TOWARDS A COGNITIVE MODEL OF GENRE: GENRE AS A VECTOR CATEGORIZATION OF FILM

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ABSTRACT: The paper offers a new model of genre. The model employs Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of plane of immanence, chaos, and, in particular, concepts and approaches of cognitive science. Genre in general and the film genre in particular are modelled as a multidimensional space with a network of vector sequences, as a plane of immanence with individual works in the role of concepts, as a cluster category without a centre. That genre model provides more explanatory power than the recent semantic-syntactical one.

Keywords: genre, semiotics of genre, vector categorization, recurrent network, horizon of expectancy.

Recent film theory employs basically three approaches to the problem of genre, which are analogous to the classical division of semiotics: a semantic one, which classifies movies according to themes, setting, heroes, and stresses the referential aspect of movies (the western, for instance). The second approach, classifying movies according to their syntactic or structural aspects, stresses configurations and relations of represented participants (the fairytale, the action movie, the thriller) and the third, the pragmatic approach, which stresses the impingement of the movie upon the audience (horror). We can, of course, find various combinations of these approaches, especially the semantic-syntactical ones.[1] But a full-fledged conception, even in the reductive framework of semiotics, is still needed. Such a conception would have to explain the historical development of genre, cross-genre mixing, and also genre boundaries and their specific traits in contemporary film.

I

In this paper I attempt to demonstrate the concept of genre as a developing, changeable categorization in a certain space, an intersubjective, objective, and mental space, in a space meant literally as well as in 'space' as a

metaphorical model of genre and genre reception. I also offer a few start-
ing points for possible genre models which deserve elaboration. As evi-
dence that more detailed research on a functional and vivid concept of the
film genre (unlike in literary theory, where a certain tendency to 'mortifi-
cation' of the genre is needed, see, for instance, the work of Maurice Blan-
chot), we can, for instance, take the list of genres and quasi-genres on the
Internet Movie Datebase, where documentaries and short films, as well as
crime, children's, horror and other films, types, genres, and 'submedia'
come to be side by side without any criteria of what genre is, not to men-
tion consideration of the question. Because I attend to the dimensionalities
of genre spaces, the analysis must include the third aspect -a pragmatic
one- which is often omitted from genre considerations for the sake of an
illusory objectivity.

Consequently, I shall consider movies (as texts, discourses, discourse
genres or discourse events, narrative structures, projected possible worlds,
and so on) and as aesthetic objects, constituting themselves in the process of
their receptions. As a film work proper (in the sense of R.G. Colling-
wood's the work of art proper) I take a movie as having been seen and, no
matter what its 'objective' structure, we can deduce it only in retrospect.
Film criticism, of course, employs this strategy, and often pretends to be
an 'objective' observer.

The preceding comments, though perhaps somewhat obvious, were nec-
essary, because the same holds also for the film genre: a genre is consti-
tuted, transformed, enhanced, and inhibited by and through receptions of
individual films and it is retrospectively deduced in critical reflection.
The determination of genre influence on the particular reception of the
film, dimensional or vector analysis of genre function, and, by the same
token, genre delimitation, can be provided only on the basis of the concep-
tion of the film as a constituted aesthetic object, including all three of
Morris's semiotic dimensions. Even partial suppression of that basis leads
to some theoretical quandary when one is faced with the need to define a
genre as a movie, for instance, "whose story, situated in the American West,
is in concert with the atmosphere of the period 1840-1900."[2] or, on the
other hand, as a movie, "it is aiming at causing certain emotional response
(...) in the case of horror the emotional state of strain and scare."[3] What we
have here is, on the one hand, a strictly semantic determination, where the
spectator is not considered at all, and, on the other hand, a strictly prag-
matic, receptional determination; in other words, one that is intentional or
uses psychology or intentional. Are we therefore to retreat from the pursuit

of a consistent, general notion of genre, as Carroll advises in the article quoted above? If we were to accept that 'method', that is, to approach each genre individually, then the very notion of genre would dissolve, as would other strata of several of the humanities, insofar that aesthetics and even film theory would loss their reason for being. When, however, we accept, in addition to the aforementioned sources, further guiding principles, such as an analysis of discursivity using the terms 'event', 'series', 'regularity', and 'condition of possibility'[4] or the general notion of genre as 'unstable heterogeneous formations capable of following out multiple lines of development',[5] it could turn out, that such a pursuit would contribute to finding a practicable way out of the recent quagmire of genre confusions.

Traditionally, from Aristotle to the present day, the notion of genre has been considered to be a certain function that transcends particular works or the 'space' that they occur in, a space that allows certain kinds of action and excludes others, when the criterion of that exclusion or inclusion is verisimilitude.[6] In the same sense and without a deformation of the original definition we can speak about meaningfulness and comprehensibility, and even (hermeneutically) about "that sense of the whole by means of which an interpreter can correctly understand any part in its determinacy."[7]

An awareness of genre pertinence of a particular work, which is generated from the very beginning of its reception, along with external information about the work (though that information need not be correct in terms of genre classification), then offers preliminary and tentative 'instructions for reading', an interpretative strategy, external and frame messages (in the words of D.R. Hofstadter) or a net of 'meaning intending acts', which is cast over the work as a whole and that whole then appears only after a 'throwing off' of that net, that is to say, after reception. Repeated enunciation and extension of that insight in the history of genre studies have provided many varied theories branching off from it, from which I shall try to extract the essence, in order to be in harmony with the aforementioned direction of the concept of genre precision.

Analogously to narrativity, the genre is basically independent of any medium, and is therefore artistically above any particular kind of art. We know, for example, the horror story in literature, horror and mystery, horror movies, horror theatre (Grand Guignol), comics. Because of that superior nature of genre, it is hardly an act of violence to the film genre if we turn to literary theory, philosophy (of language), and, ultimately, to cognitive science (problems of categorization and conceptualization), and the philosophy of mind, for some genre determinations.

Probably the simplest and least objectionable definition of genre is presented by Gerard Genette: "genres, in literature as in all the other arts, are classes of works, which conveniently group works (...)."[8] For Genette, a particular work is therefore an example of a class, that is, a genre. The demonstrative feature of that conception corresponds therefore with several schematisms in the philosophy of mind, language, and also in aesthetics (recall Donald Davidson[9] or Kant's schematic or demonstrative hypotyposis[10]). Genette's last word about genre moves us from a descriptive determination of genre to its reception: "knowing and recognising the generic properties of works constitutes a (more or less) integral part of their reception".[11] Genre, genre understanding, and knowledge of genre are therefore not only a matter of encyclopaedic taxonomy or distributive practice, but also an essential condition of meaningfulness or 'verisimilitude' of particular films and their adequate reception. (I shall discuss below possible objections or counterexamples of 'non-genre' movies, together with the 'all other' category.) V.B. Leich generalizes the receptional role of genre, which is defined variously as an "agreed code between film maker and audience",[12] "patterns/forms/styles/structures which transcend individual films, and which supervise both their construction by the film maker, and their reading by an audience",[13] a "codification of discursive properties",[14] which operates as a 'horizon of expectancy' for readers/spectators, towards Davidson's schemes or Foucault's episteme: "genres are concatenations of literary, linguistic, and social codes and conventions and their matrices, as regimes of reason."[15]

II

In the aforementioned probes into conventional or schematic conceptions of genre I should like to discuss in particular the factor of expectation or rather the 'horizon of anticipation', which is projected by genre into the process of reception of a particular film, and also the concatenation of codes, conventions, or 'radial' (in the categorical sense -see below) modifications during the genesis of particular genres.

This concatenation, I must add, to avoid misunderstanding, pertains primarily to categorization and the concatenation of discursive events (in this case, of particular movies), which constitute the genre. It does not pertain to a concatenation of discursive events within a particular movie, that is to say, it does not refer to the syntactical structure of a work; that struc-

ture performs the role of the 'diagrammatical' feature of genre classification. In their analysis of concepts Deleuze and Guattari operate with

> elements of the plane of immanence, that are diagrammatic features, whereas concepts are intensive features. (...) Elements of the plane are directions that are fractal in nature, whereas concepts are absolute dimensions, intensively defined.[16]

By analogy we can consider (in the first consideration of the problem and as a metaphorical model) the film genre as Deleuze's and Guattari's 'plane of immanence', and particular genre films as concepts, as well as syntactic and semantic structures of films as elements of that plane. This analogy will be further developed, but it is first necessary to examine the concept of 'discursive genre' in Lyotard's sense of the word. Notwithstanding the fact that Lyotard discusses mainly the philosophy of language or speech acts, his distinctions shed light also on the problem of film genres: "Discursive genres determine what it is all about, subordinate sentences of various modes to the one finality." And, elsewhere: "Teleology begins at discursive genres, not at sentences."[17] As to the film work, we can consider a discursive genre or 'inner genre' (see note 7) to be either the film itself -one concatenation of discursive events- or film genre as it is, namely, a concatenation of discursive events that are, in this case, particular films. Again a double 'bestowing the sense' emerges: verisimilitude, determination of 'what it is all about' is delimited by both the film itself as it unfolds and by the genre schema in question, discursive genre, plane of immanence, double-merging or branching-out 'horizons of expectancy'. I presume that this double 'bestowing sense' (or, if you like, vectors) in genre space of reception, is present in the reception of every film. There is, in film reception, a greater or lesser tension between a discursive genre of a particular film and a discursive genre as film genre. Some film theoreticians[18] explain the popularity of popular movies (and, conversely, the lack of popularity of more demanding, genre-modifying films) by their mild tension and smooth genre recognition. That 'phase space' does not seem to be limited to the two mentioned strata: descending through the strata we would probably reach the stratum of narrative elements (which Gerard Prince explains as the relation between two events); ascending, we would reach the stratum of all functional, receptionally active film genres, but also of genres of other kinds of art; eventually, even further up, we would reach the zone where of the planes of immanence of art, philosophy, and science intersect, which is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the human brain. (See Deleuze, Guattari: *What is Philosophy?* and its conclusion, 'From Chaos to the Brain'.)

The analogy between the concept and the plane of immanence leads deeper into the genre problem and other questions. If, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes, that are not aligned with one another, but resonate and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented' then particular films also stand as fragments of a genre plane and the genre itself is not fragmentary, because it includes all pertinent films in the one plane of that genre. They also argue convincingly:

> concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events (...). Concepts pave, occupy, or populate the plane bit by bit, whereas the plane itself is the indivisible milieu in which concepts are distributed without breaking up its continuity or integrity (...). The only regions of the plane are concepts themselves, but the plane is all that holds them together.[20]

Similarly, we can consider the film a discursive event which is a part of one region (or an implementation of it) in the genre plane which itself is not a fragmentary space, but open and continuous with places waiting to be filled.

In the last chapter of their most recent and jointly authored work Deleuze and Guattari attend to chaos and the function of the brain in the struggle with chaos: "The struggle with chaos (...) is always a matter of defeating chaos by a secant plane that crossed it."[21] We again find a double implication of that conception: if we imagine a set of films and lack genre understanding, then reception of members of that set would become chaotic and the horizon of expectancy would be based only on the part of the film that has so far been viewed and on discrete experiences of all other films experienced. Many works would become improbable, 'unreal'. By the same token, film making itself is a 'struggle against chaos' within the plane of immanence of art; it is one of the 'chaoids' as forms of thinking. But what about innovations, transformations of genres, and 'standard' genres? Deleuze and Guattari answer these questions while on 'their' plane of immanence:

> it is [they write] as if the struggle against chaos does not take place without an affinity with the enemy, because another struggle develops and takes on more importance -the struggle against opinion, which claims to protect us from chaos itself.[22]

By analogy, films that impair genre boundaries by means of ironization, antinomization, by breaching genre rules, are the struggle against genre congealing, against closing the openness of continuous genre milieu; they are the ways to develop and transform genres, to create new horizons of

possible (that is to say, meaningful, 'verisimilar') films, in other words, new genres. Moreover, those films are also implements for genre de-automatization, because genre boundaries come into being by being tres-passed. The other side of the chaoid of art, namely the 'opinion' that pro-tects us against the chaos, is formed by the set of genre 'obedient' films, easily genre classified, without tension. This has to do with the same factor (see note 18) that causes audiences at the concerts of rock stars to give the most roaring ovations to famous songs, whereas unknown songs appear 'somewhat odd' because they are on the edge of a secant plane of imma-nence, that is, at the boundary of chaos.

At the end of their research into the brain (on the philosophical plane of immanence), Deleuze and Guattari put forth a few (rhetorical) questions:

> when the brain is considered as a determinate function it appears as a complex set, both the horizontal connections and of vertical integrations reacting on one an-other (...). The question, then, is a double one: are the connections pre-established, as if guided by rails, or are they produced and broken up in fields of force? And are the processes of integration localized hierarchical centers, or are they rather forms (Gestalten) that achieve their condition of stability in a field on which the posi-tion of center itself depends?[23]

By accepting the second answer in each case to both of these questions, the authors must then conclude: "Arborized paradigms give way to rhi-zomatic figures, acentered systems, networks (...)".[24]

This 'allusion' can be used as a transition to the 'plane' of cognitive sci-ences and the general problem of categorisation, where genre categoriza-tion ranks as a 'subproblem'. From these characteristics of the work of art as an 'intersection of planes of immanence', we can extract a general concep-tion of genre 'space' and its genesis: the first, genre establishing film natu-rally constitutes the centre of a genre field, so long as it cannot be classi-fied into an established genre field, or so long as it is at least partially situated in several such fields or, in the case of a provisional classification, in the category of 'all others' (see below). Other films of a new genre co-operate in establishing a stabilizing genre field, that is to say, a Gestalt or formation, which disengages the 'pilot' film from its central position (or it could, at the same time, 'pull up' the first film from the unconnected cate-gory of 'all others'); a genre net is formed as a continuous genre space, oc-cupied by discontinuous 'singularities' of individual film works. These rhizomatic networks then constitute a certain fractal structure in the gener-alizing direction of the 'rhythm' of alternating discontinuity-continuity: first, individual events (or the relationship of two events), then the film (its

narrative structure), then the individual film work, then the genre field (which a given film comes under or which it helps to constitute), then the individual, particular genre, and then the field of all stabilized.

In other words, the reception of the film, including its ever changing categorization, corresponds to the function of the brain as it was determined by Deleuze and Guattari: the rhizomatic network forms a net of horizontal connections, intertextual interconnections, and changes (resonances) in the field of genre; vertical integration (that is, the thing which connects different films) then forms the genre field or, in short, genre, a plane of immanence, which is again horizontally connected with other genres (genre fields) and so on. Furthermore, particular planes together compose a 'phase space', so that, in the framework of that phase space, a particular film can be characterized by a direction, an intensity, and a gradual filling up of potential dimensions, that is to say, by vectors.[25]

III

In his two important books (the first of which was co-authored with M. Johnson) George Lakoff proceeds from linguistics to cognitive science, but the topics of conceptualization, categorization and structurizing experience remain. In the first book, he introduces the concept of 'experiential gestalt' as a way of organizing experiences into structured wholes. The structuring of our experiences by these multidimensional gestalts is a cause or source of the coherence of our experience (cf. the struggle with chaos in Deleuze and Guattari, Aristotle's verisimilitude, or Davidson's schemes and realities -see notes 6 and 9). The experiential gestalts are thus multidimensional structured wholes whose dimensions are determined on the basis of directly emerging concepts, for example the participant (the dimension of complicity and the notion of ego), the part (insertion of the 'part-whole' structure), stage, and position.[26]

It is evident that the film genre can also be understood as a multidimensional experiential gestalt, whose dimensions can in principle be subsumed in the three semiotic aspects and which is an instrument for accomplishing a meaningful, coherent aesthetic experience. We can therefore replace Carroll's dubious appeal to approach every genre 'otherwise' with the difference in dimensionality of every genre without having to relinquish the 'umbrella' concept of the genre. So, we can describe the western, for instance, with the help of dimensions with charged vectors: hero -good or bad, and how much of each quality there is in him; trajectory -from the

wilderness to the city and back; role -outsider, feared gunslinger, sheriff, outlaw etc; we cannot find vectors of the same structure and same interconnection in other genres. (In Lakoff's second conception -see below- instead of dimensions we come across particular cognitive models that intersect and form a categorial cluster, the central subcategory of the so-called 'radial category'. But Lakoff analyses conceptual linguistic categorization, where we can easily trace the 'core' of a category (cluster model), for example MOTHER; motion pictures have in fact no vocabulary, and are not a language in Saussure's sense of the word (as Christian Metz pointed out).

We can employ a similar approach when considering the plot (or, in Chatman's term, 'discourse') and the spectator's participation, for instance, dimensions of identification compared to anti-identification (aversion) or the 'reality' of a projected possible world compared to authenticity. But it is not merely a matter of description, but primarily one of the actual reception in which these dimensions and the thing that connects them -the genre as experiential multidimensional gestalt or the plane of immanence- make it possible for a particular film to provide a meaningful synthesizing experience.

In his second book, Lakoff elaborates a theory of cognitive models in which the so-called 'cluster models' and 'radial categories' occupy centre place. We can find interesting leads there for a theory of (film) genres, which clearly indicate that film genres are categories analogous to cognitive categories (and are governed by the same principles as them) as they are manifested in language and in the ways we structure the world and ourselves.

The enumeration of Lakoff's general principles, which govern human categorizations, includes principles that also govern, I believe, the establishing and 'life' of film genres. I shall therefore add after every cited category and its short definition a possible definition from the point of view of a new theory of genre categorization.

The following principles in particular merit mention:[27]

Centrality: radial categories containing a central subcategory, defined by the character of converging cognitive models (for instance, the aforementioned category MOTHER is the centre or the intersection of converging models, namely, genetic, nurture, marital, and genealogical). This first principle immediately presents serious problems for film theory: is genre a radial category, containing a 'hard core', that is to say, a subcategory of prototypical genre works? Or is it a matter of an inverted centrality, where

the intersection of dimensionalities of experiential gestalts is generated during reception in the mind and a film is anchored in the network of concatenations of genre space? I shall soon return to that problem with another concept of cognitive science, namely recurrent networks introducing a hitherto neglected dimension, namely, time.

Chaining: complex categories are structured by chaining; the central members are linked to other members which in turn are linked to still other members (cf. the horizontal connection in Deleuze and Guattari, discussed above). Passing from the syntax of a particular work to the chaining of a category would be a case of transition from a more or less intricate line to a network (in the case of the brain), to genre milieu in the conceptual domain.

Experiential domains: basic domains of experience, which are or may be culture-specific. These can characterize links in category chains (namely, what can be chained and where). This principle pertains to experiences with the 'lived world' of creators and spectators as well as to experiences with worlds of film, literature, and other arts, with, in fact, all possible worlds of art.

Idealized models: idealized models of the world that can characterize links in category chains. These are in effect a more particular form of the previous principle; in this case, an experiential domain with milieu character disintegrates into regions (again also in the sense of Deleuze and Guattari). The western can serve as a classic example from the cinema: the idealized model of the Wild West of filmic and literary westerns (apart from Buffalo Bill's western show) even retroactively influenced (by the process of mythologization) the historical dimension of the lived world of Americans.

Specific Knowledge: overrides general knowledge and it is thus cognitively mightier in terms of coding. We know in general that the speed of light in a vacuum is the ultimate speed, that there is no ring of invisibility, and so on, but in appropriate genres we accept the antitheses of that knowledge and they determine our horizon of expectancy.

Principle of 'The Other': conceptual systems can have an 'everything else' category that has no central members (or core) and no chaining. We use this category when we cannot classify a particular film into a genre. It is evident that members of that category are not chained, that that non-genre category provides the spectator with no horizon of expectancy. Every

movie in that category is a genre in a nascent state, a singularity as a potential space, the first point of a possible chaining. Todorov posed a a rhetorical question and provided its answer: "Where do genres come from? Quite simply, from other genres. A new genre is always the transformation of an earlier one (...)."[28] We can amend this as follows: genres can come into being by 'growing together' in a cluster, by expansion of milieu, by a Big Bang of genre space from the broad category 'The Other', which is primarily determined only by negation.

IV

The last concept of cognitive science, which we turn to in our efforts to explain the main idea (in a nascent state) of this the present essay, is the notion of the recurrent network and associated terms (vector processing, trajectory of vector sequences, prototypical sequences) coined by Paul Churchland.[29] Unlike Lakoff's basically non-temporal categories and concepts, Churchland introduces into processes of recognition and categorization the temporal dimension, whose relevance for film-genre studies is undeniable. The points in the activation space of the brain therefore (along with the temporal dimension) attain trajectory features. Even on the level of elementary sensomotoric acts, one motoric vector (an impulse of definite direction and extent) is insufficient for any response or reaction; an appropriate trajectory, a sequence of motoric vectors, is needed.

Churchland further corroborates the generation of activation vectors independently of forming motoric vectors under the influence of external stimuli. This sphere includes so-called 'limited cycles', which are stabilized vector sequences and govern, for example, walking, breathing, and, in fact, probably all activities which become automatic. A continuous line in the activation space, in other words a continuous vector sequence, can thus represent a complex reality (o.c., p. 102); in accord with Churchland's conclusions we can extend that thesis beyond the framework of 'mere' perception and motoric actions towards interpretation, aperception, symbolic reference, or narrative understanding (in the sense of Ricoeur). As Churchland explains:

> The recognition, however, of prototypical sequences in the world -any sequences at all- requires the possession of recurrent pathways in the recognizing network. (...) Recognition requires (...) a prior synaptic configuration, in order to produce the framework of waiting categories whose selective activation constitutes the network's recognition of the perceived sequence of behaviour.[30]

Consequently, categories with the temporal dimension are lines (vector sequences), not points. We can then project onto the film genre the 'framework of waiting categories' as they have been discussed so far; the 'synaptic configuration' on semantic, syntactic and pragmatical dimensions of particular film genres with full emphasis on temporality and thus construe the genre as a sequence of vectors, a sequentional vectorial categorization and recognition. Furthermore, the 'recurrent pathways' refer to both 'experiential domains' and 'specific knowledge' in Lakoff's model, to genre competency of the spectator as well as of the author, to memory as the site of the genre model of memory meta-text, according to some theoreticians.[31]

Churchland even undertakes a small excursion into the realm of art and speaks of the basis of artists' and scientists' performances as of the adoption of a 'family' or a system of prototypical performances. For instance, skill in music composition requires the assimilation of prototypes (a sequence of prototypical vectors) just as scientific skill requires an ability to apply an assimilated scientific theory. "These prototypes are represented in the well-trained musical brain by suitable regions or partitions in its neuronal activation space, or more likely, by suitable trajectories in the space."[32] With the inclusion of the temporal dimension, then, the recurrent network must come into operation. An important factor, which emanates from the model of recurrent network and prototypical trajectories, is the possibility of completing a vector sequence (for instance, a melody, after one hears only a few of its notes, or the case of the recognition of a familiar but partly veiled face), consequently, the possibility of movement in the horizon of expectancy. Vector processing (here the parallel with phenomenological intentionality is not, I believe, merely superficial), which also includes vector completing (not only inductive inference but also abduction and deduction) and working with trajectories (vector sequences), operates in "a space of high dimensionality, with widely scattered prototypical hotspots, and almost endless volumes still waiting to be explored."[33]

This description seems to correspond rather closely to the conception of genre space presented in the present paper, especially when we add to 'prototypical hotspots' the gestalt qualities of trajectories and their mutual chaining.

Consequently, genre can be understood as a multidimensional space which is interwoven with vector sequences, their intersections, knots or clusters, and is activated by gradual vector categorisation during the reception of a film. To put it metaphorically, the fly of a particular work is thus trapped in the spider-web of milieu of plane of immanence: the vector

sequences of the work (as a constituting aesthetic object) resonate with prototypical sequences of the genre-recurrent network with possibilities of being completed (the horizon of expectancy), including retroactive modifications in the process of reception and response (because during the reception the work is 'interwoven' into the genre network, and thereby modifies it). These modifications are made possible by the recurrent character of the network.

Concepts of vector categorization, sequences, and the network on the background of experiential gestalts, planes of immanence and of rhizomatic structuring, allow one to include in the genre model all three semiotic spheres, the temporal dimension of particular works, and the historical development of film genres, as well as of film as a medium. They enable one to link together creation, reception, and criticism as a (self-)reflection of the receptive acts and their 'object' poles.

This article has no pretences of being an exhaustive determination of vector characteristics of the established genres nor a prediction of new genres. It merely offers an outline of a genre model whose potential explanatory power can surpass the power of a 'semantic-syntactic approach' to film genre.

Notes

1 The Internet Movie Database presents the following list of film genres: Action, Adult, Adventure, Animation, Children's, Comedy, Documentary, Drama, Fantasy, Film-Noir, Horror, Musical, Mystery, Romance, Sci-Fi, Short, Thriller, War, and Western.

2 Mitry, Jean: 1963, *Dictionnaire du cinèma*, Paris.

3 Carroll, Noel: 'The Nature of Horror', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 46 (Fall), 51-9.

4 Foucault, Michel: 1971, *L'Ordre du discours*, Paris, Gallimard.

5 Leitch, V.B.: 1992, *Cultural Criticism, Literary Theory, Poststructuralism*, New York, Columbia UP.

6 Aristotle: *The Poetics*. For a more detailed commentary on Aristotle's verisimilitude see Culler, J.: 1975, *Structuralist Poetics*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Aristotle's criterion of verisimilitude might suggest that genre space is monodimensional, but it is clear that this verisimilitude, describable also, for instance, as an accessibility relation between the actual possible world of the text and the experiential lived world (M.L. Ryan), is not composed of one dimension, but of an integral set of dimensions. From Aristotle's normative demand on representation of people better than in reality (tragedy) or worse than in reality (comedy) it follows that every genre has its own verisimilitude and therefore dimensionality.

7 Hirsh, E.D.: 1967, *Validity in Interpretation*, New Haven, Yale UP. In this sense Hirsh speaks about 'inner genre', which can generate greater or lesser tension between it and a 'sedimentary' outer genre. He thereby raises the problem of factor, which has been noted by several authors (cf. Knight, Deborah: 'Making Sense of Genre', *Film and Philosophy* 2, www.hanover.edu/philos/film), namely, the dominance of the genre narrative structure over the evolving plot (discourse) of a viewed movie. The spectator's expectancy is therefore determined more by the 'horizon of expectancy' set up by a given genre than by any given evolving plot. The same factor appears in the problems of the chaining of discursive events in Lyotard and also in Deleuze and Guattari, at the differentiation of elements of plane of immanence and of concepts. (See below in the present essay.)

8 Genette, G.: 1997, *The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence*, Ithaca, Cornell UP, p. 207.

9 "Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience (...). Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another." (Davidson, D.: 1984, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in *Inquires into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford, Clarendon, p. 183). Cf. Aristotle's verisimilitude (see note 6).

10 Kant, Immanuel: 1973, *Critique of Judgement*, Oxford, Oxford UP, p. 59.

11 Genette, G.: *The Work of Art*, p. 217.

12 McArthur, C.: 1972, *Underworld USA*, London, p. 20.

13 Ryall, T.: 'Teaching Through Genre', *Screen Education* 17, p. 28.

14 Todorov, T.: 1990, *Genres in Discourse*, Cambridge, p. 16.

15 Leich, V.B.: *Cultural Criticism*, p. 72.

16 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F.: 1994, *What is Philosophy?*, London, Verso, p. 46.

17 Lyotard, J.F.: 1983, *Le Différend*, Paris, Minuit, sec. 40 and 147.

18 Carroll, N.: 'The Paradox of Junk Fiction', *Philosophy and Literature* 18, 225-41.

19 McArthur, C.: 1972, *Underworld USA*, p. 18: "The conventions of genre are known and recognized by the audience, and such recognition is in itself a pleasure. Popular art, in fact, has always depended on this."

20 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F.: 1994, *What is Philosophy?*, p. 35.

21 Ibid., p. 36.

22 Ibid., p. 202.

23 Ibid., p. 203.

24 Ibid., p. 216.

25 The hinted vector categorization seems to hold also for visual perception (the first level of film reception), as is indicated by neurophysiological research by the PET technique: a visual stimulus, traced as a course of electro-chemical activities in the visual correx. It is formed by five levels, V1-V5, each with a specific reactive sensitivity -to colours or brightness, shape or movement, orientation in the space, and so on. The processing of visual information then runs on three discrete, but interconnected paths, through specific sections of levels V1-V5 and a part of the stimulus can recur to repeated processing (cf. the recurrent network of P. Churchland, below). See 'The Bi-

ology of Art', *The Economist* 391, No. 8113, 69-71. I thank Professor C.E. Urriola of the Panama University for drawing my attention to this article.

26 Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M.: 1980, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago, Chicago UP, p. 81.

27 Lakoff, G.: 1987, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal about the Mind*, Chicago, Chicago UP, p. 95.

28 Todorov, T.: 1990, *Genres in Discourse*, p. 15.

29 Churchland, P.: 1996, T*he Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. A Philosophical Journey into the Brain*, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press.

30 Ibid., p.106.

31 Cf. "The only way a genre model or genre rules can be said to exist is as (...) a memorial metatext. It is because viewers operate with sets of expectations and levels of predictability that it is possible to perceive instances of variation, repetition, rectification and modification. In this way, genre can be considered as one single continuous text." (Leutrat, J.L.: 1973, *Le Western*, Paris, pp. 35-6). See also the plane of immanence, continuous milieu, and genre space, discussed above.

32 Churchland, P.: 1996, *The Engine of Reason*, p. 296.

33 Ibid., p. 297.

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