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Mandeville, Hutcheson and Hume on Pride and Honour

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List of abbreviated work

Bernard Mandeville:

FoB	*The Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick Benefits*
Part II	*Part II of The Fable of the Bees*
OH	*An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*

Francis Hutcheson:

Inquiry	*An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*
Essay	*An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*
Compendiaria	*Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*
System	*A System of Moral Philosophy*

David Hume:

Essay	*An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour*
T.	*A Treatise of Human Nature*
Enquiry	*Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (or second Enquiry)*
DoP	*Dissertation on the Passions*

Chapter I: Introduction

I first read Hume's *Treatise* when I had just finished my undergraduate studies. It found it unusual to not have read almost any Hume during those years at university, and sought to fill the gap. So I began from the beginning, or what I thought was the beginning. The title of his *opus magna* attracted me for it promised to reveal about human nature. Reading Hume's elegant and insightful philosophy was captivating and challenging.

When I arrived in Edinburgh, Hume's homeland, to study a Masters in Science in Enlightenment Studies I was drawn to him more forcefully yet. Upon rereading the *Treatise*, and completing work on a range of topics on the Scottish Enlightenment: Hume's time in Paris, his historical interests particularly regarding the evolution of the passions, I was struck by pride's overwhelming presence. A plethora of questions invaded me: Why did Hume use up so much of *A Treatise* on pride? What was his science of human nature getting at? Did pride have more motivational power than other passions? It was becoming clear that I was narrowing my focus onto this particular passion. However, this passion, as all of them, was complex, and entangled other passions, such as self-love, self-esteem, vanity, arrogance, and love of fame.

Training as a historian of philosophy, I began to understand Hume was not working *ex nihilo* and that he was in dialogue with other men and women of letters. The list of ancient and modern thinkers that shaped Hume's thoughts is long, and it is hard to rank his influences. I choose to focus on a seemingly impossible couple that was certain to have influenced him a great deal. The antagonism between Mandeville and Hutcheson must

have been food for thought for Hume: such a heated debate was likely to entertain and challenge Hume's developing philosophy in the 1730s, that is, during his twenties; a prolific and formative period for Hume.

Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume considered their task as that of an anatomist, which discovers the principles of human nature and constructs a science accordingly. However, they reached quite different conclusions concerning the source of pride and the manifestations of that passion. While Mandeville made a distinction between different sorts of pride, depending on their social stadia, Hutcheson concentrated on pride born from the correct and praiseworthy motivations. Overcoming this tension, Hume spoke about due pride's importance in shaping healthy ideas of the self for society.

Hume could have not developed his views without the help of Mandeville and Hutcheson. Like Mandeville, and Malebranche, Hume believed in the narrow connection of pride to sympathy in establishing social standards. Like Hutcheson, Hume believed that pride was due or undue depending on the quality of the connections made by the imagination and the motivations behind the desire it obeys.

As seen in chapter 1 and 2, Mandeville followed the neo-Agustinians in exploiting the uncomfortable dominance of our desire for praise, arguing that most actions we perform are ultimately directed towards gratifying this love for praise. Mandeville called the passion that constitutes this desire self-liking. This love for praise is hidden to the eyes of others, but acts upon us all without exceptions. Pride is precisely the exposition of self-liking. Moralists saw Mandeville's depiction of pride as problematic. Amongst these moralists is Adam Smith. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Hume's friend summarised the standard interpretation of Mandeville during his time as follows: "Dr. Mandeville considers whatever is done from a sense of propriety, from a regard to what is commendable and praise-worthy, as being done from a love of praise and commendation, or as he calls it from vanity" (1978, p. 308). Smith disagreed with Mandeville on naming the desire of doing what is honourable vanity. For the proper objects of esteem and approbation cannot lead to vanity, neither does the love of well-grounded fame and reputation, "the desire of acquiring esteem by what is really estimable, does not deserve that name".

Interestingly, Smith tiptoed around the matter of whether "the most generous and public-spirited actions, may not, in some sense, be regarded as proceeding from self-love" (*Ibid.* p. 309). Smith did admit, in any case, that self-love frequently *is* a virtuous motivation for action. Mandeville, on the contrary, exposed pride's status as a vice, precisely because it originates from self-love, insisting that pride is a dominant motivational force. In fact, our moral code is born from our attempts of avoiding shame, which is the same as not hurting our pride. Mandeville's perverse theory opened a can of worms that moralists such as

Hutcheson could not ignore. Mandeville emphasised that human beings accept and even indulge in praise when they suspect that this praise is inappropriate or rests in false assumptions. In fact, human beings are so eager to be praised that any praise is welcome and provides joy. Mandeville had no problem with "imaginary" praise nor praise that is not grounded on virtue.

Second, Mandeville pointed out a contradiction in the evolution of our notion of honour. That is, what we consider worthy of recognition and causing pride, in other words, our concept of what is honourable, developed in history to contradict the notion of honourableness accepted by Christianity. "The difficulty of our Religion is to live up to the Rules of Christianity" (1731, p. 8). This gave Mandeville a confirmation of the artificiality of morality.

Curiously, Mandeville claimed that the various forms self-liking may be channelled into is what explains the socialisation process by which human beings form part of society. The self-centred nature of human beings (unlike that of other animals, which makes them solely compete with each other) can be transformed and the selfish desire modified to become civilised. The codes of society that constitute the (late) principle honour as laudable are directed to gratify our selfish structure. Mandeville was able to both expose the disagreeable side of self-liking, namely pride (observing other people's belief in their own superiority makes us uncomfortable), and the more positive side of self-liking in partaking in the civilised process.

As seen in chapter 3, Hutcheson acknowledged that the moral sense can be perverted by a desire for honour. Given this, there should be a distinction between an appropriate praise and an inappropriate praise. The criterion that serves to distinguish between "love of honour" and "love of vanity" is the pleasure obtained by poorly grounded honour, such as that derived from recognition of one's wealth, is not a motive for the sense of honour to create pleasure. Instead, the sense of honour goes hand in hand with the moral sense in approving of virtuous actions and motivations. Hutcheson adapted the workings of the internal sense to the pleasures derived from external objects. The moral pleasures are superior to the rest of pleasures, and the pleasure of honour is no exception. Hutcheson resolved the tension born from taking pleasure in receiving honour from undeserved reasons by limiting the scope of the sense of honour to actions that bring moral pleasure. Hutcheson's sense of honour is therefore subordinate to the moral sense.

Hutcheson's strategy for dealing with the 'troublesome' passion of pride is different to Mandeville's and Hume's. Contrary to Mandeville, Hutcheson did not think the passions of pride, or self-love, have an all encompassing motivational force. The gratification of one's pride is just one of the many springs of our human nature. In an attempt to contain

Mandeville's speculations on the artificial origin of morality, and the contingency of our notion of honour, Hutcheson extended the scope of the moral sense, and made it attuned to the sense of honour.

Smith, a student of Hutcheson's in Glasgow, made a clear distinction between the three desires related to esteem that Hutcheson would have, most likely, agreed with. The first desire Smith discerns is the love of virtue, the "noblest and best passion in human nature" (1978, p. 309). In second place is the love of true glory, "a passion inferior no doubt, to the former, but which in dignity appears to come immediately after it". The last desire, the one that does entail vanity, is a frivolous desire of praise at any rate. Examples of attitudes of vanity include desiring praise for qualities which are either not praise-worthy in any degree, or in a lesser degree than one expects to be praised for them, or those who claim praise for actions that are not their own. Another example cited by Smith as guilty of vanity is that who "is never satisfied but when his own praises are ringing in his ears" (1978, p. 310).

It was part of Hutcheson's overriding project to argue against a dull portrayal of our human nature. But unlike Hutcheson, Mandeville's insistence on the Fall makes it difficult for him to offer a picture of human nature that is not corrupt. Like Hutcheson, Hume justified feeling pride is not as negative as Mandeville made it seem. Unlike Mandeville, Hume did not see the source of our motivations largely being self-interested as a consequence of the Fall. Hume lacked the religious dimension found in Hutcheson's work too.

Mandeville did not think there are instances in which publicly showing our pride is justified. Showing we are proud makes others uncomfortable and it can have destabilising effects in society. However, feeling pride is justified because it is embedded in our nature to have the passion of self-liking. Hutcheson restricted the realm of justified pride drastically: pride should only be felt when others approve of actions identified as worthy of approval by the moral sense. The sense of honour, therefore, only identifies and promotes actions and motivations that are morally justified. When the moral sense approves, however, feeling pride, and showing it publicly is accepted.

Mandeville and Hume shared the assumption that pride is an inclination meant to be kept in check in society, while Hutcheson advocated for correcting the passion from within one's own breast. In fact, Hutcheson argued that the opinions of others at times would pervert the moral sense. In any case, all three philosophers mocked Hobbes' insistence in necessity for government of an external body to society itself.

For Hume, our reputation with others stems from a care of preserving our own pride "and in order to attain this end, we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgement on the correspondent approbation of mankind" (Enquiry. p. 276). Support of the insecure

judgement of our worth comes from external approbation. However, Hume did not believe we are driven by excessive self-love, and does not treat pride as problematic in that sense.

Like Smith acknowledged, Mandeville was onto something when he suggested that there is an affinity between vanity and the love of true glory, because both these passions aim at obtaining esteem and approbation. However, vanity and the love of true glory are different in an important aspect, namely, that the one is "just, reasonable and equitable, while the other is unjust, absurd and ridiculous" (1978, p. 310). This summarises the struggle between those debating the extent of self-love's power over the rest of our passions and the consequences of self-love in society. When pride is kept within its proper boundaries it is not vain; on the contrary, it is fair and sensible. Hume made the first step towards compromising between the attitude towards pride that says it as necessarily virtuous, like Hutcheson; and attitudes that saw pride as always vicious, like Mandeville did. Instead, Hume and Smith spelled out the conditions of due pride and love for true glory or fame.

Moreover, pride has an intrinsic duality: the same general term is used to denote both excessive and due connotations. The confusion surrounding pride is somewhat avoided in other languages. Spanish, for instance, counts with a word other than *orgullo*, to highlight the uglier side of the phenomenon: *soberbia*. Basque also distinguishes between two forms of being proud, *harro: harrokeria* (with excessive pride) and *harrotasuna* (with due pride). Its inability to differentiate between the pride's duality adds to Hume's puzzling treatment of pride. It is likely he himself was content to run with this ambiguity.

Hume's insight on pride continues to be relevant. Hume's contribution to explaining pride catapults it as essential for one's own acceptance: self-worth. Pride, nevertheless, needs to be grounded on real causes, not chimaera, and backed by social convention. Although Hume had no moralising intentions when he spoke about pride, he insists on two limitations in its function. First, pride is justified if it is based on reality, and not imagination. Second, pride is best hidden to not offend others.

The current state of the art of pride studies differs from Hume's in an important way. Collective prides have gained popularity, particularly in discourses regarding identities that are different to other identities, such is the case of black pride and queer pride. Pride necessarily draws on comparisons to assess worth, and the premise of these collective pride movements is that identities hitherto not accepted are worthy precisely because they are different. I can imagine Hume would be surprised to hear about a collective sense of pride for the problems it poses in terms of the object not being the self but a group. However, the cause of pride would be a perfectly acceptable cause given his keen intention of broadening pride's causes.

If we were to imagine what Hume made of our use of pride today, it is possible to conclude that he would be shocked by the lack of effort we put into hiding it. Oversharing in social media has put an emphasis on the self: from selfies to slogans that promote 'believing in oneself' unconditionally.

The point of departure of this thesis was curiosity concerning pride's prominent presence in Hume's early work. I hope to not have fallen short showing that pride was at the heart of debates surrounding human nature's sociability, diverging taxonomies on the passions and moral and social worth. Pride was, in short, the passion Hume chose to explain human nature: it illustrates our human nature's duality and craving for social acceptance.

1.1 Outline of the Dissertation

The general framework of this dissertation sheds light upon how the passions, particularly pride, were seen as contributing to our moral and social life. I will examine the role of pride in promoting social virtue as presented by Mandeville, and Hutcheson's response to reconcile pride with a moral sense. Finally, I will situate Hume's opinions on pride and honour in the context of Mandeville and Hutcheson's conflicting opinions on the role of honour and pride in moral life. The thesis I will put forward is that Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume all contributed towards the perception of pride (understood as self-value) as a potentially beneficial passion. Mandeville spoke about redirecting our self-liking towards social ends and both Hutcheson and Hume distinguished between a bad sense of pride and a good one. Pride is a passion felt by relating one's actions or character to the esteem of others, but the source of esteem varies. While Hume believed that being virtuous is a valuable source of pride, he acknowledged that there are many other sources for pride; whereas Hutcheson argued that being virtuous is the only legitimate reason for feeling pride.

The development of recent trends in the study of history of philosophy have led to a more refined understanding of the intentions and aspirations of works and authors, as well as the debates that they took part in. This dissertation aims to place emphasis on works that have received little attention; Mandeville's *Enquiry into the Origins of Honour*, Hutcheson's *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*, and Hume's Book II of *A Treatise of Human Nature* and *A Dissertation on the Passions*. In addition, it will offer a close study of Hutcheson's sense of honour, which has not been systematically compared to Mandeville's text, nor has Hutcheson's sense of honour been paid due attention. These exercises will, in turn, bring us closer to improving our knowledge of Hume's opinions and their indebtedness to the intellectual debate of *his own time.* These exercises will also bring us closer to understanding what kind of moralists Mandeville, Hutcheson and Hume were, and what their aspirations were in writing on the passions and on human nature.

The first chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to clarifying Mandeville's ideas on the principle of honour. The original thesis I put forward is that Mandeville and Hume regarded modern honour as a substitute for virtue when shame failed to lead men towards moral ends, and that this thesis was unacceptable for Hutcheson.

Mandeville expands upon his theory of the artificial source of morality by elaborating upon the principle of honour; the desire of being honoured is a necessary motivation for virtue. In order to provide a context for this idea, I will also briefly explain Mandeville's

intellectual development, concentrating on his distinction between self-love, self-liking, and pride. Second, I will discuss Mandeville's conjectural history of the principal of honour. Last, I will explore the role of honour, self-liking and pride in his theory of sociability, and contrast it with Hobbes's explanation.

The second chapter is concerned with Hutcheson's strategy for containing Mandeville's thesis on the artifice of pride and honour. Hutcheson was aware of the pernicious effects of honour based on luxury or what seemed to Hutcheson as other illegitimate causes. Hutcheson believed that the moral sense may be perverted by unjustified pride and honour. However, he narrowed the scope of the sense of honour (an internal sense that produces pleasure in observing other people's approval of oneself) to virtuous actions. In this chapter I will first expose Hutcheson's aspirations as a moralist, and the difference between his system and Mandeville's. Next, I will give a description of Hutcheson's problem with unjustified honour and pride, after which I will expose how Hutcheson made the sense of honour and the moral sense uniform in scope and in the pleasures they ought to feel.

The third and final chapter of this dissertation will expose Hume's standpoint on the importance of pride in society. In order to make this clear, I will first explain the birth of pride by association of ideas and impressions and its communication by sympathy. Next, I will explore pride's place in the 'science of man' and women, as well as the unproblematic relation it has to virtue. Pride and humility are not desires, they are indirect passions rather than direct passions. Further, pride is not self-love, instead, seen by Hume as self-value, which is confirmed in the opinions of other people. Insofar as pride is reinforced within society, and insofar as it mirrors other people's opinions and passions, it is also a means of regulating our own behaviour. In this dissertation I will therefore show how Hume offered an approach to pride that liberated it from its previous problematic status in moral and social life.

Chapter 2: Genealogy of Pride

"The Truth will appear more
plainly, if we, as it were,
Anatomize and Dissect the Heart,
by entering upon the Consideration
of all its particular Passions."

Jacques Abbadie,
The Art of Knowing One-self.

Pride has been a problematic passion in many moral systems for it has been seen as having harmful consequences at an individual and political level. This thesis will argue that there is, in fact, a philosophical tradition that *has* seen self-love and its manifestation, pride, can be useful in society. This being said, each and every author that speaks about pride considers the conditions under which the love that we feel towards ourselves and the desire to be esteemed by others are justified. In other words, pride can be given under circumstances and in degrees that make it due or undue. Mandeville and Hume saw self-love and due pride, respectively, as supplementing moral duty, prudence and reason in guiding us to moral ends. Hutcheson too, allowed for a sense of honour that displays pride to naturally accompany the attitudes that are approved of by the moral sense. Therefore, what had been a neglected passion in most accounts of morals, became an important means of transforming our passions into social standards.

This introductory chapter will first explain the idea that the anatomy of the passions became paramount for the study of human nature. The idea behind this is that the passions transform and substitute each other as motivations. Second, I shall provide insight into the attitudes towards pride that shaped Mandeville, Hume, Hutcheson's theories, paying special attention to the French Neo-Augustinians and Protestants.

2.1 The Age of Passions

During the so-called "Age of Reason", there was a growing feeling, which would become a conviction, that moralising philosophy and religious precepts could no longer be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men. Arthur O. Lovejoy inaugurated this interpretation in the 1960's, exposing the eighteenth century as a time during which scholars came to the view that "pure moralising, ethical theories, the preaching of elevated ideals, have not proved adequate... remedies for man's disorders" (1961, p.9).

Traditionally, said Lovejoy, many moralists have argued that the passions may be conquered by reason. However, others have also been aware of the limited force reason has in controlling the passions. The latter moralists concluded that the best strategy for dealing with our harmful passions is to transform them into less pernicious springs. Many observers of human nature realised that it is impossible to get rid of the influence of the passions. Instead, one may only change one's slavery from one passion to another passion, without ever freeing oneself of the influence of the passions. In the face of this impotence, the passions were counterpoised against one another.

More than a decade later, Albert O. Hirschman's *The Passions and the Interests* (1977) agreed with Lovejoy in pointing out that the modern period had confidence in the ability of the passions to govern themselves. This ongoing challenging of the mainstream reading of the Enlightenment as dominated by reason lead John Dwyer (1998) to refer to the Enlightenment (in Scotland and Britain) as the "Age of Passions".

Mandeville, Hutcheson and Hume shared an interest in understanding how the passions and affections transform and substitute each other. Despite their different agendas as moral philosophers, all three philosophers saw human nature as conflicted by its passions and various inclinations. Mandeville said in *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War* that "All Human Creatures are sway'd and wholly govern'd by their Passions" (1732, p. 30).

Hutcheson said in his *Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (2002, p. 43) that "we have more lively Ideas of imperfect Men with all their Passion, than of morally perfect Heroes, such as really never occur to our Observation", and that we see ourselves represented in "the contrasts of Inclinations, and the Struggles between the Passions of Self-Love and those of Honour and Virtue, which we often feel in our own Breasts" (*ibid.*).

Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40, p. 415) famously held that "we speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and reason" (1978, p.

415). Instead, throughout Book II of the *Treatise,* "On the Passions", Hume speaks about how passions of different degrees encounter, destroy, diminish, or strengthen each other.

The three authors examined in this dissertation all ascribed to the experimental method of observing the various springs and dispositions of human nature. They understood moral and political life as an interplay of passions set against each other. They all have in common that unlike the long-lasting tradition that preceded them, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume did not see negative consequences to the passion of pride. Instead, Mandeville and Hume believed in the ability of pride to transform into necessary passions in society. Hutcheson also sees pride in a positive light since the sense of honour is accompanied by the moral sense.

2.2 Attitudes towards Pride

Pride is conceived as a problematic passion in the philosophical prose and satiric poems of the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries. Such is seen in Pope's poem (1711, p. 41):

> "Of all the causes which conspire to blind
> Man's erring judgment, and misguide the mind,
> What the weak head with strongest bias rules,
> Is pride, the never-failing vice of fools".

Long before this, pride was said to be a vice, and a source of moral evil. The reason for this is that pride evokes our self-interested nature, as well as being self-centred, and excessive.[1] The proud person is often depicted as an enemy to love and pity, and an enemy of those who possess real virtue. Being proud is contrary to being humble. Thinking too highly of oneself involves the error of thinking poorly of others and not acknowledging their accomplishments.

The motivation accompanying pride, as desire for praise, is the susceptibility to obtain pleasure in, or a desire for, the thought of oneself as an object of thoughts or feelings for other persons. Love for praise has an ambiguous reception due to the possible outcomes it may lead to. It may bring a negative outcome, when it leads men to fight with each other to obtain praise, but has also been seen as necessary for sustaining self-esteem. For example, it can lead to desirable behaviour in society by encouraging us to behave according to a standard that others will praise.

The Stoics promoted a sense of pride, *timé* is the honour which the hero expects to receive in proportion to his worth; literally "price" or value willingly assigned to something. Yet the Stoics deployed and punished being proud at the same time, *hubris* is excessive pride towards or defiance of the goods.[2] Pride in the latter sense is opposed to rational, prudent life and conduct; it may bring odium and madness, making it the ground for human misery (opposite to the good life). This makes pride an enemy of virtue.

Aristotle is an exception to the tradition of seeing pride in a negative light. He included magnanimity -namely, one's capacity for accurate self-assessment of one's greatness -among the "virtues concerned with honour" (2009, p. 67; 1123b3).[3] Aristotle said that the difference between the proud person and the vain one is that the vain thinks himself worthy

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[1]. Pride comes from the Old English word *pryde*, "excessive self-esteem". Oxford Dictionary of English.

[2]. *Timé* found in the *Perseus Greek Digital Library*.

[3]. "[T]he man is thought to be proud who *thinks himself worthy* of great things *and is worthy* of them", (Aristotle's emphasis.)

but is actually unworthy. The proud men and women "chiefly claim" honour, "but in accordance with their deserts" (*Ibid.* p. 68; 1123b24-5). Aristotle believed that a "truly proud man must be good" (*Ibid.*; 1123b29). The connection between pride and virtue is that we crave pride in the highest external good, that is, honour, which is necessarily derived from good deeds. Furthermore, Aristotle said that pride is a "sort of crown of the virtues" (*Ibid*. p. 29; 1124a2) for it makes them greater and because pride has a necessary connection to virtue.

According to Christian doctrine, humility is the attitude one should adopt towards God's in nite wisdom and grace. In almost every list, pride (in Latin *superbia*; and *hubris* in Greek), is considered the original and most serious of the seven deadly sins. As the phrase "Pride is the beginning of sin" illustrates, from *Ecclesiasticus* (X.13), pride is the source of all sins. In the story of Lucifer, pride (his desire to compete with God) was what caused his fall from Heaven, and his resultant transformation into Satan.[4]

Augustine of Hippo in *The City of God* expands the idea of pride as the source of sin. Augustine repeatedly contrasts human nature as created by God and human condition crippled by original sin. Our first parents fell into disobedience "because they were already secretly corrupted... And what is the origin of our evil will but pride?... And what is pride but undue exaltation?" (1998, Book XIV, Chap. 13). Undue exaltation of the inferior aspects of ourselves is intolerable. Loving ourselves in excess claims for ourselves God's place as being worthy of all veneration. Consequently, in the Christian doctrine, pride started being seen as the soul abandoning God as an end, substituting the love for God with love for oneself. Augustine criticises self-love that has grown beyond its proper boundaries, making individuals see themselves as the highest beings in the universe.

The two cities Augustine describes as antagonistic "were created by two loves; the earthly city by the love of God reaching the point of contempt for God, the heavenly city by the love of God reaching the point of contempt for the self". So, this self-centredness is not compatible with loving God above all things. In fact, the rebellious angels who founded the earthly city were motivated by pride, a perverse and highly specific kind of self-love that leads one to arrogate to oneself the place that properly belongs to God alone. According to Augustine, among those who pursue glory in the earthly world, there is a distinction to be made, for some seek praise from the masses, others from the prominent, and a third group from the virtuous only. The pagans must set the first two pursuits of praise aside and concentrate on obtaining praise from virtuous activity solely.

[4] Literally, "When pride comes, then comes disgrace, but with humility comes wisdom". *Proverbs* 11:2.

In Dante's *Divine Comedy*, the penitents accused of being proud are burdened with stone slabs on their necks in the purgatory, which force them to keep their heads bowed as a token of the repentance (1986, Cantos 10. verses 100-39, pp. 111-142).

Aquinas differed from Augustine regarding his attitude toward Aristotelian magnanimity. Moreover, the mediaeval philosopher's stance on the passion of pride was more ambiguous than Augustine's. According to Aquinas, pride is an "inordinate desire to excel". From pride arises vainglory, which is a capital sin that arises from the inordinate seeking after glory. Pride that promotes vainglory spoils the virtue of humility by being directly contrary to it. Another problem with pride is that it may spoil other virtues by abusing the virtues and growing proud of it. Because the proper object of pride is "arduous matter" pride must belong somehow to the irascible faculty.

Aquinas believed that due pride, magnanimity, is a virtue, one only properly understood when seen as complementing rather than opposing humility. Magnanimity implies a reaching out of the soul to great things, while acknowledging that virtue cannot be honoured by man but by God. Magnanimity "endeavours to make its performances worthy of honour, yet not as to have great esteem of honour" (1981, II: CXXIX. Art. II. III). Aquinas does criticise Aristotle for not including humility in his enumeration of virtues, for humility is a first and essential step for removing the chief obstacle to man's salvation for salvation consists in tending to things heavenly and spiritual and despising external grandeur (*Ibid*. CLXI).

Hobbes' interest in pride and desire for praise stemmed from his concern for the effect it had in society. He stressed the importance of the desire of glory amongst the "passions of the mind", as a motivation for human actions (1839, Chap. IX). This is because what makes for the prospect of success is sought from satisfying our passions in power. Glory is the desire for recognition of one's power over another. It is not surprising that *The Elements of Law*'s most prominent passion is glory. However, the pursuit of glory, Hobbes explained, is bound to create conflict. Unlike Mandeville, Hobbes saw the outcome of the desire of glory as largely problematic, due to conflicts amongst men.

Mandeville, on the other hand, saw the outcome of our desire for praise as beneficial when redirected in society, as we shall see in the first chapter. Other scientists of human nature, such as Hutcheson and Hume, observed the need for external approbation for obtaining self-esteem. Hutcheson speaks of well-grounded pride as honour, as we shall see in the second chapter. Like Hobbes, Mandeville and Hutcheson, Hume recognised pride as a necessary force too.

For Hobbes shame "is a signe of the love of good reputation" (1909, p. 45), and it destroys our pride. Shame consists in the apprehension of something dishonourable. Shame

is born from hurting pride. As it will be shown, Mandeville argued that shame was promoted and exploited as a means to encourage virtuous attitudes. Hutcheson, on the contrary, did not allow for shame's force to reside in imposed sanctions; shame is felt from a young age and comes from the disobedience of the moral sense.

The slavery of the passions was a common theme in neo-Augustinians fixated on the fallen nature of humankind. The revision of Augustine's work revisited the idea that self-love was the source of all actions and underlined the corrupted state of Mankind after the Fall. There were various discussions between different theological movements in France during the seventeenth century, between Jansenist and Jesuits for instance, focused on the original sin, amongst other issues. In any case, all neo-Augusitinians allowed for a prominent role of self-love (*amour-propre*) as a guiding principle.

Nicole says of the Neo-Augustinian's appropriation of Augustine of Hippo's doctrine and condemnation of pride, that "We must undeceive and free our selves from those false lights by which we appear in our own Eyes Great: by placing before them our own littleness and infirmities" (1677, p. 5). The condemnation of pride is very present in the modern era. The excessive love we feel for ourselves, *amour-propre*, is a consequence of our postlapsarian state, consequently, pride is a curse.[5] *Amour-propre* is often contrasted with *amour de soi,* the proper love of oneself, directed towards God. Various contemporary authors too analysed the ways in which human desires for praise, honour and respect lead us to cultivate habits of actions.

Malebranche spoke about Adam's fate: "His senses and passions revolted against him; they no longer obeyed his orders, and they enslaved him, as they do us" (1997, p. 22). The desire for grandeur illustrates a flawed understanding of human nature's true (corrupt) condition. "Pride, ignorance, and blindness will always go hand in hand" (*Ibid.* p. 378) and some minds, which do not wish to access the truth rather enter into themselves only to contemplate and admire themselves. He follows in the same page, "Thus, he who resists the proud shines in the midst of their shadows without enlightening them".

Malebranche was particularly interested in the relationship between cognitive dissonances and excessive pride. Much of Malebranche's search after truth is to warn his readers of the fatal epistemological consequences of the fancy or imagination. Pride is often found in people with presumptuous, dubious knowledge, dependent on memory, which is in turn affected by the imagination. Those who do not examine and judge the writings and testimony of others, and who agree with imprudence, retain knowledge without meditating. The same kind of person merely repeats other's opinions, but persuades others that they understand them perfectly, "and this is a source of pride to them" (*Ibid.* p. 143).

[5]. For instance, "[The love of others is] the bed or couch whereon our weakness rests it self". *Ibid.* p. 233.

Similarly, this sort of "studious person" pretends to have the right to judge everything, but, in reality, it leads to many errors. Those who suffer from a strong and lively imagination hold themselves and their qualities in high esteem: "they listen to others only with scorn, they answer them only by jeering, they think only in relation to themselves" (*Ibid.* p. 378).

As a Neo-Augustinian, Malebranche too allocated a prominent role to self-love (*amour-propre*) as an intrinsic motivating force. However, Malebranche has an insightful analysis about the necessary function of self-love in society. On the one hand, self-love can gradually destroy charity, and "break the bond of civil society" (*Ibid.* p. 161). On the other hand, "it is appropriate for God to preserve it [self-love] by also uniting men through natural ties, which subsisted without charity and appealed to self-love" Malebranche saw obeying the desire for praise as a way of obtaining knowledge of social norms, that is, by mirroring other's. According to his version, God created the world and our natures in such a way that our self-love leads us to imitate one another, and this works to bring about a certain kind of social uniformity:

> These natural ties. . . consist in a certain disposition of the brain all men have to imitate those with whom they converse, to form the same judgements they make, and to share the same passions by which they are moved. And this disposition normally ties men to one another much more closely than charity founded upon reason, because such charity is very rare (*Ibid.* pp. 161-2).

For Malebranche, amongst the chief causes of our disposition to imitate others was what Hobbes and others had described under the heading of "glory"; it is "the inclination all men have for grandeur and high position, and for obtaining honourable place in other's minds" he continues. This is the inclination that secretly excites us to speak, walk, dress, and behave with the "air of people of quality".

La Rochefoucauld, who argued that our virtues are most frequently vices disguised, began his *Moral Maxims* by proclaiming that self-love "is the greatest of Flatters" (1871, Maxim 2). Pride may adopt many forms as it transforms "itself in a thousand ways" (*Ibid.* Maxim 254). According to La Rochefoucauld humility, in fact, is pride in disguise or that pride copies humility and that humility is adopted in order to trade the trait of pride by a more agreeable trait to observe. In fact, pride is the same in all people, the sole difference is how this is manifested (*Ibid.* Maxim 35). This is proven by the fact that "if we had no pride we should not complain of that of others" (*Ibid.* Maxim 39). Last, magnanimity, too, is a form of pride, namely, "a good sense of pride" (*Ibid.* Maxim 285), or the most noble way of receiving praise. It was Hume who criticised La Rochefoucauld for confusing pride with self-love.

In a similar vein La Bruyère said that "all Men in their Hearts covet Esteem, but are loath any one should discover they are willing to be esteemed" (1752, p. 354). Hence, the hidden motivation behind our actions is self-love: "Men are so full of themselves, that self is the universal Motive; every thing favours of it" (*Ibid.* p. 359). This author too believed that sentiments towards the self and gratifying our own self-esteem is a guiding force of human nature.

> "We never seek Happiness within ourselves, but in the Opinion of Men, whom we know to be Flatterers, unjust, envious, capricious and pre-possessed: Strange Infatuation!"

The natural thing for men and women is to think of no one else but himself or herself with "pride and conceit" (*Ibid*. p. 69) but he or she aims to modify this disposition so that no one suffers by it. La Bruyère goes as far as saying that this disposition, modesty, is "an external virtue". This is a virtue that encourages a man or woman to act, apparently that is, with others as if he or she does not despise them in reality.

Abbadie said that until his analysis was put forward in 1692, there had been no perfect knowledge of pride. In order to remediate this, the several parts or all the characters of pride needed to be spelled out. More importantly, Abbadie considers that it is fortunate that the French language can distinguish between *l'amour propre*, and *l'amour de nous mêmes;* the former signifies Self-love as 'tis vicious and corrupted, the latter denotes this Love as 'tis lawful and natural" (1692, p. 129). Therefore, self-love is a vice and love towards oneself is not. These passions, however, are the principles of all the rest of the affections; all our desires, fears and hopes are reduced to an agreement of the virtue of love of our selves with self-love. Love of esteem is the only means which God used to "steer us to Vertue, and the good of Society" (*Ibid.* p. 270).

The purpose of Abbadie's search of knowledge about oneself is to "reverse the Ways and Methods of Pride, as Pride seems desirous of reversing and overthrowing the Methods of Providence" (*Ibid.* p. 67). The reason we should eradicate pride is that it does not belong to our natural state for it is too extravagant and enormous. Instead, it is a consequence of our corrupt nature. The consequences of pride are to enlarge and perpetuate oneself in spite of the odds, that is, despite the limited corporeal and temporal condition of mankind and womankind. The greatness at which pride aspires consists in perpetuating one's memory and enlarging ideas related to the self. In the words of Abbadie: "pride is a meer Drunkness, and Intoxication of Self-love, which represents us to our own Imagination greater and more perfecter than really we are" (*Ibid.* p. 126). He seeks to liberate mankind from the "*Phantome* of Pride and Concupiscence" (*Ibid.* p. 16) so that we may eradicate dreams and fictions of self-love.

According to his study, pride may be reduced to five "principal Branches: Namely, the Love of Esteem, Presumption, Vanity, Ambition, and Haughtiness" (*Ibid.* p. 227). The first branch of pride according to Abbadie is the love of esteem, the French philosopher said that the Creator made Honour and Decorum pleasurable because our own reason is partial toward ourselves and this can only be compensated by forming us "with a natural Desire of raising an Esteem of our selves in the Minds of others; a Desire, which assuredly precedes the Reflections of our Mind" (*Ibid.* p. 225). The opinions of others act as our judge as to moral honesty. The utility of love of esteem and glory is, on occasions, to make us succeed in projects and "procure us divers Advantages in Society" (*Ibid.* p. 222). On occasions, however, recognition of heroic actions ripe no profit for the hero other than esteem and commendations after dead, such is the case of those who trade their lives in the name of honour.

The second branch of pride is presumption, that is, a confident pride. Presumption casts a mist before our eyes, so "that we may not discern what is truly Estimable in us" (*Ibid.* p. 270).

Vanity commenced when people lost the source of their real glory, by "quitting that State of Sanctity and Happiness, wherein God had originally plac'd him" (*Ibid.* p. 241). Vanity is valuing oneself for things such as wealth and one's cloths. These false sources of glory make us lose sight of the real foundations of honour, piety and the love of God. Sometimes vanity is pleasurable for socialising, such as in conversation, but other times it becomes troublesome because vanity hurts the pride of those that observe it.

> *Ambition* thinks to be advanc'd to a lofty Pitch and to elevate it self beyond an Equality with other Men, because it puts us in a State of commanding them; and indeed 'tis in the right of it, according to the System of *Pride*, which measures the Price of those Advantages, it possessth, meerly by the Degree of that Elevation, to which they raise it beyond the common Level of Men (*Ibid.* p. 70).

Haughtiness or arrogance, also referred to as insolence, is the last subdivision of pride and it is the contempt of our neighbour. Abbadie observed that we "are eager to Debase those who are beneath us before, thinking we shall rise higher...as they fall lower" (*Ibid.* p. 267-8). This is the origin of slanders, calumnies, ironical praises, and satyr. Out of all the sentiments of pride, arrogance is the most dangerous and makes the arrogant man or women odious and detestable. Arrogance may lead to hatred, envy, and malignity.

Abbadie ends his book by reminding the reader that pride and corruption is almost equal, "and the same in all Men" (*Ibid.* p. 272), the difference resides solely in how it is manifested.

The abomination of pride in the Protestant context is no less forceful than in the early Christian literature. Protestantism was the dominant doctrine in Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume's time. Calvin's *Institutions of Christian Religion* constantly remind the reader of pride's role in the Fall. That is, pride prevents us from seeing the truth, namely, God. Calvin agrees with Augustine "that pride was the first of all evils" (1813, p. 224).' On the one hand, "immoderate self-love" is "innate in all men" (*Ibid.* p. 222). Other the other hand, humility is exalted as a necessary condition for the knowledge of God and of oneself by Calvin: "humility means not when a man, with a consciousness of some virtue, refrains from pride, but when he truly feels that he has no refuge but in humility" (*Ibid.* p. 227). Put in other words, not only should we avoid flattering ourselves, we must be humble, because we owe our happiness to God rather than to ourselves. Boston believed that pride sets a man against God that it is the product and master-piece of the Devil. He criticised those who spoke about the dignity of human nature and greatness of mind, who intended to persuade themselves and others that pride is a good principle. Pride, "like a kindly branch of the old stock, adheres still" and "and will not adhere to the righteousness of God" (1784, p. 75). The proud "carry the devil's mark in their right hand". It is acknowledged by Christians that "there is a root of pride in the hearts of men on earth", and that they must be mortified.

The last backdrop of the discussion of pride is an ongoing debate concerning the paradoxical relationship between material progress and moral decline.[6] One horn of the dilemma was that the rise of commerce brought luxury, which stimulated trade, prosperity, and wealth. The other horn of the dilemma was that the new way of living was corrupt. Hume felt comfortable showing that the realm of our worth extended to material goods; and so, did not condemn the corrupt trend nor a reason for guilt. In fact, in the eyes of Hume, unlike for Mandeville and Hutcheson, pride that derives from being wealthy and possessing agreeable external attributes, is not a reason for remorse.

The conflicted nature of pride led to a variety of attitudes towards this passion. In general, pride is pernicious because of the motivations behind it and because of its consequences. It is often the case that these two implications of pride are not necessarily taken apart from each other. Mandeville introduced to the English language new words to speak about these conceptual distinctions, as we will see in the first chapter. This is how Hutcheson and Hume are familiar with the debate on the perniciousness and usefulness of self-love and pride. Pride is referred to as either a consequence of desire for praise, or as a consequence of excessive self-love. However, pride was used by Mandeville, Hutcheson and Hume as self-value as well, such is Mandeville's self-liking, Hume's greatness of mind, and Hutcheson's sense of honour. These are important treatments of pride that sought to allow

[6]. See Jack, 1989.

self-love to coexist with the religiously problematic pride and politically unstable love of glory.

2.3 Strategies for Dealing with Pride

Whether virtues are acquired or natural was hotly disputed amongst the authors Hume cited as "hav[ing] begun to put the science of man on a new footage" (T. xvii). Mandeville is on one side of the dispute, underlining the artificiality of virtues, while the rest of the philosophers mentioned by Hume are more inclined to accept virtue as being natural, or innate. The Neo-Augustinians were "suspicious" of the idea that virtue is fostered for its own sake.[7] Their critique is that pursuit of virtue is easily confused with motivations other than obtaining virtue, in fact, in their opinion what drives our actions is never love for somebody besides ourselves.

The discussion on pride found in this dissertation should be understood in the context of both the aforementioned issues. Jennifer Herdt (1997) situates Hume as a promoter of the pagan virtues adapted to the bourgeois. However, Hume distinguished between the pagan virtues and the modern, and favoured the evolution of customs that shaped morals. Hume did not only believe that there are socially constituted virtues, what he called the "artificial virtues"; he saw no hypocrisy in them.

Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume all agree that pride is a natural passion or an innate feeling, and that craving it is an original tendency. Hutcheson says that "the desire of praise is acknowledged to be one of the most universal passions of the soul" (1755, p. 27). So, pride is inevitably felt by everyone. Beyond this, however, the subject of pride was disputed.

Hutcheson and Mandeville shared a common project: to describe the motivations, incentives, and springs found as natural (innate) affections in human nature; and compare whether these are different to the traits, motivations, springs that we applaud in society. Despite the common objective, they reach very different conclusions. Pride is justified insofar it satisfies the standards of honour, and honour is grounded on natural or acquired traits. While Hutcheson underlined the natural traits that lead to honour, Mandeville and Hume focused on the artificial and external birth of honour. Interestingly, in Book II of *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Hume maintains the following:

> "[H]onour and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural con-science, and produce, in some degree, the same effects". (T. 310)

It is precisely because we are susceptible to others' opinions and seek to satisfy our pride by adhering to honour codes, custom, and civil laws, that moral concepts come to be. Mandeville's insistence on the role of pride in our social interactions is at the heart of Book II and Book III of *A Treatise on Human Nature.* However, it is not enough to take the fact

[7]. See Moriarty, 2003; 2006; and 2011.

that pride occupies a central place in the *Treatise* as proof of Hume's Mandevilleanism as those highlighting Hume's Epicureanism have (Turco, 2007), arguing against Norton to prove that Hume was more preoccupied with these passions than he was with Hutchesonian passions and affections. Moore highlights Hutcheson's Stoicism[8] and says that the two new sections on the passions were added to Book I, Chapter I, Sections XV and XVI of *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*, here the passions that are downgraded are precisely the passions explained in length in Book II of Hume's *Treatise*. Namely, love of fame, pride in property and riches, and esteem for the rich and powerful (2007, p. 167).

My standpoint in the debate on the extent of Hume's adherence to Hutcheson or Mandeville is that Hume followed Mandeville in making our pride derive from the conventions of societies, but he sided with Hutcheson in making feeling pride or honour closely related to virtue. The conventions that make pride justified are found in the laws of honour. Interestingly, Hume maintained that "honour and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience, and produce, in some degree, the same effects" (T. 310), which echoes Mandeville's approach. One way of putting my thesis is that Hume provided a social analysis of the Hutchesonian moral sense.

[8]. For more on Hutcheson's Stoicism see Stewart, 1991.

Chapter 3: Mandeville on Self-liking Pride, and the Principle of Honour

> "It should not be thought that those who best examine self-love and whose penetration into the inner recesses of the human heart is deepest are always the most enlightened. Often this is only a sign that they are livelier, more imaginative, and sometimes more malicious and corrupt than others."
>
> Nicolas Malebranche,
> *The Search after Truth*

Mandeville was influenced by the French moralist's literature on the passions, which was focused on the predominance of self-love. Mandeville was also exposed to political-religious conflict in his hometown Rotterdam.[9] These realms shaped Mandeville's negative view on human nature and its impossible ability for inherent sociability. Society, however, is a direct result of multiple desires stemming from self-liking. Mandeville introduced the distinction between self-love and self-liking in an attempt to classify the conditions in which a desire for approbation leads to social ends.

[9]. See Marchi, 2001.

Unlike self-love, that is a crude passion in search of solely gratifying one's necessities in life, self-liking, manoeuvred by collective stratagem and hidden to the eyes of others, will culminate in social order, even ripe benefits to society. There is a latent tension in the work of Mandeville between the viciousness of pride and the utility of the passion. This is reconciled in this chapter by demonstrating that self-liking is gratified necessarily by obtaining external approval, binding our selfish nature to a social contract.

There are a few examples of literary discussion of Mandeville's *Origin of Honour* (1732). One example is that it has been recently discussed in relation to Hume's unpublished manuscript "An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Honour".[10] Another example is Markku Peltonen's study (2003) of *Origin of Honour* in relation to the history of duelling.[11] Sketching out Mandeville's view in order to assess Hume's debt to Mandeville is one of the *raisons d'etre* of this chapter. But the most important contribution of this chapter will be to argue that the notion of honour is more central to Mandeville's system than previous scholarship has acknowledged. Mandeville traces "Gothick honour" to a moment in the low middle ages (around the seventh century) when Christian religion devised a mechanism to channel our self-liking into honourable deeds. The principle of honour was introduced by priests to instruct men in themes that are not covered in the Gospel. So, Mandeville suggests that honour is a principle practised when virtue fails to moralise.

It has been suggested by Mikko Tolonen (2013, p. 138) that *Origin of Honour* is the sequel to *Part II* of *The Fable of the Bees* (1729). The difference, however, resides in that *Part II* concentrated on how self-liking is hidden in civil society with the help of politeness, while *Origin of Honour* explains that self-liking is explicitly manifest in society. Self-liking is a passion that reckons we are superior to others. Self-liking needs constant reinforcement because it is fed by the confirmation of others' recognition. Self-liking is responsible for the invention of the principle of honour in a civil society, one that has overcome the state of nature. *Origin of Honour* is a sequel to *Part II* of *The Fable*; but there are some nuances worth pointing out. The first is that Mandeville's intention in exposing the dangers of indulging our self-liking with modern honour, that is, overcoming our fear of death, and becoming a threat to others, is contrary to a civilising effect of self-liking explained in Part II. Another reason why *Origin of Honour* does not follow *Part II* is that in the later work Mandeville confers a greater role to external agents in imposing shaping morality, such is the case of priests in promoting war-like virtues.

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[10]. Transcription by Wright, 2012. Wright emphasises that both Mandeville and Hume believe that modern honour is contrary to the genuine virtue of courage, and that it often leads men into actual vice and criminal behaviour. I will discuss this further in Chapter III.

[11]. Peltonen interprets Mandeville as less critical to duelling than the previous scholarship held him to be.

The thesis put forward by Mandeville in *Origin of Honour* is that the origin of honour is self-liking, continuing to elaborate upon the influence and dominance of self-liking exposed in *Part II*. Reinforcing the principle of honour is useful in war, and useful in producing artificial courage. This is why Mandeville says modern honour is a "greater achievement" than virtue. Cleomenes, Mandeville's mouth-piece, praises the invention of honour:

> Horace: The Upshot is I find, that Honour is of the same Origin with Virtue.
>
> Cleomenes: But the invention of honour, as a principle, is of a much later date; and I look upon it as *the greater achievement by far*.[12] It was an improvement in the art of flattery, by which the excellency of our species is raised to such a height, that it becomes the object of our own adoration, and *man is taught in good earnest to worship himself*. (OH. p. 42, my emphasis)

Mandeville said that the principle of honour is adapted to our "inward Make", to our human nature, better than virtue: "Men are better paid for their Adherence to Honour, than they are for their Adherence to Virtue (*Ibid.* pp. 42-3)". In fact, as explained in his earlier works, virtue requires self-denial of our real make-up as humans. Essentially, Mandeville believes that in order to be virtuous one must go against human nature, whereas when one adheres to the principle of honour, men are promoting their corrupt human nature.

According to Mandeville, there have been two ways in which we have understood honour throughout the history of this concept. He, first, criticises the early idea of honour insofar as many took it to be the same as virtue, or a reward of virtue. In this sense, "it is a Technic Word", it consists of pleasing and gratifying one another's self-liking by "Conversing together". Mandeville had already separated honour from honesty. The second moment of honour came after the ancient societies, as a development of the marriage between Christianity and war culture, and then honour began to "Signify Fortitude". He puts evidence forward for his separation of honour and honesty by showing that honour cannot be a reward for virtue since it has degenerated in its modern sense to involve duels, and actions not considered virtuous *per se*.

In this chapter I will argue that the principle of honour was key in the socialisation of humankind, more so than the invention of virtue. I will focus on Mandeville's insistence on the dichotomy of real virtue (*honestum*) and the modern principle of honour. Mandeville

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[12]. It is difficult to discern rhetoric and mockery from Mandeville's discourse. There is an important way in which Mandeville is a historian of moral concepts and makes serious descriptions on human nature. Nevertheless, Mandeville's wit and provocation are part of his dialogues too. For more on the "two Mandeville's" or more than two, see the insightful yet inconclusive book by Munro, 1975.

denies that virtue is based on *honestum*. For the Stoics, and Cicero, for instance, whom Mandeville was critical of, morality is based on a sense of beauty and virtue, the *pulchrum* and the *honestum*. Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson (2008, p. vii) would later call this the "*moral Sense* of *Beauty* in *Actions* and *Affections*" . Their view was that this moral sense must be more than pleasure or self-love. Mandeville on the other hand said in the 1723 text, "A Search into the Nature of Society", that "the hunting after this *Pulchrum & Honestum* is not much better than a Wild-Goose-Chase" (1988, p. 311).

According to Mandeville, modern honour is a substitute for virtue and its role in the civilised society is to lead men (women gratify their self-liking with the virtue of chastity, and do not go to war) to public ends. Mandeville culminates his theory of the artificial source of morality by elaborating upon the principle of honour. The desire of being honoured is a necessary motivation for virtue. Virtue, in Mandeville's eyes, is always acquired, that is, it is forced upon us and inculcated from a young age. Real virtue, virtue that is disinterested and innate is not something found in human nature's makeup. Mandeville suggests morality must be based on acquired virtue, an idea that made other moralists cringe.

Scholars have classified Mandeville as a hedonist or Epicurean (Tolonen, 2013; Robertson, 2005; Moore, 1988; Castiglione, 1986; Goldsmith, 1988; Hundert, 1994: pp. 59-60; 75-96) an anti-Stoic (Brooke, 2012: p. 155), and a proponent of egoism (Kaye, 1988, p. lvi; Maurer, 2014).[13] However, Mandeville's task was far from being prescriptive, he was merely giving a description of how human nature is modified for life in society. He did not recommend we cultivate our vices when he used "Private Vices, Publick Benefits" as the subtitle of the *Fable of the Bees*.

Mandeville's neo-Augustinian roots have been examined since F.B. Kaye's "Introduction" to *The Fable of the Bees* Liberty Fund edition from 1924. What emerges from a survey of writers from Jansenius to Nicole is a complex overall picture of self-love. There is a natural attachment to one's own existence and well-being. But this cannot serve to find even a limited morality because our fallen nature makes us incapable of virtue; we are necessarily sinners. It is not clear what Mandeville's position on strict Christian precepts was. It seems to me that Mandeville not only reacts to the uselessness of reason and preaching for making people better, but also has a deep scepticism about whether people can value virtue and virtuous actions for their own sake. Instead, habituation of virtue is recommended through practice.

[13]. Maurer makes a useful distinction between the brand of egoism held by Mandeville on the one hand, and Campbell on the other.

In any case, what differentiates him from his predecessors was his emphasis on the dominance of self-liking as a passion distinct from simple love we have of ourselves (*amour-propre*). While Tolonen (2013, p. 24) has argued that Mandeville is different from the French Moralists because his distinction between self-love and self-liking is "neutral" and does not obey a prescriptive project (namely, self-love and self-liking do not correspond to a proper love and a corrupt one respectively), Hont (2006) argued that Mandeville was reacting to Fenelon's philosophy on luxury with his distinction between self-love and self-liking. I believe Mandeville's intention in making a distinction between self-love and self-liking was to distinguish between the predominant passions before civil society and those passions after the erection of civil society. Self-liking explains the origin of morals in civil society, whereas self-love is more important in a pre-civil state.

This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first is on the distinction between self-love and self-liking, and the passion of pride. The second section is on the principle of honour. And the last section is Mandeville's view on how the principles that rule our moral code come into existence. It is relevant for my project to demonstrate that the weight of artifice is immense in Mandeville's theory. Our actions obey our natural inclinations; however, these inclinations are moulded by education[14], and form the norms of society. The work of the "Moralists and Politicians", and "All that, having studied Human Nature, have endeavour'd to civilise Men", is to "render them [men and women] more and more tractable". (OH. p. 40)

Mandeville's history begins with the ruling passion of self-liking, which needs to be constantly gratified. Subliminally, we satisfy our passions while adhering to social norms. Curiously, pride is what enables our social contracts since gratifying it is what hides beneath our seemingly disinterested actions. Afterwards, I will explain how self-liking becomes honour by the approbation of others and the conventions of the society at a given time. This idea is found throughout *Origin of Honour*. Last, I will situate Mandeville with those who argued that politeness and civility are only concerned with our appearances, and that there need not be a relationship between our external behaviour and our internal morality. Moreover, Mandeville suggested that an attempt to relate external behaviour to our internal feelings was a misleading project "which would only end in bitter tears" (Peltonen also noticed this -2003, p. 268). This chapter will serve as a backdrop against which I will expose Hutcheson's work at the time and his response to Mandeville

[14]. See Heath's insightful analyses, 1998; and 2014.

3.1 Mandeville's Early Work

Mandeville's early works comprise these texts: the poem entitled *The Grumbling Hive*, The 'Remarks' found in *The Fable of the Bees*, the treatise *An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, and *A Search into the Nature of Society*. Here his intention was to provoke by offering a crude and mean representation of human nature. Michael Gill in his *British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics* (2006, p. 142),[15] classified him as having a negative answer to the question of human nature's capacity for disinterested actions and motivations. In fact, plenty of mainstream and orthodox thinkers held a similar view, but Mandeville proposed a special brand of "egoism" for he argued that our actions come from interested motivations. His perversion came from seemingly denying virtuous actions altogether.

The first part of *The Fable of the Bees* sought to establish three ideas: First, that the happiness we desire is wealth and power, glory and worldly greatness. That type of well-being is linked by Mandeville to the passions of avarice, profuseness, pride, envy, ambition, all of which are vices. Essentially, Mandeville is saying that we crave to satisfy our corrupt nature. Second, Mandeville defends the idea that in order to live in society our passions suffer a transformation; they are redirected by politicians in order to fit into society. He famously argued that there is no possibility of virtuous actions or motivations without self-denial. Since our primary inclinations drive us to what is deemed vicious, virtue is necessarily the rejection of our own nature. Third, Mandeville explains that prosperity and economic progress stem from our private vices. Paradoxically, our interested original nature brings public benefits.

Mandeville's early works make no distinction between self-love's various forms. All of our motivations are reduced to an interested passion, a passion that holds strong egoistic connotations.

Mandeville explained that those who desire to civilise mankind divide our species into two classes; one group consists of "abject, low-minded People", that simply look forward to satisfying their immediate enjoyment, whereas the other class is made up of those free of selfishness, and who with the help of reason, opposed all inclinations. That is, the first group is incapable of self-denial; whereas the second masters it. We have progressively accepted the second group as pride-worthy and the first as shameful.

[15]. Much more on Mandeville would have been useful to this book.

Mandeville started out with an unrefined account of honour. In ‘Remark R’ he explained that honour, in its figurative sense, is a "chimera" (FoB I, p. 198); an invention of moralists and politicians to keep some men and women, namely those that do not ascribe to religion, close to their duty. Mandeville later developed this idea into a more sophisticated theory of morality in *Part II* of *The Fable of the Bees* and *Origin of Honour*.

3.2 Self-liking, Pride, and Self-love

The influence of our passions is an undeniable feature of human nature:

> All Human Creatures are sway'd and wholly govern'd by their Passions, whatever fine Notions we may flatter our Selves with; even those who act suitably to their Knowledge, and strictly follow the Dictates of their Reason, are not less compell'd so to do by some Passion or other, that sets them to Work, than others, who bid Defiance and act contrary to Both, and whom we call Slaves to their Passions. (OH. p. 31)

Mandeville insists on the fact that actions and motivations recognised as meritorious need to arise from self-denial. The initial (real) impulse of our passions is hidden and is substituted by other passions. Specifically, the contrary passion to pride, shame is exploded and gradually implanted within us to avoid our self-indulgence and instead promote the interests of others.

Part II of *The Fable* includes some elaborations not found in the first part of *The Fable.* It is in the second volume of *The Fable* (1729) that Mandeville explicitly stated that self-liking is a passion distinct from self-love. Moreover, Mandeville acknowledges that there are passions that belong to the frame of our nature and are not self-centred. For instance, he is willing to admit there is such passion as love for our children. In addition, Mandeville maintains that our happiness is based on satisfying one's own pride, but this should not be confused with indulging our self-love (as merely love for one's life).

Amongst the passions Mandeville studied, self-love, self-liking and pride and shame occupy a salient role. The passion of self-liking had no name before Mandeville coined it in Part II.[16] Mandeville thought that too many people were confusing self-liking with pride. But pride, Mandeville said, is only an outward manifestation of self-liking, that is, it is a consequence of showing one's self-liking in public without exercising polite behaviour.

Throughout his work Mandeville traced much of the underlying mechanism that forms part of human psychology to a desire for external approval (in his early work the idea of self-liking as a distinct passion is muddled with pride and self-love). By the late 1720's Mandeville can state it clearly: It is an empirically verifiable fact that men and women desire to be admired by others now, and for this image to be preserved in the future:

> The true Object of Pride or Vain-glory is the Opinion of others; and the most superlative Wish, which a Man possess'd, and entirely fill'd with it can make, is,

[16]. Although Mandeville did not identify self-liking before Part II, he did point out the idea that we seek gratification of self-esteem through external approval in his "Remarks' in *The Fable* a decade earlier.

> that he may be well thought of, applauded, and admired by the whole World, not only in the present, but all future Ages. (Part II. p. 64)

The opinion others have of us is crucial in forming the ideas we have of ourselves. Mandeville did not discern between legitimate causes for pride and unjustified ones. Regardless of whether Mandeville thought there are more or less proper reasons to feel pride, he realises that this passion is in constant need of reinforcement, and virtually anything can serve that purpose.

Self-liking is "that great Value, which all individuals set upon their own Per-sons; that high esteem, which I take all Men to be born with for themselves" OH. p. 3. He added that it is shown to others in moderation and is seen as laudable, and further, that self-liking is hidden to the eyes of others. Pride, on the contrary, is an excessive and external manifestation of self-liking; and showing one's pride makes others uncomfortable on account of it reflecting excessive satiation by self-liking. Also, one's own superiority can come across as a declaration of other people's inferiority. "Every Individual values itself *above its real Worth*" (Part II. p. 130, my emphasis). This is the reason it is not agreeable to see other people express their superiority (let their self-liking show in the form of pride). The same point is highlighted by Mandeville's 'Remarks', where he claims that "every Mortal that has any Understanding over-values, and imagines better Things of himself than any impartial Judge, thoroughly acquainted with all his Qualities and Circumstances, could allow him" (Part II. p. 124).

He emphasised that self-liking is a passion distinct from self-love, in the face of theories proposed by moralists of his time that confused the two. Mandeville himself had confused self-love and self-liking in the past, in Part I of *The Fable* for instance. Upon reading Mandeville, Butler had criticised that self-love cannot be the source of all our actions, and the reason is that every so often men and women make choices that go against their own interests. It is worth noting that Butler understood self-love as self-interest here. Kaye said that Mandeville incorporated this distinction in *Part II* in response to Butler's criticism. By making a case for a passion that would potentially bring harm to oneself while still obtaining praise, Mandeville refined his initial theory.

The idea is that, in a pre-civil stage, pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding behaviour promotes our preservation. However, preservation is not necessarily one's priority in every case, especially in civil society. Mandeville said that self-love and self-liking are different passions, but they both are degrees of self-centredness (self-love is an elemental form of regard for one's life, and self-liking is found in socially cultivated circles). The point is that Mandeville wanted to distinguish between different forms of self-centredness, and advance

a theory that sheds light on the passions that participate in social life, the most important of these being self-liking.

Self-liking is an instinct given from nature. Mandeville insisted that similar to self-love, self-liking was also given to people for self-preservation, its gratification brings pleasure and satisfaction. The difference between self-love and self-liking is best understood when comparing them in an uncultivated environment (pre-civil society) versus a civil society. In the state of nature, where there is a lack of rules for civility, self-love will push human beings to perform actions that will save their lives and the lives of their biological relatives. Self-liking, in the state of nature, could put us in danger since self-liking "would make it [a creature] seek for Opportunities, by Gestures, Looks, and Sounds, to display the Value it has for itself, superiour to what it has for others" (Part II. p. 133). Therefore, the role of self-liking is more important for life in civil society than in the state of nature. Self-love, on the other hand, is essential for survival; it is the love one has for their life, regardless of whether the value of the person is publicly recognised. Self-liking, on the other hand, is love for oneself, which is mostly born by confirmation in other's opinions.

On occasions, self-liking doubles our happiness; "it is the Mother of Hopes, and the End as well as the Foundation of our best Wishes" (Part II. p. 136). And on the other side of the coin, lack of self-liking and harm to ideas that form our passion of self-liking (in other words, our self-esteem), may bring pain and suffering, as we shall see.

Self-liking may cause different outcomes: when it is moderate and well regulated, it excites the love of praise, and desire to be applauded and be well thought of by others. This arouses a strong impulse towards good actions. However, the same passion, when excessive, or "ill turn'd" (OH. p. 6) will give offence to others; it is excessive, and we have commonly come to know it as pride.

Mandeville brought the centrality of self-liking into focus. He clarified that self-liking is the underlying motivation for many actions we perform. He puts his hypothesis forward in spite of the resistance of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to admit the desire to be praised amongst the *dominant* natural affections and motivations of human nature. In fact, Mandeville's emphasis on our love of applause as the foundational principle of morality made him a Hobbist in the eyes of his contemporaries (reducing the egoistic theory of Mandeville to that of Hobbes). Mandeville highlighted the common view on pride, and pointed out that despite its bad name, it is necessary to unravel the true workings of pride:

> Since it [pride] has been in Disgrace, and every body disowns the Passion, it seldom is seen in its proper Colours, and disguises itself in a thousand different Shapes: we are often affected with it, when we have not the least Suspicion of

> it; but it seems to be that, which continually furnishes us with that Relish we have for Life, even when it is not worth having (OH. p. 135).

The above quote suggests that everybody condemns pride. However, Mandeville attempted to show that pride has not been analysed properly. Although it is difficult to see, self-liking (hidden pride) is what helps us conserve our love for social life. It is also true that the lack of social and self-approbation can bring immense misery, to the extent that it may bring a person to lose all self-love, and possibly, to suicide.

Once Mandeville established the concept of self-liking, and its relation to pride, he continued to develop on the functionality of pride. A good amount of self-liking, or pride, helps men confront danger (and fear of death). In other words, we become more preoccupied with receiving praise than with preserving our lives. On top of this, self-liking helps in the learning of the practice of duties, such as those proposed by Cicero, and social virtues, such as those hinted at by "Lord Shaftsbury". Mandeville admitted we are capable of the social virtues promoted by Cicero and Shaftesbury; however, these are a result of our desire for glory, rather than being disinterested.

The mechanism by which self-liking and pride operate is hidden:

> The more Pride they have and the greater Value they set on the Esteem of others, the more they'll make it their Study, to render themselves acceptable to all they converse with; and they'll take uncommon Pains to conceal and stifle in their Bosoms every thing, which their Good Sense tells them ought not to be seen or understood. (OH. p. 65)

Above Mandeville made an important remark: the doctrine of good manners helps us hide the outward symptoms of pride. However, the learning of rote of good manners is not a principle that stands against pride itself.

In the dialogues of *Origin of Honour*, Horatio, Cleomenes's interlocutor, complains that were pride the ruling passion in men, as well as the cause of good character, we would observe its pattern consistently in men, and find more good men. Cleomenes answers that self-liking is not always directed towards good deeds. Mandeville's response was, in fact, that men naturally differ in temperament, and that, in addition, hiding pride is encouraged by education. Moreover, temperament and education, together, form the perception man has of happiness, "according to which the Love of Glory determines them in different ways" (OH. p. 75). The want of glory, depending on how this is shaped by education and the preference each individual has in its character, will promote different actions and, therefore, adopt different forms.

Horatio is unpersuaded by Cleomenes, and tries to find examples of the perfect gentleman. According to Mandeville, however; there are no perfect gentlemen. The reason for this is that positive outcomes of self-liking are not always strong enough to entirely subdue the negative consequences derived from it. In short, there are many obstacles that may spoil the positive outcome of pride.

The recipe we must follow to obtain[17] or become[18] 'moral men' and women, is to inculcate a love for virtue, justice and probity, as well as "true notions" of honour and politeness. This is the only way to overcome the principles of sovereignty and selfishness that also derive from our passion of self-liking. In sum:

> [T]o have good Subjects, and moral Men, nothing is better than to inspire Youth with the Love of Virtue, and strongly to imbue them with Sentiments of Justice and Probity, and the true Notions of Honour and Politeness. These are the true *Specificks* to cure Man's Nature and destroy in him the Savage Principles of Sovereignty and Selfishness, that infest and are so mischievous to it (Part II. p. 313).

Mandeville explained the genealogy of these passions in our early education: infants are taught to prefer the precepts of others to the dictates of their own inclinations. For this, punishments and rewards are used, but nothing is more effective than to curb the natural passion of shame when it comes to redirecting our self-liking to social and moral ends. That is, "we may teach them [children] to be asham'd of what we please, as soon as we can perceive them to be any ways affected" (Part II. p. 78) with shame. The fear of shame is proportional to our self-liking and pride; the more self-liking and pride we possess, the easier that it is for shame to arise. He says:

> "[A]ll the Marks of Ignominy, that can be thought of, have a plain Tendency to mortify Pride; which, in other Words, is to disturb, take away and extirpate every Thought of Self-liking." (OH. p. 11)

Mandeville noted here that men have learned that it is not possible to destroy pride by force, instead, it should be played against itself. He added that we are not aware that pride is the principle by which we act since good breeding and education make us forget the principle we set out with; pride becomes a hidden spring (mere self-liking). Furthermore, his premise was that pride blinds the understanding of men of sense, since it touches upon one's own worth and excellency. We thus see in his work that even when a person is capable of examining him or herself, the extent of pride's dominion may come as a surprise:

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[17]. This is the case when the ideas are enforced by priests and politicians.

[18]. This is the case if we understand the process as self-imposed instead of externally imposed.

> "Therefore enquiring within, and boldly searching into ones own Bosom, must be the most shocking Employment, that a Man can give his Mind to, whose greatest Pleasure consists in secretly admiring himself". (Part II. p. 80)

Mandeville insisted that the same passion that makes a man honourable can make him "brag of their Vices" (Part II. p. 90); men can potentially "indulge their Pride in being shameless"[41]. In his view, pride, or the instinct of high value, is found in every individual, and leads one to the preservation of and happiness with oneself and the species; however, when it is excessive, it may lead to endless mischiefs. Gratifying our pride comes in a number of ways, depending on mode and custom.

The difference between pride and honour is that the former is an unalterable passion we are born with, and honour is "acquir'd, and the Rules of it are taught". This explains why the notion of honour varies so radically from one instance to another. Honour is formed by agreement in society of what deserves to be praise worthy. This idea will be further explored in the next section.

Origin of Honour made a noteworthy amendment to *Part II* of *the Fable*. Mandeville said that pride and shame both arise from the same passion. In fact, they are possible outcomes of our self-liking. Shame is contrary to honour (it is what we feel when our self-liking is hurt), while pride is mismanaged self-liking.

Mandeville summarised, the fear of shame "is a matter of Caprice" (Part II. p. 92), that is, it varies according to education and custom. Second, that the evil that derives from shame consists in our view of the opinions of others, that it is "altogether imaginary" (Part II. p. 95). Thus, Mandeville noted that pride may be founded on either real or imagined opinions. However, Mandeville did not add any prescriptive rules to regulate this.

Mandeville believed that what is worthy of pride and what brings shame is acquired during our lifetime. The more experienced we are in life, the quicker we perceive the "aversion which all Men have to those, that discover their Pride: And the sooner Persons are imbued with good Manners, the sooner they grow perfect in concealing that Passion" (Part II. p. 122). The offensive symptoms of pride are substituted by other symptoms, equally evident as the first in the eyes of Mandeville, but less offensive, and more beneficial to others.

The modifications of our inclinations, from pride to shame, happen without reflection; eventually we fall into these habits, and it is gradual. New improvements are made everyday, "'till some of them grow impudent enough, not only to deny the high Value they have for themselves, but likewise to pretend that they have greater Value for others, then they have

for themselves" (Part II. p. 145).[19] This knowledge is passed onto the next generations, and in two or three centuries "good Manners must be brought to great Perfection".

Mandeville's thesis on pride was that it partook in the socialisation of humankind. However, he was also aware that pride can, sometimes, be a destabilising force in society. Mandeville dramatically stated that "We have not a more dangerous Enemy than our own inborn Pride" (Part II. p. 269). Mandeville attempted to show that pride is a perverse underlying mechanism we are all implanted with. However, what is not implanted in our nature is the means to gratify this pride. Importantly, the more we are convinced that the outstanding features that men and women take pride of are acquired, "the greater Stress it will teach us to lay upon Education; and the more truly solicitous it will render us about it: And the absolute Necessity of good and early Instructions, can be no way more clearly demonstrated, than by exposing the Deformity as well as the Weakness of our untaught Nature". So, the qualities we take pride in are acquired, and education is essential for instruction in society.

The next section will explore the role of honour in Mandeville's philosophy. In the introduction I mentioned that Mandeville identified the principle of honour as an essential and excellent tool for substituting virtue. The relation of honour to religious precepts is especially puzzling to Mandeville. He realises that the promotion of honour has been in the interest of priests who could not motivate men to be virtuous for the sake of being virtuous, and that in the Gothic period honour was also necessary to promote violence and (artificial) courage (necessary in war).

[19]. At this point, Kaye mentions parallelism with Esprit, *La Fausset des Vertus Humaines* (1678) i. 449: "...il [man] a porte sa fausset au comble de l'impudence lors qu'il a ose dire qu'il est desinteress ..."

3.3 The Principle of Honour

Two decades before he wrote *Origin of Honour,* Mandeville already spoke about the artifice of honour:

> Honour in its Figurative Sense is a Chimera without Truth or Being, an Invention of Moralists and Politicians, and signifies a certain Principle of Virtue not related to Religion, found in some Men that keeps 'em close to their Duty and Engagements whatever they are. (FoB I, p. 198)

Mandeville's claim is that honour is an invention; a modification of our original (selfish) passions into moral and social ends. His criticism is that too many moralists take honour for the reward of virtue or for even virtue itself. In *Origin of Honour* Mandeville makes a distinction between three moments in the history of the concept: The word "honour" is used sometimes as the reward of virtue; sometimes as a principle that leads us to virtue; and other times, it signifies virtue itself (OH. p. 2). For this reason, it is difficult to speak about what "honour" signifies without a level of confusion.

The importance of self-liking is actually exploited in *Origin of Honour*, where Mandeville noted that self-liking accounts for the origin of honour. He described that honour obeys the same mechanism that the art of flattery does: honour brings satisfaction when a person receives the approval of others, this approval comes from the fact that we deem the actions, possessions, and or character of the first laudable. We are all affected by self-liking, the lauded person believes he or she is "in the Right to gratify and indulge himself in the Passion of Self-liking" (OH. p. 8) especially when this belief is confirmed in the opinions of others and confirms to the rule of what is honourable. Therefore, honour is a compliment made to those we approve of; and to have one's self-liking increased, is the highest award mortals can receive. In this sense, honour is found in any society, even the primitive ones.

On the other hand, Mandeville explained that honour has evolved from its first sense, into a more complex notion. The first sense of "honour", used as a verb or noun, is a mechanism by which "men by conversing together have found out to please and gratify one another on Account of [self-liking]" (OH. p. 14). The second sense signifies more than the first sense of honour; it is a "Principle of Courage, Virtue and Fidelity", which men are said to act from. This meaning of honour is newer than the first one, and was an "Invention to influence Men, whom Religion had no Power over" (OH. p. 15). Therefore, Mandeville saw honour as a substitute of virtue. "The greatest Difficulty of our Religion is to live up to the Rules of Christianity" (1720, p. 8). Mandeville says that despite our efforts to "conquer our

Passions, and mortify our darling Lusts", the "higher and heroick Virtues are very scarce to be met with" (OH. p. 15). To be a man of honour in this sense of winning duels, which is what honour came to signify in Gothic times, is a contradiction for the Christian doctrine of honour; while it is sometimes necessary to engage in private quarrels in civil society, the laws of God and one's country forbid them.

Mandeville was convinced that honour in the later sense is "entirely Gothick, and sprung up in some of the most ignorant Ages of Christianity". Rather than being classical in origin, duelling and the adjacent notion of honour were partly mediaeval, partly modern. There had been two crucial moments in history which had given a stronger impetus for these institutions to develop.[20]

Horatio said, echoing the ancient philosophers, that the codes of honour are written and engraved in everyone's breast, that a man of honour feels this within. It was Mandeville's purpose to prove Horatio wrong. If honour were felt within, this tension would not come into being. Mandeville stated that the laws of honour are "directly opposite to and clashing with the Laws of God" (Part II. p. 83). For instance, murder and revenge are forbidden by the doctrine of Christian religion, yet these are linked to honour in the context of war. Seven to eight centuries ago, said Mandeville, honour and religion were "blended together". Further, he suggests that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, mediaeval knights, their order of chivalry, and their virtues had been established. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Mandeville declared, with reference to provocative claims found in duelling manuals, "the Sense of Honour was arrived to such a Degree of Nicety all over *Europe*, especially in *France*, that barely looking upon a Man was often taken for an Affront" (OH. pp. 51-2; 63-4; 232). Little wonder that honour had such a crucial role in human society- that it was "the strongest and noblest Tye of Society" (OH. p. 57).

Honour was the most solid cement that held society together, and Christian priests were responsible for encouraging it in mediaeval wartime. Like many earlier advocates of duelling, Mandeville admitted that duelling was "directly opposite to and clashing with the Laws of God". Indeed, men knew that duelling was against religion, law and prudence. However, this knowledge as Horatio was able to explain by his own experience, could not prevent men from fighting. After all, duelling was an invaluable help in creating a good army. And, secondly, and more importantly, duelling played a vital role in the progress of civility and politeness.

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[20]. In *Part II* of the *Fable*, however, Cleomenes, Mandeville's mouthpiece, says that no one can tell when and in what King's or Emperor's Reign, or by which authority the "Laws of Honour" were first enacted.

In *Origin of Honour* Mandeville compared the invention of honour with matrimony. The similarity that resides in both honour and marriage are born from a desire already implanted within. Mandeville's point of view was that marriage was not invented to make us procreate. Instead, marriage was instituted to regulate a strong passion and prevent problems from unleashed lust. In the same manner, honour was not invented to create self-liking, this passion already existed. The difference is that honour does not mean to keep our initial inclination in check, instead, honour seeks to the indulgence of our self-liking by forming laws of honour.

In an attempt to elucidate how self-liking is present in all realms of life, Mandeville developed his theory further. He said that our nature makes us have no concern with things beyond our lifetime. Our desires do not extend beyond our lives, and all the objects we aspire to are on "this Side of the Grave" (OH. p. 36). However, the principle of self-liking still explains why we want to be well regarded beyond our own lifetime. Even when somebody desires an estate for his descendants, Mandeville argued that he does so based on the satisfaction and pleasure that comes from reflecting on the thought in this life. It is also the case that we desire not to be forgotten by future generations; however, reflecting upon this can only give us pleasure while we are alive.

He continued by noting that genesis of the codes for honour took place when politicians and moralists (priests) became convinced of the selfishness of human nature. Having made observations that establish people love themselves more than anything else, these leaders would be tempted "to try if Man could not be made an Object of Reverence to himself" (OH. p. 39).

When we yearn to possess glory it is not the good or bad opinion of others that gives us joy or sorrow; rather, it is the notion we form of their opinion. The value of this notion is what matters to us, and from the idea of the opinion of others also comes the fear of shame. The invention of honour was seen by Mandeville as a greater achievement than the creation of virtue, for the scheme of promoting honour is perfectly adapted to our inward make. Moreover, endorsing honour is

> "[A]n Improvement in the Art of Flattery, by which the Excellency of our Species is raised to such a Height, that it becomes the Object of our own Adoration, and Man is taught in good Earnest to worship himself". (OH. *p.* 42)

Mandeville noted that, unlike virtue, the manoeuvre of adherence to honour does not require self-denial. Most importantly, the invention of honour has been "more beneficial to the Civil Society" (OH. p. 43) than that of virtue. Mandeville's idea here is that the scope of honour appealed to those that had failed to ascribe to religious precepts. Another reason

why Mandeville said honour is more beneficial to civil society than virtue is because honour (self-liking in particular) is more effective at re-channeling our passions than virtue. Honour is not denied nor hidden in modern practises; instead self-liking is wholeheartedly indulged and the superiority of the person who is honourable is recognised by society.

Furthermore, Mandeville compared the amount of people that are virtuous to the amount that are honourable; the honourable are found in higher quantities than the virtuous: twenty to one, according to his calculation. Presumably Mandeville used observation to gather this data; it must have seemed evident to him that there were many more men that sought honours in comparison to virtue. Again, the reason is that virtue is not compatible with our passionate nature, whereas the principle of honour allows for the indulgence of our appetites. Whilst virtue is against the indulgence of our passions, and corresponds to the doctrine of Christ, modern honour is diametrically opposed to this doctrine for enabling such a satiation.

He went further to note that the differences between virtue and honour are evident and "shocking". According to Mandeville, a person who possesses honour has the liberty to openly proclaim himself or herself a man or woman of honour. In addition, he added that a man or woman of honour can denounce whoever doubts their honour. Mandeville emphasises the fact that there are very few men that are united with both superlative bravery, and the strictest sense of virtue.

The mechanism of honour perfectly blends in with our nature since it is constructed upon the passions of self-liking and pride. Honour became part of our moral code by a trick of priests, evolving into a principle by which, paradoxically, we find the height of pride is not inconsistent with the greatest humility. The innate "Instinct of Sovereignty" is exploited thanks to the principle of honour. Various Popes, for instance, have invented a variety of "Badges of Honour" that highly gratify the passion of self-liking.

There is an overall hesitance from Mandeville to argue, as Hobbes did, for an indispensable need for a superior sovereign that will suppress men and women's egoist passions with fear in order to respect the law (Mandeville does not believe that the source of society is artificial in this sense). However, Mandeville does identify the enforcement of the principle of honour as imposed by the priests and moralists using cunning methods, which echoes Hobbes's style of channelling the passions towards social means.

Honour became a common topic before Mandeville tackled it, and duelling was made fashionable as a means to demonstrate that one may fight when he pleases. Vanity and impatience must have always prompted the most proud men to seek to establish themselves as men of honour. "The Rules for Quarrelling and Punctilio in Behaviour, which at first were very uncertain and precarious, came to be better understood, and re n'd upon from

Time to Time" (OH. p. 64), until the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the sense of honour was fully refined all over Europe. It was evident for Mandeville, and clearly stated here that:

> "Honour is an Idol, by Human Contrivance, rais'd on the Basis of Human Pride".

In the seventeenth century duelling was so popular and dangerous that it was necessary to limit its force. Mandeville recalled an edict published in 1651 by Louis XIV, by which "Courts of Honour" were erected throughout his Kingdom to control the duels and differences between gentlemen. Shortly after, in 1653, there was another declaration against duels. Offences against honour began to be punished by law. According to Mandeville, "the punishment of the aggressor... is altogether a punishment offended, whose Wrath the Law is so far from blaming, that it justifies it, and gives him an Opportunity of indulging it by the Indignity it puts on the Offender" (OH. p. 69). In fact, there is no purpose of punishing duelling by law given the perpetrators will not suffer the consequences of law if they decease.

Pride, anger, and revenge are necessary to society for the advancement of dominion and worldly glory. The principle of honour exploits these passions, whereas the principle of religion would abolish practices that spring from these passions, such as duelling, by restraining, conquering and destroying them (OH. p. 83). However, a peaceful disposition and humility are not appropriate qualities to have at the battleground.

Mandeville does not believe that self-liking being a foundation to the principle of honour is a defect of the principle. What is unfortunate is that the principle of honour clashes with Christian religion. It was in the interest of the Church of Rome to reconcile the principle of honour and its own precepts. Mandeville observed in *Origin of Honour*:

> The Fear of Shame is able to make most Men brave. Soldiers are made by Discipline. To make them proud of the Profession, and inspire them with the Love of Glory, are the surest Arts to make them valiant: Religion has nothing to do with it (OH. p. 134).

Nevertheless, Mandeville observed, there must have been skilful priests that knew how to extol the goodness of their own, and declaim against the wickedness of their enemies. These cunning men dedicated to God would demonstrate to the troops how God loves them and they would grow less likely to indulge their vices, and consequently more governable. In fact, Mandeville says that most men that have formed part in the troops that have earned victories, have been wicked and immoral. After all, all that is required from soldiers is to fight undauntedly and obstinately.

> "Arts and Sciences seldom come before Riches, and both ow in faster or slower, according to the Capacity of the Governours, the Situation of the People, and the Opportunities they have of Improvements; but the first is the Chief" (OH. p. 318).

According to Mandeville's scheme, with time we understand the "true Use of the Passions" (OH. p. 319), and by using the weaknesses of the individuals, make the whole stronger, and skillfully "turn *private Vices into publick Benefits*". The greatness of nations, politics, and government depends on the knowledge of human nature. This wisdom is translated into regulations and articles that curb our passions and restrain our excessive nature. A flourishing society becomes so over time; it will slowly regulate the laws, repeals, and amendments necessary for its ruling. Once the mechanism behind it is brought to perfection it will carry on functioning without much effort. What promotes the arts and sciences is the recompense, profit, and honour (*Ibid.* p. 341). Were men and women less proud, the arts and sciences would not had reached such a level of perfection. Moreover, "Ambition, Avarice, and often Necessity" frequently encourage industry. This explains why Mandeville thought honour was beneficial to civil society.

Mandeville said that most people, the exception being small, are motivated by the *love of glory* and the hope of advancement in society. He did not deny that there are people who desire to serve their country, and not just for their own gratification. What Mandeville maintained, instead, is that those who "take Pains" (*Ibid.* p. 345) with regard to themselves are greater in number than those that do so to serve their country. In fact, those who seek to gratify their own pride are "infinitely greater".

Mandeville previously accused "Mr. *Hutcheson*" of mixing the real love men have for their country with their selfishness with the love they are thought to act from. In reality, they feel no such love; it is impossible to separate this from their selfishness:

> "When Men exert themselves in an extraordinary manner, they generally do it to be the better for it themselves; to excel, to be talk'd of, and to be preferr'd to others, that follow the same Business, or count the same Favours" (Part II. pp. 346-7).

The *love of applause* alone is enough to make most men, even the vicious ones, choose the most morally praiseworthy actions despite their inner feelings being indifferent to virtue. As I explained at the beginning of the chapter, Mandeville believed that morality is founded on the disconnect between the inner springs and the outward display of these springs. The principle of honour developed throughout history merely signifies what has been decided upon by convention. Inspired by moralists and politicians that have exploited the passion of self-liking, the principle of honour has become useful as a means of promoting superficial

virtue. Mandeville did not grant a connection between the inner motivations of an alleged honourable person, and the external appearances of these motivations. It is enough for there to be a connection on the surface.

Honour is a valuable moralising device. In this section I have explained that Mandeville saw honour as an important means of channelling self-liking for social purposes. Specifically, honour reached those men who did not abide by religious precepts and virtuous behaviour. In the light of the hardship that being virtuous brings, Christianity endorsed ideas of honour and allowed for codes of honour that went against Christian morals. As a historian, Mandeville identifies the social code of honour in mediaeval times as the substitute of virtue. Curiously, the social purposes that honour promotes can be detrimental for sociability, and hence the need for laws to restrict honour driven behaviour in civil society. In the next section I will explain Mandeville's theory of sociability and how it differs from Hobbes'.

3.4 The Origin of Society, and Acquired Sociableness

Mandeville was interested in the extent to which the habits of good breeding might induce behaviour that ultimately cannot be distinguished from virtue. For Mandeville there was no difference between social and moral progress. In fact, moral concepts are a plain reflection of customs that evolve in society. Mandeville himself pointed out that the etymology of the word morals is *mos* -custom- (OH. p. iii).

Morality evolves by means of artifice, and is therefore deemed artificial by Mandeville. The artifice he pointed to is that our natural inclinations are transformed by means of self-denial. Mandeville was not as perverse as his contemporaries portray him: he was persuaded that "to govern our selves according to the Dictates of Reason, is far better than to indulge our Passions without Stop or Controul" (*Ibid.* p. ii). However, he was convinced that we have no remedy but to indulge our passions. He stated that, as a matter of fact, we live with others, let it be family or strangers, and that we form societies by default. Coincidently, we learn how to use our passions in ways that are useful in society, our motivations evolve, and from social norms that gratify our passions and at the same time fit into society. What was scandalous was Mandeville's insistence on the intrinsic inclination towards self-indulgence of human nature, and the necessity to curb this by inculcating public shame.

The story of how honour came to substitute other virtues was explained in detail by Mandeville. At first, virtue was associated with "Daring and Intrepidity" (OH. p. iv). Throughout history soldiers have received consideration from being virtuous or courageous. Courage is meant to conquer the fear of death. Mandeville made it clear that his conjecture on the origin of virtue does not detract from the "Dignity of *Moral Virtue*" (*Ibid.* p. vi), or its reputation. That is, Mandeville thought that it is not problematic to trace links between virtue and courage, nor is it a problem to point out that we favour virtues traits that are beneficial to survival and explain morality as an organic and evolutionary process.

Mandeville's intention was to develop a conjecture about the origin of society, and I will explain this in the following paragraphs. According to Mandeville, in the early stages, people necessarily came together thanks to their links with their proximate family. A savage man will keep his children in check. While a "natural affection" (Part II. p. 201) will prompt the man to love, and take care of his child; the child will also provoke anger, and suspend the initial passion. If the parent hurts the child out of anger, he or she will feel pity, and his anger will cease. Therefore, the child will learn to love and fear his father. Mandeville called

the conjunction of love and fear, together with esteem, reverence. His way to explain the relationship between father and child was also by recognising that because self-liking is a ruling passion of ours, we tend to see our children as extensions of ourselves, which we wish to govern:

> [T]here is no Species but ours, that are so conceited of themselves, as to imagine every thing to be theirs. The Desire of Dominion is a never-failing Consequence of the Pride, that is common to all Men; and which the Brat of a Savage is as much born with, as the Son of an Emperour (*Ibid.* p. 204).

Pride is the reason we desire and have the ambition of governing others. The principle of sovereignty is found in every human being, let it be a savage or a civil human being. Moreover, we are all inclined to have a superlative value for ourselves, and everything that comes from us (Part II. p. 225).

Fear is important in explaining how humans first got together. Fear is a dis-position that is not acquired, and that shuns evil. This passion, according to Mandeville, brought savages, or men and women as families. In the early ages of family based societies, there was a tendency to form religion, giving them the "Opportunity of entertaining some glimmering Notions of an invisible Power" (*Ibid.* p. 207). Whenever an evil, whose cause is unknown to us, happens, we often suspect, according to Mandeville, of the existence of an intelligent cause for it. In short, what all men are born with, before receiving instruction about religion, is fear. In *Origin of Honour* Mandeville developed the idea further: this fear helps govern society. In fact, he suggested that no society can be governed without religion. Our ideas that lead toward religion, Mandeville claimed, are necessarily discovered through revelation; these need to be shown to us by means of a miracle.

Mandeville claimed that all reason is *a posteriori (Ibid.* p. 222*)*. The ideas of right and wrong come into being when we have received some instruction. Men and women surely have a tendency to act according to what are reasonable notions of right and wrong, but these are not natural. Therefore, our ideas of right and wrong are acquired.

He wrote that not even the first pair of civilised parents act from the principle of care for their species; instead, they would be vain enough to see themselves as the cause of their o spring and descendants, and receive satisfaction from the "pleasing Reflection on himself" derived by the flattering prospect of an happy posterity.

What made men and women associate, according to Mandeville, is the common danger from wild animals. He acknowledged that there are opposing forces such as wars, as well as plagues and other diseases that threaten these groups. It is due to Providence that men survive and due to the curse after the Fall that they suffer such a fate.

Slowly, language developed from gestures to words. And our superiority of understanding expanded. The superiority of understanding, namely, the capacity to reflect and learn, enhanced the grief and joy of the men and women in early stages of society. At the same time, this superiority "renders [them] more industrious to please himself" (Part II. p. 300). Therefore, self-love is more manifest the greater our understanding, filling us with hopes. This, said Mandeville, is very useful to men and women who find themselves in a political body "and it must make them fond of Society".

3.4.1 Mandeville's Criticism to Contemporary Theories of Sociability

Mandeville criticised his contemporaries concerning their explanations on the origin of society, dividing them into two fronts:

> It is very unworthy of a Philosopher to say, as *Hobbes* did, that Man is born un fit for Society, and alledge no better Reason for it, than the Incapacity that Infants come into the World with; but some of his Adversaries have as far overshot the Mark, when they asserted, that every thing which Men can attain to, ought to be esteem'd as a Cause of his Fitness for Society (*Ibid.* p. 177).

As Mandeville saw it, Hobbes' and Mandeville's adversaries insisted on separating what is natural from what is acquired, leading them to say absurdities about the alleged "Causes of Man's Fitness for Society" (*Ibid.* p. 301). Mandeville was referring to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who underlined benevolence as a predominant natural affection, responsible for the origin of society. So, Mandeville believed that the fault that some of his contemporaries demonstrated was not allowing for human nature's nakedness to be displayed; Shaftesbury and Hutcheson intended to show men and women as never striped and abstracted from external influence and education. In a wicked twist, Mandeville accused these philosophers of professing so much self-love that this makes them unwilling to have the "Ornaments seen separately from the Thing adorned" (Part II. p. 304). In other words, Mandeville complained about the rest of philosopher's incapability to admit self-love as a ruling force.

The other contemporary movement that Mandeville disagreed with is Hobbism. Mandeville believed Hobbes' account of the origin of sociability was wrong. It is worth noting that Hobbes' interest, unlike Mandeville's, was to justify the erection of a political contract, and to explain society's existence in terms of such a contract. Furthermore,

Hobbes emphasised that the need for this contract comes from the need of self-preservation. Hobbes felt that a political contract is crucial in providing protection, and this gives birth to society. Moreover, a contract is requisite to forming a society because without a contract there would be war solely. Mandeville did not believe there is a need for an external political regulator within the Leviathan; instead Mandeville believed men and women could regulate their behaviour partaking in society. Mandeville did not say that fear is the reason men and women get together, rather he sees the necessity to feed our insecure self-liking as the reason for society to exist.

Mandeville granted men and women with potentially sociable passions, that will be channelled in society. That is, society is a consequence of these passions and our ability to transform them, instead of a product of a political contract. In fact, laws and contracts are a consequence of sociability. In morals and law what has seemed advantageous for humankind in one age and country is an abomination in another time and place.

Both Hobbes and Mandeville were concerned with discerning life in family from political life. Mandeville used lust to explain why members of the opposite sex are brought together and form families. Parents love their children, and the children both fear and have esteem for their parents; they reverence them. He added that the aptness and desire of humankind to associate is not because of the "Love of others" (*Ibid.* p. 178). Mandeville said that there are plenty of examples of men and women that convince us that "Man centres every thing in himself, and neither loves nor hates, but for his own Sake".

Mandeville believed that the source of society is men and women's craving to satiate their self-liking, and this is very different to Hobbes's contractual explanation of how society is formed. Hobbes' suggestion involved realising, by calculation of the dangers of not guaranteeing self-preservation alone, that it is better to hand in our weapons to the sovereign, so he can impose the law. Mandeville, on the contrary, explained the arrangement as a gradual and natural development, yet not an innate one.

People born in society are "more desirous of it, than any other Animal" (*Ibid.* p. 180), that is, than bees or bears. The question, however, is whether we desire society by nature. He teased Shaftesbury and Hutcheson by saying that, even if men and women are naturally drawn to society, "it is no Excellency, nothing to brag of." Mandeville noted the desire for an easy life and security are sufficient conditions to make people fond of society, especially considering the needy and helpless condition of people's nature when alone. Unlike Hobbes, who identified the beginning of the social contract at an early age and time because of a helpless condition, Mandeville said that there is a need for fully grown men and women to associate: the more possessions they have, the more the need to associate with

one another. Therefore, the "most civiliz'd People stand most in need of Society, and consequently none less than Savages" (Part II. p. 181).

It did not seem to Mandeville like we have a love of our own species greater than other animals. Moreover, there is a motive that prompts men and women to enter society, which is the "Advantage or other he proposes to himself from it" (*Ibid.* p. 183). "Nature has design'd Man for Society, as she made Grapes for Wine" (*Ibid.* p. 185). He continued his premise, noting that wine is made by men and women, it an "invention", as it is to press oil from olives to make olive oil. Mandeville was arguing against the divine origin of society, and against the natural law theorists, just as Hobbes did, but offering an alternative to Hobbes' explanation. Humankind is prone to creating society, nevertheless, society cannot exist and develop without the "Concurrence of human Wisdom" (*Ibid.* p. 186).

Mandeville sees that once individuals are artfully arranged in society, their sociableness is evident, *fabricando fabri mus*; men become sociable by living in society together. Mandeville admitted, as a marginal phenomena, that there are sociable affections that naturally prompt us to take care of others, such is the devotion of mothers to their own children. With few exceptions, Mandeville's maxim concerning morality is the next:

> "What you call Natural; is evidently Artificial, and belongs to Education" (Part II. p. 270).

The laws of all countries have the same tendency; to regulate the faults, "or rather Properties of our Nature" (*Ibid.* p. 271), by contriving regulations and prohibitions for the temporal happiness of mankind. Politeness, or the regulation of the external symptoms of one's self-love does not belong to our nature.

"Artful People may dissemble Love, and pretend to Friendship" (*Ibid.* p. 305) even where there is none; however, civilised people seek to satisfy their appetites and passions as savages do. Mandeville's role is to show that "the good Qualities of Men compliment our Nature and the whole Species with, are the Result of Art and Education" (*Ibid.* p. 306).

3.5 Conclusion

I have explained Mandeville's conjectural history of the evolution of morality. According to him, humankind has learned how to indulge its ruling passions of self-liking and pride by directing them to moral ends, ultimately creating social virtues. Self-liking and pride are, curiously, responsible for our self-gratification and desire for praise as well as responsible for the socialisation process. Human beings have formed social codes that balance one's own gratification of these particular passions, with what is acceptable in society. Gratification of our self-liking takes the form of recognition of our worth insofar we are capable of ascribing to the moral code.

On occasions, the moral code has been erected by observations from politicians and other leaders, who sought to substitute pride with shame. At the same time, the moral code, such is the case of the modern concept of honour, has sought to benefit behaviour that could overcome our fear of death. Mandeville spotted incongruence between the different ways of erecting the moral code. This presents a tension in times of war for the codes of religion come to clash with wartime behaviour. Ultimately, however, Mandeville held onto his claim that we seek to indulge our passions, and that the reasons for excellency in society are acquired by education.

Mandeville's analysis of honour strengthened his overall theory of the dominance of self-liking. The principle of honour is not founded on honesty nor virtue but is efficient in promoting social virtue. In Mandeville's opinion, this disconnection between motivations and appearances is not problematic for a moral system, on the contrary, it is what makes it work.

Chapter 4: Hutcheson and the Sense of Honour

> "Dr. Hutcheson had been at great pains to prove that the principle of approbation was not founded on self-love... and that the mind was endowed with a variety of reflex senses exactly similar to the moral sense... such as a sense of shame and honour".
>
> Adam Smith,
> *A Theory of Moral Sentiment.*

In this chapter I will explain Hutcheson's strategy for containing the arguments put forward by Mandeville on the artifice of honour. What I have called Hutcheson's "strategy" is his reconciliation of the moral sense and the sense of honour in the face of Mandeville's contentions. Maurer (2009, p. 195, footnote 24) says that Hutcheson left the pleasures received from the sense of honour "aside" in *A System.* However, Hutcheson did not drop the sense of honour in *A System of Moral Philosophy,* nor does he disagree that there is a "high pleasure... felt upon our gaining the approbation and esteem of others for our good actions, and upon expressing their sentiments of gratitude" (1755, p. 25). Hutcheson

acknowledged the sense of honour despite not attributing it any capability to create particular and exclusive pleasures that correspond to it. Instead, Hutcheson makes the objects and pleasures derived from the sense of honour one with the objects and pleasures derived from the moral sense; in his own words, they are uniform.

Hutcheson first mentioned the sense of honour in works from the 1720s. However, the sense of honour's narrow moral scope was fully fleshed out and his strategy against Mandeville refined in the books he wrote in the 1730s and 1740s. Both his *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria* and *A System of Moral Philosophy* dedicated sections and chapters to the sense of honour.[21] The sense of honour, Hutcheson insisted, is consistent with the moral sense and, most importantly, natural to human nature. It is important that the sense of honour is as natural as the moral sense because this belief argues against Mandeville's artificial sense of honour, and it avoids the possibility of perverting the moral sense with unjustified honour.

The moral sense recognises laudable actions and feels pleasure in witnessing them. On the other hand, the sense of honour promotes the very actions that the moral sense approves of and conforms to our duties and ideals of honour in society. In short, honour is derived from, and only from, actions that agree with the moral sense.

A very different explanation was given to "the principle of honour" by Bernard Mandeville. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Mandeville was critical to those who paired honour with virtue. Modern honour was seen by Mandeville as a substitute for virtue. The underlying moral psychology endorsed by Mandeville was that gratifying one's self-liking (self-esteem) by external approval is necessary to our human nature. Mandeville argued that shame is taught through education to keep our self-centred passions in check. Mandeville denied that honour is a consequence of being virtuous. Instead, Mandeville said that praise derived from honour and humility born from shame are requisites and incentives for being virtuous. I have explained Mandeville's system in the last chapter and will here concentrate on contrasting Hutcheson and Mandeville's views on pride and honour.

I will start out by explaining the difference between Mandeville's and Hutcheson's respective science of human nature. Next, I will show how Hutcheson's sense of honour sought to challenge previous conceptions of pride that see this passion as a vice; he does so by reconciling the moral sense with the sense of honour. Last, I will explain how

[21]. See Hutcheson's *A System of Moral Philosophy. In Three Books.* Glasgow: 1755 (but written during the 1730s) Book I, Chapter V: "The sense of Honour and Shame explain'd. The universal Influence of the Moral Sense, and that of Honour; and their Uniformity"; and *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria (*1742). Edited by Luigi Turco. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007. Book I, Chapter I, 13. "The sense of honour and shame. The uniformity of these senses": pp. 41-43.

Hutcheson's strategy fits nicely into his theological project, and how he wrote in favour of Christian morality from Mandeville's criticism. The purpose of this chapter is to explain why Hutcheson's strategy is interesting for an intellectual historian. This is because it attempted to counter-argue with Mandeville, as well as defend the claim that human nature has primitive natural instincts of being concerned with others. The latter point will revise the role of the moral sense as a moral agent. I will show that Hutcheson allowed for the power of the moral sense to be similar to moral conscience.

Much of the literature on Hutcheson's moral philosophy has concentrated on narrow features of his system. The importance of benevolence and sympathy has been underlined (Turco, 1999); others have put the moral sense and issues on the epistemology of morals at the heart of the debate (D.D. Raphael, 1947; D. F. Norton, 1985), and his religious dimension has been highlighted too (Moore, 2000; J.A. Harris, 2008).

Early on, those who sought to make (Scott, 1900)[22] sense of Hutcheson's scheme divided Hutcheson's work into phases[7] or distinct parallel projects (Moore, 2010).[23] However, this type of approach tends to offer a fragmented reading of Hutcheson, failing to explain how these phases are interconnected. Moore (2010) says that "there seems to be little doubt that [Hutcheson] perceived the Latin works as teaching manuals and not much more".

This piece will challenge Moore's view on the importance of *A System* and *Compendiaria* because it unravels Hutcheson's strategy against Mandeville beyond the four treatises on philosophy published during the 1720s. In fact, I suggest, Hutcheson's overriding intention was to suppress the contingency of our moral code Mandeville so forcefully advocated for, and prove that being virtuous is in the reach of anybody who pursues the pleasures of the sense of honour and the moral sense. Exploring this aspect of Hutcheson's work is very important for it provides more tools to understand the moral faculty or moral sense, by discovering it's relation to the sense of honour or approbation. As Hutcheson said: "A more distinct consideration of this sense of honour and shame will much confirm the preceding account of our *moral faculty*" (System. p. 82).

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[22]. Scott's idea was that Hutcheson's thinking had changed fundamentally in the course of his career. Scott speaks about four phases: from the moral sense theory (*The Inquiries,* 1725) to naturalism (*An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections,* 1728) to theology (*A System of Moral Philosophy,* largely written in 1734-37), to stoicism (*Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*, 1742).

[23]. Moore makes a distinction between a public philosophy, explained in the four philosophical treatises written in Dublin, and a "parallel" academic philosophy conceived to satisfy the pedagogical demand of the College of Glasgow.

4.1 Vicious Pride

It is no secret that Hutcheson despised Mandeville's theories. This can be appreciated in several scornful remarks towards the 'Author of the Fable of the Bees'[24]. These were explicitly written throughout the 1720s, the decade Hutcheson spent in Dublin as a private academy teacher. However, Hutcheson's agenda was not limited to criticising the *Fable*[25]. Interestingly, Hutcheson's later works, *A System of Moral Philosophy* and *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria* were in dialogue with Mandeville's *Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, and the Usefulness of Christianity in War. By the Author of the Fable of the Bees* (1732)[31] as well. In fact, Hutcheson refined his critique of Mandeville when he became a lecturer at Glasgow. His strategy towards Mandeville went from the rude backlash of his first decade of publishing to engaging in arguments about honour's moral status during the rest of his life.

Likewise, Mandeville was critical of the evidence Hutcheson used to build a science of human nature. Mandeville claimed that Hutcheson's formula to calculate the benevolence of our actions is inaccurate. This is because, according to Mandeville, Hutcheson was confusing the disinterested aspect of benevolence with an ambition we have of being perceived as acting from benevolence. Hutcheson should discern, said Mandeville, between two elements. On the one hand, the "*real* Love Men have (...), abstracted from Selfishness" (Part II, p. 418, my emphasis). On the other hand, "the Ambition they have, *of being thought to act from that Love*, tho' they feel none", no love (Part II. p. 418, my emphasis). Mandeville wishes that

> [t]his ingenious Gentleman [Hutcheson] would once weigh these two asunder; and afterwards, having taken in impartially all he could find of either, in this or any other Nation, shew us (in) his demonstrative way, what Proportion the Quantities bore to each other.

So, Mandeville was claiming that Hutcheson's observations are mistaken. Mandeville was not willing to make concessions for what Hutcheson wanted to establish in his science of human nature, that is, that human motivations can be benevolent *per se*. Although "everyone is committed", Mandeville quoted Seneca's *Epistles*,[26] they are not entrusted to the care of others, but the care of themselves. In the words of Mandeville:

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24. There are several allusions, such as, 'Moralist(s), who will rather twist Self-Love into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principal of Approbation than Interest'. Inquiry, pp. 154-5).

25 Even though Kaye claimed '[Hutcheson] could hardly write a book without devoting much of it to attacking the Fable' F.B. Kaye, 'Introduction' to Bernard Mandeville's *Fable* (1988, p. cxlii).

26. Seneca, *Epistles:* cxxi. 18 (bk. 20, ep. 4, x18) quoted by Mandeville in *Part II* of *The Fable of the Bees:* p. 418.

> "When Men exert themselves in an extraordinary Manner, they generally do it to be the better for it themselves; to excel, to be talk'd of, and to be preferr'd to others".[27]

What we have here is the core disagreement between Mandeville and Hutcheson's approaches to the science of human nature. Mandeville categorically denied disinterested motives, while Hutcheson insisted on pointing out the possibility of their existence. Hutcheson condemned those who persistently repeat that "in all human company everyone seeks his own advantage, pleasure or glory" (1730, p. 145). He believes that the love of glory, or external recognition, is not the *only motive* found amongst our natural springs.

It is important to remind the reader that satirists and moralists in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a good deal preoccupied with a vice named *pride*, and denounced it with force. The proud person was often depicted as an enemy of love and pity, and opposite to those who possess real virtue. Thinking too highly of oneself involves the error of thinking too poorly of others. Pride has been opposed to rational, prudent life and conduct. Pride may bring odium and madness; making it the ground for human misery and differing from the good life. All in all, pride is an enemy of virtue.

Mandeville exploited the dominance of pride[28] and argued that most actions we perform are ultimately directed towards gratifying this self-indulgence. This self-indulgence consists in receiving external approval in order to make us feel good with ourselves. Consequently, argued Mandeville, virtue (strictly de ned as disinterested motivation) is impossible. In fact, Mandeville said that our moral code is born from our attempts of avoiding shame, which is the same as not hurting our pride. Mandeville's theory opened a can of worms that moralists such as Hutcheson could not ignore.[29] Hutcheson was undoubtedly against reducing all springs of our human nature to the egoistic and hedonistic concept of self-love Mandeville endorsed. This is explicit in his four treatises and his articles in journals of the time, which directly attacked Mandeville's characterisation of pride. In this quote of the *Inquiry* Hutcheson (2008, pp. 154-5) scornfully paraphrases Mandeville's treatment of pride:

> Pride, in the bad meaning of that Word, is the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an Engine, which the Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-love in the Flatterer.

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[27]. *Ibid.*

[28]. This was the case in *Part I* of *The Fable of the Bees.* In *Part II* he actually identified the cause of pride was the passion of self-liking, and suggested pride was a manifestation of self-liking. Hutcheson's *Inquiry,* however, was published in 1725, three years before *Part II.*

[29]. Mandeville served as a punching bag against which moralists charged.

Likewise, when he wrote for *the Dublin Weekly Journal,* under the pseudonym Philomeides, Hutcheson grouped pride with ambition and desire for material wealth, he equated it with luxury at several points. He says that "*Luxury, Intemperance,* and *Pride,* in their common meaning, are Vices" (2022, p. 228). In the same context he expressed disagreement with Mandeville in making a case for the desire for wealth being motivated by pride. According to Hutcheson, pride may be a motivation for consuming at a given time, but it is not the ruling principle during our lifetimes.

He underlined that pride is "taken in a bad Sense" because pride refers to a desire of honour in claiming something we do not have the right to.[30] In his letter from February 12.th, 1725 or 1726 he points out that feeling pride without justification accounts for the bad sense of this passion:

> *Pride* is having an opinion of our own Virtues, Abilities, or Perfection of any kind in comparison of others greater than what they really are, arrogating to our selves either Obedience, Service or *external Marks of Honour* to which we have no Right, and with this View desiring to equal those of Higher Stations in our whole manner of Living. (2022, p. 226, my emphasis)

Hutcheson believed that erroneous associations of ideas could lead to unjustified pride,[31] but this is not always the case since:

> Pride in the Possessor; which, as it is a general Passion, may be either good or evil, according as it is grounded, we may describe [as] the Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it. (Inquiry. p. 157)

So, Hutcheson was careful in discerning between a negative and positive under-standing of pride. In its common sense, which is the bad sense of pride and the one associated with Mandeville's self-centred vice, pride is harmful. But, Hutcheson explained that, inevitably, by nature we are subjected, in his own words, "to a grievous Sensation of Misery, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other Evil from them" (*Ibid.* p. 151) Human beings are not indifferent to other people's opinions, Hutcheson admitted this. And he made his case for an alternative meaning of pride, one that is justified, as it is the case with the pride we feel when we are honourable. This is the pleasure that we feel when pride is derived from the sense of honour.

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[30]. Or, "that to which he has no Right". Hutcheson, 2002: p. 56.

[31]. He shared this concern about mistaken associations of ideas with Descartes and Malebranche, as all three of these philosophers thought of passions as "confused perception or thought" and for this reason they deemed them dangerous. For more on this, see Barnouw, 1992.

Honour is defined by Hutcheson as the "Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys" (*Ibid.* p. 152). Honour cannot be derived from someone being acknowledged or thought of as weak, selfish, or luxurious. "It is not being universally known, no matter how". Therefore, the scope of honour, contrary to what Mandeville said, has considerable limitations.

According to Hutcheson there is no delight derived with honour unless there is a moral sense that substantiates it. In fact, honour "presupposes" a "Sense of Excellence in publick Spirit" (*Ibid.* p. 153). Although pride and ambition are said to be selfish by Mandeville, in the sense that it does not promote disinterested actions, Hutcheson makes the case for pride as love of honour. Interestingly, this *determination* to love honour presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue both in the persons who confer the honour and in him who pursues it. I have thus established that Hutcheson drew attention to counterbalancing the vicious pride with love of honour.

4.2. Hutcheson's Quest for the Honestum and Decorum

An ambition Hutcheson shared with the ancients was to offer a recipe for personal government that could limit the power of the passions while directing them to moral ends. Hutcheson offered a theory of how the passions operated and how their destructive tendencies, best articulated by Hobbes and Mandeville, might be restrained without the help of an absolute governor (as Hobbes proposed) or without self-deceit (as Mandeville proposed in his rechannelling of self-liking into shame and honour). He needed a scheme that both allowed for and limited the passions (Moore, 1979; J.D. Bishop, 1996; Harris, 2008). His disputation was with Mandeville, as Hutcheson explicitly announced. For instance in the subtitle of the first edition of his first major work, *An Inquiry Concerning our Original of Beauty and Virtue*: "In which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are Explained and Defended, against the Author of the *Fable of the Bees*: and the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil are establish'd according to the Sentiments of the Antient Moralists. With an Attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in Subjects of Morality" or in the various allusions he makes of the author of a book entitled *Private Vices, Publick Benefits*. As the subtitle to the *Inquiry* also reads, he is in tune with the sentiments of the ancient moralists, which announces sympathy with their reasonings.[32] Another important target of Hutcheson's was the Augustinian mentality that highlighted the moral as well as physical corruption of man.[33]

Hutcheson's affinity with Stoicism, and Cicero in particular, has often been discussed.[34] The identification of what is appropriate and what is honourable is also a Ciceronian sentiment Hutcheson shared with ancient doctrines. Cicero's *De Officiis* did not distinguish between *decorum* and moral goodness (1913, 1.93). Under the category of moral rectitude, Cicero enumerated temperance, complete subjection of all the passions, and moderation in all things together with decorum, which is a particular requirement of a person, rank or occasion to act in a manner that is appropriate in the circumstances that one finds oneself (translated into English from Old French *propriete*, earlier from the Latin *proprietas* as propriety).

Another important thesis Hutcheson shared with Stoicism is the belief in the naturalness of virtue. His first letter to the Dublin Weekly Journal, that formed a collection

[32]. It is noteworthy that this subtitle was dropped in later editions even in 1725. Nevertheless, Hutcheson's intentions to one the one hand, refute Mandeville, and on the other hand, appropriate the ancient's thoughts into his own system, persisted throughout his life.

[33]. See Gill, 2006.

[34]. Sher (1985) says Hutcheson is a proponent of "Christian Stoicism".

of observations on *The Fable of the Bees.* started off with a quote from Juvenal that reads: "Never does nature say one thing and wisdom another" (2022, p. 217).[35] Hutcheson wrote three letters to the *Dublin Weekly Journal* engaging with Mandeville's provocative and perplexing denial of disinterested affections. The first, dated February 4th, 1725 or 1726 reads:

> Now all men of Reflection, from the Age of Socrates to that of Addison, have sufficiently proved that the truest, most constant, and lively Pleasure, the happiest enjoyment of Life consists in kind Affections to our Fellowcreatures, Gratitude and Love to the Deity, Submission to his Will, and Trust in his Providence, and a Course of suitable Actions towards both. (2022, pp. 219-20)

Hutcheson's contributions to the *Dublin Weekly Journal* argued for the civilising effect of society "over and beyond that of the state". Where Hobbes saw the state as fundamental to the maintenance of civic order, Hutcheson perceived a capacity within society for a self-regulating civility. It is for this reason that the vehicle of the *Journal* was of such importance to Hutcheson's program. If Hobbes was as dominant in the thought of the "free wits" as Hutcheson feared, it was important that his assault was available to that audience. Moreover, Hutcheson was addressing the specific audience which, while in danger of swallowing the Hobbist understanding, was crucial to the development of a socially generated concept of civility.[36]

The *Inquiry* sought to establish that besides the principle of action from interest or self-love, there is a principle of disinterested benevolence that motivates us to act virtuously. Hutcheson explained that "these two principles may jointly excite a man to the same action: and then they are to be considered as two forces impelling the same body to motion: sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite" (*Inquiry,* p. 102).

In a footnote added to the fourth edition of the *Inquiry,* in 1738, Hutcheson reiterated the condition of the natural virtues, and its connection to the ancient doctrines:

> 'Tis thus we must understand many places of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others of the Antients, when they speak of "natural Instinct or Disposition in each Being, toward his own Preservation and highest Perfection, as the Spring of Virtue.

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35. *Numquam aliud Nature Aliud Sapientia dicit. Satires* XVI. p. 321.

36. For more on the context of the *Dublin Weekly Journal* and its editor, James Arbuckle, see Chapter 4, in Brown, 2002.

> 'Tis acknowledged by all, that we have such an Instinct, which must operate very indistinctly at first, till we come to consider our Constitution, and our several Powers. When we do so, we find, according to them, the natural Principles of Virtue, or the [natural virtues], implanted in us: They appear to us the noblest Parts of our Nature; such are our Desires of Knowledge, our Relish for Beauty, especially of the Moral Kind, our Sociable Affections. These upon Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Constitution, and we desire to bring them to Perfection from the first-mentioned general Instinct. We must not thence conclude, that all our Affections spring from Self-Love, or are ultimately pursuing private Good. Disinterested Affections are presupposed as natural Parts of our Constitution, and found in it upon Reflection, not raised by an Act of Choice for some private Good, nor ultimately pursuing it.

Hutcheson found inspiration in the Stoics Regulus, Cato, and Decius when he counterattacked Mandeville ["a late witty Author" (*Ibid.* p. 97)] on the interested nature of praise. The three were either murdered or committed suicide for actions that allegedly benefited their country. According to Hutcheson, "Regulus, or Cato, or Decius" had no Advantage by the Actions which profited their Country" since they could not admire them. There is no advantage for those who sacrifice their lives, instead "the Persons who reap'd the Advantage might praise such Actions". Therefore, Hutcheson concluded, the hero's motivation must have not been honour during their lifetimes, only after death.

In these passages on the same page, Hutcheson was also attacking Mandeville's utilitarian claim that says we encourage the most tractable and useful tempers and actions. Hutcheson asked the reader to consider a traitor, "who would sell, his own Country to us... yet we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor". In short, we disapprove of the traitor despite finding his or her action beneficial. Mandeville's explanation of the approval we derive from usefulness did not satisfy Hutcheson. Moreover, said Hutcheson, we may praise a "gallant Enemy, who is very pernicious to us". Hutcheson's admiration for Stoic philosophy was demonstrated in his translation of Marcus Aurelius's *Meditations* in 1742, together with Glasgow professor James Moor. The translation is also an appropriation of Stoic thought by Hutcheson and Moor. Through footnotes Hutcheson provided commentary on the Stoic doctrine. A comment worth noting on pride is found in relation to a passage where Marcus Aurelius speaks about making "just honour" to oneself opposed to making one's happiness dependent on the minds and opinions of others. It is implied that delegating one's happiness on other's opinions is a form of "unjust honour". In a footnote to this Hutcheson said that:

> 'Tis one of the most ancient maxims or precepts, "Reverence or stand in awe of thyself" which is the most remote from any encouraging of pride or vanity...

> [T]o be influenced by views of glory from men, is what Antoninus here reckons among the dishonours or affronts done to ourselves. (2008, p. 35 footnote)

What Hutcheson saw Antoninus as saying was that being influenced by others views of glory is shameful. Hutcheson elsewhere also remarked that the Stoics denied fame was desirable, except if fame gives opportunities of more extensive good offices. In other words, fame should be directed towards moral ends, or else it is not desirable.

In the next section I will explain the relationship of the moral sense to the sense of honour. On the one hand, Hutcheson was concerned with how popular opinions can oppose the approbations of moral sense. On the other hand, Hutcheson dismissed this problem by reconciling the moral sense with the sense of honour.

4.3 The Moral Sense and the Sense of Honour

4.3.1 Moral Sense in Opposition to Honour

In *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of our Passions and Affections* Hutcheson discerned between five senses (one external and four internal). The senses correspond to five types of pleasures. First, Hutcheson spoke about perceived bodily pleasures of the external senses (taste, sight, sound, smell, and touch). Second, Hutcheson identifies the pleasures of imagination born from the sense of beauty. Third, we may have social pleasures of the public sense, that is, of "our Determination to be pleased with the *Happiness* of others, and to be uneasy at their *Misery*" (Essay. p. 17). Fourth, Hutcheson speaks about the pleasures of the sense of honour. Last, but certainly not least, there are moral pleasures of the moral sense, "by which we perceive *Virtue* or *Vice* in our selves, or others".

The sense of honour creates a distinct pleasure. Hutcheson explained the sense of honour

> makes the *Approbation,* or *Gratitude of others*, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure; and their *Dislike, Condemnation,* or *Resentment* of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called *Shame,* even when we fear no further evil from them. (Essay. p. 18)

Obtaining external approbation for any "good Actions we have done" produces a pleasure in us we call honour and that it derived from a sense of honour. On the contrary, external dislike, and condemnation of our injuries by others, produce in us the contrary to honour, shame. Hutcheson adds that we feel shame despite being free of punishment, that is, shame occurs even if others will not act on their condemnation. This was Hutcheson's first fully fleshed out definition of the sense of honour.

Hutcheson identified the various pleasures and he is interested in classifying and ordering them according to their relevance in morals. More specifically, Hutcheson wished to understand which actions and motivations are virtuous, are felt as virtuous and create moral approval. He observed human beings are virtuous and set on a quest of exposing the various instances of virtuous actions and motivations found in human beings.

Hutcheson explained that the affections that are of most importance in morals are love and hatred and explains that the rest of the passions[37] are nothing but versions of these two original affections.

> The Affections which are of most Importance in Morals, are Love and Hatred: All the rest seem but different Modifications of these two original Affections [...] Love toward rational Agents, is subdivided into Love of Complacence or Esteem, and Love of Benevolence: And Hatred is subdivided into Hatred of Displicence or Contempt, and Hatred of Malice [...] Love of Complacence or Esteem, or Good-liking, at first view appears to be disinterested [...] real Love of Esteem no Price can purchase. (Essay. p. 102-3)

The esteem we feel towards others is disinterested. Hutcheson admitted that "we cannot avoid observing or hearing of the Sentiments of others concerning our Conduct" (*Ibid.* p. 78). In fact, we desire honour, and desire the good opinions of others, the latter necessarily gives us pleasure. But he warned the reader of the pernicious effects of excessive desire for esteem. Whoever suffers his "Desire of *Honour* or *Applause* to grow violent" and does not discern between good judges and anybody to whose judgement we may submit, will encounter great misery. Hutcheson was, in general, wary of any emotion that is felt too strongly or craved too intensely; he even states that "Men, by Passion, may become blind, even to their own Interests" (*Ibid.* p. 138).

In the *Essay* Hutcheson acknowledged that the moral sense can become perverted by popular opinion:

> It is of more consequence to compare the publick and moral Senses, in opposition to the Sense of Honour. Here there may be *direct Opposition,* since Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions of those who confer it, which may be contrary to those of the Agent, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publick Good. (*Ibid.* p. 100, my emphasis)

Hutcheson allowed for a tension between the sense of honour and the moral sense in several passages thereafter. The section in which he was concerned with the opposition of the moral sense and the sense of honour, section V, in fact, is meant to be "A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intenseness and Duration". However, what seems like a description of the various senses will soon become a prescriptive account where Hutcheson made a case for what ideas ought to underlie the senses. When one desires applause born from wealth and power one desires mere *fantastick Desires*, Hutcheson explained. Most importantly, there is nothing in our nature that leads us into

[37]. Hutcheson did make a distinction between the affections and the passions.

that type of desire, rather, these are born from "foolish *Associations* of Ideas" (Essay. p. 79) thought to contain something *honourable* and *excellent* in them. The tension, he said, can arise when ideas of honour are dictated *a posteriori* and these conventions distance themselves from the "natural" and innate moral sense. In other words, the violent pursuits of the lower kinds of pleasures are inconsistent with "*publick Affections*, the *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*" (*Ibid.* p. 81). In this context, Hutcheson linked honour born from erroneous association of ideas to lower kinds of pleasure. He even admitted that a desire for applause may pervert, by popular opinion, the moral sense:

> We may sometimes find, an high *Sense of Honour* and desire of *Applause,* where there is indeed a *moral Sense,* but a very weak one, very much perverted, so as to be influenced by *popular Opinion*, and made subservient to it. (Essay. p. 88)

This passage is describing what can be the case, but Hutcheson reassured the reader that "a high Relish for *Virtue,* or a strong *moral Sense*, with its concomitant *publick Sense and Affections*, and *a Sense of Honour*" (*Ibid.* p. 89) will never impair our senses. Whatever the effects of luxury may have been, it is not enough to "spoil a *good Palate*".

This philosopher's solution to this tension between honour and the moral sense is to abide by the mathematical norm by which we form our desire of praise in proportion to the "*Numbers* of Applauders, and their *Dignity*" (*Ibid.* p. 78). Honour cannot weaken the cause of virtue, since "Honour presupposes a *moral Sense*, both in those who desire it, and those who confer it." It is important to note that honour accompanies the moral sense for those who desire honour and those who approve. This is the idea that Hutcheson would argue for forcefully in his later published work as well.

Interestingly, Hutcheson criticises "the Vanity of some of the lower rate of Philosophers of the *Stoick Sect*" for "boasting undisturbed happiness and serenity." (*Ibid.* p. 89) This criticism is relevant to our discussion because Hutcheson does not believe a person can be completely unaffected by the external world. However, he dictated people should only be concerned with obtaining legitimate, justified honour and honour that does not clash with the moral sense. This is perfectly agreeable with Hutcheson's hierarchical scheme of the pleasures, where amidst the difficulty in comparing intenseness and duration of the pleasures, moral pleasures are more desirable than non-moral ones. Hutcheson suggested, in a footnote, the reader consults Plato's *Republic* as well as Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue*.

Following the premise put forward in his earlier treatises, that is, that the sense of honour and the moral sense should not be in tension, Hutcheson brought the sense of honour and the moral sense closer and emphasised the claim that honour must come from virtuous actions. He urged the reader to reflect on the question of "Whether we do not

sincerely love a generous kind Friend, or Patriot, whose Actions procure Honour to him only without any Advantage to our selves?" (Inquiry, p. 98) After reflecting, Hutcheson answered his own question; we find that "our moral Sense determines us to admire, without considering this Interest", and that the "*virtuous Man*... gives the preference to *moral Pleasures*." (Essay. p. 91).

4.3.2 The Marriage of the Sense of Honour and the Moral Sense

I will now explain how Hutcheson refuted Mandeville by questioning the latter's conjectural account of honour. Mandeville's genealogy of honour parted from the idea that "the most effectual Method to breed Men of Honour, is to inspire them with lofty and romantic Sentiments concerning the Excellency of their Nature" (FoB I. p. 86). Men are induced to believe that there is superlative merit in being honourable.

Mandeville said in *Part II* of *The Fable of the Bees:* "Infants are taught, in the Choice of Actions to prefer the Precepts of others, to the Dictates of their own Inclinations" (*Ibid.* p. 66). In order to reach this preference, Mandeville argues, nothing is more effective than to "artfully rouse and stir up" their shame. Although shame is a passion originally found in human nature, shame is further exploited by influencing the weak judgement of the infant. Children grow to become ashamed "of what we please" them to become ashamed, and this happens "before they can speak" or act. So, our moral feelings are, necessarily, cultivated in society.

As I mentioned before, Hutcheson added a curious extension to the outreach of the internal senses as a strategy for containing the arguments put forward by Mandeville on the artifice of pride. As I also mentioned earlier, pride was at the heart of Mandeville's system: it was problematic for it opposed virtue. However, it is also, surprisingly, the gateway to sociability. Hutcheson's strategy, on the contrary, was to argue in favour of the *naturalness* of our sense of honour in order to prove that men and women are innately sociable and suited for society without instruction of politicians or churchmen.

Hutcheson's move in the *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria,* was to elaborate upon a sense of honour and shame that "has been designed as a guardian (...) to moral virtue" (2007, p. 41).[38] With this principle of morality, the existence of a sense of honour and shame, Hutcheson argued against those who emphasised the worldly ambitions of pride and glory.[39] Previous scholarship has not paid attention to Hutcheson's expansion and development of the sense of honour in *A System* and the *Compendiaria.* This introduction of a further sense to his list of internal senses is part of his strategy to situate the genesis of honour in our own breasts, instead of in social conventions. He believed there was an internal compensation born from the approbation of one's own actions being praiseworthy; this he calls the sense of honour.

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[38]. Hereafter referred to as *Compendiaria.*

[39]. Glory as in "bona fama" is used by neo-Augustinian French moralists before Hutcheson in the sense of public recognition and a moral value in itself. See Levi's history of the passion of glory or "gloire" in Levi, 1964, particularly chapter seven entitled "The Cult of Glory".

4.3.3 Love of Honour

Hutcheson's point was that we are naturally born with a desire to be respected, but his conclusion was that we want for this respect to be founded on good moral practice. Our natural "Love of Honour" raises a desire of distinction, which has a great influence in the pleasures and pains of mankind (Essay. p. 22). The love of honour is different to mere praise or admiration, the latter may be attempted by easier circumstances than virtue. However, the love of honour Hutcheson has in mind must be satisfied by higher degrees of virtue. But Hutcheson always favoured love of honour over love of praise, as the former it is conjoined with the real love of virtue, and the bases for the sense of honour.

Hutcheson claimed that the "moral sense is naturally connected to Honour and Shame, which makes approbations, [and] the gratitude, esteem of others who approve our conduct, a matter of high pleasure" (Compendiaria. p. 41).[40] The sense of honour and shame is "immediate" and "founded upon our moral sense". This sense does more than flag the actions and motivations that are worthy of esteem, it "frequently excite[s] men to what is honourable, and restrain[s] them from every thing" vicious.

So, as explained in *A System of Moral Philosophy*, honour and shame, according to Hutcheson, appear early in life, "before any considerable reasoning can settle well the notions of morality" (1755, p. 82):

> "[B]efore we can judge for ourselves, we are wisely and benigly subjected to the direction of others, we are rewarded for our compliance, by a most grateful sensation, and by a most uneasy one, deterred from forwardness and obstinacy".

But this sensation comes from within. What is deemed good or evil is established *before* reasoning takes place, and this is an important element of Hutcheson's scheme. Hutcheson said that given "our natural capacity for moral notions" (*Ibid.* p. 85) we may be ashamed of actions without knowing the reason they are immoral. Nevertheless, Hutcheson clarified towards the end of the section, that possessing a moral sense does not entail that we have innate complex ideas of the several actions in society or innate knowledge of the effects of actions upon society (System. p. 97).

For instance, savages, as a consequence of their solitude, have not cultivated social affections or moral notions. This is due to the fact that they are not in contact with the objects that excite these affections and notions. However, said Hutcheson, were these

[40]. Note that the words "of Honour and Shame" were added in the second edition in 1745.

savages brought into society, "and had the actions and sentiments of others presented to them, their moral faculty, and their sense of honour and shame, would soon discover themselves" (*Ibid.* p. 84). Note that he said that honour and shame are uncovered and that we become aware of them, and not that they will be formed. Particularly, added Hutcheson, a "peculiar modesty" would appear.

So, there is a natural sense of honour and fame that prompts us to action: it is immediate, natural, and attune to the moral sense. This quote displays Hutcheson's strategy in full:

> There's a natural sense [of honour and [sh]ame],[41] founded indeed upon our moral sense, or presupposing it, but distinct from it and all other senses, and seems manifest from that natural [motion of the soul that is called shame or] modesty, which discovers itself by the very countenance in blushing; which nature has plainly designed as a guardian not only to moral virtue, but to all decency in our whole deportment, and a watchful check upon all the motions of the lower appetites.[42] And hence it is that this sense is of such importance in life, by frequently exciting men to what is honourable, and restraining them from every thing dishonourable, base, agituous, or injurious (Compendiaria. p. 42).

The paragraph was edited in 1745, which makes us think that Hutcheson was revisiting the importance of the sense of honour and dotes it with a motivational force; one that is attune with the perceptions of the moral sense.

Hutcheson said that it is evident that the sense of honour admits several degrees of conformity to the moral sense. The steadier the moral sense approves of a cause the more intense the sense of honour will be. First, the actions and motives we approve of by the moral sense and that provide us with a sense of honour are the notions of happiness and the means of promoting it. These notions are incentives that seek to promote the public good. Hutcheson observed that even the social practices that we at first sight might condemn because they are different to our own, are actually most times "an alledged tendency to some public good" (*Ibid.* p. 92). Second, Hutcheson acknowledged that another source we might approve of are systems that promote the good in a narrow circle. Third, Hutcheson believed that we tend to approve of opinions about what God has commanded.[43]

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[41]. Turco says this should have been translated as shame.

[42]. This phrase was added in 1745.

[43]. Recall and contrast Mandeville's observation on the pernicious consequences of honour.

So, in each and every case the sense of honour is born from following the dictations of the moral sense, which promotes the calm desire of benevolence and so, the public good. Hutcheson believed that approval from others is confirmed by the pleasure they experience by means of their own moral sense. However, Hutcheson attempted to diminish, or perhaps even eradicate the notion of an external approval being necessary. Honour means to be well regarded by others, but merely being well regarded by others, without the approval of their moral sense, is of little value. Although the sense of honour is innate, the consequences of our actions are discovered by observation and reasoning. For this reason, we often draw mistaken conclusions about the consequences of actions and practices. That is why he condemned self-approbation based on elements other than the moral sense. The sense of honour has the capacity for directing men and women to moral ends:[84]

> [S]ince the true object of praise is virtue alone; that natural strong passion for praise should excite every wise man to regulate his whole life according to the rules of virtue, and employ himself continually in some truly honourable offices (*Ibid.* p. 64).

Hutcheson did see himself as contributing to a new foundation for understand-ing human nature by observing the dispositions that lead to our moral ends. His descriptive ambitions went hand in hand with his moral and normative project. As his project unravelled and his works matured, it became more apparent that his theory of human nature obeyed his sense of higher purpose. I have tried to prove so by explaining the marriage between the sense of honour and the moral sense.

4.3.4 Moral Sense as Conscience

Leechman, a colleague of Hutcheson at Glasgow University who was responsible for writing the "Preface" to Hutcheson's posthumous *A System* (1755), attacked those who have represented Hutcheson as arguing for the personal happiness of the agent when it comes to answering the question of gratifying present desires: "Why am I to gratify this present desire? or why should I rather choose to controul it in favour of another? the answer which this order of philosophers[44] has given, is very different from that which is and must be given by Dr. Hutcheson" (1755, p. 22). Leechman believed that Hutcheson's answer did not rely on personal happiness nor would it be correct to think it should. Others have positioned him as standing side by side with Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit,* which stated the ultimate end of the agent's cool and deliberate pursuit is one's personal happiness.

"Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine is far otherways" said Leechman and goes on to giving support for Hutcheson's scheme as a harmony between the different calm determinations found in our nature. There are three calm determinations that Hutcheson conjoined. The first is the calm desire of our own happiness; the second, the calm desire of the happiness of other beings; and the third, the calm desire of moral perfection. Leechman explained "there can scarce happen any opposition" between the calm desire of the happiness of others and the calm desire of moral perfection, "but that it is quite otherwise betwixt the first and the other two". Between the calm desire of our own happiness and the calm desire of the happiness of others, there is "an apparent opposition". The role of the moral sense is to regulate this, and sacrifice one's own happiness for the happiness of the whole. The "calm regard to the greatest private interest controlls our particular selfish passions; and the heart is satisfied in its doing so". Leechman directs the reader to section 12 of Chapter IV, "Concerning the Moral Sense, or Faculty of perceiving Moral Excellence, and its Supreme Objects" in Book One to offer evidence for his interpretation of Hutcheson. This section explains that the moral sense reduces all our powers into order, since human nature is "capable of many generous affections ultimately terminating on the good of others; neither arising from any selfish view, nor terminating on private good" (System. p. 74).

> Without a distinct consideration of this moral faculty, a species endued with such a variety of senses, and of desires frequently interfering, must appear a complex confused fabrick, without any order or regular consistent design. By means of it, all is capable of harmony, and all its powers may conspire in one

[44]. Leechman does not mention names, but I suppose he is referring to Shaftesbury, Hume and Mandeville, or one of those. I thank M.A. Stewart for suggesting these names.

> direction, and be consistent with each other. 'Tis already proved that we are capable of many generous affections, ultimately terminating on the good of others, neither arising from any selfish view, nor terminating on private good.

In this short section I have explained how Leechman saw Hutcheson's moral project. I have endorsed Leechman's interpretation of Hutcheson by presenting instances in which Hutcheson recognised the supremacy of the moral sense in guiding us towards moral ends; the moral sense is a moral agent that directs the passions and affections to contribute to the happiness of societies and the universe as a whole. Hutcheson paired the moral sense with conscience: "conscience… is either this moral sense or faculty we have explained, or includes it as its most essential part" (Compendiaria. p. 116).

4.4 Conclusion

It has become clear throughout this chapter that Hutcheson's moral sense, which is the responsible sense for identifying virtuous actions and motivations and creates pleasure (approval) in witnessing them, was also responsible for dictating the actions that were to be approved by the sense of honour. The pleasure obtained by the moral sense was the same as the pleasure obtained by the sense of honour, which has led to argue that the sense of honour blends with the moral sense.

I have explained how Hutcheson's strategy was to refute Mandeville's conjectural history of morals by introducing a sense of honour that allows for well grounded pride and that goes hand in hand with virtue. This is necessary for containing Mandeville in three fronts: the first is the viciousness of pride, the second the incongruence between the moral sense and the notions of honour, and the third the artificiality of morals.

So, as Hutcheson said "the true object of praise is virtue alone" (*Ibid.* p. 64). When praise and glory are "founded upon virtue" they are to bring happiness; but without this foundation are of little consequence" (*Ibid.* p. 62) for happiness. Moreover, Hutcheson said that false glory, or "groundless honours" does not last long. Precisely influenced and excited by the "natural strong passion for praise", wise men and women should be motivated to regulate their lives according to the rules of virtue. Mandeville, on the contrary, was keen on explaining how our idea of virtue had come to be associated with honour, and he had established that the relation was artificial. This is the conclusion Hutcheson sought to remediate with his strategy.

Chapter 5: Hume on Pride, Love of Fame, and Honour

"Nothing inspires us
with more boldness
than a good opinion
of ourselves"

David Hume,
A Treatise of Human Nature.

It is well known that Hume thought that reason alone is not sufficient to motivate action, and that he spoke about reason being a slave to the passions. Hume described the need for passions in the next way:

> "Reason is, and ought only to be a slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them". (T. 415)

This leaves us with the question of which passions, in particular, prompt action more frequently and effectively. In this chapter I will argue that Hume assigned a salient role to pride; pride is seen by Hume as the passion that directs us towards moral ends. Pride is

defined by Hume as "a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession, which we enjoy". (DoP. p. 7) Hume's discussion of pride in Book II of *A Treatise of Human Nature* is best understood against the backdrop of talk about self-love amongst French moralists at the end of the seventeenth century and the discussion between Mandeville and Hutcheson on the source of morality that took place during the first decades of the eighteenth century.

While the scholarship on Hume's moral philosophy has spotted the importance of pride in his work, the discussions have not taken into account pride's transformative role in morals. Scholars have seen Hume as solely interested in speaking of properly grounded pride (proper pride or due-pride) and about the virtuousness of pride. Pride has been discussed as a virtue itself by Annette Baier (1991, p. 145; p. 147; p. 187; pp. 206-12). Jacqueline Taylor explains that Hume challenged not only theological, but also secular views on pride that regard the passion vicious (2012). I agree with Taylor in this dissertation and will expand on this point further by explaining Hume's disagreement with Hutcheson and Mandeville on pride.

Hume did state that a well grounded portion of pride is healthy and desirable, but in the *Treatise* pride is not necessarily a virtue; and in the second *Enquiry* pride is not always treated as a virtue. Hume was not concerned with accounting for" vicarious pride" either,[45] nor with looking at pride's problematic implications. Instead, Hume's work observed the influence of pride in regulating actions in the social realm. He was indeed concerned with pride's relation to virtue, but he was not interested in making a normative case for the virtuousness of pride. On the contrary, Hume was interested in observing what the relation between pride and virtue really is. The reasons behind moral worth were indeed a subject of Hume's inquiry, but he makes no assessments of whether the causes of moral worth are justified or not. For Hume, moral worth did not need to be grounded on virtue alone, nor on duty. Hume broadened the concept of virtue considerably, to include material wealth, and moral actions that do not derive from duty. Instead, virtue included traits and actions that are immediately agreeable and useful or that become useful and agreeable.

Instead, I think, Hume paid close attention to pride because it has a salient role in transforming our passions. This is interesting insofar it provides a context for understanding why pride occupied a central place in Book II of *A Treatise.* This is a necessary exercise for it can help break the curious silence on Book II of Hume's *Treatise.* In addition, *A Dissertation on the Passions* has received too little attention. Unlike Amyas Merivale (2009), who distinguished between Hume's mature and less mature account of the indirect passions, my emphasis in this chapter will be on Hume's consistency when

[45]. Unlike Martin, 2006, p. 69 says.

speaking about the indirect passions. More specifically, Hume maintained, in *A Treatise* and *A Dissertation of the Passions*, that satisfying our pride is an essential personal and social need.

It is my intention to supplement our sense of the purpose of Hume's work on the passions in general, and on pride in particular. What Hume called pride is roughly known today as self-esteem. In a nutshell: Hume said that because pride is very fragile we seek constant reinforcement to maintain it. What starts off as a quest for satiating our pride becomes adherence to ideals of honour in society. Like Mandeville, Hume recommended pride be kept hidden, otherwise, transmitted through sympathy in excess, it can shock other people's pride.

It will become clear throughout the chapter that Hume had a long-lasting interest in understanding the passion of pride and the desire of applause or reputation, and their mechanism. For Hume, pride did not entail excessive self-love and it should not be confused with vanity. Pride and humility do not prompt us to action immediately because pride and humility are "pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action." (T. 367; DoP. p. 18) Hume explained that our love of fame and the desire for honour are a motivation in political and social life. However, highlighting these passions did not exclude other inclinations found in human nature.

Hume was sceptical of the possibility of government of the passions at the individual level, that is, by reason, the will, or prudence. This suspicion led Hume to locate the government of the passions in the social sphere. Hume believed that the regulation of sentiments came from adherence to social standards. Hume's thesis was that moral excellence is more than what had hitherto been considered 'virtue'. Hume supplemented natural conscience with civil laws, custom and honour. Honour rests upon gratifying our ideas of self worth by obtaining external approval. What Hume called pride was a due recognition of one's worth.

Pride is the passion that fuels honour, and in this sense it is responsible for regulating other passions. The relation between pride and honour in Hume's corpus is bidirectional; pride is a consequence of being honoured, while being honourable, or well regarded, brings pride. He refused to condemn pride in general, and pride in houses, bodily appearance, good humour and similar traits previously not regarded as virtuous, in particular. The causes of pride are not limited to virtues derived from obeying moral duty and virtues approved of by the moral sense. Thus, he expanded the scope of objects that cause proper pride.

In this chapter I will trace Hume's interest in pride and honour throughout his work. I will argue that Hume located the passion of pride at the heart of the love of fame we all

possess, necessarily, and that the need to satiate this love of fame is transformed into moral ends. In other words, pride is transformed into other passions that fit nicely into society. Hume's conception of pride as genuine, due, proper and generous consists in pride that is well concealed and not based on our imagination solely. This chapter will begin with Hume's criticism of previous accounts of pride. Namely, I will review Hume's reaction to the conception of pride in the work of the French neo-Augustinian moralists, Mandeville, and Hutcheson. Next, I will explain that pride is an indirect passion, and what this means. Third, I will show how pride is transformed into other passions. Last, I will give a definition of due pride and compare it to the ancient conception of greatness of mind[46].

There are several stages in which Hume's ideas developed. The first stage is characterised by Hume's worry about holding high standards for obtaining pride and honour. Second, Hume moved on to unravelling the mechanism by which pride is born, a double association of ideas and impressions. Third, Hume included pride in the qualities of the mind that account for virtue.

[46]. The findings of this chapter, with a section derived from the previous chapters, will be published in an article entitled "Hume on our Great Propensity to Pride" (Barrenechea, forthcoming).

5.1 Government of the Passions

Hume's survey in Book II went as follows: On the one hand, the will can be moved by reason, but it needs the help of some passion to be triggered, and at the personal level it is often difficult to produce a change in the will since it is hard to change our passions by our own means. On the other hand, the so-called strength of mind (the prevalence of the calm passions over the violent) requires experience, since new passions are usually felt strongly. So, the belief that moral ends are obtained by regulation of sentiments from within (by reason or prudence) and without being influenced externally, seemed implausible to Hume. As he put it in his essay "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion":

> "Philosophers have endeavored to render happiness entirely independent of every thing external. That degree of perfection is impossible to be attained..." (1987, p. 5)

On top of this, Hume regarded an external imposition of duty as counterproductive if opposed to the passions:

> "The notion of duty, when opposite to the passions, is seldom able to overcome them [the passions]; and when it fails of that effect, is apt rather to encrease them, by producing an opposition in our motives and principles". (T. 421)

Therefore, Hume was sceptical of the possibility of governing our passions at the individual level (T. 414-5; T. 599). Unlike previous conceptions that believed that the passions could be restrained by reason, the will, duty, or prudence, Hume believed in transforming our passions and substituting one passion for another rather than restraining them altogether.

The government of the passions, a task that moralists have seen as belonging to the realm of morality, was delegated to the social-political realm by Hume. In his eyes, practical philosophy can not obtain its ends by listening to the voice of reason or conscience, or by imitating what is approved by the moral sense. This means that, Hume observed, instead of governing ourselves towards moral ends at a personal level, we mirror other persons' opinions and passions, and this is a means of regulating and transforming our own. While it is true that violent passions such as superstition and enthusiasm grow stronger in a zealous society, it is also the case that calm sentiments can be cultivated in civil society, by favouring standards of honour that aspire to politeness and civility and with the help of industry.

Hume spelled out the importance of ideas of honour and the passion of pride in regulating our actions, especially in accordance with the place we occupy in society, and the conventions that come with that. As established in the *Treatise:*

> 'Tis necessary, therefore, to know our rank and station in the world, whether it be fix'd by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation. *'Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly.* And shou'd it be said, that prudence may suffice to regulate our actions in this particular, without any real pride, I would observe, that here the object of prudence is to conform our actions to the general usage and custom; and that *'tis impossible those tacit airs of superiority shou'd ever have been establish'd and authoriz'd by custom, unless men were generally proud, and unless that passion were generally approv'd, when well-grounded.* (T. 599, my emphasis)

He clarified that it is not prudence that helps regulate our actions, but "real pride". Our awareness of the position we hold in society is our moral compass. We act out of honour insofar we do what is expected from us, and seek to gratify our pride. The reason prudence is not the first source of regulating actions is that honour is based on custom. What Hume means with custom is social practice that becomes embedded. Honour is developed throughout history and has different characteristics depending on custom. Custom, however, is established because we are generally proud, and seek to gratify our pride by satisfying the standards imposed externally and that others approve of. These remarks are close to what Mandeville had established in his *Origin of Honour y*ears earlier.

Smith echoed Hume when explaining the distinction of ranks as originating in ambition in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*: "to deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the greatest objects of ambition and emulation" (1978, p. 84). Smith made Hume's distinction between the two roads that may lead us to this admiration of mankind more explicit. Both paths, said Smith, equally lead to the "attainment of this so much desired object". One possibility is to obtain admiration by the study of virtue and practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness. Like Smith, Hume discerned between due and undue pride; however, unlike Smith, Hume was not concerned about the motivations behind engaging in the path to obtaining admiration. What Hume considered problematic was that pride might be a product of the fancy entirely or that pride be shown to others and hurt their pride.

Hume said that "honour, and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience" (T. 310).) Note that "conscience" was at the top of the hierarchy of Butler's

principles of human action[47]. Although Hutcheson would had agreed with Hume that "publick praise and blame increase our esteem for justice" (T. 500), Hutcheson did not allow for moral distinctions to be conditioned externally. Moreover, Hutcheson placed the source of moral distinctions in the moral sense, and therefore, within oneself. Unlike Mandeville and like Hutcheson, Hume allowed for natural virtue, that is virtue that arises immediately from observation of a quality or action that is agreeable in itself. In this sense, Hume can be seen as providing a social analysis of the Hutchesonian moral sense.

The government of the passions, that is, the task that previous, contemporaries, and later, moralists have seen as the realm of morality is delegated to the social realm by Hume. Practical philosophy does not obtain its ends by operating solely in listening to the dictates of our own breasts or what is approved by the moral sense. This means that, Hume observed, instead of governing ourselves towards moral ends at a personal level, we mirror other people's opinions and passions as a means of regulating our own. It also means that Hume located moral ends in the laws of political conventions. Artificial virtues are the means by which our passions are re-channeled. Violent passions such as superstition and enthusiasm grow stronger at the level of society, but calm sentiments can be cultivated in civil society with the help of industry.

[47]. According to Butler it belongs to conscience or reflection to preside and govern. He said “Reflection or conscience comes in, and disapproves the pursuit of them -desires- in these circumstances” (1886, p. 406).

5.2 Criticism of Mandeville, Hutcheson, and French Moralists

Hume was critical of previous systems of morality in Book II, but he is not explicit about who his criticism is directed towards. In this section I will help clarify what arguments on pride Hume disagreed with. First, Hume criticised Hutcheson's dependence of feeling pride and honour for actions and attitudes approved by the moral sense only. Second, Hume, albeit Mandevillean in important ways, disagreed with Mandeville's opinion of pride being a vice. Third, Hume accused the French neo-Augustinians of confusing pride with vanity. Hume believed it was wrong not to acknowledge virtue excites pride, because pride is considered a vice. Instead, Hume explained that pride and virtue are felt in together:

> There may, perhaps, be some, who being accustom'd to the style of the school and pulpit, and having never consider'd human nature in any other light, than that in which *they* place it, may here be surpriz'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice; and of vice as producing humility, which they have been taught to consider as a virtue. (T. 297, Hume's emphasis)

This statement speaks to the fact that the mainstream metaphysics[48] and the church considered humility a virtue and pride a vice. Hume is referring to the notion of pride as vicious or a sin cultivated by religious beliefs, both Catholic and Protestant. The Catholic literature sees humility as acceptance of our imperfect nature, and our submission to God's infinite knowledge and goodness. Protestants too take pride in a negative sense; it is a sign of the corruption of our nature after the Fall. However, Hume declared that "self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character" (T. 597). This statement shows the difference of Hume's opinions on traditional opinions of pride. In any case, it is "certain, that good-breeding and decency require that we shou'd avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show that passion" (T. 597). So, Hume was aware of the practice and need of hiding our pride in order to avoid making others uncomfortable. Even "a small bias towards modesty" is for this reason favourably regarded. Annette Baier said that pride's promotion to a virtue "is to some extent just part of Hume's Christian-baiting" (1991, p. 207). However, Hume's criticism went beyond the religious tradition, for pride's viciousness was also found among secular philosophers.

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[48]. M.A. Stewart points out that Hume's references to "school" and "schools" tend to be derogatory to traditional logic or metaphysics (2005, p. 25).

But "nothing can be more unphilosophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natural, and vice with what is unnatural... 'Tis certain, that *both vice and virtue are equally artificial, and out of nature*" (T. 475). In this passage, where Hume said that virtue and vice are not artificial or natural; Hume was rejecting Hutcheson's and the natural law theorists' parallel between what is natural and what is virtuous.

Hume has been seen by Krause (2004, p. 641) as criticising Mandeville's exaggeration of what is artificial in society, with evidence found in passages like the following: "nothing can be more evident, than that the matter has been carry'd too far by certain writers on morals, who seem to have employ'd their utmost efforts to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind" (T. 500). Hume read Mandeville as proposing a point of view that is too radical to be true. In this instance, Hume portrayed Mandeville as eliminating virtue altogether.

In his own time, many authors read Mandeville literally, and argued against him for denying virtue altogether. However, as explained in Chapter I of this dissertation, Mandeville, defined virtue as necessarily what is born from a disinterested motive. Mandeville's account recognised the influence of pride as perverse as it is self-centred, but he also acknowledged the transformative power of pride in rechannelling self-centredness into public interest. Robertson argues that Hume was suggesting an account of pride, that differed from Mandeville's all encompassing 'self-love',[49] and Tolonen argues that Hume's pride is analogous to the passion of self-liking.[50] Pride, in any case, is a passion born from satisfaction with ourselves, but this is not the same as saying it is derived from self-love. Like Mandeville, Hume discerned between self-esteem and self-love. Hume used pride in a specific sense, that is, as self-value, but not as excessive self-love. However, Hume made it clear that pride was not a desire itself, unlike the indirect passions of love and hatred. As it has been explained before, Hume said that pride is not accompanied by desire, it is a "pure emotion".

When Hume spoke about philosophers that represent all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and education, he was referring to Mandeville and Hobbes, who made "skillful politicians... restrain the turbulent passions of men" by making them operate for the public good by honour and shame. Mandeville's treatment of pride was an influence on the young Hume. The coupling of virtue with the demands of Christianity and their over-demandingness could have led the young Hume to question whether Christian virtues are human virtues.

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[49]. Robertson (2005, p. 293) is not aware of Mandeville's distinction between self-love and self-liking found in *Part II* of *the Fable* and *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour* which Tolonen has exposed.

[50]. Tolonen's thesis is that the passion Mandeville called self-love was at the heart of Hume's virtue of justice, while the passion Mandeville called self-liking was central to Hume's notion of politeness. See Tolonen, 2013, Chapter 4. "Social Theory in *A Treatise of Human Nature*".

In *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1902, p. 270) Hume rejected the so-called "monkish virtues", which not only serve no purpose, but they also have negative effects on the individual and society as a whole. Although pride is motivated by a desire to satisfy the opinion we have of ourselves, it is not a vice. I take this to be Hume's third criticism, this time towards Mandeville's theory. Although Hume was Mandevillean in many ways, he would have disagreed with Mandeville's claim that true virtue, understood as genuine altruism, was impossible. Unlike Hume, Mandeville believed there are no innate springs in our human nature that prompt us to act unselfishly.

However, Hume was interested in breaking the link between pride and vice, and humility and virtue, and in this regard he differs significantly from the early Mandeville. For Hume, that virtue excites pride should not be "detested". Hume made the reduction of the springs of human nature into solely self-love seem superficial, and moralising, but this is not a posture Hume attributes to Mandeville, rather he linked this attitude with the French neo-Augustinian moralists. Hume never spoke about pride in terms of it being a selfish passion, nor a disinterested one. He learned from Mandeville of the value of pride in mirroring others' opinions and passions, and he took this to the next level of sophistication by pointing out that mechanism by which pride operates, namely by a double relation of ideas and impressions, which is fed by opinions and impressions of others and ourselves. Unlike Mandeville, Hume unraveled the double relation of impressions and ideas, and the two moments of pleasure found in pride, without "troubling ourselves at present with that merit or blame, which may attend them" (T. 298).

Hume established that pride is not always vicious and that humility is not always virtuous either.

> The most rigid morality allows us to receive a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action; and 'tis by none esteem'd a virtue to feel any fruitless remorses upon the thoughts of past villainy and baseness. Let us, therefore, examine these impressions, consider'd in themselves; and enquire into their causes, whether plac'd on the mind or body, without troubling ourselves at present with that merit or blame, which may attend them. (T. 297-8)

Even the strictest known system of morality allows for pleasure born form reflection on certain actions. But Hume knew that the pleasures he accounted for are more than those recognised by the orthodox systems. Hume's treatment of pride, therefore, was a criticism of Hutcheson as well as Mandeville. In the face of Hutcheson's view he says that: "If nature produc'd immediately the passion of pride or humility, it wou'd be compleated in itself, and wou'd require no farther addition or encrease from any other affection" (T. 306). But this is not the case, said Hume. Pride is actually formed by a double association of ideas and

impressions: "This is not only easily conceiv'd, but I will venture to affirm 'tis the only manner, in which we can conceive this subject" (T. 307).

Hume said that the relationship between pride and virtue, and humility and vice reflects that pride is a pleasurable passion, whereas humility is not. For this reason Hume affirmed that virtue and the power of producing pride are the same type of quality:

> [T]hese two particulars are to be consider'd as equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power of producing love or pride, vice and the power of producing humility or hatred. In every case, therefore, we must judge of the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility. (T. 575)

Any quality of the mind that produces pride is virtuous, and any quality of the mind that causes hatred and humility is vicious. This is criticism of both Mandeville and Hutcheson, and their interpretations of the relationship of pride and virtue.

This is not to say that Hume did not agree with Mandeville in accepting the artifice of politicians preserving peace in society, and that this artifice has produced an esteem for justice. It would have been problematic for Hume to sympathise with Mandeville's view publicly. It is becoming clear that Hume is considering pride in a different light. Hume's view is that "The very essence of virtue... is to produce pleasure, and that of vice to give pain" (T. 296). Moreover, "virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility. What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas?" (T. 296). However, Hume was quick to clarify that his reflections on pride are not meant to be extrapolated: "the persons, who are proudest, and who in the eye of the world have most reason for their pride, are not always the happiest; nor the most humble always the most miserable, as may at first sight be imagin'd from this system" (T. 294). Since Hume was not making remarks on practical philosophy, pride is not meant to be understood as synonymous with happiness.

As I have analysed in the previous chapter, Hutcheson favoured the passions that were naturally sociable, such as different forms of benevolence; love for family, love to humanity, and love of company itself.[51] Although Hutcheson scorned the "vanity of some of the lower rate" Stoics, namely, the ascetic Stoics, who thought that happiness could be achieved without dependence of other people,[52] he also disregarded the passions that most forcefully

[51]. Also noteworthy is the fact that Hutcheson makes benevolence a sort of love, whereas Hume said that benevolence derives towards those we love.

[52]. According to Hutcheson, the Stoics' mistake is in "boasting of an undisturbed Happiness and Serenity" (Essay. p. 83). James Moore points this out to rebut David Fate Norton in the debate on how Hutcheson understood

partake in human interactions and serve as the grounds for esteem for others and self-esteem.

Hutcheson disregarded and dismissed social validation as an important part of forming pride, and as important for morals altogether. Importantly, Hutcheson made it clear that the source of virtue and therefore, the cause and reason for well grounded pride must come from approving of objects that the moral sense approves of. Hume complained about certain "unskilful naturalist[s]" for having "recourse[d] to a different quality, in order to explain every different operation". Hume insisted the human mind must not have so many distinct causes attached to pride and humility, which in turn create a "monstruous heap of principles" (T. 282). He was referring to those who postulated special senses instead of more fundamental principles for explaining the causes of pride, which alludes to Hutcheson. For Hutcheson said that: "to be proud or *ashamed*, are Words without any meaning, if we take away *a moral Sense*" (Essay. p. 100). This was Hume's criticism, that is, that pride was formed independently from a moral sense. The point here is that pride must be formed by other means instead, as I will explain later.

The Scottish philosopher said that pride is not in itself bad or good, rather, it can be taken in a bad or good sense, depending on its source and the circumstances that attend the passion. Hume said that although pride is often taken to hold negative connotations, it does not necessarily need to be so. Second, Hume pointed out that La Rochefoucauld is the head of the "French" who express pride as the term "amour-propre". He accused the French neo-Augustinians of confusing pride with vanity and self-love. He does not take pride to be "excessive self-love" in general. He was worried about pairing self-love with vanity for it brings "a great confusion". Hume said that pride is not in itself bad or good, rather, it can be taken in a bad or good sense, depending on its source and the circumstances that attend the passion. For this reason Hume had already depicted pride as follows:

> But not to dispute about words, I observe, that by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy'd with ourselves: And that by humility I mean the opposite impression. 'Tis evident the former impression is not always vicious, nor the latter virtuous. (T. 297)

Stoicism (2007, p. 140). Hutcheson was indeed a special neo-Stoic insofar he did not refuse to allow the motivational force of the passions in morals. In fact, Hutcheson appropriated Marcus Aurelio's reading to accommodate for the benevolent passions. When Marcus writes of "the peculiar structure and furniture of human nature", Hutcheson noted in his translation of the *Meditations* that "this.... is such as both recommends to us all pious veneration and submission to God, and all social affections" (2008, p. 134 footnote).

Hume pointed out that the French use self-love to connote vanity. Hume's concern with pairing self-love with vanity is clear here: it brings "a great confusion". The problem is that all passions have been reduced to self-love, and this is a simplification. But he tried to disentangle the problem by discerning two understandings of pride:

> "The term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to other circumstances which accompany it." (Enquiry. p. 314, Note [SS])

Although pride is motivated by a desire to satisfy the opinion we have of ourselves, it is not a vice. It was not his intention to evaluate whether the motivation for pride is more rooted in interested motives than in disinterested ones: he dropped this approach, and instead concentrated on the empirical analysis of pride. I believe Hume's strategy with pride, i.e. to reject that it is all vicious, is the same he followed regarding luxury. Hume, likewise, divided luxury into vicious and harmless. He aimed to correct "both extremes", that "praises vicious luxury is advantageous to society", and "blames even the most innocent luxury".[53] When Hume admits there is such a thing as harmless pride he is establishing that pride is not vice in all its forms.

[53]. In fact, Hume changed the title "Of Luxury" (1754) to "Of the Refinement in the Arts" in 1760 (1987: p. 269).

5.3 Pride's Role in Transforming the Passions

I will defend three statements in this section: First that pride is an indirect passion that operates through associations of ideas and impressions; Second, that we love "fame", and that gratifying pride motivates adherence to social standards; and last, that Hume's definition of due pride is comparable to greatness of mind.

5.3.1 The Indirect Passions

Book II, "Of the Passions", of *A Treatise on Human Nature* is largely devoted to what Hume calls the indirect passions. Pride is the passion Hume chooses as an example of the indirect passions. The underlying mechanism the indirect passions obey is a double association of impressions and ideas. Hume takes as "altogether novel and extraordinary" (T. 659)[54] the display of the association of ideas and impressions found and applied to his theory of the passions in Book II. Hume dedicates time to elucidating our love of fame,[55] the pride we take in property and riches,[56] and why we have esteem for the rich and powerful[57] in Book II. The association of ideas, or the principle that enables an easy transition from one idea to another, has "a mighty influence on every operation, both of the understanding and the passions" but it is "not commonly much insisted on by philosophers" (T. 283; DoP. p. 7). The association of impressions, that is the connection of all resembling impressions and chain they form by giving place to one another, is the other type of association Hume believes he is unique in pointing out. In fact, these two species of relations are what Hume comes to regard as the "real, efficient causes of the passion" (DoP. p. 8).

The indirect passions are born from a mechanism that necessarily relates oneself to others, to their pain and pleasure, given these feelings are echoed by sympathy. The self is the "original object" of the indirect passions; the indirect passions are necessarily redirected towards ourselves/oneself. That is, pride cannot take place without an idea of "me". The causes of the indirect passions, by contrast, are solely natural; and it is difficult to isolate an

[54]. Note this is written in the Abstract of a Book Lately Published Entitled "A Treatise of Human Nature" and not in the body of the Treatise itself. In any case, Hume is known to have written the *Abstract.*

[55]. See Book II, Part I, Section XI, "Of the Love of Fame".

[56]. See Book II, Part I, Section II, "Of pride and humility, their objects and causes".

[57]. See Book II, Part II, Section V. "Of our esteem for the rich and powerful".

inherent property in these causes that would render them capable of giving rise to one passion and no other.

The discussion on pride in Book II is roughly an exercise of unravelling the associations of ideas and impressions that form our passions. Hume is concerned with understanding how the passions are transformed and modified in relation to other passions and other people. The principle of sympathy is key in this regard. In fact, sympathy is what makes us able to control our own passions.[58] In Book III, "Of the Greatness of Mind" sympathy and comparison are explained in detail. Comparison is the other key principle in the associations of ideas and impressions that form pride and humility: "Comparison is in every case a sure method of augmenting our esteem of any thing" (T. 315-6). Naturally, said Hume, a rich person feels happier of his condition by opposing it to that of a beggar. So comparison is also necessary to understand sympathy and the ways in which we obtain pride. The principles of comparison and sympathy and their use in forming the indirect passions are what allow Hume to put forward what can be understood as a social analysis of the Hutchesonian moral sense. Thanks to the mirroring of other people's attitudes, opinions, and passions, our own passions are transformed.[59]

The terms direct and indirect passion refer to categories that consist in passions that

> "arise from a direct pursuit of good and aversion to evil [direct passions and] others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more than one view or consideration [indirect passions]" (DoP. p. 7).

The ideas of pleasure and pain are never considered simply, but always occur in the context of numerous associations. Pride and humility are based on a pleasurable or painful experience, and are still "simple and uniform impressions", but are attended by numerous circumstances:

> The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them. (T. 277)

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[58]. In fact, Harris, Hume's latest intellectual biographer argues that "a careful reading of Book Two... would bring out the ways in which the operations of sympathy allow the social system of the passions to be presented as able (more or less) to control itself" (2009, p. 146).

[59]. This approach follows James Harris' treatment of Book I and II as forming a "compleat chain of reasoning" insofar they sought to provide an answer to the question of the relation between reason and passion with what he calls sympathetic sociability.

Pride and humility, and love and hatred, the indirect passions, involve more than one opinion, and this is why they are more complex than the direct passions.

Hume reminded the reader that to understand pride and humility we are to pay attention to the circumstances that attend them, meaning that pride and humility are associated with ideas we form of ourselves and ideas that others have of us. As we have said earlier, Hume established that the object of pride and humility is the self, which proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse of the mind, and thus, is "the distinguished characteristic" (T. 280) of the passion. Whenever an object gives rise to pain or pleasure, and this is connected to us by property or close relation either pride or humility must arise (T. 310), again:

> "[A]ll agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones, humility." (T. 290)

According to Hume, the object of the passion is the idea to "which [the passions] direct their view", but this is not enough to understand all the circumstances that attend the (indirect) passion, or what "determines each of them to be what it is" (T. 280). So, Hume made a further observation about the elements that constitute pride and humility. It is here that he turned to the causes of the passions. The causes of passions are the ideas, or impressions of objects, that "excite [the passions]" (T. 278).

Curiously, Hume consistently denied that pride is a desire, that is, it does not have the same ability the direct passions do of moving the will directly. Therefore, pride is classified as an indirect passion. Still, the indirect passions are important insofar they strengthen the direct passions, which are the ones that prompt volition, in Hume's system. The mechanism is explained in this quote:

> These indirect passions... give in their turn additional force to the direct passions, and encrease our desire and aversion to the object. Thus a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition and desire. Again, when these cloaths are consider'd as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure, which attends that passion, returns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope. (T. 439)

So once he established the means by which the most complex impressions are born, Hume took his project of erecting a science of human nature to the next level and added love of fame to his list of moral principles.

5.3.2 The Love of Fame

In 1770, when editing his lifetime work *Essays and Treatises in Several Subjects*, Hume changed the name of the essay "Of the Dignity of Human Nature" into "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature". This small change in the title is an acknowledgment of the fact that Hume speaks of both the dignity and the meanness of human nature, which reflects Hume's effort to provide a balanced account of human nature. On top of this, in 1748 Hume eliminated a paragraph from the original text of the same essay. Interestingly, the paragraph Hume erased said that it "had been prov'd beyond Question by several great Moralists of the present Age [Shaftesbury], that the social Passions are by far the most powerful of any, and that even all the other Passions receive from them their chief Force and Influence" (1987, p. 620). The paragraph written by Hume to substitute the earlier draft argued that even a certain "species of self-love" can have a great influence over human actions "and even greater, on many occasions, than that which remains in its original shape and form" (1987, p. 85). That is, Hume believed that human nature is worthy of honour and respect and wanting or lacking dignity, base, and ungenerous.[60]

Hume sought to offer a balanced view on the traits of human nature. He was not afraid to expose the "hideous"[61] parts of our anatomy in morals, nor did he downplay the benevolent nature and natural virtues found in human nature. Hume offered a range of passions that depicted our inclinations. Amongst these passions was pride. In the introduction of this dissertation I have spoken about pride as "desire for esteem", and "excessive self-love". As mentioned earlier, Book II of *A Treatise* denies that pride is a desire. Rather, pride is classified as indirect passion. On top of this, in the second *Enquiry,* Hume criticises those who confuse pride with self-love.

Pride was important for Hume insofar it serves to confirm our worth -let it be moral or not. Our love of fame is further proof that the opinions of others are essential because they confirm the positive ideas we form of ourselves. In fact, "[m]en always consider the sentiments of others in their judgement of themselves" (T. 303), said Hume. Our love of fame is a desire for reputation (as the origin of the word *fama*, in Latin, suggests, "what is

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[60]. Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary* contains two roots for "mean". On the one hand, mean can derive from *moene*, Saxon, and signify 1. "of low rank"; 2. "low-minded, base". On the other hand, it may come from the French *moyen* and mean "mediocrity". Johnson, 1979: 16F.

[61]. Hume's Letter to Hutcheson from the 17.th of September, 1739, NLS MS. 23151 f. 55. Hume originally wrote: 'Where you pull of the Skin, & display all the minute Parts, there appears something trivial if not hideous, even in the noblest Attitudes'. He deleted the words 'if not hideous' (but did not make them illegible). This remark was pointed out by Tolonen, 2008: p. 32.

said") and recognition of our qualities. Love of fame is the moral principle which moves us towards satiating our pride.

According to other accounts, said Hume, pride simply "must be vicious" be-cause "it causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison" (T. 596). However, Hume acknowledges that "self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character" (T. 597). In any case, "good-breeding and decency" require that we avoid showing signs of pride to others, because it produces uneasiness. Hume learned from Mandeville that pride and humility have a salient role in regulating our social conduct. For Mandeville, satiating our self-liking, which is hidden pride, is what makes us behave properly in society. Mandeville's insistence on the role of pride in our social interactions is at the heart of Book II and Book III of Hume's *A Treatise*.

He explained that the desire for approval is necessary, universal, and it brings us to question our own conduct in life. There are some key quotes that will help us understand Hume's posture. The "Conclusion" of his *Enquiry* explained the importance of self-esteem and the love of fame. The self-regarding nature of pride is fundamental. It is noteworthy to remark Hume's point was that every peculiarity we find in our character or belongings, we take to be a trait worth having. He explained that the desire of approval is necessary, and it brings us to question our own conduct in life:

> Another spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of force to moral sentiment, is, the love of fame; which rules, with such uncontrolled authority, in all generous minds, and it often the grand object of all their designs and undertakings. By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes of those, who approach and regard us. (Enquiry. p. 267)

This is proof that our sentiments are regulated by mirroring other people and their attitude. Furthermore, the notions of right and wrong are made sense of by surveying in the face of other's opinions:

> "This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others; which is the surest guardian of every virtue..." (*Ibid.*)

Hume said that the system of morals we are best familiar with is the one that seeks the support of our insecure judgement on the correspondent approbation of mankind. On the same page, he goes on to say that our interest with good reputation is founded on the importance of maintaining a good opinion of ourselves, namely keeping our pride:

> "Here is the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted: here is displayed the force of many sympathies. Our moral sentiment is itself a feeling chiefly of that nature...".

This is further proof that our sentiments are regulated adhering to the standards of honour, and by mirroring other people and their attitudes. In addition, the notions of right and wrong are made sense of by surveying in the face of others' opinions: Our interest with good reputation is founded on the importance of maintaining a good opinion of ourselves, namely keeping our pride:

> [O]ur regard to a character with others seems to arise only for a care of preserving a character with ourselves; and in order to attain this end, we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgement on the correspondent approbation of mankind.

These quotes illustrate that the love of fame is a ruling principle in morality and because our pride is fragile, it needs to be strengthened by others. The absence of self-value or "generous pride" means we are missing an essential part of our make-up. Hume compared the fundamental need of self-value to the need of having a nose or eyes. An original propensity to love oneself, or have self-esteem, "genuine and hearty pride", "if well conceal'd and well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour", and as he reiterated, having pride is quite necessary. In a footnote, he emphasised his point by adding that "Where a man has no sense of value in himself, we are not likely to have any higher esteem of him". So, a sense of value in oneself affects other people's projection of one's value too, and *vice versa*.

The passions of vanity, ambition and desire of enjoyment are always directed towards the self, and that a need to gratify the good opinion one has of oneself is just a matter of fact. Hume said the following:

> If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praise: If I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: If I be not angry, the punishment of an adversary is totally indifferent to me. In all these cases, there is a passion, which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our good or happiness. (*Ibid.* p. 301)

We are anxious about opinions that go against our favour. We worry very much about what others think of us, and this is indeed a motivation for governing ourselves towards what is worth approval in the eyes of others. The love of fame is crucial to understanding human nature. We are afflicted by the difficulty to be partial towards ourselves. Thus, it is important to compare our opinions of ourselves with the opinions others hold of ourselves. Because we love fame, we are highly dependent upon the opinions of others. It is only others who are in a prudent distance, and therefore, in an appropriate position to judge us:

> Our consciousness of partiality still makes us dread a mistake: And the very difficulty of judging concerning an object, which is never set at a due distance from us, nor is seen in a proper point of view, makes us hearken anxiously to the opinions of others, who are better qualified to form just opinions concerning us. Hence that strong love of fame, with which all of mankind are possessed. (DoP. p. 14).

Hume re-wrote parts of Book II the *Treatise* into a text he named *Dissertation on the Passions*, two decades after the original text. In fresh sections Hume emphasises the need for others' opinions in forming opinions of oneself further. Here, Hume pointed out that there is "a secondary cause" or reinforcement of pride "in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections" (T. 316), in fact, confirmation of our reasons to feel pride enhances pride. Hume added the whole paragraph that reads like this:

> Our opinions of all kinds are strongly affected by society and sympathy, and it is almost impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment, against the universal consent of every one, with whom we have any friendship or correspondence. But of all our opinions, those, which we form in our own favour; however lofty or presuming; are, at the bottom the frailest, and the most easily shaken by the contradiction and opposition of others. Our greatest concern, in this case, makes us soon alarmed, and keeps our passions upon the watch.

To sum up, the relation between pride and honour in Hume's corpus is bidirectional; pride is a consequence of being honoured, while being honourable, or well regarded, brings pride. Hume spelled out the importance of ideas of honour and the passion of pride in regulating our actions, especially in accordance with the place we occupy in society, and the conventions that come with that.

5.3.3 The Causes of Pride

Hume's contribution to understanding pride is that this passion is rooted in property and riches, instead of in the pursuit of what was considered by many as virtue. This expanded the scope of virtue significantly. Hume's thesis was that pride and humility arise not from these qualities alone of the mind, which, "according to the vulgar systems of ethicks, have been comprehended as parts of moral duty, but from any other that has a connexion with pleasure and uneasiness" (T. 297). This is precisely what we should take as Hume's subversion to the previous systems of philosophy. Hume's subversive understanding of pride consists in his belief that virtue is more than moral excellence. Consequently, the motives for due pride are more than his contemporaries were willing to accept. In this section I will explain three views on pride Hume was in disagreement with.

Mandeville explained that it is often difficult to discover the true colours of the passions, since they are mixed and their proportions vary. Mandeville was interested in tracing the motives that result from the mixtures and different proportions of various passions. This quote illustrates Mandeville's quest:

> It is with the Passions in Men as it is with Colours in Cloth: It is easy to know a Red, a Green, a Blue, a Yellow, a Black, etc. in as many different places; but it must be an Artist that can unravel all the various Colours and their Proportions, that make up the Compound of a well-mix'd Cloth. In the same manner may the Passions be discover'd by every Body whilst they are distinct, and a single one employs the whole Man; but it is very difficult to trace every Motive of those Actions that are the Result of a mixture of Passions. (FoB. p. 84)

In the same vein, Hume defended that the impressions, contrary to ideas, which "are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture" (T. 366), never unite completely. Impressions occur at the same point in time and space, they are not combinations of different elements. Like Mandeville, Hume aspires to discerning the perfect, and often indistinguishable, blend of passions:

> "[I]mpressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole". (T. 366)

Hume wanted to unravel the causes of the passions in order to discern one passion from another. Hume established two premises concerning the causes of pride and humility. The first is that "'tis from natural principles this variety of causes excites pride and humility", and "that 'tis not by a different principle each different cause is adapted to its passion" (T. 282).

The second premise is that the causes of the passions are natural (but not original); in surveying them we observe that the similar causes give rise to pride and humility in all ages and nations. However, the causes of the pride and humility are not adapted to these passions by a "particular provision, and primary constitution of men" (T. 281), so the causes of the passions vary. Nevertheless, it was Hume's project to make the causes of pride and humility, which are few and simple, evident. Hume proceeds to enumerate the main causes of pride and humility.

> Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confin'd to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise. A man may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture. *But this is not all.* The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility. (T. 279, my emphasis)

Riches and power render a person "considerable and important in the world" (T. 616). The rich and powerful are esteemed, although the esteem that they give place to is different to that produced by a virtuous character. Hume does not explain why this is the case, it is in his words "inexplicable", and simply observes that experience informs us of this "variation of feelings" (T. 617).

Pride and humility are never fully satiated; they are capable of being excited by whatever has the slightest relation to ourselves. This picture of the causes of pride is quite different to any normative claim on pride known to any Churchman in the eighteenth century. Hume's science of human nature is here fully displayed. Beside the enumerated causes of pride and humility, Hume points out that there is "a secondary cause" or reinforcement of pride "in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections" (T. 316). As I have mentioned earlier, confirmation of our reasons to feel pride enhances pride.

The indirect passions are based on ideas, such as possession (comparison of what one has with what others' have or do not have), that enforce the direct passions. Hume believed

that moral philosophers had a hard time understanding the causes of pride before his own account of the double association of ideas and impressions:

> "Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus". (T. 282)

Hume regarded the advancement of natural science as having simplified and naturalised the "overload of hypothesis" that natural philosophy suffered before Hume's time; Hume's project is the same for moral philosophy as Copernicus's and Newton's project for the natural sciences. I believe that this outlined project concurs with the task set out by Mandeville's skilful artist. Moral philosophy, it is worth noting, counts for all aspects concerning human nature in this view, embracing history, literature and philosophy. Hume's morality expands from the realm of ethics (inquiry about the individual's government, or description of their human nature) to the political arena. This is, once again, what Hume envisions himself as doing: setting the science of human nature in a better condition than the one he has inherited. This remark echoes Hume's observation in "Letter to a Physician", where he says that after reading many books on morality during the late 1720s, and "being smit with their representations of beauty and virtue",[62] he began to think about how to proceed with his own philosophical inquiries:

> I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity laboured under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending more upon invention than experience: every one consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend.

Hume was showing his concern with an account of human nature that is based on the true colours of men and women. The previous schemes of virtue and happiness do not seem to satisfy Hume's ambitions. He was arguing that the causes of pride and humility are misunderstood in previous accounts, and we observe that Hume attempts to correct this. For this reason, Hume argues for vice and virtue as the causes of pride and humility: virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility (T. 296). Hume summarised the controversy on moral distinctions and appears to avoid entering it:

> To begin with vice and virtue, which are the most obvious causes of these passions [pride and humility]; 'twou'd be entirely foreign to my present purpose to enter upon the controversy, which of late years has so much excited the curiosity of the publick, whether these moral distinctions be founded on

[62]. David Hume, Letter to a Physician [most likely George Cheyne], March or April 1734 in Hume, *2011,* Vol. 1: p. 16.

> natural and original principles, or arise from interest and education. The examination of this I reserve for the following book;[63] and in the mean time shall endeavour to show, that my system maintains its ground upon either of these hypotheses; which will be a strong proof of its solidity. (T. 295)

The type of moral distinction that pride and humility entail, that is, evaluations of one's worth, and the worth that others attribute to us, have been discussed in terms of natural and original principles or interest and education. The dichotomy that divides opinions is exposed.

Virtue and vice, to the extent that they are the causes of pride and humility, are neither distinctions found within us originally (from the beginning of our existence), nor do they appear as a result of "interest and education" (that is later in our lives). Hume was pointing to a middle way between classifying virtue and vices as exclusively natural or exclusively artificial, and breaking the dichotomy altogether. In fact, both natural and artificial virtues are causes of pride and humility. Hume also pays attention to the causes that excite love and hatred, and make us regard others as virtuous:

> [W]hen we enumerate the good qualities of any person, we always mention those parts of his character, which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father. We consider him with all his relations in society; and love or hate him, according as he affects those, who have any immediate intercourse with him. And 'tis a most certain rule, that if there be no relation of life, in which I cou'd not wish to stand to a particular per-son, his character must so far be allow'd to be perfect. If he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue. (T. 606, my emphasis)

It is established by observation that what makes for the approval of our characters and that of others, are the qualities that fit into society the nicest. The highest level of excellence that may be found in the characters of others, that is the reasons we love or hate, admire or despise other people, according to Hume, are their quality of being suitable for society and human interactions. Love and esteem are "produc'd by the same qualities as pride" (T. 331). The indirect passions show that we can "expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those themselves have entertain'd" (T. 331-2).

[63]. It is for this that he speaks about natural and artificial virtues in Book Three.

5.4 Greatness of Mind and Due Pride

In the section entitled "Greatness of Mind" of Book II of A Treatise, Hume explained that men have a "universal propensity" to over-value themselves, and that there is a "*prejudice* against self-applause" (T. 598). Because of the natural aversion we feel towards displays of pride, he recommended "some disguise in this particular is absolutely requisite"(T. 598). But, in reality, said Hume, whoever is acquainted with practice in the world, would admit that humility is only required externally. In fact, no one seriously believes that humility goes beyond the outside, or that "thorough sincerity in this particular is esteem'd a real part of duty" (T.598).

It has been pointed out (Taylor, 1985) that it is curious Hume used humility as the antagonist of pride, instead of speaking about shame. This is because Hume reserved shame to oppose honour.

Hume included modesty in his list of virtues. As pride is a due sense of our own force, modesty is "a just sense of our weakness" (T. 592), or lack of value. Observing modesty in others is welcome, but feeling modesty in oneself it "produces often uneasiness" (T. 597). But modesty is recognition of the limits of one's grounds for pride. Hume spoke about modesty as a "quality immediately agreeable to others". Modesty is agreeable insofar it does not hurt our pride. Modesty is not humility, that disagreeable, debilitating passion. Humility is painful dwelling on undesirable features of oneself, features one would prefer to hide, and is seen by Hume in a negative light, far from the facilitator of knowledge Augustine of Hippo, and his example, proposed. Naturally, the opposite of humility, pride, was not seen as guilt or sin by Hume.

On the contrary, Hume observed, "a genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well conceal'd and well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour" (T. 599). The requisites for pride to be good are first, that it is well hidden; and second, that it is based on reasons and not on chimaeras. It is necessary to feel the "passion of pride" in conformity to our social status, and "regulate our actions accordingly" (T. 599).

What has been called "*heroic virtue*", said Hume, is nothing but a "steady and well-establish'd pride and self-esteem" (*Ibid.* his emphasis), or partakes of that passion. Hume made a distinction between the degrees and circumstances of pride early in his intellectual development, a distinction that he expanded upon in later works. When pride is within just bounds it gives us an immediate satisfaction and capacitates us for business. This is a desirable trait in Hume's eyes: it is greatness of mind. However, when pride is beyond its just bounds it is no longer useful to oneself and can be dangerous, life-threatening. The

latter sort of pride elevates our spirits and gives us a sublime sensation actuated by it. Hume's sense of pride as greatness of mind evoked Aristotle's notion of magnanimity and shunned conceptions of pride that are excessive and blinding, such as an heroic character's pride.

Therefore, the merit of pride depends on two criteria: first, on whether pride is based on a real object or a fantastic one; second, on the degree in which this pride is shown to the world. The more manifest pride is to the eyes of others, the less agreeable it is to others. Its utility, too, is greater when it is hidden. When pride is founded upon the fancy is not agreeable to others either, nor is it useful.

That a certain degree of "generous pride or self-value" (Enquiry. p. 253) is a requisite for a healthy evaluation of oneself is also found in Section VII of the *Enquiry:* "Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves". These qualities are valued for their immediate pleasure, which they bring to the person who possesses them. They are not connected to views of utility or of beneficial consequences; but, Hume stated, this sentiment of approbation arises from views of a public or private utility.

Hume explained that attitudes that express humility, that is, seeing others being humble, creates sympathy readily. However, expressions of pride and haughtiness are displeasing, "merely because [they] shock our own pride". Moreover, the appeal to our pride, activates sympathy and makes us compare ourselves with the pride holder, causing us to feel humility. While the observation of humility in others is pleasing, feeling humility ourselves is painful.

Hume revisited the theme in an essay entitled "Of Impudence and Modesty" in the 1740's. In this essay he explained that there are exceptions to the rules regarding the approval of moral qualities, the case of modesty and impudence are instances of such exceptions. The general rule, which impudence and modesty are exceptions to, is as follows:

> "to be endowed with a benevolent disposition, and to love others, will almost infallibly procure love and esteem; which is the chief circumstance in life, and facilitates every enterprize and undertaking: besides the satisfaction, which immediately results from it". (1987, p. 553)

So, Hume pointed out that benign ability is welcome by others and that attitudes of similar nature ensure the esteem of those who encounter them. The case of impudence (the quality of being not "prudent", ashamed, modest), however, is an exception to Hume's general rule. Impudence boasts one's worth, and it can potentially be disturbing in the eyes of others. But somehow the reaction this passion provokes in others, although it is a "vice", is positive: "Nothing carries a man through the world like a true genuine natural impudence". On the

other hand, diffidence (modesty, shyness resulting from lack of confidence) is prejudicial. Diffidence makes modesty, which resembles it in its outward manifestation, seem disgraceful.

Hume abandoned his Addisonian style of moral essay writing in the 1760s (Box, 1990), and thus, he withdrew "Of Impudence and Modesty" and other essays from his collection of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects.* The phenomena he describes here is, nevertheless, relevant to understanding the attitude he held towards pride and honour.

Hume further explained his standpoint on pride in a new text. I will concentrate on the passages added to the *Dissertation* here in order to make Hume's point clearer. Hume re-wrote the part of the *Treatise* named "Of the love of fame" in the *Dissertation.* In this fresh section Hume develops the need for other's opinions in forming opinions of oneself further:

> "[W]hen a man desires to be praised, it is for the same reason, that a beauty is pleased with surveying herself in a favourable looking-glass, and seeing the reflection of her own charms". (DoP. p. 14)

An interesting difference between Book II and *A Dissertation* is found in Hume's distinction of the pleasures produced by virtue and the pleasures of pride or self-satisfaction. Both virtue and pride produce pleasure, but those pleasures are "distinct" from each other, said Hume. Vice produces an uneasiness "separate" from humility or remorse. This paragraph was newly added:

> "Virtue, therefore, produces always a pleasure distinct from the pride or self-satisfaction, which attends it: Vice, an uneasiness separate from the humility or remorse". (*Ibid*. p. 9-10)

This is important insofar as it speaks to Hutcheson's uniformity of the pleasures of the moral sense and the sense of honour.

Hume located the origin of "vulgar lying" in vanity; men and women "heap up a number of extraordinary events, which are either the fictions of their brain; or, if true, have no connection with themselves" (DoP. p. 10-1). The foundation of vanity is not limited to qualities of the mind solely: houses, gardens, equipment, and other external objects are all reasons for pride. It is sufficient that these objects hold a close relation to ourselves: "It must be someway associated with us, in order to touch our pride".

The intensity or weakness or the passion is related to the connection the pleasure has with ourselves. Whatever strengthens the connection must also increase the passion. The relations of blood that bring pleasure are likely to cause pride, and the relations to family

that create uneasiness will bring humility. Of all the relations one may have with the objects of pleasures, that of property gives us "the fullest power and authority over any object". Hume said all and any object in the world that is considered beautiful, useful, or surprising, belonged to a famous artist, a prince, or a great man.

In fact, Hume spoke about "noble pride", and related it to dignity of character and greatness of mind. It is well regarded to display noble pride in its full extent, in special circumstances, such as oppression. Hume's view on "noble pride" echoes the ancient philosopher's treatment of pride as greatness of mind or magnanimity. According to the ancients, a man of honour would display pride or love for his life, family, and country in adverse circumstances. The difference, however, is that magnanimity, such as Aristotle understood it, that is, as one's capacity for accurate self-assessment of one's greatness, would not had allowed "greatness" in such a broad spectrum as Hume allowed for.

5.4.1 Acquired Virtues

Hume's thoughts on honour and its place in society began early in his life. He produced an essay entitled "An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour" around 1734.[64] Unfortunately, the final pages or passages are missing from the manuscript. Hume does not say much about modern honour in the pages known to us nowadays; however, the title of the essay suggests modern honour is, together with chivalry, a central theme of the piece. It is likely that we are missing the pages that broach the subject. Written before the Treatise, "An Essay" demonstrates Hume's early interest in conjectural history and the genealogy of moral virtues. He coupled chivalry with modern honour and explains that they differ from the genuine virtue of courage as represented by the ancients. The moderns, on the contrary, were characterised by Hume for their civility, which is a mixture of love with courage.

John P. Wright's article (2012) on Hume's early work on the origin of modern honour is exemplary in his treatment of a balanced account of Hume's early indebtedness to the philosophers of his time. Until the age of 20 Hume's moral philosophy had probably been largely influenced by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and their views on virtue are in the background of the essay. At the same time, there is evidence in Hume's essay that suggests Hume entertained sceptical ideas of Mandeville and Bayle. Specifically, it is noteworthy to point out that Mandeville's text from 1732, *Origin of Honour,* uses the term "modern honour" twice. Both Hume and Mandeville treat modern honour as chivalry.

Unfortunately, the last passages of Hume's ''Essay" are missing from the original manuscript, which means we do not know how Hume sought to resolve the issue of modern honour anticipated in the title of the essay. Wright says that Hume did not "simply take over Mandeville's thesis in the *Origin of Honour* that modern honour was adopted by the founders of Christianity as a method of social control" (2012, p. 188). But it is not possible to verify that Hume had not drawn such a conclusion because of lack of textual proof. There is no conclusive judgement on modern honour in Hume's *Essay.*

Let us go back to the surviving text, and consider what we can confidently conclude from the manuscript. Hume started his essay by drawing a contrast between modern honour and virtue among the ancients. He recalls the defeat of the Roman Empire by hands of the "Barbarians", and says that the latter's imitation of the Romans "was carried to... length" (2012, p. 204, paragraph 1). The Barbarians did not limit themselves to imitating the ancient manners; "but would naturally invent at first any other, which was

[64]. M.A. Stewart has shown the likelihood that it was written between 1731 and 1743. The essay was not published during Hume's lifetime. It is preserved (except for its final pages) among the Hume manuscripts now at the National Library of Scotland. See Stewart, 2000: pp. 117-127, esp. 122-123 for more.

suitable to that Twilight of Reason, by which their Minds were bewilder'd". The Barbarians, therefore, went astray by studying "Excellencys and Beautys *beyond* the Original [Grecian Philosophy]", they embraced Christian Religion. The associations of ideas and impressions put forward by Christianity had a profound influence on the mind. Hume explained the epistemological phenomenon that occurs in the human mind when it is tricked into believing in a power that is superior to what it actually possesses:

> "[T]he Humane Mind when it is smit with any Idea of Merit or Perfection, beyond what its Faculties can attain, & in the pursuit of which, it uses not Reason & Experience for its Guide, it knows no Mean, but as it gives the Rein & even adds the Spur to every florid Conceit or Fancy, runs in a moment quite wide of Nature" (2012, paragraph 2).

If the mind falls into such a defeat of the idea of perfection, it works on a "fairy-ground", and completely covers itself in its "own Whimsies & Chimera's" (2012, paragraph 3). The mind invents a new world in which the laws and beings that inhabit it are not the same as ours. Both religion and a certain kind of philosophy, although not really capable of producing the new reality materially, do trick us into making us "act in this as if we were different Beings from the rest of Mankind", even though we are not capable of executing "Rules of Conduct different from these which are set to us by Nature". Hume's concern with dangerous associations of ideas suggests indirect indebtedness to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.

However, Hume continued by criticising a view that advocated a human nature superior to the one we possess:

> An imagin'd Merit, the farther over Chimera's hurry us from Nature, & the Practice of the World, the better pleas'd we are, as valuing ourselves upon the Singularity of our Notions, & thinking we depart from the rest of mankind only by flying above them: Where there is none we are apt to think we have no excellency, & self-conceit makes us take every Singularity for an Excellency.

We set ourselves apart from others in terms of singularity. Hume was arguing against those who aspire to self-perfection for the sake of self-conscious superiority. This is the germ of Hume's later distinctions of true philosophy versus false and hubristic philosophy. His view on the power and consequence of the association of ideas leaned towards highlighting the dangers of erroneous associations; this is Hutcheson's view too. Hume's understanding of the positive interaction between the imagination and the passions, however, was to be found years later in *A Treatise*.

The other theme of this essay is the difference between the passion of natural courage, and the artifice of brave chivalry. Hume pointed out that the warlike bravery is an admired virtue "in all rude Ages, & in the Infancy of every State". In fact, it is the most admired virtue, said Hume. Courage will enjoy the approbation of "all Politicians they being persons, who principally reap Advantage of it" (2012, paragraph 7). On the other hand, the "Monster of Romantick Chivalry or Knight-Errantry... was brought into the World" (2012, paragraph 5) by an "extravagant mishapen Conceit of the Conquerors". Courage was the chief virtue of the "cavaliers or Roman-tic Heroes" . Ancient and moderns both valued themselves upon their bravery; however, a "knight-errant" fights with civility instead of passion: "He salutes you before he cuts your Throat" (2012, paragraph 16). Hume observed that, to an extent, the source of modern values was chivalry, and he also said that chivalry was a corruption of modern values.

In *A Treatise* Hume enumerated a number of ancient virtues that lie in self-esteem:

> "Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin". (T. 599-600)

Hume recalled the virtues found in the "Historical Essay" in order to link them with his more sketched out analysis of pride and self-esteem. Whereas the essay sought to mark a difference between natural and artificial courage, and ancient and modern virtues, the treatise underlined the similarity of them all. The virtues, ancient and modern, have developed from what is originally self-esteem.

Shortly after the publication of *A Treatise,* in the essay entitled "Rise and Progress of the arts and sciences" (1742) Hume included a note on the "point of honour" or duelling, which he withdrew in 1768. As "a modern invention" duelling is "by some esteemed equally useful for the refining of manners". However, Hume did not know how honour came to refine manners. In fact, Hume says in his essay "Rise and Progress of the arts and sciences" (1987, p. 626) that the point of honour is *useless and pernicious*. Hume points out the paradox of making a distinction between a man of honour and a man of virtue:

> By separating the man of honour from the man of virtue, the greatest profiigates have got something to value themselves upon, and have been able to keep themselves upon, and have been able to keep themselves in countenance, tho' guilty of the most shameful and most dangerous vices. They are debauchees, spendthrifts, and never pay a farthing they owe: But they are men of honour; and therefore are to be received as gentleman in all companies.

Hume was critical of the hypocrisy of duelling[65], nevertheless, he did not condemn honour. On the contrary, his discussion on modern honour intended to show the evolution of the standards by which social norms are erected.

What did Hume make of the effects of pride in our moral and political actions? It is necessary to remind the reader that Hume's project was descriptive, and so, when Hume spoke about virtues it is not with a moralising tone. Hume was interested from a very young age in understanding the practical consequences of association of ideas and impressions. In the "Historical Essay" he was presenting the virtues promoted by the ancients, barbarians and moderns. In these three moments the relationship between courage and virtue varies. For the ancients courage is the predominant excellence; it was the most celebrated by poets, and recommended by instructors. Courage was not masked. For the Romans, who followed the ancients, "the esteem of courage" was "so high" that it was distinct from all other moral qualities" (Enquiry. p. 13). This theme was developed further in *A Treatise* and the later work on morals. Hume spotted that the development of virtue for the moderns changed substantially, and it paradoxically made it compatible with vice understood in the ancient way.

[65]. See Tolonen who says that the "utterly negative approach to modern honour" Hume sent out in his later work was contrary to his original intention (2014, p. 61).

5.5 Hume's synthesis

The Hume reader cannot help but ask why pride is given such attention in his first major writing, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Not only is pride right at the heart of the *Treatise*, but it is the single passion most written about in his oeuvre. Hume's lasting concern with pride remained intact throughout his life, continuing to edit his *Dissertation on the Passions* just a year before his death.

Scholarship on Hume's moral philosophy has indeed spotted the importance of pride in his work. On occasions, scholars have seen Hume as specially interested in speaking of properly grounded pride (proper pride or the dignity of pride) and about the virtuousness of pride. This is not the case because Hume spoke about the problematic as well as positive aspects of pride. Failing to acknowledge both aspects of the passion clouds Hume's more systematic ambition to offer richer views on human nature than those he had read about. Moreover, pride is not a tool in Hume's effort to do normative philosophy, namely to offer a recipe for happiness, he had no such agenda.

Contrary to prescriptive readings of (due) pride as a "master passion"[66] focused on reflexivity to rebuild the destroyed self in Book I, the enigma of Hume's interest in pride must be answered by bringing both Mandeville and Hutcheson into the picture. They are, according to Hume, among the six philosophers beginning to put the science of man on "a new footing" (T. xvi), a task Hume himself sought to culminate. When the historical dimension of Hume's work is analysed we find the questions he sought to answer were geared towards solving the selfish hypothesis at the social level instead of the individual.

In its *Abstract* Hume proclaimed that the *Treatise*'s opinion on the passions was "new and extraordinary" (T. 659). The indirect passions are Hume's concern for the larger part of Book II because they were Hume's own innovation; a new classification of the passions. McIntryre (2006) already nicely argued Hume is engaging with the treatment of the passions given by his contemporaries, but neither Mandeville nor Hutcheson were mentioned in her survey. So, Hume's general criticism is that the workings of the passions have not been fully exposed yet. His characterisation when saying "None of the direct affections seem to merit our particular attention" (T. 439), leads us to think that the mechanism underlying the direct passions is not unknown or unfamiliar to his contemporaries and is simple enough. Yet the indirect passions require a social component that had not yet been studied. Pride is the indirect passion Hume uses as exemplary.

[66] See Baier (1980) for the wrong reasons Hume gave pride 'philosophical priority': "The place given to pride is not so much a case of egotism as it is of preoccupation with reflection and reflexivity": p. 133.

Exemplary insofar pride aimed to show the workings of the indirect passions as well as being a propensity of our human nature.

Hume read Hutcheson and Mandeville around the same time, before writing the *Treatise*, in the early 1730s. Likewise, Hutcheson read Hume's *Treatise* and Hume edited it bearing in mind Hutcheson's remarks[67]. On the other hand, Mandeville did not live to read the *Treatise*. However, Mandeville's insistence on pride underlying our social interactions inspired Hume's first known essay, on modern honour. Specifically, Hume owes his adherence to Mandeville to the fact that he makes pride derive from society's conventions. But Hume's apple doesn't fall far from Hutcheson's tree either, for he makes pride what I have termed a "social moral sense". This means that pride has a social root but nevertheless mimics the moral sense for it helps distinguish between what is right and wrong.

Pride and humility are never fully satiated; they are capable of being excited by whatever has the slightest relation to ourselves. This picture of the causes of pride is quite different to any normative claim on pride. Hume's science of human nature is here fully displayed. Beside the enumerated causes of pride and humility, Hume points out that there is "a secondary cause" or reinforcement of pride "in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections" (T. 316). As I have mentioned earlier, confirmation of our reasons to feel pride enhances pride.

Therefore, it can be said that the causes at work in the indirect passions *would* be unfamiliar to Hume's audience at the time. The effect of desire on the will was accounted for in previous and contemporary works, but the indirect passions go a step further in analysing the phenomenon that relates to the will. Hence, Hume believes there is a need to discover the nature of these passions and expose them. The indirect passions of love and hatred, for instance, Hume treats in a particular manner, by making them exclusively person directed. Even when love was identified as the primary passion, which it often was for philosophers at that time and before, its different forms were accounted for by its direction toward different objects. Love, in this sense, was a generic form of desire, not the person-directed indirect passion we find in Hume.

I believe Hume's strategy with pride, i.e. to reject that it is all vicious, is the same he followed regarding luxury. Hume, likewise, divided luxury into vicious and harmless. He aimed to correct "both extremes": those that "praise vicious luxury is advantageous to society", and whoever "blames even the most innocent luxury" (1987: p. 269). When Hume admits there is such a thing as harmless pride he is establishing that pride is not vice in all its forms.

There are two principles of authority that judge our own worth and character, -sympathy, which renders others' sentiments present to us, and reasoning, which makes us take their judgement into account-. Besides these principles, our judgments, of our own worth and character,

[67] As he promised in his letter written to Francis Hutcheson on September 17th, 1739: p. 32.

are in each case linked to passion. Sympathy plays an important role in describing the mechanism that operates the passions. More specifically, however, Hume observes pride and humility arise from praise and blame, reputation and infamy (T. 320). Praise and blame, reputation and infamy, are sympathy dependent.

Pride is important insofar it serves to confirm our worth -let it be moral or not. That worth goes beyond the morally virtuous is a discovery Hume was happy to come across. Our love of fame is further proof that the opinions of others are essential on account of confirmation of the positive ideas we form of ourselves. In fact, people "always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves" (T. 303), said Hume. Our love of fame is a desire for reputation (as the origin of the word *fama*, report, in Latin, suggests) and recognition of our qualities. Love of fame is the moral principle which moves us towards satiating our pride.

In a nutshell, the requisites for good pride are that it must be hidden, it must be based on reasons (not chimaera), and it must be in conformity to our social status. In fact, it is *necessary* to feel the "passion of pride" in conformity to our social status, and "regulate our actions accordingly" (T. 599). Pride is as natural to Hume as was the moral sense to Hutcheson. What has been called "*heroic virtue*", said Hume, is nothing but a "steady and well-establish'd pride and self-esteem" (T. 599), or partakes of that passion. Hume's sense of pride evoked Aristotle's notion of magnanimity and shunned conceptions of pride that are excessive and blinding.

Hume included modesty in his list of virtues. As pride is a due sense of our own force, modesty is "a just sense of our weakness" (T. 592), or lack of value. Observing modesty in others is welcome, but feeling modesty in oneself it "produces often uneasiness" (T. 597). But modesty is recognition of the limits of one's grounds for pride. Hume spoke about modesty as a "quality immediately agreeable to others". Modesty is agreeable insofar it does not hurt our pride. Modesty is not humility, that disagreeable, debilitating passion. Humility is painful dwelling on undesirable features of oneself, features one would prefer to hide, and is seen by Hume in a negative light, far from the facilitator of knowledge Augustine of Hippo, and his doctrine, proposed. Naturally, the opposite of humility, pride, was not seen as guilt or sin by Hume.

Prescriptive readings on Hume's use of pride have linked it to his notion of humanity, utility, and benevolence. All terms were emphasised more intensely during Hume's later work. Such readings trust Hume intended his philosophy to be useful for an individual's government of his or her passions. However, this perspective fails to see Hume's necessarily social understanding of the curbing of passions: regulation of our actions takes place thanks to rank and keeping our pride in check.

In this thesis, Mandeville and Hutcheson's views on pride were elucidated in order to shed light on Hume's. They each reached different conclusions: while Mandeville made a distinction between the different sorts of pride, depending on their social stadia, Hutcheson concentrated on

pride born from virtuous and praiseworthy motivations. Last, Hume spoke about pride's importance in shaping healthy ideas of the self that would in any and all cases, fit in within society.

To sum up, the relation between pride and honour in Hume's corpus is bidirectional; pride is a consequence of being honoured, while our need to satiate our pride, or be well regarded, makes us act honourably. Hume spelled out the importance of ideas of honour and the passion of pride in regulating our actions, especially in accordance with the place we occupy in society, and the conventions that come with that.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to bring the scholarship to a better under-standing Book II of *A Treatise* and Hume's work on the passions in general. In particular, I have provided a context for understanding why pride was at the heart of Hume's research. My thesis has been that the debate on pride's role in regulating our passions, posed by Mandeville, and answered to by Hutcheson, was in the background of Hume's attempt to elucidate the passion of pride.

Hume was indeed concerned with pride's relation to virtue, but he is not interested in making a normative case for the virtuousness of pride. He broadened the concept of proper pride considerably, to include material wealth, and moral actions that do not derive from duty. The reasons for worth were indeed a subject of Hume's inquiry, but he makes no assessments of whether the causes of worth are justified or not. For Hume, worth did not need to be grounded on virtue alone, nor on duty. Instead, virtue includes traits and actions that are immediately agreeable and useful or that end up being useful and agreeable. While other philosophers said that pride "must be vicious" because "it causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison" (T. 596). I hope to have shown that Hume allowed for pride that is well hidden, to be noble and for it to have a salient role in transforming our passions.

Chapter 6: Final Remarks

This thesis presents Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume's views on pride and honour by means of a close reading. This has led to the identification of the interplay of ideas between the three on these particular matters and concerning human nature as a whole. There certainly was an exchange of ideas that fuelled their thought, in the case of Mandeville and Hutcheson this took place between the 1720s and even after the death of Mandeville, in 1733. Hume, on his end, was inspired by both authors and their views served as a catalyst for his own, particularly during the 1730s and early 1740s.

As the first chapter explained, the backdrop of these discussions *via correspondence*, essays and even philosophical dialogues is a generally hostile view of pride; prose and poems portray the passion in a negative light. There is, in fact, a long tradition in viewing pride as vicious and detrimental. Beginning with the Stoics, who underlined *hubris* as a vice, and continuing throughout Christianity's philosophy, Catholic as well as Protestant, pride is problematically sinful. In stark contrast, humility is venerated. Aristotle is a noteworthy exception to the rule. Nevertheless, Neo-Agustinians recall pride's viciousness: it is offensive to love oneself in the face of the love we ought to profess towards God. Malebranche, for example, relates pride with a cognitive impairment born from the imagination. Hutcheson and Hume were fascinated with this same phenomenon. La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyére, Abbadie, all, obsess over pride and agree on its perniciousness. Pride is, in short, dangerous. However, it is an intrinsic aspect of human nature. The conclusions drawn from searching previous literature on pride make it clear it was worthy of our three philosopher's attention.

This thesis has argued that Mandeville, Hutcheson and Hume, all three, against earlier problematic conceptions of pride, see it useful in society. In any case, they depart in their beliefs concerning the condition by which pride is useful, virtuous, and due.

Mandeville, to begin with, in his most mature work, spoke about two internal passions, self-love and self-liking, and their external manifestation, pride, and a principle that would bridge them all, namely, honour. *An Enquiry*'s role is to establish that honour was used when virtue failed to moralise. Honour is not equivalent to honesty, like Hutcheson, his philosophical archenemy, thought. Honour is entirely a construct. Men are to society like grapes are to wine, and so all its (natural) passions are potentially social but would need to be curbed and educated to reach that form.

Against Horatio, Juvenal, and Hutcheson, Mandeville sets out to show the Stoics that honourable people are found in greater numbers than the virtuous. This is because promoting honour is perfectly adapted to our human nature. Honour doesn't require much self-denial since it is founded upon self-liking. That being said, pride ought to be concealed so as to not bother others. The principle of honour, according to Mandeville, is a great invention promoted by religion, that directs our passions towards moral ends. He identifies several historical moments of institutionalised honour, such as through duelling in the Middle Ages and so, by the XV. century honour had substituted virtue as a motor progress in the arts and sciences and ultimately a signature feature of civil society. Therefore, chapter 2 shows how self-love, self-liking, pride and honour are all extremely useful and beneficial to erecting society.

What is noteworthy about the second chapter is that it focuses on Mandeville's later work, unlike most of the scholarship, which is dedicated to the *Fable*. Bringing into focus the *Origin of Honour* allows the reader to appreciate Mandeville's mature philosophical efforts. Namely, his increased sophistication unravelling the mechanisms of the passions and their place in society. Moreover, Mandeville's last book regarded modern honour as a substitute for virtue when shame failed to lead men and women towards moral ends. Pointing this out, as done in this thesis, sheds light on Mandeville's most elaborate conjectural history and greatest contributions.

Hutcheson must have been appalled by such a depiction of the development of the non benevolent passions and their foundational role in society. So,Hutcheson developed a strategy designed to contain Mandeville’s conjectural history of morals by introducing a sense of honour that allows for well grounded pride and that goes hand in hand with virtue. This is necessary for stopping Mandeville in three fronts: the first is the viciousness of pride, the second the incongruence between the moral sense and the notions of honour, and the third the artificiality of morals.

Hutcheson believed the real object of praise is virtue alone. Moreover, false glory, or 'groundless honours' do not last long. Precisely influenced and excited by the natural strong passion for praise, wise men and women should be motivated to regulate their lives according to the rules of virtue and the moral sense. Mandeville, on the contrary, was keen on explaining how our idea of virtue had come to be associated with honour, and he had established that the relation was artificial. This is the conclusion Hutcheson sought to remediate with the strategy I have explained in chapter 3.

The aforementioned chapter is a contribution to the scholarship insofar it does not focus on narrow features of Hutcheson's work, instead, it manages to encompass Hutcheson's wider moralising ambitions, namely, to prove human's social nature and create a system to surrender to this idea. Why did Hutcheson underline the importance of the sense of honour? What role does the sense of honour have? None other than to serve the moral sense. In fact, Hutcheson's ideas evolved throughout his writing as a means to face Mandeville's criticism. Towards that end, Hutcheson contained Mandeville by making well grounded pride go hand in hand with virtue.

Hume knew about the depictions of pride made by both Mandeville and Hutcheson. He might have been an amused reader of controversial correspondence between them and sensed their more subtle interactions by means of enquiries and essays. This begins to explain his interest in pride. Perhaps he sought to alleviate the tension born from this controversy, and previous depictions of pride as malicious.

The last chapter of this thesis looks into Hume's lengthy treatment of pride contributing to the Hume scholarship by showing Hume found a middle ground between two divergent treatments of the passion. He criticised Hutcheson's reliance on the moral sense and the sense of honour to allow feeling pride; and, he corrected Mandeville's insistence on pride and its external manifestation, honour, being the basis of morality. Hume bridged previous conceptions by making pride a "social moral sense". This way, Hume broadens pride's scope, beyond the virtuousness and viciousness of the passion, and depicts it as a regulatory passion at the societal level. This, in turn, has made Hume's intentions in Book II a little more clear, and has hopefully, helped understand why Hume was so concerned with pride.

At the same time, the chapter on Hume takes a stance in the debate concerning Hume's greatest philosophical influences. Mandeville and Hutcheson were, perhaps, the two single most important influences in Hume's youth. They both contributed to shaping the young Hume and inspired him to write the *Treatise.*

Hume admits human nature is neither completely dignified (by virtue of virtue) nor entirely mean (corrupt and vile); he allows the passion of pride to be foundational for

society, which makes him Mandevillean. Hume spelled out the importance of ideas of honour and the passion of pride in regulating our actions, especially in accordance with the place we occupy in society, and the conventions that come with that.However, he challenged Mandeville's perverse depiction of human nature in favour of a more balanced one. In this sense, he was a follower of Hutcheson, at least he sought to gain Hutcheson's approval.

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