

APPREHENSIO SIMPLEX IN THE KIEV-MOHYLA ACADEMY

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ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to reconstruct the theory of simple apprehension held in the Kiev-Mohyla Academy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We start from Aristotle's idea of two kinds of knowing and from the Thomist theory of the two operations of the intellect in view of the ontological distinction between essence and actuality. In dealing with the theory of the activities of the intellect in the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, we consider simple apprehension as a form of Aristotle's immediate knowledge. We conclude by introducing the notion of non-representational simple apprehension.

Keywords: apprehension, simple apprehension, indivisibles, intellection, iudicium, judgmental and non-judgmental knowledge.

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1. Aristotle on two kinds of knowledge

Aristotle in a number of texts distinguishes two kinds of knowledge attainable through two corresponding activities of the intellect (*nous*): the intellection of indivisible objects, on the one hand, and the composition of compound objects which are made up of simpler constituents, on the other. The second kind of knowledge is concerned with predication, as Aristotle's examples suggest:

As Empedocles said that "where heads of many a creature sprouted without necks" they afterwards by Love's power were combined, so here too objects of thought which were separate are combined, e.g. "incommensurate" and "diagonal" (...)

Another example of this sort of combining is what expressed by the statement "Cleon is white".

According to Aristotle, truth and falsity are applied to two kinds of knowledge in different ways. Thus, in *De Anima* III. 6 he states that the knowledge of indivisibles "is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible", so that truth in its primary sense -as the opposite of falsehood- applies only regarding the knowledge of composites: "where the alternative of truth and false applies, there we always find a sort of combining of objects of thought in a quasi-unity". In the ninth book of *Metaphysica* we find a similar distinction between truth and falsity regarding incomposite objects, on the one hand, and regarding composites, on the other:

With regard to incomposites, what is being or not being, and truth or falsity? A thing of this sort is not composite, so as to be when it is compounded, and not to be if it is separated, like the white wood or the incommensurability of the diagonal; nor will truth and falsity be still present in the same way as in the previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the same in these cases, so also being is not the same; but truth or falsity is as follows -contact and assertion are truth (assertion not being the same as affirmation), and ignorance is non-contact. For it is not possible to be in *error* regarding the question what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds good regarding non-composite substances (for it is not possible to be in error about them).

As regards "being" in the sense of truth and "not being" in the sense of falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject and the attribute are really combined, and falsity if they are not combined; in the other case, if the object is existent it exists in a particular way, and if it does not exist in this way it does not exist at all; and truth means thinking these objects, and falsity does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance,- and not an ignorance which is like blindness; for blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty of thinking.

We can see from the quoted text that, according to Aristotle, some of things which we are able to know by contact or by touch (*tigein*) have something to do with "what a thing is". The metaphor of touch does not necessarily imply that the indivisibles are immaterial entities, nor that the intellection of indivisibles is instantaneous. Although the question whether to treat the objects of touch-like knowledge as (1) essences, (2) concepts or (3) separate immaterial forms, has been considered as controversial, there have been brought forward strong evidence that the essences or forms of ordinary material entities at least should be included among the indivisibles. Truth or falsity regarding essences naturally follow from the success or failure of knowing them, while in the case of composites it would depend on whether the subject-predicate connection which is formed by the intellect corresponds to reality. Interpreting Aristotle's doctrine of the infallibility of knowledge regarding indivisibles, E. Berti writes that

the intellection of the incomposite realities consists in a search, which has as its object the "what it is", and this search, like all genuine enquiries, is faced with two possible outcomes (succeeding or failing).

Thus the infallibility of intellection

does not exclude a certain process, such as a search must necessarily be, nor does it exclude a risk of failure;

it is

not an *a priori* guarantee of the success of the search, but a characteristic which belongs to the intellection only when it actually takes place.

Thus, according to this enquiry-like view of the intellection of indivisibles, Aristotle's knowledge of incomposites can be mediated by experience and should not be considered as a remnant of Platonic intuitionism. As Berti suggests, the metaphor of touching does not necessarily indicate a direct access to the object, for it allows "a process of approaching, which precedes the act of touching itself" and "can even be difficult and laborious". While the first activity of the intellect (we shall also call it simple apprehension, *apprehensio simplex*, in accordance with the later Scholastic terminology) is certainly not immediate Platonic intuition, it is however direct in some other sense. To clarify this sense, we have to turn to the theory of two activities of the intellect as it was later developed within the Aristotelian tradition.

2. Aquinas on two activities of the intellect

Aquinas's commentary on the quoted text from *Metaphysica* explains that indivisibles are those things which are not different from their essences. This is the case when things are considered in their *per se* mode of being, whereas in the case of being *per accidens* each thing is different from its essence: "white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white man". If the simple objects of the first activity are essences or forms, would it be correct to relate Aristotle's epistemological distinction between two kinds of knowledge to the later ontological distinction between essence and actual existence? Aquinas clearly introduces the former distinction in connection with the latter:

The operation of the intellect is twofold. One is called by some imagination of the intellect, and the Philosopher in III *De Anima* names it intellection of the indivisible. It consists in the apprehension of the simple quiddity; another name for it is formation. Another operation is called belief (*fides*) and consists in composition or division of propositions. The first operation considers the quiddity of the thing; the second considers its very existence.

Since there are two [modes of being] in the thing -the thing's quiddity and its existence (*esse*)- the operation of the intellect is correspondingly twofold. One apprehends the quiddities of things; it is called among philosophers formation, and also the Philosopher in III *De Anima* calls it intellection of the indivisible. Another comprehends existence of the thing by means of composing the affirmation, for certainly existence of a thing composed by matter and form, from which the second operation receives knowledge, consists in certain compositions of matter and form, of substance and accident.

The quoted passages raise certain questions. What does it mean to understand existence? Existence is neither *genus* nor *differentia*, it does not enter into the definition of a thing. What then does existence add with regard to cognition to the thing's essence? Aquinas uses terms *imaginatio* and *formatio* to name the first activity of the intellect; *fides*, *credulitas* and *iudicium* are used in his different texts to refer to the second. This terminology is mostly inherited from Arabian philosophers. Moreover, both Aquinas's theory of the twofold activity of the intellect and his view on the very distinction between essence and existence to a great extent gives rise to Avicenna. In particular, Aquinas accepted Avicenna's view on the relation of existence to essence. Existence adds to essence what an individual adds to the universal, namely, *instantiation*. Generic or specific essences do not exist as such, they exist only in individual instances. Similarly, the individual essence exists only in a particular place and time, exemplified by a particular designated matter and accompanied by certain accidents. Neither matter nor pure form taken separately is real; neither substance nor accident, considered apart from each other, constitutes a thing. It is only a particular composition of form and matter, substance and accidents, which is available for our cognition *qua* existent, that is, *qua* existing thing. Moreover, as we can see from the second of the passages quoted above, the existence of the thing *consists* "in certain compositions of matter and form, of substance and accident".

Within the Aristotelian perspective, cognition is meant to be an activity held by a particular human intellect towards an individual entity; it is by no means a cognition of general principles undertaken by an impersonal epistemological subject. To comprehend a thing *qua* particular means to grasp the actual existence of its present circumstances, the diversity of its current accidents. Judgment in Aquinas's meaning of this term is the apprehension of existence, that is, of a particular dynamic combination of the essence with accidents. The twofold structure of things (essence/existence) is thus reflected by the twofold activity of the intellect: while the first operation consists in conceiving the quiddity or substance (*conceptus*), the

second operation *-iudicium-* consists in a composition or division of the substance with accidents. Of course the first and the second operations are simultaneous: apprehending an existing thing *qua* individual involves both grasping its essence and existence.

3. Simple apprehension in Late Scholasticism

In the manuscripts of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, which represent one of the latest schools of the Post-Medieval Scholasticism, we find a different theory which treats simple apprehension as an *over-judgmental* activity.

The philosophical heritage of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy contains a large number of *Latin-written* texts. The most creative period, the so called "golden age" of the Academy, lasted from its opening in 1632 to the middle of the 18th century. There are a number of philosophical texts of the "golden age" period which contain theories of judgment and apprehension. According to Stephan Javorsky's doctrine of 1691, grasping an object by simple apprehension is like grasping a thing by hand. Due to simple apprehension, the object is presented clearly and just as it is, without mediation of any judgment:

The first operation of the intellect is simple cognition of something and mental intuition (*mentis intuitus*), through which we do not affirm or deny anything about the thing. Speaking otherwise, the apprehension of the simple -I say apprehension because, just as through grasping something by hand it comes to be in one's hand, although it was out of it, in the same way through this operation some object comes to be in the intellect. The apprehension is called simple and of the simple because the thing is represented through it purely and directly, without any judgment. [This operation is] first in order because it leads on to other operations.

Stephan Kalinovsky in 1729 brings together the second and third operations stating that they both are judgments. The difference is that the third operation is mediated by reasoning, while the second is immediately based on simple apprehension: it is by *iudicium* that we state either connection of the "terms" apprehended by the first operation or the absence of this connection:

So you [are to] discern three mental operations. The first is simple apprehension, in which the intellect apprehends by some simple intuition, making no judgment, that is, neither affirming nor denying. The second is called judgment, in which the intellect judges concerning the object it has apprehended, by affirming or denying. Finally, the third is inference (*discursus*), in which the intellect concludes one thing from another. But, although the second mental operation resembles the third in that both are judgments, they differ in that the former is a pure judgment of reasoning (*iudicium purum illationis*), springing from the mere apprehension of connection or contradiction between terms. For instance, when apprehending the

connection between the terms *man* and *animal*, you form the affirmative judgment *man is an animal*, and when apprehending the contradiction between the terms *man* and *stone*, you form the negative judgment *man is not a stone*. But the third operation is a judgment linked with consequences by reasoning (*sed illatione*). It proceeds from one or more preceding judgments as if from a source moving and determining the intellect. For instance, from the judgment *man is an animal* you thus conclude that *man feels*.

What is quite unusual here from the Thomist point of view is the priority given to non-judgmental knowledge obtained through simple apprehension. All examples in the passage given above are concerned with logical rather than empirical judgment. Other places in the Kalinovsky's manuscript show that, as we might expect, the priority of simple apprehension equally applies to empirical and even to evaluative judgment. Thus, in Kalinovsky's *Ethics* we find a chapter where he discusses to what extent participation of the mind is required for an act to be a free act. Kalinovsky argues that simple apprehension is quite enough for freedom, for the first operation potentially contains everything that subsequent second operation would actually contain. In other words, simple apprehension anticipates judgment and is equally rational. It is clear from the context that what is being discussed is evaluative judgment, namely, judgment of desirability of an object of the will:

It is efficiently confirmed that all clarity and evidence (*claritas et evidentia*) of judgment depends on and follows from the evidence of simple apprehension, for the intellect is not limited in assenting to a judgment, except only by the connection of the terms clearly and evidently known by simple apprehension (...) That is, actual judgment of the mind does not present anything which was not presented before by simple apprehension equally clear and equally evident; it only expresses in the form of assertion what was presented by simple apprehension barely and in non-compound way (...)

This view differs from the Thomist theory where judgment and simple apprehension were responsible for different modes of knowledge. According to Kalinovsky, on the contrary, through the first operation we get all the knowledge about the situation, so that there is nothing left to be complemented by the second. Kalinovsky's usage of "judgment" (*iudicium*) is quite modern: *iudicium* is an act consisting in assenting to a proposition, i.e. in adopting a mental or linguistic construction that *expresses* knowledge. Within such interpretation, judgment does not deal with the particularity of the apprehended thing, at least not directly: its role is only to express the vision grasped through the first operation. Simple apprehension thereby obtains a synthetical role: it has to deal with existence and particularity. While Kalinovsky's understanding of judgment as proposition fits well the

modern framework, simple apprehension is scarcely reduced to the apprehension of "ideas" or other representations. The passage quoted above exhibits a very non-Cartesian usage of quite Cartesian vocabulary (*claritas et evidentia*). It is not the data of introspection but our knowledge of the external world obtained through simple apprehension which is clear and evident.

At the same time, according to Kalinovsky, the result of the first operation of the intellect takes the form of certain connection between "terms", i.e., between concepts. Not only judgment, but also simple apprehension is understood in a conceptual vein: not in the sense of apprehending concepts, but in the sense of *apprehending through* concepts. This view according to which any activity of the human intellect is unavoidably concept-based and therefore representational goes back to Duns Scotus.

4. *Non-compound simple apprehension*

As a matter of fact, in the Kiev-Mohyla tradition and, in particular, in Kalinovsky's theory simple apprehension is a *twofold* operation. The distinction between the two kinds of simple apprehension is mentioned by Javorsky:

Note that the first apprehension is twofold. One [sort of the first apprehension] is simple or non-compound: it presents the apprehended object as single or apprehends many [objects] by means of one, as when I apprehend a kind. Another [sort of the first apprehension] is complex and compound: it apprehends something as multiple, but without judgment, and [it apprehends] affirmation or negation.

The same distinction is much better articulated in Kalinovsky's doctrine:

The nature of the operation, which is usually called simple apprehension, is presented above. Although it is always simple as regards itself, and for this reason it is considered as being similar to physical vision, however as regards its object it is divided into simple and compound. Simple as regards its object apprehension is commonly called precision, or abstraction, that is, apprehension which among many [objects] that are united together, conceives one apart from the others, as when, for instance, we conceive by the mind only the sweetness of milk, thinking nothing about other qualities of milk. Another apprehension, on the contrary, is compound as regards its object: by means of it we conceive many [objects] together, as, for instance, when we conceive these truths: *milk is sweet, or something sweet is white*.

The first operation is said to be either non-compound or compound *as regards its object*. According to classical Aristotelian/Thomistic doctrine, immediate knowledge is concerned with indivisibles. The Kiev-Mohyla account gives a subtler distinction between immediate knowledge of indi-

visibles (non-compound simple apprehension) and immediate knowledge of divisible things (compound simple apprehension). The first kind of simple apprehension (properly "apprehension of the simple") "presents the apprehended object as single or apprehends many [objects] by means of one, as when I apprehend a kind". The quotations given above allow one to assume that apprehension of the simple gives abstracted knowledge. It might be knowledge of an essence: either generic, or specific ("when I apprehend a kind"), or else individual ("it presents the apprehended object as single"). In each of these cases what is known should be abstracted from a particular thing or situation conceived. It might be also an individual property; in each case abstraction presupposes precision from all features except one ("apprehension which among many [objects] that are united together, conceives one apart from the others".) There is no distinction between precision and abstraction in the Kiev-Mohyla texts, and Kalinovsky explicitly calls non-compound simple apprehension "*praecisio, sive abstractio*". There is no mention that compound simple apprehension is directed only towards essential properties. Thus apprehension of the simple is an equivalent of the first operation of the Thomistic doctrine; however, it is extended to embrace apprehension of individual accidental forms (i.e. "the sweetness of milk").

Sweetness is scarcely an essential property of milk. Moreover, it is not just an accidental property of milk *qua* natural kind. In fact, if any particular milk *happens* to be sweet now, later it may lose this quality, e.g. become sour or bitter. The sweetness of milk should be understood as an accidental property of an individual: as "*this* sweetness of milk" or "the sweetness of *this* milk". It has the same role regarding particularity as a man's being tanned, not as a man's having a lobe of the ear. Taking this into account, we have to conclude that Kalinovsky's non-compound simple apprehension gives knowledge of *particular accidental forms* (i.e., "the sweetness of *this* milk"), so that any aspect of the particularity of the apprehended situation can be conceptualized by means of this operation.

It may be argued that sweetness is an essential property of milk and that upon becoming bitter or sour it ceases to be milk. However, our main point here is that simple apprehension is directed towards *all* properties of the thing, accidental as well as essential. This suggestion does not depend on what definition of milk we choose, but follows from Kalinovsky's view of simple apprehension as over-judgmental activity.

Our translation of the last quoted Kalinovsky's passage was minimal in the sense that it did not take into account the particularistic character of the

first operation. However, if we have adopted the view that non-compound simple apprehension is directed towards particular accidental forms, the underlying sense may be better rendered with the following English translation:

(...) Simple as regards its object apprehension is commonly called precision, or abstraction, that is, apprehension which among many [objects] that are united together, conceives one apart from the others, as when, for instance, we conceive by the mind only the sweetness of *this* milk, thinking nothing about other qualities of *this* milk. Another apprehension, on the contrary, is compound as regards its object: by means of it we conceive many [objects] together, as, for instance, when we conceive these truths: *this milk is sweet*, or *something sweet is white*.

5. Compound simple apprehension

The second kind of simple apprehension (compound simple apprehension) is described as "compound as regards its object". Similarly, according to Kalinovsky, "by means of it we conceive many [things] together". Kalinovsky's examples show that "*multa simul*" refers to the multiplicity of particular forms within the apprehended *particular* object: first, *this* is milk, second, it is sweet, third, it is white; moreover (to introduce negation) the milk is not blue etc. This particularistic interpretation makes sense also for Javorsky's suggestion that compound simple apprehension "apprehends something as multiple, but without judgment". To apprehend a thing *qua* multiple means to apprehend it *through* the full multiplicity of its particular features, where the range of the latter embraces all of Aristotle's categories. The apprehended individual is taken by this operation in its full particularity, but it is not seen as a unit. On the contrary, it appears as a bundle of atomic formal properties. Another Javorsky's suggestion that non-compound simple apprehension deals with "affirmation or negation", most likely, refers to grasping propositions as verbal-like "compound things" of their own kind. Such intellection of propositions indeed makes sense even outside of the contexts of apprehending a particular thing or situation. But in so far as we are interested in those contexts, propositions which are at stake are propositions *said* about the particular, and apprehending affirmations and negations should mean apprehending that certain connections and oppositions between concepts are induced by the particular case. In Kalinovsky's example the connections expressible by judgments "this milk is sweet" and "something sweet is white" are induced by *this* white and sweet milk.

To sum up, *compound simple apprehension* is the activity in which the intellect apprehends a particular thing or situation through a number of concepts connected with each other by the usual logical relations (inclusion, intersection, coincidence). In other words, by means of compound simple apprehension we conceive the particular as represented by (fragments of) our conceptual schemes. *Non-compound simple apprehension* is the activity in which the intellect prescind from most of the concepts representing the particular in favor of only one of them. Grasping an individual essence, "*this something*", turns out to be a special case of non-compound simple apprehension, in which the intellect prescind from accidental features of the particular; similarly grasping a specific essence (e.g., *this stone*, *this flower*, *this person*) is another case, and so is apprehending the particular through any of further natural kinds of the Porphyrean tree.

Obviously, these two kinds of simple apprehension are mutually supplementary, like simple apprehension and judgment are supplementary in the Thomistic doctrine: understanding a particular thing requires both. However, something seems to be missing in the interpretation we have just outlined. Both kinds of simple apprehension, as we have considered them, are representational operations. We have to conclude that Javorsky's and Kalinovsky's approach does not provide the agent with the ability for non-representational knowledge. That is, while the ultimate object of Kalinovsky's first operation is an individual entity in its full particularity, the apprehension of this entity is mediated by concepts and therefore does not provide a non-representational ground for our knowledge. And as long as Kalinovsky's second operation is merely assenting to a proposition, it does not provide such a ground either.

6. *Non-representational mode of simple apprehension*

We have seen that Kalinovsky's simple apprehension is obviously directed towards particular forms represented through concepts. However, apprehension as directed towards a particular *qua* real (rather than merely conceptual) indivisible is still missing in our scheme. We shall discuss whether such view is relevant for Kalinovsky's doctrine, after considering a few arguments in favour of *non-representational* simple apprehension.

The importance of non-representational element in simple apprehension can be better seen if we attempt to apply Kalinovsky's epistemology for dealing with practical presuppositions. The result of the first operation is a certain vision of connections and oppositions between concepts. It would be unrealistic to think that any real cognitive agent strictly follows the

Porphyrean tree when conceptualizing in this way the surrounding world. Rather, the conceptual scheme of the real person has a mixed character: it unites the elements of ontology with presuppositions. Practically useful generalizations, such as "All ravens are black" or "All strangers are dangerous" are inherently present in our conceptualizing activity. If they are taken seriously as truths, they are taken on a par with tautologies like "All plants are living entities", unless the cognitive agent is sophisticated enough to exclude practical truths from his conceptual scheme. In fact, only the "ideal cognitive agent" would be able to distinguish his own conceptual presuppositions from the universal typology of things he is committed to; to attribute such ability to any real human agent would be unrealistic.

The advantage of the Thomistic cognitive theory consists in the fact that it gives an account of immediate apprehension as non-representational activity of the intellect. It is due to our ability for immediate apprehension that the agent possesses a capability to be critical about her own assent. This principal capability may become a skill to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the person's experience of judging-and-acting in the given field of human activity. Practical presuppositions held by a professional in any particular human activity (say, fishing or poetry) are always more realistic and more adjustable to particular cases than those held by an apprentice. In any case what allows the agent to be critical about practical truth - to discern presuppositions from judgmental propositions - is immediate (non-representational) knowledge. If we are to be flexible about practical truths, including those implemented in our conceptual schemes, if we are to reconsider our concepts towards a better understanding of the world, then we have to be "in touch" with things, to be able for immediate acquaintance with reality.

The particular apprehended through Kalinovsky's simple apprehension, reflected in the mirrors of representations in the absence of immediate knowledge, tends to break into fragments of conceptual abstractions. This makes extremely problematic any identification and recognition of the particular beyond subjective conceptual schemes.

Assuming a *non-representational* mode of non-compound simple apprehension by means of which the intellect immediately apprehends a particular *qua indivisible* does not follow directly from the quoted texts of Javor-sky or Kalinovsky. The question whether such assumption was really made in the Kiev-Mohyla tradition or in any other late Scholastic school, requires further rigorous analysis and goes beyond the concern of this paper. We suggest, however, that assuming non-representational simple apprehen-

sion is at least compatible with Kiev-Mohyla doctrine. Kalinovsky's definition of non-compound simple apprehension as "apprehension which among many [objects] that are united together, conceives one apart from the others" may be understood in the sense of singling out an individual entity from a situation. Similarly, Javorsky's point that non-compound simple apprehension "presents the apprehended object as single" may be interpreted not only in the sense of grasping the object's essence with precision from current accidents (as we were assuming so far), but in the sense of grasping it without precision, that is, in the sense of grasping an individual entity *qua* particular.

As we have seen, in the quoted texts simple apprehension is considered to be of a complex nature, namely, it appears as an interaction of two sub-operations: (1) compound, concerning with conceptualization of the particular, and (2) non-compound, concerning with abstraction and singling out its particular features. Non-representational simple apprehension takes the role of initial, pre-conceptual, singling out the particular, in which the intellect in grasping the particular as "*this*" achieves Aristotelian *formal identity* with it, while formal identity with the individual or specific essence is achieved through further precise abstraction, requires conceptualization, and so involves both compound and non-compound modes of simple apprehension.

7. Particularity and conceptualization

After having introduced the non-representational simple apprehension we can better approach the problem of Aristotelian *indivisibles*. Consider the following statements:

- (1) *I know this white house*
- (1a) *I know that this house is white*
- (2) *I know this house*
- (2a) *I know that this house exists*
- (3) *I know this something*
- (3a) *I know that this something exists*
- (4) *I know this*
- (4a) *I know that this exists*

The sentences (1a)-(4a) present propositional (or, in Kalinovsky's terminology, whose usage of "*iudicium*" is, unlike Aquinas's, quite modern, *judgmental*) knowledge. As we have seen, knowledge which is expressed by

(1a)-(4a), according to Kalinovsky's doctrine has to be already contained in the sentences (1)-(4) correspondingly. The difference between non-judgmental and judgmental knowledge is sometimes referred to by means of the distinction between "knowing-this" and "knowing-that". "Knowing-this" consists in the pure activity of contemplating, to *teorein* as opposed to *episteme*. "Knowing-this" is obtained exclusively through simple apprehension and constitutes the scope of Aristotle's enigmatic knowledge in which "contact and assertion are truth" and to which falsity does not apply. If the house mentioned in the sentence (1) really turns out to be black, (1a) is false and erroneous, while (1) is still true and the mistake is present in it only accidentally. Indeed, "it is not possible to be in error (...), save in an accidental sense". The same consideration is valid for (2)-(4).

Simple apprehension corresponding to the sentence (1) is obtained through conceptualization and thus representational. The apprehension is compound: we grasp the specific essence of the particular, and, moreover, we grasp it through the quality of whiteness. The sentences (2)-(4), on the contrary, express non-compound simple apprehension. Their judgmental equivalents (2a)-(4a) are made up with the predicate of existence: the empty *concept* of existence is the only one which does not add properties when forming judgments. The sentence (2) presents the particular from the point of view of its specific essence only, with precision from all irrelevant properties. This sentence expresses representational non-compound apprehension. Similarly, (3) presents the particular through its individual essence, with precision from all current accidents. Only in the case of (4) are we concerned with purely non-representational knowledge. At the level of knowing "this" the existing particular is grasped without precision from any of its features.

To sum up, assuming the non-representational mode of simple apprehension strengthens the Kiev-Mohyla doctrine in at least two respects. First, this assumption allows one to treat a particular (that is, an individual entity in the full particularity of its existence) as an Aristotelian indivisible. Bearing in mind our typology of the modes of apprehension, we can without any reservation identify simple apprehension with Aristotelian immediate "touch-like" knowledge, regarding which "truth means thinking these objects, and falsity does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance". Second, non-representational mode of simple apprehension appears as the operation in which the intellect achieves Aristotelian formal identity with the particular. This allows one to consider non-representational acquaintance with the *existence* of an individual entity as an initial point for further conceptu-

alizing and abstracting. The particularized (individualized up to the full particularity) form of the apprehended existent appears then as a cognitive "lump" from which pieces of conceptualized (and thus inevitably subjectivized) knowledge are yet to be cut off. Without non-representational simple apprehension the cognitive agent would be doomed to partial and secondary knowledge sliding through surfaces of things and never reaching the essences, for at the level of purely conceptual knowledge essential and accidental features of the thing are mixed up and indistinguishable from each other: if the particular is not an existing entity but just a bundle of predicates (in other words, a bundle of *concepts* of properties), then accidental predicates enjoy equal rights with essential ones.

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ARISTOTLE'S EXTENSIONAL MODALITY: HINTIKKA'S INTUITIONS, LUKASIEWICZ'S LOGIC AND MIGNUCCI'S VERDICT

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ABSTRACT: The paper discusses interpretations of Aristotle's modal notions by modern commentators (J. Hintikka, J. Lukasiewicz, M. Mignucci). It is shown that the semantics of modal notions which the above mentioned authors attribute to Aristotle is based on the algebraic idea of multiplier.

Keywords: Aristotle, modality, extensionality, multiplier, derivative set.

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1. Preliminaries

Aristotle's modal notions pose the problem to modern commentators (Bekker 1933, Hintikka 1973, Seel 1982). It is enough to mention difficulties in giving an uniform interpretation of Aristotle's notion "*endekhomenon*" which sometimes means in Aristotle "possible" being consistent with "necessary" and sometimes "contingent" being inconsistent with "necessary" (*De int.* 22 a 23-30). In its turn, Aristotle's notion "*anagkē*" (necessary) also manifests an irregular usage. Sometimes what is actual is qualified also as necessary. This is the case when Aristotle derives the apodeitic conclusion from the apodeitic major premise and the assertoric minor premise in the first figure (Barbara) considering at the same time the similar derivation from the assertoric major premise and the