a high degree its international behaviour and its practice of hegemony.

In a general sense, exceptionalism is defined as the unique qualities that differentiate one country from another⁴⁷. In the case of America, this term becomes more complex and could be defined as a foundational narrative that "holds that the United States has a unique place in history, differing fundamentally and qualitatively from all other countries" and bestowed with "a "God-given destiny" to guide the rest of the world according to the mainstream U.S. political, social, and economic worldview⁴⁸. Therefore, American exceptionalism has not only rhetorical and national use, but has a reflection in its foreign policy practice and in its understanding of international society. As a result, American exceptionalism is inherently related to the global project that is United States' institution of hegemony.

In Deudney and Meiser's opinion, the main reason of American exceptionality is its intense liberal character that has taken advantage of its international success to become globally socialised and internalised⁴⁹. According to Hoffman, its main argu-

⁴⁴ Several constructivist and English School scholars refer to the hegemon's lost of legitimacy. *Vid.* CLARK, I., "China and the United States... *op. cit.*"; FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy... *op. cit.*"; HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*"; REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*".

⁴⁵ WALT, S. M., "The Myth of American Exceptionalism", *Foreign Policy*, nº 189, November 2011, pp. 72-75; FENG, Z., "The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 19, nº 2, 2013, pp. 305-328. In this section, there will be used the phrase "American Exceptionalism" instead of "U.S. Exceptionalism". Even if the author prefers, along all the work, the use of United States instead of America, in this section it is considered that the use of the name of the continent instead of the official name of the country is itself a characteristic and expression of this exceptionalism.

⁴⁶ The original quote refers to American hegemony. RUGGIE, J. G. (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters... op. cit.*, p. 593. However, Walt states that there is a myth on the exceptional character of American Exceptionalism. WALT, S. M., "The Myth of American Exceptionalism... *op. cit.*", p. 72.

⁴⁷ FENG, Z., "The rise of Chinese exceptionalism... *op. cit.*", p. 306.

⁴⁸ LIPSET, S. M., *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1996; NAYAK, M. V. and C. MALONE, "American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 11, nº 2, 2009, p. 254.

⁴⁹ DEUDNEY, D. and J. MEISER, "American exceptionalism" in M. COX and D. STOKES (eds.), *US Foreign Policy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 25

ments could be summarised on four: the superiority of U.S. constitution; U.S. benevolent imperialism; its role as responsible for world order; and its military superiority⁵⁰. As it has been explored in the previous section, it is true that U.S. hegemony has provided a degree of constitutionality to the international society in the forms of agreed rules, institutions and informal practices. However, the hegemon is also bound by these, even if it considers its national rules as superior.

In practice, these kind of tensions often arise and are not easily solved. It is possible to distinguish four faces of American exceptionalism that give rise to different situations of tension⁵¹. The first is the distinctive rights culture of the U.S., inheritors of its political, historical, economic and social tradition. Koh admits that this rights culture is highly consistent with the universal human rights values, and concludes that American exceptionalism does not affect deeply to the global Human Rights⁵². However, what Koh does not address is the relation between American notion of human rights and global ones, as the influence of Western notion of society and human rights on the global one⁵³.

The second face regards America's tendency to use different labels to describe synonymous concepts, maintaining an integrationist cultural distinctiveness that does not use the globally agreed standards. Despite complicating the dialogue and the sharing of statistics, this feature turns even sharper when the U.S. coins new labels to describe the reality (pre-emptive war or axis of the devil, for example) that often become universal.

The third face of American exceptionalism is its exclusionary treaty practice or, in other words, its exemptionism⁵⁴. Though different mechanism (non-ratification, ratification with reservations and non-self executing treaty doctrine) the hegemon is not bound by several institutional and legal mechanism that are widely accepted as the Rome Statute or the Convention on the Rights of the Child⁵⁵. In other cases, the United States does not feel bound by its rules and decides to contravene them, as in

⁵⁰ HOFFMANN, S., "American Exceptionalism: The New Version" in M. IGNATIEFF (ed.), *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 229-230.

⁵¹ The four faces of American exceptionalism are fully discussed in KOH, H. H., "America's Jekyll-and-Hyde ... *op. cit.*", pp. 113-117.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁵³ For a deeper analysis of the relativism of universal Human Rights see, among others, AN-NA'IM, A. A. (ed.) *Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992; DONNELLY, J., "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 6, n° 4, 1984, pp. 400-419; DONNELLY, J., "The Relative Universality of Human Rights", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 29, n° 2, 2007, pp. 281-306; DUNNE, T. and N. J. WHEELER (eds.), *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

⁵⁴ The term exemptionalist is used, for example, by Ignatieff. IGNATIEFF, M., "Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights" in M. IGNATIEFF (ed.), *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 4.

⁵⁵ The case of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1980) is perhaps the most striking one, as the United States is the only state that has not ratified it, just signed.

the cases of Geneva Treaties or on the decision to go to war against Iraq without the UNSC approval.

Finally, the four and most problematic face of American exceptionalism is its double standard. It is a practice that, relying on the three previous faces, defends the application of different standards for the United States and its allies. Even if, to some extent, the practice of these double standards benefits the U.S. in the practical cases, it could be argued that the continuous application of these double standards disempowers the hegemon by weakening its moral authority and its legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of the rules themselves⁵⁶.

The rise of what has been term as “new exceptionalism” in this decade deserves special attention. This new exceptionalism has a different feature and now refers to “being, remaining, and acting as the only superpower” due to its military primacy, and not ideals or missions⁵⁷. Even if this new brand was completely put in practice after the 9/11, the rise of global terrorism was the cause that the doctrine of exceptionalism was looking for⁵⁸. Mixing force and faith, this new exceptionalism came into practice with the Bush administration’s doctrine rooted in a strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism⁵⁹, mixing its identity as an exceptional and benign power.

To underpin this new exceptional identity linked to its role identity as a superpower, the U.S. has used rhetorical and identitarian tools such as the creation of threats and the discourses of fear. After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet other, the U.S. has opted to articulate its threat discourses in a multiple and fragmented way. This way, the government can diversify the arguments that support the emergency actions that are deployed after the securitisation. This way, the securitisation of multiple threats⁶⁰ reinforces internally the U.S. national identity and, externally, tries to legitimate the hegemon’s foreign policy

As the foreign policy practices of this century demonstrates, this new exceptionalism has, from its beginning, an extremely close relation with unilateralism, as often these unilateral actions have been justified by the exceptionality of America⁶¹. This points out to the importance of redefining the U.S. identity to transform its global

⁵⁶ KOH, H. H., “America’s Jekyll-and-Hyde... *op. cit.*”, p. 118. In this vein, Hurd argues that United States recent unilateral actions seek for a legitimization of new norms, especially in the case of norms of pre-emption. HURD, I., “Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*”.

⁵⁷ HOFFMANN, S., “American Exceptionalism... *op. cit.*”, p. 229.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 232; RUGGIE, J. G., “Doctrinal Unilateralism... *op. cit.*”, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Koh attributes this quote to the former Secretary of State during Clinton Administration, Strobe Talbott. KOH, H. H., “America’s Jekyll-and-Hyde... *op. cit.*”, p. 127.

⁶⁰ Several threats can be identified. For example, in the military field, terrorist groups and several governments (Iraq, Afghanistan); firstly Japan and now China have been targeted as economic threats; and, finally, Russia and again China as ideological threats. PINTADO, M., “Identidad y Alteridad en un Mundo en Transformación... *op. cit.*”, p. 100.

⁶¹ BORJIAN, T., “The Problems With American Exceptionalism”, *Cornell International Affairs Review*, Vol. 5, nº 1, 2011, <<http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1220/the-problems-with-american-exceptionalism>> [20th December 2016].

involvement, as well as its relations with emerging countries like China. Otherwise, if the United States continues behaving unilaterally it will show a misunderstanding on how international society works, as it believes that there does not apply any legitimacy constraint to its use of power⁶². As Ruggie argues, the Iraq war is the perfect example of the absence of relation between power and legitimacy as well as a reminder of the role of legitimacy on the deployment of force. If the U.S. decides to omit this advises, the concentration of power in its hands will constitute a risk for the international society⁶³.

8.3. China in international society

China's recent accommodation in the international society and the identities in play in its international practice are quite important to explore the future role of the country. Moreover, Chinese identity is evolving together with its role and its material power, which adds difficulty to the complex Chinese case. In a general sense, the identity of a state as a rising power is an important narrative in-progress that will mark not only what kind of power China decides to be, but also how other states tackle with its rise. The Chinese government is aware of this and has put a strong effort on rhetorically redirecting its discourses abroad through narratives as the peaceful rise/development and China dream, displacing other relating to the China threat or those of victimisation.

The construction of identity of emerging states, even if they share important characteristics, differ from one state to another. The case of China is surely the more iconic and complex, as it nowadays mixes characteristics from a rising state and a great power. Moreover, arenas in which great powers interact are crucial for the identity of the rising China to expand, reshape and dialogue with others. In Thies words, rising powers and great powers are shaped by different socialisation pressures. He defines emerging powers as those that are moving towards great powers and are expanding their roles while, at the same time, suffering high pressures of socialisation. Great power status, on the contrary, does not suffer socialisation pressure but engages in competition with its peers that, in practice, results in transformation and continuity at the same time⁶⁴. In the case of China, its complexity generates a tension between its emerging power identity and, also, its status as a great power with wide regional and global interests and goals that, in practice, is capable to achieve.

As its integration in international society has not been fully completed, its analysis should always look closely to its double situation. This calls for a "sophisti-

⁶² RUGGIE, J. G., "Doctrinal Unilateralism... *op. cit.*", p. 1.

⁶³ DUNNE, T., "Society and Hierarchy... *op. cit.*", p. 306.


⁶⁴ THIES, C. G., "China's Rise and the Socialisation... *op. cit.*", p. 289.

cated approach” that notices both its challenge to international society as well as its stakeholder behaviour⁶⁵. However, this makes more complex the future institutionalisation and dissemination of China’s values, because its progressive compliance with the existing structures of international society that have been slightly transformed may erode its capacity to challenge them. In other words, its progressive compliance as a norm taker may erode its future role as a norm maker⁶⁶.

On capturing the complexity of China’s identity, Chan discards the notion of a single Chinese identity and defends that there are multiple and blended. Hence, he identifies six prominent identities that have been played and reinforced by the government and, even if they surged in different times and contexts, still influence the blended contemporary Chinese identity.

Although every state has a changing influence in the contemporary identities, the last three stages could be targeted as the more influential ones. The reform and opening up state should be understood in a contest of a growing Chinese participation on the Western international society and the accomplishment of the most important reforms that lay the foundations for China’s rise. Its influence is still evident in the two stages of identity that will be analysed: its rising power identity based on peaceful rise and its identity as a responsible great power.

Figure 16: Transitional Stages of China’s International Identities⁶⁷. Own elaboration based on Chan’s classification



⁶⁵ ZHANG X., “China in the conception of international society: the English School’s engagements with China”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, n° 2, 2012, p. 783.

⁶⁶ CLARK, I., “International Society and China... *op. cit.*”, pp. 333-334.

⁶⁷ CHAN, G., “Capturing China’s International Identity: Social Evolution and Its Missing Links”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, n° 2, 2014, pp. 265 and 275.

8.3.1. China as the leader of emerging powers. Rising power identity as a way of socialisation among "equals"

Even if the concept of rising powers is not new, as states like Germany, Japan and, more evidently the United States were considered as rising powers, the complexity and relevance of the concept has sharply risen. One of the main reasons, despite the multiplication and synergies among these states, is that the environment in which they rise is no longer the same. As Buzan and Cox note, China rises in an environment in which a total war among great powers' is highly unlikely because of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the United States took advantage of both conflicts to mainly eliminate all the rising and status quo states without fighting in its own land and evolved from rising state to hegemon⁶⁸.

A rising state, understood as a state that is rising to become a great power, faces a double phenomenon once the international society recognises that it fits into this category. Firstly, it gains prestige and is growingly involved in more relevant discussions, has a growing diplomatic relevance and its interests are considered more important. In the case of the BRICS, their growing influence as a group has increased some states' influence, especially South Africa and Brazil, that were considered regionally but less globally. Secondly, the state labelled as rising power has to face international society's growing prudence and caution, as status quo powers and neighbours often see the growth in military and economic terms as a challenge and threat⁶⁹.

Therefore, the rising power is a transitional stage between major state and great power, and experiences important changes on its beliefs and behaviour. However, Pu contends that, even if rising powers disagree in several normative issues of the international society, this dissatisfaction is not channelled through and viable alternative vision of the order they prefer⁷⁰. However, as previous chapter have outlined, it is possible to trace the first steps of China's alternative vision, not only through its efforts to develop its material power, but especially through a growing concern on building alternative non-Western alternatives to global problems, in traditional institutions and also in the new ones it is building, and through its new narratives that contests agreed concepts as emergence, hegemony or development. Despite this, Pu's opinion should not be discarded, as it is accurate in the case of most rising powers. In the case of China, its progressive development of a coherent alternative vision evidences its dual nature as a rising power and a great power or, in other words, the tension between a status quo state in several forums and a reformist/revisionist.

⁶⁸ BUZAN, B, y M. COX, "China and the US... *op. cit.*", p. 129.

⁶⁹ MILLER, M. C., "The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Power... *op. cit.*", pp. 211 and 216.

⁷⁰ PU X., "Socialisation as a Two-way Process... *op. cit.*", pp. 361-362.

In its task of consistently building a identity as a rising power, states like China develop three main beliefs that gradually fit with the behaviour that these states play. The first type of behaviour that the rising state accomplishes is an increase of its material capabilities, especially economic and military. To respond to this increase, the rising state must reconcile its capabilities with the constraints that the international society establishes, otherwise its behaviour will be only framed in terms of threat. This material rise generates a multiplication of its goals, as it is capable to success in arenas that previously were unachievable.

Regarding this, the second behaviour relates to a multiplication of its national interests that increase in scope and complexity. Simultaneously to its rise, the international society demands a greater involvement from the rising state, which is forced to take growing global responsibilities. However, this behaviour should be addressed through transformative beliefs that recognise these growing responsibilities and interest and also shows respect from the hierarchies that exist in the system. In this vein, neighbour states and status quo powers constitute the most important audiences that the rising state has to address, contextualising these behaviours on a greater context of these states' goals and purposes. Finally, the rising power simultaneously engages on behaviours of internal recognition of its changing status while, at the same time, become more contested internally in relation to its role. In response to this, the rising state develops new narratives to explain the goals underlying its international behaviour⁷¹.

In this transition, the rising state experiences a high production of narratives supporting these beliefs. In the case of China, the growing influence of the discipline of International Relations, as have been explored in Chapter 4, has had an important relation with its rise. However, other narratives have also gained attention, both internally and externally. To respond to the recurrent narrative of the China threat⁷², the Hu Jintao administration accurately developed the notion of peaceful rise/development⁷³, that has been spread through all international society, although nowadays is less recurrent in leaders' speeches.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 217 and 219.

⁷² MENGES, C. C., *China: The Gathering Threat... op. cit. Vid.* PINTADO, M., "Identidad y Alteridad en un Mundo en Transformación... op. cit."; PAN C., *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics Western Representations of China's Rise*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015.

⁷³ In its origins, peaceful rise was the original term as developed by Zheng Bijian in 2003. It became popular in leaders speeches and even president Hu Jintao recurrently used it. However, after a meeting prior to the Baoa Forum, the CCP leaders decided to soften it and replace it with "peaceful development", strengthening China's commitment with a peaceful and stable international system but avoiding the notion of rise. A deeper description of the events can be found on GLASER, B. S. and E. S. MEDEIROS, "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise'", *The China Quarterly*, nº 190, 2007, pp. 291-310.

Figure 17. Comparison between the major rhetorics of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations. Own elaboration

HU JINTAO (2002-2012)	XI JINPING (2013-....)
Peaceful Rise/Development	China Dream (internal)
	Striving for Achievement (mixed)
	New Type of Great Power Relationship (external)
Defensive	Transformative

This narrative, focused on external audiences, could be targeted as successful, but the maturity of the country as a rising state marked a change on the Xi Jinping administration. Along with the demise of the peaceful rise narrative, Xi's administration produced three interrelated concepts that address both internal contestation and external environment. Firstly, the China Dream was an appeal to internal audiences, emphasising China's glorious past. Secondly, both the narratives of "Striving for achievement" (calling for an internal rejuvenation while actively transforming the international environment. Finally, the "new type of great power relations" supposed rhetoric to international audiences⁷⁴. However, what marks a different are not the changes of the narratives, but the turn from a defensive discourse (peaceful rise) to active and transformative ones (striving for achievement and new type of great power relationships). This debates take place in crucial moments in which the path to become a great power is contested. Or, saying it differently, these debates respond to the question of which kind of great power should China be⁷⁵.

The origins of the narrative of peaceful rise recall the discourse of the China threat that became common in academic, political and media circles since the end of the 90's. This discourse fulfilled the objective of creating a powerful otherness after the demise of the Soviet Union and was especially popular among neorealists⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ The review of the three main narratives of Xi Jinping administration, with especial attention to the last one, can be found on MILLER, M. C., "The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Power... *op. cit.*", p. 219.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁷⁶ Based on the realist claim that the surplus derived from China's economic rise will be used on military investment, these discourses content that China is modernising its military to confront and beat the U.S. and establish a imperial hegemony. BERNSTEIN, R. and R. H. MUNRO, "The Coming Conflict with

The peaceful development rhetoric constitutes a practical manifestation of the strategy of social creativity, which commonly entails a re-evaluation of a negative characteristic as positive or the identification of an alternative comparison dimension in which the agent ranks highly or higher than its rival. Moreover, as Larson states, the exercise of social creativity admits, at least on a practical strand, that the status hierarchy of international society is legitimate or, at least, stable⁷⁷.

This rhetoric is, at the same time, a refusal of the traditional colonial and imperial dynamics that great powers-to-be have traditionally pursued while, at the same time, a reaffirmation of Chinese exceptionalism. Specifically, two of the three components of exceptionalism were implicit in the peaceful development narrative⁷⁸. On the one hand, it was a reaffirmation of China's benevolent pacifism, more likely to assimilation and interaction than to active conflict. These claims are especially accurate in a context of modernisation of the Chinese military, as has been analysed in depth in chapter 6. On the other hand, the peaceful development thesis also reinforces ideas of harmonious inclusionism that has accommodationism at its base. The idea of harmony traces back to Chinese classical philosophy and has been revived by the CCP in recent years, and helps to establish the still contested idea of a Chinese utopia, therefore reinforcing the exceptionalist identity⁷⁹.

America", *Foreign Affairs*, n° March/April, 1997, pp. 18-32; MEARSHEIMER, J. J., "China's Unpeaceful Rise... *op. cit.*"; MENGES, C. C. *China: the gathering threat... op. cit.*. However, it should be noted that the China threat rhetoric did not become popular only in the U.S., but also in Asian countries. CALLAHAN, W. A., *Contingent States... op. cit.*, p. 19. At this point, Turner suggests that this recent China threat narrative is an echo of two previous threatening images of China, one from the mid-to-late 19th century and another during the Cold War. In his article, Turner argues that these two previous discourses of the China threat were a result of a crisis of U.S. identity and were articulated as an intensification of rhetorics to "reassert the natural identity". TURNER, O., "'Threatening' China and US security: the international politics of identity", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 39, n° 4, 2013, pp. 905-907.

⁷⁷ LARSON, D. W., "Will China be a New Type of Great Power?", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 8, n° 4, 2015, pp. 329 and 340. In the case of China, it could be argued that its opinion is that this hierarchy shows a grade of stability, but it has repeatedly denounced the unfairness of this status hierarchy and pushed for a reorganisation, both individually and also through other groups as the BRICS.

⁷⁸ According to Feng, the three components of Chinese exceptionalism are great power reformism, benevolent pacifism and harmonious inclusionism. FENG, Z., "The rise of Chinese exceptionalism... *op. cit.*", pp. 310-314.

⁷⁹ The notion of Great Harmony is particularly interesting. Even its etymology and translation is contested. Although the Chinese notion of *dātóng* (大同) is usually translated as great harmony, the character *tóng* can also be translated as "same" or "agree". In this work, the translation as great harmony will be preferred, as it does Callahan in his. Moreover, the application of the notion of great harmony evidences the tension between traditional philosophy and modern politics. From its use as a Confucian utopia in the ancient times, it has become the 21st century utopia for the Communist Party with domestic and international application. For the purpose of deepening this idea, Callahan offers an interesting explanation of the concept of Great Harmony and traces a link with Negri and Hardt's theory of empire. CALLAHAN, W. A., "Remembering the Future... *op. cit.*". On the link between the Confucian idea of *dātóng* and the Chinese marxism see LU X., "The Confucian Ideal of Great Harmony (Datong 大同), the Daoist Account of Change, and the Theory of Socialism in the Work of Li Dazhao", *Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East*, Vol. 21, n° 2, 2011, pp. 171-192. Moreover, former President Hu Jintao also

The exceptionalist roots that form the peaceful development narrative are useful to trace a phenomenon that has been difficult to define. Perhaps one of the most extended definitions is Buzan's, which stresses the capacity of the rising state to get "absolute and relative gains in both its material and its status position" without precipitating hostilities. The author also emphasises the "two-way process" of peaceful rise, involving both Chinese accommodation to international society and also the accommodation of the rules and structures to adjust to the new disposition, in clear relation with two way processes of socialisation⁸⁰.

However, the rhetoric of peaceful rise is not new, at least in practice. As Buzan and Cox explain, the U.S. itself should be analysed as a case of a peacefully rising state. Although it was involved in both the WWI and WWII, it is true that the U.S. did not go to a direct war with the United Kingdom and it did even support it in the European wars. Hence, a further analysis of the U.S. evolution from rising power to great power/hegemon shows the multiplicity of the peaceful rise phenomenon. Even if it did not get into war with the existing hegemon, which could gain it the definition of the warm peace model, the picture is different if considering other great powers as well as the regional context. In the first case, it is a warm/cold mixed model, as it did not precipitate wars but it took part. However, in the case of the region's countries, it is hardly difficult to target the U.S. as a peacefully rising state due to its strong interventionism in military, economic and political terms⁸¹. Therefore, this last label of the U.S. as a warlike rising power shows the different faces of this processes that can be peaceful in some contexts while simultaneously warlike in others⁸². This mixed perspective could be as well translated to the case of China, that gradually is showing a greater involvement in the economic development of poor countries, especially in Latin America and Africa, but also in several Asian countries, while at the same time is not reluctant to reinforce its territorial claims on the South China sea or to denounce United States and Japan's intromissions in Asian affairs when they affect its interests.

Hence, the mixed characteristics of the peaceful development rhetoric along with the difficulties of translating it into practice makes complex to understand fully the phenomena. Even of the first steps to underpin this rhetoric internationally are barely new, through the institutional network that China is building and its emphasis on international development, the peaceful development rhetoric has strong national

used the notion of harmonious world in its discourses. HU J., "Build Towards a Harmonious World... *op. cit.*".

⁸⁰ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... *op. cit.*", p. 5.

⁸¹ For an extended analysis of United States' interventionism in Latin America and the Caribbean through history, see PINTADO, M., "La Presence de Estados Unidos en America Latina... *op. cit.*".

⁸² Cox and Buzan propose three rising models in their text: warlike rise, cold/negative peaceful rise and positive peaceful rise, relaying of a previous works by Gatling. BUZAN, B., y M. COX, "China and the US... *op. cit.*", pp. 112-113; GALTUNG, J., "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 1, n° 3/4, 1964, pp. 206-231; GALTUNG, J., "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, n° 3, 1969, pp. 167-191.

roots. As Buzan argues, the peaceful development has been deeply embedded in the last 20 years processes of reform and opening in China⁸³. Therefore, it could be said that the success of Chinese strategy of international institutions is already starting to underpin the peaceful development rhetoric that was already tested at home. Moreover, these institutional developments addressed in the previous chapter stay between China's emerging power identity as a peaceful developing country and also as an emerged great power who promotes a new type of great power relationships.

8.3.2. China as a great power. From status quo responsibility to reformist new type of relations promoter

China's gradual rise on status towards a great power has been accompanied with the CCP's discard of Deng's strategy of "keeping a low profile". This progressive integration as a great power with "special responsibilities" could be targeted as the second major identity that China plays on international society. The interrelation with the previously analysed identity is intense. While China is gradually achieving a greater status, the international audiences, especially those rising states that claims to lead, expect China to behave accordingly to its rising power rhetoric. In other words, emerging powers, as well as Asian neighbours, expect China to perform as "a leader of the rests" while, at the same time, Chinese leaders acknowledge that, in order to achieve a fully membership on the great powers club, the country must acquire more responsibilities and behave as a status quo responsible stakeholder⁸⁴.

Along with Chinese identity as the leader of the emerging powers commanding the peaceful rise of others, repeated calls have been made from the top hierarchy of the international society asking for a gradual increase of Chinese involvement on global affairs. Internationally, calls to abandon Deng's strategy to keep a low profile on the international arena, reached its peak on the 1995-2001 interval, when three main landmarks underpinned the definite push for China as a great power with full responsibilities. The first event traces back to the 50th Anniversary of the UN, when

⁸³ BUZAN, B., "The Logic and Contradictions... *op. cit.*", p. 384. Buzan also points out the linkage between this rhetoric's emphasise on peace and development and Deng Xiaoping's rhetoric of reform and opening up as a narrative directed to neighbours. *Ibid.*; ZHANG F., "Rethinking China's Grand Strategy: Beijing's Evolving National Interests and Strategic Ideas in the Reform Era", *International Politics*, Vol. 49, n° 3, 2012, pp. 331-332.

⁸⁴ Even if China has more than once refused to assume these new responsibilities (on the Copenhagen Summit or inside the IMF), the United States has repeatedly encourage China to involve responsibly on great powers affairs and act as "a responsible stakeholder". LARSON, D. W., "Will China be a New Type... *op. cit.*", pp. 342 and 344; ZOELLICK, R. B., "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?", *Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations*, New York, 21st September 2005, <<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>> [7th December 2016]. The recent institutional practice suggests, as it has been stated in the previous chapter, that under the Xi Jinping government the country is becoming more involved on great power politics and is progressively achieving a greater status in the club.

then-president of the United States Bill Clinton manifested that its country “welcome[s] China to the great power table. But great powers also have great responsibilities” with the presence of former President Jiang Zemin⁸⁵. Although Clinton’s call resembles Zoellick’s (made ten years later), the significance of former president’s is undeniable. Moreover, Clinton addresses directly the special responsibilities that great powers have to address, which sustain the principle of social differentiation in a legally equal world with unequal practice of its rights⁸⁶.

The second event was the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998), when Beijing decided not to devalue the renminbi, contravening its own national interests in order to stabilise the regional economy not contributing to the volatility of currencies. Even if the devaluation of its national currency could have contributed to the competitiveness of its external sectors, China acted responsibly and helped the international efforts to address the crisis with its decision⁸⁷. Finally, the last event that marked Chinese fully membership of the great powers club was the successful complementation of the negotiation to access to the WTO in 2001, which were completed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By that moment, significant differences persisted, but the international events turned the situation and the United States and China agreed to solve these issues once China was a member⁸⁸.

Since these events, and especially on the 2010 decade, China has exhibited and increasing confidence and ambition related to its identity as a responsible great power⁸⁹. Therefore, its interests and values have risen from a regional sphere to the global one, with a great involvement in regions in development such as Africa, Latin America and East Asia. In China’s globalisation as a great power, its discourse as a responsible great power has been channelled through a greater promotion of a multilateral international society inside which the country was presented as a pro status

⁸⁵ The quote from Clinton’s National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, is mentioned by Nye. NYE, J. S., “China’s Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific”, *Survival*, Vol. 39, n° 4, 1997-1998, p. 76.

⁸⁶ As it has been addressed in Chapter 5, special responsibilities refer to a “differentiated set of obligations, the allocation of which is collectively agreed and they provide a principle of social differentiation for managing collective problems in a world characterised by both formal equality and inequality of material capability”. BUKOVANSKI, M. et al., *Special Responsibilities... op. cit.*, pp. 13 y 16. These special responsibilities are, therefore, based on the mixed nature of international society as Clark defines it, formed by a horizontal concert between great powers and a vertical hierarchy with the hegemon on the top. CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁸⁷ YONG D., “China: The Post-Responsible Power”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 37, n° 4, 2014, p. 120.

⁸⁸ The major issue of controversy regarded the American insurance company AIG, which wanted to maintain a large share of the huge Chinese insurance market. The European Union was strongly opposed to U.S. willingness to assure that its national branches could create 100% owned branches, as European companies were only able to own a 50% according to a previous agreement. WINESTOCK, G., “AIG Is Key Issue Blocking China’s Entry to the WTO”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 19th July 2001, <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB995487647252659670>> [9th December 2016].

⁸⁹ GAO X., “China as a “Responsible Power”: Altruistic, Ambitious or Ambiguous?”, *International Journal of China Studies*, Vol. 4, n° 3, 2013, p. 432.

quo power⁹⁰. However, the pro-multilateralist role of China could be understood as a communicative strategy to reinforce its identity as a responsible power.

Moreover, as Clinton expressed, great power status also carries great responsibilities. Three main global issues have been recurrently numbered as those that call for great power's special responsibilities: nuclear proliferation; global economy and climate change and environmental issues⁹¹. In these issues, Chinese involvement has gradually increased but on a different degree. Different events regarding the first two, namely the North Korean nuclear proliferation and the global economic crisis, show a growing reliance in China as a great power. Although national developments have been impressive in environmental issues, China has carefully addressed its involvement in global treaties on climate change. Lately, it has showed a strong involvement, but in negotiations it maintains strongly the notion of "common but differentiated responsibilities"⁹². The recurrent use of this term links its identity as a great power with bestowed special responsibilities with its identity as a rising state that aims to highlight its past as a peripheral power.

However, the notion of a responsible state reunites several questions that need to be addressed specially in the case of China. In general, it is nearly impossible to agree a definition of responsible state. The definition of a responsible power is itself slippery. As Gao summarises, two main characteristics of responsible power confront in the debate. Firstly, a responsible state should be status quo and an insider of the international society, which presumes an acceptance of the consensualised values, norms and major international agreements. Secondly, it should be an active participant in world affairs, not only a norm taker, but also a norm maker⁹³. However, the transition between these two stages is especially troublesome in the case of China. As Clark explains, to become a respected norm maker, China has to be firstly seen as a state fully integrated on international society and compliant with it. Therefore, to constitute itself as a norm maker, China has to blur any ambiguities about its membership on international society and, more difficult, into the club of great powers⁹⁴.

Moreover, the evolution of this consensual international society and the prevalence of different historical understanding of responsible power make it more difficult to resolve China's dilemma⁹⁵. The promotion of human rights and democracy that the

⁹⁰ YONG D., "China: The Post-Responsible Power... *op. cit.*", p. 119.

⁹¹ GAO X., "China as a "Responsible Power... *op. cit.*", pp. 424-427; BUKOVANSKI, M. et al., *Special Responsibilities... op. cit.*

⁹² PEOPLE'S DAILY, "China reaffirms the key principle of "common but differentiated responsibility"", Beijing, 1st December 2015, <<http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1201/c90000-8983878.html>> [13th December 2016].

⁹³ GAO X., "China as a "Responsible Power... *op. cit.*", p. 406.

⁹⁴ CLARK, I., "International Society and China... *op. cit.*", p. 333.

⁹⁵ Rosemary Foot identifies three main phases in the evolution of the notion of responsible state. The first one, from the WWII to the 1980's, has a strong influence of the Westphalian understanding of the international system and stresses the importance of the norm of non intervention and its bases (sovereignty, non-interference and non-use of force). Secondly, in the 1980's, with the institutionalisation of international

United States has leaded, even through interventionist, leaves China in a difficult situation regarding international society. Even if admitting that legally the standard of civilisation has vanished, Gong considered human rights and modernity as prospects for a new standard of civilisation⁹⁶, reinforcing the solidarist nature of contemporary international society. More recently, Zhang argued that the norms of human rights and democracy may serve as tools to underpin the hierarchy of international society by creating a core of democratic states (or we) and a periphery or outsiders group of non-democratic states (or others)⁹⁷. Hence, the notion of responsible state and its qualification as such allows a corruption of membership by revitalising notions of otherness based on Western narratives of a solidarist international society, as well as liberal hegemonic definitions of democracy and human rights⁹⁸. In Clarks words, “[t]he strategy of the leading states has been to secure widespread support for concepts of legitimacy that would specify civilised international behaviour” and, therefore, the bestowal of legitimacy in the form of rightful membership “becomes an integral part of the ongoing international political process”⁹⁹.

Along with the controversial membership, the Chinese government has shown a special attachment to the notion of responsible state, as analysis of the official rhetoric and pro-government media shows¹⁰⁰. However, the last two periods of leadership have exercised different emphasis on the notion. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, he stressed the link between domestic development and foreign policy. On the contrary, under Xi Jinping administration, the Chinese government has tried to reinforce its

affairs towards the goal of global peace and security, responsible states were those with an active engagement and compliance in those institutions. Finally, after the Cold War, the notion of responsible state evolved towards a state with major contribution to the solidarist international society characterised by the promotion of democracy and human rights as common goals. FOOT, R., “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible States”, *The China Journal*, n° 45, 2001, pp. 3-11; GAO X., “China as a “Responsible Power... *op. cit.*”, p. 408.

⁹⁶ GONG, G. W., *The Standard of “Civilisation”... op. cit.*, pp. 90-93.

⁹⁷ ZHANG X., “A Rising China and the Normative Changes... *op. cit.*”, p. 240.

⁹⁸ The argument above does not aim to discredit the importance of human rights and democracy on international society. However, it wants to point out that both notions are defined and interpreted through a liberal prism that creates exclusive categories not for an altruist promotion of these principles but to its own interests. As a result, contradictions arise when Western states promote rhetorically these principles but do not implement them in full or continue to favour several states that contravene them while punishing others.

⁹⁹ CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 177. Similar arguments have been made by Donnelly, Buzan, Yong or Risse and Sikkink. DONNELLY, J., “Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, n° 1, 1998, p. 2; BUZAN, B., “From International System... *op. cit.*”, pp. 349-352; YONG D., *China’s Struggle for Status. The Realignment of International Relations*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 72-73; RISSE, T. and K. SIKKINK, “The Socialization of Human Rights Norms” in T. RISSE et al. (eds.), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ There are several works that analyse the impact and reproduction of the notion of “responsible power/state” on different Chinese media. *Vid.* GAO X., “China as a “Responsible Power... *op. cit.*”; CHAN, G., “Capturing China’s International Identity... *op. cit.*”; JOHNSTON, A. I., *Social States... op. cit.*, pp. 146-140.

identity as a responsible state promoting a change in the relations on the top of the hierarchy of the international society, therefore linking its development to other countries', both on top and behind¹⁰¹.

Since the start of the century, CCP has definitely discarded Deng Xiaoping's strategy and has embraced an increasingly raising involvement in global affairs. The official change of strategy was made in 2013 with Xi Jinping speech to the CCP, but previous events eroded the strategy and deadly hurt it¹⁰². The concept of "striving for achievement" derives from Xi administration's idea that links Chinese development to other countries'. As Yan argues, this new strategy is more useful to China in its task to establish a solid leadership based on strategic credibility. To achieve these, he argues, China should provide security protection and economic benefits, and these new strategy works in this way¹⁰³.

The concept of "new type of great power relationship" seeds the grounds for this new strategy, with three simple main points that serve to summarise the striving for achievement strategy: no conflicts or confrontations, mutual respect and win-win cooperation¹⁰⁴. Moreover, the new type of great power concept has both theoretical and practical implications. On the one hand, it roots on notions of harmony related to Yan Xuetong's human authority while, on the other hand, establishes different strategies of cooperation with the U.S. socialisation process, as next section will address.

8.4. Identities in flux in a changing international society. Processes of socialisation in the China-U.S. relations

The importance of the processes of socialisation in international relations has been growingly recognised. Hence, it is important to note that it has a double meaning. On the one hand, it acknowledges the relevance of the process, as relational theory highlights, as both processes and relations have a significant role on the development of international norms and the evolution of actor's identity. On the other hand, to address this processes successfully, socialisation among actors should be done on a two-way process that transforms all the actors, This way, this opposing poles interact

¹⁰¹ MILLER, M. C., "The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Power... *op. cit.*", p. 220.

¹⁰² Among others, Yan points to three main events. Firstly, after the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, key members of international society made explicit calls to Beijing to involve actively in international security issues. Secondly, Obama administration's strategy to rebalance China proves the "keeping a low profile" strategy's inability to prevent the U.S. to target China as strategic competitor. Finally, regional maritime disputes and fears among several neighbours demonstrate the strategy's failure to assure a peaceful environment. YAN X., "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, n° 2, 2014, p. 156.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹⁰⁴ QI H., "China Debates the 'New Type of Great Power Relations'", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 8, n° 4, 2015, p. 350.

in non-conflictual relations that evolve towards an harmonious synthesis that includes elements of both poles¹⁰⁵.

The analysis of processes between the United States and China is not an easy task, as interactions are multidimensional. Moreover, as the characterisation of both states' interactions as "superficial friendship" suggest, relations usually tend to be egoistic and strategic¹⁰⁶. For the purpose of this analysis, it will be approached through three questions, relying on a slightly transformed version of Qin and Wei's proposal to observe the ASEAN's process of community building¹⁰⁷. The first step questions if the process is joined by the major powers (in this case, the answer will be always positive, as the selected issues will be either bilateral or global) and if they become involved in a way that may transform the hostile role structure into a non-hostile one. Also, in this vein, it will be addressed if other actors become involved in the process (from the beginning or later). The second question regards the outcomes of the process, namely if it produces any rules and norms which are accepted by both or even extended to the whole international society. This question gains special relevance in topics that need both states compliance from the beginning, or even blocked issues that demand U.S.-China agreement. Finally, the third step questions if both actors behave with restraint in order to maintain the process, or, in other words, if the stability and maintenance of the process is considered more important than certain interest that will require actions that hurt the process itself.

In the selection of the cases of study that better define the processes of socialisation between both states, it will be selected issues that fit on what Yan Xuetong calls the types of interest relations. Differing in its content and favourability, Yan proposes four types of relations depending on states' interests: common, complementary, confrontational and conflicting¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁵ This Chinese dialectic or *Zhōngyōng* is different from the hegelian dialectic. QIN, Y., "Cultura y Pensamiento Global... *op. cit.*", pp. 82-83.

¹⁰⁶ Yan and Qi define the state of superficial friendship as "one where neither one of two parties regards the other as a strategic partner, but where both claim a strategic partnership. In their cooperation, each party is solely concerned with the individual benefits to be obtained". YAN X. and QI H., "Football Game Rather Than... *op. cit.*", pp. 105-127.

¹⁰⁷ QIN Y. and WEI L., "Structures, Processes, and the Socialization of Power. East-Asian Community-Building and the Rise of China" in R. S. ROSS and ZHU F. (eds.), *China's Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, New York, Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 129-130.

¹⁰⁸ YAN X., "The Instability of China-US Relations", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, nº 3, 2010, pp. 272-273. Both the typology of interests and the classification of issues rely on Yan's work. However, we do not agree completely on Yan's proposed classification of issues, for example, on the Uyгур terrorism (conflicting while we would propose complementary or even common), the Iranian nuclear issue (conflicting while we will propose complementary) or the models of development (targeted by Yan as confrontational as we would definitely target it as conflicting). On a greater discussion of Yan's article, Johnston also disagrees on this classification, although his critics go further. *Vid.* JOHNSTON, A. I., "Stability and Instability in Sino-US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong's Superficial Friendship Theory", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4, nº 1, 2011, pp. 5-29.

Figure 18: Types of interests Relations and classification of the four issues whose processes will be analysed. Own elaboration based on YAN X., "The Instability of China-US Relations... *op. cit.*", pp. 272.

	<i>Same in Content</i>	<i>Different in Content</i>
<i>Mutually Favourable</i>	Common Interests Global financial market and globalisation	Complementary Interests Bilateral Trade
<i>Mutually Unfavourable</i>	Confrontational Interests Global leadership	Conflicting Interests Enviromental issues

8.4.1. The stability of the global financial market and globalisation

As Buzan and Cui have openly expressed, in contemporary international society, great powers share an interest in maintaining a stable global economic governance, to the extent that now it constitutes a core function of the great power management¹⁰⁹. Even if the most important roots of contemporary global economy were created by the West, nowadays this core structure has been globalised and socialised not only among great powers but also within the majority of international society. However, before the global economic crisis that hit the financial markets from 2008, this process of socialisation has mainly spread on a one-way process. It could be argued that after the incapacity of Western powers (mainly the U.S. the European Union and Japan, as well as Western dominated institutions such as the IMF, G8 or the WB) to overcome the crisis without emerging peripheral powers, the second wave of socialisation started.

The crisis shocked the structure of global economy in a way that it was not solvable without the involvement of the second world economy, China, and the more dynamic economies in the world (India, South Africa, Indonesia or Mexico, among others). As it has been described in depth in the previous chapter, Western powers accomplished an institutional transformation that involved those emerging states, extending in practice the top leadership that manages the global economy although maintaining several important benefits.

In the context of the relations between the U.S. and China, this event produced an important dialogue between both states that some named as a "de facto G2"¹¹⁰. This

¹⁰⁹ CUI, S. and B. BUZAN, "Great Power Management... *op. cit.*", p. 200.

¹¹⁰ GARRETT, G., "G2 in G20... *op. cit.*".

dialogue exemplified the involvement of both powers towards the aim of overcoming confronting strategies to address the crisis. Hence, the approval of two similar stimulus packages reinforced China's identity as a responsible great power as well as U.S. resignation to a more bilateral management of global economy. Moreover, the management of the crisis was a tacit resignation to the interdependence of both states' economies and the need of addressing global problems jointly in order to avoid a greater damage. Therefore, it could be argued that the role structure, as Qin and Wei's first question discusses, has been transformed although not completely towards a more cooperative and inclusive non-hostile one.

Even if the crisis has not deeply transformed the global economy and the regulations of financial markets, it did transform the share of privileges in the management of the global economy. More than an external reform of the markets and the global economic model, the reform was internal in the ruling mechanism, especially in those led by the United States. As the previous chapter has explored, the IMF and the WB experienced great changes in their quotas, with China as the main beneficiary. Moreover, the fist mechanism to address global economic issues shifted from the G8 to the newly created G20 that hold a two headed informal leadership with the U.S. and China. In practice, this changes served as a reinforcement of both states identities: the U.S. as a benign hegemon that continues to provide public goods through institutional change and China as a responsible state that promotes new type of great power relationship that are not only bilaterally win-win, but globally positive.

The behaviour of China in the global economic crisis resembles to the one it played on the Asian Financial Crisis, when it decided to subordinate its national interests to the global ones. However, this could be hardly considered as a concession in order to maintain the process with the United States. China rightly understood the global character of the crisis and the global economy and decided to bet for a larger term solution that will, at the end, fulfil its national interest while at the same time bestow itself with a greater role globally that blurs its past politics of non-involvement.

It is also questionable that the United States' behaviour on this specific period could be characterised by restraint. In fact, the hegemon behaved this way after it realised that it could only provide partial solutions to the crisis that will be futile. For example, the launch of the stimulus package amounting \$800 billion dollars in ten years would have been useful as a partial punch for investors in the U.S. However, the national debt of the hegemon is highly dependent on Chinese investment, therefore China will indirectly benefit from the program without any costs. Moreover, this investment will only serve as a small stimulus to mature economies, with little influence on the emerging economies that were sustaining global growth. The complementation

of China and U.S. stimulus programs, however, were more efficient both in Europe and in Asia, as they stimulated production, investment and consumption¹¹¹.

The relative success of the process, that overcomes a partial socialisation to embrace the second phase of it, could be strongly influenced by the common interests that both shared on this issue. Moreover, there was difficult to avoid a greater involvement of China on economic governance, not only for its huge economy but also because of the global impact of both countries' decision. However, other issues have a less optimistic approach. It could be concluded that the path to achieve transformative processes is an approach that highlights the shared interests and builds common solutions.

8.4.2. Bilateral trade

Trade relations among the United States and China are considered the most dynamic and important ones in the whole world. Moreover, the interdependence of both economies is broader than any bilateral relations and the complexity of patterns of trade relations highlights the need of an eclectic analysis. For instance, United States' nature as a consumer economy tends to create extremely big trade imbalances with other countries, as actually with China. During the Cold War, and especially after the dollar crisis European countries and Japan helped to maintain the dollar's strength even though in pure macroeconomic terms U.S. expending was leading to a devaluation. However, these states' interest in the stability of the dollar was not merely economic; they wanted to guarantee the hegemon's assistance and security both in Europe and Asia. Even if nowadays China and the United States' relation does not resemble to the one with European powers or Japan, China has invested great amounts of dollars on U.S. public and private debt, creating an interdependent relation that contributes to a more stable relationship and to the transition to a non-conflictual relation.

As Figure 3 explains, the China-U.S. trade relations hold complementary interests. On the one hand, the stability and prosperity of these relations is mutually favourable for both in different terms. On the other, the content differs as they both search for different goals and use different means to get them, as it will be latter explored. However, as the complexity and the importance of these trade relations for the global trade and economic structures grows, it also needs to explore processes of socialisation actually at work that have the ability to alleviate any crisis or trade conflict. Moreover, there can be argued that the growth of Chinese trade is one of the most

¹¹¹ This does not aim to say that the way both states addressed the global crisis was the most effective way. However, it is considered that the joint actuation was more accurate and cooperative.

important contributors to Chinese full integration into the global economy and international society.

As the evolution of trade relations suggests, both states have gradually recognised the importance of these issue not only in their economies but also in their bilateral relations, having the projection to develop a spill over effect to other issues. Even if it has evolved to a more cooperative structure, it shifts from amity to hostile periods. Moreover, trade relations have been extremely influenced by both states behaviour in other issues as, for instance, the Iran nuclear developments, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or terrorist attacks. The definitive push towards a more cooperative trade environment was the successful accession of China to the WTO after the 9/11. However, recent events suggest that socialisation needs not only to be two-way, but also need to be maintained and strengthened¹¹².

It is evident than both powers have tried to retain themselves not only to maintain the process but also not to produce economic turbulences. It could be said that the more dangerous element in the achievement of a non-hostile structure in this issue is nationalism¹¹³. Both states have used specific bilateral trade issues to reproduce their national identities in the form of developing country or exceptional state, for example. One of the clearest examples of this are repeating complains by the United States pushing China to appreciate its currency. Both Obama and Trump administrations have repeatedly urged China to appreciate the renminbi, defending that this measure would alleviate the huge trade imbalance that the U.S holds in its trade with China. However, Beijing has refused to accomplish the string measures that the U.S. Congress asked for (a 20% appreciation in several Congress members' opinion) and is slightly appreciating its currency to reduce the risk of inflation¹¹⁴. Measures and rheto-

¹¹² The agreement that frames China's Access to the organisation addressed the Price difference between China and developed countries by allowing to treat China as a non-market economy. This measure allows the imposition of anti-dumping measures that raises the prices of Chinese products. However, after the expiration of this treatment on December 2016, the EU, U.S. and Japan are still reluctant to give China the market economy status. THE ECONOMIST, "The 15-year hitch", 7th May 2016, <<http://www.economist.com/news/china/21698265-pact-2001-stirs-trouble-between-china-and-west-and-between-america-and-europe>> [19th January 2017].

¹¹³ Yan suggest (although he latter explains that they are not explicative of the period he analyses) that there are two destabilising factors in China-US bilateral relations: nationalism and the perception that China's growth of power has make it "bolder" in its relations with the hegemon. YAN X., "The Instability of China-US Relations... *op. cit.*", pp. 263-264. As the example will suggest, nationalist calls are sometimes used to pressure China from the U.S.

¹¹⁴ The view that the appreciation of the renminbi will alleviate U.S-China trade imbalance is discussed by several authors. Hale and Hale, for instant, maintain that the trade imbalance is influenced by the globalisation of goods production. Usually, China constitutes the last assembling stage of the production and this exacerbates the trade imbalance. However, at the same time, China creates trade imbalances with other Asian countries that produce the first steps of the goods. In the opinion of Hale and Hale, Beijing is correct in arguing that such a great appreciation will produce really negative effects for China, such as an increase of the costs of production or the rise of unemployment. However, they maintain that it will not alleviate the trade imbalance, because this issue needs a more comprehensive approach that includes measures such as taxation reform, the restructuration of the corporate and banking sectors, the gradual opening

rics to confront China economically are quite common to the extent that some have named it as “sinophobia”, a behaviour that in the case of trade ignores the changes that globalisation has generated in the processes of production and asks for measures to cut the imbalance and impose greater taxes¹¹⁵.

Hence, the process of socialisation of a non conflictual bilateral trade structure usually performs as an arena of reproduction of the exclusive identities of both states. In this case, they should acknowledge their dependency on a stable relationship. On the one hand, the U.S. benefits greatly of the investment of Chinese foreign currencies in U.S. national debt that sustains not only its national spending but also several compromises abroad, some of them related to the rhetoric of benign hegemon (security of navigation, rescues abroad, peacekeeping operations). On the other hand, China gets benefits from these public goods and is also dependent of the huge consumption of the U.S. to maintain its industries and trade surpluses. Neither of them is likely to perform solely its more compatible identities, because alterity reinforces exceptional national characteristics. The ratification of the TPP, that excludes China and includes Japan, is one of these alterity measures that add uncertainty to U.S.-China trade relations. However, commitments to a structure organised around several consensualised norms and rules, taking WTO standard as the minimum starting point would be an accurate step. In general, Chinese commitment to the organisation has been high and, after 15 years of membership, there is an evident call to move beyond and establish a greater framework that involves more openness to foreign investment in China as well as greater cooperation from the U.S. to share the benefits of their extraordinary huge trade relation. This non conflictual structure, along with sharing benefits, would also generate a positive interdependent and an eventual successful trade socialisation.

of capital accounts, and the encouragement of domestic consumer spending. HALE, D. D. and L. H. HALE, “Reconsidering Revaluation: The Wrong Approach to the U.S.-Chinese Trade Imbalance”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, n° 1, 2008, pp. 57-66.

¹¹⁵ The term sinophobia appears at ATHUKORALA, P-C and N. YAMASHITA, “Global production sharing and US-China trade relations” in L. SONG and W. T. WOO (eds.), *China's Dilemma. Economic Growth, the Environments and Climate Change*, Canberra, The Australian National University and Asia Pacific Press, 2008, p. 60. As it has been stated, nationalist claims in the U.S. that push for a appreciation of the renminbi do not pay attention to the changes on trade structures produced by globalisation. As Xing and Detern explain, trade patterns have been transformed by global production networks, to the extent that currency measures will not be capable of reducing the trade gap between both states. As an example of the complexity of trade imbalances, the authors indicate the iPhone, a product that has been invented in the U.S. by an American company, with components of four countries (Japan, Korea, U.S. and Germany) and assembled in China; therefore their sales contribute to the trade imbalance even though none of the components is made in China. XING, Y. and N. DETERT, “How the iPhone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the People's Republic of China”, *ADBI Working Paper*, n° 257, 2010, Tokyo, Asian Development Bank Institute, <<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156112/adb-wp257.pdf>> [9th January 2017].

8.4.3. Global leadership

The issue of global leadership can be tagged as the more difficult one to become an inclusive non-conflictual process among the ones analysed. Despite the difficulties of avoiding what has been named as the “Thucydides trap”¹¹⁶, the process is nearly impossible to be non-conflictualised as both what to get the same prize: lead the system in a way that is more beneficial to itself and build an institution of hegemony around to lock its leadership. Even if both states have publicly stated that they aim to avoid a conflict over leadership¹¹⁷, clashes of interests repeat in issues such as territorial claims, economy or the status of Taiwan.

From the political turn of Nixon administration, the U.S. has managed to approach carefully to China. It is true that U.S. post-1979 involvement with China has had the greater impact on its emergence as a rising power. As a result, the Asian country has been successfully socialised as a norm taker on international society, even if these processes can be discussed. However, the success of this process could be explained by the hierarchical relation that characterised both states’ interactions in these early stages. Nowadays, the relationship is approaching horizontality and most conflictual points regard the conceptualisation of the relation. The United States try to impose its hierarchical position while China pushes for a more equal one.

Moreover, the reproduction of identities of the other that are difficult to cope with has shifted the strategy of engagement towards one more close to deterrence. Even if the U.S. administration during Bush and Obama’s presidencies has shown shifting strategies towards China, the shadow of a possible threat to U.S. hegemony has made the relation colder, while many in China have the impression that the hegemon has been treating their country unfairly¹¹⁸. As Zhao summarises, in China it persists a latent sense that the great consensus, characterised by a convergence on fundamental strategic interests, has come to the end. Prior to 2001, the United States pursued a strategy of engagement towards China, trying to integrate it into the hegemonic international society. At the same time, China wanted to be integrated in this Western international society and, therefore, the strategy of grand consensus, sup-

¹¹⁶ ALLISON, G., *Destined for War: America, China, and the Thucydides’s Trap*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

¹¹⁷ As Thomas Donilon, National Security Advisor in Obama’s Administration, stated, both China and the U.S. “do not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation” and called for building “a new model of relations between an existing power and an emerging one”. WHITE HOUSE, “Remarks By Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013”, 11th March 2013, New York, <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisor-president-united-states-an>> [11th January 2017].

¹¹⁸ LAMPTON, D. M., “A tipping point in US–China Relations is upon us”, *US–China Perception Monitor*, 11th May 2015, <<http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/>> [11th January 2017].

ported by some shared strategic interests, succeeded¹¹⁹. After 2001, with the accession of China to the WTO, this integrated could be seen as completed and U.S. strategy of engagement started to blur as they saw that the Chinese were not longer willing to concede to U.S. preferences. As a result, the strategic cooperation was over and they had to approach every crisis individually, with clashes in issues as energy, environment or economy.

The demise of the grand consensus has produced cooperation on specific areas without a mayor consensus on how the relations between both powers should be. The proposal of the creation of the G2 or Xi Jinping's "new model of great power relations" have been futile attempts to establish a major framework for the relations between the two countries that would eventually produce formal and informal norms that would reduce hostility. However, in this specific case, both states have interests that are mutually unfavourable towards the same goal of global leadership. It is unlikely that a peaceful transition as the previous one between the U.S. and the U.K. would occur¹²⁰, because the institution of hegemony that every state projects permeates its identities that, in this case, are really heterogeneous. In the U.K.-U.S. case, the prevalence of the Western identity, along with the historical ties between both cultures, facilitated the peaceful resolution of the transition. To approach this outcome, both the U.S. and China have to work towards the establishment of ties that generate, in Qin's terminology, a new synthesis that has elements of both. However, threatening rhetorics and the gradually clash of interests sustains that as time moves forward, the achievement of this new synergy is, at least, unlikely¹²¹.

8.4.4. Environmental issues

Under Yan's taxonomy of types of interests, the environmental issues, targeted as conflicting, look as the less likely candidate for a cooperative and non hostile proc-

¹¹⁹ Zhao summarises the view of Da Wei from its Chinese text. The grand consensus (大共识 *dàgòngshí* in Chinese) or convergence (契合 *qìhé*) refers to the shared fundamental strategic interests between both countries, involving consensus on questions such as "what type of country each wanted to be, how to reach national objectives, what type of country each hoped the counterpart to be and how to tread the counterpart". ZHAO S., "American Reflections on the Engagement with China and Responses to President Xi's New Model of Major Power Relations", *Journal of Contemporary China*, <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2017.1274814>>, p. 6; DA W., "Can China and the US re-establish the grand consensus (中美还能重建大共识吗)", *Paper*, n° 27, 2015, <http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1357483_1> [10th January 2017].

¹²⁰ *Vid.* FENG Y., "The Peaceful Transition of Power... *op. cit.*"; BUZAN, B. and M. COX, "China and the US... *op. cit.*".

¹²¹ However, it is possible to argue that the process towards a new synthesis is evolving positively in the case of China and several Asian countries, thanks to the cooperation with the ASEAN and also to the launch of the AIIB. In this case, Chinese restrain in the conflict of the South China Sea will determine the process' success.

ess of relations among the ones analysed¹²². However, against any prediction, environmental processes of cooperation could be targeted as moderately successful, specially under the second term of Obama's presidency. Undoubtedly, the most transcendent point was the successful negotiation of the Paris Agreement prior to the 2015 summit and the performative reproduction of this agreement on the simultaneous ratification during the G20 meeting in Hangzhou in 2016.

Environmental issues, as economics, involve several complications due to their complexity and their transversal nature, as they have relation with economics, energy, public health, industry or diplomacy, among others. Moreover, the issue gets even more complex with the different patterns of growth and globalisation processes that coexist in countries in different stages of industrialisation. In environmental cooperation, the targeting of states as developed or in process of development complicates negotiations, as emerging countries ask for more flexible measures to protect their development and more implication and emission cuts for rich countries. Underneath every environmental negotiation between the United States and China, there is the conflict whether to consider China as a developing or developed country.

Although important differences still prevail, it can be said that both states, the world top polluters accounting more than 40% of global emissions, have actively joined the processes of cooperation and have worked to change the hostile structure. At this point, it is interesting to confront the previously mentioned negotiations over the Paris Agreement on 2015 with the Copenhagen Agreement in 2009, where no binding agreement was reached. The Summit witnessed strong clashes between the United States and the BASIC countries¹²³, to the extent that President Obama and Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton burst into a secret meeting between these countries led by former Premier Wen Jiabao¹²⁴.

As it has been stated, the cooperation between both generated a new framework on climate change that has been ratified by major powers and entered into force in 2016. Moreover, these steps provide important starting points towards further agreements and binding normative structures not only in future climate change and environmental conferences, but also on other topics. The process of negotiation has proved that China and the U.S. understand that their bilateral agreements are necessary and encouraging to achieve any global agreement, as it happened with both states' stimulus packages after the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, both governments acknowledge the need to restrain and yield in several points towards global goals.

¹²² In Yan's taxonomy, environmental issues did not appear expressly; he labelled the standard of CO₂ emission reduction as a conflicting issue. However, for the purpose of this chapter, it has been decided to extent it, as environmental issues cover other topics that could also be targeted as conflictual, such as other emissions or other kind of contamination. YAN X., "The Instability of China-U.S. Relations... *op. cit.*", p. 272. Against Yan's view, we consider "global leadership" as the less prospect subject of cooperation.

¹²³ These countries include Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

¹²⁴ CLINTON, H. R., *Hard Choices*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2014, pp. 415-416.

Along with its implications in international society, the processes of cooperation on such a difficult issue as environmental crisis offers an interesting lesson. Firstly, it demonstrates that even conflicting issues could evolve towards a less hostile relation and, in this case, legitimise and socialise such important agreements within developed and developing countries. And, secondly, as Yan expresses, the competition between both states to achieve the “higher moral ground” in climate change and environmental issues has proved to be globally beneficial¹²⁵. Hence, if this peaceful competition spreads to other topics, process-changing relations and non-hostile structures will prevail and international society could possibly evolve towards a more inclusive one.

¹²⁵ YAN X., “The Instability of China-US Relations... *op. cit.*”, p. 290.

CHAPTER 9

HEGEMONIC LEGITIMACY IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. UNITED STATES HEGEMONIC INSTITUTION AND CHINA'S ALTERNATIVE

The recent turn towards the study of non-material variables in the analysis of international society has spurred studies of legitimacy in IR scholarship. It has become transversal concept through many issues on the discipline, to the extent that it has been defined as “a ‘master question’ of international relations”¹. It is not only that this concept has become more influential in academic circles, as it has. The major strength of legitimacy as a concept in the discipline is its explanatory capacity on the specific theoretical framework that intersects scholars from constructivism and English School. Under these approaches, legitimacy has the capacity to enrich and explain several key concepts such as international society or hegemony², as this chapter will aim to explore.

¹ MULLIGAN, S. P., “The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 34, n° 2, 2005, p. 350.

² As legitimacy has been taken as the starting point to explore notions of International Society and hegemony in the present thesis, Clark explores the boundaries of International Society and World Society through legitimacy. *Vid.* CLARK, I., “Legitimacy in International or World Society?” in A. HURRELMANN, S. SCHNEIDER and J. STEFFEK (eds.), *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007, pp. 193-210; CLARK, I., *International Legitimacy and World Society... op. cit.*

Moreover, placing legitimacy in the centre of the analysis recognises the importance of social structures and explores its role on the establishment of an institution of hegemony within the international society. Indeed, legitimacy is inherently linked to this institution, it bestows the institution and as its analysis may suggest, is crucial in hegemonic successions that could give rise to an alternative hegemonic institution.

The present chapter will explore the intersection between legitimacy and United States hegemony through four parts. Firstly, legitimacy will be contextualised through an English School/Constructivist framework. In this exploration, there will be addressed how legitimacy enriches the concept of international society by highlighting its evolutionary nature and, moreover, it will be described the role of legitimacy in hegemony and systemic change³. Secondly, the chapter will discuss in depth the theory of hegemonic legitimacy, by approaching to hegemonic succession and the concept of the institution of hegemony. In a more practical sense, the third section will analyse the changing hegemonic dynamics that bestowed U.S. institution of hegemony, namely its bases on its origins and the contemporary debates about its erosion. Finally, the fourth part will aim to disentangle whether China is willing to build and alternative institution, its bases and the growing legitimacy is gaining.

9.1. Legitimacy as a cornerstone concept: international society, hegemony and systemic change

As a concept of political philosophy, legitimacy has been widely studied⁴ but the turn of IR towards legitimacy is quite recent. However, as recent developments have shown⁵, by adding the legitimacy variable it is possible to complement existing understanding on more stabled and studied concepts, mainly hegemony or international society.

Prior to any further analysis, it is necessary to state what will be the exact understanding of legitimacy in the present chapter, As Reus-Smit states it is “a social concept in its deepest sense” and refers to “a quality that society ascribes to an actor’s identity, interests, or practices, or to an institution’s norms, rules, and principles”⁶. In

³ Although legitimacy developments within the English School have gained relevance quite recently, it has been considered from more classical perspectives, like Wight’s. WIGHT, M., “International Legitimacy”, *International Relations*, Vol. 4, n° 1, 1972, pp. 1-28.

⁴ On this vein, Mulligan offers an interesting genealogy of the concept of legitimacy. MULLIGAN, S. P., “The Uses of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*”, pp. 352-356.

⁵ *Vid.* CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in the International Society... op. cit.*; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*; DUNNE, T., “Society and Hierarchy... *op. cit.*”; HURD, I., *After Anarchy... op. cit.*; REUS-SMIT, C., “Imagining Society... *op. cit.*”; REUS-SMIT, C., “Power, Legitimacy, and Order... *op. cit.*”; RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, “Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*”; IKENBERRY, G. J., “Institutions, Strategic Restraint... *op. cit.*”; IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*; IKENBERRY, G. J. y C. A. KUPCHAN, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power... *op. cit.*”.

⁶ REUS-SMIT, C., “International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*”, p. 159.

other words, ascribing legitimacy to an institution, an actor or an action implies recognising it as rightful, and therefore admitting a degree of voluntary compliance that, at the end, contributes to stability⁷.

As these definitions express, legitimacy has two different actors at play that result on a social relationship. Firstly, the referents or actors who seek legitimation for themselves or for their ideas, ideologies, rules, organisations. Secondly, there are the subjects that bestow this legitimacy, who through legitimation accept some grade of compliance⁸. The success of the referents on gaining legitimation has among all the benefits, three important ones, namely, others active support; the compliance of other actors and finally, a relative low levels of opposition, with reduces costs⁹.

The definition of legitimacy as a certain knowledge structure highlights the social and political nature of the processes of obtaining and maintaining legitimacy. To the extent that legitimacy contests are mediated through justification and mediation, the legitimation of power is social. Moreover, is also political in its relation with the exercise of power that is audited and negotiated through compromises that promote accommodation¹⁰.

The success of a legitimacy process, in the case of powerful states, roots on the perception of the actors that bestow that this exercise of power and its actions are appropriate and convenient in relation to a socially constructed system of norms, values and beliefs¹¹. This perception, as becomes interiorised, transforms and influences the audience's interests. Therefore, legitimacy transforms the social relation and, together, the social environment that is the international society.

However, legitimacy is itself a changing and evolutionary social concept. Principles of legitimacy, although recurrently present along the history of international society, are in constant evolution. Moreover, as Zhang concludes, the historical transformations that have taken place on the international society are better understood in terms of changing social and normative structures, and among them legitimacy is a crucial one¹². As Clark's historical analysis of the changing legitimacy dynamics shows, historical transformations produce changes on the core principles of legitimacy and this principles have a deep influence on the transformations of the international society, in the form of a consensus of great power, and have explanatory capacity over the normative structure of international society¹³.

As this further exploration manifest, the relationship between legitimacy and international society is theoretical and practically transversal. Taking the English

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁸ RAPKIN, D. P. and D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 117.

⁹ REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 163.

¹⁰ ZHANG Y., "China and the Struggle for Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 308.

¹¹ SUCHMAN, M. C., "Managing Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 574.

¹² ZHANG Y., "China and the Struggle for Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 303.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

School notion of International society (including expressly recent developments) as a starting point, the addition of two different contributions highlight its changing nature. On the one hand, a dialogue with constructivist approaches reinforces the inclusion of intersubjective relations on the analysis, expressly legitimacy as a cornerstone concept. On the other hand, the dialogue with sino-constructivism and Qin Yaqing's work raises the idea of an international society defined by relations in motion. Applying this frame, the understanding of China's rise and United States hegemony is more complex and transversal and denies International society's definition as static, an understanding that will identify China's rise as a break. However, an evolutionary vision understands all this phenomena as a process, as other transformations of the principles of legitimacy have to be understood. As Zhang explains, understanding international society as a non static "it" that China wants to modify, there is a mutual processes of transformation in which both subjects change¹⁴.

On this vein, Clark explores the historical relation between the changes in the dynamics of legitimacy and the transformations on international society. Through this analysis he identifies a major change produced after the Vienna settlement, where great powers consensually agreed to shift legitimacy from morality to legality/constitutionality¹⁵. Moreover, the analysis of this historical evolution shows that after power struggles emerge changing principles of legitimacy. Ikenberry characterised these moments after power struggles as "great moments of international order building"¹⁶; therefore understanding international society as static and these struggles as breakups. Legitimacy, on the contrary, reinforces the procedural characteristics of international society and equates systemic change with transformations of the parameters of political legitimacy¹⁷.

However, legitimacy is not only relevant in these specific moments of change; it is also useful on the exercise of power. Along with its empowering capacity and the reduction of the cost of the exercise of power, legitimacy plays a vital role in these moments of power struggles. It plays an indispensable role on the construction and negotiation of the social structure of international society in a way that it is acceptable and agreed. After this social structure is settled, legitimacy confers to the referent power over actors and, therefore, it plays an important role on hegemonic orders¹⁸.

The practice of hegemony, as well as profoundly influenced by the evolutionary nature of international society, should also be analysed along with legitimacy. In fact,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 338. This process of change resembles to Qin's proposal of mutually transformative relationships analysed more deeply in Chapter 8. QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", p. 141.

¹⁵ CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 248-249.

¹⁶ IKENBERRY, G. J., *After Victory... op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁷ BUKOVANSKI, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁸ ZHANG Y., "China and the Struggle for Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", pp. 309-310.

as the theoretical framework of this thesis has in depth explored, “alternative conceptions of hegemony differ in terms of the importance they assign to legitimacy”¹⁹.

In the purpose of deepening the links between both concepts, hegemony has to be examined not only in material term but also “in terms of the distinctive legitimacy dynamics that come into play between the hegemon and its various social constituencies”²⁰. On the same vein, Bukovansky goes further and defines hegemony as “the existence of a dominant form of legitimate authority”²¹. Hence, hegemony should not be just understood as a certain power distribution, but as a shared knowledge structure that reinforces this configuration that, in fact, permits changes on the leading hegemonic state within this certain hegemonic culture²², as the peaceful transition between the United Kingdom and the United States exemplifies.

The role of legitimacy in process of systemic change has also been widely recognised among scholars from social theoretical traditions²³. Negotiations on the boundaries of legitimacy among history describe, for example, how the legitimation of a certain narrative of the notion of rightful membership define the terms under which states participate on the international society²⁴. Therefore, legitimacy plays a crucial role on defining the boundaries of rightful state conduct and constitutes vital dynamics on the constant evolution of international society. In specific terms when principles of legitimacy are contested, these contestation debate the terms that will restrain and define the actions of future power holders and, over time, impact deeply on the system²⁵.

The importance of legitimacy in the case of states that hold “extraordinary systemic roles” is growingly relevant²⁶. As the present thesis has stressed over its pages,

¹⁹ RAPKIN, D. P. and D. BRAATEN, “Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*”, p. 118.

²⁰ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 51.

²¹ BUKOVANSKI, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 8.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²³ CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in the International Society... op. cit.*; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*; CLARK, I., “China and the United States... *op. cit.*”; CLARK, I., “International Society and China... *op. cit.*”; HURD, I., *After Anarchy... op. cit.*; REUS-SMIT, C., “Imagining Society... *op. cit.*”; REUS-SMIT, C., “Power, Legitimacy, and Order... *op. cit.*”; RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, “Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*”; IKENBERRY, G. J. y C. A. KUPCHAN, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power... *op. cit.*”.

²⁴ The notion of rightful membership has been somehow compared to the standard of civilisation. However, in this thesis both are considered as different, although there is an interesting relation to explore. On the same vein, some authors have considered that issues of rightful membership reinforce the solidarist principles of the international society, defending a less pragmatic behaviour on the relation with non-democratic states and/or human rights violators. On conflicting visions about the relation between both concepts, see DONNELLY, J., “Human rights: a new standard of civilization...*op. cit.*”; JACKSON, R. H., *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. On the same vein, Zhang offers an interesting summary of the application of the new standard of civilisation to the case of China, through the pluralist-solidarist debate. ZHANG X., “China in the Conception of International Society... *op. cit.*”, pp. 779-782.

²⁵ BUKOVANSKI, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁶ RAPKIN, D. P. and D. BRAATEN, “Conceptualising hegemonic legitimacy... *op. cit.*”, p. 118.

hegemony is not solely a material concept; it does imply conflicting dynamics of legitimacy over the preferred institution of hegemony that states what to lead. In other words, systemic change is defined by conflicting and complementary conceptions of legitimacy that aim to prevail on a certain international society²⁷. On a similar argument, Clark situates legitimacy as a distinctive feature of hegemony, emphasising its institutional dimension as the “empowerment of the institution of hegemony” and not of the power of the hegemon itself²⁸. This way, the author links the exercise of hegemony with the construction of “a distinctive and acceptable pattern of order”²⁹.

Once this institution of hegemony gains legitimacy, it establishes a sense of continuity once this hegemonic order “sustains itself, not only through socialization, but also through either suppression or neutralization of the stresses and strains brought on by any cultural contradictions existing or emerging within that order”³⁰. However, this hegemonic institution may suffer several strategies of resistance that aim to impose cost to the hegemonic exercise of power. Schweller and Pu contextualise this resistance on several deconcentration/delegitimation strategies that involve discourses of resistance (or delegitimation rhetorics) as well as cost imposing strategies (or practice soft resistance)³¹. Several states, which have not yet achieved the sufficient amount of material resources to impose direct cost on the hegemon, practice rightful resistance strategies that take place on two different directions. Firstly, the state accepts partially and temporally the legitimacy of the hegemon’s exercise of power to the extent that it takes advantage of the stability in several issues as well as of the public goods that the hegemon assures. Secondly, it uses the opportunities and formal channels that the order provides to channel a certain grade of contestation to specific hegemonic behaviours³².

Hence, these strategies, if they are successful, could increase the emerging power’s status within the system and, therefore, it can be argued that its desires to overcome the system decrease. However, the emerging state calculates that its benefits will increase in an order at its shape, with its own institutional architecture and influenced by its identities and interest. All in all, the rising power is aware that it would do even better within its own hegemonic institution.

Thus, the dynamics of legitimacy in processes of systemic change have two different but interrelated processes to look at. Firstly, the institution of hegemony is gradually suffering erosion on its legitimacy. This erosion is not only motivated by other strategies to delegitimize the institution, but also by the hegemon’s behaviours.

²⁷ BUKOVANSKI, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁸ CLARK, I., “China and the United States... *op. cit.*”, p. 24.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ BUKOVANSKI, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 50.

³¹ SCHWELLER, R. and PU X., “After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*”, p. 44.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51. Schweller and Pu’s notion of rightful resistance has several references to O’BRIEN, K. J. and LI L., *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 2, 15-24.

Crises of legitimacy occur when its level of social recognition declines to the extent that the institution of hegemony should decide either to adapt or face its disempowerment³³. Although hierarchy is not only accepted but also legitimated within the international society, through the recognition of several special responsibilities to great powers, these states should also comply with several cultural systems. In other words, crisis of legitimacy occur when the legitimacy nexus that intertwines state behaviour and the principles, norms or customs breaks. On a similar vein, Hurd considers that there exist three different paths to a crisis of this kind³⁴. The first type involves the recurrent violation of a particular norm to the extent that it faces disempowerment. The second type centres on a particular state behaviour that fails to convince on its commitment to the culturally legitimated system. This dominant state, usually the hegemon, finds itself still commanding the hierarchy of international society, but faces growing resistances and contestation to the rightfulness of its privileged position. Finally, the third path involves a systemic crisis of legitimacy caused by the first two, with consequences on the underlying structures of the international society. However, crises of legitimacy are not one-way paths towards disempowerment. The hegemon, in this case, has the opportunity to maintain its power through two choices³⁵. First, it can decide to compensate its loss of legitimacy through the use of material inducements, therefore abandoning hegemony and exercising the hierarchy through pure primacy. Second, it can decide to recalibrate its legitimacy reconciling its practices and interest with the expectation of other actors with the legitimated international society. This way, the hegemon would revitalise its legitimacy and maintain the benefits of deference over pure domination.

As it has been said before, two dynamics of legitimacy should be explored on processes of systemic change. The second one is the relations with the rising challenger state with legitimacy, through a nascent legitimacy towards its alternative hegemonic institution as well as through pushes of delegitimation towards the hegemonic state. As it has been stated before, the hegemon's action may trigger delegitimation and crises, but rising state could push for this crisis both through discourses of resistance and cost-imposing strategies. Moreover, these discourses may probably set the bases for the rhetoric that will sustain and socialise its alternative hegemonic institution.

In the case of China, the analysis of legitimacy has been applied not only in its recent form. China experiences a double process of accommodation: of itself as a rising power with growing status and a nascent legitimation of the alternative hegemonic institution that aims to build. The process of accommodation of China on the contemporary international society, as it has been explored in the previous chapter,

³³ REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 158.

³⁴ HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*", pp. 197-198.

³⁵ REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 171.

involved processes of greater responsibilities in its status, but its integration process is not yet completed³⁶. At the same time, China is involved in a process of building its alternative institutions, which main lines have been outlined in the previous chapters, that seeks legitimation. Therefore, the analysis of Chinese attempt to gain legitimacy from within and also outside of the U.S. led institution of hegemony constitutes a crucial variable not only to the study of China's rise, but also to the systemic changes of contemporary international society. Along with an analysis of the legitimacy that the U.S. led institution of hegemony holds, it will offer a clear map of the dynamics of systemic change of the international society.

Through the framework applied in this thesis, the systemic change that is been examined is contextualised as a hegemonic succession. Usually, changes on the hegemonic hierarchy have been considered through theories of power transition. However, the turn to the concept of hegemonic succession highlights that the "broad acceptance of a dominant state's preferred international order is itself a constituent of a hegemon's effective power"³⁷. Therefore, it is this order (or the institution of hegemony, adopting Clark's terminology) what seeks legitimacy and who suffers its erosion. The current U.S. led institution of hegemony, built after the WWII, should be understood in this way, as a resource of its effective power. Likewise, the nascent Chinese alternative hegemonic institution seeking for legitimacy aims to become a source of power.

9.2. U.S. institution of hegemony and legitimacy. An analysis

After the end of WWII, the United States has held a prominent position in international society that has transcended the special responsibilities of great powers. It is a relative consent on dating the advent of U.S. hegemony after this war, but its confrontation with the socialist block makes compulsory to rethink the concept of hegemony. In fact, the U.S. did behave as a global hegemon and successfully socialised a universal appeal while its hegemony was restricted to a limited bloc³⁸. The U.S. performed as a hegemon globally (even more than the Romans or the Britons) equalling this universality with the West. Therefore, one of the main characteristics of the U.S. institution of hegemony from its origins is its Western and liberal nature. It was based on "the proliferation of competing centres of political authority and the promotion of

³⁶ ZHANG X., "China in the Conception of International Society... *op. cit.*", p. 783.

³⁷ CLARK, I., "China and the United States... *op. cit.*", p. 14.

³⁸ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 123; PARCHAMI, A., *Hegemonic Peace and Empire... op. cit.*

formal territorialsovereignty” or, in other words, “in a world of open doors (capitalist markets) and closed frontiers (territorially sovereign states)”³⁹.

Despite the enormous primacy that the United States hold after the war, it successfully accomplished two key strategies that reinforced its material leadership towards a social status. Firstly, it exercised a leadership of restraint that looked for consensus and accommodation, which in practice was translated into compliance and legitimation. Secondly, the United States was the active creator and promoter of an extensive and growing set of binding secondary institutions that covered multiplicity of issues and helped to overcome those problems derived from the lack of trust⁴⁰.

On the same vein, other authors multiply the sources of legitimacy that underpinned the U.S. hegemony after the conflict⁴¹. Several deserve special attention, as, for instance, the open and consensual mode of decision-making among the Western bloc, mainly channelled through institutions. Its moderation in policy as well as its adherence to international law it is usually named as other pillars; but its main success was the preservation of peace, security and prosperity through institutions, cooperation and active engagement.

However, during the period of U.S. hegemony, several claims of decline and crisis of legitimacy have been raised. Even though decline refers to primacy and crisis of legitimacy is related to hegemony, usually both claims have been intertwined and confused. After its success on WWII and the post-war hegemonic leadership, the United States started to face several economic and political problems on the 1970s, which gave rise to the declinist thesis. Some authors, as Clark, even consider that United States hegemony ended in this period⁴². However, material an social analysis evidence that, even suffering turmoil, the hegemon was capable not only to maintain its primacy (militarily and also economically), but also its social legitimacy to face the end of the Cold War.

The end of the conflict generated an expansion of the U.S. institution of hegemony towards the non-Western states. Surprisingly, through this exercise of adaptation, the United States reinforced and refreshed the legitimacy of its institution, even though it maintained a restricted membership on several secondary institutions. As it has been more precisely examined in the case of China, these processes of accommodation usually take place on a hierarchical way and states in process of accommoda-

³⁹ COLÁS, A. and R. SAULL, “Introduction” in A. COLÁS and R. SAULL (eds.), *The War on Terror and American Empire After the Cold War*, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 3.

⁴⁰ CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, p. 140-141. Kydd describes the perspective of hegemonic assurance, that contents that hegemons can solve problems of mistrust by cooperating with other states in the identification of common goals and, this way providing assurances to more reluctant states, KYDD, A., “In America We (Used to) Trust: U.S. Hegemony and Global Cooperation”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 120, nº 4, 2005/2006, pp. 620-621.

⁴¹ TUCKER, R. W., and D. C. HENDRICKSON, “The Sources of American Legitimacy”. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, nº 6, 2004, pp. 18-32; WALT, S., *Taming American Power... op. cit.*, pp. 160-178.

⁴² CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society... op. cit.*, pp. 123-146.

tion are socialised as norm takers, and then they face a race towards a growing status within the system. As it has been stated, after the Cold War, the institution of hegemony reinforced in the absence of a threat, but at the same time the hegemon faced a profound crisis of identity.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the weakness of Russia as a potential rival pushed for a reconfiguration of the United States identity that, instead of opting for a reconstruction of its identity in non-conflictual terms, decided to diversify its threats. This process culminated in 2001, when the 9/11 terrorist attacks pointed out towards the new global threat. However, the following events headed the world towards a profound crisis of legitimacy of the institution of hegemony. In this case, the decision by the Bush Administration to go to war against Iraq cracked legitimacy in two different ways. Firstly, the intervention was carried out without the approval of the United Nations Security Council⁴³, even though the hegemon gained the support of the United Kingdom and Spain. As it has been stated in the previous pages, restraint and adherence to the principles of international law are strong pillars of legitimacy and root on the sources of the institution of hegemony.

Secondly, the unilateral turn of the hegemon also highlighted the absence of consensus and the non-participation of other great powers on the decision-making process, to the extent that some claimed that several states were opting to accomplish soft-balancing strategies⁴⁴. For all these reasons, some suggested that the intervention on Iraq prompted a crisis of legitimacy⁴⁵. However, as Hurd argues, a more narrow analysis of the event may show a deliberate attempt to delegitimise the norms of intervention agreed within the international society. Under this consideration, Hurd explains that this deliberated attack on international law aimed to legitimate new norms on pre-emption⁴⁶. In other words, instead of legitimating its actions through norms, the hegemon wanted to legitimate new norms through practice, corrupting the relation between actions, norms and legitimacy. In a general sense, the actuation according to norms constituted a source of legitimacy. However, the hegemon considered itself bestowed with legitimacy and wrongly perceived that its actions were le-

⁴³ For a profound analysis of the relation between the United States hegemony and the UNSC see Chapter 7.

⁴⁴ PAPE, R. A., "Soft Balancing... *op. cit.*"; PAUL, T. V., "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power... *op. cit.*".

⁴⁵ HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*"; REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*"; KAGAN, R., "America's Crisis of Legitimacy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, nº 2, 2004, pp. 65-87.

⁴⁶ HURD, I., "Breaking and Making Norms... *op. cit.*". The notions of Pre-emptive and preventive war should not be confused. As Battistella summarises, "a preemptive war is undertaken to confront a threat perceived to be imminent, whereas a preventive war aims at fore-stalling a threat likely to become effective only after a certain period of time". BATTISTELLA, D., "Preemptive War" in B. BADIE, D. BERGSCHLOSSER and L. MORLINO (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Vol. 1*, California, SAGE, 2011, p. 2121.

gited per se. From that point, it tried to establish new norms through practice that would change the consensus towards new boundaries in the use of force.

The United States decision seems to be based on a wrong approach to the international context. It miscalculated the legitimacy context of hegemony; it thought that the United States itself was the legitimated referent and, therefore, its action sooner or later would be legitimated and so would be the new doctrine on the use of force. Nonetheless, being the institution of hegemony the legitimated subject and considering that the action itself contravened several values and sources of the institution (inclusive decision-making, restraint, exercise of power through institutions and adherence to international law, among others) the United States had to face a profound crisis on its institution of hegemony. That being said, a deep analysis on the legitimacy of the hegemonic institution in this specific context will provide not only a test on hegemony itself, but also a clue of the resistances that faces and the dynamics towards the resolution of this crisis of hegemony.

9.2.1. A qualitative analysis of the legitimacy of U. S. hegemonic institution

As it has been stated on the methodological approach, social variables constitute difficult variables to study. Legitimacy is not an exception to this rule, even though its recent developments suggest interesting paths to operationalise and empirically address its analysis⁴⁷. Before choosing the variables and indicators, the most important step in the analysis is to identify the referents and the audiences that bestow with legitimacy. As it has been leaked along the chapter, the present analysis aim to address hegemonic legitimacy, more exactly the legitimacy bestowed to the United States' institution of hegemony. Understanding the growing multiplicity of actors in international society, the present analysis will focus mostly on states that bestow with legitimacy. However, understanding the growing role of world society on dynamics of legitimacy, in several indicators that address values and images of the hegemon, several opinions from global civil society will be also included⁴⁸.

The present analysis of legitimacy will be divided in four main sources of legitimacy. The first one will be substantive legitimacy, directly relates directly to the main roots of the institution of hegemony, its shared social structure. In other words, substantive legitimacy is connected to the common goals, values and principles that

⁴⁷ As it has been describe on the methodological part in Chapter 5, the present analysis of hegemony will rely on Rapkin and Braaten's work, even though several indicators and variables have been expanded, omitted or transformed. RAPKIN, D. P. and D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising hegemonic legitimacy... *op. cit.*".

⁴⁸ The multiplication of actors on international society has also multiplied the audiences towards legitimacy is performed. HURRELL, A., "Legitimacy and the Use of Force... *op. cit.*", p. 24; CLARK, I., *International Legitimacy and World Society... op. cit.*, pp. 13-35. Rapkin and Braaten also address this point, but in their analysis their focus mostly on global civil society as the bestowers and use public surveys to pulse its opinions. RAPKIN, D. P. and D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising hegemonic legitimacy... *op. cit.*", pp. 126-128.

sustain the institution of hegemony and that, in the end, serve as justifications of the initiatives or actions of the hegemon. The second source of legitimacy the constitutionalism procedural one, related to the first part of the process, the constitutional decision making, its accessibility and the implications of other actors in this process. Thirdly, the second procedural source related to the referent and its strategic restraint, practices through its role on the world, its policy moderation, its institutional binding and its adherence to international law. Finally, the fourth source is legitimacy is over outcomes and analysis the effectiveness of the exercise of power through the institution of hegemony, as well as the compliance of other actors with the leadership model build through the institution

Figure 19. Summary of the Variables and indicators that will be analysed

LEGITIMACY ANALYSIS	
a)	<p>Substantive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Variable 1</u>. Clashes in particular policies are driven by differences in values or interests? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Indicator</i>: Iraq War - <u>Variable 2</u>. Main idea(s) that drive international society <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Indicator</i>: Privileged values on institutions and public discourses.
b)	<p>Constitutionalism. Process 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Variable 1</u>. Tension between U.S. identity's great power and hegemon. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Indicator</i>: Main driver of foreign policy on: international politics, economy, environment - <u>Variable 2</u>. Implication of other states on the hegemon's policies. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Indicator</i>: War on Terror
c)	<p>Constitutionalism. Process 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Variable 1</u>. The state's role in the world <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Indicator 1</i>: Adherence to international law. Number of conventions/treaties ratified. • <i>Indicator 2</i>: Institutional participation.
d)	<p>Outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Variable 1</u>. Influence in the world <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Indicator</i>: Map of alliances - <u>Variable 2</u>. Leadership model. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Indicator</i>: Images of the United States leadership. Pew Research.

9.2.1.1 Substantive Legitimacy

The roots that sustain the contemporary institution of hegemony have a relevant role on the legitimacy bestowed to it. The constitutional nature of this institution implies a consensus on the social structure composed by values, interests, principles and norms, and this social structure is reinforced, challenged and contradicted through hegemonic practice. As it has been referred previously, the establishment of the institution of hegemony relied, on its first stages, on a partial part of the internationally, namely the Western states, which reinforced the common values between the hegemon and its main allies.

Therefore, the contemporary institution of hegemony has permeated important values and principles of the Western society of states. However, after the end of the Cold War, as Fukuyama has warned, "the sense of shared values" between Europe and United States "is increasingly frayed"⁴⁹. These shared values, moreover, become recurrent resources of rhetorics for and against the hegemon's practice, becoming a referent itself which compliance becomes a source of legitimacy. From its origins, the U.S. institution of hegemony could be defined by its liberal character, both internal and international. This liberalism has strengthened its ties with other liberal states, mainly Western, whose alliance it gained after the WWII. The liberal values, at that time, were confronted with communism, therefore creating a crew of liberal states within U.S. hegemony. As Bukovanski describes, the after war institution of hegemony was not only rooted in the U.S. leadership as a benign hegemon, but also on the socialisation of the virtues of markets to increase living standard and the notion of democratic peace⁵⁰.

In this liberal institution of hegemony, the United States was the essential glue on creating and sustaining the institutional network, assuming the cost of this liberal international order and containing the external threats to the order, mainly embodied on the Soviet Union⁵¹. Many of the values, principles and norms of the institution of hegemony were directly derivative from its liberal character, the democracy promotion, the defence of equality and individualism, and the mutual security protection. This set on values, in practice, became the main drivers not only of the institution of hegemony but of a hierarchy within the international society that marked a core and periphery within the institution of hegemony once it became global after the Cold War. In that moment, the set of values and principles that joined together the liberal states become a set of contemporary standard of civilisation that reinforced a hierarchical status within the institution of hegemony.

⁴⁹ FUKUYAMA, F., "The West may be Coming apart", *The Strait Times*, 10th August 2002.

⁵⁰ BUKOVANSKY, M., "Liberal States, International Order... *op. cit.*", p. 178.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Once identified the main values that drive the contemporary institution of hegemony, the analysis of the second variable of substantive legitimacy relies on that precise characteristic: the core and peripheral relations that coexist within the institution. On analysing the resistance and contestatory practices towards hegemony, it is also important to recognise if these resistances are rooted on differences in values and principles or driven by interests. This binarisation resembles to one of the challenges to the normative ambition of international society identified by Hurrell, the plurality. It constitutes a challenge to the extent that it reunites a plurality of ideas, views and values and, at the same time, a plurality of political identities that seek for recognition⁵².

Within the core of the hierarchy, there exists a wide consensus on the liberal values of the institution of hegemony. The West has been from its origins, the main fuel of the hegemony and its partner in actions against the resistances. However, the embankments on a liberal democratic crusade and the coercive means to impose it have undermined "the tenets of liberalism itself"⁵³, creating a dissonance on the liberal discourse around with the West bloc was united. Even though there exist a strong consensus among liberal states on the accuracy on the liberalising attempts, several disagreements occur on the ways to achieve it, a resistance that has been exacerbated through a growing opposition within the world society. Hence, divergences in several states towards U.S. actions usually demonstrate a hypocritical behaviour from national governors that rhetorically confront U.S. interventionism to avoid domestic confrontation. This is the case, for instance, of France, whose active and recurrent opposition to the invasion of Iraq strongly contradicts, for example, its pro interventionism practices in several parts of Africa. The resistance within the core, in this case, is due to its self interests that, on the one hand, aim to avoid national confrontation for an intervention in a country not relevant to its foreign policy as Iraq; and, on the other hand, promote interventionism on countries that are considered sensible for the French foreign policy⁵⁴.

However, the liberal project developed by US hegemonic institution has not gained such as strong support on the peripheral countries. On a context of rightful resistance, these peripheral actors accept partially the legitimacy of hegemony but take advantage of opportunities to contest the hegemon's actions within the order⁵⁵. It is particularly evident the recurrent resistance of the Russian delegation on the UNSC towards most of the initiatives brought by the United States. Those kinds of behaviours are a clear example of the contestation within the order, precisely because even

⁵² HURRELL, A., *On Global Order... op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

⁵³ BUKOVANSKY, M., "Liberal States, International Order... *op. cit.*", p. 177.

⁵⁴ *Vid.* SIMON, L., "The Spider in Europe's Web? French Grand Strategy From Iraq to Libya", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 18, n° 2, 2013, pp. 403-434; GAFFNEY, J., "Highly Emotional States: French-US Relations and the Iraq War", *European Security*, Vol. 13, n° 3, 2004, pp. 247-272.

⁵⁵ SCHWELLER, R. and X. PU, "After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*", p. 50.

if contestation and resistance through the core is permitted, its exercise from the periphery is silenced and somehow punished.

Among the periphery, differences with the practices of the hegemon differ in their source. It is true that several are caused by conflicting interests, for example in issues concerning the economic order. In the case of China it does exist several differences on this vein, concerning the distribution of gains and the status within the economic order. However, China is highly committed with the values promoted by the United States concerning global economy. However, in the case of intervention, China strongly refuses the intrusion in other states' domestic matters and promotes the principle of non-intervention⁵⁶. On these issues, China confronts the liberal hegemonic promotion of values and principles and, in this case, it clashes with the hegemonic narrative root on different understanding on the values that international society should promote.

Even though in the core there also exist divergences with the institution of hegemony, they usually do respond to clashing interest within the West. However, in the case of the periphery, confrontation on values is quite more recurrent, as the values of the institution of hegemony are strongly liberal. Peripheral countries show a particular divergence on the hegemonic promotion of human rights as a prerequisite to access to several of the benefits and public goods and hegemony. As Bukovasni rightly explains, the problems are not the values underneath the institution of hegemony, but its way of imposing them globally through illiberal practices as well as its inability to lead by example. While the United States promotes human rights defence and condemns other states' violations, it hypocritically does not ratify treaties that promote human rights. These contradictions are, in Finnemore's view, "manifestations of the constraints" that the hegemon face, and these kind of behaviours eventually "undermines respect and deference both for the unipole and for the values on which it has legitimized its power"⁵⁷.

Hence, the levels of substantive legitimacy of the institution of hegemony could be targeted as hybrid. Strong consensual movements exist within the core, that reunites several of the most powerful states (including the European Union and Japan), although their self-interest often collide. However, rightful resistances and divergences on values are more common among peripheral powers. The hegemon's effort to extend the scope of the institution of hegemony still seems fruitless due to its inability to reconcile its liberal values portfolio with the diversity of the peripheral powers. As the next section will address, the inclusiveness of decision making processes are prospect tools to advance on the inclusion of the periphery and the strengthening of the legitimacy of the institution.

⁵⁶ The principle of non intervention constitutes a cornerstone concept for China among the five principles of peaceful coexistence that guide its foreign practices.

⁵⁷ FINNEMORE, M., "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure... *op. cit.*", p. 61.

9.2.1.2. Constitutionalism process 1.

The dynamics of legitimacy also address the involvement and compliance of the international society of states on the specific policies that the hegemon promotes. The first procedural constitutionalism is related to the decision making processes that any important policy of the hegemon generates on the international society. As it has been stated, the United States successfully involved Western countries on decision making processes after the WWII and created a constitutional order with strong secondary institutions. Moreover, as Chapter 7 has deeply addressed, the relation of the hegemon with this institutional order is ambiguous and volatile. For the purpose of centring the analysis, the first procedural legitimacy will be analysed on the context of the invasion of Iraq, as it constitutes an important event that permits a *post hoc* review of the events. The decision-making processes will be addressed in two specific ways. Firstly, there will be a close examination of the pre-war decision making, paying attention to dynamics of collaboration, resistance and (de)legitimation, specifically on the context of the negotiations for a resolution of the UNSC authorising the use of force. Secondly, the analysis will introduce a *post hoc* perspective that aims to address the trust environments in which the decision-making process took place, as well as the after war legitimization of the action.

In is a wide consensus on the relative open nature of the decision making prior to the invasion of Iraq. Besides the strong institutional character of the decision not to legitimise the action through the UNSC, an informal non-institutional decision-making process took also place. In fact, the latest resolution prior to the military intervention was withdrawn after futile attempts to gain the members support. This movement, despite inaugurating an action outside the mandate of the Council, also reinforced the coalition unilateralism, not only in its practices but also in the decision-making processes. The coalitional actions of hegemonic power are not new phenomena, not even in the case of the United States, that has taken advantage of several coalitions to operationalise its actions. However, the demise of the consensual decision making has unchained a delegitimising process on the actions that took place in Iraq, in comparison to prior actions in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Bush administration publically criticised and delegitimised the United Nations, declaring that it should “prove to the world whether it is going to be relevant or whether it is going to be a League of Nations, irrelevant”⁵⁸. In the task of confronting terrorist that “attacked the status of internationalism due to its putative illegitimate identity”, Bush lost its nation coherence, highlighting the gap between the principles and the institutional practices of the international society⁵⁹. In other words, what promoted the crisis of legitimacy

⁵⁸ BERMAN, N., “Intervention in a “Divided World”: Axes of Legitimacy” in H. CHARLESWORTH and J.-M. COICAUD (eds.), *Fault Lines of International Legitimacy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 115.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

was not the decision to go to war on Iraq, but the choice to do it without the approval of the established decision making processes.

Even though the unilateral coalitional action led to a crisis of legitimacy, the hegemon managed to somehow legitimate post hoc the intervention. In 2004, the UNSC recognised the Coalition as the Provisional Authority, bestowing a central role to the transition and reconstruction of Iraq, which was extended through several other resolutions⁶⁰. Although the U.S. Coalition suffered the withdrawal of several allied national forces, the institutionalisation of its occupation and its privileged role on the transition is a clear move to solve the legitimacy crisis originated with the invasion. Understanding the differences between legitimate and legalised, it is argued that in this case the legalisation involved a strong degree of legitimation of the role of the coalition and, what is more important, a post hoc legitimation of the invasion.

Even if the burdens of the invasion were not shared not economically not even socially, on the reconstruction there was an active involvement and a reorganisation around the hegemon. The decision making process returned to multilateralism although it was a uni-multilateralism through the UNSC that aimed to reduce the political costs of an action that happened besides its mandate. Therefore, it is possible to say that, after the military invasion, which affected the consensus around the hegemon, there was a reunification move that evidences the overcome of the specific crisis of legitimacy over the action on Iraq. Moreover, in the case of Libya, the hegemon took note and exploited the option of the multilateral decision making and adherence to institution that was not practices in full on Iraq.

9.2.1.3. *Constitutionalism process 2.*

The second type of procedural constitutional legitimacy addresses directly the hegemon's role as a great power. In analysing the hegemonic practice and its legitimacy, it refers to the state's self-restraint on this fight between its more recurrent identities as hegemon and great power addressed in depth in Chapter 8. This equilibrium is only maintained by reducing the returns of power and moderating its policies, but also through an ambivalent adherence to international law that often generates scratches on the hegemonic legitimacy.

⁶⁰ Four specific resolutions established the mandate of the coalitional forces on Iraq. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1546 (2004)*, New York, 8th June 2004, <<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement>> [10th February 2016]; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1637 (2005)*, New York, 11th November 2005, <<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/592/77/PDF/N0559277.pdf?OpenElement>> [10th February 2016]; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1723 (2006)*, New York, 28th November 2006, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1723%282006%29> [10th February 2016]; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, *Resolution 1790 (2007)*, New York, 18th December 2007, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1790%282007%29> [10th February 2016].

For the purpose of examining this hegemonic dynamics, three main variables will be observed. The first variable regards to the adherence to international law, through the specific issue of United States adherence to human rights treaties. It is considered that this indicator is specifically appropriate, as human rights have been recurrently used by the hegemon as rhetorics to bestow it with legitimacy. Secondly, the United States use of institutions to agree and check its practice is particularly important, as well as its willingness to accommodate other powers to reinforce the legitimacy of its hegemonic institution. Relying on the deeper analysis of Chapter 7, this variable will also analyse the use of institutions as laundry services to disguise its unilateralism as multilateral policies. Finally, it will be addressed its role as a great power with special responsibilities, through the legitimacy of the nuclear status quo.

The issue of the adherence to international law in the case of powerful states involves different practices such as instrumentalisation, withdrawal, legitimating or attempts to reorganise hierarchically international law, becoming at the same time instrumental and resistance to the hegemonic power⁶¹. Moreover, in the case of the United States, the non adherence to several international law conventions and practices has been typified as a form of exceptionalism, namely exemptionalism⁶². Even though the United States does exercise a form of hegemony through secondary institutions, it has several times contravened the mandates of the Security Council, the legal guarantor of peace and security, as Chapter 7 has advanced. It has also tried to delegitimise several treaties with its non accession, as it has happened with the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court⁶³.

Specifically, the support and promotion of the Human Rights treaties from the United States seems to be, if not delegitimising, at least disappointing. Among the eighteen most important treaties on the issues of human rights, the United States has just ratified 5 and it is the great power with least ratifications⁶⁴. Despite this ratio, the hegemon is considered as a benign hegemon committed to the defence of human rights, and even recurrently uses them as arguments to delegitimize others. Even if other countries also share U.S. hypocritical position among human rights, the excep-

⁶¹ KRISCH, N., "International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order", *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 16, n° 3, 2005, p. 369.

⁶² IGNATIEFF, M., "Introduction: American Exceptionalism... *op. cit.*", p. 4; MORAVCSIK, A., "The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy" in M. IGNATIEFF (ed.), *American Exceptionalism... op. cit.*, p. 147-197.

⁶³ Even if the United States rhetorically defends international justice and, in fact, at a first step signed (but not ratified the Rome Statute) it latter changed its posture towards the court. On the hearth of this change seems to be the independency of the Court from the UNSC that at first was supposed to be dependent from the UNSC and interlocked on the UN Charter. SCHABAS, W. A., "United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's All About the Security Council", *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 15, n° 4, 2004, p. 701.

⁶⁴ France leads with 17 treaties ratified, followed by the United Kingdom (13), Russia (11), China (8) and the United States (5).

tionalism of the American case roots on its role as promoter, enforcer and leader of the human rights standard while, simultaneously, maintain and outlier position⁶⁵.

United States scepticism towards international law binding instrument, and specifically human rights policies, could be explained, in Moravcsik opinion, through four characteristics that are present in other countries but that only reunite together on the hegemon's case: its geopolitically uncontested power, its democratic stability, its concentrated active conservative minority and, finally, its decentralised and fragmented political institutions⁶⁶. Moreover, to this bunch of arguments there exist another important one to add, namely, unprecedented the role of the United States military in the world. Due to its expansionist militarism, the hegemon is present and /or intervenes worldwide and its not binding commitment to several international legal instruments has prevented further legal responsibilities of its military personnel.

Despite these practices, the hegemon is legitimated as the global leader of human rights, demonstrating a break between the practices and the perceptions. It is true that the hegemon has diffused the role of promoter of new legal instruments on human rights, but at the end is still considered like the last change to ensure the compliance of the legal instruments. Even if several actions against human rights arise, as the Abu Ghraib tortures or the recurrent criticism towards Guantanamo, the hegemon not only continues to disguise itself as a human rights promoter, but its behaviour is legitimised and reproduced by the international society, showing a strong legitimacy towards its institution of hegemony regarding its adherence to international law.

Regarding the second variable, the institutional practice of the hegemon, it is necessary to acknowledge the impressive institutional promotion and participation that the hegemon has practiced from the WWII to nowadays. Two main indicators highlight the relevance of institutions to the hegemon's legitimacy. The first one is the attraction that these institutions exercise, not only as channels of multilateralism and consensual practice, but also as sources of status. In this vein, the recent efforts to accommodate rising states that were deeply discussed on chapter 7 evidence that the hegemon is aware of the legitimating capacity of the institutional web and the necessity to revitalise its legitimacy. The web of secondary institutions is highly influenced by the most important values, principles and interest that the hegemon aims to spread. Moreover, they constitute instruments of hegemonic influences as well as sources of legitimacy.

In the case of legitimacy through institutions, in the case of the United States is accurate to question why the crisis of legitimacy generated by the Iraq war did not deadly undermine the institution of hegemony. The United States, at first, tried to take advantage of the laundry service provided by the UNSC, both to disguise the intervention as legitimate and multilateral and also to share the burdens of it. Even though

⁶⁵ IGNATIEFF, M., "Introduction: American Exceptionalism... *op. cit.*", p. 2.

⁶⁶ MORAVCSIK, A., "The Paradox of U.S... *op. cit.*", p. 150.

at some degree the United States' institution of hegemony suffered delegitimation and faced a crisis because of this action, what was more undermined was the legitimacy of the Security Council itself. The inability to constrain the hegemon and the afterwards legitimation of the action evinced an accessory nature of the legalisation via the Council for the actions led by great powers, especially in the case of the United States⁶⁷.

Despite the particular policies around the War on Terror, the United States institutional practice seems to be perceived as evidences of moderation and self-restraint. The institutional web created after the WWII is still today not only a way of reducing the costs of hegemony, but also a tool to strengthen the links between United States institution of hegemony and the allies at its core. Accommodation and reformist practices that took place after the 2008 economic crisis evidence the great capacity of reinvention of the hegemon, as well as the present reformist character of China as the greater challenger. Small and make up changes have become, at the same time, greater legitimacy tools for the hegemon, not only to produce win-win strategies but also to silence dissidences from the periphery offering a greater status within its own hegemonic system.

Finally, the third variable involves the practice of special responsibilities that structure legitimate political action in a way that creates a hierarchy of agents that enables and constraint their actions⁶⁸. Nuclear order, according to Walker's definition is defined as "more than a structure of power and a set of deterrent relations"⁶⁹ and within it there underline the interests, values and principles that the institution of hegemony promotes⁷⁰. In other words, the nuclear order is not only the practical application of special responsibilities, but also an example of the spill over effect from the institutional hegemony towards the different parts of international society.

Despite the asymmetries within the nuclear order, it can be said that it constitutes one of the most successful realms of the expansion of the U.S. institution of hegemony. Moreover, Chinese and Russian compliance with the nuclear order show the strength of U.S. role in this realm, as well as the legitimacy it holds. Among the three special responsibilities that are often mentioned (climate change, global finance and nuclear proliferation)⁷¹, nuclear order is the one that has more successfully diffused

⁶⁷ For an extensive argument of these point , see Chapter 7 and, also, MORRIS, J. and N. J. WHEELER, "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*"; CLARK, I., *Hegemony in International Society...* *op. cit.*, pp. 151-152; VOETEN, E., "Delegation and the nature of the Security Council... *op. cit.*", p. 50.

⁶⁸ BUKOVANSKI, M., I. CLARK, R. ECKERSLEY et al., *Special Responsibilities...* *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁶⁹ WALKER, W., "Nuclear Order and Disorder", *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, n° 4, 2000, p. 722.

⁷⁰ The relation between hegemony, international society and nuclear order constitutes an interesting starting point to rethink several of the concepts of the English School/Constructivist tradition. *Vid.* BUKOVANSKI, M., I. CLARK, R. ECKERSLEY et al., *Special Responsibilities...* *op. cit.*, PINTADO, M., "China's responses to a nuclear order un crisis... *op. cit.*".

⁷¹ BUKOVANSKI, M., I. CLARK, R. ECKERSLEY et al., *Special Responsibilities...* *op. cit.*

the hegemonic power towards a great power hierarchy and, as a consequence, the less contested one.

As this second dynamic of procedural legitimacy exemplifies, the hegemon's role in the world is not only seen as legitimate, but also considered as beneficial. The moderation and the politics of exercising hegemony through institutions has successfully constructed a notion of a moderate self-restrained hegemon that can be, in practice, in conflict with the outcome of legitimacy that analysis the effectiveness of its exercise of power as well as the compliance with the leadership model it represents.

9.2.1.4. Outcome Legitimacy

The dynamics of outcome legitimacy clearly address the compliance of the actors of international society with the hegemon's institution of hegemony. This compliance involves the check of the effectiveness of the hegemon's practices of power and its images together with an analysis of the leadership model that the U.S. socialises. The concept of outcome legitimacy, however, becomes quite complex as it involves issues of perception, national gains, geopolitical calculus and historical alliances. Moreover, it also has to do with questions of citizens' perceptions as well as pro and anti-Americanism.

Due to the complexity of this type of legitimacy, the two selected variables will address two different audiences that bestow legitimacy: states and citizens. Even though the present project has been approached with a statocentric view, it has been decided to include also non-state views⁷². Therefore, two different variables will be offered. The first one will describe the hegemon's influence in the world through a map of the expansion of the institution of hegemony. The second will try to summarise the main views towards the U.S. institution of hegemony among citizens of different countries, as well as the values they ascribe to it in several statistical surveys.

As it has been advanced along the chapter, the current institution of hegemony is unevenly produced and reproduced among states due to the different degrees of compliance and its role as producer, reproducer and resistance to it. These roles are particularly evident in several practices that have been examined in previous chapters, namely, institutional practice, shared values, pattern of gains or alliance systems. Moreover, these roles are non-inclusive, one state can play different roles in different issues or periods of time. To draw a map of these different perceptions on the institution of hegemony, it will rely on the state practice that has been analysed in the previous chapters, as well as historical alliance systems and corpus of shared values.

⁷² In their work, Rapkin and Braaten rely solely on the citizens' views expressed in different international surveys. RAPKIN, D. P. and D. BRAATEN, "Conceptualising hegemonic legitimacy... *op. cit.*", pp. 128-133. However, in this methodology state's views are also considered, even if they are more difficult to establish, in practice reveal the different degrees of the expansion of the institution of hegemony.

Several states constitute what is considered as the core of the institution of hegemony, states that produce and reproduce the hegemonic values, principles and practices. The states that constitute this core hold an important status among the international society, that sometimes is considered overrated. Several examples illustrate this point as, for instance, the status of France as a permanent member of the UNSC. Due to its alliance with the winners on the WWII and because of its colonial status, France was given a greater status although nowadays it seems to be overrated comparing with other great powers such as Germany or Japan. Moreover, Japan also holds an important role on the IMF as well as in the ADB because of its past role as the second greatest world economy as well as due to its strong alliance and compliance with the hegemon. However, the core states also have to share with the hegemon several burdens, through active and strong involvement on institutions funding, active defence and promotion of the hegemon practice and, usually, exposition to national criticism because of it. For instance, Spain played an active role on the negotiations on the UNSC prior to the Iraq War and it took part military even though it produced a strong criticism in the national society. However, these moves at the core are usually driven to demonstrate strong compliance to the hegemon, as well as reliability and diplomatic involvement.

There can be delegitimation practices within the core, but as they often occur based on the same set of values of the hegemonic power, there are easier to overcome. Moreover, the resolution of crisis of legitimacy among the core milder, as the hegemon does not opt to use a recalibration of material power to restore it. It does, on the contrary, rely on a "communicative reconciliation" of the institution of hegemony's "social identity, interests, or practices with the normative expectations of other actors within its realm of political action"⁷³. Even of in the case of the U.S., the intervention on Iraq as well as several criticisms derived from the War on Terror that lead to a legitimacy crisis was closed definitely when the hegemon decided to act differently in Libya, restoring its trust towards an exercise of power through institutions. Hence, its practices went back to met the normative expectations of this core.

States with less status within the institution of hegemony are considered as peripheral powers, involved in the reproduction but not powerful enough to produce changes within the hegemony as core states do. Often considered as second rank allies, their silence on confronting policies is complemented with a high degree of compliance with the secondary institutions that often control their own national processes. In Asia and Latin America, for instance, financial institutions created by the institution of hegemony controlled the processes of economic recalibration after crises, as well as the subsequent political processes⁷⁴. The role of the periphery is, on the one hand,

⁷³ REUS-SMIT, C., "International Crisis of Legitimacy... *op. cit.*", p. 172.

⁷⁴ PINTADO, M., "La Presencia de Estados Unidos en América Latina... *op. cit.*"; BLACK, J., *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony... op. cit.*

serving as experiences to legitimate the institution of hegemony, through histories of success in applying the hegemon recommendatory practices, for example. On the other hand, peripheries serve as interesting experiences of lobbying within the system through abruption of states that share similar problems, values or goals. This lobbying can sometimes contest the hegemon's legitimacy, as the members of the Bandung Conference did, but this happens on an attempt to broaden the hegemonic principles and values of the society, not in a direct attempt to delegitimize the institution of hegemony.

Among the core and the periphery, there coexist an interesting group of states than composes a sort of reformist/resistance movement. It is composed by members of the core that aim to expand their status and benefits, as well as some outsiders that contest it from a pretended non inclusion on the hegemonic institution⁷⁵. This heterogeneous group of states does resist in different ways and contests both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the global leadership model that the institution of hegemony sustains. The states at the core constitute the most interesting subject, as they present mixed characteristics of reformist and revisionist that often takes the shape of a rightful resistance model. In other words, they aim to improve their status within the institution while, at the same time contests several core values that it defends. The most exemplar case are emerging powers, especially China, that simultaneously what to improve their status, for example through major institutional power and, at the same time, construct alternative models of leadership that contest the hegemon's legitimacy.

These states approach resistance through processes of deconcentration and delegitimation that do not always want to overturn the hegemonic institution. However, these practices do erode the social power of the hegemon, both through the delegitimation generated by external and internal balancing, as well as deconcentration practices that push for a dispersion of power more evenly within the international society⁷⁶. These practices create the necessary crack on the institution of hegemony, the chance to build an alternative institution of hegemony rooted on this deconcentration of values, principles and power.

Regarding the second audience included in this type, the approach needs a survey-based analysis. In a general sense, the global opinion towards the United States is favourable among different regions and seems to have recovered after the 2002-2008 period, clearly influenced by the election of Barack Obama⁷⁷. On an overall sense, the 69% of the global public hold a favourable view towards the United States, compared

⁷⁵ The reference to a pretended non-inclusion aims to highlight the global character of this institution of hegemony, whose reproduction does influence the whole globe. Even though several states nationally try to contest this reproduction, the processes of globalisation complicate these attempts and make them somehow influenced.

⁷⁶ SCHWELLER, R. and PU X., "After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*", pp. 46-47.

⁷⁷ The influence of the leaders of states in global opinions constitutes an interesting object of study that has reached some interesting conclusions on the case of the United States.

to the 24% that has unfavourable views. Among NATO allies, views are highly positive, although in Germany the views are almost even (50% favourable versus 45% unfavourable). Moreover, among Asians views are also positive, and quite even in the case of China (49 favourable and 44 % unfavourable); but in a regional view Africa by difference the region with more favourable opinions to the U.S. with a 80% media of favourable views in the nine countries that took part on the survey⁷⁸. However, in the case of China, the U.S. is seen as the main treat to the country (45%) before economic instability and climate change. This treat perception seems to be highly influenced by the general view that the United States is trying to prevent China to become powerful⁷⁹.

On the same vein, the hegemon's influence in the world is seem as stable over the last ten years, with the exception of Japan and China that see U.S. influence as declining⁸⁰. However, there is a strong support to the claim that the hegemon supports personal freedoms, even though its tortures on the contexts of the War on terror are, in the opinion of the 50%, non justified, while the 35% sees them as justified⁸¹.

As pools suggest, the United States is considered as a stable leader as well as a legitimate holder of the primary values it defends, especially human rights and personal freedoms. Moreover, its role as economic leader is not contested, as the 51% considers it is the world leading economic power, while the 26% targets China as the leading economy⁸². Hence, the vision of the United States as a hegemon, based on the values and principles it spreads, is not only majority, but also increasing. At the same time, its rates seem to have improved during Obama's presidency and, at the same time, are likely to shift in future pools due to the hegemon's national political polarisation.

9.3. Chinese alternative hegemonic institution in the verge of an hegemonic succession

Simultaneously to the changing nature of United States' institution of hegemony, that has managed to reinforce several of its legitimacy bases after crises, China is

⁷⁸ PEW RESEARCH CENTER, "Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture", June 2015, <<http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2015/06/Balance-of-Power-Report-FINAL-June-23-2015.pdf>> [16th February 2017].

⁷⁹ PEW RESEARCH CENTER, "Chinese Public Sees More Powerful Role in World, Names U.S. as Top Threat", October 2016, <<http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/10/Pew-Research-Center-China-Report-FINAL-October-5-2016.pdf>> [16th February 2017].

⁸⁰ PEW RESEARCH CENTER, "As Obama Years Draw to Close, President and U.S. Seen Favorably in Europe and Asia", June, 2016, <<http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/06/Pew-Research-Center-Balance-of-Power-Report-FINAL-June-29-2016.pdf>> [16th February 2017].

⁸¹ PEW RESEARCH CENTER, "Global Publics Back U.S.... *op. cit.*".

⁸² *Ibid.*

thoroughly trying to strengthen its worldwide influence, improve ties with other states and reinforce and expand its legitimacy. However, a closer look suggest that there are several weak points that the country must advance on to posse a credible alternative to the U.S. institution of hegemony.

The task of analysing the legitimacy of China as an alternative model must be channelled differently. As the Asian country does not have an established institution of hegemony and a so rooted set of values and principles that aims to expand compared to the United States, the analysis should be more flexible. Even though the analysis will be framed on the same type of legitimacy types as the previous one, it will be applied on more broad examples and in progress policies.

One of the most iconic problems of China on its legitimacy on international society regards substantive legitimacy. The United States took advantage of its non-colonial and Anglo-Saxon identity to build a Western transatlantic partnership that, in practice, has been the main component of the Western identity rooted on shared values, principles and interest. China, however, has difficulties on strengthening ties with its Asian neighbours, due to its increasing power, its military modernization and its past as a regional hegemon. Even though Japan also holds a belligerent past towards its neighbours, China's rapid emergence has increased the threat perception. To confront this dynamic, China is trying to cooperate more closely with its Asian neighbours in terms of security and, more importantly, economy, both through the newly created institutions and also through an active partnership with the ASEAN.

China is also trying to reinforce its claims to "Asian values", as they are the base n the construction of a distinctive regional international society. As Buzan suggest, the project of constructing this regional international society embrace a "postcolonial view of global international society, and would necessarily mean a more decentralised global order"⁸³. On this line, the post-crisis international society offer a great opportunity to advance on this model, as these experimental alternatives, in Buzan words, can advance on a more pluralist management of the global international society relying on peaceful coexistence, trade and environmental issues⁸⁴.

However, by the moment China is not succeeding on the socialisation of its role as a great power based on Asian values. Even though it has rhetorically been quite stuck to its rhetoric as a peaceful rise state, its power still generates clashes. Simultaneously, the Chinese government has discovered its major source of legitimacy among medium and small power: the attractiveness of its economic and development model. The success on economy has raised Chinese status within the great power club and, moreover, has constituted an example to rising states. Relying on this influence, it has leveraged its rising foreign investment to channel a growing number of projects to this audience. The progressive expansion of the OBOR initiative as well as the AIIB will

⁸³ BUZAN, B., "China in International Society... *op. cit.*", pp. 34-35.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

work on this path, expanding the notion of China as a reliable cooperation partner and the more dynamic developing actor on the non-Western world. It is this model, along with the strengthening the trust among its neighbours, the most important task for China to constitute a credible and successful alternative.

It is true that China has made notable improvements regarding the issues considered on the procedural constitutionalism. It has successfully improved its attractiveness as an institutional hub, as the expansion and active engagement of states in the organisation it promotes exemplifies. This has temporally concurred with a growing Chinese involvement in international affairs with the demise of the policy of “keeping a low profile”. This shift has evidenced that China has somehow subsumed its self-interest on a broader notion as a responsible state, understanding that its national developments is inherently linked to the global one. On this vein, Chinese legitimacy will be influenced by how it balances the two main identities that it is trying to socialise: on the one hand, a status quo responsible power that aims to take greater responsibilities and increase its status and, on the other hand, its identity as a reformist emerging power that wants to promote a new type of relations. However, once its power increases both identities will inevitably mutate on a complex one, a reformist responsible hegemonic successor.

The main problem of this mutation will be the concerns it can raise among the hegemon and the states that are located at the core of its institution of hegemony. As China relies in many of the economic principles that the United States has established and socialised, it is not only dependent of it, but also its main beneficiary and the most successful example. Moreover, as president Xi Jinping has clearly expressed, China is extremely compromised with economic globalization: “it is true that economic globalization has created new problems, but this is no justification to write economic globalization off completely. Rather, we should adapt to and guide economic globalization, cushion its negative impact, and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations”⁸⁵. The Chinese explicit defence of globalisation and global economic cooperation performed in Davos is clearly related to the turbulences that the uncertain policies of the United States in recent times. After the withdrawal of the hegemon from the TPP and the calls for a more nationalist economic policies, the Chinese government has responded with a strong defence of the global processes and has bestowed itself as the main driver of them. This progressive role as the main economic responsible constitutes an interesting movement of China towards achieving greater legitimation through its greater involvements, something that will increase while U.S. continues its disentanglement from several of the bases of its hegemonic institution, such as global-

⁸⁵ XI J., “President Xi’s speech to Davos in full”, *World Economic Forum*, Davos, 17th January 2017, <<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum>> [21st February 2017].

isation, transatlantic alliances or adherence to international law and human rights promotion.

Regarding the second procedural constitutionalism, it is possible to identify an ongoing transformation in Chinese foreign policy practices from the non-implication towards a growing trend. In the case of international law, China is showing a growing involvement, especially in the 21st century, with the ratification of four human rights instruments, where China has ratified eight of the eighteen most important instruments⁸⁶. However, its human rights record indoors is still poor and its violation of the international maritime law on the context of the disputes in the South China Sea have been denounced⁸⁷. These two specific issues constitute the most recurrent critics to China, along with the growing but still insufficient protection to foreign investments in the country.

This contrasts with its high institutional participation, which reached its peak with the accession to the WTO, as well as its partnership with institutions in which it does not take part as the ASEAN. This institutional practice has gone even further with the promotion of new institutions centred in alternative hubs such as emerging countries or countries in development. This change on the audiences constitutes the main novelty, as China tries to root its legitimacy in the peripheral countries which United States influence is still important in a hierarchical way but which do not receive the main gains of the hegemonic institution. However, the growing military modernisation and the regional aspirations of China continue creating fear on its neighbouring countries, a sense that only increases with its expansionist claims in the South China Sea. It can be argued that a pacific resolution on this complex conflict will be not only highly legitimating but also vital to Chinese construction of an alternative institution of hegemony.

Concerning special responsibilities, as the previous chapters have explored, China is showing a stronger involvement as well as a great institutional creativity on the way it address several issues. In economics, the 2008 financial crisis constitutes the starting point of a joint effort of the U.S.-China team to foster not only stability but also economic growth and financial investment. In nuclear proliferation, China has contributed to the maintenance of the nuclear order with its commitment with retaliation-based strategy as well as through an institutional engagement, not to forget its

⁸⁶ The four instruments ratified in this century are International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (created in 1976 and ratified in 2001), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (created in 2002 and ratified in 2008), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (created and ratified in 2002) and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (created and ratified in 2008).

⁸⁷ PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, "PCA Case n° 2013-19. The Philippines vs. the People's Republic of China in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration", *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 12th July 2016, <<https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf>> [20th February 2017].

role on the North Korean case, even though the nuclear order is no less representative and more based on U.S. hegemony⁸⁸. Moreover, in climate change, China has jointed efforts with the United States to successfully achieve more commitments. In these three arenas, it should be noted that China has moved towards a more active cooperative relation with the United States, admitting its hierarchical role on specific orders and reinforcing its role as responsible state. In other words, it has subsumed its revisionist sentiments to build and reform within the order, as it recognised both the legitimacy of the order as well as the material, social and legitimacy benefits it can extract from it.

Finally, in the context of outcome legitimacy, it is evident that China does not have a stable and reliable alliance system as the United States. Despite its special relation with Russia, that fluctuates and is full of self-interest and mistrust, other relations take place on specific context and, more importantly, have an important lack of transversality. For example, in the case of the transatlantic alliance, which has strong military origin, it has not only permeated to economics, but also to issues such as politics, trade, research, cultural exchange or technology. In the case of China, its relations are still too tight to specific issues or interests, as economic investment or military cooperation

Moreover, Chinese worldview both among nation states and citizens is still to poor and biased. This is a direct result to China's poor record on public diplomacy⁸⁹, at the past for its lack of performance and interests and nowadays for its little effectiveness. It is true that the factors that have the ability to affect the operation of public diplomacy (political regime and historical problems, political relations among countries. relative power and economic relations) are not by its side, as they reunite the most recurrent critics and fear towards China⁹⁰.

In statistical terms, surprisingly surveys show a growing favourable opinion towards China worldwide. A media of 55% of the people has a general opinion towards China, and more favourable views concentrate in Africa and Latin America, while the Asian region is the less favourable one⁹¹. Moreover, there is a worldwide agreement on the statement that China will eventually replace or has already replace the United States as the world leading superpower, with the exception of the United

⁸⁸ HORSBURGH, N., *China and The Global Nuclear Order... op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁸⁹ Cao defines public diplomacy as "government-led diplomatic campaigns that introduce foreign policy and other relevant measures through such means as cultural exchanges and media publicity aimed at foreign and domestic publics". CAO W., "The Efficiency of China's Public Diplomacy", *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 9, n° 4, 2016, p. 411. Public diplomacy has been usually linked to concepts of soft and smart power. "Public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to mobilize" the resources that produce soft power "to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments". NYE, J. S., "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, n° 1, 2008, p. 95.

⁹⁰ CAO W., "The Efficiency of China's Public Diplomacy... op. cit.", pp. 415-417.

⁹¹ PEW RESEARCH CENTER, "Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS... op. cit.", p. 28.

States, Indonesia, Philippines, Japan, Vietnam and Brazil⁹². As these data highlights, China get positive views more broadly in regions or countries in development, while Asian neighbours usually hold unfavourable opinions On the leadership of Xi Jinping, Japan shows a strong unfavour opinion, (79% versus 12 %), while Australia (37% versus 39%) and India (15% versus 20%) target it as favourable, also with quite equal results⁹³. By contrast, inside the country, there is a high confidence on the new role of China a 75% of the population believes that China plays a more important role than ten years ago⁹⁴. Even if there are mixed opinions about China, it is true that its public image has not improved sharply, even though it is becoming a growing concern both for the government and for the Chinese academia⁹⁵.

As Rawnsley notes, China's approach to public diplomacy has two main areas of interest: economics and culture. regarding to economics, in its view, the Chinese model, to the extent that is highly linked to the authoritarian regime, has influence on regimes with similar political regimes by have difficulties in convincing the liberal democratic core of international and world society⁹⁶. On the same vein, d'Hooghe highlights the double effect of the Chinese economy success in the context of public diplomacy. On the one hand, it inspires developing countries on the exploration of roads of development similar to China's and also stimulates the discussion of the China Model in developed countries, while also becomes an international hub not only for economic but also research and innovation. On the other hand, this rapid growth also inspires fears, especially due to the uncertainty of how the CCP is going to politically use this success⁹⁷.

Culture has been the other main areas where the Chinese government has put its efforts, relying in its interesting ancient philosophy and taking advantage of its growing role to expand its language and culture. This way, the expansion of Confucius Institutes around the world, the organisation of the 2008 Beijing Olympics⁹⁸ and

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁹³ PEW RESEARCH CENTER, "As Obama Years Draw to Close... *op. cit.*", p. 27.

⁹⁴ PEW RESEARCH CENTER, "Chinese Public Sees More Powerful Role in World... *op. cit.*", p. 3.

⁹⁵ Interesting reviews of the understanding of public diplomacy by the Chinese academia include CAO W., "The Efficiency of China's Public Diplomacy... *op. cit.*"; WANG Y., "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, n° 1, 2008, pp. 257-273.

⁹⁶ RAWNSLEY, G. D., "China Talks Back: Public Diplomacy and Soft Power for the Chinese Century" in N. SNOW and P. M. TAYLOR (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 283.

⁹⁷ D'HOOGHE, I., "The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy", *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers*, n° 12, July 2007, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, <http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20070700_cdsp_paper_hooghe.pdf> [20th February 2017], pp. 13-14; D'HOOGHE, I., "The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System" in WANG J. (ed.), *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, p. 26; D'HOOGHE, I., *China's Public Diplomacy*, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2015, pp. 67-70.

⁹⁸ On the link between the Beijing Olympics and China's global ambitions, see HONG F. and ZHOUXIANG L., "Beijing's two bid s for the Olympics: the political games", *The International Journal of the*

the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai, as well as the growing internationalisation of its cultural presence. This two mayor events that China hosted perform to different audiences, according to d’Hooghe The Olympics had a global character but more importantly lead China to interact with the top of the hierarchy, offering a view of a modern, powerful, and capable country with a fascinating culture” but also highlight some of its defects (lack of transparency or non respect of human rights). In the Case of the World Expo, hosted two years later, the Chinese learn from the previous experience and even though it had a smaller audience, China successfully performed as the leader of the developing world, both by its partnership and support to the African participation and also because of the dialogue and long term cooperation established, that result on an impression of China as a “modernizing and capable country with many flaws but also a country in which real change is happening”⁹⁹.

Even though the Chinese government is aware of the profound problems and obstacles it has to solve, it is also true that there are areas of prospective development as the one previously explored. At present, it is true that China’s military developments have greater influence on public opinion that the country’s public diplomacy¹⁰⁰. However, the expansion and improvement of its public diplomacy policies, as well as the flexibility to adjust its policies responding to several criticisms constitute, for d’Hooghe, important positive characteristics that, along with a raising cultural profile and the strengthening of the role of non-state actors, have the potential to improve China’s image¹⁰¹.

History of Sport, Vol. 29, nº 1, 2012, pp. 145-156; HONG F. and ZHOUXIANG L., “The politicisation of the Beijing Olympics”, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 29, nº 1, 2012, pp. 157-183; HONG F., WU P. and XIONG H., “Beijing ambitions: An analysis of the Chinese elite sports system and its Olympic strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games”, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 22, nº 4, 2005, pp. 510-529. On a more general sense, Pulleiro offers an interesting exploration of the links between international relations and the Olympics games. PULLEIRO, C., “El comportamiento estatal en los Juegos Olímpicos durante la Guerra Fría y Posguerra Fría. Un análisis desde el realismo neoclásico de Relaciones Internacionales”, PhD Thesis, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU).

⁹⁹ D’HOOGHE, I., *China’s Public Diplomacy... op. cit.*, pp. 283-284.

¹⁰⁰ CAO W., “The Efficiency of China’s Public Diplomacy... op. cit.”, p. 399.

¹⁰¹ D’HOOGHE, I., *China’s Public Diplomacy... op. cit.*, p. 219.

CONCLUDING PART

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

After an extensive and profound research on the object of study, the present thesis has reached to several conclusions. This division of the conclusions, that accomplishes the main parts of the thesis, also aims to highlight the evolutionary character of this research project, that has not only proposed an eclectic theoretical approach, but also has tested it in a practical field through the construction of a complex methodology.

The ambitious objectives of these project, hence, have also been accomplish with these theoretical-practical gap in mind. Even though the conclusions, are divided, the both theory and practice has experienced a relevant dialogue within the thesis. Dialogues , both between theory and practice or, for example, between materialist and social approaches, constitute the main driver of this thesis and have undoubtedly influenced the set of conclusions that is presented on the following pages.

10.1. Theoretical conclusions

The theoretical approach to hegemony evidences the need to build bridges between different research projects to construct a comprehensive approach that understands hegemony both as social and material concept.

The development of the theoretical framework that travels around four main-stream theories (Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and English School) evidences the gap between material and social prisms in their understanding of international society and hegemony. It has been decided to construct the methodological bases for the practical analysis through an eclectic approach that offers a broader map although also a more complicated one. Moreover, the analysis of these four Western approaches displays the existing confusion over the notions of primacy and hegemony, that sometimes are considered as synonyms. Even though the English School makes a clear distinction, there are presented as different phenomena although, at the end, they are sometimes complementary.

Several realist approaches define hegemony mainly in material terms, despite the inclusion of non-material variables such as prestige or status that they do not, in practice, operationalise. Moreover, the liberal approaches do address the relation between hegemony and institutions, but they do not draw concrete lines between primacy and hegemony.

Social approaches such as Constructivism and English School prioritise the non material elements that constitute hegemony, but they neglect any composed analysis that focuses firstly on the material bases that sustain the primacy of the hegemon. As they take this primacy for granted, social approaches left the operationalisation of the materialist bases of hegemony on the hands of purely realist approaches

This lack of comprehensive approaches evidences the absence of fruitful dialogue between social and materialist research projects. As these project evidences, approaching the materialist analysis within the broader understanding of structure that is simultaneously material and social contextualises better the data and empowers social analysis dialoguing directly with the main materialist understandings.

As Pu rightly expresses, "the gap between material power and ideational power constitutes a major disequilibrium in the international system, and this disequilibrium drives the major international political change"¹. It is in this gap where this thesis navigates, on identifying the disequilibrium between the material and the social that produce change on the overall structure.

Hence, the composed approach transforms conflicting approaches in complementary and spurs dialogue. This way, the transgression at this point is not to create

¹ PU X., "Socialisation as a Two-way Process... *op. cit.*", p. 353.

new terms, but to create a “conceptual geography” of the discipline to advance analytically².

The growing trend to decentralise IRT needs to advance at the same time on indigenisation and internationalisation and, at this point, the project of the Chinese School is becoming quite successful.

The rise of new poles of knowledge production on IRT is occurring simultaneously with the emergence of new global hubs of power. Evidently, both processes cannot be isolated, as the rise of these previously peripheral powers has pushed their national academics to denounce the deficiency of the Western academia to address their own processes. Hence, they are gradually advancing on the construction of a theoretical corpus and a research agenda that address better its national processes. Therefore, the decentralisation of IRT, analysed in this work through three specific projects on the Chinese School is, at the same time, a project of indigenisation and internationalisation.

On the one hand, there exists a strong call to base these innovative contributions on the local cultures, the historical and philosophical traditions as well as in the native political practice. Even though at some point these make more difficult the global expansion of the theory, as they call for a contextualisation, this constitutes the more subversive point of the project of decentralising IRT. These evidences, not only the lack of non-Western approaches on the centre of the debate, but also the lack of knowledge of the history of peripheral areas, whose processes of political struggles offer interesting starting points to challenge theories and, also, to complement the canonical historical traditions that base Western knowledge, mainly Ancient Greece and Rome, with enriching civilisations³.

On the other hand, this native projects have to insert themselves on global discussions, not only to foster its development, but also to complement and influence the research accomplished globally. In other words, the aim of the Chinese Schools, as well as of other projects, has to be a contestation of the hierarchies of global knowledge production on IR theory, but not an auto-marginalisation from this hierarchy. At this point, the rise of China gives its native schools the main object of analysis, as well as the excuse to strength ties and look for synergies with other schools, as it has been explored in the case of the English School.

However, this exercise has its risks, as internationalisation might blur its purpose of overcoming the explanatory deficiencies of Western core theories. Equally, the

² A prominent example of this transgression is Barkin’s work. BARKIN, J. S., *Realist Constructivism. Rethinking International Relations Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 155.

³ Several authors are exploring this path, for example, ZHANG Y. y B. BUZAN, “The Tributary System as International Society... *op. cit.*”, BUZAN, B. and Y. ZHANG Y. (eds.), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

excessive indigenisation may marginalise the projects and make them only applicable for the Chinese specific case only in the national contest. Hence, the dialogue with Western theories, that claim their global explanatory capacity, is essential to shape and reformulate native theoretical developments. In the case of the Chinese school, two main attempts have been made. Firstly, the debate between Yan Xuetong's moral realism with the broad realist school and, more precisely with the offensive realist scholars, has raised Yan's influence as well as the global aim of its theory. Secondly, there should be mentioned the growing debate between the Chinese and English Schools. Despite their profound differences, their shared position as "challengers" to American realist and liberal theories constitutes the starting point to share lessons and channel criticism⁴. The success of this dialogue, which first steps are quite promising, will influence the globalisation of the Chinese schools. Hence, the task of building this indigene projects becomes more exciting once they start navigating on the space between the core and periphery⁵. Making this gap smaller trough their dynamic dialogue with both the core projects and the peripheral resistances, they will start to erode this hierarchical dynamic.

The source of conflict under hegemonic leadership is the tension between the real distribution of material power and the hierarchical hegemonic international system

Even though the theories analysed in this thesis attribute conflict in the international system to different reasons, the lack of a notion paying attention to material and social variables addresses only partially this issue. The different transformations that take place on the social and material structures translate in different ways; distribution of material power, for instance, changes more rapidly but social changes in the hegemonic international society are more profound but also require longer periods of time.

The hierarchical hegemonic system was born under a certain distribution of power in which the state's primacy has no challenge. This system, once it becomes more and more operationalised through instruments such as alliances, socialisation and legitimation practices and institutions, orders a hierarchy of distribution of gains. As this distribution is locked by the social role of the hegemon, it automatizes and maintains nearly stable over time. However, simultaneously, the hegemon's material

⁴ WANG Y. y B. BUZAN, "The Chinese and English Schools... *op. cit.*", p. 2.

⁵ On analysing the place of the Chinese school on the IR hierarchy of knowledge, Kristensen points out its triple position in relation to the core, together with American Schools, with the semi-periphery as a "school among schools" and on the periphery with the rest of the rising powers. KRISTENSEN, P. M., "Navigating the core-periphery structures... *op. cit.*", p. 143. On the same line, see also SHIM, C-Y and C.-C. HUANG, "Balance of relationship and the Chinese School of IR: being simultaneously Confucian, post-Western and post-hegemonic" in Y. ZHANG and T.-C. CHANG (eds.), *Constructing a Chinese school... op. cit.*, pp. 177-191.

power base raises its maturity and the exercise of power raises the cost of hegemony, even if some of the burdens are spread among the system. More dynamic states rise in this distribution of power, especially in economic terms, while its status in the social hierarchy does not match its new material position. It does not only involve questions of status, identities or responsibilities, but also involvement on the decision-making processes and a better position on the hierarchy of the distribution of gains.

The neglect to accommodate its rising challenger constitutes, under this view, the worst scenario for the hegemon, as the rising state will push for overcoming that hierarchy once the gains of doing it overcome the costs. Evidently there is an inevitable clash of interest between both states, but this is worsened by the apparently independent functioning of both of them.

Hence, the isolation of both structures spurs this absence of dialogue between them and stimulates the hegemon's blindness on the changes that the material distribution is pushing for. Theoretical analysis can, modestly, try to transform this and stimulate processes of accommodation that, at least, reduce the costs for the rising state. At this point, sino-constructivist constitutes an interesting field of study that understands international society as a process and aims to advance towards mutually constitutive processes that advance towards heterogeneity. On the mutually constitutive relation between agents and structure, the move towards heterogeneity suggest less conflictual scenarios, even though the rise of a challenger, as it happens rapidly and in a revisionist way, is due to produce changes in the global structure than produce instable movements that may generate, in the end, conflict.

There is an important research field on the expansion of the concept of hegemony and legitimacy

The present thesis has deeply explored several theoretical boundaries in the contexts of concepts such as hegemony and legitimacy. On this vein, this study has highlighted the capacity of the concept of legitimacy to explain and enrich several key concepts, not just hegemony, but also power or international organisations, for instance. Moreover, legitimacy is transversal, outwards with other disciplines such as political science or sociology, but also inwards, linking concepts of hegemony knowledge and power.

Legitimacy and its study gains relevance in analysing the role of states with special responsibilities. Undoubtedly, states' quest for an identification as responsible is a performative act towards the audiences that bestow legitimacy and set the base for the values and principles that these states aim to expand.

The task of defining legitimacy evidences that is something more than an aseptic concept. It is true that is necessary to advance towards its operationalisation. However, it should be understood in depth its nature as a certain knowledge structure composed simultaneously but social, political and cultural processes.

As well as materialist identify several historical transformations as a result of changes in the distribution of power, it is possible to reformulate the social international history attending to the transformations of the social and normative structures, as well as the changing and evolutionary legitimacy structures⁶.

Legitimacy studies have become, therefore, fruitful theoretical exercises that also set the boundaries of international society and reinforce the material hierarchies within them. Hence, the establishment of a hegemonic institution implies a dominant form of legitimate authority that set the boundaries of rightful membership, in a short of updating of the standard of civilisation.

It is true that the way different theories conceptualise hegemony has a direct relation with the role they confer to legitimacy. In this vein, the growing special role that legitimacy has among several constructivist and English School scholars evidence an evolutionary conception of international society, understood as a process. The most interesting conclusion of this position, and an interesting field for further study, is the understanding of systemic change in its broader sense as a result of transformations of the parameters of political legitimacy⁷.

10.2. Methodological conclusions

There is a high difficulty on composing a methodology where social values play a crucial role

Approaching hegemony through social lenses involves the difficult task of composing a methodology that innovates on its proposal. However, to identify the variables and indicators, there is necessary to explore the collective understandings that constitute them into key objects of analysis. The continual transformations of the social structures difficulties its selection as objectives of analysis, although in institutions and legitimacy analysis it is easier.

The first object of study, the institutional orders, has been approached as a result of a certain distribution of power. The methodology proposed has taken into account the role of hegemony in establishing a certain neoliberal order in several areas, but also states that the international organisations develop certain independent dynamics once they mature. The tension between these two arguments constitutes the source of the main methodological decisions. On the case of the United States, how its hegemony is articulated and at the same time contested needs to be approached through selected troublesome in several institutions. The way contestation is over-

⁶ In this task, Clark's work has been the most prominent analysis that has inspired several of the guidelines of this thesis. CLARK, I., *Legitimacy in the International Society... op. cit.*; CLARK, I., *International Legitimacy and World Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.

⁷ BUKOVANSKI, M., *Legitimacy and Power Politics... op. cit.*, p. 50.

come, through accommodation or conflict, has revealed itself as the main indicator of the flexibility and stability of the hegemonic institutional order. Moreover, the different nature of institutions, its ability to absorb changes, also affect the sources of contestation as well as the following processes of accommodation.

The second set of variables regards identities, a complex object of study in an age of ontological insecurity. The methodological decisions made have been guided through a liquid understanding of identities involved in processes of mutual socialisation. However, it cannot be denied that states still hold a profoundly hegelian understanding of identities and states usually search from their alters. The articulation of values and principles not only around identities, but also in contrast to them, and that is the reason why the analysis of the different identities of both China and the United States should not be understood isolated from the audiences towards they perform and the others they want to confront.

Finally, in the methodological approach to the analysis of legitimacy, it should be admitted that there were prominent works to rely on to develop a creative methodology⁸. However, in this case the methodology aimed to address the analysis on the context of a statocentric audience, even though other actors have to be considered. That way only in the last of the variables, outcome legitimacy, there has been widen the scope of the audience, towards a global understanding to world society. The first three main groups of variables –substantive, first constitutional procedural and the second one- involve the methodological difficulties of selecting relevant time lapses, as well as approaching to them learning from the previous two social variables, and contextualising them with the changing material distribution. It is this last variable, legitimacy, the one that interlinks all of them, reinforcing the theoretical idea that social and material worlds reunite around just one structure.

There is not an agreement on several indicators that aim to address economic and technological variables

Even though the analyses of material distributions of power have been widely studied, there are several problems that have to be channelled through further studies. One of the main conclusions of the methodological construction has been the evident lack of modernisation of several of the studied variables and indicators that continue to be analysed. For instance, the methodological chapter has clearly stated that the focus on geographical and population variables, due to their stability and the changes on military and industry. For instance, military developments have declined the necessity of larger armies and human resources are growingly substituted by more technological tools. In the case of industrial variables such as iron and steel production,

⁸ RAPKIN, D. P. y D. BRAATEN, D., "Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy... *op. cit.*".

the present analysis has considered that the role of these resources has been substituted by the national technological developments as well as the investment on research and development as a national strategy.

Moreover, in economic variables and indicators, despite the great amount of world data available, there is no consensus on which are the less biased indicators of, for example national GDP. The discussions around GDP in current or constant U.S. dollars or, more recently, under measures of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) are still open. However, it was decided to apply the most conservative of the indexes and discard the PPP that shows more revolutionary results.

Finally, the methodological decision to include analysis of energy and technology has been proved to be not only interesting but also key to the subsequent chapters. The raise of both energy and technological issues to the front line of the analysis makes compulsory not only to address them through a quantitative methodology, but also to contextualise and examine the strengths and weaknesses of this statistical information. In the case of energy, it should be admitted that there exist broad analysis on energy related to different issues and a broad data available. However, in the case of energy there exist not only difficulties to offer a broad time lapse, but also scarce indicators related only to practical sciences and neglect the broad scope of R&D. Moreover, methodologically it has been opted to include (every time it has been possible) the data from Macao and Hong Kong, even though differences between mainland and these two special administrative regions

Through these methodological decision, that have been moderately concluding, there has been advanced modestly to a modernisation of the analysis of material structures. As more complex indicators are developed, there will be a need to expand this updating as, for example, considering unmanned combat air vehicle or cibermilitarisation.

10.3. Practical conclusions

China's rise on the material power structure suggests future parity scenario. Meantime, China is taking advantage of the material development to develop internally and to expand its influence internationally.

As the material analysis has clearly demonstrates the impressive figures of China's national growth in economic trends and commercial issues and its growing involvement in the financial energy and military arenas.

In economic terms, China's is taking advantage of its surplus on two different realms, Internally, the Chinese government is trying to cut the gaps between country and urban zones, as well as reducing poverty and fostering a strong middle class. Even though in per capita term China is still a poor country, its advance in the last

three decades show a huge potential of internal development, as well as a prospective global economic leadership.

Even though there have been examined several vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the Chinese model, the strong interdependence of China's economic perform not only with the United States, but with the global process of globalisation.

Moreover, China is also devoting its new resources to produce attractiveness to the countries in development, as well as to several neoliberal elites on its defence of globalisation. Through institutions and its involvement on special responsibilities as a responsible state, China is developing an alternative that, even though nowadays is not as clearly articulated as the United States', has the potential to reunite around progressively more actors of international society. However, important shadows still prevail, especially regarding the authoritarian nature of the Chinese governments, as well as the lack of liberties and protection of human rights.

These important problems arise particularly regarding the military modernisation of China. It is true that China is devoting great amounts of resources to the military and defence areas, but it should also be admitted that the Chinese army is still obsolete in several areas and the United States supremacy in this area is unquestionable. However, a turn towards military strategies evidences both states' consideration of the other as the main military enemy.

The turn of the U.S. to the Pacific is not only relevant but also durable and determinant, as it will guide important hegemon's decisions. In practice, the Asia Pacific has become the main and most dynamic region in economic, financial, energy and military terms as well as the scenario where both powers' interests overlap.

The United States is showing signs of recovery in the material and social realms, although it is facing a need of accommodation of China due to its rise.

Even though one of the main drivers of these analysis was the perception of the decline of the United States hegemony both in material and social terms, the practical analysis shows a more moderate scenario. In material terms, especially in the economic sphere, the United States has recovered after the 2008 crisis and has reinforced its bases of growth, while China is still growing in more dynamic and impressive terms. However, the hegemon has shown an important ability to rejuvenate and spur its economy, even though in periods of crisis the maturity of its economy is more evident. It maintains its primacy after the crisis, but this event has pushed for a more bilateral management of economic, financial and security issues, not only to share the cost, but also to have a broader consensus on the measures assumed.

On the social realms, the unilateralism and expansionism of the Bush administration inherently eroded the hegemon's legitimacy and institutional support. As it has been analysed both in Chapters 7 and 9, the Iraq War, and the War on Terror as a whole, was committed through small coalitions and weak support from the UNSC

and the global civil society, as the strong opposition and decreasing legitimacy shows. However, the afterwards legalisation of the Provisional Authority by the UNSC and the change in the U.S. Administration has revived the images of the hegemon as committed to international law, institutions and the global development. On this issue, the restraint showed on the Libyan War demonstrates that the U.S has learned from previous lessons and decided to stand a step before and active and open involvement.

As the 2003 and 2008 events highlighted, the hegemon is not immune to material and social constraints. However, these processes can be reverted, both through a material recalibration or a reconciliation of its practices and interests with the expectations of other actors. Precisely, this last strategy was the one chosen by the United States that took advantage of the change of government in 2009 to transform itself into a hegemon committed to multilateralism and global agreements.

Even though several scars prevail, as Chapter 9 shows, the hegemon has successfully recovered a legitimated role. However, the rise of new models that contests from the inside and the outside the hegemonic model, pushes moderate reforms on the institution of hegemony, trying to resemble less to itself and more to the international society.

China's identity as a rising power is performing a rightful resistance strategy that tries to accommodate and contest within the U.S institution of hegemony. However, it is simultaneously building and alternative model around its hierarchical leadership.

One of the central objectives of the present thesis was to outline Chinese strategies on the current international society. Even though China is usually portrayed as the confronting model towards the hegemonic leader, its involvement in the current institution of hegemony is, as it has been analysed in depth in the practical chapters, highly active.

The accommodation of the secondary hegemonic institutions leaded by the United States has been quite relevant in the last ten years, to the extent that China is, in some of them, considered as a status quo power within them⁹. However, simultaneously, China is building several institutional projects with two main purposes. The first is to spread its influence and improve its modest legitimacy record, especially among its neighbouring states. As its military modernisation is causing concerns among Asian states, as well as its politics of confrontation on the South China Sea,

⁹ As Lesage explains, China was not pushing for revolutionary reforms, but more slight changes that matched better with its peaceful rise strategy. LESAGE, D. et al., "IMF reform after the crisis... *op. cit.*", pp. 567-568.

institutions devoted to regional developments such as the AIIB as well as the project of the OBOR improve the cooperative engagement while, at the same time, open new markets for the Chinese public and private investment.

Secondly, China aims to push Western led institutions to a gradual disempowerment or, in other word, to a growing diffusion of the institutional power among the new institutions. Within the Western led institutions, China is tacitly accepting the structure of the regimes, but at present aims to transform the main principles that guide these institutions in an attempt to become a norm maker. In security terms, for instance, it is trying to socialise the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention, as its practice on the UNSC evidences. Even though changes are gradual and slow, they serve as points of convergence that are further developed in the new institutions that China is building that, in practice, are one of the steps on its process of system change. In a difficult balance, China maintains what Schweller and Pu define as “rightful resistance”¹⁰. From within the system, China maintains a hybrid strategy of status quo-reformist aims. It seems like in institutions such as the G20, it is maintaining a collaborative state practice, as well as in climate change politics or terrorism. However, China has been pushing for reformism in the IMF and it has been trying to improve its status on the WTO.

Definitely, the Chinese growing institutional practice permeates clearly the revisionist aims of China, through a path of peaceful rise that reunites the notions of responsible state and rising leader of developing countries. Until now, China has avoided any direct confrontation with the United States and has pushed accommodation to expand its gains on Western institution. China is aware that neither it can match United States material power yet, nor it has the societal support to do it. Nevertheless, through this rightful resistance process, it contributes to decentralise and contest the hegemonic institution while it continues to expand its material and social bases of power.

The changes in the material and social power distribution will lead to a more unstable and conflicting international society

The end of the Cold War inaugurated an era of growing stable relations among great powers, as well as an important consensus around the processes of globalisation and institutional participation. Even though this consensus seemed to be broken in 2003, the return to multilateralism dissipated this doubts. However, the changes on the distribution of power have created a growing decentralisation on economic and climate change governance that will continue to expand.

¹⁰ SCHWELLER, R. L. y PU X., “After Unipolarity... *op. cit.*”, p. 42.

Moreover, materially, the militarisation of the Asia-Pacific is an issue of special concerns, not only due to its economic relevance but also of its growing role as energy reserves on a scenario of a scarcity of resources. As the interests of China expand, there will enter on a growing conflict with the hegemon's, and it is possible to inaugurate an era of less cooperative and more confronting bilateral relations. Definitively, the relations between both states will mark inherently the future stability of the international society. However, it is still too early to foresee a scenario of succession of hegemonies, mainly because China has not yet articulated coherently and clearly its alternative proposal. Even though this thesis has outlined several of the prospective values, principles and interests, the dynamism of the process makes difficult to describe completely the nature of its alternative.

For this purpose, the next four years under the Trump Administration will be vital to observe China's response to a more belligerent hegemon, as rising defence budgets suggest. Moreover, how the international society reorders itself to face this new geopolitical reality will be crucial not only to the hegemonic legitimacy but also to the growing support to China's processes of contestation. Considering that the core of this international society is constituted by the most strongest allies of the hegemon, delegitimising practices that could be developed from this core could produce more profound changes on hegemony.

Hence, international society will face social and material instability as long as the hegemonic institution fails to perform dynamically these changes. This instability, reproduced also in the state system with the non inclusive behaviour of Chinese identity and, more especially, with the United States' activation of its more exceptionalist and nationalist identities. Accommodation practices within institutions will have small influence in the future as long as the gap between material distributions and structures of social knowledge become more distant. Therefore, innovative approaches to the international practice will be needed towards an inclusive construction of identities in an international society in continuous process.

ANEXO

ANEXO

RESUMEN DE LA TESIS

La presente tesis doctoral aborda uno de los objetos de estudio más relevantes de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales, concretamente el debate sobre la hegemonía de Estados Unidos y el auge de China como posible potencia revisionista. Se trata de un debate que ha sido abordado a través de distintas tradiciones teóricas, así como a través de marcos de carácter más práctico en el ámbito de otras disciplinas como las Ciencias Políticas o la Economía. De hecho, la propia disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales ha estudiado este debate a través de un profundo análisis de la estructura de la sociedad internacional contemporánea.

El punto de partida de esta investigación se coloca en el profundo consenso en la naturaleza cambiante de la actual sociedad internacional, cambios que a diferentes niveles están erosionando el liderazgo de Estados Unidos. Esta tesis parte de una noción de la estructura internacional compuesta no solo por recursos materiales sino también recursos inmateriales o sociales que ganan importancia en contextos de unipolaridad o primacía, en los que el Estado que ostenta el liderazgo se enfrenta a unas leves limitaciones a su poder material

Sin embargo, al inicio de este siglo, y especialmente después de los acontecimientos del 11-S y el auge del terrorismo, la sociedad internacional ha sido testigo de una política exterior estadounidense mucho más unipolar y contundente, derivando

en una crisis en la hasta entonces naturaleza multipolar del sistema hegemónico, Como resultado, esa visión del hegemón como benigno proveedor de bienes públicos comenzó a desdibujarse.

Es evidente que la erosión el poder del hegemón ha tenido lugar en el terreno de la legitimidad política. Estos hechos han impulsado el estudio de la hegemonía y la sociedad internacional a través de tradiciones teóricas que le prestan especial atención a conceptos relacionados con las ideas, especialmente aquellas relacionadas con la construcción social de la hegemonía y la legitimidad hegemónica.

Es precisamente en esta perspectiva en la que se coloca la presente tesis, en un acercamiento más abierto y eclético hacia la hegemonía que, simultáneamente cuestiona la composición de la estructura del sistema internacional e impulsa un estudio de la sociedad internacional a través de dinámicas sociales.

A través de estas teorías, la institución de la hegemonía, basada en la primacía y socializada a través de prácticas institucionalizadas, reproducción de identidades y diversas variables legitimadoras, se enfrenta a ciertos signos de pérdida de poder, mientras que comienzan a identificarse signos de la construcción de una institución hegemónica alternativa.

1.1. El objeto de estudio y los objetivos de investigación

La presente tesis parte de una noción de la sociedad internacional en continuo cambio¹, en un contexto en el que la institución hegemónica de Estados Unidos juega un importante rol. La noción de la estructura como una construcción material y social evidencia también la diferencia entre las definiciones de primacía y hegemonía. Entendiendo que la primacía hace referencia a una determinada distribución de poder, la hegemonía debe ser definida no solo de modo material sino también social, como una práctica de la sociedad internacional en situaciones de primacía que es institucionalizada y legitimada.

En este contexto, esta tesis considera que, actualmente, Estados Unidos ostenta una posición hegemónica en el sistema internacional. Sin embargo, algunos hechos como los descritos anteriormente, están erosionando su poder, no tanto en la estructura material, sino en el terreno social. Del mismo modo, China está emergiendo en la estructura de poder material y está enfocando esta creciente relevancia material en la construcción de una posible institución hegemónica alternativa.

El objetivo principal de esta tesis es la construcción de un marco teórico innovador para abordar los análisis sobre la hegemonía y los procesos de cambios sistémico en la sociedad internacional. Partiendo de una profunda exploración de las corrientes teóricas materialistas, es posible identificar ciertos hechos y tendencias que no es

¹ QIN Y., "International Society as a Process... *op. cit.*", p. 138.

posible explicar a través de estas construcciones teóricas. Éste supone el punto de partida en la construcción de un acercamiento ecléctico que reúne no solo estas perspectivas materiales de la academia occidental, principalmente el realismo y en liberalismo en su sentido más amplio. Esta aproximación teórica incluirá también desarrollos occidentales más innovadores en cuanto a las variables que utilizan, como el constructivismo y la Escuela Inglesa, así como los tres principales proyectos teóricos que se están desarrollando en China.

Desde este objetivo principal, es posible identificar varios objetivos secundarios. El primero de ellos es ofrecer una introducción innovadora a las escuelas chinas de Relaciones Internacionales, poniendo de relieve no solamente sus debates con las perspectivas occidentales sino también sus sinergias. De este modo, la tesis espera contribuir a la descentralización de la teoría de Relaciones Internacionales y la inclusión de perspectivas no occidentales en los debates principales de la disciplina.

El segundo objetivo es identificar los recientes cambios que están teniendo lugar en la estructura de poder material, los cambios en la posición de los Estados Unidos a través de variables económicas, energéticas y militares, entre otras.

El tercer objetivo es detectar las tendencias más relevantes en el orden internacional derivadas de estos cambios materiales. No es el objetivo de este trabajo pronosticar el futuro de estas variables materiales ni la fecha de una posible transición de poder, sino más bien identificar las debilidades y fortalezas de ambos Estados en lo que respecta a sus capacidades materiales.

En cuarto lugar, se establece el objetivo de detectar y descubrir las principales características materiales de la emergencia de China, en referencia a la fortaleza de su modelo económico, su modernización en el terreno militar, así como las estrategias militares para hacer frente a la hegemonía de Estados Unidos en Asia-Pacífico.

El quinto objetivo es examinar las bases sociales de la institución hegemónica de los Estados Unidos relacionadas con el atractivo del modelo del hegemón, las ganancias que este modelo le provee a otros Estados.

En sexto lugar, la tesis establece como objetivo examinar los crecientes procesos de construcción de la identidad de China como potencia emergente, tanto como potencia responsable así como potencia emergente líder de los Estados periféricos.

Finalmente, el último de los objetivos busca abordar los procesos de acomodación de China en el seno de la hegemonía de Estados Unidos, así como el desarrollo paralelo de un conjunto de instituciones secundarias alternativas y dinámicas legitimadoras que permiten entender el grado de amenaza de China hacia la institución hegemónica de Estados Unidos.

1.2. Hipotesis

Partiendo de estos objetivos, esta investigación establece las siguientes hipótesis:

6. El presente objeto de estudio, la hegemonía y las sucesiones hegemónicas, necesita de la construcción y aplicación de marcos teóricos nuevos e innovadores que incluyan estructuras sociales y factores no materiales tales como la institucionalización, las identidades y socialización o la legitimidad como aspectos centrales.
7. El ascenso de China en términos materiales se aproxima a una situación de paridad con los Estados Unidos en términos económicos, por el dinamismo de la economía china y la madurez económica del hegemon. China utilizará crecientemente esta fuerza económica para modernizar y desarrollarse internamente, así como impulsar sus inversiones y el desarrollo a nivel internacional.
8. La hegemonía de los Estados Unidos se enfrenta a una fase de declive como resultado de su expansionismo, su unilateralismo y la erosión de su legitimidad hegemónica.
9. La identidad de China como potencia emergente es inherentemente revisionista y está comenzado a construir su propia institución hegemónica alternativa basada en sus propios principios, valores e intereses.
10. Los cambios en la estructura de poder material, junto con la coexistencia de dos instituciones hegemónicas alternativas llevarán a la sociedad internacional a una fase de mayor inestabilidad y conflicto.

1.3. Aproximación metodológica

Esta tesis se enmarca dentro de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales, concretamente en la subdisciplina de Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales, y busca reformular y explorar las fronteras entre las distintas tradiciones teóricas para ofrecer una perspectiva innovadora. Precisamente, la complejidad del marco teórico deriva del amplio espectro de teorías que son analizadas.

En primer lugar, el análisis parte de la tradición realista en el sentido más amplio, a través de la teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica de Gilpin y la Teoría de las Transiciones de Poder de Organski, que constituyen los principales acercamientos teóricos dentro de esta perspectiva. También se abordarán las teorías del equilibrio de poder que se han contrapuesto a estos desarrollos hegemónicos y que han argumen-

tado que el sistema era bipolar y/o que se aproximaba al equilibrio². Posteriormente, se abordaran las aproximaciones del liberalismo institucional con el fin de entender el rol de las organizaciones internacionales en la sociedad internacional, así como la interrelación con los sistemas hegemónicos

Tras abordar estas dos tradiciones teóricas, el marco teórico avanzará hacia acercamientos que consideran las estructuras como material y social. En el contexto de los desarrollos constructivistas, se abordará definición de la política internacional como un ámbito construido por las ideas, las normas y los valores compartidos. A través de este acercamiento, se pondrán de relevancia el rol de estas variables así como la influencia constitutiva entre agentes y estructuras. Especialmente relevantes resultan las sinergias entre el constructivismo y la Escuela Inglesa, que constituirá la base conceptual de esta tesis y avanzará hacia la identificación de aquellas variables no materiales del análisis.

Posteriormente, el acercamiento a los tres principales proyectos teóricos de la Escuela China constituirá una de las mayores innovaciones del marco teórico. Estos tres proyectos, que se basan en diferentes tradiciones filosóficas chinas, serán el Tianxia de Zhao Tingyang, el realismo moral de Yan Xuetong y el sino-constructivismo de Qin Yaqing.

En la parte práctica de la tesis, la metodología se dividirá en dos apartados principales. En primer lugar, para abordar la distribución material de poder, se ha seleccionado un acercamiento metodológico cuantitativo. A pesar de que ha constituido un amplio objeto de estudio en la tradición de la disciplina, los distintos indicios se acercan de un modo diferente a las distribuciones de poder, y algunas de las variables que incluyen (por ejemplo, la población, el territorio o la producción industrial), han sido descartados como variables, mientras que se han incluido aquellas que hacen referencia a la energía y el desarrollo tecnológico.

En segundo lugar, se establecerá una metodología cualitativa para proporcionar un estudio complejo sobre los elementos sociales identificados en el marco teórico. El primero de éstos será el orden institucional promovido por el hegemón, así como el orden alternativo que China está tratando de construir. En el caso del orden hegemónico, se abordaran los procesos de acomodación de las potencias emergentes tanto en la distribución de ganancias en el seno de la institución como en los procesos de toma de decisiones.

En el caso de China, además de examinar como interactúa en estas instituciones y como aumenta su status dentro de las mismas, también se examinarán las alternativas institucionales que China está promoviendo, con especial atención al Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructuras (AIIB).

² KRAUTHAMMER, C., "The Unipolar Moment... *op. cit.*", pp. 24-26; WALTZ, K. N., "Structural Realism... *op. cit.*", pp. 32-37.

El Segundo elemento del análisis cualitativo será un acercamiento a las identidades de Estados Unidos y China en la sociedad internacional. Como explica Cronin, en la sociedad internacional contemporánea, Estados Unidos sufre “la paradoja de la hegemonía”, en referencia a la tensión existente entre su rol hegemónico, relacionada con la legitimidad y el liderazgo por un lado, y su identidad como gran potencia, relacionada con sus impresionantes capacidades materiales por otro lado³. En el caso de China, esta tensión es también evidente, ya que simultáneamente se erige como líder de las potencias emergentes y como potencia responsable que ostenta aquellas responsabilidades especiales que les son otorgadas a las grandes potencias.

Finalmente, el tercer elemento social analizado serán las dinámicas legitimadoras, examinando la legitimidad hegemónica a través de la metodología propuesta por Rapkin y Braaten, así como un análisis de la creciente legitimidad de China.

A través de esta metodología compuesta, que será presentada en detalle en el Capítulo 5, sea abordará el examen práctico del caso. La bibliografía utilizada en esta tesis está compuesta principalmente por la academia de Relaciones Internacionales, así como informes oficial e institucionales, análisis económicos y noticias de los medios de comunicación. Además, hay una fuerte presencia de aportaciones de la academia occidental, principalmente anglosajona, pero se ha puesto un especial interés en impulsar la presencia de Fuentes chinas, no solo oficiales sino también de los académicos chinos, ya sea a través de sus aportaciones en inglés así como en varias aportaciones en chino.

1.4. Plan de la obra

La presente tesis está organizada en cuatro partes. La primera, la Introducción, presenta un breve acercamiento a la investigación, delimitando el objeto de estudio, su interés, la pertinencia del acercamiento teórico seleccionado, así como estableciendo los objetivos, las hipótesis y la metodología del proyecto.

La segunda parte, de carácter teórico, está compuesta por tres capítulos. El Capítulo 2 examina las principales aportaciones teóricas de dos de los proyectos de investigación de la disciplina, el realismo y el liberalismo, en relación a la hegemonía y a la cooperación institucional.

El Capítulo 3 ofrece una investigación de las perspectivas constructivistas y de la Escuela Inglesa, indagando en la exploración de conceptos relativos a la estructura social del sistema internacional y la noción de la sociedad internacional. Además, el capítulo avanzará en la conceptualización de la hegemonía en el presente proyecto, especialmente en relación al concepto de legitimidad.

³ CRONIN, B., “The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, nº 1, 2001, pp. 104-105.

El Capítulo 4 se centra en los desarrollos de la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales en China. Además de un análisis de los tres principales proyectos teóricos, el capítulo también examinará el procesos de construcción de una escuela china, los debates sobre sus raíces filosóficas y su cientifismo.

La tercera parte de la tesis consiste en cinco capítulos que componen la aplicación práctica de la teoría. El Capítulo 5 desarrolla la metodología a aplicar, los elementos extraídos de la teoría para su aplicación al caso, que se organizarán en dos grupos principales elementos materiales y elementos sociales, El Capítulo 6 abordará las continuidades y cambios en la estructura de poder material, a través de un análisis cuantitativo de variables económicas, financieras energéticas y militares. Además ofrecerá una descripción de las fortalezas y debilidades del poder material tanto de China como de Estados Unidos

El Capítulo 7 se centra en las variables sociales, analizando diversas instituciones establecidas por el hegemón, tales como el Fondo Monetario Internacional (IMF), el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas (UNSC) y el Grupo de 20 (G20) Además, se presentarán los proyectos institucionales que China está desarrollando, ofreciendo un mapa de los desarrollos y centrando el análisis en dos organizaciones que trabajan en diferentes ámbitos: la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghai (SCO) y el Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructuras (AIIB).

El Capítulo 8 continuará con el análisis social acercándose a las diferentes identidades que China y Estados Unidos tartán de socializar, a través de diferentes procesos que buscan distintas audiencias en la sociedad internacional.

El Capítulo 9 aborda las dinámicas legitimadoras que tienen lugar en el seno de la institución de la hegemonía. Además de revisar la importancia de este concepto en las dinámicas de la sociedad, se revisa en detalle la legitimidad hegemónica de Estados Unidos y la creciente legitimidad e China como modelo emergente.

Finalmente el Capítulo 10 ofrecerá las conclusiones de la investigación divididas en tres grupos principales: conclusiones teóricas, metodológicas y del caso práctico.

1.5. Conclusiones

A continuación, se presentan las principales conclusiones de la presente tesis, en estrecha relación con los objetivos e hipótesis establecidos en la parte introductoria.

- La aproximación teórica a la hegemonía evidencia la necesidad de construir puentes entre diferentes proyectos de investigación con el fin de construir un marco teórico que entienda la hegemonía como un concepto material y social.
- La creciente tendencia hacia una descentralización de la Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales necesita realizarse manteniendo un equilibrio entre la in-

digenización y la internacionalización. En este punto, los proyectos que se están desarrollando en China se enfrentan actualmente a la difícil tarea de manejar dicho equilibrio.

- La principal fuente de conflicto en un contexto de liderazgo hegemónico radica en la tensión existente entre la distribución de poder real y la jerarquía del sistema internacional hegemónico. Los cambios en la estructura material, mucho más dinámica, permean de un modo más paulatino en las estructuras y jerarquías sociales, generando tensiones entre ambos elementos que son más evidentes en el seno de ciertas construcciones sociales.
- Existe un importante terreno de innovación teórica en la intersección de los conceptos de hegemonía y legitimidad. Los estudios de la legitimidad se han convertido en terrenos de ejercicio teóricos que marcan las fronteras de la sociedad internacional. Por ello, el cambio sistémico en su sentido más amplio debe ser observado a través de las transformaciones en los parámetros de la legitimidad política.
- La investigación y la construcción metodológica hace evidentes las dificultades de construir una metodología en la que las variables sociales tengan un rol crucial. La desconstrucción de las definiciones de conceptos establecidos, tanto materiales como sociales, evidencia también la necesidad de avanzar hacia sinergias que completen la definición de estas variables y las posibles debilidades de las mismas.
- No existe un consenso en los indicadores materiales que abordan las variables económicas y tecnológicas. De hecho, el análisis ha puesto de relieve la necesidad de avanzar hacia metodologías que incluyan variables importantes en la sociedad internacional contemporánea, especialmente energéticas y tecnológicas, cuya operacionalización a través de indicadores es complicada y escasa.
- La emergencia de China en la estructura de poder material sugiere un próximo escenario de paridad. Simultáneamente a este hecho, China está aprovechando sus excedentes materiales para impulsar el desarrollo interno a diferentes niveles y, al mismo tiempo, promoviendo proyectos internacionales que expandan su influencia a nivel internacional.
- La hegemonía estadounidense comienza a mostrar signos de recuperación tanto en el ámbito material como social. La crisis de legitimidad tras Iraq ha demostrado estar cerrada y su pérdida de poder material en el contexto de la crisis financiera también muestra signos de recuperación. A pesar de esto, el

hegemón se enfrenta a la tarea ineludible de acomodar a China en las distintas estructuras jerárquicas de su institución de la hegemonía.

- La identidad de China como potencia emergente está operando en el seno de la institución hegemónica a través de estrategias de resistencia legítima que buscan a la vez la acomodación y la contestación. Simultáneamente, China avanza en la construcción de un modelo alternativo alrededor de su liderazgo jerárquico, de un claro carácter revisionista. Sin embargo, actualmente China es consciente de que no puede equipararse a Estados Unidos ni en el terreno de poder material ni en el terreno social.
- Los cambios en las estructuras de poder material y social derivarán en un escenario de creciente conflicto e inestabilidad en la medida de que los intereses de ambos estados entren en conflicto, especialmente en la zona de Asia-Pacífico. Indudablemente, como se desarrollen las relaciones entre ambos Estados en los próximos años constituirán una de las variables principales que marque la estabilidad del sistema.

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