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Norms for pure desire
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent ...
Global aphasia and the language of thought
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
Jerry Fodor's arguments for a language of thought (LOT) are largely theoretical. Is there any empirical evidence that supports the existence of LOT? There is. Research on Global Aphasia supports the existence of LOT. In ...
Fodor and demonstratives in LOT
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution ...
Fodor on multiple realizability and nonreductive physicalism: Why the argument does not work
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
This paper assesses Fodor’s well-known argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive physicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizability is weak at best and so ...
Resources and the acceptability of the Repugnant Conclusion
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
La Conclusión Repugnante de Parfit argumenta, contraintuitivamente, que para cada mundo A hay otro mundo mejor Z con una población mayor y mínimo bienestar. Esa intuición es incorrecta porque el argumento no ha considerado ...
Not rational, but not brutely causal either: A reply to Fodor on concept acquisition
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
Jerry Fodor ha argüido que la adquisición de conceptos no puede ser un proceso psicológico o "causal-racional", sino que solamente puede ser un proceso de adquisición "causal-tosco". Esta postura da lugar al problema "pomo ...
Some theoretical and empirical background to Fodor’s systematicity arguments
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
This paper aims to clarify certain features of the systematicity arguments by a review of some of the largely underexamined background in Chomsky’s and Fodor’s early work on transformational grammar.; Este artículo intenta ...
Guest editor’s presentation
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
Guest editor's presentation of the special issue on the philosophical legacy of Jerry Fodor.
Perception as a propositional attitude.
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, "Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?" (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein ...
Does impartial reasoning matter in economic decisions? An experimental result about distributive (un)fairness in a production context.
(Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua, 2020)
El velo de ignorancia rawlsiano debería inducir una conducta justa en contextos distributivos. Este estudio intentó, mediante un juego del Dictador con opciones de dar y tomar, re-crear una especie de posición original en ...