

# Stanley on Ideology

John PROTEVI

Received: 11/05/2016

Final Version: 11/07/2016

BIBLID 0495-4548(2016)31:3p.357-369

DOI: 10.1387/theoria.16326

**ABSTRACT:** I explore Jason Stanley's notion of ideology. After preliminary remarks on ideology and coercion in social reproduction, I offer a restatement of Stanley's position on ideology, examining his notion of epistemic harm. I then examine the role of emotion in his thinking as that which binds beliefs to agents, and conclude with an argument for a notion I call "affective ideology" that enables us to connect ideology with the use of force in "coercive social reproduction."

**Keywords:** Jason Stanley; ideology; emotion; social reproduction.

**RESUMEN:** Examino la noción de ideología debida a Jason Stanley. Tras algunas observaciones preliminares sobre ideología y coerción en la reproducción social, ofrezco una reformulación de la posición de Stanley sobre la ideología, examinando su noción de daño epistémico. Examino a continuación el rol de las emociones en su pensamiento, en tanto que son las que vinculan las creencias a los agentes, y concluyo con un argumento a favor de lo que llamo "ideología afectiva", la cual nos capacita para conectar la ideología con el uso de la fuerza en la "reproducción social coercitiva".

**Palabras clave:** Jason Stanley, ideología, emociones, reproducción social.

In this paper I explore Jason Stanley's contribution to the literature on ideology in *How Propaganda Works* (2015).<sup>1</sup> In preliminary remarks I define a two-sided notion of ideology wide enough to cover its application to equal and unequal societies alike. I will call these two aspects the psychological and the functional senses of ideology, and will relate them to coercive practices that also contribute to the reproduction of social patterns. I do this to provide a definition of ideology that can encompass Stanley's notion that ideology need not be flawed, stemming as it does from the regularities of experience, even though it does tend to be flawed in unequal societies. I then offer a restatement of Stanley's position on ideology and its attendant epistemic harms. I then examine the role of emotion in his thinking,

---

<sup>1</sup> I would like to acknowledge the help of Martin Armstrong, Liam Kofi Bright, Gordon Finlayson, Robert Gooding-Williams, Ruth Groff, Bryce Huebner, William Lewis, Ed Kazarian, Sina Kramer, Rebecca Kukla, David Owen, William Clare Roberts, Michael Rooney, Jason Stanley, Marcus Stanley, Eric Swanson, and the anonymous reviewer for *Theoria*.



which is largely, though not entirely, that of anchoring beliefs to subjects by bonding to loved ones with whom one shares practices. I conclude with an argument for an expanded notion I call “affective ideology,” in order to assuage the following worry: if we exclude the affective from ideology and confine it too much to the strictly cognitive, so that it is limited to epistemic problems with beliefs, propositions, concepts and the like, then it will not be able to account for a crucial part of the problem of social reproduction, that is, the ability of enforcers to mete out the punishment that constitutes “coercive reproduction.”

### *Ideology and social reproduction*

Although the notion of ideology is usually applied to unequal societies, we can generalize it so that “ideology” simply means the coincidence of thought patterns of an entire society, whatever its pattern of distribution of goods. Call that the psychological notion of ideology. The psychological notion includes at least the basic concepts and inference patterns of a society, though I will argue it should also include the values and associated affective stances common to a society, as what is shared is an entire orientation to the world such that objects appear with characteristic affective tones: an enculturated person will not experience just “this action,” but “this beautiful and graceful action that everyone should admire,” or “this grotesque and shameful action that should be punished.”<sup>2</sup>

The psychological sense is entwined with the idea that ideology contributes to the stability and reproducibility of social patterns of thought and practice on daily, lifespan, and generational scales. Call that the functional notion of ideology. We should note that the targets of the functional sense are practical, material patterns of production, to the reproduction of which shared thought patterns are said to contribute. Note also then the term “contribute”: no one thinks social practical patterns are reproduced by shared thought patterns alone; all societies have practices of physical force that can, at least in theory and when properly applied, punish or eliminate those prone to system-damaging behavior such as free-riding or bullying. Call that coercive social pattern reproduction. So we want to be able to see the relation of the psychological and functional senses of ideology to each other and the relation of that pair to coercive reproduction. We should note that while no one thinks shared ideology alone is enough to ensure social reproduction, some hold that contemporary societies have rendered the functional sense of ideology otiose via sophisticated forms of coercive reproduction and their attendant collective action problems [Rosen 1996]. As I will explain, I don’t share that position; I think ideological buy-in on the part of a criti-

---

<sup>2</sup> This is not to deny the existence of puzzling experiences, which don’t fit the pre-existing concepts, or moral dilemmas, in which an action is susceptible of multiple and conflicting interpretations. Without wanting to produce a full phenomenological description of those cases, but simply to insist on the essential co-presence of affect and cognition in experience, note that there is a characteristic affective tone of puzzlement, or of being stuck, of being pulled in two (or indeed more) directions, or of hewing to-and-fro between commitments. And that we often experience a felt sense of relief in having made a decision, or foreboding at the outcome of our decision, or a sense of resignation to our fate, or a sense of commitment to the type of person we are making of ourselves by this decision, and so on and so forth.

cal portion of the enforcers of coercive reproduction is necessary, but only with a notion of ideology expanded to include the affective.

In egalitarian societies, it's easy to see how the psychological and functional notions of ideology reinforce each other and fit smoothly with coercive reproduction. As paradigm egalitarian societies have tended to be small forager bands, the transmission of shared thought patterns (concepts, values, affects) via enculturation (tales, stories, myths, rites) is reliable, thus fulfilling the psychological sense of ideology, and the coincidence of thought patterns enables the efficiency of shared productive labor via an ease of shared intentionality. In this way the stability and reproducibility of the system is also furthered by those shared thought patterns, thus fulfilling the functional sense of ideology.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, due to small size and mostly transparent shared production, the identification of the few cases of free-riders and bullies is easy and the individual benefits of mutualism and reciprocity for the majority, along with the motivation and coordination of behavior made easier by shared thought patterns, are such as to enable the punishment via ridicule, ostracism, exile, or execution of people posing threats to the system, thus showing the contribution of ideology to coercive reproduction (Boehm 2012; Sterelny 2016).

However, in societies with unequal distributions of goods beyond a certain threshold of inequality we see, alongside interest-concordant behavior, the appearance of interest-disscordant behavior (assuming that the inequality in question is such that those on the short end are deprived of a level of goods necessary for their interests as human beings capable of flourishing<sup>4</sup>). We thus want to know how the psychological and functional senses of ideology relate to each other and to coercive reproduction in unequal societies. A common answer, and one to which Stanley subscribes, is that in unequal societies, ideology entails the sharing, throughout the society, of thought patterns proclaiming the system to be fair and thus for the elites to have been justly rewarded (psychological sense) so that this coincidence contributes to the reproduction of the system (functional sense). The ideology of meritocracy and elite superiority helps reproduce the system by epistemic and emotional processes. Elites do not see the injustice of the system and thereby feel justified in their success, thus protecting interest-concordant behavior from interference by elite guilt feelings should their benefits appear unearned. For negatively privileged people, there is an epistemic effect of hiding the systematic sources of their social position, and an emotional effect of resistance-inhibiting "justified" inferiority feelings, thus protecting interest-disscordant behavior from interference by feelings of righteous indignation.<sup>5</sup>

We are then brought to the question of the relation of ideology to coercive reproduction, which also contributes to keeping the system in place through examples of punishment producing expectations of the same for future deviations. If we assume, contrary to some thinkers (e.g. Rosen 1996), that collective action problems brought on by the expectation of force and coercion do not exhaust system-maintenance, so that ideology is not

---

<sup>3</sup> For introductory comments on shared intentionality and the cooperative motives that enable it, see Tomasello 2009. For early cultural learning fulfilling the psychological sense of ideology – transmitting the basic concepts of a society, including those of technical procedures, see Sterelny 2012.

<sup>4</sup> The Sen – Nussbaum capability approach would be one way to provide content to the notion of interest here.

<sup>5</sup> For a social psychology treatment of these processes, see Jost, Banaji, and Nozick 2004 on "system justification theory."

an otiose notion, then we have to determine its scope. What is left over for ideology to do once we have left the realm of coercion and assigned it the task of explaining the non-coerced portion of the reproduction of unequal social systems? We will focus on the role of ideology in enabling the internal discipline of the punishment forces deployed in coercive reproduction. Are police, army, and workplace personnel (from security guards to slave overseers) kept in place merely via a set of external rewards (raises and promotions) and punishments (fines, demotions, dismissal, execution)? That is, are they subject to completely effective collective action problems produced by coercive reproduction practices targeting them? Call that lateral coercive reproduction. Or does that system of lateral coercive reproduction itself require an ideological buy-in on the part of at least some portion of the enforcers for them to do their work of disciplining the others who produce the punishment practices contributing to — or wholly responsible for — large-scale social reproduction? And finally, does that notion of ideological buy-in on the part of (some portion of) the enforcers not have to include an affective dimension?

### *Stanley's definition of ideology*

*How Propaganda Works* is a two-part argument, showing how the linked problems of flawed propaganda and flawed ideology reveal the necessity of material equality for democracy. Material inequality leads to flawed ideological beliefs, which in turn enable the success of demagoguery, which, in producing false beliefs, allows partial interest to be presented as public interest. This distortion then prevents reasonableness, that is, democratic deliberation that treats all viewpoints equally (Stanley 2015: 183; 231). So we can see that, in a larger piece, we could examine Stanley's treatment of the functional role of propaganda. But let us limit ourselves to his treatment of ideology.

The psychological sense of ideology is fulfilled by two mechanisms: the transmission of explicit verbal messages (though with the possibility that the ideology of meritocracy is only inferred from the surface of the messages) and by enculturation into practices. Of course when the two modes of narrative and enculturation coincide we can expect them to reinforce each other, but it's important to keep them conceptually separate.

Stanley offers the British colonial school system in Kenya as an example of the way in which a dominant narrative of meritocracy is transmitted, bolstered by "testimonial evidence of authorities" (237). While the surface message was the superiority of Christianity to native religion, the ideological meaning of meritocracy was also transmitted, such that the superiority of elite British culture (and not brute force) was the reason for British rule. Transmission of the meritocracy narrative by authorities is thus "the mechanism by which the flawed ideology of the positively privileged group comes to be held by the negatively privileged group" (237). The more the transmission space is saturated, the more clearly the meritocracy message comes across. The ideal case would be when "negatively privileged groups are not exposed to an alternative ideology" (237). Hence Stanley's focus on media and schools, which, even when not achieving total saturation, are privileged sites of ideological messaging.

However, this explicit transmission of ideology by narrative is not the only means of transmitting ideology adduced by Stanley; there is also a sort of passive enculturation. According to this line of thought, an ideology is composed of beliefs generated by regularities

of experience from participation in practices; these beliefs provide expectations that guide social life for the participants, and for an observer the beliefs serve to explain their behavior. We find a clear statement of Stanley's concept of enculturation-transmitted ideology in a passage, where, after a reference to Marx and legitimation narratives, he credits Tommie Shelby and Sally Haslanger for influencing him: "beliefs that are part of an ideology are the record of expectations of various goods built out of the regularities of convention. They are the beliefs that unreflectively guide our path through the social world. In this sense, everyone has an ideology because everyone has a social world" (184).<sup>6</sup> As ideologies can only fulfill the psychological sense when shared, the implication is that there is a mode of the transmission of ideology from participation in shared practices.<sup>7</sup>

Another aspect of the enculturation mode is the anchoring of ideological belief to subjects via self-oriented desire: "Because our ideologies are guided by a desire to maintain a sense of normalcy, especially when normalcy is pleasant, they characteristically lead to beliefs that are connected to one's positive self-image" (184). (We will examine the notion of other-directed emotional bonds as means of anchoring ideological beliefs in the next section of the paper.) In unequal societies with widespread belief in meritocracy and elite superiority, the internal self-directed anchoring of such beliefs in elites proceeds by self-justification, but the beliefs themselves are produced by participation in inequality-producing social practices: "These [self-legitimizing] problematic beliefs are characteristic examples, maybe *the* characteristic examples, of flawed ideology that has its source in flawed social structures" (184).

Other passages reinforce the generation of beliefs via participation in practices. Stanley uses the example of a slaveholding family in the South of the United States: "The ideology of the family can be considered to be the social practices they engage in, together with the beliefs that guide their behavior in these practices"; such beliefs can guide behavior because they "include their ordinary daily expectations about their social life" (194). The content of belief as practice-generated expectations is included in the notion of "script" introduced a bit later: "an ideology, in the sense I use, is simply a social 'script' that governs one's expectations, normative and practical" (200). For social subjects, the beliefs are expectations generated for them by regularities of experience and internalized in enculturation. However, the observer infers them from externally observed behavior: "these beliefs are the ones that explain their behavior" (193).

The notion of reality-structuring concept is also used in discussing enculturation; the ideology of the slave-holding family is composed of "the beliefs they have that guide them through their social lives, as well as the concepts they use to structure reality around them" (194). For Stanley, a concept is a "way of thinking of a property," such that a concept is empty if there is no property it denotes (204-5). Furthermore, propositions are built out of concepts, rather than the properties or objects they denote, and propositions are the "content of a belief" (205).

<sup>6</sup> Robert Gooding-Williams (2016) helped me appreciate the relations among Shelby, Haslanger, and Stanley on ideology.

<sup>7</sup> This absorption or enculturation mode of ideology transmission accords with research done on unconscious transmission of racial bias via body comportment (Castelli et al., 2008). We could also note here Stanley's references to Susanna Siegel's work on perception in which gaze following indicates confidence, thus indicating a pattern of social valuation (Stanley 2015: 249).

To draw all this together, if a belief is the cognitive state of holding a proposition as true, and propositions are made up of concepts, and concepts structure social reality, and beliefs are record of expectations built from regularities, then the concepts structuring social reality are what make up the propositions that are the content of our beliefs and that guide our behavior as we participate in practices. Since the enculturation mode proceeds well below the level of explicit narrative, and since Stanley thinks that knowledge of propositions need not be verbally articulable (Stanley 2011, Stanley and Krakauer 2013), then our beliefs need not be verbally articulable either. They can be such basic, unexamined expectations that when disappointed we could have trouble explaining why exactly we are disappointed when the expectation isn't fulfilled.

What about the functional sense of ideology, its contribution to social reproduction? It's clear Stanley believes in such a functional role; he states in one passage that, "it is natural to think that the elite maintain power by promulgating the flawed ideology that their interests are the interests of the society at large" (232). The content of this functionally effective ideology is that of "elite superiority and the belief that society is a meritocracy" (232). A bit later, he clearly states that the function of ideology is social control via justifying beliefs acquired by the negatively privileged (269). Accepting this ideology acts on negatively privileged people so that they are "incapable of acting against the very system that oppresses them" (250). This incapacity is produced by the anti-motivational effects of self-blame for failure; the rare successes will believe in their own merit (250).

The majority of the case for the functional role of ideology lies with Stanley's argument for the epistemic harms of ideology. We should be careful to note that for him ideology does not necessarily produce ignorance or illusion in negatively privileged individuals. Certainly, those who buy into the ideological beliefs of meritocracy and elite superiority suffer epistemic harm from possession of those false beliefs, insofar as they are thereby unable to see the systematic causes of their subordination, and as they thereby buy into a belief in their own blameworthy inferiority. However in some cases flawed ideology directly aids privileged people, giving them an epistemic advantage as they can more easily assert knowledge; their practical authority grants them a presumed epistemic authority (255; one could imagine someone thinking "the boss must know what they're talking about or else they wouldn't have been promoted").

Recall that Stanley doesn't want to claim that ideology can account completely for social reproduction through foreclosure of effective, organized, political resistance or revolution (233); like all thinkers of ideology he allows a role for coercive reproduction. And in fact the epistemic harm to negatively privileged people, even when they are not under the sway of a flawed ideology, comes through coercive reproduction. Taking up some of Kristie Dotson's work,<sup>8</sup> Stanley argues that, given the interest-relativism of knowledge and the knowledge norm of assertion, negatively privileged people, when placed in high-stakes positions, are hampered when attempting to enter democratic deliberation as they face much a higher barrier to their knowledge assertions than positively privileged people (255). But the high-stakes epistemic harm is rooted in the precarious social position of negatively privileged people (they could be fired for union organizing, say, as in Stanley's example at 254), not by their having bought into the dominant ideology. It is precisely when they are not

---

<sup>8</sup> Dotson 2012.

fooled that their high-stakes position hurts their ability to assert knowledge of the exploitation or discrimination or harassment they suffer. So, even if you see oppression, epistemic harm by high-stakes position kicks in, such that the epistemic disadvantage account is the answer to problem of “voluntary servitude” posed by Étienne de la Boétie (267).

For Stanley, in order to explain the functional aspect of ideology — its contribution to social reproduction — a theory of ideology must explain the phenomenon of evidence-resistant beliefs, both interest-concordant and interest-discordant. What allows interest-concordant behavior is no great mystery, as it is after all, by definition, in the interest of the agent to behave in this way. What needs explanation is the resistance of the beliefs that account for that behavior to contradictory evidence. Then there is the question of the resistance to evidence of the beliefs accounting for interest-discordant behavior; why do people seem to believe their own inferiority? (Note this is only a puzzle when such beliefs exist; as we have seen, sometimes interest-discordant behavior can be produced, via directly sensed threat and collective action problems posed by a system of coercive reproduction, even in the absence of ideological buy-in). As we have seen, ideology contributes to social reproduction by spreading, via enculturation and narrative, the dominant class’s belief in elite superiority and social meritocracy throughout the society, even to those for whom belief in such meritocracy would be contrary to their interests by preventing recognition of injustice. While he acknowledges the role of self-legitimation beliefs (“beliefs that are connected to one’s positive self-image” [184]), the bulk of his explanation of evidence-resistant beliefs rests with the power of beliefs tied to social identity, which are anchored in place by emotional bonds with others. Let us now turn to that aspect of *Propaganda*.

*Stanley’s view: social identity emotion as that which binds beliefs to agents*

Explicit mentions of emotion are rare in *Propaganda*. In its first part, Stanley reconstructs Klemperer’s classical theory of propaganda, as that which entails the closing off of political debate by appeal to emotion. But emotions are often rational, Stanley claims, and allow us to track reasons for political proposals (48). The problem diagnosed by classical theories is that propaganda bypasses the rational will; it “makes the state move as one, stirred by emotions that far surpass the evidence for their intensity” (48). Thus “propaganda is the manipulation of the rational will to close off debate” (48). However, Stanley does not think the classical theory — or Chomsky’s updated theory, which relies on the notion of “biased speech,” which “irrationally closes off certain options that should be considered” (48) — will account for the attractions of propaganda or its relation to ideology.

Nonetheless, in the other explicit discussion of emotion and propaganda, Stanley juxtaposes Darwall’s notion of guilt as the emotion triggered by our failure to live up to demands of reasonableness — the normative ideal of liberal democracy so that everyone’s viewpoint is accorded proper respect. But rather than guilt, it’s empathy, glossed here as the ability to take another’s viewpoint, that is the key to reasonableness. Stanley here discusses Du Bois and Locke, and their call for rhetoric that would “force a dominant majority to expand respect and empathy and thereby increase reasonableness” (108). So, empathy rather than guilt is the key to propaganda enabling democratic reasonableness.

Let us now look at ideology and emotion in the second part of *How Propaganda Works*. To maintain his belief-centered account, Stanley has to counter the suggestion by Gendler

that “alief,” with its affective component alongside representation and behavior-priming, should be introduced into the concept of ideology (Gendler 2008a and 2008b). Stanley’s concern is with “the central puzzle of the theory of ideology ... why is our behavior so often guided by states that do not seem sensitive to available evidence?” (Stanley 2015: 190-91). Gendler says we need a new mental category, that of “alief,” but Stanley replies that instead we need to pay attention to social ontology and identity constitution via participation in social practices, “which should be theorized independently of the mental states of agents embedded within them. A theory of ideology is there to explain certain puzzling behavior: in the most interesting cases, behavior that seems to run contrary to what is rational, given what the obviously available evidence strongly suggests or even demonstrates” (190-91).

For Stanley, the danger of focusing on ideological belief as resistant to rational revision is that we will be tempted to see two types of belief: rationally revisable normal beliefs and rationally unrevisable ideological beliefs (185). But the source of unrevisability is not that unrevisable beliefs are some other genre of mental state from revisable beliefs, Stanley insists; rather they are connected to social practices, and ultimately to our social identities as “constituted by the practices and habits in which we engage” (185-86). As we have seen that self-legitimation is an important factor anchoring ideological beliefs, let us here turn to emotional bonding with others.

As we have seen, participation in practices induces ideological belief through enculturation and narrative, which are, in turn, in a relation of mutual presupposition, necessary for participation in those practices. In a key passage Stanley writes about our social identities:

We must at least act as if certain propositions are true in order to engage in those practices. To abandon those beliefs is to abandon certain practices and habits that constitute our social identity. To abandon those beliefs is therefore to abandon one’s community, to leave everyone with whom you identify behind. This is very difficult for an individual person to envisage; usually they can only perform the experiment of setting beliefs aside that are so connected to their social identities when they are asked to rationally reflect upon them. But as soon as they slip back into ordinary life, they reengage the practices that make them who they are. (185)

The key to anchoring ideological beliefs to subjects is the emotional bonding to others.<sup>9</sup> In a key passage, Stanley writes, “Many ideological beliefs ‘look mentally’ just like nonideological beliefs. The reason individuals are loathe to abandon them is that they don’t like to leave their friends behind” (186). In addition to ties with friends, parental bonds also anchor ideological beliefs, as in the discussion of the slaveholding family. Their ideology is the beliefs that guide them through their social lives, and these beliefs produce an epistemic distortion that allows the functional sense of ideology to operate. The beliefs of the slaveholding family “will prevent them from gaining knowledge about their social world” (193); acknowledging slavery was unjust is hard because “it is very difficult to view one’s parents as evil” (194).

---

<sup>9</sup> It is not the only bond, however, as inclination to belief in the objectivity of perception also anchors ideological belief in subjects and hence explains their resistance to revision via presentation of contrary evidence. Using work from a number of contemporary psychologists, Stanley discusses the way we obtain perceptual habits that constitute and reinforce ideological belief. As it is psychologically hard not to believe perception is objective, and in biased societies there are stereotypes that influence perception, then we tend to believe propositions formed via biased perceptions (211-15).



Stanley's discussion of Walter Lippmann and Susan Stebbing also emphasizes social-identity-related emotional anchoring as the key to understanding evidence-resistant flawed ideological belief. Stanley glosses Lippmann's notion of stereotypes as "social scripts that guide us through the world, make sense of it, and legitimate our actions within it." Stereotypes resist rational revision because "it is emotionally upsetting, perhaps in a distinctive way, to abandon them. They are connected to our identity" (195). Stanley is interested in Stebbing's idea that ideological beliefs are cherished beliefs, but is wary that it might suggest a kind of individualism about ideological belief: "An individual's *emotional attachment* to a belief is what makes it difficult to rationally revise" (196; emphasis in original). But, Stanley continues, this takes us back to thinking ideological belief is marked out by special characteristics of it qua mental state. Rather than that, however, the "cherished" status is "constituted by social reality. A social identity could be thought of as a set of practices and habits. If we think of those practices as external social relations between persons, it may be that various social relations that make up those practices prevent the revision of certain beliefs" (196). Stanley thus shifts the target of "cherishing" from beliefs to practices: "beliefs are preserved by dint of their connection to certain cherished *practices*. The relation of the agent to the practice is what is fundamental in the case of the flawed ideological beliefs at issue in this book" (197; emphasis in original).

To summarize Stanley's views on emotion and ideology, we should note two aspects. First, there is the implantation of feelings of justified superiority and inferiority in privileged and negatively privileged people; these feelings help explain interest-concordant and interest-discordant behavior even in the face of what would seem to be evidence of injustice (250). Secondly, beyond self-interest, the mechanism that keeps agents in practices is emotional attachment to an ideal self-image (184) and to other persons (186).

### *Affective Ideology*

However, in the latter cases, emotion is exterior to belief; it is that which binds beliefs to agents engaged in identity-constituting practices. Although the emotion-generating desire for good self-image and positive connection with friends and family is left unaccounted for by Stanley, I do not think the psychological mechanisms and their implicit anthropology are all that controversial. But there is a risk that keeping beliefs at the center of an account of ideology focuses one on the puzzle of evidence-resistant belief. While that notion points to a certain aspect of social reproduction, it misses another aspect, that is, punishment practices that constitute coercive reproduction. And that aspect needs to have an account of affect constitutive of concrete mental states, instead of merely externally binding beliefs to agents, since torture and killing (by non-psychopaths) requires overriding at least some level of inhibition produced by empathic identification with a subject in pain, even given attenuation of empathy across group lines.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The relations among empathy, arousal, and violence are complex and the literature discussing them is massive and constantly evolving. Nonetheless, some outlines can be observed: increasing in-group empathy increases the violence of punishment of out-group members for threats to in-group, and the targets of that violence receive less empathic resonance with the punishers, resulting in lower estimations of the pain dealt out. However, there must still be some recognition of pain in the targets, or else the

To get to the root of the question of emotion's role in Stanley's account of ideology, we have to distinguish between belief-desire psychology as a philosophical explanation of behavior and the psychological processes involved in the encoding of experiential regularities. Stanley holds that behavior-explanatory beliefs are generated from regularities of experience. Hence, the expectation that dinner will be served is an experience-generated belief, part of the family's ideology, and explains their behavior, for instance, their going to the dinner table to eat without having gone to the kitchen to work. However, I take it to be a widely accepted psychological fact that the experiential encoding of regularities is going to encode the affective tone of the situation along with representations of state of the world. From the perspective of experiential encoding, emotions aren't separate mental states that bind beliefs to agents; they are an inherent part of the experience and become associated with the representational content. Hence the emotions produced in the scenes of daily life are part of what is transmitted by the identity-constituting practices: the reproduction of the practice of white supremacy for that slave-holding family is not simply accounted for by instilling in children beliefs with the propositional content of racial superiority and inferiority and binding them to those identities by love for friends and parents who participate in that practice. The reproduction of the practice of white supremacy is also constituted by an affective structure of white pride and vengeance motivated by white vulnerability, and hatred, fear, and contempt for blacks that is encoded along with the representational content of the scenes of humiliation, torture, and death that constitute the daily practices of the coercive reproduction side of plantation white supremacy (see Baptist 2013 for claims that widespread torture was responsible for increased productivity on cotton plantations).

Recall the discussion of the slaveholding family. "One might expect the ideology to lead the members of the plantation family to believe that Blacks are inherently lazy ... One might expect their ideology to lead them to believe that Blacks ... are not capable of self-governance. One might expect them to believe that Blacks are inherently violent and dangerous and require harsh punishment and control to keep them from posing a threat to civil society" (194). The first two sentences entail that the practice-generated ideology (expectations from regularities of having daily work done by slaves) is separate from these other beliefs, which are consequences of the ideology. These seem to be explicit narrative

---

notion of punishment loses its sense: you don't torture a wall, even if you bang on it out of frustration. So, despite the attenuation of empathy toward out-group members, consistent testimony from combatants shows the strong emotional surge necessary for almost all people to engage in violent confrontation. (The question of desensitization is difficult; one might think experience in violence, by desensitization, would ease the barriers to the engagement in violence, but burnout is also possible, such that it is sometimes newcomers who are more likely to engage in violent activity, though sometimes, due to their freshness, the results of witnessing the carnage can be emotionally devastating to them.) The tension of the group faceoff characteristic of much combat, however, once broken, can result in routs and torture of the enemy, especially in a situation in which a helpless enemy faces a group; in this case the conquering group members can escalate the atrocities in a lateral display to their comrades. While the heavy racial inflection of the use of torture on slaves in the United States as elements of coercive social reproduction would require some modification of this basic schema, I think it's clear that a strong affective component is necessary for that practice. (One of the best works on the social psychology of violence I know, and the study of which is the source from which I draw most of these remarks, is Collins 2009.)

beliefs that we can expect the family to hold on the basis of their social position. From that ideology other beliefs about characteristics of Blacks (laziness, incorrigibility, primitiveness, violence and thus danger to whites) can be expected to be derived; these serve to explain Black behavior to the family and justify the punishment dealt out. If we keep the parallel structure for the third sentence, then Black violence and danger is an additional belief, not included in the practice-generated belief set, but derived later, serving to justify the family's punishment and control practices, i.e., coercive reproduction (whether or not the agents of the violent punishment are family members or overseers).

But Black "laziness," "incapacity for self-governance," and "inherent" violence and danger are theory of mind inferences, that is, beliefs held by the family that refer to supposed behavior-explaining properties of Blacks. They are not observables, but inferences whose objects are character traits. However, the coercive reproduction practices of the plantation — torture and humiliation — are daily events, and the beliefs on the part of the punishers (family members and overseers) in Black laziness, incorrigibility, and danger have to explain that punishment behavior. Are ideological beliefs up to the task of accounting for the practices of coercive reproduction on the plantation? Only when paired with an emotional state capable of motivating the punishers to tear into the flesh of the slaves.

Hence there is a theory of motivation that is latent in Stanley's account that I'm trying to expand with the notion of affective ideology. As the actions constituting the punishment practices have heavy affective components, both for active, immediate participants and for family members who experience the scenes of torture, I'm tempted to return to Gendler's notion of aliefs: "blacks; disgusting, frightening; must torture to set example" seems to be a fuller explanation of the psychological state of the torturers (which is then transmitted to others experiencing the scene, preparing the children for their turn holding the whip) than simple belief in self-legitimizing propositions, even when anchored by love of others. The affective disposition allowing gruesome torture has to be part of the ideological transmission.

Let us turn to the question of ideological buy-in on the part of the enforcers of coercive reproduction. This necessity of discussion of an affectively expansive ideological buy-in comes out in the passage from Hume cited by Stanley: "The sultan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his *mamelukes* or *praetorian bands*, like men, by their opinion" (232). The question here is whether a simple appeal to self-interest is enough to satisfy Hume as an explanation of the behavior of the enforcers, or whether there needs to be ideological buy-in for the enforcers to perform their coercive reproduction practices. Why do the rank-and-file of the police and army, or the overseers of a slave society, drawn from the popular classes, act in ways that promote the interests of the elite? If there is any room here for ideology, or is discipline in the forces of order itself the product of interest-concordance (the cops, soldiers, and overseers get paid, after all) and collective action problems (the lone cop, soldier, or overseer who in the name of popular resistance steps out of line gets punished)?

At least on the plantation, self-interest and lateral coercive reproduction practices do not seem sufficient to explain the behavior of the torturers. There has to be ideological buy-in, but only if we have an affect-inclusive notion of ideology. If simple beliefs are too pallid to explain the ability to participate in the terror-inducing torture that is a big part of social reproduction of white supremacy in slavery and beyond, then I'd say the affective structure

enabling terrorizing torture and class solidarity of the planters (they can be counted on to hunt runaways and return or kill them) is essential beyond the mere “belief” as cognitive stance holding a proposition to be true, even the proposition that Blacks are dangerous.

### *Conclusion*

To conclude, the necessity to include affect in our notion of ideology gets to a problem with a restricted notion of ideology critique. If we restrict ideology critique to identifying cognitive errors (category mistakes and false empirical generalizations as generating bad beliefs, and confirmation bias and resistance to rational revision of beliefs as keeping them in place) then we risk missing an essential component of unjust social systems: the production of emotional commitments that accompany those beliefs and that allow for the punishment on which part of the effectiveness of coercive reproduction rests. But if we push too far into the affective-cognitive, are we really talking about “ideology” anymore? If we say no, if we restrict “ideology” to the cognitive, are we then led to say that ideology critique, by its inability to account for punitive practices in coercive reproduction, misses the mark and isn’t all that helpful in tackling the reproduction of unjust social systems?

But that throwing away of ideology critique seems too much; some people, sometimes, do respond to a cognitively oriented ideology critique: they are open to persuasion via exhibition of their cognitive errors; their beliefs become rationally revisable. However, as Stanley’s analysis of social identity emotion that binds beliefs to cognitive agents shows, that seems only to happen after a change in their social identities — a move to a new location, the gaining of new friends — and that change has an affective component.

So I think we should retain the term “ideology,” but broaden its scope to include the affective, as that is needed to account for both coercive reproduction and for the occasionally successful rational revision of beliefs via ideology critique.

### *REFERENCES*

- Baptist, Edward. 2014. *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism*. New York: Basic Books.
- Boehm, Christopher. 2012. *Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame*. New York: Basic Books.
- Castelli, Luigi, De Dea, Cristina, and Nesdale, Drew. 2008. Learning social attitudes: Children’s sensitivity to the nonverbal behaviors of adult models during interracial interactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 34.11: 1504-1513.
- Collins, Randall. 2009. *Violence: A Microsociological Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dotson, Kristie. 2012. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. *Frontiers* 33.1: 24-47.
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó. 2008a. Alief in Action (and Reaction). *Mind & Language* 23.5: 552-85.
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó. 2008b. Alief and Belief. *Journal of Philosophy* 105.10: 634-63.
- Gooding-Williams, Robert. 2016. Degraded Citizenship; or, How Racism Works Now, Part I. Unpublished conference paper.
- Jost, John, Banaji, Mahzarin, and Nozick, Brian. 2004. A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo. *Political Psychology* 25.6: 881-919.

- Rosen, Michael. 1996. *On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rosen, Michael. 2000. *On Voluntary Servitude and the Theory of Ideology*. *Constellations* 7.3: 393-407.
- Smith, David Livingstone, and Panaitiu, Ioanu. 2016. Horror Sanguinis. *Common Knowledge* 22.1: 69-80.
- Stanley, Jason. 2011. *Know How*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stanley, Jason. 2015. *How Propaganda Works*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stanley, Jason and Krakauer, John. 2013. Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 7 (Article 503), 29 August. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00503
- Sterelny, Kim. 2012. *The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Sterelny, Kim. 2016. Cooperation, Culture, and Conflict. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 67.1: 31-58. doi:10.1093/bjps/axu024.
- Tomaello, Michael. 2009. *Why We Cooperate*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

**JOHN PROTEVI** is Phyllis M Taylor Professor of French Studies and Professor of Philosophy at Louisiana State University (USA). His most recent books are *Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic* (2009) and *Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences* (2013) both with University of Minnesota Press. He is also editor of *A Dictionary of Continental Philosophy* (Edinburgh and Yale, 2005).

**ADDRESS:** Department of French Studies, 416 Hodges Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA. E-mail: protevi@lsu.edu