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Scientific theories as intervening representations
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2006)
In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the di-chotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as ...
Recent Computability Models Inspired from Biology: DNA and Membrane Computing
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2003)
Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2003)
Which Modal Models are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)?
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2003)
Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2003)
The Must and the Heptahedron: Remarks on Remarks
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2003)
Remarks on Second-Order Consequence
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2003)
Logic, the A priori, and the Empirical
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2003)
Truth matters: normativity in thought and knowledge
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2004)
If language and thougt are to be taken as objective, they must respond to how the world is. I propose to explain this responsiveness in terms of conditions of correction, more precisely, by taking thoughts and linguistic ...
Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2004)
Moral projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there ...