THE RECEPTION OF *PARADEIGMA* IN LATE GREEK RHETORICAL THEORY[[1]](#footnote-1)

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*Abstract*: It seems that from its inception rhetoric generated treatises where technical advice was given about the use of that *techne*. Although many of these treatises are lost, a good number of them are still preserved, and through them it is possible to understand the development of the rhetorical art and also to catch a glimpse of ancient reflections on the art of rhetoric and of the discussions that were probably raised about certain of its aspects. Among the rhetorical proofs, the *paradeigma* or example surely had an essential role from the very beginning, since it is one of the most salient proofs in the preserved rhetorical handbooks of the Classical period, that is, in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. Although not exclusively, there are essentially three aspects of the *paradeigma* which hold the attention of the authors of rhetorical treatises, namely its function, its contents (including the relation between *paradeigma* or example and *parabole* or comparison) and the methods of refutation. In comparison with the handbooks of the Classical period, the methods of refutation are expanded in the treatises of the Late period. The relation between *paradeigma* and *parabole*, announced by Aristotle but omitted in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, is discussed, and the *paradeigma*’s function, which in the Classical period was mainly argumentative, is maintained in the late treatises, but with time its exhortative function, which will prevail in the medieval period, develops.

*Keywords*: rhetoric, *paradeigma*, example, Aristotle, rhetorical handbook.

*Key passages*: *Rhetoric to Alexander* 8.14, 1430a6-8; Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1356b6-8; Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1357b28-30; Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 2.20, 1393a28-31; Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 2.25, 1402b13-14.

It is usually accepted that rhetoric as *techne*, understood as an ensemble of rules which are consciously applied to reach the desired target, emerged in the 5th century BC[[2]](#footnote-2) in Syracuse, and from there soon passed to Athens.

The first handbook of rhetoric is attributed to Corax and Tisias[[3]](#footnote-3) (Cic., *Brut.* 46-48),[[4]](#footnote-4) both of them linked to the birth of rhetoric in Syracuse. However, it seems that in the 5th century BC some other treatises of rhetoric were in existence too (cf., for example, Pl., *Phdr.* 266d; Arist., *SE* 184a-b; Isoc. 13.19). According to some scholars, these nascent *technai rhetorikai*, which, of course, are not preserved, were no more than model speeches.[[5]](#footnote-5) Some other scholars, however, think that they already included theoretical teachings.[[6]](#footnote-6) And still others differentiate between, on the one hand, the works of the Sophists, which consisted essentially of model speeches or even of parts of speeches, and, on the other hand, the theory of rhetoric gradually developed by Tisias, Thrasymachus, Theodorus and others.[[7]](#footnote-7)

In any case, the first preserved handbooks of rhetorical theory are the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus,[[8]](#footnote-8) and Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, both works from the 4th century BC.[[9]](#footnote-9) In both handbooks the example or *paradeigma* is one of the most important *pisteis* or proofs.[[10]](#footnote-10) In concrete terms, example is in those works the most relevant argumentative resource together with *eikos* or probability (in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*) or the enthymeme (in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*). However, in the stagirite’s work, which creates a correlation between the *techne rhetorike* and dialectic (*Rh*. 1354a1), the example or *paradeigma* can be a resource comparable to induction (and, as such, with the same level of relevance as the enthymeme), as well as a source of the enthymeme (and, as such, subordinated to it). This fact results in that work offering a broader view of the functions of example or *paradeigma*.

This paper analyses the way in which the classical, and mainly Aristotelian, view of example is received in Late Antiquity, specifically in the Imperial period.[[11]](#footnote-11) In that period rhetoric experiences an era of splendour and becomes the basis of education in all of the Greco-Roman world.[[12]](#footnote-12) Generalist treatises[[13]](#footnote-13) were still written, such as the *Anonymous Seguerianus* (2nd century AD), Rufus’ *Rhetoric* (2nd century AD) or Apsines of Gadara’s *Rhetoric* (3rd century AD), all of them organised around the parts of speech (prooimion, narration, argument and epilogue). These generalist treatises follow to a large extent the Aristotelian work, since they differentiate between artistic and non-artistic proofs and in the former category they include the example or *paradeigma* and the enthymeme. But the way these treatises present the example leads one to think about certain questions, such as the relation between example and induction, the different ways to refute an example or the delimitation of its contents.

This last question is especially interesting, because the Aristotelian view thereof is innovative and opposes that of the *Rhetoric of Alexander*. This work considers that example or *paradeigma* has to be historical, while the stagirite upholds that example can be historical as well as fictional, and under the fictional example he includes the parable (παραβολή) and the fable (λόγος) (*Rh*. 2.20, 1393a28-31).

From then onwards the rhetorical handbooks of the Imperial period make an effort to delimit the contents of the example, and most of them establish a distinction beween the example or *paradeigma* and the comparison or *parabole*, moving away significantly from Aristotle.

But, in addition to the rhetorical generalist treatises, in the Imperial period the exercises of rhetoric or *progymnasmata*[[14]](#footnote-14) (Theon called them *gymnasmata*) were set. These exercises were understood as a series of preliminary exercises which prepared the student for the last phase of education, the elaboration of μελέται or *declamationes*, which included the ὑποθέσεις δικανικαί or *controversiae* and the ὑποθέσεις συμβουλευτικαί or *suasoriae*.[[15]](#footnote-15) Although many *progymnasmata*, without any doubt, were written,[[16]](#footnote-16) only those of four authors have been preserved, namely Theon (1st century AD),[[17]](#footnote-17) Pseudo-Hermogenes (probably 3rd century AD), Aphthonius (4th century AD)[[18]](#footnote-18) and Nicholas of Myra (5th century AD).

In these treatises the scheme of proofs is not mentioned at all, and the *paradeigma* hardly. But some of these rhetorical exercises can be related to the example, and oddly enough, in them the fictional example gains prominence at the same time as its argumentative function becomes of secondary importance.

In the following pages an analysis is made of the reception of example or *paradeigma* in the rhetorical treatises of the Imperial period, paying attention mainly to the three points mentioned above, that is, the *paradeigma* as an argumentative resource, the contents of the *paradeigma* and the *paradeigma* in the *progymnasmata*.[[19]](#footnote-19)

The *paradeigma* as an argumentative resource

In classical rhetorical theory, represented by the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, the *paradeigma* is considered primarily an argumentative resource. Concretely, both handbooks divide the rhetorical proofs into technical/artistic proofs or *entechnoi pisteis* and non-technical/non-artistic proofs or *atechnoi pisteis* (*Rh.Al.* 7.2, 1428a16-19; *Rh.* 1.2, 1355b35-39), although this terminology is only Aristotelian,[[20]](#footnote-20) and they include the *paradeigma*, understood as a fact (*illustrans*) different from the explained fact (*illustrandum*) but related to it generally because of its similarity, in the artistic proofs. Within this group both handbooks give priority to two proofs, although these, even though they are similar, are not the same in both cases.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* includes seven proofs among the artistic proofs (*Rh.Al.* 7.2, 1428a20-23; cf. *Rh.Al*. 7.4-14.7, 1428a26-1431b8),[[21]](#footnote-21) but the first two are more developed, these being the probability or *eikos* argument and the *paradeigma*. Both proofs are supplementary, in the sense that the *eikos* is “what is being said when the audience has examples in their thoughts” (Εἰκὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, οὗ λεγομένου παραδείγματα ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες, *Rh.Al*. 7.4, 1428a25-26),[[22]](#footnote-22) while the use of *paradeigma* is recommended when it is not possible to use probability (*Rh.Al*. 8.1-2, 1429a22-27; *Rh.Al*. 14.1, 1431a25-27).

Aristotle creates a more complex system, according to which the artistic proofs can be developed in the sphere of the *ethos*, the *pathos* and the *logos* or *pragma* (*Rh*. 1.2, 1356a1-4), and through two means, which are the *paradeigma* and the enthymeme (*Rh*. 1.2, 1356b6-8; cf. *Rh*. 2.20, 1393a24-25). Since the enthymeme is developed from the probable or *eikos* (also from the sign or *semeion*; *Rh*. 1.2, 1357a31-32), the pair of *paradeigma* and enthymeme is similar (although not identical) to the pair that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* establishes of *eikos* and *paradeigma.*[[23]](#footnote-23)

In explaining the *paradeigma* and the enthymeme, Aristotle equates them with the induction and syllogism respectively (*Rh*. 1.2, 1356b2-6), so that the *paradeigma* proves from particular cases and the enthymeme does so from general premises (*Rh*. 1.2, 1356b14-18). But in the second book of *Rhetoric* the example appears also as a source of enthymemes, together with the probability and the signs, conclusive or not (*Rh*. 2.25, 1402b13-14). From this it is concluded that the example in Aristotle can be two things, a proof similar to the induction,[[24]](#footnote-24) as well as a source of enthymemes, in the sense that it supplies the premise of an argument. In accordance with this distinction, the term *paradeigma* designates in Aristotle the resource as a whole, comparable to the induction, as well as the *illustrantia* or elements which are related to the *illustrandum* through similarity. In both senses the *paradeigma* is, or plays a part in, a method of reasoning.[[25]](#footnote-25) However, how is this view of the example received in the late rhetorical treatises?

 In the generalising treatises from the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD, where the theory of Hermogenes is still not meaningful (Hermogenes starts having strong influence only from the 4th century AD on), the rhetoric is still largely Aristotelian,[[26]](#footnote-26) and in them the *paradeigma* continues to be primarily an argumentative resource.

 This happens in the *Art of Political Speech* (Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου), generally known as *Anonymous Seguerianus*,[[27]](#footnote-27) which was probably a summary made by a student collecting the opinions of several authors.[[28]](#footnote-28) The treatise has been dated towards the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 3rd century AD[[29]](#footnote-29) and is structured around the four parts of speech: prooimion, narrative, proofs and epilogue.

 Following Aristotle’s trail, the *Anonymous Seguerianus* differentiates between artistic and non-artistic proofs (§ 145). And within the artistic proofs, those derived from the art, it distinguishes two species: *paradeigma* and enthymeme (§ 146). But the *Anonymous Seguerianus* awards this division to Alexander and, hereafter, it offers the division of Neocles (§ 147), according to which the two species are those which derive from *pathos* and those which derive from the evidence or *pragma* (note that the *ethos* mentioned by Aristotle is left out). These last ones are developed through the probability, the signs and the *paradeigma* (§ 149).[[30]](#footnote-30) In these two classifications the two views of Aristotle are reproduced, that is, the *paradeigma* can be a type of artistic proof, at the same level as the enthymeme, and also a source of and consequently subordinated to the enthymeme. From this point on, the handbook explains each of these elements: probability (§ 149-150), *tekmerion* and *semeion* (§ 151-153) and *paradeigma* (§ 154-156). And after the *paradeigma*, the handbook explains the enthymeme (§ 157 ss.), so that the positioning of *paradeigma* is strategic because it can make a pair with the enthymeme, whose explanation follows, or be one of the methods of reasoning from the *pragma*, like the probability and the signs, whose explanation precedes.

 Regarding the definition of the *paradeigma*, the *Anonymous Seguerianus* collects the definitions of three rhetors: Neocles, Alexander and Zeno.[[31]](#footnote-31) According to Neocles (§ 154), the *paradeigma* is “a likeness and similarity and probability to a fact under question, from which, as a starting point, one would think it right to regard likenesses in a like way and applicable to the question under discussion” (ἐμφερὲς καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ εἰκὸς τῷ ζητουμένῳ πράγματι, ἀφ’ οὗ ὁρμώμενος ἄν τις ἀξιώσαι ὁμοίως τὰ ὅμοια φρονεῖν καὶ ἐπί τοῦ ζητουμένου).[[32]](#footnote-32) For Alexander (§ 155) “Paradeigm is language drawing from the particular either to (another) particular or the universal, or from like to like” (παράδειγμά ἐστι λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἤτοι ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐπάγων ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ τὸ ὅμοιον). And, finally, according to Zeno (§ 156), “paradeigm is a reminder of something that has happened for comparison with what is now under discussion” (παράδειγμά ἐστι γενομένου πράγματος ἀπομνημόνευσις εἰς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένου).

 Common to the three definitions is the consideration that the *paradeigma* establishes a link between two questions (*illustrans* and *illustrandum*) based on a relation of similarity. The one who most emphasises and develops this idea is Neocles, who, besides, includes probability almost as a form of similarity, which is not strange since *paradeigma* is “ein Teil des *comparabile*, das selbst wieder ein Teil des *probabile* ist”.[[33]](#footnote-33) Alexander emphasises the fact that example implies not only a relation of the part to the part or of the similar to the similar, as Aristotle said, but also of the part to the whole, to the universal, which is the consubstantial to the induction, but which is not clearly considered in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.[[34]](#footnote-34) Finally, Zeno’s definition stresses that the content of *paradeigma* is something that has happened, omitting the possibility that the *paradeigma* can have a fictional content, as Aristotle claims (*Rh*. 2.20, 1393a28-31). So, each of these three definitions puts the emphasis on one concrete aspect of the *paradeigma*.

 In order to refute a *paradeigma* classical rhetoric considers two possibilities: using a counterexample or saying that the given examples are not appropriate or similar to the *illustrandum* (*Rh.Al*. 36.33, 1443b38-41; *Rh*. 2.25, 1403a5-10). In contrast, the *Anonynous Seguerianus* includes three possibilities (§ 187): saying that the example is false, claiming that the circumstances are different and don’t imply similarity, or dissenting in the way how example is applied. From these three possibilities the first one in particular stands out; it implies, in line with the definition of Zeno, that the example should be historical and not fictional, which would create a big difference with regard to Aristotle, in whose view examples could be real as well as fictional (*Rh*. 2.20, 1393a28-31).

 In any case, the possibilities of refutation are increased in Apsines of Gadara’s *Rhetoric*, a treatise from the 3rd century AD which, as it seems, Apsines could not bring to a conclusion and was thus finished by one of his students.[[35]](#footnote-35) In its chapter 7 this treatise distinguishes at least five ways of refutation of the example, namely through contradiction (§ 7.1), through a difference (§ 7.2), through the consequence (§ 7.3), through the counter-argumentation of an authority (§ 7.4) and finally through the inversion of the argument (§ 7.5).

The content of *paradeigma*

 One of the essential topics regarding the *paradeigma* is the delimitation of its content. In fact, on this point there was already a disagreement in the Classical period, since the *Rhetoric to Alexander* considers that example has to be historical (*Rh.Al*. 8.14, 1430a6-8) and, furthermore, preferably referring to recent events or, at least, to well known events (*Rh.Al*. 32.3, 1439a1-4), while Aristotle distinguishes between examples departing from historical events and invented or fictional examples, including the parable (παραβολή) and the fable (λόγος) (*Rh*. 2.20, 1393a28-31).[[36]](#footnote-36)

 The content of *paradeigma* or example and its differentiation with regard mainly to the *parabole* or comparison is a question addressed in some treatises.

 In Apsines of Gadara’s *Rhetoric* the *epicheirema*, a word with which in the Late period logical proof is designated,[[37]](#footnote-37) is divided into *paradeigma* and enthymeme (§ 8.1), following the path indicated by Aristotle. Chapter 6 of that treatise is dedicated to the *paradeigma* and it starts by differentiating it from the comparison:[[38]](#footnote-38) “A *parabolē* (or comparison) differs from a *paradeigma* (or example) in this, that the parabole is taken from something inanimate or from irrational living things ... Paradeigms, on the other hand, are taken from persons of the past” (Παραβολὴ παραδείγματος τούτῳ διαφέρει, ὅτι ἡ μὲν παραβολὴ ἀπ’ ἀψύχων ἢ ἀλόγων λαμβάνεται ... τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα ἐκ γεγονότων ἤδη λαμβάνεται προσώπων, § 6.1).[[39]](#footnote-39)

 On the one hand, Apsines considers the *paradeigma* a resource similar to comparison, which implies, although its definition is not preserved, that he saw it as a resource based on a relationship of similarity between *illustrans* and *illustrandum*.[[40]](#footnote-40) On the other hand, Apsines considers that the specific quality of the *paradeigma* is its historical content. Moreover, those real events on which the example is based can be, according to Apsines, domestic or foreign. The domestic ones are preferred, although the foreign events are not to be totally rejected (§ 6.2). If the *Rhetoric to Alexander* gives priority to examples close in time, the Apsines’ *Rhetoric* prioritises examples close from an affective or emotional point of view.

 Furthermore, coinciding with classical sources, Apsines also advises that examples be well known and clear, not too remote nor mythical, closely related to the issue under discussion and not very long (§ 6.6). Regarding their inclusion in the speech, this treatise explains that it is not common to use the *paradeigma* in the *prooimion*, unlike in the remaining parts of the speech, and that the conclusions derived from the *paradeigma* can appear before or after (§ 6.7).[[41]](#footnote-41)

 In his *Rhetoric* Rufus organises the matter of arguments distinguishing also between non-artistic and artistic proofs. But in the last group he distinguishes arguments based on people, on facts and on examples (§ 27). Arguments based on example include the example itself (*paradeigma*), the comparison (*parabole*) and the hypothesis (§ 30). The difference is that the *paradeigma* is the mention of a past event because of its similarity with the subject matter (§ 31); the *parabole* is the mention of a real and present event because of its similarity with the subject matter (§ 32) and the argument based on hypothesis is neither past nor present, but arises from an hypothesis made by the orator (§ 33).[[42]](#footnote-42)

 In the treatise of Minucianus entitled *On Epicheiremes* (Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων) or *De argumentis* (3rd century AD) the author starts again from the Aristotelian division between artistic and non-artistic proofs and he classifies the first ones in ethical, pathetical and logical or pragmatic. The proofs are manifested in *epicheiremata*, which can be paradigmatic or enthymematic. And the paradigmatic *epicheiremata* derive “from history and from a comparison of events which have already occurred” (παραδειγματικὰ μὲν ὅσα ἐξ ἱστορίας καὶ ὁμοιώσεως τῶν ἤδη πεπραγμένων λαμβάνομεν, *Rh.Gr*. I, 418.2-3 Spengel).[[43]](#footnote-43) Furthermore, in order to function examples have to be familiar to the listeners and appropriate to the subject matter (*Rh.Gr*. I 418.11-12 Spengel). However, at a later stage Minucianus also includes in the paradigmatic *epicheiremata* the comparisons (*parabolai*) and the similes (*eikones*) (τοῦ παραδειγματικοῦ εἴδους εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ καλούμεναι παραβολαὶ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, *Rh.Gr*. I 418.28-29 Spengel). The difference between the *paradeigma* and the *parabole* is that *paradeigma* is taken from history and *parabole* arises from events that may have happened in an undetermined moment, but without reference to history (*Rh.Gr*. I 418.29-32 Spengel), a difference that coincides with that established by Aristotle. For its part, the simile (*eikon*) is similar to the *parabole*, but it makes the speech more vivid, so that the listener thinks he sees it (*Rh.Gr*. I 419.2-4 Spengel). This implies an interpretation of *eikon* as a stylistic similarity, something close to that which can be found in Aristotle, where εἰκών designates the comparison as an aesthetic resource and is a type of metaphor, while the παραβολή makes reference to an argumentative resource and is a type of παράδειγμα.[[44]](#footnote-44) Nevertheless, according to Minucianus, inside the paradigmatic arguments the *paradeigma* itself is included, along with the *parabole* and the *eikon*. But Minucianus ends the section dedicated to the example adding that “Those stories which belong to fables are also in the class of examples” (παραδειγματικὰ δὲ καὶ ὅσα εἰς μύθους ἀνήκει, *Rh.Gr*. I 419.10-11 Spengel), with which he seems to indicate that fictional stories too can be an example. So, Minucianus differentiates in the *paradeigma*, the historical example or *paradeigma*, the *parabole* or comparison (the simile or *eikon* is linked to this *parabole*) and the *mythos* or fictional story, that Aristotle calls *logos*. In that way the Minucianus’ classification seems to integrate all the elements that are significant in the Aristotelian system concerning this matter.[[45]](#footnote-45)

 Therefore, these rhetors (the *Anonymus Seguerianus*, Apsines, Rufus or Minucianus) divide the proofs in the Aristotelian way between *atechnoi* and *entechnoi* *pisteis*, designate the logical proof as *epicheirema* and they divide it into *paradeigma* and enthymeme. For his part, Pseudo-Hermogenes in his treatise *On invention* (Περὶ εὑρέσεως or *De inventione*) tries to relate the argumentation to the *stasis* theory[[46]](#footnote-46). This treatise, composed of four books, focuses on the *inventio*, but organises itself around the three parts or the speech (*prooimion* or preamble, *diegesis* or narrative and *kataskeue* or confirmation of proofs) and dedicates the fourth book to issues of style. The beginning of the third book explains that the refutation of a point or κεφάλαιον requires a λύσις, supported by an ἐπιχείρημα, elaborated by an ἐργασία, and it concludes with an ἐνθύμημα. The *ergasia* is, therefore, necessary for the confirmation of the *epicheirema* and it derives from the comparison, the example, the lesser, the greater, the like and the contrary (ἀπὸ παραβολῆς, ἀπὸ παραδείγματος, ἀπὸ μικροτέρου, ἀπὸ μείζονος, ἀπὸ ἴσου, ἀπὸ ἐναντίου, Rabe en Rabe and Kennedy, p. 98.6-8). That is, the *ergasia* is comparable to the *paradeigma*.

 However, the differentiation established in this treatise implies a re-elaboration of the classical theory. Aristotle affirms simply that the *paradeigma* implies a relation of the similar to the similar (*Rh*. 1.2, 1357b28-30). Anaximenes, instead, mentions two types of relation when he differentiates between examples in line with the reasonable (κατὰ λόγον) and those contrary to the reasonable (παρὰ λόγον) (*Rh.Al*. 8.2, 1429a27-29). In the Late period, however, Apsines says that the *paradeigma* is “the strongest thing in speaking” (ἰσχυρότατον ἐν λόγῳ) and that it can derive “from like, from contrary, from greater, from lesser” (ἀπὸ ὁμοίου, ἀπ’ ἐναντίου, ἀπὸ μείζονος, ἀπ’ ἐλάττονος, § 6.8). Βeing “the strongest thing” is odd, because in Aristotle it seems that the probationary strength of the enthymeme is considered superior.[[47]](#footnote-47) On the other hand, the classification of Apsines, as well as that offered by Pseudo-Hermogenes, takes into account a higher type of relation between *illustrans* and *illustrandum*.

 Nevertheless, although the system created in the treatise of Pseudo-Hermogenes is different, the *epicheirema* depends on the *ergasia* and the enthymeme, and the *ergasia* in turn is based on a relation of similarity and includes as main forms the *paradeigma* and the *parabole*, so that the Aristotelian scheme is still maintained to a large extent.

The *paradeigma* in the *progymnasmata*

 As has been seen, many treatises include the *paradeigma* in the treatment of argumentation. It is different, however, in the situation with the *progymnasmata*, where the scheme of proofs is not mentioned and the *paradeigma* is hardly mentioned.

As has been explained, only the *progymnasmata* of four authors have been preserved, namely Theon, Pseudo-Hermogenes, Aphthonius and Nicholas of Myra. Among all of them, the *progymnasmata* of Aphthonius, which include fourteen exercises (*mythos*, *diegema*, *chreia*, *gnome*, *anaskeue*, *kataskeue*, *koinos topos*, *enkomion*, *psogos*, *synkrisis*, *ethopoeia*, *ekphrasis*,[[48]](#footnote-48) *thesis* and *nomou eisphora*), became the prototype of the genre. Some of these exercises can be related to the *paradeigma*, although they are not designed as such. Concretely, narration, *chreia* and comparison have been mentioned in that sense.[[49]](#footnote-49) But in my opinion it would be more accurate to relate the *paradeigma* to fable, narration and comparison.

The *mythos* or fable is the first of the progymnasmatic exercises and it is defined as “a fictive statement, imaging truth” (λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν; Aphthonius 1.1 Patillon).[[50]](#footnote-50) On his part, Theon (§ 73) claims that fable can receive different names: *mythos*, *ainos* and *logos*. This last designation is the one used by Aristotle, who in his *Rhetoric* considers that the fable or *logos* is a type of fictional example (*Rh*. 2.20, 1393a28-31). Therefore, the *progymnasmata* as well as Aristotle emphasise the fact that the fable is a fictive narrative, but Aristotle integrates it in his rhetorical construct through the example, while in the *progymnasmata* the attention is focused primarily on its composition.[[51]](#footnote-51)

Yet the fable functions as an illustration of a moral lesson that can be placed in the beginning as well as at the end of the fable (Aphthonius 1.3), and the fable itself is paradigmatically related with an account, to which it can precede or follow (Theon 74-75). In essence, the fable is a concrete and fictional account from which a general truth is extracted, as in inductive reasoning and, with nuances, as in the Aristotelian example,[[52]](#footnote-52) or it is also an account related to another through similarity.

The second progymnasmatic exercise is the narrative or *diegema*, defined as “an exposition of an action that has happened or as though it had happened” (ἔκθεσις πράγματος γεγονότος ἢ ὡς γεγονότος, Aphthonius 2.1 Patillon). This definition establishes a connection between the narrative and the historical example (which has happened),[[53]](#footnote-53) but perhaps also between the narrative and the fictional example designated as *parabole*.[[54]](#footnote-54) So, in these first two exercises (fable and narrative) the three types of examples pointed out by Aristotle (at least, the two essential types: the fictional and historical example) are apparently brought together.

However, although Aristotle includes in the *paradeigma* the historical as well as the fictional example, he seems to give priority to the historical example, since it is the one he uses to explain what the *paradeigma* is(*Rh*. 1.2, 1357b30-36). But in the Late period the fictive narrative becomes very important, perhaps, among other things, because of the function of the *progymnasmata* in the scholar’s education.[[55]](#footnote-55) As a result, the concept of *enargeia* (lat. *evidentia*) is developed, which tries to show that the described element can be vividly imagined by the listener or, as Nicholas of Myra says, seeks to turn the listeners into spectators (Nicholas of Myra 68-70).[[56]](#footnote-56)

The fact is that the *progymnasmata* provide elemental forms of speech and models from which the students can compose their productions, either in the sphere of political speech or in the sphere of literary expression. Thus, the argumentation in these treatises is deemed of secondary importance.

 The pair formed by the *paradeigma* and the *parabole*, so prominent in other rhetorical handbooks, is mentioned in the *progymnasmata* as well, but here the two are elements from which the *chreia* or anecdote (Aphthonius 3.3 Patillon) and even the *gnome* (Aphthonius 4.3 Patillon) can be composed, and the difference between them is not explained.

 Furthermore, among the progymnasmatic exercises the *synkrisis* or comparison is also included; it is defined as “a comparison, made by setting things side-by-side, bringing the greater together with what is compared to it” (λόγος ἀντεξεταστικὸς ἐκ παραθέσεως συνάγων τῷ παραβαλλομένῳ τὸ μεῖζον, Aphthonius 10.1 Patillon). In this definition it seems clear that there is an *illustrans* and an *illustrandum*, as in the *paradeigma* and in the *parabole*, but the relationship between them is of opposition instead of similarity, and as a consequence of that relationship between *illustrans* and *illustrandum* the *illustrans* has the effect of emphasising the value of the *illustrandum*. The inductive value that exists in the Aristotelian *parabole* is minimised, therefore, in the progymnasmatic *synkrisis*.

 But there is another important consideration, and it concerns the fact that Aphthonius assumes that there can be comparison involving “both persons and things, occasions and places, dumb animals, and, in addition, plants” (πρόσωπά τε καὶ πράγματα, καιρούς τε καὶ τόπους, ἄλογα ζῷα καί πρὸς τούτοις φυτά, Aphthonius 10.2 Patillon). So, while *paradeigma* and *parabole* are differentiated to a large extent according to their content, the *synkrisis* seems to imply a different type of reasoning. That is, the *synkrisis* separates itself from the *paradeigma* and is presented as a specific resource at the service of the encomium or the vituperation, since it establishes an opposition between two elements which deserve a different valuation, with the target not of supporting an argumentation, but of giving, by opposition, more brilliance to a character.

Conclusion

 Classical rhetoric, especially Aristotle, lays the essential foundations for the definition of *paradeigma*, explaining its argumentative function and its possible contents. The main characteristics of the *paradeigma* remain in the Late period, although the view of that figure is gradually enriched.

 To begin with, in consonance with the double meaning of the *paradeigma* in Aristotle, in the Late period too there are paradigmatic examples opposed to the enthymematic ones, and the *paradeigma* and the *parabole* are included among them (in the Late period the fable or *logos* is omitted in most cases); the *paradeigma* and the *parabole* remain unfailingly linked, but they differ depending on diverse criteria: Aristotle differentiates *paradeigma* and *parabole* because of their different grade of veracity, Apsines differentiates depending on whether they focus on rational or irrational creatures, Rufus differentiates depending on whether they refer to a past or a present event, etc.

 Moreover, in the Imperial period, and later on during Late Antiquity the methods of refutation are enriched and the types of relationship between *illustrans* and *illustrandum* increase, two aspects of the argumentation process that in classical rhetoric are not very developed.

 But perhaps the most important change refers to the function of the example. The *paradeigma* has, in general terms, three functions: “as an example, it makes generalization possible; as an illustration, it provides support for an already established regularity; as a model, it encourages imitation”.[[57]](#footnote-57) Classical rhetoric and most of late rhetoric focuses on the first two functions, but with time the third function becomes increasingly prominent, which explains the medieval success of the collections of *exempla*.[[58]](#footnote-58)

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BIOGRAPHY

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1. This study has been carried out within the framework of a research project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and the FEDER Funds (FFI2016-79533-P) and a project funded by the UPV/EHU (EHU16/07). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Some authors, as Cole (1991b) or Schiappa (1999) place the beginning of rhetoric in the 4th century BC. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The relation between Corax and Tisias is disputed. Although Corax is mostly considered the inventor of rhetoric and the teacher of Tisias, Cole (1991a) 65-84, for example, defends the idea that Corax and Tisias are one and the same person. All the preserved testimonies making reference to Corax and Tisias are collected in Radermacher (1951) 28-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Although Cicero attributes that information to Aristotle, the stagirite in *Rh*. 2.24, 1402a18 mentions only Corax, and Plato in *Phaedrus* 273c only quotes the name of Tisias. But not only Corax and Tisias strive to be the creators of rhetoric. Other fonts, as Diogenes Laërtius 8.57, Sextus Empiricus, *Against Dogmatists* 1.6 (these two authors quote as authority to Aristotle in his work *Sophist*) or Quintilian 3.1.8, attribute the honour to Empedocles. Hinks (1940) 61, deals with the issue and defends that the creators of rhetoric were Corax and Tisias, and not Empedocles. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Cf. Gercke (1897) 341-359; Cole (1991b) 71-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Cf. Wilcox (1942) 137-141; Reinhardt (2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Cf. Kennedy (1959). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. On the authorship of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, cf. Cope (1867) 406-414; Chiron (2002) xl-cvii. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Due mainly to the mention of certain historical facts and to the political atmosphere reflected in the work, it is believed that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was written ca. 340 BC; cf. Chiron (2011a) 240-241. For its part, it seems that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was written in phases (cf. Kennedy, 1996) over a period from 350 to 330 BC; cf. Cope (1867) 36-49; Rapp (2002) 178-193; Chiron (2011a) 241-243. Most scholars consider that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is earlier than the Aristotelian treatise. In contrast, Chiron (2004) 82 and (2011), proposes an interspersed, instead of consecutive, composition of both works, so that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* would be later than a first writing of the Aristotelian *Rhetoric*, but earlier than the definitive writing of this treatise. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. On *paradeigma*, cf. Ernesti (1795) s. v.; Alewell (1913); Jost (1936); Hauser (1974); Price (1975); Anderson (2000) s. v. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. A summary of the history of the rhetorical handbooks is offered in Kennedy (1997) 20-37, Conte (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. In the Imperial age numerous rhetorical treatises are written. Pernot (2005) 157, adduced two reasons for that: on the one hand, the necessity of handbooks within the education system and, on the other hand, the fact that rhetoric became an object of analysis in itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Chiron (2007) 104-105, divides the *technai rhetorikai* into two groups, namely the generalist and the specialised treatises, and he distinguishes in each group four subgroups, so that he creates a classification with eight types of rhetorical handbooks. Patillon (2001b) 243-246, instead, differentiates between six possible schemes in the composition of rhetorical handbooks: parts of speech, oratorical genres, tasks of the orator, technical and non-technical proofs, thesis and cause, and *status causae*. The problem is that each handbook can imply more than one form of composition. For example, in Rufus’ *Rhetoric* Patillon (*ibid*., 255) finds, at least partially, the six ways of composition. And the *Anonymous Seguerianus* is structured according to the four parts of speech, but, in addition, these four parts constitute a theory of *inventio* and are followed by a final part devoted to *elocutio*; cf. Patillon (2005) v-vi. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. On *progymnasmata*, cf. Webb (2001); Chiron (2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. On declamation in Greece, cf. Russell (1983). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Heath (2002-2003) 129-141, collects a list of the attested, although not preserved, *progymnasmata*. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Theon’s *progymnasmata* are generally dated in the 1st century AD. However, the date is disputable and some scholars defend a later date. For example, Heath (2002-2003) 141-158, shows how Theon’s work fits into the situation of the 4th and 5th centuries AD. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Aphthonius’ treatise stood out above the rest (perhaps because he is the only one who accompanies the explanation of each exercise with an example, and exceptionally with two examples) and his *progymnasmata* became the prototype of the genre. On the use of examples on Aphthonius’ *Progymnasmata*, cf. Robert (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The reception of *paradeigma* in Late Antiquity has been previously studied by Demoen (1996) 35-56; (1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. On this division and the *pisteis* that each group includes in both authors, cf. Kraus (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. On these proofs, cf. Chiron (1998); Calboli Montefusco (2007); Kraus (2011) 268-274. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. I use the edition of Fuhrmann (1966) (see also Chiron, 2002) and Mirhady’s translation in Mayhew and Mirhady (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. I follow for Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* the edition of Dufour (1967). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. On induction in Aristotle, cf. Fritz (1964). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. On example in the handbooks of the Classical period, see a more detailed explanation in Encinas Reguero (2017a) 44-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. “Before the victory of Hermogenes, rhetoric as taught in Greek schools seems to have been a development of concepts originating with Aristotle but modified by the system of stasis theory developed by Hermagoras of Temnos in the second century before Christ, by the taxonomy of tropes and figures to which grammarians contributed, and by the increasing role of declamation in the schools”; cf. Kennedy, in Dilts and Kennedy (1997) ix. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See the editions of Dilts and Kennedy (1997), Vottero (2004) and Patillon (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Cf. Kennedy in Dilts and Kennedy (1997) xi-xiv, and Kennedy (2003a) 300. Kennedy disagrees with the proposal made in 1891 by Graeven, who understood this work as an epitome of a lost work of Cornutus. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Cf. Dilts and Kennedy (1997) xiii, Vottero (2004) 93-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. On this point there is an interesting difference between the edition of Dilts and Kennedy (1997) 42-43, which mentions only three forms: probability, sign (τεκμήριον) and example, and, on the other hand, the edition of Patillon (2005), which adds the σημεῖον. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. As Kennedy (2003a) 300, stresses, this handbook is especially interesting, since it identifies the sources from which each idea comes, something not very usual in the handbooks of Greek rhetoric from the Imperial period. On the sources of the *Anonymous Seguerianus*, cf. Patillon (2005) xxxii-lxxiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. I use for the *Anonymous Seguerianus* the edition and translation by Dilts and Kennedy (1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Cf. Martin (1974) 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Aristotle makes it clear that the *paradeigma* implies a relation of the part to the part (*Rh*. 1357b26-30), which implies an essential difference with regard to the induction, where it goes from the part to the whole (*Top*. 105a13-14). These difference between παράδειγμα and induction or ἐπαγωγή is made explicit in the *Prior Analytics* by the philosopher himself, who explains, in addition, that induction proves from all the concrete cases and the example only from some of them (*APr*. 69a17-19). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. On Apsines’ *Rhetoric*, see the editions of Dilts and Kennedy (1997) and of Patillon (2001a). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. On the differences of reasoning implied by the example, the parable and the fable, cf. Coenen (1992) 329-335. According to Price (1975) 42, the parable is “an analogy whose *illustrantia* are drawn from the real everyday world” and it differs from historical example, firstly, in that it describes the activities of types and not of specific people and, secondly, in that it can be hypothetical. The fable, for its part, is totally fictional and is usually located in an unreal world. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. The word *epicheirema* is used by Aristotle to designate a dialectic inference based on probabilities (*Top*. 162a16), but in the Late period it is used with regard to a rhetorical proof in general, that is, what Aristotle called *pistis*. On the concept of *epicheirema*, cf. Meador (1964) 54-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. It has been supposed there is a gap before chapter 6, where a definition of the example was probably included. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. I use for Apsines’ *Rhetoric* the edition and translation of Dilts and Kennedy (1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Cf. Patillon (2001a) lix. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Aristotle recommends using the *paradeigma* as demonstration in the absence of an enthymeme (*Rh*. 2.20, 1394a9-10), but he recommends using it as a testimony when there are enthymemes, and to do it as their epilogue (*Rh*. 2.20, 1394a13-16). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. On Rufus’ *Rhetoric*, see the edition of Patillon (2001b). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. I use for Minucianus the edition of Spengel (1853) and the translation of Meador (1964). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. In order to designate the comparison in Greek there are essentially four words, namely εἰκών, παραβολή, εἰκασία and ὁμοίωσις; cf. McCall (1969) ix. Among these words εἰκών is the main one and the most early attested. In Plato παραβολή and ὁμοίωσις start being used; and in Aristotle the used words to designate the comparison are εἰκών and παραβολή, cf. McCall (1969) 1-24. On the relation between the *paradeigma* and the idea of similarity in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, cf. Encinas Reguero (2017b). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Similarly to Minucianus, but in a treatise of a different type (*On Figures* or Περὶ τρόπων), Trypho includes into the concept of similarity or ὁμοίωσις three figures: εἰκών, παράδειγμα and παραβολή (*Rh.Gr*. III, 200.4-6 Spengel). In his definition of these elements Trypho makes it clear that the *paradeigma* refers to real and past events (*Rh.Gr*. III, 200.21-23 Spengel), and it differs from the *parabole* in that this last refers to undetermined and possible events (*Rh.Gr*. III, 200.31-201.2 Spengel). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. In the Hellenistic period *inventio* is expanded to include the *stasis* theory, that is, the technique of determining the central question of a speech and designing the strategy to follow in the argumentation. Concretely, the *stasis* theory was formulated by Hermagoras of Temnos in the 2nd century BC, but his treatise was lost and we know it through the version of Hermogenes of Tarsus (2nd century AD). On the process of formation of the *stasis* theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes, cf. Nadeau (1959). On the *stasis* theory, cf. Kennedy (1983) 73-86; Calboli Montefusco (1986). The work or Hermogenes of Tarsus did not initially have great success (it seems that, at the time, the handbook of Minucianus had greater success), but it became the essential handbook of rhetoric from the 5th to the 15th century AD; cf. Kennedy (1983) 73-74. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Although in the beginning *paradeigma* and enthymeme are put on the same level of relevance (*Rh*. 1.2, 1356b18-25), later Aristotle claims that “induction is not suitable to rhetorical discourses except in a few case*s*” (τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, *Rh*. 2.20, 1394a12-13). The supremacy of the enthymeme over the example can also be appreciated in other passages of *Rhetoric*. See, for example, *Rh.* 1.1, 1354a15, where enthymeme is described as “the ‘body’ of persuasion” (σῶμα τῆς πίστεως) or *Rh*. 1.1, 1355a6-8: “rhetorical *apodeixis* is enthymeme (and this is, generally speaking, the strongest of the *pisteis*)” (ἔστι δ’ ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων). On this, cf. Cope (1867) 107-108. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. On *ekphrasis*, cf. Webb (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Cf. Demoen (1996) 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. I use for Aphthonius the edition of Patillon (2008) and the translation of Kennedy (2003b). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. In the *Anonymus Seguerianus* (§ 99) the *mythos* is dealt with in the section devoted to the narrative. Concretely, “l’Anonyme appelle μῦθος une narration dans la narration, plus précisément une narration fictive dans una narration réaliste”; cf. Chiron (2011b) 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Aristotle says that the example goes from the part to the part (*Rh*. 1357b26-30); this statement disagrees with the definition of induction, which goes from the particular to the general (*Top*. 105a13-14). This is one of the differences between *paradeigma* and induction (cf. note 34). But, the reality is that, when Aristotle exemplifies the *paradeigma*, he finishes with a general sentence (*Rh*. 1357b35-36), which shows that in Aristotle the παράδειγμα goes, effectively, from the particular to the particular, but it makes it pass through the universal; cf. Encinas Reguero (2017b) 243-245. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. The sayings and events of the past can be an important argument. That is why Aristotle recognises the relevance for the orator of knowing his history (*Rh*. 1.4, 1360a33-37). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. On the parable, cf. note 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. According to Webb (2001) 301, “While historical themes were common in declamation, at this earlier stage [*progymnásmata*] students made more use of the mythological figures and narratives which were synonymous with poetry”. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. As Webb (1997) 344-345, explains, a form of *mimesis* shared by poetry and rhetoric is the representation of a person, action or place through the narrative or description. So, the idea of *enargeia* acquires an important role in the Hellenistic and Roman rhetorical theory. But Longinus is the only one who suggests a difference between the use of *phantasia* in poetry and in rhetoric. In poetry the result is one of astonishment, that is, the impact on the audience, while the rhetor looks for clarity, which, combined with argumentation, produces persuasion (Pseudo-Longinus, *On the Sublime* 15.2 y 15.9). On the relation between poetry and rhetoric, cf. Webb (1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1989) 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. On the medieval *exemplum*, see the summary of Demoen (1996) 54-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)