The concept of cultural heritage has experienced a process of extension during the past few decades. Because it is a cultural construction, it is subject to differences in appreciation based on contextual and institutional ...

We examine competition in Mobile Internet services, when operators bargain over the coverage sharing and their reciprocal roaming charge. Results show that in equilibrium operators cover the overall territory entirely and ...

Potential efficiency gains due to a merger can be used by competition authorities to judge upon proposed mergers. In a world where agents’ efforts, observable or unobservable, affect the success of a production cost reducing ...

In this paper, we seek to examine the effect of comparisons and social capital on subjective well-being. Furthermore, we test if, through social influence and exposure, social capital is either an enhancer or appeaser of ...

In this paper, we assess the forecasting performance of count data models applied to arts attendance. We estimate participation models for two artistic activities that differ in their degree of popularity -museum and jazz ...

In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal ...

The result of neutrality of vertical integration for competition postulated by the Chicago School can be supported by a benchmark model with (1) an upstream monopolist, (2) homogeneous goods downstream and (3) observable ...

This paper investigates the extent to which a biased transmission of educational endowments affects fertility. To this end, we devise a version of Becker’s family decision model that takes preference change into account. ...

This paper analyzes the impact of agency problems on two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to carry out a stand-alone or a joint project. A joint project can be conducted by a single or both entrepreneurs’ research units, which ...

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over ...