Ikerlanak;;Ikerlanak
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6123
2024-03-29T09:34:35ZThe Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/34464
The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
Iñarra García, María Elena; Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-Ichi
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus, one of the central single-valued solution concepts in cooperative game theory. This paper is an updated survey on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. As a first approach to these concepts, we refer the reader to the great survey by Maschler (1992); see also the relevant chapters in Peleg and Sudholter (2003). Building on the notes of four lectures on the nucleolus and the kernel delivered by one of the authors at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem in 1999, we have updated Maschler’s survey by adding more recent contributions to the literature. Following a similar structure, we have also added a new section that covers the bargaining set.
The nucleolus has a number of desirable properties, including nonemptiness, uniqueness, core selection, and consistency. The first way to understand it is based on an egalitarian principle among coalitions. However, by going over the axioms that characterize it, what comes across as important is its connection with coalitional stability, as formalized in the notion of the core. Indeed, if one likes a single-valued version of core stability that always yields a prediction, one should consider the nucleolus as a recommendation. The kernel, which contains the nucleolus, is based on the idea of “bilateral equilibrium” for every pair of players. And the bargaining set, which contains the
kernel, checks for the credibility of objections coming from coalitions. In this paper, section 2 presents preliminaries, section 3 is devoted to the nucleolus, section 4 to the kernel, and section 5 to the bargaining set.
2019-06-01T00:00:00ZCharacterization of efficient networks in a generalized connections model with endogenous link strength
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/34463
Characterization of efficient networks in a generalized connections model with endogenous link strength
Olaizola Ortega, María Norma; Valenciano Llovera, Federico
We consider a natural generalization of Jackson and Wolinsky s (1996) connections model where the quality or strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a non-decreasing function of that amount. The information that the nodes receive through the network is the revenue from investments in links. We prove that in this most general version of the connections model, the only possibly nonempty efficient networks, in the sense of maximizing the aggregate proffit, are still the all-encompassing star and the complete network, with the sole and rare exception of a highly particular case where there is a draw between the all-encompassing star, the complete network and a whole range of a particular type of nested split graph structures intermediate between them.
2019-05-09T00:00:00ZPartial ownership of local firms and zoning of neighboring towns
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/32820
Partial ownership of local firms and zoning of neighboring towns
Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Casado Izaga, Francisco Javier
This paper investigates zoning in two neighboring towns in which firms are owned by investors that reside in the two towns. We find that local regulators use zoning strategically depending on the weight of local profits in social welfare. When they are high enough both towns are zoned. For intermediate values an asymmetric result emerges: only one regulator resorts to zoning despite the symmetry in the percentage of ownership of the neighboring firms. For a low weight of local profits, towns may or may not be zoned. Zoning restrictions on the location of firms are tighter when local profits are more significant for social welfare.
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2019-03-27T00:00:00ZHousing Tenure, Geographical Mobility and the Labour Market: the Role of the Employment Exit Rate
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/30207
Housing Tenure, Geographical Mobility and the Labour Market: the Role of the Employment Exit Rate
Vives Coscojuela, Cecilia
This paper studies the effect of home-owners' migration costs on unemployment in an economy where workers move both for work- and non-work-related reasons. To this end, a search model with heterogeneous locations is developed and calibrated to the US economy. Both the employment and unemployment exit rates are endogenous. Migration costs imply that home-owners quit their jobs less often than renters and find jobs at a higher rate. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the model predicts that home-owners have a lower unemployment rate than renters.
2018-11-01T00:00:00Z