



Politika eta Administrazio Zientzia Saila

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

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Eskerrak

Doktorego tesia aldapa malkartsu bezain luzea da eta berau hasi aurretik, bitartean eta amaieran era batean edo bestean bide hori egiten lagungarriak diren pertsonak amaigabeak dira. Ezinezkoa da orri xume hauetan euren ekarpenen garrantzia islatzea are gutxiago pertsona horien guztien izena jasotzea. Zuzenean aipatu ez arren, guztiei eskerrak eman nahi dizkiet aldeztu aurretik.

Lehenik eta behin, eskerrak eman nahi dizkiet prozesu hau gertutik jasan eta aurrera egiten lagundu didazuenei: gurasoei, Begoña eta Txitxori, Miren, Alex eta Peiori (bidearen amaiera bakarrik ezagutu arren), osaba Mikeli y como no, a mi amama Celia, el espíritu más inquieto y joven de todos. Zuen laguntza funtsezkoa izan da, batez ere tesiaren zama pisutsuegia izan denean. Zaloari, momentu ilun eta argi guztiak kolorez margozten laguntzeagatik. “Visionaris en un mon d’aquareles!”. Osaba, izeko eta lehengusu guztiei, txikitatik lagun modukoak izateagatik. Esna mantentzeko amesten jarraitzen duen izeko Enkarri. Jule Goikoetxeari eta Igor Ahedori, hasierako (eta amaierako) zalantzekin intelektualki lagundu eta nire lanean aurrera jarraitzeko beti hitz onak izateagatik.

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Eskerrik asko guztioi!

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Ikerketa lan honek Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatean ikertzaileak prestatzeko kontratazio deialdiaren diru-laguntza jaso du, 2014ko apiriletik 2018ko apirila arte.

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Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

AURKIBIDEA

.....	1
.....	1
Sarrera.....	21
1- Ikerketa postpositibista: nazionalismoaren falazia epistemikoa gainditzearen beharrak.....	24
1.1 Positibismoa.....	24
1.2 Ikerketa post-positibista bati bide eginez.....	29
1.2.1 Gizarte Zientziak vs. Natur Zientziak: kokapen “arkeologikoa”	29
1.3 Ikerketa post-positibista	30
1.3.1 Lehen zertzeladak.....	30
1.3.2 Aurreikuspenik eta lege kausalik ez.....	31
1.3.3 Aurkikuntza testuinguruaren eta justifikazio testuinguruaren banaketarik ez: nazionalismoaren falazia epistemikoa.....	32
1.3.4 Problematizazioa, azalpen erretroduktiboa eta pertsuasioa: artikulazioaren metodoa	36
2- Ikerketa galderak eta hipotesiak:	40
3- Tesiaren egitura	42
1 The Strategic Relational Approach.....	46
1- Putting the Strategic Relational Approach in its place: its broader theoretical context.....	46
2.1 The SRA in its context: separate tables in a divided discipline.....	46
2.1.1 Abstraction vs Empiricism	47
2.1.2 Structure vs Agency	47
2.1.3 Society vs State.....	48
2.2 The SRA: finding its place beyond separate tables.	49
3- The strategic relational heuristic: its development through three stages.....	49
3.1 The SRA through its main stages.	49
3.2.1 First Stage of the SRA: overcoming society-centred and state-centred views	49
3.2.2 The second phase: spatio-temporal reflections on structure and agency....	55
3.2.3 The third phase: semiosis and the critical cultural turn.....	59
4- What is the state?.....	62
4.1 Defining the state: a first approach.	62

4.2 The State as a social relation: Six dimensions of the state and state power	65
4.2.1 Formal or institutional dimensions	67
4.2.1.1 Modes of political representation and their articulation:	67
4.2.1.2 The institutional architecture of the state.....	68
4.2.1.3 The mechanisms and modes of state intervention and their overall articulation	69
4.2.2 Substantive dimensions	71
4.2.2.1 The social bases of state power: power block, hegemonic bloc and historical bloc.....	71
4.2.2.2 State project	72
4.2.2.3 Hegemonic visions.....	74
5- Basic conceptual framework: matrix and subaltern state(hood) defined	75
6- Mechanisms and processes: strategic relational collective action.....	79
6.1 Mechanisms, Processes and Episodes: putting mobilization in motion	79
6.2 Mechanisms and processes of secession.....	84
6.3 Hegemony as a concrete process:	85
2 Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren teoria.....	87
Sarrera:.....	87
1- Diskurtsoa eta Artikulazioa	90
2- Subjektua	93
3- Antagonismoa eta objektibitatea	96
4- Antagonismoa eta artikulazioa:	98
4.1 Ekibalentzia eta diferentzia:.....	98
4.2 Antagonismo herritarra eta demokratikoa:	99
4.3 Unibertsala eta partikularra:.....	101
5- Diskurtsoaren egituraketa eta adierazleak.	105
6- Hegemonia.....	110
6.1 Zer da hegemonia?.....	110
6.2 Hegemonia kategoria gisa:.....	111
6.3.1 Maila ontologikoa: jendartearen eraketa	112
6.3.2 Maila ontikoa: hegemonia politikaren logika moduan.	113
6.3.3 Hegemonia identitate politiko kolektiboen eraikuntzarako logika.....	114
7- Antagonismoa eta politikoa:.....	116

8- Herria eta populismoa.....	120
9- Ikuspegi kritikoak.....	132
10- Frame analisia: hegemoniaren azterketarako euskarri metodologikoa.....	140
3 Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy: neoliberal governmentality and the return of sovereignty	142
1- Introduction: sovereignty and demands for sovereignty	142
2- Sovereignty and democratization	143
3- Neoliberal governmentality	149
3.1 Governmentality defined	149
3.2 From the liberal art of government to the neoliberal governmentality.....	151
3.3 Neoliberal governmentality as a new rationality	153
3.4 Governmentality, hegemony and historical bloc: which place for the state?	155
4- Excursus on capitalism and the state:.....	156
4.1 The articulation of economic and extraeconomic institutions.....	156
4.2 From the Keynesian Welfare National State to the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime	159
4.3 Trends and counter-trends.....	160
5- The trend towards authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy	162
5.2 The beginning of ‘authoritarian statism’.....	162
5.3 New articulation of authority territory and rights: neoliberal governmentality and the consolidation of the SWPR.....	163
5.3.1 Redistribution of powers inside the state: the strengthening of the executive and fast policy making.....	163
5.3.1.1 What about the European Union?.....	165
5.3.2 Reconfiguration of the public private divide.....	166
5.3.2.1 From government to governance	167
5.3.2.1.1 The European Union: what place for democratic governance? ..	167
5.3.2.2 Comercial arbitration	171
5.3.2.3 Credit Rating Agencies	172
5.4 Authoritarian statism and North Atlantic Financial Crisis: condensation of previous trends.....	173
5.4.2 Authoritarian statism and the crisis management in the EU:	174
5.4.2.1 The European Financial and Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM):	175

5.4.2.2 The ‘tightening’ of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP):.....	176
5.4.2.3 The Euro-Plus-Pact (EPP).....	177
5.4.2.4 The Fiscal Compact (FC).	177
5.4.3 Crisis management and the breach of Formal democracy.....	177
5.4.4 Multiscalar authoritarian statism in the EU: final considerations.....	178
4 Spanish Matrix State	180
1- A dual axis transition: from dictatorship to democracy and from semi-peripheral fordism to semi-peripheral post-fordism (1975-1978)	180
1.1 From dictatorship to democracy	182
1.2 The political economy of change: transition from semi-peripheral fordism to semi-peripheral post-fordism.	183
2. Democratic Spain as a semi-peripheral Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime (1978- 2008): España va bien.....	185
2.1 Some introductory considerations: accumulation regime, state project and Spanish nationalism.....	185
2.2 The Spanish accumulation strategy and its neoliberal state project:	188
2.2.1 Which were the results and consequences of the boom years?	193
2.3 The State of Autonomies: decentralization in the shadow of hierarchy	195
2.3.1 Some introductory notes.....	195
2.3.2 Autonomous Communities in motion	196
2.3.3 Subalternity, decentralization and recentralization: democratization in the era of authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy	198
2.3.3.1 Is Spain a federal state?	200
2.3.3.2 Strong executive and central government.....	204
4- 2007-2017: Spain after the fiesta.....	206
4.2 The crash of the accumulation strategy, the state project and recentralization: crisis management, austerity and authoritarian statism	206
4.2.1 The end of the ‘fiesta’	206
4.2.2 Authoritarian statism and re-centralization	208
4.3 Krisi organikoa: ¡No es una crisis es una estafa!.....	214
4 Katalunia	225
1- Sarrera:	225
1.1 Posfordismoaren tentsioak: txanpon beraren bi aurpegi.	225
1.2 - Katalanismoa eta Kataluniako nazionalismoaren kokapen orokorra.....	226

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

1.3. Trantsizioa Katalunian	228
1.4 Garai autonomikoaren aktore nagusiak.....	230
1. 5 Independentismoa: bazterreko mugimendu politikoa.	232
2- Estatalitate subalternoa eta demokratizazio katalana: demos, state, nation building prozesua	234
2.1 Autonomismoa: estatu proiektu organiko hegemonikoa (1978-2010).....	234
2.2 Naziorik gabeko estatutik estatalitate subalternora: demos, state, nation building prozesua.	237
2.3 Model sanitari català: nazio eraikuntza garaikidearen adibide.	240
2.3.1 Konfidantza eta dependentzia: komunitate politikoaren ardatzak.....	240
2.3.2 Model sanitari català.....	241
2.3.2.1 - Kokapena:	243
2.3.2.2- Aktoreak.	247
3- Demokratizazioa eta desdemokratizazioaren arteko tensioa demos-nation-state building-aren adibide	250
4- Tripartit-a eta Estatut berria (2003 – 2010).....	255
4.1 Botere erakundetuaren (potestas) krisia: “Crisis in” eta autonomiaren mugak	255
4.2- Estatut berria: demokratizazio katalanean sakontzeko adostasun instituzionala	258
4.3- Estatu gaitasunak, egingarritasun politikoa eta gobernu demokratikoa.....	264
5- Procès (2010-2018)	267
5.1- Procès: gatazkaren kausak eta definizioa(k).....	267
5.2- Krisi organikoa/ “Crisis of”:	270
5.2.1 Ordezkaritza krisia eta estatuaren oinarri sozialaren krisia:	274
5.2.2 Estatu proiekturen krisia, zilegitasun krisia, barneratze instituzionalaren krisia eta gaitasunen krisia.....	287
5.3 Krisi organikoa demokratizazioa/desdemokratizazioaren arteko tentsioan: zenbait ondorio.....	301
5.5- Hegemonia independentista eta artikulazio populista.....	312
5.5.1- Sarrera:	312
5.5.2- Eragile independentisten diskurtsoa:.....	314
5.5.2.1- Ara és l’hora. Units per un país nou.	314
5.5.2.2- Via Lliure a la Republica Catalana.....	318

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

5.5.2.3- Junts pel si (ERC- PdeCat)	325
5.5.2.4- CUP-Crida Consituent	329
5.5.3- Markogintza independentista	331
5.5.4- Hegemonia eta artikulazio populista	339
6 Basque Country	347
1 Some introductory notes	347
2- Defining the Basque Country.	348
3- On Basque exceptionalities:	351
3.1 Basque Federalism:	351
3.1.1 The federal parliamentary system:	352
3.1.2 The confederal Finance System:.....	352
3.2 The Basque protest cycle:	357
4 Basque democratization	361
5 The Political Statute of the Community of the Basque Country: an institutionalised compromised to deepen Basque democracy	364
6- The new political time (2011-2018)	378
6.1 Introduction	378
6.2 Passive Revolution	378
6.2.1 Crisis of representation and crisis of the social basis of the state	380
6.2.2 Crisis of the state project, crisis of legitimacy, crisis of institutional integration and crisis of capacities.....	388
6.2.3 Crisis in: Basque democratization and the organic crisis of Spain.....	400
6.3 Mechanisms and processes.....	402
6.4 Autonomist hegemony and populist articulation:	408
6.4.1 Introduction:	408
6.4.2 Gure Esku Dago	411
6.4.3 EAJ PNV	413
6.4.4 Pro-independence approach	419
6.4.5 Hegemony and populist articulation	429
6.4.5.1 The Basque Oasis: institutional populist articulation	431
7 Britainiar Estatu Matrizea	438
1- Sarrera:	438
2- Post-fordismoa, krisi organikoa eta Thatcherismoa	439

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

3- Britainiar Estatu eta lurraldearen artikulazio politikoa.....	447
3.1 United Kingdom: Batasunaren oinarriak eta Eskoziar estatu erakundeak	447
3.2 Scottish Office: demokratizazio mugatua	448
3.3 Eskoziar subalternitatea: Thatcherismoa klima hotzean.	452
4- Britainiar Krisi Organikoa: Disunited Kingdom	460
8 Scotland	469
1- Some introductory notes.....	469
2- Devolution: state powers and Scottish democratization.....	469
3- Scottish Health System.....	472
4- Sovereignty and organic crisis.....	479
4.1 Crisis of representation and crisis of the social basis of the state.	479
4.2 Crisis of the state Project, legitimacy crisis, crisis of institutional integration and crisis of capacities.....	485
4.3 Crisis of: Scottish democratization and the organic crisis of Britain.	493
5- Referendum on Scottish independence and the dynamic of contention.	494
6- Hegemony and the new people.....	504
9 Ondorioak	522

Irudien Aurkibidea

IRUDIA 1. Indukzioa eta Dedukzioa	26
IRUDIA 2. Teoria, errealitatea eta behaketaren banaketa.....	26
IRUDIA 3. Aurkikuntza eta Justifikazio Testuingurua	30
IRUDIA 4 Hiru momentu analitikoak.....	36
IRUDIA 5 The Dialectic of Structure and Agency: Beyond Structuration Theory.....	56
IRUDIA 6 From Foucauldizing Gramsci to Gramscianizing Foucault.....	62
IRUDIA 7 A Dynamic, Interactive Framework for Analyzing Mobilization in Contentious Politics.....	83
IRUDIA 8 Mechanisms of Hegemony	86
IRUDIA 9 Desplazamendua eta Kondentsazioa.....	108
IRUDIA 10 Eskaera Partikularrak eta Ekibalentzien Logika	123
IRUDIA 11 Arbuioa eta dimentsio irabazlea	126
IRUDIA 12 Dimentsio irabazlea eta osotasunaren ordezkapena.....	127
IRUDIA 13 Iraultza Pasiboa eta Transformismoa.....	129
IRUDIA 14 Kate alternatiboa eta muga berriaren sorrera.....	130
IRUDIA 15 Politika, Hegemonia eta Populismoa.....	131
IRUDIA 16 Hegemonia eta artikulazio populista.....	141
IRUDIA 17 Political power from potentia to potestas	145
IRUDIA 18 The ideal process of Basque Sovereignty/ Democratization.	148
IRUDIA 19 Governance and its democratic deficit	169
IRUDIA 22 Botere politikoa potentiatik potestasera.....	215
IRUDIA 23 15- M: Yes We Question this Democracy.....	216
IRUDIA 24 Six dimensions of the state and state power	218
IRUDIA 25 Zor Publikoa (BPG%)	221
IRUDIA 26 Zerga bidezko diru sarrera EBko Estatu Kideetan, 2014.....	222
IRUDIA 27	226
IRUDIA 28 Estatu Boterearen Dimentsio Substantiboak	231
IRUDIA 29 Kataluniako Ezker Independentistaren eskema	233
IRUDIA 30 State Nation Demos Building	237
IRUDIA 31 SCS Zuzendaritza Batzordean parte hartze kuotak.....	246
IRUDIA 32 Kataluniako Osasun Sistemarekiko asetze eta fideltasun maila (2012).....	252
IRUDIA 33 Kataluniako Estatutua Berritzeko Beharra (2005).....	258
IRUDIA 34 Burujabetza eskaeren dimentsio nagusiak	259
IRUDIA 35 Subalternitatea eta Burujabetza Katalana	266
IRUDIA 36 Liskarraldi Sezesionistaren kausak.....	269
IRUDIA 37 Krisi Organikoa Katalunian eta 1978ko Erregimena.....	271
IRUDIA 38 Estatuaren eta Estatu boterearen sei dimentsioak	273
IRUDIA 39 Kataluniako Demokraziaren funtzionamenduarekiko asetze maila.....	275
IRUDIA 40 Kataluniako egoera politikoaren balorazioa	275
IRUDIA 41 Espainiako egoera politikoaren balorazioa.....	276
IRUDIA 42 Kataluniako Politikariekiko Konfiantza. 2017ko uztailen.....	277
IRUDIA 43 Espainiar Politikariekiko Konfiantza 2017ko uztailen	277

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 44	Kataluniako Politikariekiko Konfiantza. 2007-2017 bilakaera	278
IRUDIA 45	Spainiar Politikariekiko Konfiantza 2015-2017 bilakaera.....	278
IRUDIA 46	Kataluniako Generalitataren balorazioa 2017ko uztailean	279
IRUDIA 47	Spainiar Gobernuaren balorazioa 2017ko uztailean.....	279
IRUDIA 48	Kataluniako Generalitataren konfiantza maila: 2009-2017 bilakaera	280
IRUDIA 49	Spainiar Gobernuaren konfiantza maila: 2009-2017 bilakaera.....	280
IRUDIA 50	Kataluniako Erakundeen balorazioa: 2017ko uztaila.	281
IRUDIA 51	Kataluniako Parlamentuaren balorazioa: 2009-2017 bilakaera	282
IRUDIA 52	Spainiar Diputatuen Kongresuaren Konfiantza maila: 2009-2017 bilakaera	282
IRUDIA 53	Alderdiekiko Sinpatia 2006-2017.....	285
IRUDIA 54	Estatu boterearen dimentsio substantiboak 1978-2019	286
IRUDIA 55	2010-2018: polarizazioa	287
IRUDIA 56	Diskurtsoaren dimentsio nagusiak.....	312
IRUDIA 57	Com vols que sigui el teu país nou?	315
IRUDIA 58	Ara és l'hora 9N.....	316
IRUDIA 59	Ara és l'hora: pensions i dones lliures	317
IRUDIA 60	Via Lliure a la República Catalana: ekibalentzien logika I	319
IRUDIA 61	Via lliure: ekibalentzien logika II.....	320
IRUDIA 62	Junts Pel si: Círculo virtuoso de la democracia en Catalunya	325
IRUDIA 63	Junts pel Sí Injusticias no, solidaridad sí.....	326
IRUDIA 64	Junts pel Sí. Sí a gestionar nuestro dinero para no sufrir recortes	327
IRUDIA 65	Junts Pel Sí Cercanías eficiente	328
IRUDIA 66	Markogintza Independentista.....	331
IRUDIA 67	Via Lliure a la república: artikulazio populistak	342
IRUDIA 68	Errepublikak demokraziaren metafora	344
IRUDIA 69	Kate ekibalentzial alternatiboa	345
IRUDIA 70	State Demos Nation building.....	350
IRUDIA 71	Perceptions of the need to reform the Statutes of Autonomy (%) 2005	365
IRUDIA 72	Attitudes towards the state project.....	366
IRUDIA 73	Main claims: demos state building issues.....	367
IRUDIA 74	Passive Revolution and the Regime of 78.....	379
IRUDIA 75	Gure Esku Dago.....	406
IRUDIA 76	Hegemony and populist articulation.....	410
IRUDIA 77	Gure Esku Dago: Zergatik Erabaki?.....	412
IRUDIA 78	EAJ PNV: Hegemonic articulation.....	418
IRUDIA 79	Pro-independence hegemonic articulation.....	428
IRUDIA 80	Sovereignty, Transformism and Passive Revolution.....	432
IRUDIA 81	Populism and self-government	436
IRUDIA 82	Bigarren Mundu Gerra osteko “Britainiartasuna”	444
IRUDIA 83	Thatcherismoaren “Britainiartasun” neoliberal/kontserbadorea.....	445
IRUDIA 84	Sektore ekonomikoen bilakaera; 1989-2015	454
IRUDIA 85	Eskoziar demokraziaren metafora	457
IRUDIA 86	Thatcherismoaren aurkako “Eskozia sozialdemokrata”	459
IRUDIA 87	Alderdi kideak milaka: 1929-2017 bilakaera	462

IRUDIA 88 Britainiar gobernuak “ia inoiz sinisten ez dituztenen” ehunekoa (almost never trust)	463
IRUDIA 89 Sindikatuen kide kopuruen jaitsiera eta soldata ezberdintasunaren hazkundera....	464
IRUDIA 90 Gini Adierazlearen bilakaera: 1961-2015/16.....	465
IRUDIA 91 Exclusive national identity, England 1992-2014.....	466
IRUDIA 92 Devolved and Reserved Revenue in Scotland 2016-17.....	476
IRUDIA 93 Devolved and Reserved Expenditure in Scotland 2016-17	476
IRUDIA 94 Sovereignty and Organic Crisis	479
IRUDIA 95 Trust in the Scottish and UK Governments to work in Scotland's best interests (1999-2016, % trust 'just about always'/ 'most of the time').....	480
IRUDIA 96 Trust in the UK Government, Scottish Government and Local Council to make fair decisions (2006-2016, % trust 'a great deal'/ 'quite a lot')	481
IRUDIA 97 How good are the Scottish Government, UK Government and own Local Council at listening to people's views before taking decisions? (2004-2016, % 'very good' / 'quite good')	481
IRUDIA 98 Who has most influence over the way Scotland is run? (1999-2016, %).....	482
IRUDIA 99 Who ought to have more influence over the way Scotland is run? (1999-2016, %)	483
IRUDIA 100 Does having a Scottish Parliament give ordinary people more say in how Scotland is governed (1999-2016, %).....	484
IRUDIA 101 Unemployment Rate: Scotland and UK	489
IRUDIA 102 Actual and Forecast UK welfare spending compared to a 2010/11 baseline	492
IRUDIA 103 UK Welfare Spending Trends as Nominal cost, Real cost and as share of GDP.....	492
IRUDIA 104 Reductions in Social Security spending (Scotland-level) from Coalition and Conservative government policy.....	492
IRUDIA 105 Support for Independence- 36 year trend	496
IRUDIA 106 Support for independence 1999-2016.....	496
IRUDIA 107 The cost of Westminster	506
IRUDIA 108 Achievements	507
IRUDIA 109 Protect your NHS.....	507
IRUDIA 110 Poverty.....	508
IRUDIA 111 Westminster and the Government of Scotland	509
IRUDIA 112 Nuclear weapons.....	510
IRUDIA 113 It's Scotland's Oil	511
IRUDIA 114 A better, fairer Scotland.....	512
IRUDIA 115 Business for Scotland	514
IRUDIA 116 Yes/No football pitch.....	515
IRUDIA 117 RIC Sack the Tories.....	516
IRUDIA 118 Yes and Scottish Labour.....	516
IRUDIA 119 Populism and Scottish Independence	519
IRUDIA 120 Scottish Independence as a metaphor of democracy	521
IRUDIA 121 The privatization of democracy and its tensions in current statehood.....	527
IRUDIA 122 Tesiaren oinarri nagusiak.....	531

Taulen Aurkibidea

TAULA 1 Six dimensions of the state and state power.....	66
TAULA 2 Tentsio demokratiko liberala.....	119
TAULA 5 Trends and Counter-Trends.....	161
TAULA 9 Egitura Ekonomikoa, jarduera sektoreka	235
TAULA 10 Egitura ekonomikoa Autonomia Erkidegoen, udalerrien eta sektoreen arabera (%) 2005-2006	236
TAULA 11 Autonomiekiko herritarren asetze maila	254
TAULA 12 Estatu Proiektuarekiko jarrerak (2002-2005)	258
TAULA 13 Estatutaren aurkako epaia.....	263
TAULA 14 Kataluniako Parlamentuko Hauteskundeetan Botoaren bilakaera 1980-2015	285
TAULA 15 Autonomia mailaren balorazioa: 2017ko uztaila.....	288
TAULA 16 Autonomia mailaren balorazioaren garapena: 2006-2017	289
TAULA 17 Erregioa, Autonomia, Estatu Federala, Estatu Independentea:	289
TAULA 18 Erregioa, Autonomia, Estatu Federala, Estatu Independentea:	290
TAULA 19 Independentzia bai/ez: 2017ko uztaila	290
TAULA 20 Independentzia bai/ez: 2015-2017 bilakaera.....	291
TAULA 21 Independentzia eta gertakari politiko nagusiak: 2006-2016 bilakaera	292
TAULA 22 Independentziaren aldeko arrazoiak: 2017ko uztaila	293
TAULA 23 Independentziaren aurkako arrazoiak: 2017ko uztaila	293
TAULA 24 Sektore ekonomikoen bilakaera Katalunian eta Espainian: 2000-2012	295
TAULA 25 Aktibitate, langabezia eta okupazio tasen bilakaera Katalunian eta Espainian: 1976- 2012.....	296
TAULA 26 Defizit fiskalaren bilakaera 1986-2012 artean	299
TAULA 27 Independentziaren aldeko arrazoiak: garapena	313
TAULA 28 ANC: Diagnostikoa eta Pronostikoa	322
TAULA 29 The meaning of Euskal Herria.....	349
TAULA 30 The Economic Agreement.....	354
TAULA 31 New Statute	368
TAULA 32 Contents of the new Statute.....	369
TAULA 33 Reflections on self-government I	370
TAULA 34 Reflections on the procedure.....	370
TAULA 35 Valuation of Basque self-government	371
TAULA 36 Comparison with Spain: are the next services better, equal or worst in the Basque Country?.....	372
TAULA 37 Which are the two institutions that have helped more in the improvement of the Basque Country?	372
TAULA 38 Consequences of self-government.....	373
TAULA 39 Questions about the New Statute.....	373
TAULA 40 Questions about the rejection of the New Statute	374
TAULA 41 Basque and Spanish political situation.....	381
TAULA 42 Basque and Spanish Governments	382
TAULA 43 Satisfaction with the working of democracy	383

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 44	Satisfaction with institutions	384
TAULA 45	Confidence in institutions.....	385
TAULA 46	Evolution of the Electoral Support.....	386
TAULA 47	Sympathy with parties	387
TAULA 48	Are you happy with current statute of autonomy?	388
TAULA 49	Do you want more or less autonomy?	389
TAULA 50	Major self-government would be beneficial?.....	389
TAULA 51	Soziometroa: Support to independence 1998-2017.....	390
TAULA 52	Soziometroa: Independentzia bai/ez.....	390
TAULA 53	Imagining the Basque State: attitude towards independence	391
TAULA 54	Euskobarometro May 2017	391
TAULA 55	Desires for political change.....	392
TAULA 56	GVA by Autonomous Community, municipality and sector (%) 2005-2006.....	394
TAULA 57	Gini Index.....	395
TAULA 58	GDP by sector and year.....	396
TAULA 59	Unemployment rates	396
TAULA 60	Reduction of the state's capacities for intervention.....	399
TAULA 61	Support to the right to decide	407
TAULA 62	Europar Batasunarekiko jarrera eta nazio identitatea.....	466
TAULA 63	Devolution and policy areas.....	471
TAULA 64	Attitudes towards Division of Powers between Scottish Parliament and UK Government, 2010-16	484
TAULA 65	Economic Sectors: 1989-2015	487
TAULA 66	UK, excluding Scotland, output by sector (2011).....	488
TAULA 67	Scotland, output by sector (2011) –.....	488
TAULA 68	Graph 3: Key labour market statistics (January - March 2014)	489
TAULA 69	Krisi Organikoa: Espainia, Katalunia, EAE, Britainia Handia eta Eskozia	535
TAULA 70	Mekanismoak: Katalunia, Euskal Herria, Eskozia	537
TAULA 71	Prozesuak: Katalunia, Euskal Herria, Eskozia	537

Sarrera

Tal vez no nos corresponda decir que nuestra situación es nueva, que nuestra lucha es nueva, pero ¿es que hay alguien que no advierta que nuestra situación es nueva, que nuestra lucha es nueva?¹

Charles Péguy,

Un nuevo teólogo, 1911

Ikerketa honen abiapuntua zurtasun analitiko batetik baino artegatasun pertsonal eta kolektibo batetik dator. Sezesio prozesuek, eskuin edo ezkerreko populismoek, austeritatearen aurkako mugimenduek, alderdi politiko berriek, Europar Batasunaren krisiak, feminismoaren loraldiak, krisi ekologikoak edota azken urteetan ugaritu diren borroka anitzek, ba al dute euren artean harremanik? Era isolatuan aztertzea gomendagarria da edo komunean duten erroak lehentasuna izan beharko luke? Nola txertatu nazionalismoari buruzko ikerketak egungo egiturazko aldaketen baitan?

Errealitatea izozterik ez dagoen neurrian, galderek galdera gehiago eragitea funtsezkoa da. Hala ere, bideari ekiteko ezinbestekoa da horietan sakondu aurretik lehen intuizioak plazaratzea. Zentzu horretan, mundu mailan burujabetza eskaerak ugaritzen ari dira eta eremu analitikoki ezberdintasunak azpimarratzeko joera nagusitu arren, funtsean erroa oso antzekoa denaren susmoa geroz eta hedatuago dago. 2008. urtetik aurrera, egitura politiko eta ekonomikoaren tentsio eta kontraesanak azaltzeko “krisia” izan da etengabe erabili den kontzeptua. Analitikoki gutxi esateaz gain, krisiaren ideia eduki zehatzekin lotzen ez bada, desdemokratizazio prozesu oro justifikatzeko aitzakia bihurtu daitekeela deritzogu. Hala ere, Gramsciren definizio klasikora hurbilduko gara gure lehen hausnarketak plazaratzeko. Zentzu horretan, “mundu zaharra hiltzen ari da eta berria ezin da jaio. Eta ilunbe horretan sortzen dira munstroak” zioen maisu Sardiniarrak.

Testuinguru hauetan, norabide oso ezberdinak har ditzaketen prozesuak azaleratzen dira. Greziar egoerari begirada bat emango bagenio, solidoak sublimatu eta aurreko antzik ez duen mamu gaseoso baten antza har dezakeela ikus liteke. Kataluniako egoera aztertuz aldiz, izotzezko bloke gogorrak mobilizazio liskartsuaren ondorioz urtzera ailegatu daitezkeela esan genezake. Europar Batasunaren baitako herri gehienak aztertuta

¹ Bensaïd, 2009:11-n aipatua.

bestalde, inork aurreikusi ez zituen austeritate neurriek agerikoa ez den gas-egoera utzi eta egituretan gogorki solidifikatzen ari direla esan liteke.

Momentu politiko horren baitan ulertu behar dira nazionalista moduan sailkatu diren mugimenduen loraldia. Aldiz, nazionalismoari buruzko teoriak egungo errealitatea sakontasunez azaltzeko dituzten gabeziak azpimarratzea da gure lehen abiapuntua. Zibiko eta etniko dikotomiak, frantziar edo germaniar inspirazioa eta hauei loturiko ilustratua ala erromantikoa banaketak enpirikoki funtsik ez izateaz gain, nazioa eta demokraziaren arteko lotura aztertzeke dagoen traba politiko-epistemologiko nagusia da (Azurmendi, 2014; Máiz, 2008).

Eskola teorikoei dagokionez, paradigma primordialista, perenialista, modernista eta etnosinbolikoaren arteko hartu emanak nazioaren ikuspegi esentzialistena gainditzeko zenbait oinarri eskaini arren (Odrizola, 2016), ez dizkigute egungo estatu egituren eta aktoreen arteko harreman konplexuak azaltzeko oinarri teorikorik eskaintzen.

Azken ideia horretatik gertu, azken hamarkadetan erregio eta erregionalismoari loturiko ikerketak ugaritu dira (Keating, 1998; 2001; 2014). Hauen oinarrian, Europar Batasunaren baitako aldaketei erantzuteko asmoz, post-soberania eta postnazionalismoaren ideiak leudeke. Honi hertsiki loturik, Edinburgoko eskolaren baitan, nazionalismoa eta ongizatearen arteko lotura burutu duten zenbait lanen eragina azpimarratu beharra dago (McEwen, 2005).

Ikerketa eremua hedatu eta galdera berriei erantzuteko nazionalismoaren teorian ohikoak ziren eremuetatik at zeuden lanabes teorikoak baliatzea da aipatu eskolen ekarpen nagusia. Haatik, egungo errealitatea era kritikoan aztertu ordez, nazionalismoaren teoria egungo ordena politiko ekonomikoarekin era akritikoan lerrotatzen duen “problem-solving” ikuspegitik gertu dagoela iruditzen zaigu (Cox, 1981). Nazioak aztertzerako orduan “estatu egituren” ordez “erregioa” bezalako metafora espazialak pribilegiatzea, hustasun ontologiko batean oinarriturik dagoela deritzogu. Bestetik, analitikoki ezberdinak diren errealitateak berdintzea eragin dezake (Ingalaterra Hego Ekialdea eta Eskozia adibidez). Horretaz gain, gure testuinguru hurbilenean nazioa eta soberania geroz eta presentzia handiagoa duten momentuan, post-soberaniari eta postnazionalismoari buruz hitz egitea baino, hauen eraldaketa eta demokraziaren arteko loturari buruz itauntzea egokiago iruditzen zaigu.

Estatua erlazio sozial konplexua da eta horren ondorioz sortzen diren eraldaketak aztertzea da gure aburuz abiapuntua. Hori dela eta, aurrerago ikusiko dugun moduan, gure ikerketa ez da nazionalismoari buruzko lan bat, estatua eta demokraziari buruzkoa baizik. 1970. hamarkada amaieratik aurrera kapitalaren frakzio finantzariaren lidergopean egituratu zen bloke historikoaren kontraesanei buruzko lana hain zuzen. Horren baitan garatu diren demokratizazio eta

desdemokratizaziorako joeren tentsioek lehentasuna izango duten neurrian, Eskozia, Katalunia eta Euskal Herriko burujabetza eskaerak dinamika horiei loturik ulertzen ditugu. Euskal Herria eta Kataluniari dagokienez, aldez aurretik esan beharra dago Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoa eta Kataluniako Autonomia Erkidegoa izango direla lan honen ikergai nagusia.

Hori aintzat harturik, zergatik ez ditugu antzekoak diren beste kasu batzuk aukeratu? 2014. urteko apirila eta 2018ko apirila artean burutu ikerketaren ondorioa da eskuetan dugun lana. Tarte horretan aipatu lurraldeetan jazo diren hainbat gertakirekiko jakinmina izan da gure ikergaiaren bulkada, hortaz, horrek bultzatu gaitu kasuok aukeratzera.

Azkenik, ikerketa gorabeherak dituen bide malkartsua izanik, bere garapenerako aukeratzen diren lanabesek bide horren noranzkoa, garapena eta helmuga baldintzatzen dute. Hori dela eta, beharrezkoa jotzen dugu lanabes horien artean hegemonikoa den positibismoaren inguruko hausnarketa kritikoa plazaratu eta nazionalismoa postpositibismoaren talaiatik begiratzea.

1- Ikerketa postpositibista: nazionalismoaren falazia epistemikoa gainditzearen beharraz

1.1 Positibismoa

Ikerketa honen zioetako bat, bai Gizarte Zientzietan maila orokorrean zein Politika Zientzietan maila zehatzean nagusi den ikerketa paradigma positibistaren aurrean alternatiba bat proposatzea da. Hala ere, hori garatze aldera lehenik eta behin aipatu paradigmaren elementu nagusiekiko hurbilpen labur bat egitea komenigarria deritzogu.

Zer da positibismoa? Kontzeptu askorekin gertatzen den antzera aterki orokor horren baitan ikuspegi eta eskola anitz koka daitezke, euren artean kontraesankorrak izan daitezkeenak askotan. Hori kontuan hartuta definizio orokorretara mugatzeak, *a priori*, gauzak argitu baino gehiago ilundu litzakela uste dugu. Hori dela eta, definizio eta eskolez harago, bere ezaugarri nagusien hurbilpen bat burutzea egokiagoa deritzogu.

Dreyfusen ikuspegitik hauek liriateke teorizazio positibista idealaren 6 ezaugarriak² (Dreyfus, 1986:11-12):

- 1- Argia eta esplizitua izatea: ezin da intuizioan edo interpretazioan oinarritu.
- 2- Unibertsaltasuna: leku guztietan momentu guztietan frogagarria izatea.
- 3- Abstrakzioa: ez dio derrigorrez adibide partikularrei erreferentzia egin behar.
- 4- Diskrezioa: testuinguruko elementuen eraginik gabe burutu behar da.
- 5- Sistematizazioa: osotasun berri bat sortuko du, zeinetan banaturik dauden elementuak (aldagaiak, ezaugarriak, faktoreak etab.) bata bestearekin harremanetan jarriko diren lege edo arauen bidez.
- 6- Aurreikuspena eta osotasuna: ikertuko den eremuaren deskripzioak osoa izan behar du, eta beraz, eremuan eragiten duten elementuen aldaketak eta beraien ondorioak zehaztuko ditu. Horren bidez, etorkizunari begira aurreikuspenak burutuko dira.

Lehenengo hurbilpen honen ostean positibismoaren ezaugarri nagusiak gehiago garatzen saiatuko gara. Lehenik eta behin esan beharra dago bai zuzenean zein zeharka, Gizarte eta Politika Zientzietan lortu ezinezko ideal baten etengabeko presentzia dakusagula: politika eta jendartea azaltzeko, natur zientzietan garaturiko eredutik gertu (ahalik eta gertuen) egongo den “benetako zientzia” garatzea. Horren ondorioz, paradigma positibistaren³ aburuz, ikerketa zientifikoaren helburu nagusietako bat **legeak bilatzea**

² Jatorrizkoa ingeleraz: (1) Explicitness, (2) Universality, (3) Abstractedness, (4) Discreteness, (5) Systematicity, (6) Prediction and completeness.

³ Neurri handi batean Asier Blasen “Politika eta Administrazio Analisirako Metodologia eta teknikak” liburua, paradigma positibista (edo neo-positibistaren) elementu nagusietan oinarritzen da. Patxi Juaristiren lanarekin batera (Juaristi, 2003), gaiaren inguruan euskaraz argitaratu den bakanetarikoa da beraz atal honetan erreferentzia gisa erabiliko dugu.

edo deskribatzea izango da (Blas, 2008:27). Legeak, behatutako bi fenomenoren arteko harreman erregularrak dira eta aldagaitzak edo probabilitatezkoak⁴ izan daitezke (idem). Blasen eredua jarraituz, hauek kausalak edo ez-kausalak izan daitezkeen arren, Gizarte Zientzietan **lege kausalak** bilatzea izango da helburua (ibidem:27-28). Hau, Glynos eta Howarthekek adierazten diguten moduan, Natur Zientzietan nagusi den **lege kausalen paradigmen hegemoniaren** ondorio da:

We claim that the default tendency to rely on deductive (and inductive) reasoning, the hypothetico-deductive method of scientific investigation, and the covering-law model of explanation, is a product of the hegemonic grip of particular, though admittedly powerful, conception of the natural sciences – what we call the causal law paradigm (2007:18).


Glynos eta Howarthen aipuan, positibismoan nagusi izan diren arrazoitzeko bi eredu nagusiak jaso ditugu jadanik: *indukzioa eta dedukzioa*. **Indukzioak**, behatutako errealitatea oinarritzat hartzen du honen bidez sormena estimatu eta teorizatzeke (Blas, 2008:34). Hortaz, errealitateko gertaeretatik hasita orokortu daitezkeen teorizazioak ondorioztatuko lirakeke indukzioaren bidez. **Dedukzioak** aldiz, “sormen intelektualean dauka indarra teoria orokor bat egituratzeko, hortik abiatuta auresaten baitu behaketan aurkituko duena” (idem). Honen bidez, ariketa induktiboaren alderantzizko operazioa egingo litzateke, abstraktuak diren berrespen teorikoetatik abiatuz auresate zehatzak formulatuko genituzkeelako (idem). Hurrengo grafikoan hauen logika nagusia bereizi dezakegu:

⁴ Aldagaitzak Natur Zientzietan nagusituko lirakekeen bitartean, Gizarte Zientzietan probabilitatezko legeak izango dira nagusi (lege aldagaitzak ezinezkoak direlako etengabe aldatzen dagoen errealitate sozialean) (Blas, 2008:27).

IRUDIA 1. Indukzioa eta Deduczioa

A) INDUKZIOA


B) DEDUKZIOA



Iturria: (Blas, 2008:33)

Arrazoitzeko bi bideak kontuan hartu ostean, **teoria eta errealitatearen arteko banaketa** litzateke positibismoaren beste ezaugarrietako bat. Honen arabera, alde batetik konplexua den errealitatea legoke eta bestetik, berau laburbildu eta azalgarriago edo ulergarriagoa egingo lukeen teoria (ibidem:28). **Behaketaren** bidez, teoria eta errealitatea elkartuko lirateke, teoria baten printzipio nagusiak egiaztatuz edo baztertuz. Hurrengo grafikoan jasotzen dugu eskema honen sintesia:

IRUDIA 2. Teoria, errealitatea eta behaketaren banaketa.



Iturria: Blas, 2008: 28

Teoria on batek, arau eta ezaugarri batzuk zaindu beharko lituzke. Hori kontuan hartuta, bere lehen baldintzetako bat *egiaztagarria* izatea litzateke, hau da, errealitatea behatzeko balio duela ziurtatzea (ibidem:35). Hori lortze aldera, “teoriaren eta errealitatearen arteko lotura sistematikoa eratu behar da aztertu ahal izateko teorizatutakoa betetzen denetz” (idem). Honen ondorioz, zehaztapen maila txikia duten teoria abstraktuak ez lirateke baliagarriak izango (idem). Are gehiago, teoria bat egiaztagarria bada, gai izan beharko da *aurreikusteko*⁵ zein egoeratan ez den beteko (idem)

Beste ezaugarrietako bat, teoria baten *barne-logika edo koherentzia* litzateke (idem). Koherentzia horren bidez gainera, beste pertsona batzuek ulertu ahal izatea ahalbidetuko litzateke (idem). Edukiei dagokienean, **fenomenoa azaltzeko** gaitasuna izan behar dute, eta beraz, emango dituzten azalpenek **berau asetzeko modukoak** izango dira (idem). Horren ondorioz, bere muinean dauden galdera guztiei erantzun beharko diete eta ez dute berrietarako abagunerik utziko (idem).

Horretaz gain, ikuspegi honen arabera teoria bat **ezin da mugatu kasu zehatz batzuk azaltzera**, “leku eta momentu desberdinetan gertaera desberdinak azaltzeko balio behar du, hau da, *orokorra izan behar du*⁶, eta aldi berean, orokortzea erraztu behar du” (idem). Zergatik? Ikuspegi positibistaren xedea etorkizuna aurreikustea delako eta horren ondorioz etorkizun horren inguruko iragarpen eta auresateak burutuko ditu. Blasen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“Azterketa politiko enpirikoak gertakizun zehatzen ezagutza eta azalpena lortu nahi du behaketan oinarrituta, baina betiere fenomenoari buruz ikasteko eta **etorkizuna aurreikusteko xedearekin**⁷. Lan horretarako, lehen pausoetako bat izan behar du teorizazio on batek, alegia, ondo landu beharko dira teoria batek dituen osagai garrantzitsuenak: **kontzeptuak, hipotesiak eta aldagaiak.**” (idem).

Hori aintzat harturik, **teoria on batek 7 ezaugarri izango lituzke (ibidem:62-63):** (1) Gaitasun esplikatzaile handia izatea; (2) Errealitatea laburbiltzeko eta sinplifikatzeko gaitasun handia izatea; (3) Azalpen asegarriak emango ditu; (4) Ongi egituratuta egongo da; (5) Teoria on bat faltsutu daiteke; (6) Gizarteko fenomeno garrantzitsuak azaltzen ditu; (7) Auresateak egiteko balio du.

⁵ Ikusiko dugun moduan, etorkizuna aurreikustea eta iragarpenak egitea da positibismoaren ezaugarrietako bat.

⁶ Jatorrizkoan letra lodiz agertzen da.

⁷ Letra lodia guk gehitua.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Era laburrean hauek lirateke ikerketa positibistaren ezaugarri nagusiak. Joan gaitzen orain honen printzipioak gaindituko dituen ikerketa eredu post-positibista baten ezaugarriak aztertzeraz.

1.2 Ikerketa post-positibista bati bide eginez

1.2.1 Gizarte Zientziak vs. Natur Zientziak: kokapen “arkeologikoa”

Arestian aipatu moduan, Gizarte Zientzien helburuetako bat Natur Zientzien eredura gerturatuko den bide bat garatzea izan da. Zergatik? Foucault-ek adierazten digun bezala, XIX. mendetik aurrera garaiko kezka, zalantza eta beharrei erantzunez gizakia “objektu zientifiko” izatera igaro zenean sortu ziren Giza Zientziak (1968:334). Hori dela eta, beste eremuekin konparatuz, ez zuten aurreko mendeetan landutako eremu epistemologiko baten oinordetza jaso, aldez aurretik ez zelako gizakia erdigunean jartzen zuen zientziarik (idem).

Episteme modernoaren eremua anitza eta irekia izan arren, oinarrizko hiru dimentsioren arabera eraiki zen: (1) zientzia matematiko eta fisikoak; (2) hizkuntza, bizitza, eta ekoizpen ekonomikoa oinarri zuten zientziak; (3) hausnarketa filosofikoa oinarri zuten zientziak (ibidem:336-337). Giza zientziak, aipatu hiru eremuen artean kokatu dira berezko eremu autonomoa izan gabe. Horrek azalduko luke euren ahultasuna eta Natur Zientzien eredura gerturatzearen beharra. Zuzenean Foucaulten hitzak jasoz:

“Lo que explica la dificultad de las "ciencias humanas", su precariedad, su incertidumbre como ciencias, su peligrosa familiaridad con la filosofía, su mal definido apoyo en otros dominios del saber, su carácter siempre secundario y derivado, pero también su pretensión a lo universal, no es, como se dice con frecuencia, la extrema densidad de su objeto; no es el estatuto metafísico o la imborrable trascendencia del hombre del que hablan, sino más bien la complejidad de la configuración epistemológica en la que se encuentran colocadas, su relación constante a las tres dimensiones, que les da su espacio (ibidem:338).”

Ikus ditzagun hortaz, ikerketa post-positibista baten ezaugarriak zeintzuk izan beharko liratekeen.

1.3 Ikerketa post-positibista


1.3.1 Lehen zertzeladak

Natur Zientzien eredia jarraitzeak, aurreko ikerketa paradigma positibistaren ezaugarriak hobestea ekarri du. Bere elementuen artean, besteak beste, etorkizuna aurreikusteko guraria, lege kausalen bilaketa, arrazoitze deduktibo eta induktiboa edota teoria, errealitatea eta behaketaren banaketa azpimarratu dugu. Gure ikuspegitik, ikerketa post-positibista batek dimentsio horiek era kritikoan aztertu eta gainditu behar ditu. Hori izango da atal honen helburua, hala ere, lehen hurbilpen moduan gure ikuspegia ideia hauekin laburbildu daiteke:

- Aurreikuspenaren ordeztu, Gizarte Zientzietako ikerketaren oinarria **azalpenezko argudioak** ematea izango da.
- **Teoria, errealitatea eta behaketa ezin izango ditugu banatu:**
 - o Aurkikuntza testuinguruaren eta frogapen testuinguruaren artean ez da banaketarik egongo.
 - o Maila ontologikoa kontuan hartzea beharrezkoa izango da.
- Hipotesiak formulatzerako orduan indukzioa edo dedukzioaren ordeztu **erretrodukzioa hobetsiko** dugu.

Aipatu ideiak grafiko honen bidez islatuko ditugu:

IRUDIA 3. Aurkikuntza eta Justifikazio Testuingurua



Iturria: egileak egina Glynos, Howarth, 2007:33-n oinarritua

1.3.2 Aurreikuspenik eta lege kausalik ez

Lehenik eta behin, errealitatearen azterketa xume batekin agerikoa da aurreikuspenak dituen mugak. Gertuko bi adibide hartuta, inor gutxik aurreikusi zuen Donald Trumpen edota 'Brexitaren' garaipean edota adibide historiko batera joanda, Sobietar Batasunaren bat bateko desagertzea. Zentzu horretan Tilly eta Goodinekin bat eginik, "the program of identifying simple general laws concerning political structures and processes has so far yielded meagre results" (2006:20). Hala ere, ikerketa eredu honen arrakasten artean, **azalpen bat behar duten erregulartasunen identifikazioan** legoke (ez euren azalpenean). Zentzu horretan, aurreko autoreen hitzak zuzenean jasoz: "what strength that program of seeking simple general laws has achieved lies in its identification of empirical regularities to be explained, not in its provision or verification of explanations (idem)." Oso zaila da egitura eta prozesu zabalen eskalan erregulartasunak topatzea, beraz lege enpirikoen ordez, **errepikatzen diren prozesuak** eta **berauek sustatzen dituzten mekanismoak** identifikatzea egokiagoa litzateke aipatu autoreen aburuz:

"Regularities certainly occur in political life, but not at the scale of whole structures and processes. Political scientists should shift their attention away from empirically grounded general laws to repeated processes, and toward efficacious causal mechanisms that operate at multiple scales but produce their aggregate effects through their concatenation, sequences, and interaction with initial conditions." (idem).

Antzeko ikuspegi batetik Errealismo Kritikoaren sortzaile den Bhaskarrek dioskun moduan, horrelako planteamenduek ikerketa eremu itxietan zentzua izan dezaketen arren gizarte zientziak eremu irekietan garatzen dira (1993: 21-22). Horren ondorioz, Gizarte Zientzietan garatzen ditugun azalpenak ezin dira era arrakastatsuan beteko liratekeen "aurreikuspen bateria" batzuetara mugatu. Hori dela eta, **aurreikusi ordez fenomenoak azaltzea** izan beharko litzateke gure xedea. Bhaskarren hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

"The positivist tradition is correct to stress that there are causal laws⁸, generalities, at work in social life. It is also correct to insist (when it does) that these laws *may* be opaque to the agents' spontaneous understanding. Where *it errs is in the reduction of these laws to empirical regularities*, and in the account that it is thereby committed to giving of the process of their identification.

[...] In particular it follows from this condition that criteria for the rational appraisal and development of theories in the social sciences, which are denied

⁸ Bhaskarrek eta Tillyk, lege kausalen ordez mekanismo kausalak hobesten dituzte.

(in principle) decisive test situations, *cannot be predictive and so must be exclusively explanatory*⁹.” (Bhaskar, 2005: 22-23)

Hori aintzat harturik, gure aburuz azalpen bat behar duten erregularitasunak topatzen ditugu. Kasu honetan, burujabetza eskaerak lirateke. Aurrerago ikusiko dugun moduan, erregularitasun horiek sortzen dituen mekanismo nagusia, burujabetza gabeziak dira. Hori da gure ikuspegitik erregularitasunaren (burujabetza eskaeren) eta berau eragiten duen mekanismoaren (burujabetza faltaren) arteko lotura. Gure xedea beraz, ideia horiek era koherentean artikulatuko dituen argudioak azaltzea izango da eta ez prozesu horietan eragiten duten faktoreen azterketa enpirikoa eta horien lege kausalak aurreikustea.

Horretaz gain, horrelako ikerketa eredu bat jarraitzea desiragarria den ere planteatu genezake. Gure aburuz, zeharka bada ere, ikerketa gai batzuk beste batzuen ordean hobestea eragin dezake. Zentzu horretan, bat gatoz Shapirok egiten duen hausnarketarekin:

“Making a fetish of prediction can undermine the problem-driven research via wag-the-dog scenarios in which we elect to study phenomena because they seem to admit the possibility of prediction rather than because we have independent reasons for thinking it worthwhile to study them. This is what I mean by method-drivenness... in principle it sounds right to say ‘let’s test the mode against the data’. In reality, there are few uncontroversial data sets in political science.” (Shapiro, 2002:609; Glynos, Howarth, 2007:18).

1.3.3 Aurkikuntza testuinguruaren eta justifikazio testuinguruaren banaketarik ez: nazionalismoaren falazia epistemikoa

Bestalde, metodo hipotetiko deduktiboan aurkikuntza testuingurua eta justifikazio testuinguruaren arteko banaketa zorrotza egiten dela kontuan hartu behar dugu. Gure aburuz testuinguruak garrantzia berezia du bai hipotesiak formulatzerako orduan zein datuei zentzua ematerakoan (Glynos, Howarth, 2007:36). Horretaz gain, gure ikuspegi ontologikoak ere eragina izango du bai ikerketaren planteamenduan zein datuen inguruko hausnarketak burutzen ditugunean (ídem).

Ez dago beraz, “erreal-zehatza” era zuzenean ezagutzeko ahalmenik, beti baitago tarteko bitartekaritza bat (Howarth, 2005:49). Maila zehatz konplexuenean zein maila abstraktu sinpleenean, analisi guztiek izango dute dimentsio teoriko edo diskurtsibo bat (Jessop, 1982:213). Hortaz, Althusserrek dioskun moduan, **dimentsio teorikoa eta enpirikoa ezin dira banatu**, ez baitago bi mailen arteko kanpokotasun harremanik,

⁹ Letra lodia guk erantsia.

dedukzio harremanik edota subsumtzio harremanik (Althusser, 1990:49). Bere hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“In no case is the relation of theoretical concepts to empirical concepts a relation of exteriority (theoretical concepts are not ‘reduced’ to empirical data), or a relation of deduction (empirical concepts are not deduced from theoretical concepts), or a relation of subsumption (empirical concepts are not the complementary *particularity* – the specific cases - of the *generality* of theoretical concepts) (idem).”

Horretaz gain, “izatearen” inguruko hausnarketak aintzat hartzea ezinbestekoa da eta horrenbestez *maila ontologikoa txertatu* beharra dago. “Izatearen” inguruko adierazpenak ezin dira “ezagutzaren” inguruko adierazpenetara mugatu (Bhaskar, 1993:26). Hori dela eta Bhaskarrek dioskun moduan, **dimentsio ontologikoa alboratzea falazia epistemiko** bat besterik ez litzateke izango, era inplizituan esperientziara mugatutako ontologia bat onartuko genukeelako (idem).

“Negar la posibilidad de una ontología tan sólo tiene como resultado la generación de una ontología implícita y de un realismo implícito. Así pues, en la tradición realista empírica, la falacia epistémica cubre o disfraza una ontología basada en la categoría de la experiencia y un realismo basado en las supuestas características de los objetos de la experiencia, a saber, sucesos atomistas y sus relaciones.” (ibidem:31)

Honek, garrantzia berezia du nazionalismoaren inguruko azterketan. *Falazia epistemikoak, berdinen ordezkartza ez zilegia* eragiten du. Honek laburki hurrengoa adierazi nahi du: izen baten aldaketa gauza bera esan nahi duen beste izen batengatik. Aldaketa horrek, hala ere, testuinguruaren arabera adierazpenaren zentzua aldatzen du. *Gure aburuz, estatu ofizialik ez duten nazioak aztertzerako orduan demokrazia eta nazionalismoaren artean berdinen arteko ordezkartza ez zilegia burutzen da.*

Hori azaltzeko hurrengoa hartu behar dugu aintzat¹⁰. Demokraziak bere subjektua birsortzen du: *demosa*. Era berean, nazionalismoak bere subjektua birsortzen du: *nazioa*. Nazioa demokraziarik gabe existitu daitekeen arren, demosa ezin da naziorik gabe existitu, herri burujabetzaren titularra demosa delako, eta hau aldi berean nazio mota bat besterik ez delako (Goikoetxea, 2013). Hori dela eta, egungo jendarte demokratikoetan biak banaezinak diren neurrian, demokrazia nazionalismo mota bat dela deritzogu (idem). Hala ere, hegemonikoa den ikuspegiaren ondorioz, nazionalismoa eta demokrazia banaturik agertzen zaizkigu biak ala biak egungo jendarteetan mihiztaturik egongo ez balira bezala. M-15en eta Podemosen sorrera edota Syrizen loraldia izango balira gure

¹⁰ Jule Goikoetxearen lanetan oinarritzen gara (2013; 2014; 2017).

ikergaiak, zuzenean demokraziaren pribatizazioarekin eta estatuaren krisiarekin lotuko genituzke. Kontrara, nazionalismoari buruzko ikerketak ezberdintasun kulturalaren akomodaziora, “partikularitasunaren” babesera, edo askoz jota, Europar Batasunaren baitako dinamika post-soberanoaren erregionalismora mugaturik daude.

Horren ondorioz, egungo burujabetza eskaerak nazionalistak direla adierazten badugu, bere erro demokratikoa alboratu eta nazionalismoaren ikerketari dagozkion ezaugarri “kultural”, “identitario” “partikularrak” atxiki beharko genizkieke. Hori dela eta, gure aburuz “nazionalista” eta “ez nazionalistaren” arteko banaketak, “nazionalista zibiko” eta “etnikoen” arteko banaketak edota kapitalismo finantzariaren krisiaren ondorioz pizten diren “gatazka demokratikoen” eta nazionalismoaren eraginez sortzen diren “gatazka identitarioen” banaketak ez du zentzurik. *Gatazka demokratikoak gatazka nazionalistak dira (M-15 eta austeritatearen aurkako mugimenduak orokorrean) eta gatazka nazionalistak gatazka demokratikoak dira (Eskozia, Katalunia, Euskal Herria). Egungo Europar Batasunaren baitan banaketa horiek burutzeak, nazionalismoa eta demokraziaren falazia epistemikoan sakontzea besterik ez du eragiten.* Argigarriak dira zentzu horretan Jule Goikoetxearen hitzak:

“This is why a book on American international politics is published in a collection on globalization while a book on Catalan international politics is published in one on nationalism, or why an article on women’s subordination is published in a journal on feminism but not in one on democratization.”
(2017:54)

Horretaz gain, teoria eta maila enpirikoa lotzearen beharra, harreman zuzena dauka *hipotesiekin: hipotesien formulazioan erabilitako arrazoiketa eta hipotesien onarpenean jarraitutako arrazoiketa ezin direlako era guztiz banatuan ulertu gizarte zientzietan* (Glynos, Howarth, 2007:27). Hortaz, teoria eta maila enpirikoa ezin badira era banatuan ulertu eta hipotesien formulazioa eta frogaketan jarraitutako arrazoiketa ezin badira banatu, ikerketa positibistan azaldutako logika aplikatzea ez da baliagarria izango. Hori dela eta, indukzioa edo dedukzioaren orde *erretrodukzioa hobetsiko* dugu, honen bidez aurkikuntza testuinguruaren eta justifikazio testuinguruaren banaketa zurruna ekidinez.

Erretrodukzioaren bidez “erreal-zehatzean” ematen den gertaera gatazkatsu bat identifikatu edota teorikoki gatazkatsua den ideia bat antzeman eta berauek sortzeko gaitasuna izan dezaketen mekanismo, prozesu edo dinamika politikoak identifikatuko ditugu. Horretaz gain, mekanismo horiek efektu horiek sortzeko baldintzak ere identifikatuko ditugu. (Jessop, 1982:217). Hori dela eta, **erreal-zehatzean antzemandako gatazka** bat azaltzeko, lehenik eta behin horren inguruko hausnarketa


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

orokorrak *maila abstraktu-simple batean* planteatuko dira, ostean analisi planoak eta zehaztasun maila handiagoa gehituz.

1.3.4 Problematizazioa, azalpen erretroduktiboa eta pertsuasioa: artikulazioaren metodoa

Erretrodukzioari esker, aurkikuntza testuinguruaren eta justifikazio testuinguruaren banaketa ekidingo dugu. Zentzu horretan, Gizarte Zientzietan *analitikoki hiru momentu dialektiko*¹¹ ezberdinduko ditugu (Glynos, Howarth, 2007:38):

IRUDIA 4 Hiru momentu analitikoak



Iturria: egileak egina.

Problematizazioaren bidez, erreal-zehatzean antzemandako fenomeno bat edota “gatazka teoriko” bat identifikatu eta honen inguruko lehen hausnarketa burutzen da. Prozesu aktibo honen bidez, *arazoa* eraiki (explanandum-a¹²) eta jadanik gure lehenengo usteak eta pertzepzioak eraldatu egingo dira (ibidem:34). Fenomenoa ulergarriagoa egingo duen azalpen bat bilatze aldera lehenengo pausoak emango dira. Hauen oinarria, *logika erretroduktiboaren eta teoria eraikuntzaren arteko elkarrekintza* izango da. Glynos eta Howarthen hitzak jarraituz:

“This process is understood in terms of the logic of retroductive explanation and theory construction, which involves a to-and-fro movements between the phenomena investigated and the various explanations that are proffered” (idem).

¹¹ Ikus aurreko grafikoa.

¹² Terminologia klasikoa erabiliz, explanandum-a eta explanans-a ezberdindu daitezke. Explanandum-a, azaldu nahi dugun fenomeno izango litzateke. Explanans-a bestalde, fenomeno hori azaltzen duten argudioak lirateke. *Hempel eta Oppenheim*, lana jarraituz "By the *explanandum*, we understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon itself); by the *explanans*, the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon" (1948:154)

Prozesu honen bidez, hasiera batean era kaotikoan eta abstrakzio maila ezberdinetan lantzen diren kontzeptu, logika, datu enpiriko edota aurreiritziak elkartu egiten dira lehenengo azalpen bat eraikitzeke xedearekin (idem).

Bestalde, *azalpenaren justifikazioa* konplexua izango da, barne eta kanpo mailako irizpideak galdatuko dituelako. Alde batetik, *barne mailan*, azalpena eraikitzeke irizpideak sortu beharko dira eta bestetik, *kanpo mailan*, besteak erakartzeko pertsuasio lanean interbentzio teoriko eta praktikoak garatu beharko dira (idem). Hala ere, gure *explanans*-a justifikatzeko eraikitako barne irizpideak eta paradigma positibistan erabilitakoak ezberdinak dira. Azken hauetan, signifikazio estatistikoa lortzea edota azalpenaren baieztapena/ezeztapena izango da helburua. Hori izanik xedea, era exhaustiboan errealitatea azaltzeko gaitasuna izango duten baieztapenak proposatuko dira. Honen bidez era zurrunean aurkikuntza testuingurua eta justifikazio testuingurua banatzen dira.

Ikerketa post-positibista batek kontrara ez ditu irizpide unibertsal eta zurrinak jarraituko. *Era malguagoan baina publikoki defendagarriak diren printzipioak jarraituko dira, besteak beste: argudioen arteko koherentzia, sinesgarritasuna, funtsa, trinkotasuna, babes frogatzailea, osotasuna edota sakontasuna* (idem). Horren ondorioz, ikuspegi post-positibistaren frogaren eremua pertsuasioa eta interbentzioari loturik dagoen arren, hau aldi berean ez da frogaren eremura mugatuko, ikerketaren hasieratik bertatik lehenengo pertsuasio jarduerak hasiko direlako. Problematizazioa, teoria eraikuntza eta froga hertsiki loturik daude eta horren ondorioz frogapen prozesuarekiko ikuspegi elastikoagoa mantenduko da:

A post-positivist conception of *testing is therefore elastic* (as opposed to hard) and involves theoretical and critical interventions, as well as practices of persuasion, in relation to both the agents being studied and the relevant scholar community. Crucially, however, the persuasive aspect of justification extends to the task of convincing the relevant audience about the way the problem was characterized in positing the proto-explanation at the outset, pointing us back to the context of discovery (ibidem:38).

Hori kontuan izanik, hiru dimentsioak elkarreraginean ulertzea ahalbidetzen digun metodorik osoena, *ikuspegi estrategiko harremanezkoaren artikulazioaren metodoa da* (Jessop, 1982: 213-220).

Mundua aztertzeke edozein saiakera determinatua eta determinantea den neurrian, errealitatearen konplexutasuna azaltzeko teoria batek beti izango du erredukzionismo eta partzialtasun maila bat (Jessop, 1982:211). Konplexutasunak, konplexutasun gehiago eragiten duela kontuan izanik, plano ontologikoan, epistemologikoan eta metodologikoan hurrengo hausnarketak kontuan hartzera behartuta gaude.

Maila ontologikoan koiuntura zehatzen **‘ezinbesteko kontingentzia’** aintzat hartu behar dugu (ibidem:212). Kontraesankorra dirudien adierazpen honek hurrengo esan nahi du:

“This apparent contradictio in adjectio means that while the combination or interaction of different causal chains produces a determinate outcome (necessity), there is no single theory that can predict or determinate the manner in which such causal chains converge and/or interact (contingency) (idem).”

“This indicates both the de facto *causal determination (necessity)* of events and phenomena and their *ex ante indeterminability (contingency)*” (Jessop, 2008a:229).

Horren ondorioz, *mundua konplexua eta irekia* den sistema dela aintzat hartu beharko dugu, algoritmo sinpleen bidez bere konplexutasunak alde aurretik azaltzeko xedek alboratuz (idem). Hori dela eta, *sinplifikazioa eta metodologia erlazionala* hobetsiko ditugu (idem).

Maila epistemologikoan, mundu errearen mugagabeko konplexutasuna dela eta, ezin da analitikoki guztiz ezagutu (idem). Hortaz, konplexutasun horrekiko sarrera sinplifikatzaileak hartu, eta ezagutza beti **partziala, probisionala** eta **ez osoa** dela onartuko dugu. Are gehiago, **‘ezinbesteko kontingentzia’** hori azaltzeko marko teoriko ezberdinen erabilera beharrezkoa izango da. Jessopen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“if ‘contingent necessities’ exist, adequately to explain them requires one to combine concepts, assumptions, and principles of *analysis from different theoretical systems and to relate them to a given, theoretically defined explanandum*. This implies that an explanation is only more or less satisfactory relative to a given explanandum that has been isolated (and thus ‘constructed’) by an observer out of that infinite complexity” (ibidem:230).

Gakoa beraz, posible liratekeen beste hainbat kausen artean, gertaera bat azaltzen duten kausa eta prozesuak antzematea izango da:

“The key issue is to explain specific explananda in terms of specific causal antecedents, suggesting how specific causal processes or intersections from among many possible intersections intervened to produce something that would not otherwise have happened (idem).

Gure kasuan, mugimendu nazionalista historikoek burutzen dituzten burujabetza eskaeren eduki eta arrazoiak aztertzeaz gain, antzeko prozesuek eragin ezberdinak dituztela aztertzen saiatuko gara (liskarraldi sezesionista leku batzuetan eta besteetan ez).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Azaleko itxuretatik harago, dinamika horien sakoneko kausa eta prozesuak antzematen saiatuko garen neurrian ezinbesteko zaigu metodologia konplexua erabiltzea.

Hori kontuan izanik, *metodologikoki, artikulazioaren metodoa hobetsiko dugu*, konplexutasuna eta ‘ezinbesteko kontingentzia’ aintzat hartzeko gaitasuna duen ikuspegi bakarra delako.

“We must engage in an analysis of the many determinations that are combined in a concrete conjuncture and show how they are interrelated as necessary and/or sufficient conditions in a contingent structure of causation. This entails *both movements from the abstract to the concrete within a single plane of analysis and from simple to complex with the combination of different planes of analysis*. As a consequence, it excludes the pretence of constructing a general theory and aims at producing the theoretical tools with which particular conjunctures can be examined (Jessop, 1982:213).”

Hori dela eta, jada adierazi moduan indukzioa eta dedukzioa baztertu eta erretrodukzioan oinarrituko gara: “retroduction involves the production of a hypothesis concerning the conditions of possibility of a given phenomenon or explanandum in terms of a real mechanism and its mediations” (Jessop, 1982:218).

2- Ikerketa galderak eta hipotesiak:

Horren arabera, eta esandako guztia kontuan hartuz, hurrengo ikerketa galderak proposatzen ditugu:

- Zein erlazio dago postfordismoaren baitan egon den Estatuaren eraldaketaren eta mugimendu nazionalista historikoen burutzen dituzten burujabetza eskaeren artean?
- Zein da zehazki Kataluniako, Eskoziako eta Euskal Herriko burujabetza eskaeretan duen eragina?
- Zein da burujabetza eskaera horien estrategia eta artikulazio diskurtsiboan duen eragina?
- Zergatik Katalunian eta Eskozian liskarraldi sezesionista bat aktibatu da eta Euskal Herrian ez?

Hipotesiei dagokionez, logika erretroduktiboa jarraitzen duten 9 hipotesi proposatuko ditugu:

H1: Postfordismoaren baitan, Ongizate Estatu Nazional Keynesiarretik, Lan Erregimen Postnazional Schumpeteriarrera trantsizio bat egon da. Honen ondorioz **tentsioan dauden bi dinamika ezberdin** garatu dira: Autoritate pribatuak ahaldundu dituen **desdemokratizazio prozesu bat eta nazio historikoak era demokratikoan birsortzea** ahalbidetu duen estatu egituren deszentralizazioa.

H2: Desdemokratizaziorako joerak egungo estatu guztietan antzekoak izan arren, *Europar Batasunean arrazoi estruktural eta estrategikoengatik* sakonagoak izango dira. **Desdemokratizazio prozesu** horretan *governantza mekanismoak* ezinbesteko dispositiboak diren bitartean, **Europar Batasuna** izan da bere sustatzaile nagusia.

H3: *Atlantiko Iparraldeko Krisi Finantzariaren testuinguruan* Europar Batasuneko Estatuak izan duten parte hartzearen ondorioz, “desdemokratizazio prozesu hori areagotu da”, demokratizazioan oinarrituriko mobilizazio ziklo bati hasiera emanez eta burujabetza eskaerak areagotuz.

H4 **Nazio historikoak era demokratikoan birsortzea** ahalbidetu duen estatu egituren deszentralizazioaren ondorioz, estaturik gabeko nazioen ordeztu “estatalitate subalternoei” buruz hitz egingo dugu. “Estatalitate subalternoak” diren neurrian, Katalunia, Eskozia eta Euskal Herriko burujabetza eskaerak **demosgintza eta estatugintza izango dute oinarri**.

H5: Eskaera hauek sustatuko dituen mekanismo nagusia **burujabetza falta** bat izango da: bere demosa eskaeren arabera gobernatzeko eta bere demosa gobernatze prozesuan barneratzeko gaitasun politikoen falta bat.

H6: Eskaera horietatik abiatuta “liskarraldi sezesionista” bat aktibatu dadin, egiturazko muga eta aukeren baitako tentsioan *aktore independentisten jarduera estrategikoa* ezinbestekoa izango da.

H7: Egiturazko muga eta aukerei dagokienean, *krisi organikoek* prozesu independentistei aukeren espiralak zabalduko dizkiete. Hau ezin dugu era mekanikoan ulertu: krisi organikoek prozesu independentista sustatuko dute eta aldi berean prozesu independentistek krisi organikoak eragingo dituzte.

H8: Dinamika horretan *sezesioaren mekanismo eta prozesuak* aktibatuko dira. Gatazka eta jarduera estrategikoaren ardatz nagusia hegemonia berri baten eraikuntza izango den neurrian *garrantzia berezia izango du prozesu batek: hegemonia berri baten eraikuntzak. Honen baitan hegemoniaren mekanismoak aktibatuko dira.*

H9: Hegemonia hori ez da nazioa eta nazionalismoaren ikuspegi klasikoan oinarrituko. Estatuaren eraldaketaren ondorioz, *demosgintza eta estatugintza izango dute oinarri. Argudio horietatik abiatuta, logika ekibalentzian oinarrituriko “herri” bat artikulatu* beharko dute.

Gure aburuz, azken hipotesiak beharrezko kontingentzia bat adierazten duen neurrian, aurreko hipotesiak, berau gertatzeko ezinbestekoak diren kate kausalak dira. Hipotesiek aldi berean, hausnarketa abstraktuenetatik zehatzenetara bide orri bat eskaintzen digute.

3- Tesiaren egitura

Aurreko ikerketa galderak eta hipotesiak aintzat harturik egituratu da doktorego tesia. Hori dela eta, sarrera eta ondorioez gain, **zortzi kapitulutan** banatu dugu ikerlana. Robert Coxen irizpideak jarraituz, “problem-solving” ikuspegiak gainditu eta **“ikuspegi kritikoa” hobetsi dugu** gure lanean (1981:128). Zergatik da kritikoa? Bere hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“It is critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex *as a whole rather than to the separate parts*. [...] *the critical approach leads towards the construction of a larger picture of the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved.*” (idem)

Hori da hain zuzen ere gure ikerketaren funtsa: **egun indarrean dauden erakunde eta botere harremanak era kritikoan aztertzea eta aldi berean a priori banaturik dauden prozesu eta errealitateen arteko lotura burutzea**. Horretarako ezinbestekoa da kategoria kritikoak garatzea eta euren arteko lotura konplexua azaleratzea.

Hori lortze aldera, **lehenengo kapituluan** Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoaren oinarritzko printzipioak aintzat hartu eta gure ikerketa gidatuko duen heuristika orokorra azalduko dugu. Garrantzia berezia du, ezen egitura, aktoreak edo diskurtsoak hobetsi ordez, dimentsio ezberdinen ekarpenak aintzat hartzen ditu. Honen baitan, eraldaketa politikoaren ikuspegiarik dinamikoena txertatzeko xedearekin, liskarraldien dinamikan aktibatzen diren Mekanismo eta Prozesuen teoria jasoko dugu.

Bigarren kapituluan, Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren teoriaren oinarritzko printzipioak aintzat hartuko ditugu. Honek, proiektu hegemoniko berrien artikulazioa ulertzeko beharrezkoak diren tresna analitikoak sakonki aztertzekeo parada eskainiko digu.

Lehenengo eta bigarren kapituluen bidez, gure ikerketa gidatuko duten oinarri teorikoak azaltzeaz gain, teoria eraikuntzari ere tarte bat eskainiko diogu “estatu matrize” eta “estatu subalternoaren” inguruko lehen definizio eta hausnarketak plazaratuz. Hortik aurrera, hurrengo taulan ikus daitekeen moduan, gure ikerketa kasuen azterketarako ezinbestekoak diren kontzeptuak maila abstraktu eta sinpleenetik maila zehatz eta konplexuenera jaso eta aplikatuko ditugu.

Zentzu horretan, **hirugarren kapituluan**, Estatuak, burujabetza eta kapitala maila abstraktu batean azaldu eta gubernamentalitate neoliberalarekin elkartuko ditugu. Hauen bidez, zehatzagoak eta konplexuagoak diren hiru prozesuren azterketari atek irekiko dizkiogu: **Lan Erregimen Posnazional Schumpeteriarrari, demokraziaren pribatizazioari eta estatismo autoritarioari**. Kapitulu honetan, Estatuaren eraldaketa plano orokor batean aztertu arren, garrantzia berezia izango dute Europar Batasunaren inguruan egindako hausnarketek.

“*Spanish matrix state*” izendatutako **laugarren kapituluan**, aurreko idea horien analisi zehatzagoa egingo dugu. Postfordismoaren baitan Espainiar Estatuaren bilakaera aztertuz, **demokratizazioa eta desdemokratizazioaren** arteko tentsioa jasoko dugu. **Metaketa estrategia, estatu proiektua eta proiektu hegemonikoa** izango dira kasu honetan gure ikerketa gidatuko duten kontzeptu teorikoak. Hauen bidez, egungo burujabetza eskaerak azaltzeko ezinbesteko diren bi prozesuren arteko dinamika erlazionala kokatuko dugu: (1) Nazio historikoak era demokratikoan birsortzea ahalbidetu duen deszentralizazio prozesua. Prozesu horren ondorioz naziorik gabeko estatuen ordeztu **estatalitate subalternoei** buruz hitz egingo dugu. (2) **Demokraziaren pribatizazioa eta estatismo autoritarioerako** joera. Hauen arteko tentsio eta kontraesanen bidez azalduko ditugu Espainiar **krisi organikoa** eta **burujabetza eskaerak**.

Bostgarren kapituluan, Kataluniako kasua landu eta gure tesiaren planorik zehatzena eta konplexuena txertatuko dugu. Estatalitate subalternoa izateak, demos, nazio eta estatu eraikuntza propioa garatzea suposatuko du. Hori dela eta, prozesu horietan estatu egituren eta aktoreen estrategien arteko hartu emanean egongo da gakoa. Gure kasuan, osasun sistema oinarri hartuko dugu nazio eraikuntza garaikidearen adibide gisa. Ostean, estatu botereen arteko talkan sortzen diren burujabetza eskaeren oinarriak aztertuko ditugu, 2006. urteko Estatut-a oinarri hartuz. Pròces moduan ezagutzen den liskarraldiaren azterketarako, continuum baten atal ezberdinak kontsidera daitezkeen kontzeptuak baliatuko ditugu: **burujabetza eskaerak, krisi organikoa, liskarraldi subiranista eta hegemonia subiranista**.


Seigarren kapituluan, Kataluniako eredu eta kontzeptu berdinak jarraituz **EAEko** kasua aztertuko dugu. Ez dugu Euskal Herri osoa aztertuko, lurraldeotan demokratizazio maila eta mota desberdina delako, Ipar Euskal Herrian euskal instituziorik ez dagoelako, eta EAEk eta Nafarroako Foru Erkidegoak (NFE) ezberdin erabili dituztelako beren erakunde estatalak eta beren ahalmen politikoak¹³ (Goikoetxea, 2017b:153).

¹³ Honen inguruko hausnarketa laburra plazaratu dugu ondorioetan.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Britainiar Estatuari dagokion ***zazpigarren kapituluak***, Espainiar Estatuaren eskema bera jarraituko du. ***Eskoziari*** dagokion ***zortzigarrenak*** aldiz, Katalunia eta Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoan aplikatutakoa jarraituko du beraz ez du zehaztasun gehiagoren beharrik.

Esandakoa kontuan harturik, hurrengo taularen bidez gure ikerketa garatzeko jarraituko ditugun kontzeptuak eta kapituluetan izango duten kokapena jasoko dugu. “Nabigazio karta” honen xedea, hasierako hausnarketa abstraktuenen eta amaierako ondorio zehatzenen arteko argudioen lotura ikusaraztea da. Horren ondorioz, kontzeptuak banaturik ulertu ordez, euren arteko lotura eta eragin estuan ulertzen ditugu. Ostean azalduko ditugun arren, alde zuzenetik gure ikerketaren plano ezberdinak ikustaraziko ditugu hurrengo taularen bidez.

Kapitulua	1 eta 2	3	3, 4 eta 7	3, 4,5,6,7 eta 8	4,5,6,7 eta 8	
Abstraktua 	- <i>Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoa</i> - <i>Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren teoria</i>					
	- Estatua: formak mugatutako erlazio soziala - Burujabetza: gobernu demokratikoaren erlazio soziala - Kapitala: izaera politikoa duen erlazio soziala		- <i>Gubernamentalitate neoliberala</i>	- <i>Demokraziaren pribatizazioa</i> - <i>Demokratizazioa</i>		
			<i>Lan Erregimen Posnazional Schumpeteriarra</i>	- <i>Estatismo autoritarioa</i> - <i>Estatalitate subalternoa</i>	<i>Burujabetza eskaerak</i>	
			<i>Metaketa Estrategia</i>	- <i>Finantziarizazioa</i> - <i>Desindustrializazioa</i>	<i>Krisi organikoa</i>	
			<i>Estatu proiektua</i>	- <i>Politika publikoak</i> - <i>Demos/nazio/estatu eraikuntza</i>	<i>Liskarraldi soberanistak</i>	
Simplea Zehata			<i>Proiektu hegemonikoa</i>	<i>Nazio interesa eta kanpo eratzaillea</i>	<i>Hegemonia subiranista</i>	
					Konplexua	

Iturria: egileak egina

1 The Strategic Relational Approach

1- Putting the Strategic Relational Approach in its place: its broader theoretical context.

2.1 The SRA in its context: separate tables in a divided discipline

According to Almond, Political Science as a discipline has been divided into ‘separate tables’ in which different schools and sects have developed their views without considering the work and advances of the ‘others’ (Almond, 1988). In his view ‘the various schools and sects of political science now sit at separate tables, each with its own conception of proper political science, but each protecting some secret island of vulnerability’ (ibidem:828).

It has been that very point the underlying assumption of most of the schools of thought of the last century. Ritzer’s classical work¹⁴ for instance, identifies disagreements between structural functionalism, neofunctionalism, theories of conflict, different varieties of neomarxism, systems theory, symbolic interactionism, etnomethodology, theories of exchange, theories of nets, theories of rational choice, feminist theory, structuralism and poststructuralism (Ritzer, 2001).

Indeed, most of the schools have focused on different topics and problems (Zamitz, 1999) leading those ‘separate table’ to become, again in Almond’s words, a ‘divided discipline’ (Almond, 1990). Among those problems, the most common ones are those related to the dialectic between structures and agents, state and society or abstraction and empiricism (macro-micro approaches) (Simón, 2004:27). Each school has tended to focus in either of them and there are only a few the ones that have been successful in integrating all. In Simón’s words, Bob Jessop and Joel S. Migdal are the only ones that have been able to break those separate tables and create a “new modesty”¹⁵ (ibidem:424). Despite coming from antagonistic traditions (Jessop’s origins are Marxist structuralism and Migdal comes from pluralism), they have coherently linked the above-mentioned tensions in a new approach (ibidem: 425).

¹⁴ It is just an example that by no means exhausts the big amount of existing schools and approaches.

¹⁵ Based on Beyme (1994)

We are going to explain neither all schools of political thought nor their main authors, but we will take as a reference the main approaches inside pluralism and structuralism in order to put the SRA in its place. Following Simón's view during the last decades there has been a trend towards convergence between these two opposed traditions (Simón, 2004:19). We are going to explain this process by reflecting on the above-mentioned conflicts between abstraction and empiricism, structures and agents and society and the state.

2.1.1 Abstraction vs Empiricism

When it comes to the dialectic *abstraction empiricism*, the first pluralism had a blind trust on empiricism, which was reinforced by the behaviourist revolution, and was developed by authors such as Truman, Dahl, Polsby or Latham (Simón, 2004:455-456). From a reformist pluralist approach, Jeremy Richardson and Grant Jordan proposed a first critic (Smith, 1994: 137-170) which was later developed following a neopluralist view by Dahl¹⁶ and Lindblom (Simón, 2004:457). It was Migdal the one that overcame this hard approach (Almond, 1988:829) and proposed a view that took into account abstraction and empiricism (Simón, 2004:457).

Structuralism followed an opposite path that began with Althusser's hard abstraction in which historical events were just 'happenings' with no explicative capacity (ibidem:458). The first critics began with the work of Theda Skocpol and Fred Block that rejected the 'structuralist obsession with abstraction' (idem) and have been developed by Jessop, that embraces abstraction and empiricism thanks to the method of articulation (Jessop, 1982: 213-220) that links abstract-simple reflections with concrete-complex phenomena by adding different planes of analysis with different levels of abstraction in each plane (ibidem:215). Following a critical realist account of science, he distinguishes three levels of abstraction: the 'empirical', the 'real' and 'the actual'¹⁷. This, allows him to replace the typical logic of discovery and techniques of research based on induction or deduction (Blas, 2008: 32-35) and adopt retroduction¹⁸ (Jessop, 1982:217).

2.1.2 Structure vs Agency

The dialectic *structure and agency* is directly related to the previous discussions on abstraction and empiricism. Althusser's and Poulantzas' emphasis on abstraction is linked to their epistemological trust on structures in which agents are determined by their role in the relations of production (Ritzer, 2001:179). Skocpol keeps this hard structural view while Fred Block makes a move trying to integrate agency

¹⁶ The second stage in Dahl's work.

¹⁷ We will explain these notions in advance.

¹⁸ We will explain it in advance.

when dealing with the ‘arbitrary’ limits between state and society (Simón, 2004:459). However, Jessop rejects the previous structuralist determinism and integrates both structural and agential elements (Jessop, 1996:124). In ‘strategic relational’ terms we must view social structures as involving *structurally inscribed strategic selectivity* and action must be assessed in terms of its performance by agents with *strategically calculating structural orientation* (Jessop, 1996:124).

Pluralist tradition follows again the inverse trajectory from a complete trust on agents towards an integration of structural elements that began with Richardson and Jordan and was developed by the neopluralist approach of Charles Lindblom and the ‘second’ Robert Dahl (Simón, 2004:460). It was Joe Migdal, in an attempt to moderate the influence of ‘neoestatism’ inside the pluralist tradition, who developed a view that integrate both structures and agents (ibidem:461).

2.1.3 Society vs State

While in the previous debates both traditions began their trajectory from antagonistic points of departure, in the case of *the society state* dichotomy both views have undergone a similar evolution from a complete rely on society towards an integration of the state and society. There are three stages in each tradition.

In the first one, under the influence of the first english pluralism, the pluralist tradition rejects using the ‘state’ as a concept and privileges a societal view based in ‘the political system’, ‘the govern’ or ‘social groups’ understood in a broad sense (Simón, 2004: 462). When it comes to Althusser’s and Poulantzas’ structuralism, although they attributte a ‘relative autonomy’ to the State, in the end it keeps the epiphenomenal role of maintaining the interests of the capitalist system (idem).

In the second stage, in the pluralist tradition we see again a first move by Richardson and Jordan in which political institutions have a say through concepts such as ‘political community’ or ‘topic nets’ (ibidem:463). Such a view was developed further by the second Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom that finally reject the idilical view of groups of the classical pluralism (idem). Nordlinger, however, tries to integrate in dialogue with Skockpol and Block the neoestatist critic and assumes a similar approach in which society is completely replaced by the state (ibidem: 464). We see the same trend in the structuralist tradition in which Skockpol replaces the economic determinism by a new kind of political determinism in which the state is at the core (Sckpockol, 1984). In this regard, Fred Blobk tries to go ‘beyond relative autonomy’ and move from Skocpol’s statism, but in the end, it keeps a view in which political institutions gained a power to act almost autonomously (Block, 1980).

It is in the third stage that we see again a convergence between both traditions thanks to Jessop's and Migdal's work. They criticized the static limits between the state and society and, inspired by Tomothy Mitchell's work, they pay special attention to the production and reproduction of their line of difference (Mitchell, 1991:95). However, Migdal does not give any coherence to the state's activity while Jessop keeps an equilibrium between the recognition of fragmentation and the coherence of politico-institutional activities (Simón, 2004:466-467) which makes his view much more complete.

2.2 The SRA: finding its place beyond separate tables.

According to the above mentioned ideas, we have seen how different schools and authors of the last century tried to develop their principles based on the tools established by their own matrix schools (classical pluralism and classical structuralism). There were some that went a step further and introduced themselves *in terra incognita* in order to find responses to the lacks of their proposals in other theoretical traditions (reformed pluralism, neopluralism and neoestatist structuralism). Jessop and Migdal have gone even a step beyond becoming what John Elster calls 'Unbound Ulises' because they are open to hear the siren calls of different approaches without being previously limited by their own schools (Elster, 2000).

As long as they converge in most of the currently relevant theoretical discussions, they both may suit our theoretical needs. However, we are not going to use Migdal's work because the structural tradition of Jessop gives us deeper concepts in order to deal with the state. Moreover, Jessop's strategic relational approach has been classified inside another trend between 'Foucauldizing Gramsci' and 'Gramscinizing Foucault' (Sum, 2004:7) in which the Discourse Analysis of the Essex School also finds its place. With the aim of keeping coherence among the different lines of our epistemological approach, we think that Jessop's work may better suit our needs.

So we can conclude saying that the SRA finds its place beyond the dominant separate tables, overcoming its matrix, structuralism, as well as the dichotomy abstraction/empiricism, structure/agency and both socio-centric and state-centric models.

3- The strategic relational heuristic: its development through three stages.

3.1 The SRA through its main stages.

3.2.1 First Stage of the SRA: overcoming society-centred and state-centred views

As Bertramsen points out, the strategic-relational period of Bob Jessop began in 1983 after overcoming his previous institutionalist period (1977-82) (Bertramsen, 1991:95). In his institutionalist phase he addressed the fallacies of reductionism and essentialism in Marxist state theory and managed to escape the false choice between society-centred and state-centred approaches that narrowly conceived state and economy as two independently constituted entities (Bertramsen, 1991:95).

In *The Capitalist State* (Jessop, 1982: 221-226) he suggested four guidelines for a state-theoretical approach that tried to avoid the problems of society-centred and state-centred approaches:

- 1- The adoption of an institutional account of the state: it is conceived as a plurality of institutions with no pre-given operational unity. He defined the state as “a set of institutions that cannot, qua institutional ensemble, exercise power” (Jessop, 1982: 221) which implies that in contrast to both the society-centred and state-centred approaches the state cannot be seen as a subject (Bertramsen, 1991: 101).
- 2- He also emphasized that political forces do not exist independently of the state: they are shaped in part through its forms of representation, its internal structure, and its forms of intervention (Jessop, 1982: 221). It draws attention to the way in which the institutional form of the state affects both the access of political forces to the state and their ability to use the state as an instrument of policy implementation (Bertramsen, 1991: 101).
- 3- He also insists in accordance with Poulantzas on the state’s character as a complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of social forces in a determinate conjuncture (Jessop, 1982: 221). In so doing, he pre-empted the instrumentalist equation between class power and state power (Bertramsen, 1991: 101).
- 4- He denied a structuralist account as he stated that “the state power is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains, or restores the conditions required for capital accumulation in a given situation and it is non-capitalist to the extent that these conditions are not realised” (Jessop, 1982: 221). As a consequence one should examine whether the effects of state policies create, maintain, or restore the conditions required in a given situation for capital accumulation (Bertramsen, 1991: 101).

According to Bertramsen (1991:101-102), the first and third guideline prohibit society-centred as well as state-centred approaches; the second guideline rejects the instrumentalist version of a society-centred approach, and the fourth prevents the structuralists’ version of a society-centred approach.

This view was based on a “relational” approach that focuses on the “relations among relations”, that, is “an analysis of the relations among different relations comprising the social formation (Jessop, 1982:252; 2008a: 29). In “The Capitalist State” he already presented some important notions for the developing of the SRA such as the “structural” and the “conjunctural” moments, “power” and “interests”.

According to Jessop, if we are to find a solution to the problems arising from the attempts to differentiate between structure and practice, structure and conjuncture, or structure and process, we must define structure relationally (1982: 252). Thus we will distinguish between the “structural” and the “conjunctural” moments¹⁹ of a given conjuncture or situation (idem).

On the one hand, the “**structural moment**” can be defined as those elements in a social formation that cannot be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during a given time period: it may include practices as well as their emergent properties and material preconditions and it may be more or less enduring beyond the time period in question (Jessop, 1982:253). It thus refers to the relatively enduring features of institutional orders (Bertramsen, 1991:120). On the other, the “**conjunctural moment**” can be defined as those elements in a social formation that can be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during a given time period (Jessop, 1982:253). It refers to the fact that a given structural selectivity could be transformed by current oppositional strategies. This separation implies that the same element can function as a “**structural constraint**” for one agent (or set of agents) at the same time as it appears as a “**conjunctural element**” open to transformation by another agent (or set of agents) (idem). He also highlights the importance of strategic and/or tactical alliances to transform situations because the same element can act as a “structural constraint” for one agent (or set of agents) or provide a “conjunctural opportunity” for the same agent(s) in association with another agent (or set of agents) (idem). It implies that a short-term structural constraint can become a conjunctural element in the longer term (idem).

We can see an example of these structural-conjunctural moments if we analyse the Spanish State and its Constitution. It establishes in the article 2 that “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them all.” It makes it structurally very difficult for a movement that wants to secede to achieve its goals. For a long period it has been successful in reducing

¹⁹ It is similar to the structural and the political moment of the historical bloc as defined by Gramsci (Portelli, 1973:58-59)

the possibilities of secession in the Basque Country, Catalonia or Galicia. However, as we can see at least in the Catalan case, through strategic and tactical alliances the very same element has provided a “conjunctural opportunity” for the same agents in association with another set of agents²⁰ to overcome it and to promote a “secessionist contentious episode” (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015:323).

When it comes to **power**, it should not be seen as a pre-given property of particular agents that is allocated in a zero-sum fashion, it should be seen as a complex social relation reflecting the changing balance of forces in a given situation (Jessop, 1982:253). It can be defined in Jessop’s view as “a complex, overdetermined phenomenon that serve to identify the production of significant effects through the interaction of specific social forces within the limits implied in the prevailing set of structural constraints” (Jessop, 1982:255). The analysis of power is connected with the analysis of the organization, modes of calculation, resources, strategies, tactics, and so forth, of different agents (unions, parties, departments of state, pressure groups, police etc.) and the relations among these agents (including the differential composition of the “structural constraints” and “conjunctural opportunities” that they confront) which determines the overall balance of forces (Jessop, 2008a:29).

Accordingly, the analysis of **interests** must be undertaken in a relational context concerned with comparative advantage rather than some notion of absolute interest posited in isolation from specific conjunctures (Jessop, 1982:256). Therefore, instead of talking about a general concept of interest we must asses it in its context. Consequently, a situation, action, or event can be said to be in an agent’s interest if it secures a greater net increase (or smaller net decrease) in the realisation of that agent’s conditions of existence than do any feasible alternatives in a given conjuncture (idem). So it must be assessed in relation to the structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities obtaining in a given period (idem).

Moreover, as Jessop points out, insofar as agents are involved in different relational systems and can be interpellated with different subjectivities or identities , there may be conflicts among the conditions of existence relevant to these systems and/or subjectivities with the result that the agent has no unitary and non-contradictory set of interests capable of realization (Jessop, 2008a:30). So according to Jessop, a key area of ideological struggle consists in the redefinition and/or recombination of subjectivities and hence the interests that agents may have in various situations (Jessop, 2008a:30). In a similar fashion Mouffe says that interests are never objective in the sense that they exist prior to political practices (1988:90). If agents

²⁰ It is not possible to explain such a complex process in deep so we are just giving a very simplified example.

achieve their identities through various articulations and political projects, it necessarily follows that the interests they are guided by, and seeking to realize, must be constituted through the same relational contexts (Frolund Thomsen, 1991:162).

The issue of “interest” supposes a very important point for our research because we are arguing that pro-independence movements may have the capacity of creating a new identity/subjectivity powerful enough as to become a “project identity” (Castells, 1997:8) contrary to the privatization of democracy. This is one of the points in which we see a convergence between the SRA and the Discourse Theory of the Essex School.

Another crucial notion of the SRA is the concept of **strategy** itself. It appeared in the dispute between Jessop and “capital-theoretical” and “class-theoretical” analysts. It has three interrelated dimensions (Frolund Thomsen, 1991: 162-165) and provides the “middle-range” concepts needed to bridge the gap between the above mentioned “capital-theoretical” and “class-theoretical” approaches (Jessop, 2008a:34). According to Frolund Thomsen (1991: 165) three dimensions which constitute a political strategy can be identified:

- (1) *The formation of strategies*: the notion of strategy refers to those processes of articulation in which a number of dissimilar elements are connected and thereby endowed with particular identities.
- (2) *Strategies as ensembles of political forces (agents)* which aim to master the social world in order to realize certain policy objectives.
- (3) The institution of *relations of dominance and resistance* as particular features of modern political practices.

One of the keys is to emphasize that not just structure and agency are dialectically related but also that each moment in this dialectical relation contains elements from its “other” (Jessop, 2008a:34). So the notion of strategy includes the articulation of the perspective of agents and that of the structures, the perspective of the voluntarist mobilization of political forces and the institutionalisation of relations of domination and resistance. In so doing, ***we are overcoming the binomial separation “structure-agency” and “society-state”***.

Goikoetxea gives us a clear example when she explains the importance of Basque State Institutions in order to explain the interaction between Basque state-building and demos-building processes (Goikoetxea, 2015:202-210). For the state is not just the structure and the “people” are not just the agents, in processes of democratization the very same agents perform activities of state and demos building

(Goikoetxea, 2015: 203). Following her example, teachers of Basque public schools would be doing both state and demos building (Goikoetxea, 2015:204).

Most of the above mentioned reflections were already present in *The Capitalist State* (1982) and in the evaluation of Poulantzas' reflections on strategy (Jessop, 1985:340-343) and were consolidated in *State Theory* (1990) in the end of the first phase of the SRA. As Jessop says, "the major theoretical change in this work was its elaboration of arguments about the inherently strategic nature of the state into the claim that it was theoretically productive to *regard the state as political strategy*" (2008a:35). *This very idea is crucial for our research, because it will help us rejecting a deterministic approach of structures and analyse the inscription of competing state and nation building strategies.* There were two concepts that had become crucial:

- (1) The structurally inscribed strategic selectivities of the state (Jessop, 2008a:36).
- (2) The capacity of social forces to engage in strategic context analysis and pursue strategies that are more or less well adapted to these selectivities (including strategies oriented to circumventing and/or modifying their associated constraints) (Jessop, 2008a:36).

Therefore, the state could be seen as the site, the generator, and the product of strategies (Jessop, 1990:248-272):

- (1) *The state system is the site of strategy*: it is a system of strategic selectivity whose structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of political strategies than others (ibidem:260). A given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategy they adopt to gain state power and more suit to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others (idem).
- (2) *The state is also a site where strategies are elaborated*: the unity of the state and its activities can only be explained by referring to political strategies in which the role of state managers (both politicians and career officials) is crucial (ibidem:261). This is a consequence of considering the state as a social relation, i.e. as the form-determined condensation of a balance of forces (idem).
- (3) *The structure and modus operandi of the state system can be understood in terms of their production in and through past political strategies and struggles.* The current strategic selectivity of the state is in part the emergent effect of the interaction between its past patterns of strategic selectivity and the strategies adopted for its transformations (idem). The calculating subjects which operate on

the strategic terrain constituted by the state are in part constituted by the strategic selectivity of the state system and its past interventions (ibidem:261-262).

That is why, similar structures can entail the reproduction of different nations (for instance: Basque or Spanish) and at the same time benefit different classes and fractions of the power bloc. We see an example again with Goikoetxea (2012:16). In her view, ‘depending on the party make-up of the governments, Basque nation- or demos-building policies will tend to benefit different groups and institutions. In the case of the PNV Christian-Democratic party,²¹ which has had an almost unbroken run in governments since 1980, this has benefited industrial entrepreneurship interests and groups above others’ (idem).

One of the main conclusions of this first stage was that as an institutional ensemble the state cannot exercise power. As it is not a real subject instead of considering its power we should better speak about the various state capacities that are inscribed in it as an institutional ensemble (Jessop, 2008a:37). Therefore, we conclude saying that the state does not exercise power: its powers are activated through the agency of definite political forces in specific conjunctures (idem).

3.2.2 The second phase: spatio-temporal reflections on structure and agency

The second phase of the SRA served to develop three main issues:

- 1- The analysis of *economy in its inclusive sense*²² and Jessop’s engagement with the regulation approach (Jessop, 2008a: 38).
- 2- The importance of *capital as a social relation and the contradiction in the commodity* form between exchange- and use-value. These reflections on the contradictions of capital and its repercussions served him to reintegrate the analysis of economics and politics (idem).
- 3- Reflections on the relation between *structure and agency* (idem).

When it comes to the economy in its inclusive sense, we are going to consider the importance of *different accumulation strategies and modes of regulation* in order to get ‘*meso categories*’ that will help us explain the privatization of democracy in a more concrete plane of analysis. It is going to be especially relevant when dealing with changes in Spain and the United Kingdom during the 1980s. *The capital as a social relation* and its contradictions are going to play a special relevance in analysing the transition from the *Keynesian Welfare National State to the*

²¹ It has had an almost unbroken rule in governments since 1980.


²² “L’economia integrale” (accumulation regime + mode of regulation) has been directly influenced by Gramsci’s notion of the “integral state” or “l’estato integrale” (political society + civil society)

Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime. We will deal with these issues in advance.

However, because of the relevance it has for our research, we are going to focus now on the third point in order to develop a strategic relational view on the general issue of structure and agency. Although some reflections, such as those related to the “structural moment”, “conjunctural moment”, “strategy”, “power” or “interests”, have already been explained in the epigraph dedicated to the first stage, in this part we are going to try to go a step further.

In the so-called second stage of the strategic relational approach, Jessop developed his arguments in response to the reflections of Holmwood and Stewart (1991) on this very topic. These authors claim that the traditional dualisms between structure and agency can only be resolved through context-specific case studies while Jessop proposes to deal with it through abstract theorizing (Jessop, 1996:123). We will see in the next figure the two dominant views²³ on structure and agency that he rejects and his strategic relational proposal:

IRUDIA 5 *The Dialectic of Structure and Agency: Beyond Structuration Theory*



(Source: Jessop, 1996: 124)

On the one hand, in “strategic relational” terms we must view social structures as involving *structurally inscribed strategic selectivity* which means that structural constraints always operate selectively: they are not absolute and unconditional but are always temporally, spatially, agency- and strategic specific (Jessop, 1996:124); on the other, action must be assessed in terms of its performance by agents with *strategically calculating structural orientation* (idem). This implies that agents are

²³ It is not our aim to deal in depth with this issue so we are going to explain neither the general reflections on structure and agency nor the one defended by Holmwood and Stewart. We mention them in order to introduce Jessop’s strategic relational proposal.

reflexive, capable of reformulating within limits their own identities and interests, and able to engage in strategic calculation about their current situation (idem).

We have already mentioned most of these ideas in the epigraph dedicated to the first phase so we are not going to extend more our explanation. However, instead of talking about the structural and conjunctural moment and the structural constraint or conjunctural opportunity we want to highlight *their spatial and temporal dimension*. Since agents may be able to operate across variable spatial scales as they also do across changing time horizons, spatial structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities will also be determined in a “strategic-relational” manner (ibidem:125).

According to these ideas, it is clear that **structures** do not exist outside of specific spatial and temporal horizons of action pursued by specific actors acting alone or together and in the face of opposition from others (ibidem:126). When it comes to **actors**, they always act in specific action contexts which depend on the coupling between specific institutional materialities and the interaction of other social actors (idem). But if we take this analysis further, we will see that **actors** are as self-reflexive as to remake their identities and interests in specific conjunctures (idem). When it comes to **structures**, they can be analysed further by investigating the path-dependent structural coupling and co-evolution of different operationally closed (or autopoietic) systems (idem).

One of the most important concerns once this strategic-relational heuristic is applied is **the spatio-temporality of social structures, agents and agency** (Jessop, 2008a: 45). In Jessop’s view, structures emerge in specific places and at specific times, operate on one or more particular scales and with specific temporal horizons of action, have their own specific ways of articulating and interweaving their various spatial and temporal horizons of action, develop their own specific capacities to stretch social relations and/to compress events in space and time, and, in consequence, have their own specific spatial and temporal rhythms (ibidem:46). These are constitutive properties that help to distinguish one organization, institution, institutional order, or structural configuration from another (idem).

As **all the structures privilege** the adoption of certain spatial and temporal horizons of action by those seeking to control, resist, reproduce, or transform them, some practices and strategies are privileged while others are hindered according to how they “match” the temporal and spatial patterns inscribed in the relevant structures²⁴ (idem). Nevertheless, as we have already said, a short-term constraint

²⁴ We see, for instance, how financial sectors manage to move easily through different spatio-temporal fixes while people’s democratic claims are still linked to their ‘national state’. Regarding

for a given agent could become a conjunctural opportunity if there is a shift to a longer-term strategy (idem). So according to Jessop, **spatial structural constraints** and **conjunctural opportunities** are also determined in a “strategic-relational” manner because agents may be able to operate across variable spatial scales as well as across several time horizons (idem).

Finally, according to the strategic relational approach we have to bear in mind that the reciprocal interaction between **structurally inscribed strategic selectivity** and **strategically calculated structurally oriented action** could lead through the mechanisms of **variation**, **selection** and **retention** to the formation of a configuration characterized by ‘**structured coherence**’ (Jessop, 2008a: 46). This could take the form of what Gramsci called a ‘**historical bloc**’²⁵ (Portelli, 1973:64-91), which supposes the mutually implicated, structurally coupled, and historically co-evolving ensemble of economic, political, and socio-cultural relations, the construction of which depends on the activities of organic intellectuals and collective projects as well as on the gradual and emergent co-adaptation of institutions and conduct (Jessop, 2008a: 47).

This is one of the most important aspects for our research, because in adopting such a view, we are able to consider nationalist and ‘pro-independence’ movements in their strategic relational context. As long as they are “strategically calculated structurally oriented actors”, they interact with “structures with their own strategic selectivity” and in so doing they form new “structured coherences – historical blocs”. That is one of the keys in order to understand how Scotland, Catalonia²⁶, The Basque Autonomous Community or The Foral Community of Navarre²⁷ through the last decades have formed new ‘structured coherences – historical blocs’ in connection/competition with the ones at Spanish, British or European level. Moreover, as long as they have emerged within democratization processes ruled by the principle of popular sovereignty, they have developed, according to Goikoetxea, their own processes of democracy-building, reproducing themselves not only as nations but also as democracies (2013:3). Thus, when giving a definition, instead of focusing in their ‘specificities’ we will privilege their relational and contentious

this point, we may hypothesized that some international/globalized organizations would be more opened to the interests of financial sectors and will structurally privilege these actors whereas people’s democratic claims would be mostly conducted through their national state institutions.

²⁵ According to Portelli, as long as the historical bloc represents a concrete historical context, its analysis could refer to a certain geographic and historical situation: for instance, Gramsci takes into account different spatio-temporal fixes and analyses the ‘national historical bloc’, the ‘European historical bloc’, the ‘local historical bloc’ etc. (Portelli, 1973:82-84)

²⁶ The autonomous community and not the whole “Catalan nation” also called “Països Catalans”.

²⁷ We see the same example: the consolidation of different “structured coherences” that do not correspond to the “Basque nation” also called “Euskal-Herria” formed by the 7 historical provinces.

dynamic. In so doing, we believe that instead of ‘nations without states’, or ‘regions and regionalism’, *‘matrix’ and ‘subaltern states’ are the most appropriate analytical categories. Moreover, focusing in their contentious dynamic, will lead us to give prevalence to the issue of organic crises, as we will see when dealing with the case studies.*

3.2.3 The third phase: semiosis and the critical cultural turn.

The SRA has also been influenced by the “cultural turn” but it keeps a critical view on it. It was through the influence of theorists such as Ngai-Ling Sum and Colin Hay that “cultural political economy” (CPE) was introduced in the SRA.

Although the “cultural turn” is commonly reduced to a concern with discourse, meaning, identity and representation (Sum, 2004:3), in Sum’s view it is insufficient to map a cultural international political economy that can address macro- and micro-power (idem). According to Sayer, we can make a distinction between the uncritical and the critical turn (1998: 1-2):

- ***The uncritical turn:*** reduces the social and political life to discursive texts or text-like objects and attends only to their “construing” or signifying qualities (ibidem:2). On his view, there is no reason why a focus on cultural dimensions of social phenomena cannot be combined with analysis of other dimensions and criticizes a wholesale marginalisation of economic issues (idem). Indeed, *this approach focuses on micro-political at the expense of macro-structural.*
- ***The critical turn:*** it is concerned not only with “construal” but also with “construction” so pays attention to *the articulation of the cultural and the material as well as asking critical questions about capitalist society* (Sum, 2004:3).

Such an approach, stresses both the **semiotic moment** and the **material moment** of social relations (Jessop, 2008a:238). In so doing, it rejects in Jessop’s view, two common temptations in social analysis. On the one hand, it avoids the temptation of **radical social constructivism** according to which social reality is reducible to participants’ meanings and understandings of their social world (idem). As a consequence, it rejects both ‘the sociological imperialism of pure social constructionism and the voluntarist vacuity of certain lines of discourse analysis, which seem to imply that agents can will anything into existence in and through an appropriately articulated discourse’ (idem). On the other, it faces the problems of different forms of structuralism and social determinism which reduce agents and actions to passive bearers of self-reproducing, self-transforming social structures (idem).

For it was Colin Hay one of the first state theorist that combined the SRA and discourse, his work has been essential in order to adopt the above mentioned approach. Hay has paid attention to the ways in which ideas, narratives and discourses play a role in mediating social structuration (ibidem:48). In his opinion, it is in periods of *moral panic or social crisis* when struggles to interpret an uncertain conjuncture are especially relevant because they can shape subsequent developments (idem). Moreover, the ability to win such struggles depends not only in **structural factors** (strategic selectivity) but also on **discursive factors** (discursive selectivity). According to Hay, the issues of 'structure and agency,' and the 'ideational and the material' cannot be separated and should not be 'bracketed', because both, though analytically separable are ontologically intertwined (Hay, 2001). As they do not exist in isolation, we consider them as complexly interwoven and mutually interdependent, so the discursive or the ideational is only relatively autonomous of the material (idem). In the same way that a given **context is strategically-selective**²⁸ (selecting for, but never determining, certain strategies over others) it is also **discursively-selective** (selecting for, but never determining, the discourses through which it might be appropriated) (idem).

This dialectic between semiotic and structural selectivities supposes that the SRA²⁹ is not only concerned with how texts produce meaning and thereby help to generate social structure but also how such production is constrained by emergent, non-semiotic features of social structure (Jessop, 2004:167). According to Jessop, 'although every social practice is semiotic (insofar as practices entail meaning), no social practice is reducible to semiosis' (idem). Semiosis is never a purely intra-semiotic matter without external reference and involves more than the play of differences among networks of signs so it cannot be understood without identifying and exploring the extra-semiotic conditions that make semiosis possible and secure its effectivity (idem). The relative success or failure of construals depends on how they correspond to the properties of the materials used to construct social reality (idem). However, we cannot forget that semiotic mechanisms have greater weight in the stage of variation and that extra-semiotic mechanism are more important in the phase of retention (Jessop, 2008a: 243).

We also have to bear in mind some ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations:

Ontologically: semiosis contributes to the overall constitution of specific objects and social subjects and to their co-constitution and co-evolution in wider ensembles

²⁸ Or Structurally selective.

²⁹ Or the so-called 'Cultural Political Economy' as defined by Hay and Sum inside the Strategic Relational Approach.

of social relations (Jessop, 2004:161). According to this view, social construction involves material elements too but these can be articulated within limits in different ways through the intervention of semiotic practices (idem).

Epistemologically: it rejects any universalistic, positivist account of reality, denies the facticity of the subject-object duality, allows for the co-constitution of subjects and objects, and eschews reductionist approaches to economic analysis (ibidem:162).

Methodologically: combines objects from critically semiotic analysis with those from critical political economy (idem).

After mentioning that features, which is our problem? We cannot ignore the risks of adopting an uncritical turn that would suppose reducing social and political life to discursive texts and would attend only to their “construing” or signifying qualities (Sum, 2004:3). If we took such an approach, we would be tempted to embrace a radical social constructivism and reduce our research to participants’ social meanings and understandings of the social world (Jessop, 2008a: 238).

However, strategic relational theorists such as, Jessop, Sum or Hay have mostly focused on changing discourses of competitiveness, narratives of enterprise, entrepreneurial cities (Jessop, 1998; Jessop and Sum, 2000; Mulvad, 2015) and new economic imaginaries surrounding the emergence of the knowledge-based economy (Jessop, 2008a:51) which do not fit exactly with our research.


Moreover, methodologically, they combine critical semiotic analysis and critical political economy which are not so useful in order to deal with “nationalist movements” and “secessionist contention”.

Our research is less concerned with “economic imaginaries” which is one of the key analytical focuses of the “cultural political economy” and the “strategic relational approach” than it is with the creation of subjects and identities. Although we accept most of the elements of the strategic relational approach at an abstract-simple level, once we introduce ourselves in a more concrete-complex level we are more concerned with processes of assujetissement, interest articulation, social antagonisms and political mobilization that are the typical analytical interests of the School of Essex.

Inside the critical cultural turn Sum highlights two trends that range from “*Foucauldizing Gramsci*” to “*Gramscianizing Foucault*” (Sum, 2004:7). In this case, we are going to deal with theoretical assumptions and concepts from two schools inside this trend: *the Strategic Relational Approach* and the *Discourse Analysis of the Essex School*.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 6 From Foucauldizing Gramsci to Gramscianizing Foucault



(Source: Sum, 2004:7)

As Jessop and Sum point out, endorsing a critical cultural turn involves a post-disciplinary spirit insofar as it draws on concepts and arguments from several disciplines without regard to disciplinary boundaries (Jessop, Sum, 2001:89). That very same spirit is the one that conducts our theoretical framework as long as we are trying to avoid focusing on strict disciplinary boundaries in order to enrich our view with as many tools as possible. Using Jessop's words our proceeding way would run as follows: "do not multiply complications beyond what is necessary but do introduce as many as are necessary" (Jessop, 1982: 214-217; Jessop, 2008a: 225)

According to Jessop, the Essex School of discourse analysis has been almost exclusively concerned with assujettissement (the formation of subjects and identities), interest articulation, social antagonisms and the nature of political mobilization orientated to such discursively constituted phenomena (1990: 297). Moreover, it provides us with concepts, assumptions and explanatory principles for discursive frames of meaning which is its privilege field (ibidem:300). From our point of view, the discourse analysis of the "Essex School" gives us a valuable theoretical framework for analysing those very topics. Furthermore, the idea of social antagonism and the discursive articulation of a *constitutive outside* (them) are of paramount importance to *redefine the boundaries of the political community* (us) and in that way, build *a new hegemonic vision* (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; Mouffe, 1999; Laclau, 2005).

After explaining in fairly abstract terms the general strategic relational heuristic we are going to go a step further and embrace at a more concrete and complex level the issue of the state.

4- What is the state?

4.1 Defining the state: a first approach.

State theory enjoyed a fair amount of attention during the 1970s not only from Marxist theorists but also from more mainstream sects within social sciences (Aronowitz, Bratsis, 2002: 12). Though it is true that there have been different attempts to deal with the issue of the state, or following Evans', Rueschermeier's and Schocpol's famous work, to "bring the state back in" (1985) it is also true that there has also been what Zizek calls a "theoretical amnesia" (1989:1) in which authors such as Milliband, Offe, Block, Therborn or Poulantzas³⁰ were completely ignored (Aronowitz, Bratsis, 2002: 12).

It is Bob Jessop the one that, as mentioned above, has had the ability of keeping the strongest points of Marxism and Structuralism while receiving the insights of many scholars that were far from his original positions³¹. In so doing, he has focused much of his work on theorizing the state, for which he has dedicated many articles and books. As we have seen in the previous epigraphs, state theory is at the core of his research so we can easily conclude that among his main academic contributions are those related to this area.

But why do we include this epigraph? Why are we pointing out this basic question? Because as Jessop constantly mentions³², *one of the first problems we face when dealing with such a topic is the very definition of the state.*³³ In his own words:

"The first and most difficult task confronting analysts of the state is to define it. For the state is a complex phenomenon and no single theory or theoretical perspective can fully capture and explain its complexities." (2008a:1)

So placing this innocuous-looking question is the first and the most fundamental problem facing all theories of the state (Jessop, 1990: 339) because states are not the sort of abstract, formal object which readily lend themselves to a clear-cut, unambiguous definition (ibidem: 340). In Jessop's view, *'it is the task of state theorists to build up an understanding of the state as a form-determined social relation through a steady spiral movement from abstract to concrete and from simple to complex'* (ibidem:341). *That is precisely one of the main goals of this research: to understand changes in statehood and their influence in current sovereignty demands (H1). This very goal entails a greater complexation of*

³⁰ In the famous "Bring the State Back In" these authors were relegated to a couple of paragraphs and footnotes (Aronowitz, Bratsis, 2002: 12).

³¹ It is probably Luhman the most important one.

³² He makes this point in most of his writings on the state, although we are just quoting one example.

³³ That is why we are giving special importance to theory construction before introducing more concrete and complex planes of analysis.

dominant views and a new understanding of what means state and state power in those ‘supposedly stateless nations’ (H4).

With that in mind, he gives us a *four-element basic definition* which will enable us to take later further steps in order to organize a research on the state. This definition runs as follows:

“The core of the state apparatus comprises a relatively unified ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularised, and strategically selective ***institutions and organisations*** (Staatsgewalt) whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce ***collectively binding decisions on the members of a society*** (Staatsvolk) in a ***given territorial area*** (Staatsgebiet) in the name of the ***common interest or general will of an imagined political community identified with that territory*** (Satatsidee).” (Jessop, 2015a: 479)

In a similar way, Sassen talks about changes in statehood due to the continuous (re)assembling of ***authority, territory and rights*** (2010). According to Jessop, this broad cluster definition identifies the state in terms of its generic features as a specific form of macro-political organization with a specific type of political orientation; it also establishes clear links between the state and the political sphere, and indeed, the wider society (1990:341). However, if this definition is to be useful in organizing research six qualifications are required:

- 1- ***Above, around and below the core of the state are found institutions and organizations*** whose relation to the core ensemble is uncertain (ibidem: 342). States never achieve full closure or complete separation from society and their precise boundaries are usually in doubt. Their operations also depend on a wide range of ***micro-political practices*** dispersed throughout society but coordinated, more often in intent or aspiration than in reality, in the “core” of the state (Jessop, 2015b:50). They also enter into links with emergent state-like institutions in the interstate field (idem).
- 2- The nature of these institutions and organizations, their articulation to form the ensemble and their links with the wider society ***will depend on the nature of the social formation and its past history*** (Jessop, 1990:342).
- 3- Although the socially acknowledged character of its political functions for society is a defining feature of the normal state, the forms in which this legitimacy is institutionalized and expressed will also vary (idem). Jessop call these functions “socially acknowledged” because their content is constituted in part ***through politically relevant discourses, imaginaries,***

- and projects* (2015b:50). This is one area where the threefold distinction between polity, politics and policy is especially resonant (idem).
- 4- Although coercion is the state's ultimate sanction, it has other methods of enforcement which it can employ. Violence is rarely the first resort of the state and in many cases it would prove counter-productive (Jessop, 1990:342). A state also has *other means of intervention at its disposal, both material and symbolic*. Their articulation and deployment involves various contradictions and dilemmas and poses important strategic issues (Jessop, 2015b:50).
 - 5- The society whose common interest and general will are administered by the state should no more be interpreted as an empirical given than the state. *The boundaries and identity of the society are often constituted* in and through the same processes by which states are built, reproduced and transformed (Jessop, 1990:342).
 - 6- Whatever *the political rhetoric of the common interest or general will might suggest, these are always "illusory"* insofar as any attempt to define them occurs on a strategically biased structural and discursive terrain and involve the differential articulation and aggregation of interests, opinions and values (Jessop, 2015b:50). Indeed, the common interest or general will is always asymmetrical, marginalizing or defining some interests at the same time as it privileges other. *There is never a general interest which embraces all possible particular interests* (Jessop, 1990:342).

After giving this first four-element definition (institutions, society, territory, political community) and having introduced its six qualifications we can continue with a strategic-relational approach to the state. In so doing, we must shift the focus from the state to *the topic of state power and consider the state as a social relation*.

4.2 The State as a social relation: Six dimensions of the state and state power

According to the ideas mentioned above, we can say *that the State is not an instrument or a subject but a social relation* (Poulantzas, 1979:154). *It is a social relation between people (or political forces) mediated through the instrumentality of things (state apparatus, capacities, resources etc)*. That is why we have described "structures as strategic in their form, content, and operation; and analyse action as structured, context-sensitive, and structuring" (Jessop, 1999:51).

Once we treat *the state apparatus* as a strategically selective terrain with its own institutional dynamic and treat *state power* as the resultant of the action of social forces pursuing strategies on this terrain, it is clear that the state cannot be reduced to its institutions inside the formal part of the state (Jessop, 2008a: 98).

As Jessop itself points out, to develop the SRA, it is useful to explore six dimensions of the state that can be studied from the most basic state forms through to specific regimes in particular conjunctures (Jessop, 2015b: 59). For this task six dimensions seem useful (see next table)³⁴.

TAULA 1 Six dimensions of the state and state power

Dimension	Definition	Significance	Crisis aspects
Three formal dimensions			
Modes of representation	These give social forces access to state apparatus and power	Unequal access to state Unequal ability to resist at distance from state	Crisis of representation
Modes of articulation	Institutional architecture of levels and branches of state	Unequal capacity to shape, make, and implement decisions	Crisis of institutional integration
Modes of intervention	Modes of intervention inside state and beyond it	Different sites and mechanisms of intervention	Rationality crisis
Three substantive dimensions			
Social basis of state	Institutionalised social compromise	Uneven distribution of material and symbolic concessions to 'population' to secure support for state, state projects, specific policy sets, and hegemonic visions	Crisis of power bloc Disaffection with parties and state
State project	Secures apparatus unity of state and its capacity to act	Overcomes improbability of unified state system by giving orientation to state agencies and agents	Legitimacy crisis
Hegemonic vision	Defines nature and purposes of state for wider social formation	Provides external legitimacy for state, defined in terms of the 'common good', 'general will', etc	Crisis of hegemony

Source: Jessop, 2015a: 480

The first three are primarily formal or institutional and they correspond to the inputs, withinputs and outputs of the state (Jessop, 1990: 345). Although its dimension has its own strategic selectivities, and while each one is analytically distinct, they all overlap empirically. We introduce them as follows:

- 1- Modes of political representation and their articulation. They are linked to the “inputs”.

³⁴ Although these dimensions were already present in his work on “State Theory” published as early as in 1990, they have been developed and deepened in his very late publications in which he has paid special attention to crisis and crisis-management as part of an “ESRC Professional Fellowship” (see the table on Jessop’s academic evolution). It is worth mentioning, because of the importance of the “crisis aspects” in our research and the emphasis placed in it by Jessop in his latest work.

- 2- The vertical, horizontal, and transversal articulation of the state as an institutional ensemble and its demarcation from, and relation, to other states. These would be the “withinputs”.
- 3- The mechanisms and modes of state intervention and their overall articulation. We are talking about the “outputs”.

The other three dimensions concern the discursive and action-oriented aspects of the state and give content and strategic meaning to its more formal features (Jessop, 2015b:60):

- 4- The social bases that provide a stable core of support for the state and comprise its principal material or symbolic beneficiaries.
- 5- The “state projects” that shape its internal unity and *modus operandi*.
- 6- The “hegemonic visions” that define the nature and purposes of the state for the wider society or world.

Though distinguished analytically, we must bear in mind that there are linkages and potential disjunctions within each set and cross-cutting connections between them (Jessop, 2015b:60). Therefore, after a general overview and with the aim of giving more light on each dimension we are going to explain them separately.

4.2.1 Formal or institutional dimensions

4.2.1.1 Modes of political representation and their articulation:

When it comes to the modes of representation, they can be defined in a constitution but constitutionally designated institutions may not be the most important mechanisms of political representation (*ibidem*:61). Insofar as official decisions take account of potential support or resistance, it is clear that political representation also occurs away from the state. While formal channels of representation are important, they must be related, *inter alia*, to the roles played by political parties, pressure groups, social movements or state managers (*idem*). They provide links to the social bases of the state and help to organize them (*idem*).

Following Jessop’s approach we are going to list five ideal-typical modes of representation³⁵:

- 1- Clientelism: exchange of political support in return for a favourable allocation of politically mediated resources (Jessop, 1982:229-230; 2015b:62). It is associated with cadre parties run by notables, with patronage parties and with classical party machines politics.

³⁵ We are not claiming them to be exhaustive.

- 2- Corporatism: involves political representation on the basis of a socially designated function, role, or task within the division of labour. Corporatism is also found in patterns of governance based on networks that link groups with different roles (Jessop, 1982:230; 2015b:62).
- 3- Parliamentarism: is based on the indirect participation in policy-making of formally equal “citizens”, through their exercise of voting and accompanying rights, in relation to an elected legislature or political executive (Jessop, 1982:230; 2015b:62).
- 4- Pluralism: is based on institutionalized channels of access to state apparatuses for political forces with voluntary membership, which represent interests or causes rooted in civil society (as opposed to function in the division of labour) and are recognized as legitimate by relevant branches of the state (Jessop, 1982:230; 2015b:62-63).
- 5- Raison d'état: this is a limit case of intervention without formal channels of representation. It involves attempts to legitimate such intervention by appeal to threats to the security of the state itself, to the security of society, or to some significant national or public interest (Jessop, 1982:230; 2015b:63-64). It has become more significant in recent decades in the context of what Poulantzas called “authoritarian statism” (1979: 247-305) and it plays an important role in the so-called “war on terrorism”.

These forms of representation affect, inter alia, the way in which political forces are constituted, their ability to access the state system, as well as their identities and their form or organization (Jessop, 2015b:64-65)

4.2.1.2 The institutional architecture of the state

This dimension concerns the internal vertical, horizontal and transversal organization of the state system as expressed through the distribution of powers among its parts, considered territorially and functionally (Jessop, 2015b:66). In this part, it is worth mentioning the relative weight of the legislative and executive branches of government, the weight of various parts of the administrative apparatus or the relations between national territorial states and emergent trans- and supranational state forms, as well as among central, local, regional, and parastatal forms of rule (idem).

One of the most important aspects of adding this dimension is that it overcomes the rigidity of the “black box” view which assumes a distinction between “inputs” and “outputs” neglecting what systems theorists call “withinputs” (Jessop, 2015b:67). The internal structure of the state shows us the importance of analysing it as “a system of strategic action fields” (Fligstein, McAdam, 2015: 67-82). In so doing,

we realize the difficulties to secure the unity of the state apparatus, the coexistence of formal bureaucracy with more informal modes of intervention or the importance that articulation of the branches and departments of the state system has in structuring power relations (Jessop, 2015b:68).

The relative dominance of departments or ministries can underwrite the hegemony of specific material and ideal interests. We find a clear example in Britain, where the dominant role of the Treasury-Bank of England nexus has been an important element in the structural determination of the hegemony of national and international commercial and banking capital (idem). We see how different UK governments have constantly promoted the interests of the City of London as financial centre and a neoliberal, finance-dominated accumulation regime that favours London and the rest of the south-east of England (idem).

The decentralization of powers has also changed the institutional architecture of the state, enabling the creation of ‘states’ within the legally recognized ‘official states’ (H1). The conflict between them can lead to crisis of institutional integration and even trigger processes of secession.

It also has a crucial relevance when it comes to differentiate “normal” and “exceptional” regimes. In the former, channels of democratic representation are the dominant ones (clientelist, corporatist, parliamentary and pluralist) while in the latter, different state apparatus such as the military, the security branch or the fascist party are the dominant ones (Jessop, 2015b:69).

Although we will develop this idea in a different chapter, we can advance that we have witnessed a restructuring of the institutional architecture of the state which has encouraged the strengthening of some branches such as the executive or security agencies and develop a tendency towards “authoritarian statism” (Boukalas, 2014; Jessop, 2015b: 211-238; Poulantzas, 1979: 247-305; Sassen, 2010:233-253). Simultaneously the decentralization of powers have enabled the democratic reproduction of old nations and the consolidation of ‘subaltern states’ within states (H1).

4.2.1.3 The mechanisms and modes of state intervention and their overall articulation

As mentioned above, the mechanisms and modes of intervention are linked to what system theorists call outputs. As we already know, from a strategic relational point of view there are significant material and discursive lines of demarcation between the state qua institutional ensemble and other institutional orders and the lifeworld, however, we also need to emphasize that state’s apparatuses and practices are

materially interdependent with other institutional orders and social practices (Jessop, 2008a:5). The state is socially embedded that is why it makes special sense quoting Tim Mitchell's view:

“The state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangements, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing this line of difference. (Mitchell, 1991:95, Jessop, 2008a:5)”

Based on this view, when it comes to state's modes of intervention one of its main role is the demarcation of the changing boundaries between public and private (Jessop, 2015b: 70). But we also have to remark the institutional and organizational mechanisms and resources available for state intervention (*idem*). These would be what Michael Mann calls the state's “infrastructural powers” (1984:189) or what according to Charles Tilly (2010: 47-56) are “state's capacities” and it involves its capacities to penetrate society and organize social relations throughout its territory, on the basis of its political decisions (Jessop, 2015b: 70). As long as states are not omniscient these capacities are relational.

Apart from these overall macroscopic considerations we must also take into account the microphysics of state power which helps us in raising issues such as the growing interest on governance and governmentality (*idem*). Thus, the retrenchment of state structures has favoured their privatization by encouraging the rise of governance in the name of decentralized decision-making and reflexive collaboration³⁶. We will see its features below³⁷.

We cannot finish this part without mentioning the paramount role of taxes in state intervention and the dependency that it creates in the so-called “tax state” (*idem*). This can lead to fisco-financial crisis that might include crisis over the right of taxation, crisis of institutional integration, crisis affecting the state's capacities for intervention, legitimacy crises or a hegemonic crises around the nature and purposes of government for society (*idem*). This can trigger or intensify existing crisis “in” or “of” the state and lead to demands to redesign political representation, reform the state's internal structures and operations, alter the amount and modalities of state intervention, recompose the social bases of the state, redefine state strategies,

³⁶ It is a rhetoric that dovetails with the neoliberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008).

³⁷ In the chapter about authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy.

and alter the balance between consent and coercion to address hegemonic and wider organic crisis (idem).

Instead of the Habermasian ‘crisis of rationality’ used by Jessop, we would rather talk about *a ‘crisis of capacities’* in line with Tilly’s (2010) and Goikoetxea’s (2017) approach.

4.2.2 Substantive dimensions

4.2.2.1 The social bases of state power: power bloc, hegemonic bloc and historical bloc

According to Jessop, it refers to ‘the specific configuration of social forces, however identified as subjects and however (dis-) organized as political actors, that support the basic structure of the state system, its mode of operation, and its objectives’ (2015b: 72). It involves an “unstable equilibrium of compromise” that reflects the projects and demands of different social forces in which the inclusion of popular forces matters (idem). Apart from the “consensus” there is also a need for specific modes of mass integration (or indeed exclusion) that channel, transform and prioritize demands and manage the flow of material concessions necessary to maintain the mentioned unstable equilibrium (idem).

We have to recall that the various social forces on the political scene are not pre-given and unchanging, they are constituted in part through the forms of representation and intervention and are objects of political transformation (Jessop, 1982:242). We see for instance thanks to Goikoetxea, how the role played by the interaction between Basque political actors and institutions (the Basque State in its inclusive sense) has (re) produced a new subject: the Basque demos³⁸ (Goikoetxea, 2013).

In developing this issue, Jessop uses three important gramscian concepts: the power bloc, the hegemonic bloc and the historical bloc.

- **The power bloc:** it comprises *a durable alliance among dominant classes and class fractions that structures the politics of power and defines the “art of the possible” on the political scene* (Jessop, 2015b:72). Electorally it can be represented in one or more governing parties but, its durability is grounded in a viable mode of growth and a mode and in a solid presence in the wider state system, which includes a significant influence over the state project (ibidem:73).

³⁸ It is a demos because it has been the subject and object of a democratization process (Goikoetxea, 2013:16).

- **The hegemonic bloc:** it refers to the historical unity, not of structures (as in the case of the historical bloc), but of social forces (ruling classes, supporting classes, mass movements, and intellectuals) (Jessop, 1997:55). It is a durable alliance of class forces organized by a class (or class fraction) which has proved itself *capable of exercising political, intellectual, and moral leadership over the dominant classes and the popular classes alike* (idem). According to Jessop, although it applies principally to the national states, it can also be used in studying supra- and sub-national regimes (idem).
- **The historical bloc:** it can be defined as *a historically constituted and socially reproduced correspondence between the economic base and the politico-ideological superstructures of a social formation* (Jessop, 1997:55). According to Portelli, as long as the historical bloc represents a concrete historical context, its analysis could refer to a certain geographic and historical situation: for instance, Gramsci takes into account different spatio-temporal fixes and analyses the ‘national historical bloc’, the ‘European historical bloc’, the ‘local historical bloc’ etc. (Portelli, 1973:82-84).

All these points involve giving *special importance to the subjective elements of the political life such as common sense, identity, will formation or leadership* (González, 2003:125-135) *in which political parties and intellectuals play an important role* (Portelli, 1973: 93-118). They are a key element for organizing political power across all six dimensions of the state (Jessop, 2015b:74), but especially in organizing and securing the social bases of the state, elaborating state projects and articulating hegemonic visions (ibidem:76). However, we are witnessing *a crisis in the party system* which is more broadly connected with transformations on the state form from the Keynesian Welfare National State towards the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (Jessop, 2008c). We see how the emergence of sovereignty demands are also related to this crisis as we see for example in Scotland and Catalonia, where ‘traditional parties’ such as the Labour Party or the Socialist Party face difficulties in connecting popular masses to broader British and Spanish state projects and hegemonic visions³⁹.

4.2.2.2 State project

In addressing this issue, we are presupposing the improbability of a unified state system because the state does not exist as a fully constituted, internally coherent, organizationally pure and operationally closed system but is an emergent,

³⁹ We will deal with the issue further below.

contradictory, hybrid and relatively open system (Jessop, 1990:346). State projects and practices define the boundaries of the state system and endow it with a degree of internal unity (idem). It corresponds to the “part” moment of the “part-whole” paradox of the state that we are going to explain below.

According to Jessop (2015b: 84), the state project denotes the political imaginaries, projects and practices that:

1. Define and regulate the boundaries of the state system vis-à-vis the wider society.
2. Seek to provide the state apparatus thus demarcated with sufficient substantive internal operational unity for it to be able to perform its inherited or redefined “socially accepted” tasks.

As the state has no inherent substantive unity *qua* institutional ensemble it has to be created through practices outside the state (e.g., through intellectuals), elaborated within (parts of) state apparatus or imposed by external forces (ibidem:85). Enduring projects are usually embedded in a constitutional settlement or institutionalized compromise (idem). The state project is associated with a distinctive *raison d’etat* and with a statecraft that seeks to unify the activities of different branches and departments across its different sites, scales, and fields of action (idem). It is in trying to ensure such unity that different challenges arise and partially *explains why state crisis often manifest themselves as crises of institutional integration and coherence of state action* (idem).

We may understand unity in its broad sense, in terms of the capacity of the state apparatus to maintain general political order and social cohesion within an associated territory (idem). State projects aim to provide a framework in which individual agents and organs of the state can coordinate and combine (collibrate) policy and practices, and also connect diverse policies to pursue a (more or less illusory) national interest, public good and social welfare (idem).

According to these points, we conclude this part with three main ideas:

- 1- ***There is never a point when the state is finally built in*** a given territory and after which it operates, according to its own, definite, fixed and inevitable laws (Jessop, 2015b:86). Talking about the state depends on the contingent and provisional outcome of struggles to realize more or less specific “state projects” (idem).
- 2- ***National boundaries do not constitute a fixed horizon for emergent state projects***: there is no more reason to rule out strategies aiming to build multi- and transnational networks and circuits of state power than there is to

exclude local or regional state powers (idem). We clearly see in our cases that pro-independence movements provide a different state project that wants to set different national boundaries for their political communities.

- 3- ***State actions should not be ascribed to the state as an originating subject but*** should be seen as the emergent, unintended, and complex resultant of what rival “states within the state” or competing social forces have done and are doing on a complex strategic terrain (idem).

From our point of view, when applying this approach to our particular case studies⁴⁰ we must bear in mind what we may call the political dimension of the state project and its economic dimension:

- ***The political dimension of the state project:*** it relates to the institutional architecture of the state and its territorial articulation and thus, to the organization of “its internal state boundaries”. As a result, we may differentiate, for instance, a unitary, a federal or an autonomic state. It also relates to the dominant view on the relation between these internal boundaries. ***Those who understand the ‘matrix state’ as the main political body and the ‘subaltern state’ a subordinated entity (one region among others) will be called ‘matrix nationalists’. Those who understand that both ‘matrix states’ and ‘subaltern states’ are equal political bodies will be called ‘subaltern nationalists’.***⁴¹
- ***The economic dimension of the state project:*** it relates to different public policies, investment policies and all the elements that define the role to be played by the state in organising society. As a result, we may differentiate, for instance, a more socialist, social democrat or neoliberal state project.

4.2.2.3 Hegemonic visions

According to Jessop, they reflect the “whole” moment of the above mentioned “part-whole” paradox and they elaborate the nature and purposes of the state for the wider social formation (Jessop, 2015b: 86). They provide political, intellectual and moral guidelines for the conduct of state policy and seek to reconcile the particular and the universal by linking the nature and the purposes of the state to a broader (but always selective) political, intellectual, and moral vision of the public interest, the good society or an analogous principle of societal organization (ibidem:87).

⁴⁰ We have developed these concepts in order to adapt the SRA to the specificities of our case studies.

⁴¹ We will develop these ideas further.

When coping with hegemonic visions⁴² we are bearing in mind that they always privilege some material and ideal interests, identities, spaces, temporalities over others and that they are most likely to succeed when they address the major structural constraints imposed by existing forms of domination as well as by the prevailing balance of forces and by the prospects for their transformation through new alliances, strategies, and spatiotemporal horizons of action (idem).

It more specifically can be said to involve: “(a) the formulation of a political agenda involved in the construction of a concrete, national-popular programme of action which operates as an organizing and unifying principle for that project; (b) the expansion of this agenda to include more and more social questions and social phenomena through a process of displacement; and (c) the provision of a relatively unified social basis by the construction of political frontiers in relation to those social groups which are defined as the enemies of the projects.”(Bertramsen, 1991:110)

In our cases, subaltern nationalists will try to articulate those very ideas creating a political frontier in which the matrix state will be used as a constitutive outside. Thus, we believe that the key in current nationalist contentions is the struggle between competing state project and hegemonic visions in trying to reach as many people as possible (H9). In such a process, especially in times of crisis the articulation of a new people is particularly important so we think that the School of Essex has a great deal to offer in that regard.

5- Basic conceptual framework: matrix and subaltern state(hood) defined

According to the above-mentioned approach, the key idea is that state power is an *explanandum*, not an explanatory principle (Jessop, 1990:117-118; in Jessop, 2015b:96). The *explanandum* means something to be explained whereas *explanans* is the explanation itself (Jessop, 2015b:92). In that regard, we need to consider that:

- State theory cannot take the concept of state for granted as an analytical object; but it can and should explore the practices that produce highly variable *state effects* (ibidem:46).
- The SRA reject attempts to capture the ‘essence’ of the state and aim instead to elaborate useful theoretical and methodological tools to study its changing forms, functions and effects (ibidem:54).
- The SRA widens its focus, so as to capture not just the state apparatus but the exercise and effects of state power as a contingent expression of a

⁴² Previously called “hegemonic projects” (Jessop, 1990:346).

changing balance of forces that seek to advance their respective interests inside, through and against the state system (idem).

- The SRA considers the role of discursive and material practices in delimiting territorial boundaries (ibidem:48)

Thus, it can be concluded that we have to explain the implications of changes in statehood for the analysis of current nationalist demands. Therefore, after dealing in fairly abstract terms with the general strategic relational heuristic and its implications for the analysis of the state, we are going to go a step further and provide our own definition.

Our aim is to develop a non-essentialist account of neither nationalism nor the state, so we will try to overcome the epistemic fallacy of nationalism while enriching at the same time state theory. Thus, we are going to give a preliminary definition that will serve us as a guideline when dealing with our case studies in a more concrete plane of analysis.

We consider subaltern state (hood) to be a recent expression of state power. More concretely, of the state effects that result from decentralization processes in the so-called Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (Jessop, 2008c). With that in mind, our definitions run as follows:

For matrix state(hood) we refer to those spatio-temporal fixations of authority, territory and rights that have the official status of a sovereign state in accordance with international legislation. They are coherently structured as a result of the constant interaction between its strategically calculated oriented actors, structurally inscribed strategic selectivities, discursively inscribed selectivities and technologically inscribed selectivities. If ruled by the principle of democratic sovereignty, this complex interaction produces democratic state effects. It is in such a process that the demos is produced and reproduced and the democratic nation is produced and reproduced.

For subaltern state(hood) we refer to those spatio-temporal fixations of authority, territory and rights that put into motion their state powers in accordance with the political capacities devolved by the matrix state. It relates to what traditionally have been called nations without states. They are coherently structured as a result of the constant interaction between its strategically calculated oriented actors, structurally inscribed strategic selectivities, discursively inscribed selectivities and technologically inscribed selectivities. If ruled by the principle of democratic sovereignty, this complex interaction produces democratic state effects. It is in such a process that the demos is produced and reproduced and the democratic nation is produced and reproduced. Thus, 'subaltern states' are states inside 'matrix states'

and produce and reproduce ‘subaltern democracies’ inside ‘matrix democracies’ and ‘subaltern nations’ inside ‘matrix nations’.

As mentioned above, democracy reproduces its subject: the demos. In the same way, nationalism reproduces its subject: the nation. Whereas the nation can exist without democracy, the demos cannot exist without nationalism. In current Western countries, the demos is a type of nation, and democracy is a type of nationalism. Thus, it makes no sense to distinguish between nationalists and no nationalists. Therefore, from a non-essentialist point of view, those who understand the ‘matrix state’ as the main political body and the ‘subaltern state’ a subordinated entity (one region among others) will be called ‘*matrix nationalists*’. Those who understand that both ‘matrix states’ and ‘subaltern states’ are equal political bodies will be called ‘*subaltern nationalists*’.

The term subaltern was firstly introduced by Gramsci in order to develop a new approach to deal with the history of the ‘dominated’ (Gramsci, 1981). In his view, the distinctive feature of dominated groups was their subaltern condition.⁴³ He referred to the working class, peasants and all those groups that could be broadly defined according to Rancière as ‘the part with no part’ (Zizek, 2010). If we are to give a brief definition, we would say according to Galfarsoro that *the notion of the subaltern means of ‘inferior rank’* (Galfarsoro, 2007). This idea has been commonly used by feminists, amongst which we would like to highlight Spivak (1988), whose famous work ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ has inspired the title of this thesis. On her view, although subaltern subjects are physically able to speak, in reality, they do not have the capacity to express themselves and being heard. Its most radical example would be that of colonial women who would be doubly subaltern.

To make an analogy, when it comes to political communities and state institutions, *subalternity* relates to the relation of dependence between the matrix and the subaltern state. It entails material, strategic and discursive aspects. When it comes to the material aspect, this dependency is based on the need for the subaltern state to ask for more political capacities in order to produce and reproduce their demoi differently (to normalize them through disciplinary, biopolitical and regulatory mechanisms) or to ask for political representation at the matrix state. This need is strategically articulated by political, social and economic actors. As long as it is a relational concept, it must be discursively produced and reproduced by political

⁴³ It is worth mentioning that this concept has inspired the emergence of new theoretical schools around the world like the School of Subaltern Studies in which authors such as Spivak, Chakrabarty, Said or Guha tried to give voice to those who were condemned to speak lower.

parties, state agents, organic intellectuals, social movements etc. In such a process, the matrix state is used as its constitutive outside.

As long as it is a relational concept, we cannot give a set of features that define fully *a priori* when we are dealing with a subaltern state. However, in order to begin a research and test it empirically the criteria used by Requejo to determine whether a specific case may or may not be regarded as a minority nation seems appropriate. In that regard, he adds two criteria to those considered more traditional ones (the existence of historical, linguistic or cultural singularities and the desire for a different status and self-government) (2006:3). These two criteria run as follows: the existence of autonomously functioning political institutions characterized by: 1) a distinct party system from that of its state-level counterpart; 2) within which at least one secessionist party is present (idem).

We may hypothesized that in such a case, at least, a differentiated process of nation/demos/state building may take place, that sovereignty demands to deepen such a process will be requested and that the matrix state will be used as a constitutive outside. Moreover, in the political interaction and discursive incomunication- the discursive practice based on the lack of communication (Goikoetxea, 2010) - between matrix and subaltern nationalists political (nationalist/democratic) confrontation usually arise (Goikoetxea, 2017:141).

These conflicts tend to create crises that have both objective and subjective dimensions. *'Objectively*, they occur when a set of social relations cannot be reproduced ('go on') in the old way. *Subjectively*, they are moments of indeterminacy, where decisive action can repair these relations, prompt piecemeal adaptation, or lead to radical innovation.' (Jessop, 2015a:458).

We make a distinction between *'crisis in' and 'crisis of' the political system*. *'Crisis in' the political system*: these kind of crises "may take a familiar form for which crisis-management routines have already been developed and/or which can be solved quickly through trial-and-error experimentation that restores 'business as usual'. These can be described as normal crises or crises in an organization, institutional order, functional system, or wider social order." (Jessop, 2015a:458)

However there can also be a *'crisis of' the political system*: crises 'of' institutional orders, functional systems, or social orders are less common. They typically involve a crisis of crisis-management, indicating the inability to 'go on in the old way' in the face of challenges that require radical new approaches to crisis-management and resolution or, indeed, indicating deep-seated contradictions and crisis-tendencies that demand more radical transformation or, even, revolution. The disorienting effects of crisis create the space for contesting previously sedimented meanings,

which can occur in many different fields on many different scales. This can create in turn opportunities to reorder the lines of demarcation that distinguish the polity from its 'constitutive outside', to reshape the political field and reconfigure the state apparatus and bases of state power, and to redefine the legitimate themes and topics for policy debate, policy-making and policy implementation. In short, crises are opportunities for political contestation and learning as well as policy learning. (Jessop, 2015a:458)

In line with Jessop's view, "it is important to accept the idea implicit in systems theory that the political system is self-substituting: that is, that a crisis in the political system leads normally not to its demise but to its reorganization" (2008a:7). **That is why secession is an exceptional process and sovereignty demands tend to produce outcomes that are more moderate and are usually integrated according to the logic of difference (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987).**

We think that our three case studies share this basic framework at an abstract-simple plane of analysis. However, they obviously have marked differences when we take further concrete-complex planes of analysis. Moreover we think that Basque political contention has undergone a 'crisis in' the political system whereas Scottish and Catalan ones have undergone a 'crisis of'.

However, when we talk about nationalist confrontation in current European Union we think that they all share a key feature: the will of subaltern nationalists of being considered an equal political unity and getting more political capacities not (or not only) on the basis of having a different cultural identity but (also) of being a different political community. *Metaphorically and inspired by Spivak's famous work, we think that what is really at stake in current 'nationalists contentions' is how and to what extent can the subaltern states speak.*

6- Mechanisms and processes: strategic relational collective action.

6.1 Mechanisms, Processes and Episodes: putting mobilization in motion

We have explained a general strategic relational heuristic and develop concrete definitions inspired by this very approach. However, in spite of the fact that strategic action is at the core of its *raison d'être*, it does not provide us with theoretical concepts concrete enough as to study the issue of stability and change.

Therefore, although we see similar process of state, nation and demos building in Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country when it comes to the more concrete outcomes we see divergent results. In that regard, it is obvious that there has been

a rise of pro-independence movements in Scotland⁴⁴ that has led to a binding referendum on independence (Azkune, 2016:38-55), a ‘secessionist contentious episode’ (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015: 323) in Catalonia whereas in the Basque Country the level of contention has been lower and most of the demands for sovereignty have been articulated in a democratic logic of difference⁴⁵ (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 218-228).

That is why we need to link the above mentioned macrosocial processes with much more concrete microinteractions in order to explain the dynamics of emergent conflict and change (Flingstein, McAdam, 2015: 31). As long as every attempt to define a complex phenomenon is selective (Jessop, 2008a:2), we are giving preference to state theory (SRA) and theories of hegemony (Essex School). However, we consider theories of collective action to be a good bridge between them. As far as it is a tangential aspect of our work, it goes beyond the scope of our research analysing in depth its details⁴⁶.

It is a prolific object of study so there have been many different approaches engaged within the social movements research agenda. Nevertheless, the main trends among American and European scholars since the 1960’s may be summarized as follows (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001: 15-16):

- **Resource Mobilization theory** emphasized the significance of organizational bases, resource accumulation and collective coordination for popular political actors. They downplay the contingency, emotionality and interactive character of movement politics.
- **Political Process** analysts stressed dynamism, strategic interaction and response to political environment. One of its key concepts is that of “political opportunity structures”. They also pay attention to the forms of claim making, or what has been called “the repertoire of contention”.
- Finally, what has been known as the **frame analysis** has paid attention to discourses not as a simple expression of pre-existing group claims but as an active, creative, constitutive process.

They all kept a fruitful dialogue and tried to learn from each other resulting in what has been known as *the Classic Social Movement agenda*. In short, we may say that

⁴⁴ More exactly, it has been precisely the independence referendum and its campaign the most important trigger of the support for independence.

⁴⁵ The debate about a new political status for the Basque Autonomous Community that has taken place in the Basque Parliament is a good example.

⁴⁶ For more details in this topics, see for instance: (Ahedo, 2012; Ibarra, 2005; Letamendia, 2015; Martínez, 2011; Martínez, Casado, Ibarra, 2012; Telleria, 2012; Zubiaga, 2009).

they focused on four key concepts: (1) Political opportunities; (2) Mobilizing Structures; (3) Collective Action Frames; (4) Repertoires of Contention (ibidem: 14).

This model was criticized on the basis of being too structural, static, deterministic and non suitable for broader conflictive episodes. On the contrary, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (hereafter MTT) moved toward the analysis of smaller-scale causal mechanisms that recur in different combinations with different aggregate consequences in varying historical settings (ibidem:24). *We believe that they offer us a more dynamic, context sensitive and strategic model, which suits better with our Strategic Relational heuristic⁴⁷. Thus, it can provide us with proper tools for one of the more concrete and complex planes of our research: the activation of episodes of secession (H8).*

In that regard, they distinguish three key concepts (idem):

- **Mechanisms** are a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.
- **Processes** are regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements.
- **Episodes** are continuous streams of contention including collective claims making that bears on other parties' interests.

Therefore, along with big and macro processes – revolution, democratization, nationalism- they provide us with the tools to study smaller and more limited processes such as mobilization, creation of political identities, polarization etc. (Zubiaga, 2009:97). Finally, within these processes, we always find more concrete mechanisms such as brokerage, certification, attribution of opportunities, repression etc. In that regard, when it comes the concrete aspect of mechanisms, they also distinguish among three main types that despite being analytically distinct, they all overlap empirically (ibidem:25-26):

- **Environmental mechanisms** mean externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life. Such mechanisms can operate directly: for example, the Brexit vote can be considered an environmental mechanism with the capacity to trigger a second referendum on independence in Scotland.

⁴⁷ McAdam and Flingstein (2015) developed a new approach called 'Strategic Action Fields'. However, they do not provide us with significant changes for our research.

- **Cognitive mechanisms** operate through alterations of individual and collective perception; words like recognize, understand, reinterpret, and classify characterize such mechanisms.
- **Relational mechanisms** alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks. Brokerage is one of the most common relational mechanism.

All in all, the point of departure is the above-mentioned classical agenda. They introduced a more dynamic and strategic dimension to the previous variables as follows (ibidem:45):


- **From opportunity structure to attribution of threat and opportunity:** opportunities and threats are not objective categories, but depend on the kind of collective attribution that the classical agenda limited to framing of movement goals. They also involve other actors than formal movement organizations: members of the polity and subjects as well as other challengers.
- **From mobilizing structures to social appropriation:** mobilizing structures can be preexisting or created in the course of contention but in any case need to be appropriated as vehicles of struggle.
- **From strategic framing to social construction:** entire episodes, their actors, and their actions are interactively framed by participants, their opponents, the press, and important third parties.
- **From transgressive repertoires to innovative collective action:** innovative action gains attention, introduces new perturbations into an interactive field, and typically results in a ratcheting up of shared uncertainty among all parties to an emergent conflict.
- Thus, **mobilization occurs throughout an episode of contention.** The interaction among the mechanisms in the model is both continual and recursive, and mobilization can be understood, in part, as a function of their interaction⁴⁸.

With that in mind, the transformations from a static agenda to a set of interactive mechanisms are summarized in the next figure:

⁴⁸ We will see it clearly when dealing with the Scottish referendum campaign.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 7 *A Dynamic, Interactive Framework for Analyzing Mobilization in Contentious Politics*



(source: idem)

6.2 Mechanisms and processes of secession

According to Martínez and Zubiaga, in so far as nationalism is a kind of political struggle within which similar processes and mechanisms can be detected in seemingly very different cases, the theoretical framework provided by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly seems useful (2015:3). More concretely, they “propose *a map of secession mechanisms and processes whose degree of activation would be directly related to the existence of a secessionist process* or one of partial state break-up and the creation of new states (ibidem:4). On their view, “in the light of this map it would be possible to comparatively analyze the recent Basque and Catalan processes of the demand for nationhood” (idem).

As long as their research is close to one of the most concrete and complex dimension of ours, we are going to rely directly on their work for the Basque and Catalan cases. We will also try to use it in the Scottish case. They place the mechanisms into four categories as follows (ibidem:5-6):

- *Catalysing mechanisms*: Infringement of the interests of the elites, sudden imposition of grievances and opportunity spirals.
- *Mobilizing mechanisms*: category formation, identity shift, tactical innovation, brokerage and competition.
- *Facilitating mechanisms* that assist the consolidation of the secessionist episode, basically through the de-alignment of elites and the certification of the process carried out by external agents, particularly international ones.
- Finally, in the opposite sense, we should make reference to the *deactivating mechanisms* that impede the development of the secessionist contentious episode: we refer to the adaptation of the subject of the demand to repressive contexts and/or to alternative political proposals made by the kin-state.

Apart from this mechanisms they also mention three *broader processes*: *identity sift*, *polarization* and *diffusion* (ibidem:14-15). Their definition run as follows:

We would define *diffusion* as “a political process in which actors at different levels (strategically) adopt and adapt foreign examples to make national and transnational claims and to change legal and institutional settings, build alliances and exert pressure.” (idem).

Identity shift entails “alteration in shared definitions of a boundary between two political actors and of relations across that boundary” (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 162)

By *polarization* “we mean widening of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward one, the other, or both extremes. When it occurs, polarization is an

important accompaniment to contentious episodes because it vacates the moderate center, impedes the recomposition of previous coalitions, produces new channels for future ones, fills even the most concrete of policy issues with ideological content which can block their solution, and can lead to repression, armed conflict, and civil war.” (Ibidem:322).

Thus on their view “in the Catalan case certain mechanisms that enable us to speak of a “secessionist contentious episode”, at least since 2008, have been activated, whereas in the Basque Country, this has not happened, at least not yet.” (ibidem:4). We will add that in the Scottish case we also appreciate the activation of those very mechanisms.

6.3 Hegemony as a concrete process:


As long as the relation between the matrix and the subaltern state tends to be conflictive, articulating a competing ‘collective will’ is always one of the most relevant tasks for subaltern nationalists. More concretely, for those movements that want to secede from their matrix state, building a new hegemony has become a must in current Western countries. Episodes are not merely complicated processes. They always involve two or more processes (ibidem: 28). Thus, apart from the mentioned mechanisms and processes, of *particular relevance for our research are the processes related to the construction of a new hegemonic project and their concrete mechanisms.*

Zubiaga’s work provides us with a good tool in that regard (2012). On his view, thanks to *brokerage*, previously distant areas are connected favouring the equivalential articulation⁴⁹ of separated demands (Zubiaga, 2012:126). Moreover, *Tactical innovation on discourses and repertoires* of contention, are crucial for the emergence of the political which enables the social rupture that opens the door to hegemonic struggles (idem). Finally, *polarization* favours the gravitation towards more radical options of people who initially preferred options that were more moderate. **We show the mechanisms of hegemony in the next graphic:**

⁴⁹ We will see the specificities of hegemony in the next chapter when dealing with the Essex School of Discourse Analysis.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 8 Mechanisms of Hegemony



Source: elaborated by the author

With that in mind, after explaining in depth the Strategic Relational Approach and the more concrete issue of strategic collective action, we are going to focus on the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. *We believe that it will serve us to conduct the last and more concrete and complex issue of our research: the construction of a new hegemonic project and the articulation of the people (H9).*

2 Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren teoria

Sarrera:

Bira Linguistikoa adiera, XX. mendeko hirurogeita hamar eta laurogeigarren hamarkadetan indartu zen filosofian zein giza eta gizarte zientzietan lengoaiak hartu zuen garrantzia islatzeko helburuarekin (Ibañez, 2003:23). Testuinguru horretan ulertu behar da diskurtsoan oinarrituriko analisi eta eskolen hedapena. Eztabaidagarria suerta liteke diskurtsoaren analisisia zer den eta zer ez den guztiz zehaztea edota zein eskola koka daitekeen diskurtsoaren analisiaren barruan eta zein ez. Phillipsek eta Jorgensenek esaten dutenarekin bat eginez, argi dagoena da “diskurtsoa” modan dagoen kontzeptua dela eta horren ondorioz eremu oso ezberdinetan aurretiaz definiziorik eman gabe erabiltzen dela (2002:1). Aipatu autoreek adibidez, Laclau eta Mouffen teorian oinarrituriko Essexeko Eskolaren diskurtsoaren teoria, Diskurtsoaren Analisi Kritikoa eta Psikologia Diskurtsiboa ezberdintzen dituzte (2002:1). Iñiguezek bestalde, diskurtsoaren analisisian dauden ikuspegi ezberdinen sailkapenean, Interakzio Soziolinguistika, Komunikazioaren Etnografia, Elkarrizketa Analisisia, Diskurtsoaren Analisi Kritikoa eta Psikologia Diskurtsiboa ezberdintzen ditu (2003: 92-103).

Gure helburua ez da diskurtsoaren analisisia eta honen baitan dauden eskola ezberdinen azterketa bat egitea beraz ez ditugu honen inguruan dauden eztabaidak landuko. Atal honetan, eremu horretan kokatzen den Essexeko Eskolaren planteamendu nagusiak azalduko ditugu.

Chantal Mouffe eta Ernesto Laclaren urteetako lanaren ondorioz sorturiko eskola honek identitate politiko kolektiboen eraikuntzen azterketarako balio handiko euskarri teorikoa eskaintzen digu. Gramsciren hegemonia kontzeptua ardatz, 1985. urtean *Hegemonia eta Estrategia Sozialista*⁵⁰ (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987) liburuaren bidez mundu akademiko zein politikoan eragin handia izan duen korrante teorikoa sortzeko hastapeneko pausua eman zuten. Mouffek berak liburuaren 30. urteurrenean onartzen duen moduan, liburu teoriko eta politiko zen aldi berean, 68ko maiatzaren ostean klase ardatzetik harago indartzen ari ziren hainbat mugimendu ulertzeko ezkerrek zituen gabeziei aurre egitea helburu zuena (Errejón, Mouffe, 2015: 9).

⁵⁰ Hemendik aurrera HES.

Proiektu honen oinarria, marxismo ortodoxoarekiko autoreek politikoki eta teorikoki zuten asegabetasunari aurre egitea zen. Jules Townshendek esandakoa jarraituz, teorikoki, marxismo ortodoxoak ez zien ideologiaren ikuspegi erabilgarria bat eskaintzen: egitura/gainegitura banaketak erlazio sozialen eraikuntza ideologikoa baztertzen zuen eta klase ardatzetik harago kokatzen ziren identitate politikoak azaltzeko arazoak zituen (2004: 270). Aipatu dikotomiaren eragina gutxitzeko asmoz “autonomia erlatiboa” proposatzen zuten ikuspegiak ere ez zuten azken instantziako determinismo ekonomikoa gainditzeko gaitasunik adierazten. Hori dela eta, diskurtsoak eta identitate politikoak ekoizpen erlazioen epifenomeno gisa ikusi ordez, egungo erlazio sozialen oinarrian dauden antagonismoen eraginez sorturiko borroka hegemonikoen ondorio gisa ikusten dituzte (idem).

Besteak beste, Foucault, Lacan, Saussure, Wittgensetin, Lefort, Macpherson, Althusser eta Gramsci dira Laclau eta Mouffen hasierako lanetan eragin handiena izan duten autoreak⁵¹ (Howart, 2000; 2015; Townshend, 2004). Mouffek berak dioskun moduan Foucaultek eta postestrukturalismoak garrantzia handia izan zuten esentzialismoari aurre egiteko. HES-ren berezitasun teorikoa hain zuzen ere, posestrukturalismoa Gramscirekin elkartzea izan zen (Errejón, Mouffe 2015:12-13). *Aipatu uztarpena, Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoa azaltzerako orduan azaldu dugun*⁵² *“Gramsciren Foucauldizazioa” eta “Foucaulten Gramscianizazioaren” logikan kokatzen dugu (Sum, 2004:7). Era orokor batean Laclauk eta Mouffek ikuspegi agentzialagoa hobesten duten bitartean Jessopek ikuspegi estrukturalagoa*⁵³ *darabilela esan dezakegu. Hori dela eta, Laclau eta Mouffen ereduak oinarri materialari garrantzia gutxi ematen diola uste dugu*⁵⁴ *(ibidem:6).*

Essexeko Eskolako kide den David Howarthekek, Diskurtsoaren Teoriaren aplikazio enpirikoetan lotura duten bi ikerketa eremu hobesten ditu: identitate politikoen eraikuntza eta desagitea eta mito eta imajinario kolektiboak sortzen dituzten praktika hegemonikoak (2000: 136.). *Gabeziak gabezia, estatu matrizearekin lehiatzen duten proiektu hegemonikoen artikulazioen azterketarako ikuspegi baliagarria izan daiteke.*

⁵¹ Ezin dugu ahaztu Mouffen hurrengo lanetan Carl Schmittek adibidez izan duen garrantzia.

⁵² Ikusi “The Strategic Relational Approach” kapituluari, “The third phase: semiosis and the critical cultural turn” atala.

⁵³ Laclauk, Derridaren eragina maiz onartzen duen bitartean (1998) Foucaulten eragina espresuki murrizten du: *“El trabajo de Foucault sólo tuvo una limitada influencia en mi enfoque y sólo me despertó una simpatía muy restringida;”* (Laclau, 2003: 285). Foucaulti egiten dion kritika nagusia praktika diskurtsibo eta ez diskurtsiboen artean egiten duen banaketa da Laclau eta Mouffen ikuspegitik praktika guztiak diskurtsiboak direlako (Laclau, Mouffe: 1987: 180).

⁵⁴ Laclau eta Mouffe-ri beste autore batzuk egin dizkieten kritikak eta gure lanerako dituzten gabeziak beste atal batean landuko ditugu.

Esandakoaren arabera beraz, bi korrante hauen gorputz teorikoa uztartuz marxismo tradizionalaren “klase esentzialismoa” gainditu eta “soziala” artikulazio politiko kontingenteen ondorioz eraikitako espazio diskurtsibo gisa definitu zuten (Errejón, Mouffe, 2015: 11). Oinarri hori hartuta, HES idatzi ostean Laclau eta Mouffen arteko lan intelektualaren banaketa artikulatu bat eman zen, posizio gerra akademiko baten bidez euren proiektuari atxikimendua emango zioten aliatuak bilatuz (Townshend, 2004: 275). Mouffek filosofia politikoaren ildotik Carl Schmitten lana jarraituz “politikotasunaren” kontzeptua “pluralismo agonistikoarekin” bateragarri egin zuen lerroa⁵⁵ abiatu zuen (ibidem: 279). Laclauk beste aldetik HES-n ezarri oinarria sendotu eta garatzeari ekin zion populismoari buruzko teorizazioa izanik bere azken ekarpen esanguratsuena (Vergalito, 2007:3). Biek abiatutako lan horren ondorio dira aipatu diskurtsoaren teoria eta Essexeko eskola bera.

Gure ikerketaren ardatza den *artikulazioaren metodoa jarraituz*, lehenik eta behin maila abstraktu sinple batean eskola honen kontzeptu nagusiak azalduko ditugu pixkanaka zehaztasun eta konplexutasun maila areagotuz. Hori dela eta diskurtsoaren inguruko hausnarketekin hasiko gara amaieran plano zehatzago batean hegemonia eta herriaren eraikuntzarekin bukatuz.

⁵⁵ Beste hainbaten artean hurrengo lanak horren adierazle dira: “El retorno de lo Político”, “La paradoja democrática” edo “En torno a lo político”.

1- Diskurtsoa eta Artikulazioa

Diskurtsoaren inguruan HES-k egiten duen ekarpena, guztien artean berritzaileena eta aldi berean eztabaidatuena da. Essexeko Eskolaren baitan kokatzen den David Howarth-en arabera Laclau eta Mouffen diskurtsoaren kontzeptuaren oinarria hurrengoa da:

“...the idea that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by particular systems of significant differences”
(Howarth, 2000: 101)

Euren aburuz beraz, objektu eta praktika guztiak diskurtsiboak izango lirateke. Beste era batera esanda, gauzek eta ekintzek esanahia izan dezaten diskurtso zehatzen parte izan behar dute. Honek ez du esan nahi errealitate osoa diskurtsiboa edo linguistikoa denik, baizik eta gauzak ulergarriak izan daitezen zabalagoa den esanahi marko baten barruan existitu behar direla (Howarth, 2015:129). Howarthez eskaintzen digun adibidea gure eginez, harri bat ezin da materia denik ukatu baina bere testuinguru sozialaren arabera, etxe bat eraikitzeke adreilua, gerra tresna bat edo aurkikuntza arkeologiko bat izan liteke (idem).

Oinarri hau jarraituz Torfingek⁵⁶ egiten duen diskurtsoaren definizioa hurrengoa da:

“A discourse is a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated” (1999:85)

Aipatu ideiak sarrera gisa kokatu ostean jadanik eskola honen ezaugarri nagusia agerikoa da: **diskurtsoak eta horrenbestez agentziak duen izaera pribilegiatua**. Hala ere, honek suposatzen duena sakonago aztertzea beharrezkoa da eta horretarako diskurtsoa eta artikulazioa elkarrekin ulertu beharreko bi kontzeptu dira. Euren hitzak zuzenean erabiliz:

“...llamaremos **articulación**⁵⁷ a toda práctica que establece una relación tal entre elementos, que la identidad de éstos resulta modificada como resultado de esa práctica. A la totalidad estructurada resultante de la práctica articuladora la llamaremos **discurso**. Llamaremos **momentos** a las posiciones diferenciales en tanto aparecen articuladas en el interior de un discurso. Llamaremos, por el contrario **elemento** a toda diferencia discursiva que no se articula discursivamente” (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 176-177).

Honek, hala ere, hiru dimentsio jarraituz zehaztaper batzuk egitea eskatuko du:

⁵⁶Jacob Torfing ere Essexeko Eskolaren ildoan kokatzen da.

⁵⁷ Letra lodia guk egina.

- 1- Formazio diskurtsibo baten koherentzia zehatzari dagokionez: Foucault-en formazio diskurtsibotik gertu dagoen hurbilpen bat burutuko dute “dispertsioa erregularitatean” aldarrikatuz (ibidem: 177). Formazio diskurtsiboa euren ikuspegitik, *posizio ezberdinduen*⁵⁸ multzoa litzateke baina posizio hauek ez lirateke euren kanpoko printzipio baten adierazpena izango (ibidem:178). Aipatu konfigurazioa, hala ere, kanpoko zenbait baldintzen ondorioz osotasun moduan adierazi daiteke, praktika artikulatarioak izanik hori lortze aldera lehentasuna izango duten jarduerak. Artikulaturiko osotasun diskurtsibo batetan elementu bakoitzak posizio ezberdindu bat izango du (“elementua” osotasun horren “momentu” bihurtu da) eta horren ondorioz *identitate oro erlazionala* dela esango dugu.
- 2- Praktika diskurtsibo eta ez diskurtsiboen banaketaren ukapena⁵⁹: objektu oro diskurtsiboa izango da ez delako emergentzia azalera diskurtsibo batetik at agertuko (ibidem: 179). Honek hala ere beste hainbat zehaztapen eskatuko ditu:
 - a. Aipatu banaketarekin ez dute pentsamendutik at mundurik existitzen ez denik adierazi nahi ezta eztabaida materialismo/idealismo logikan kokatu nahi. Adibidez, lurrikara bat materialki existitu arren, “fenomeno natural” moduan sailkatzeko eremu diskurtsibo baten egituraketa beharrezkoa izango da (ibidem: 182).
 - b. Bestalde, egitura diskurtsibo guztien izaera materiala aldarrikatzen dute. Euren ikuspegitik:

“la práctica de la articulación como fijación/dislocación de un sistema de diferencias tampoco puede consistir en meros fenómenos lingüísticos, sino que debe atravesar todo el espesor material de instituciones, rituales, prácticas de diverso orden, a través de las cuales una formación discursiva se estructura.” (ibidem: 185).
- 3- Osootasun diskurtsiboan logika erlazionala “osatugabea⁶⁰” eta kontingentea da: “elementuetatik” “momentuetara” egiten den trantsizioa ez da inoiz guztiz egikaritzen beraz beti egongo da praktika artikulatzailea aurrera eramateko aukera zabalik. Hori dela eta, erlazioek ezin izango dituzte identitate guztiak bildu eta kontrara ez dago bere osotasunean eraiki daitekeen identitaterik⁶¹ (ibidem: 188). Horren ondorioz, “jendartea” ez da

⁵⁸ “Posiciones diferenciales”.

⁵⁹ Foucaulten ikuspegiarekin talka egiten dute, honek praktika diskurtsibo eta ez diskurtsiboen arteko banaketaren beharra azpimarratzen duelako. Laclauk eta Mouffek egindako banaketa honek euren planteamenduari eginiko kritika askoren iturria izan da.

⁶⁰ Incompleta.

⁶¹ Beti egongo da identitate horren kanpo dagoen diskurtso bat.

osotasun suturatu, itxia eta autodefinitua beraz ez dago ezberdintasunen eremu osoa finkatuko duen printzipio bakarra. Kanpoaldearen eta barnealdearen osotasuna ezinezkoa izateak ahalbidetzen du sozialaren eraikuntzarako eremua.

Aipatutakoa kontuan hartuz euren ikuspegian “diskurtsoa” eta “diskurtsiboa” ezberdindu beharra dago. Arestian aipatu Torfingen definizioa jarraituz “Diskurtsoa adierazpen sekuentzien batasun erlazionala da” (1999: 91).

Aldez aurretik ezarrita dagoen zentrorik ez dagoela aldarrikatzen dutenez, erabateko osotasuna eta horrenbestez itxiera ezinezkoa dela adierazi dugu. Bata bestea ordezkatzeko duten zentro ezberdinen ugalketak ordenaren izaera prekarioa erakusten dute eta esanahia era partzial batean finkatuko da soilik. Diskurtsiboa edo diskurtsibitatearen eremua itxi ezineko osotasun hori litzateke eta diskurtsoa aldiz osotasun horren parte bat era prekarioan finkatzeko gaitasuna lukeen artikulazioa. Torfingen hitzak jarraituz:

“The partial fixation of meaning produces an irreducible surplus of meaning which escapes the differential logic of discourse. The field of irreducible surplus is termed the discursive (or the field of discursivity) in order to indicate that what is not fixed as a differential identity within a concrete discourse is not extra- or non-discursive, but is discursively constructed within a terrain of unfixity” (1999: 92).

Diskurtso ororen helburua, “diskurtsiboaren” eremuan gailentzea litzateke baina hori guztiz lortzea ezinezkoa izango denez “itxiera partziala” soilik lortuko da. Beste era batera esanda, antagonismoaren izaera eratzaileren ondorioz proiektu politiko batek ezin izango du jendartearen osotasuna ordezkatu baina praktika hegemonikoaren bidez zatikaturik dauden eskaerak artikulatu eta proiektu zehatz batean behin-behinekoz elkartzeko gaitasuna izan dezake. Horrek kanpoaldean proiektu kontragehemoniko bat artikulatzeko gaitasuna izan dezakeen eremu bat uztea suposatzen du.

2- Subjektua

Eskola honek subjektuen inguruan egiten duen hausnarketa ez dator guztiz bat gure ikerketaren oinarriekin. Gure aburuz, demosa izan beharko litzateke gaur egungo gizarteetan subjektuaren inguruko hausnarketetan lehen abiapuntua. Gorputz otzan menderatuak eta gorputz boteretuek txanpon beraren bi aldeak diren neurrian, etenik gabeko gatazkan sortzen da demosa (Goikoetxea, 2017:7). Bere bi ezaugarri dialektiko nabarmendu behar dira: subjektua (boteretua) eta objektua (menderatua) dela aldi berean bata bestea gabe ezin delako ulertu. Arestian aipatu moduan, diskurtsoaren teoriak garrantzia gutxi ematen dio oinarri materialari eta ez digu hortaz tresna baliagarririk eskainiko demosaren birprodukzioan oinarrizkoak diren estatu egituren eta estatu botereari buruz. Hala ere, gure ikerketan identitate berrien eta hegemonia berri baten eraikuntzak izango duen garrantzia kontuan hartuta prozesu horretan subjektuen inguruan egiten dituzten ekarpenak aztertzea beharrezkoa izango da.

Diskurtsoaren Teoriaren helburuetako bat klase esentzialismoari aurre egitea dela esan dugu eta honek lotura zuzena du subjektuen inguruan egiten duten hausnarketarekin. Althusserren ikuspegi estrukturalistak subjektuari buruz egiten duen irakurketa da euren iturri nagusia. Subjektua alde aurretiko berezko ideia eta balioen inguruan elkarturiko elementua dela uste dutenen aurrean, Althusserrek subjektuak praktika ideologikoen bidez eraiki⁶² egiten direla uste du (Howarth, 2015: 132). Honekin adierazten duena da pertsonen subjektu zehatz moduan euren bizitza ulertzeko eta bizitzeko era (“langileak”, “emakumeak”, “gizonak” etab.) eragin ideologiko baten ondorio dela eta honek euren bizi baldintza errealean araberako identitate imaginario bat ematen diela (idem). Laclauk eta Mouffek subjektuen identitateak eraikiak direla onartzen duten arren Althusserren irudikoz subjektua egitura sozial eta ekonomikoaren menpe legoke eta eurentzat honek izaera deterministegia izango luke.

Esandakoa kontuan hartuz, elkar lotuta dauden bi dimentsio gatazkatsu jarraituz subjektuaren inguruan duten ikuspegia garatzen dute: subjektuaren izaera diskurtsiboa edo aurrediskurtsiboaren arteko gatazka alde batetik eta subjektu posizio⁶³ ezberdinen arteko erlazioa bestetik.

⁶² Althusserren hitzetan “interpelatuak”.

⁶³ Subjektu posizioa Foucault-ek “Ezagutzaren Arkeologian” garaturiko kontzeptua da, Essexeko Eskolak bereganatu eta bere esanahia moldatu arren. Foucault-en ikuspegitik subjektu posizioa modalitate enuntziatiboan baitan adierazpen zilegi eta lotesleak egiteko gaitasuna duten subjektuak lirarteke (medikua adibidez).

Subjektuaren izaera diskurtsiboa edo aurrediskurtisboaren arteko gatazkari dagokionez, honek izan dituen hiru forma hartzen dituzte kontuan (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 195-208):

- a. Subjektua agente arrazional eta gardena dela defendatzen duten ikuspegia kritikatzan dute.
- b. Subjektuen posizio ezberdinen artean ematen den izatezko batasun eta homogeneotasunaren aurkako kritika egiten dute.
- c. Subjektua erlazio sozialen jatorri eta oinarria dela defendatzen duen ikuspegia kritikatzan dute.

Aipatu kritikak kontuan hartuta, *subjektua* kategoria moduan erabiltzerakoan, egitura diskurtsibo baten barneko *subjektu posizio ezberdinei* egingo diete erreferentzia (ibidem:196). Bestalde, subjektuak ez dira erlazio sozialen jatorria izango esperientzia orok aukerarako baldintza diskurtsibo zehatzak galdutako duelako (idem). Aipatu elementu ezberdinetan oinarrituz, Laclauk **Subjektu posizioak eta subjektibitate politikoa ezberdinduko ditu** (Laclau, 1990: 60).

Pertsonak posizio ezberdinekin identifikatu daitezkeenez, aktore indibidual batek *subjektu posizio ezberdinak izan ditzake*. Honen arabera, pertsona batek bere burua “independentista”, “emakumea”, “feminista” edo “langile” moduan defini dezake edo aldi berean subjektu posizio guzti horien konbinazio zehatz bat egin⁶⁴.

Subjektu posizioak indibiduoak aktore sozial moduan sortzeko erari erreferentzia egiten dion neurrian, *subjektibitate politikoa* aktore sozialen jarduteko eraz arduratuko da. Laclauen aburuz, subjektuei identitatea ematen dieten diskurtsoen kontingentziaren ondorioz azalaraziko da aktoreen jarduera (1990:39). Hau horrela izateko, ezinbestekoa izango bere tresneria teorikoan garrantzia izango duen beste kategoria bat txertatzea: *dislokazioa*⁶⁵ (ibidem:55). Kontzeptu hau, Zizekek HES-n jasotako antagonismo sozialaren irakurketa kritikoa egin ostean garatu zuen Laclauk (Torfing, 1999: 128). Honen bidez, egitura diskurtsiboen izaera kontingentea azaleratzen da. Prozesu sozialen bidez egituraren “deszentratze”⁶⁶ bat egongo da existitzen diren identitate eta interesetan eraginez eta subjektuengan identitate krisi bat sortuz. Laclauen adibidea jarraituz, kapitalismoaren sorrerarekin besteak beste komunitate tradizionalak desagertu ziren, lan diziplina

⁶⁴ Subjektu posizio ezberdinen arteko erlazioari dagokionez bestalde linguistikatik eta psikonalisitik abiatuz gaideterminazioaren inguruan Althusserrek egindako irakurketa berreskuratu eta moldatzen dute baina hau diskurtsoaren egituraketaren baitan gaideterminazioaren azalpenari eskainiko atalean garatuko dugu.

⁶⁵ Dislokazioak, Laclauen ikuspegia “egiturazko” elementuetara gehiago hurbiltzea eragiten du.

⁶⁶ “Decentramiento” gaztelaniaz eta “Decentring” ingeleraz.

gogorra eta soldata baxuak ezarri ziren eta honek aurreko identitateen krisia eta identitate berrien sorrera suposatu zuen (1990:56).

Howarthen arabera, egituren baitan ematen den krisien ondorioz aktore sozialei identitate bat eskaintzeko zailtasunak egongo dira eta subjektuak politikoki ekitera bultzatuko ditu (2000:108-109). Identitate sozialak krisian daudenean eta egiturak aldatu behar direnean subjektua erabakiak hartzera behartuta egongo da⁶⁷ (edo proiektu politiko batekin eta bere diskurtsoekin identifikatzera). *Identifikazio* prozesu honen bidez sortzen dira *subjektibitate politikoak*. Jada sortuta eta formalizatuta daudenean *subjektu posizio* bihurtzen dira eta hauek indibiduoak ezaugarri batzuk izango dituzten aktore sozial bihurtuko dituzte (ibidem:109).

Dislokazioak aldez aurretik sakonki jaulkitako identitate eta leialtasun politikoen eraldaketa eragin dezake, beraz garrantzia berezia dauka krisi testuinguruetan. Zehazki, Gramsciren krisi organikoarekin (Portelli 121-142), ekintza kolektiboaren teorien aukeren espiralekin (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001) eta Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoaren aukera koiunturalekin (2008: 46) eta momentu semiotikoekin (2008:238) lotura aberasgarria egin daitekeela deritzogu.

⁶⁷ Argudio hau sinplifikaturik azaltzen da atal honetan ez delako egitura eta agentziaren arteko gatazka eta honen inguruan dauden irakurketa ezberdinak sakonduko. Essexeko Eskolak dikotomia horretan ikuspegi "agentzialagoa" babesten dutela esatearekin nahikoa dela uste dugu.

3- Antagonismoa eta objektibitatea

Antagonismoaren aldarrikapenaren bidez, besteak beste, Ted Gurrek, Marxek edota Duverger bezalako teorilari klasikoek⁶⁸ gatazka sozialaren inguruan duten ikuspegiarekin apurtu nahi dute (Howarth, 2000:105). Hauen aburuz, gatazka alde aurretiko identitate eta interesak guztiz osaturik dituzten agente sozialen arteko talkaren bidez emango litzateke.

Aipatu interpretazioa nagusi izan da besteak beste mendebaldeko marxismoan, Frankfurteko Eskolan edota Saussuren estrukturalismoan⁶⁹. Laclau eta Mouffen ikuspegitik, identitatea erlazionala izateaz gain antagonismoaren beharra izango du. Sausurren teorian adibidez, zeinuen egitura erlazionala izan arren aldi berean egitura itxia da eta horren ondorioz unibertsaltasuna barne ezberdintasunik eta hausturarik gabeko osotasun moduan suturatzen da (Gadea, 2008:5)

Perspektiba horietatik ezberdinduz, antagonismoa, objektibotasun ororen mugaren adierazlea dela esango dute (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 209). Antagonismoen existentziak, ez lege historikorik ezta alde aurretiko interes eta identitateak dituzten agente politiko unibertsalik ez dagoela adieraziko du (Howarth, 2000: 105-106). Laclau eta Mouffen teorizazioan osotasun soziala irekita dagoen egitura bat izanik bere konfigurazioan antagonismo bat beharrezkoa da. Subjektu sozialen eraikuntzan beraz “besteak” aldi berean muga eta aukerarako baldintza izango da (Gadea, 2008:5).

Hori kontuan hartuta, identitateen osotasuna beti izango da osatugabea, edozein identitatearen eraikuntzarako gure identitatea kolokan jarriko duen “besteak” beharrezkoa izango delako (Stavrakakis, 1999:13-40). “Gu-a” eraikitzeke beti kanpoaldean egongo den “besteak” existitzea ezinbestekoa izango da. Antagonismoa beraz, ez da identitate osoen arteko harremanen ondorioz sortuko, identitate oso horiek eraikitzeke ezintasunaren ondorioz baizik (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 214). Antagonismoek hortaz, jendartearen muga ezarriko dute, azken honek era oso batean eratzeko duen ezintasuna hain zuzen.

Howarthekek (2015: 131) dioskuna jarraituz antagonismo sozialak diskurtsoaren teorian hiru arrazoiengatik izango dira garrantzitsuak:

- 1- Erlazio antagoniko baten eraketak beti “besteak” sortzea suposatzen duelako eta honen bidez muga politikoak ezarriko direlako.

⁶⁸ Gatazka soziala defendatzen duten eskolek orokorrean.

⁶⁹ Eskola hauek aipatzen dira autoreengan eragin zuzena izan dutelako.

- 2- Erlazio antagonikoak eratzea eta muga politikoak egonkortzea formazio diskurtsiboen eta agenteen identitatearen ezarpen partzialerako ezinbestekoak direlako.
- 3- Antagonismoak identitate ororen izaera kontingentea era argi batean adieraziko duelako.

Antagonismoak beraz, identitate sozial baten elementuen banatzea eta objektibitate ororen muga adierazten du. Identitate oro bere “kanpoaldean” oinarrituz eraikitzen den neurrian “kanpoalde” honek aldi berean bere izaera kolokan jarriko du eta bere aurka borrokatuko du (Gadea, 2008:6). Beste era batera esanda, eskaera partikular ezberdinen arteko barne ezberdintasunekin bukatzea ahalbidetzen duena ez da eskaera ezberdinei *a priori*ko batasun bat emango dion ezaugarri positibo bat baizik eta “beste” baten aurkako konfrontazioa. Erabat inklusiboa den komunitate politikorik ez da existituko beti ere *kanpo eratzaille* bat egongo delako, bere existentzia eta antolaketaren baldintza den “kanpokaldea” hain zuzen (idem). Honek garrantzia berezia du gure planteamenduan, estatalitate subalternoaren sorrera bera, eta bere izaera subalternoaren definizioa, kanpo eratzaille baten aurka (estatu matrizea) sortuko delako.

Bai izaera erlazionalak (batasuna) zein antagonismorako joerak (banaketa) praktika hegemonikoaren bi momentu osagarri adieraziko dituzte, gizarte plural batean botere eta subjektibitate forma berri bat definitzeko balio dutenak (idem). Horren ondorioz antagonismoa artikulazioarekin batera ulertzea ezinbestekoa izango da.

4- Antagonismoa eta artikulazioa:

Antagonismoak sozialaren itxieraren ezintasunean duen papera azaldu ostean ideia hori garatzeko ezinbestekoa da antagonismoa eta artikulazioaren arteko loturan kokatu beharreko dimentsio ezberdinak azaltzea. Lehenik eta behin ekibalentzia eta diferentzian oinarrituriko logikak azalduko ditugu ostean hauekin hertsiki loturik dauden antagonismo herritarra eta demokratikoa bereizteko. Azkenik unibertsala eta partikularraren arteko tentsioa garatuko dugu.

4.1 Ekibalentzia eta diferentzia:

Erlazio ekibalentzialen bidez, elementuen artean dagoen ezberdintasuna “beste baten”⁷⁰ aurka eten egiten da euren arteko lotura sustatuz. *Erlazio diferentzialen* bidez bestalde, elementuak aniztasunean oinarrituriko batasun batean lotze ditu. Bi erlazioetan ematen diren lotura hauek euren hitzetan “*kateak*” izango dira: “*ekibalentzia kateak*” eta “*diferentzia kateak*” (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 218-228).

Ekibalentziaren logika, espazio politikoaren sinplifikazioa dakarren logika da, diferentziaren logika aldiz honen hedapenaren eta konplexutasunaren adierazlea da (ibidem: 223).

Beti ere “kanpoaldetik” datorren eragin bat egon daitekenez ez dugu inoiz logika ekibalentzial oso bat edo logika diferentzial oso bat izango elementu ezberdinen artean hauek elkartu eta banatuko dituen antzekotasun bat eta ezberdintasun bat egongo delako, hau da, poloen arteko tentsioa mantenduko da. Ez logika ekibalentziala ezta diferentziala ere ez da inoiz guztiz nagusituko. Honek identitate ororen prekarietatea adieraziko du.

Bestalde, antagonismoa ezin da era singularrean ulertu, ezberdintasun sistema batean edozein posizio bihurtu baitaiteke antagonismo baten iturri (ibidem:224). Erlazio sozialak zenbat eta ezegonkorragoak izan hainbat eta antagonismo eremu gehiago pizteko aukera egongo da. Kasu horretan, aldi berean, zentralitate baten falta handiagoa izango da eta zailagoa izango da elkaturiko kate ekibalentzialak eraikitzea. Honek Gramsciren “krisi organiko” kontzeptuarekin eta gure ikerketarekin lotura zuzena mantentzen du. *Gure hipotesietan adierazi dugun moduan, Atlantiko Iparraldeko Krisi Finantzariaren testuinguruan Europar Batasuneko Estatuak izan duten parte hartzearen ondorioz, “desdemokratizazio prozesua areagotu da”, demokratizazioan oinarrituriko mobilizazio ziklo bati hasiera emanez eta burujabetza eskaerak areagotuz (H3). Aktore independentisten jarduera estrategikoaren bidez, krisi testuinguru batean ase*

⁷⁰ Kanpo eratzaille baten.

*gabeko eskari ezberdinak era ekibalentzian artikulatu eta proiektu hegemoniko berri bat eraikitze gaitasuna izan dezaketela uste dugu*⁷¹.

Atal honetan aipatu ditugun hainbat kontzeptu hobeto azaltzeko Zubiagak Lemoizeko zentral nuklearraren⁷² aurkako borrokan oinarrituta darabilen adibidea gurera ekarriko dugu. Liskarraldi hori adibide hartuz, logika diferentziala nagusitzekotan, ekologistek, feministek, okupek, euskaltzaleek edota independentistek⁷³ euren aldarrikapenak banaturik proposatuko lituzkete⁷⁴ (2012a: 120-121). Ekibalentzien logika nagusituko balitz aldiz, aipatu aldarrikapen ezberdin horien arteko “ekibalentzia kate” bat osatuko litzateke eta horren ondorioz eskaera guztiak elkarrekin daudela eta helburu berdina bat dutela ikusaraziko litzateke (ibidem:120). Azken kasuan, eremu politikoaren sinplifikazio baten bidez “kanpoaldean dagoen beste baten aurka” artikulatuko den “gu” bat eratuko da, diferentziaren logika nagusitzen bada aldiz, banaturik jardungo duten “gu” ugari sortuko dira. Hau sakonago garatzeko hurrengo puntuan azaltzen ditugun antagonismo herritar eta demokratikoak hartu behar ditugu kontuan.

4.2 Antagonismo herritarra eta demokratikoa:

Arestian aipatu dugun moduan, identitate oro prekariora da eta horrenbestez ezinezkoa izango da logika diferentziala edo ekibalentziala guztiz nagusitzea. Laclaren ikuspegitik identitate sozial guztiak ekibalentzien logikaren eta diferentzien logikaren arteko elkarreragineko eremuak dira (1995:152). Bien arteko oreka eta tentsioa egongo den arren, euren artean hierarkia bat egongo da. Momentu batzuetan logika ekibalentziala nagusituko da eta beste batzuetan aldiz logika diferentziala. Gaitasun handiko demokrazietan orokorrean (Tilly, 2010:47-56) logika diferentziala nagusituko da estatu egiturek herritarren eskaera gehienak era indibidual batean asetzeko ahalmena izango dutelako. Krisi testuinguru batean aldiz estatu egituren gaitasuna murriztuko da eta logika ekibalentziala nagusitzeko aukera egongo da.

Antagonismoaren eraikuntza demokratikoa: Politikoki antagonismoa logika diferentzialaren nagusitasunean eraikitzen bada, *eraikuntza demokratikoa*z arituko gara. Aurreko atalean aipatu moduan, diferentziaren logika espazio politikoaren hedapenaren eta konplexutasunaren adierazlea da (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 223). Eskari ezberdinek euren izaera “korporatiboa” mantendu eta era indibidualean

⁷¹ Prozesu hau era argian ikusiko dugu Kataluniako eta Eskoziako kasuak aztertzean.

⁷² Aipatu adibidean Zubiagak Laclaren populismoaren teoria aplikatzen du. Guk hori aurrerago garatuko dugunez atal honetan momentuz dagozkigun elementuak hartuko ditugu kontuan: ekibalentzia eta diferentzien logika.

⁷³ Borroka edo eremu ezberdin hauek Laclau eta Mouffen ikuspegiari “eskariak” izango lirateke.

⁷⁴ Gramsciren kontzeptuak erabiliz, euren *momentu korporatibora* mugatuko lirateke.

jardungo dute estatu egiturekiko logika “bertikal” bat mantenduz. Horren ondorioz, ezberdintzea eta subjektuen zatikatzea nagusituko da. Jendartea geroz eta konplexuagoa den neurrian eremu sozialak eta horrenbestez antagonismorako eremuak biderkatuko dira. Hala ere, Riechmannek eta Fernández Bueyek esaten diguten moduan ezin ditugu zatikatze soziala eta pluralismoa nahastu, euren hitzetan:

“no se debe confundir la fragmentación social con el pluralismo; en el sentido de que el proceso de integración indirecta, es decir, de fragmentación social, contribuye de manera notable a la forma contemporánea del *divide e impera*” (1994: 189).

Horretaz gain ezin dugu ahaztu taldeen arteko erlazioa botere erlazioak direla. Laclaren hitzak zuzenean hartuz:

“sabemos bien que las relaciones entre grupos están constituidas como relaciones de poder- es decir, que cada grupo no sólo es diferente de otros, sino que en muchos casos hace de tal diferencia la base de la exclusión y subordinación de otros grupos. Consecuentemente, si la particularidad se afirma como pura particularidad, en una relación meramente diferencial con otras particularidades, está validando el statu quo en la relación de poder entre los grupos” (1995b:45).

Eskaera ezberdinen partikularismorako erabateko joerak hauen despolitizaziora eta “teknifikaziorako” joera sustatu dezake. Zer gertatu da mundu mailan eta zehazki Europar Batasunean azken hogeita hamar urteetan? Neoliberalismoaren hegemoniaren ondorioz, demokraziaren pribatizazio bat egon dela (Goikoetxea, 2017a) eta sistema post-demokratiko (Crouch, 2004) eta post-politikoetara (Mouffe, 2010: 75-78; Zizek, 2010:33-36) hurbildu garel. Horren ondorioz, aldarrikapen ezberdinen politizazio eta artikulazioaren ordez banaketarako eta despolitizaziorako joera nagusitu da. Oinarri ideologikoak dituzten gatazka eta antagonismoak, “adituen kudeaketaren” esku uzteko joera nagusitu da. Zizeken hitzak zuzenean hartuz:

“De esta manera, la post-política subraya la necesidad de abandonar las viejas divisiones ideológicas y de resolver las nuevas problemáticas provistos de la necesaria competencia del experto y deliberando libremente en función de las necesidades y exigencias puntuales de la gente” (2010:33)

Hala ere, logika diferentzial demokratikoa guztiz nagusitzea ezinezkoa izango da, “arkadia” autoerregulatu perfektu eta zorientzua ezinezkoa delako eta beti antagonismoaren politizaziorako aukera egongo delako.

Antagonismoaren eraikuntza herritarra: esandakoaren arabera antagonismo demokratikoaren aurrean “ekibalentzien logikan” oinarrituriko *eraikuntza herritarreko* aukera ere egongo da. Kasu honetan espazio politikoaren sinplifikazio baten bidez posizio ezberdinak ordezkatzeko dituen identitate politiko berri bat eraikitzen da: “herria”. Eraikuntza demokratikoan aldarrikapen ezberdinen momentu korporatiboa lehenesten bada eraikuntza herritarrean aurkakoa gertatuko da, posizio bakoitzak bere izaera partzialaren parte bat galduko du ekibalentzia kate baten bidez beste aldarrikapenekin lotuz, komunean dutena hobetsiz. Kasu honetan, eskaera ezberdinen arteko harreman “horizontala” lehenetsiko da.

Zubiagaren adibidea berreskuratzuz, *diferentzien logikan* oinarrituz jendartean zeuden aldarrikapen ezberdinak “ekologismoa”, “independentzia”, “feminismoa”, “sozialismoa”, “euskaltzaletasuna” eta “okupazioa” era *demokratiko diferentzialean* kudeatzekotan, ez lirateke euren artean lotuko eta sistema politikoak baneratu edo ukatuko lituzke. Ekibalentzien logikan oinarrituz bestalde, euren artean komunean dutena indartu eta sistema instituzionalaren aurka (beraiek) dagoen “herria” (gu) eraikitzeo aukera egongo da sistemaren “kudeaketa tekniko” kolokan jarritz.

Eremu demokratiko instituzionalaren eta momentu populistaren arteko konbinazioa beti egongo da. Aipatu dugun moduan, erabateko logika demokratiko instituzionalak politikotasunarekin bukatu eta kudeaketa administratibo hutsa bihurtuko litzateke eta kontrara erakundetzerik gabeko etengabeko logika herritarra ere ezinezkoa litzateke⁷⁵. Muturren arteko tartean egongo da lehia. “Polisa” (elkarrekin bizitzea) eta “polemosaren” (antagonismoa eta gatazka) arteko lehia eta tentsioa beharrezkoak izango dira beraz (Mouffe, 1999: 14).

4.3 Unibertsala eta partikularra:

Unibertsala eta partikularren arteko eztabaidaren berreskurapena multikulturalismoaren indartzearen testuinguruan kokatu beharra dago. Izatezko “subjektuaren heriotza”, identitate anitzen emergentziak edota migratzaileen inguruan pizturiko eztabaidek kulturantzatasunaren hedatzea suposatu zuen. Galfarsorok dioskun moduan, “kulturantzatasunaren inguruko eztabaidetan diferentzia eta dibertsitatea edo bestearen errespetua eta tolerantziaren gaiak ardatz

⁷⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uufpzut38kc> aurkezpen honetan, Ernesto Laclau era didaktikoan azaltzen ditu aipatu ideiak. Azken bisita: 2018/03/07.

dira;” (2012:28). Ideologiatzat hartuta praktika eta teoria politiko liberalaren eremuan kokatzeaz gain, multikulturalismo mota nagusia anglofonia da (idem). Maila akademikoari dagokionez batez ere 90. hamarkadan garatu eta izan zuen arrakasta besteak beste Kimlycka, Taylor edo Gutman bezalako autoreen eskutik.

Laclaren hausnarketa ere testuinguru horretan ulertu behar da. Bere ikuspegitik, arazoa partikularismoaren eta unibertsalismoaren arteko banaketa era baztertzaila batean proposatzean sortzen da, hau da, partikularrak eta unibertsalak bata bestea ukatzen duela ulertzean (Laclau, 1995b: 41). Bere ustez unibertsala gailendu den partikular bat litzateke. Bere hitzak zuzenean erabiliz:

“el abismo entre lo universal y lo particular es irreductible- lo que equivale a decir que lo universal no es más que un particular que en algún momento ha pasado a ser dominante, y que no hay manera de alcanzar una sociedad reconciliada” (1995b:44).

Unibertsalak praktika hegemonikoen bidez partikular batek bete arte ez dauka bere baitan eduki zehatzik. Berriz ere Laclaren hausnarketa baliatuko dugu ideia hau garatzeko:

“Lo universal, como hemos visto, no tiene en sí mismo un contenido concreto (que lo encerraría en sí mismo), sino que es el siempre inasible horizonte que resulta de la expansión de una cadena indefinida de exigencias equivalentes. La conclusión aparente es que la universalidad es inconmensurable con cualquier particularidad y, sin embargo, no puede existir separada de lo particular (ibídem:51)

Partikularretik unibertsalera ematen den “jauzia” ezin da alde zuzenetik determinaturik egon, ez da alde zuzenetik existitzen den klase edo subjektu unibertsal baten “garaipena”. Unibertsala, “erlatiboki unibertsala” izango da beti ere partikular baten artikulazio politikoaren ondorioz emango den “unibertsalizazioa” izango delako.

Judith Butlerrekin eta Slavoj Zizekekin mantentzen duen eztabaidan, Laclauk esku artean dugun afera berreskuratzen du, logika politikoetan unibertsaltasunak oraindik duen garrantzia aldarrikatuz:

“Si los efectos *universalizantes* hegemónicos van a ser irradiados a partir de un sector *particular* de la sociedad, no se los podrá reducir a la organización de esa particularidad en torno a sus propios intereses, que necesariamente serán corporativos. Si la hegemonía de un sector social *particular* depende, para su éxito, de que pueda presentar sus objetivos propios como aquellos que hacen posible la realización de los

objetivos *universales* de la comunidad, queda claro que esta identificación no es la simple prolongación de un sistema institucional de dominación sino que, por el contrario, toda expansión de esa dominación presupone el éxito de esa articulación entre *universalidad* y *particularidad* (es decir una victoria hegemónica).” (Butler, Laclau, Zizek, 2000: 55)

Eztabaida beraz zuzenean hegemoniarekin lotu beharra dago, “hutsik” dagoen espazio horren edukia betetzeko gaitasuna duen “identitate partikularra” izango delako hegemonikoa. Prozesu hori, eskaera batzuen onarpena eta beste batzuen bazterketa suposatuko duen borroka politikoa izango da (Torfing, 1999:175).

“Hutsik” dagoen espazio hori, *adierazle hutsa* izango litzateke. “Demokrazia”, “herria edo “sozialismoa” bezalako kontzeptuak ez dute alde zuzenik guztiz itxita dagoen esanahi bat, aktore politiko partikularren praktika artikulatzaileen ondorioz beteko direlako.

Hala ere, Mouffek unibertsala eta partikularren arteko eztabaidan egiten duen ohartarazpena kontuan hartu beharko dugu. Bere esanetan, “Demokrazia Erradikala” Ilustrazioaren baitan emandako iraultza demokratikoaren ondorio bat den arren, Ilustrazioak egindako hainbat adierazpen kolokan jartzen ditu (1999:32). Are gehiago, demokrazia erradikal batean ezinbestekoak diren hainbat borrokek unibertsalismo gurariei uko egiten dietela adierazten du. Bere hitzak zuzenean jasoko ditugu:

“Muchas de estas nuevas luchas renuncian de hecho a toda pretensión de universalidad. Muestran que en toda afirmación de universalidad yace un desconocimiento de lo particular y un rechazo de la especificidad. La crítica feminista desenmascara el particularismo que se oculta detrás de los llamados ideales universales que, en realidad, siempre han sido mecanismos de exclusión. Carole Pateman, por ejemplo, ha mostrado de qué manera las teorías clásicas de democracia se basaban en la exclusión de las mujeres. [...] A todos nos han enseñado que “individuo” es una categoría universal que se aplica a cualquiera o a todas las personas, pero en realidad no es así. “El individuo” es un “varón”.

La reformulación del proyecto democrático en términos de democracia radical requiere el abandono abstracto de la Ilustración, que se refería a una naturaleza humana indiferenciada.” (1999:32)

“[...]No se rechaza el universalismo, se lo particulariza; lo que hace falta es un nuevo tipo de articulación entre lo universal y lo particular (Mouffe, 1999:33).”

Mouffek egiten duen hausnarketa aintzat hartzea ezinbestekoa izango da beharrezkoa baita “hutsik” dauden asmo unibertsalistek zein partikularitate baztertu eta zein unibertsalizatzen duten aldez aurretik hausnartzea. Unibertsala eta partikularren arteko interpretazioak historikoki gatazkatsuak izan diren neurrian, gurean ere Euskal Estuari buruzko auzian Goikoetxeak⁷⁶ zalantzan jarri du “unibertsalaren aldeko” aldarrikapena. Hausnarketa interesgarria plazaratzen digu Euskal Estatu Feministari buruzko gogoetan:

“Demos orok uzten du kanpo beti zerbait-norbait, helburua beraz, eskusio mekanismoak identifikatu eta kontrolatzea da ahalik eta eskusio murriztena edo eragingarriena egiteko ahalik eta biolentzia txikienarekin.” (Goikoetxea, 2015)

Gure ikerketan, hegemonia berri baten eta identitate politiko berri baten eraikuntzak izango duen garrantzia dela eta unibertsala eta partikularren arteko lehia hori kontuan hartzea beharrezkoa da. Hori dela eta “*adierazle hutsak*” edo “*adierazle flotanteak*” bezalako elementuak garatzen jarraituko dugu.

⁷⁶ http://www.berria.eus/paperekoa/1955/023/001/2014-10-15/aitzakiarik_ez_dago.htm
http://www.berria.eus/albisteak/94887/nazioa_hustez_140_karakteretan.htm (Goikoetxea, Apaolaza eta Galfarsororen arteko eztabaida).

5- Diskurtsoaren egituraketa eta adierazleak.

Adierazle hutsak, *puntu nodalak*, *adierazle flotanteak* edo *gaindeterminazioa* bezalako kontzeptuak sarri erabiltzen dituzte Essexeko Eskolako diskurtsoaren teoriaren jarraitzaileek. Ez ditugu sakonki aztertuko baina era laburrean definitu eta identifikatuko ditugu aurrerago egingo dugun azterketa era argiago batean uler dadin.

Adierazle hutsak, zentzu hertsian, esanahirik ez duten adierazleak dira (Laclau, 1996:69). Ez dute alde zuzeneko esanahirik, absente dagoen osotasun baten, gabezia baten adierazleak direlako (Laclau, 1996:80). “Herria”, “demokrazia”, “askapena” edo “sozialismoa” bezalako kontzeptuak *adierazle hutsak* dira euren behin behineko esanahiak lehia politikoaren ondorio direlako. Essexeko Eskolarentzat, hegemoniaren eraikuntza ez da jendartean dauden talde batzuen arteko akordio bat ezta jendartean alde zuzeneko existitzen den esentzia baten egikaritzea. Aipatu kasuetan adierazle hutsak ez lirateke garrantzitsuak izango. Laclauen aburuz kontrara hegemoniaren auzia adierazle hutsen produkzio sozialaren ikuspegitik aztertu behar da:

“Porque en tal caso la operación hegemónica sería la presentación de la particularidad de un grupo como la encarnación del significante vacío que hace referencia al orden comunitario como ausencia, como objetivo no realizado” (Laclau, 1998:83).

Hori kontuan izanda, jada esan dugun moduan edozein diskurtsok diskurtsibitatearen eremuan nagusitzeko, hau da hegemoniko bihurtzeko, kateak⁷⁷ hedatuko ditu. Kate horien barnean zentzua ezartzen duten puntu pribilegiatuak dira “*puntu nodalak*” edo “*point de capiton-ak*”⁷⁸. “*Adierazle flotante*” pribilegiatuak direla esango dugu.

Zubiagak, Stavrakakis eta Arditiren lanak erabiltzen ditu puntu nodalak definitzeko:

“[...] el **point de capiton** alude directamente a los botones que sujetan la tapicería del diván y que anclan el relleno y forman una superficie llena de tensiones (fuerzas). Esta superficie representa [...] el espacio social y cada botón, **un punto nodal**. [En los puntos nodales] convergen y se entrecruzan un plural de líneas de fuerza y formas de resistencia,

⁷⁷ Ekibaletzia eta diferentzia kateak.

⁷⁸ Lacan-en teoritik hartutako kontzeptuak dira. Zuzenean autoreek jaso bezala erabiliko ditugu.

se forman identidades colectivas, surgen objetivos de lucha, aparecen tácticas de intervención y también formas de regulación y control” (Stavrakakis, 1999b, Zubiaga, 2009: 260)

Errejonek bestalde (2011: 176) Zizeken testu bat baliatzen du puntu nodala adibide baten bidez azaltzeko :

“Cuando arropamos los significantes flotantes de Comunismo, por ejemplo, lucha de clases confiere una significación precisa y fija a todos los demás elementos: a democracia (la llamada democracia real opuesta a la democracia burguesa formal como forma legal de explotación); a feminismo (la explotación de las mujeres como resultado de la división clasista del trabajo), a ecologismo (la destrucción de los recursos naturales como consecuencia lógica de la producción capitalista orientada a la obtención de beneficio privado); al movimiento pacifista (el principal peligro para la paz es el agresivo imperialismo), y así...” (Zizek, 1989:88 Errejón, 2011:176)

Aipatu adibidean “klase borroka” beste adierazle flotanteak (“demokrazia”, “feminismo”, “ekologismoa” etab.) elkartu eta finkatuko lituzkeen “puntu nodala” litzateke. Zubiagak, Zizeken ikuspegia kritikatzeko du honen aburuz klase borroka litzatekelako artikulazio gune edo “puntu nodal” nagusia eta kontrara “ekologismoa”, “feminismoa” edo “nazionalismoa” ezin izango liriteke “puntu nodalak” izan (2009:260). Ezin dugu ahaztu momentuko lehietatik harago, berau baldintzatzen duten aukerarako baldintza materialak beti kontuan hartu behar izango ditugula eta jendarte kapitalistetan klase interes ezberdinak mantenduko direla. Hala ere, analisi plano honetan Zubiagaren kritikarekin bat gatoz, hegemonia berri baten aldeko lehian ezin dugulako alde aurretik zehaztu zein izango de artikulazio gune nagusia eta askotan klase ardatzetik harago egituratuko da.

Azkenik, *gaindeterminazioaren* garrantzia aipatu behar da. Psikoanalisian eta linguistikan jatorria duen kontzeptu honek Althusserrek berreskuratu zuen jendarte “egituratutako multzo konplexu” gisa definitzerakoan osotasun hegeliarretik ezberdintzeko asmoz (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 163). Eremu sozialean ez legoke *gaindeterminaziotik* at dagoen eremurik eta horren ondorioz hau ordena sinboliko gisa eraikitzen da.

“El Sentido potencial más profundo que tiene la afirmación althusseriana de que no hay nada en lo social que no esté sobredeterminado, es la aserción de que lo social se constituye como orden simbólico. El carácter simbólico- es decir, sobredeterminado- de las relaciones sociales implica, por tanto, que éstas carecen de una

literalidad última que las reduciría a momentos necesarios de una ley inmanente.” (ibidem: 164).

Hala ere, Althusserrek ikuspegi hau ez zuen guztiz garatu bere gorputz teorikoan ekonomiak “azken instantzian” determinatzeko zuen gaitasunagatik. Azken ikuspegi hau gaindeterminazioarekin kontraesankorra zen. Gaindeterminazioaren potentzialitatea garatzeko, psikoanalisian desplazamendua eta kondentsazioarekin loturik dagoela hartu beharko dugu kontuan.

Laplanche eta Pontalisen lana jarraituz kondentsazioa hurrengoa litzateke:

“una representación única representa por sí sola varias cadenas asociativas, en la intersección de las cuales se encuentra. Desde el punto de vista económico, se encuentra catectizada de energías que, unidas a estas diferentes cadenas, se suman sobre ella.” (1996: 76)

Desplazamendua bestalde:

“Consiste en que el acento, el interés, la intensidad de una representación puede desprenderse de ésta para pasar a otras representaciones originalmente poco intensas, aunque ligadas a la primera por una cadena asociativa.

La teoría psicoanalítica del desplazamiento recurre a la hipótesis económica de una energía de catexis susceptible de desligarse de las representaciones y deslizarse a lo largo de las vías asociativas.

El «libre» desplazamiento de esta energía constituye una de las principales características del proceso primario, que rige el funcionamiento del sistema inconsciente.” (1996: 98).


Gure helburua ez da teoria psikoanalitikoak sakonki aztertzea baina eremu horretan erabiltzen diren zenbait kontzeptu era “xume” batean gure ikerketara ekarriko ditugu. Gaindeterminazioari esker, eremu sozial ezberdinen arteko lotura eta elkarreraginaren kontzeptualizazio hobea burutuko dugula uste dugu. Erlazio sozialen gaindeterminazioak artikulazioari esanahi berria emango dio eta honek gure ikerketan garrantzia berezia izango du identitate berrien eraikuntza eta praktika hegemonikoen azterketarako banaturiko eremu sozialen artikulazioa funtsezkoa izango delako.

Kontzeptuen garapenarekin jarraituz, orokorrean, “desplazamendu” bat egongo da aldarrikapen baten esanahia beste batera transmititzen denean. Desplazamendua

egoteko beharrezkoa izango da aldarrikapenen artean “aldamenekotasun⁷⁹” bat sortzea. “Kondentsazioa” aldiz esanahi ezberdinak aldarrikapen batean bat egiten dutenean egongo da. Desplazamendua metonimiarekin lotzen du Laclauk. Kasu honetan burutu den mugimendua oraindik ere begi bistakoa izango litzateke (Laclau, 2003:2). Kondentsazioa bestalde, metaforarekin erlazionatzen du eta hemen aldiz ikusgaitasun hori galtzeko joera legoke.

Idea hauek hurrengo grafikoan jasotzen saiatuko gara:

IRUDIA 9 Desplazamendua eta Kondentsazioa



Iturria: Egileak egina.

Laclauk berak proposatzen digun adibide bat erabiliz azaltzen saiatuko gara:

“supongamos que existe cierta área en la cual hay violencia racial, y que la única fuerza social capaz de oponerse a la violencia racial son los sindicatos. En ese caso, tenemos originariamente un desplazamiento de tipo metonímico, porque la función básica de los sindicatos no es luchar contra el racismo, sino defender los salarios de los miembros, pero dado que es la única fuerza presente en esta zona para combatir al racismo, esta lucha es asumida. En este caso, lo que tenemos es una relación de contigüidad. Uno ve que este desplazamiento dentro del polo sintagmático implica una situación contingente, pero con el tiempo, si esta situación se mantiene, uno tiende a pensar rápidamente que la lucha

⁷⁹ Contigüidad.

antirracista es una lucha sindical, o sea que la metonimia se diluye cada vez más en el polo metafórico. Es decir, que el polo metafórico y el polo metonímico son dos extremos in continuum, en el cual tenemos siempre el movimiento de uno a otro.”(2003:2)

Aipatu elementu guztiak elkar erlazionaturik leudeke. Gaindeterminazioaren ondorioz, “adierazle flotante” ezberdinak erlazionaturik daudela ikusi dugu. Euren arteko lotura hala ere, artikulazio politikoaren menpe egongo litzateke. Era ekibalentzial batean artikulatzekotan, metonimiarako joera nagusituko da eta honen hegemoniarako joera zenbat eta egonkorragoa izan⁸⁰ orduan eta “metaforikoagoa” izango da.

⁸⁰ Beti ere egonkortasun prekariora izango da.

6- Hegemonia

6.1 Zer da hegemonia?⁸¹

Diskurtsoarekin batera hegemonia da eskola honen oinarri teoriko garrantzitsuena. Zein da hegemonia kontzeptuarekin sortzen den arazoa? McAdamek, aukera politikoen egiturarekin dakusan arazo bera ikusten dugu guk hegemonia kontzeptuarekin:

“Al haber sido utilizado el concepto de una forma tan amplia y haberse definido de manera tan diversa amenaza con convertirse en una cáscara vacía que no resulte de utilidad a nadie” (1999: 51)

Howartheek, Laclau eta Mouffen hegemoniaren erabileran hiru fase ezberdintzen ditu: 70. hamarkadan oraindik subjektuen ikuspegi determinista mantentzen zuten eta klase sozialek gidatutakoa prozesua zen. Testuinguru horretan lan nagusiak Laclaren *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* eta Mouffen *Gramsci and Political Theory* irateke (Howarth, 2000: 109-110). Bigarren fase batean *Hegemonia eta Estrategia Sozialistaren* bidez identitateak eta agente sozialak kontingenteak direla aldarrikatu eta praktika artikulatzaileen garrantzia azpimarratu zuten. Hirugarren fase batean aldiz, Laclauk elementuen kontingentzia subjektuei aplikatzeaz gain egitura sozialei ere aplikatuko die. Fase horretan besteak beste Laclaren *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* edota Butler eta Zizekekin batera idatzitako *Contingency, Hegemony and Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the left* (2000: 109-111) leudeke.

Kronologikoki ezberdintasunak egon arren, hegemoniaren erabilerak bata bestearen gainean teilakatzen dira beraz operatiboa izateko ezberdintasun horiek era koherentean ordenatu beharko ditugu. Horretarako Retamozok egindako bereizketa baliatuko dugu. Bere ikuspegitik Laclaren gorputz teorikoan hegemoniak kategoria bat eta hiru kontzeptu adieraziko lituzke (2012:40). “Kategoria” eta “kontzeptua” ezberdintzeko Hugo Zemelmanen definizioa erabiltzen du:

“Las categorías, a diferencia de los conceptos que componen un corpus teórico, no tienen un contenido único sino muchos contenidos. En este sentido, las categorías son posibilidad de contenido, no contenidos demarcados, identificables con una significación clara, unívoca, semánticamente hablando.” (Zemelman, 2005; Retamozo, 2012)

⁸¹ Atal honen helburua ez da gure ikuspegitik hegemoniak izan beharko lukeen esanahia azaltzea izango, Essexeko eskolaren baitan egiten diren hegemoniaren erabilera ezberdinak antolatu eta argitzea baizik.

Retamozok, Zemelmanen ideia hartu eta garatzen du:

“Es decir, entendemos por categoría una lógica formal teórica que propone herramientas para el abordaje analítico de los fenómenos. Por concepto, en un nivel menor de abstracción, los diferentes contenidos posibles que adquiere una categoría implementada en la reconstrucción de un proceso particular y en función de una problemática específica” (2012:40).

Hegemonia kategoria moduan, unibertsala eta partikularren arteko erlazioari loturiko logika litzateke (Retamozo, 2012: 45). Kontzeptu moduan aldiz hiru erabilera ezberdintzen ditu (2012: 49- 55): Maila ontologiko batean, jendartearen eraketaz oinarritzen den logika litzateke. Maila ontiko batean bestetik, politikaren eremuko logikari egingo lioke erreferentzia. Azkenik, Identitate politikoen eraikuntzaz arduratzen den logika ere bada.

6.2 Hegemonia kategoria gisa:

Laclaren lanen azterketa bat eginez hegemonia partikularra eta unibertsalaren arteko harremanari loturik dagoen logika bat dela ikus dezakegu. Butler eta Zizekekin mantentzen duen eztabaidan adibidez, hegemoniaren lau dimentsio ezberdintzen ditu eta guztien oinarria partikularretik unibertsalera ematen den jauzia da.

“[...] hay hegemonía sólo si la dicotomía universalidad/particularidad es superada; la universalidad sólo existe si encarna –y subvierte- una particularidad, pero ninguna particularidad puede, por otro lado, tornarse política si no se ha convertido en el locus de efectos universalizantes.” (Butler, Laclau, Zizek, 2000: 61)

Aipu⁸² honetan jasotzen dugun ideia hau etengabe agertuko da bere lanetan eta aipatu ditugun hiru kontzeptuetan islatuko da. Hala ere, hegemonia kategoria moduan garatu ahal izateko beste nozio batzuk kontuan hartu beharko dira. Retamozok ezinbestekotzat jotzen ditu *artikulazioa*, *diskurtsoa*, *puntu nodala* eta *adierazle hutsa* (2012:46). Guk ideia hauek beste atal batean landu ditugunez ez ditugu gehiago sakonduko.

⁸² Ez dugu aipu gehiago jasoko bere lanetan ideia honek duen garrantzian sakontzeko ikusi: (Retamozo, 2012).

6.3 Hegemonia kontzeptu gisa:

6.3.1 Maila ontologikoa: jendartearen eraketa

Howarthen arabera, hegemoniaren logika maila ontologikoan diharduen tresna bihurtu da eta horren ondorioz ordena sozialaren eraikuntzaren azterketetan aplikatu daiteke (Howarth, 2008: 336-337). Hori dela eta, hegemonia “politikoaren”⁸³ eremuan kokatuko litzateke. Euren ikuspegia jarraituz, politikoa, amaigabetasuna⁸⁴ ordena baten mugen barruan zedarrizteko saiakera litzateke (Retamozo, 2012:50). Ordenak ez du sozialaren azpian dagoen esentzia bat ordezkatzeko; sozialaren gainean jardun eta hegemonizatzeko saiakera da (idem). Politikoak jendartearen baitan maila sortzailea⁸⁵ du. Retamozoren bidez, Laclauk honen inguruan egindako adierazpenak jasoko ditugu:

“Para mí, lo político tiene un rol primariamente estructurante porque las relaciones sociales son, en última instancia, contingentes, y cualquier articulación existentes es el resultado de una confrontación antagónica.” (Laclau, 2006: 20; Retamozo, 2012:50)

“Respecto de lo político, nuestra posición es que lo político es el momento de institución de lo social, tiene el status, si quieres ponerlo en esos términos, de una ontología de lo social. Y, “Hegemonía”, para mí, es la categoría fundamental de lo político” (Laclau, 2003:4; Retamozo, 2012:51)

Sozialaren ontologiaz hitz egin arren, Howarthekek adierazten duen moduan honen inguruan erabilpen ezberdinak egin ditu eta argitasuna falta zaio (2008: 333). Retamozok, arazo honi aurre egiteko “sedimentazioaren” nozioa berreskuratu eta “soziala” eta “ordena sozialaren” artean ezberdintzea gomendatzen du (2012:52). Aipatu kontzeptuak erabiliz, Laclauen lanean sozialaren bi erabilera ezberdindu ditugu⁸⁶. Lehenengo erabilera soziala jendartearekin berdinduko den bitartean bestean “sedimentazioarekin”⁸⁷ lotuko dugu. (2012:52-53)

- 1- Soziala jendartearen sinonimo moduan: Politikoak sozialarekiko duen lehentasuna, lehenengoak bigarrenarengan duen izaera eratzailea onartzea suposatzen du.

⁸³ Politikoa eta Politikari buruzko hausnarketak hurrengo atalean jasoko ditugu.

⁸⁴ Infinitud.

⁸⁵ Instituyente.

⁸⁶ Retamozok hiru erabilera ezberdinak arren, egiten duen banaketan gauzak gehiago argitu ordez ulermena zailagoa izatea lortzen du beraz guk bi banaketa egingo ditugu.

⁸⁷ Soziala objektibotasunaren forma sedimentatua litzateke.

- 2- Sedimentazioaren dimentsio ontologikoa: politikoari loturiko operazio hegemonikoaren aukerarako baldintzak lirateke. Hauek, historikoki pilaturiko praktika eta erlazio sozialak lirateke. Eremu hori (mugarik ez duena) osotasun diskurtsiboa antolatuko duten puntu nodalen bidez mugatzeko saiakera egongo da, horretarako unibertsalizatuko diren adierazle partikularrak ezarriz (praktika hegemonikoa). Soziala beraz, atze oihal moduan diharduten praktika historiko eta erlazio sozial horiek lirateke.

Hegemoniaren maila ontologikoak ordena sozialaren eraketan ekarpen garrantzitsua suposatzen duen arren, Howarthen hausnarketa jasoz, Laclauen gorputz teorikoa gehiago fintzea beharrezkoa da (2008: 333). Zentzu horretan, Laclauk a priori sofistikatua den tresneria garatu arren, hustasun ontologiko bat eraikitze arriskua dagoela uste dugu. Hori dela eta, Jessopen Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoa hobetsiko dugu.

6.3.2 Maila ontikoa: hegemonia politikaren logika moduan.

Hegemoniaren bigarren kontzeptua politikaren eremuarekin kokatu beharra dago. Arditik, Laclau eta Mouffen erabileran oszilazioak ikusten ditu zenbaitetan hegemonia politika egiteko era bat delako (beste batzuen artean) eta beste batzuetan *per se* politika egiteko era bakar moduan erabiltzen dutelako (Arditi, 2010; Retamozo, 2012:53). Laclau eta Mouffen erabileran anbiguetatea eta zenbait kasutan adierazpen kontraesankorrak egon arren, guk hegemonia politika egiteko era bat dela uste dugu beraz hegemoniaz gain politika egiteko era ezberdinak ere badaudela onartuko dugu. Horren adibide lirateke zenbait alderdiren jokabidea, aktore batzuen korporatibismoa edota hegemonia helburu ez duten aliantza politikoak.

Bestalde, hegemonia fenomeno modernoa den ala ez eztabaidagarria izan daiteke. Retamozok adierazten digun moduan modernitatearen aurretik praktika hegemonikoak egon ziren arren (erlijiosoak adibidez), garai honetatik aurrera hasiko dira hegemonia garatzeko baldintza egokienak ematen (2012:54). Autore honen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“En esta perspectiva estaríamos más cerca de admitir que la hegemonía es una lógica política entre tantas pero que adquiere especial relevancia en la modernidad, con la consecuencia de debilitar ciertas pretensiones originales del concepto y recuperar su inscripción en una de las dimensiones gramscianas” (2012:54)

Hori dela eta, gure egungo testuinguruan jendartean nagusi den banaketa eta heterogeneotasuna kontuan harturik, praktika hegemonikoek inoiz baino garrantzia handiagoa dutela uste dugu.

6.3.3 Hegemonia identitate politiko kolektiboen eraikuntzarako logika

Arestian aipatu moduan, Laclau eta Mouffen iturri teoriko nagusia Gramsci da. Hegemonia eta Estrategia Sozialistan, kontzeptuaren genealogia bat burutu zuten Pejanov, Luxenburgo, Bernstein edota Lenin bezalako autoreek egiten dituzten hausnarketak jasoz (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 81-155). Horien ekarpenak aztertu ostean, Gramsciren ikuspegiari lehentasuna ematen diote marxismoaren baitan hegemoniaren ikuspegi sofistikatuenak garatzen duelako. Subjektuen eraketan eremu politiko eta ideologikoari lehentasuna ematen dion arren, marxismoan nagusi zen determinismo ekonomikoaren eta esentzialismoaren ondorioz (ibidem:133-155) ezin izan zuen identitate politiko kolektiboen eraikuntza muga horietatik at garatu. Aipatu traba horiek gainditzea izan zen Laclau eta Mouffen helburua. Euren ustez subjektuak ez dira jarduera politikoaren aurretik existitzen horren ondorio moduan baizik. Autoreen aipuak zuzenean jasoz:

“La hegemonía no es, por consiguiente, una relación de alianza entre agentes sociales pre-constituidos, sino el principio mismo de constitución de dichos agentes”. (Laclau, 1985:21; Retamozo, 2012:55).

“Hegemonías es la construcción de nuevos sujetos” (Laclau, 1985:30; Retamozo, 2012:55).

“Los objetivos de cualquier grupo en lucha por el poder solo podrían lograrse si este grupo operara hegemónicamente sobre fuerzas más amplias que sí mismo, que, a su vez, cambiarían su propia subjetividad” (Laclau, 2006:54; Retamozo, 2012:55).

Identitate kolektiboen sorrerarekin loturiko ideia hauek Laclau eta Mouffen eskeman etengabe agertzen diren hainbat kontzepturekin loturik daude. Beste atal batzuetan landu ditugun neurrian hemen era laburrean besterik ez ditugu aipatuko. Identitateen eraikuntzan oinarritzkoa da *antagonismoa eta kanpo eratzaillearen* ideia (Mouffe, 1999: 15). Horretaz gain, subjektibitate demokratiko horien eraikuntzan *eskariak* ezinbestekoak izango dira (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987: 305). Eskari horiek hedatu, hustu, unibertsalizatu eta beste eskari batzuen *inskripzio azalera* bihurtuko dira identifikazio subjektiborako eremu berri bat sortuz (Retamozo, 2012:55).

Talde sozial batek eskari bat egiteak identifikazio eta subjektibizazio prozesu bat suposatzen du zeinaren bidez bere jatorrizko posiziotik mugitu eta bere eraketa

eremura mugitzen den. Identitate zabalagoak lortzeko ahalmena eskariak *ekibalentzia kateak* ezartzeko (momentu horizontala) eta *artikulatzeko* (momentu bertikala) gaitasunarekin loturik dago (idem). Prozesu horretan eskari bat hustu eta ondorio unibertsalak sortzeko gaitasuna izango du. Hori izango da hain zuzen ere *identitate politikoen eraikuntzaren logika hegemonikoa*. Eskari ezberdinen artikulazioaren bidez subjektibitate berri bat edo identitate herritar bat sortuko da (idem). Laclaren azken lanetan “herriaren” eraikuntza izango da lehentasuna hartuko duen auzia. Populismoaren gaiak azken urteetan Europan izan duen loraldiari lotuta Laclaren lanak (2005; 2006) berau aztertzeko tresna garrantzitsua eskainiko digu aurrerago landuko dugun atalean.

Azaldutako kontzeptu ezberdinak neurri batean kontuan hartuko ditugun arren *identitate politiko kolektiboen eraikuntzan aplikatzen den hegemoniaren ikuspegiak izango du gure ikerketan lehentasuna. Jessopek Estatuaren dimentsio subjektiboen baitan hegemoniaren inguruan egiten dituen hausnarketak aberasteko erabiliko dugu batez ere.*

7- Antagonismoa eta politikoa:

Sarreran aipatu dugun moduan Hegemonia eta Estrategia Sozialista, bere idazketaren ostean garatuko den eskola oso baten sortze lana da. Hori horrela izateko, bai Ernesto Laclauk zein Chantal Mouffek gerra posizio banatu baten bidez elkar elikatzen duten ikuspegia garatu zuten. Mouffen jarduera garrantzitsuena, liberalismoari egiten dion kritika eta politikoaren aldarrikapena izan da.

Carl Schmittek *El concepto de lo político* (1991) lanean politikoari buruz egiten duen hausnarketan “Estatua kontzeptuak” “politikoa” suposatzen du. Funtsezko ezberdintze politikoa bestalde, “laguna” eta “etsaiaren” artean egiten dena litzateke. Hori dela eta, bere ustez politikoarekin bukatzea ezinezkoa denez, nazioarteko eremura eraman behar da, gerra izanik bere adierazpenik zuzenena. Horretaz gain, demokrazia politikotasunarekin bateraezina den neurrian sistema autoritario bat beharrezkoa litzateke⁸⁸.

Mouffek, Schmitzen politikoari buruzko hausnarketa demokrazia pluralisten errealitatera moldatzen du. Horretarako, “etsaiaren” ordez “aurkariaren” ideia aldarrikatuko du, “gerraren” ordez “lehia”, eta “antagonismoa” “agonismoa”⁸⁹ bihurtuko du (1999:13-14). Adostasunaren eta desadostasunaren arteko tentsioan inskribatzen du demokrazia pluralistaren baitako dinamika agonistikoa (ibidem:21).

Hori dela eta *pólemos* eta *polis* kontzeptu klasikoetan oinarrituz “politikoa” eta “politika” ezberdindu behar direla diosku. Lehenengoa, giza harremanetan oinarritzkoa den antagonismoa eta gatazkarekin lotzen dituen bitartean bigarrena ordenaren eta elkarbizitzarekin lotzen ditu. Biak analitikoki era banatuan planteatu arren etengabeko elkarreraginean daude.

Honek eragin zuzena du soziala eta jendartearen inguruan egiten duen irakurketarekin. Bere ikuspegitik, liberalismoak eta presentziaren metafisikak mugimendu politiko estrategikoak “objektibitate” sozial baten gainean burutzen dituzte, jendartea era itxi batean birsortuz doan osotasun baten moduan ulertuz (ibidem:15). Mouffek hau kritikatu du, bere ustez “itxiera” hori ezinezkoa denez kontingentea izango delako. Hori dela eta beti partziala izango da eta bazterketan (eta horren ondorioz boterean) oinarriturik egongo da (idem). Ikuspegi horretan oinarritzen du “politikoaren izaera fundazionala”.

⁸⁸ Bere garaian, Hitlerren Alemaniaren alde kokatu zela gogoratu behar dugu.

⁸⁹ *Etsaia* hil egiten dugun bitartean *aurkariaren* aurka lehia egiten dugu. *Antagonismoak* bestalde gerrara eramaten gaituen bitartean, *agonismoak* logika gatazkatsu hori bide demokratiko pluralisten bidez kudeatuko duen erakundeen alde legoke.

“Lo político siempre tiene que ver con conflictos y antagonismos y no puede no trascender el racionalismo liberal, pues indica los límites de cualquier consenso racional y revela que todo consenso se basa en actos de exclusión” (ibidem:168)

“Politikoa” eratzeko⁹⁰ hegemonikoa burutzen duten ekimenekin loturik dagoen bitartean “soziala” praktika ezberdinen sedimentazioari egiten dio erreferentzia (Mouffe, 2007:24). Zer da soziala Mouffen ikuspegitik eta zein da bere funtzio nagusia beraz? Bere hitzak jasoz:

“Lo social se refiere al campo de las prácticas sedimentadas, esto es, prácticas que ocultan los actos originales de su institución política contingente, y que se dan por sentadas, como si se fundamentaran a sí mismas.” (idem).

Horren ondorioz, borroka politikoaren parte bat sedimentatutako praktika horiek berraktibatzean datza (des-sedimentazio prozesu bat) euren izaera politiko eta historikoa ikusaraziz (Laclau, 1998). Hori dela eta, antagonismoen eraikuntza ezinbestekoa izango da.

Hori kontuan hartuta, politikotasunaren lehentasuna azaltzeko “kanpo eratzaileren” nozioa beharrezkoa da. Mouffen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“La idea de “exterior constitutivo” ocupa un lugar decisivo en mi argumento, pues, al indicar que la condición de existencia de toda identidad es la afirmación de una diferencia, la determinación de un “otro” que le servirá de “exterior”, permite comprender la permanencia del antagonismo y sus condiciones de emergencia.” (1999:15).

Identitate politiko orok beraz, *kanpo eratzaille bat beharko du bere sorrerarako* eta horretarako *antagonismoa eta gatazka beharrezkoak* izango dira. Elementu honek gure ikerketan garrantzia handia izango du, *estatu egituren izaera subalternoaren ezinbesteko baldintza izango direlako. Hau da, subalternitateak beti galdutako du kanpo eratzaille bat finkatzea (Madril edo Westminster adibidez) eta honekin mantentzen diren harremanek beti izango dute dimentsio antagoniko eta gatazkatsu bat*. Hori gertatuko ez balitz, ez genuke ezberdina den komunitate politiko bat izango eta “estatu matrizearen” baitan gatazkarik gabe integratutako beste erregio bati buruz arituko ginateke.

⁹⁰ Sorrera edo instituzioa adierazi nahi da.

Horretaz gain, gure ikerketaren testuinguru politikoa ere aintzat hartu beharko dugu. *Zer gertatu da Europar Batasunean?*⁹¹ *Demokraziaren pribatizazio bat egon dela (Goikoetxea, 2017) eta honek beste hainbat gauzen artean erabaki politikoak “adituen” esku uztea suposatu du. Honi besteak beste, Mouffek (2007:71-97) eta Zizekek (2010:33-36) “postpolitika” deitu diote.*

Beck-en “arriskuaren gizartea” edota Giddensen jendarte “post-tradizionala” lirarteke “ezkerreko”⁹² ikuspegi batetik logika “postpolitiko” honen eraikuntzan eragin handien izan duten teoriak⁹³. Mouffen aburuz, autore hauek politikotasuna eta honek dakarren antagonismoa ukatzen dute eta onartzen duten aurkaritza bakarra modernitate erreflexiboaren logikaren aurka dauden “tradizionalista” eta “fundamentalistak” lirarteke (2007:56). Autore hauen ustez ezkerria eta eskuinaren arteko bereizketak gaur egungo gizarteetan ez luke zentzurik eta horrek alderdi gehienak “zentrora” jotzea suposatu du. Garrantzia berezia du alderdi sozialdemokratetan nagusitu den “Hirugarren Bidea” New Labourra eta PSOE izanik honen adibide argienak.

“Gobernantza ona”, “partisanoa ez den demokrazia” edo “post-soberania” postpolitika honen adibideak lirarteke gure aburuz. Geroz eta eduki gutxiago erabaki daitezke gehienak herritarren kontroletik at dauden instantzietan erabakitzen direlako. Zein da honen ondorio nagusia? Mouffen ikuspegitik Europan “eskuineko populismoa” izan da honi erantzuteko gaitasun gehien izan duen mugimendua (2007: 71-97; 2010:71-96). Statu quoaren aurrean alternatibarik ez dagoenaren ustea nagusitu da eta honek pasio politikoak eskuineko populismoaren bidez bideratzea ahalbidetu du (Mouffe, 2010: 78). Azken urteetan Syriza eta Podemos ere eremu horretan kokatzen ditu (Mouffe, 2015: 62-70) eta guk honi independentzia mugimenduak atxikituko genituzke (H1.1.3).


Mouffen politikotasunaren eta agonismoaren teorizazioa era egokian jasotzen ditu Zubiagak hurrengo irudian:

⁹¹ Saskonago aztertuko dugu “Authoritarian Statism and the privatization of democracy” atalean.

⁹² Sozialdemokrazia klasikoan eragin berezia izan dutela esan dezakegu, nabaria da Giddensen eragina “New Labourren” adibidez.

⁹³ Beck eta Giddens soilik aipatzen ditugu baina Mouffe bere lanetan orokorrean liberalismoari, komunitarismoari, multikulturalismoari eta azken hamarkadetan teoria politikoan nagusi izan diren korronteei kritika zorrotza egiten die. Besteak beste, Rawls, Taylor, Nozick edo Habermas bezalako autoreekiko jarrera kritikoa mantentzen du. Baita ere “autonomiaren” teoriaren eremuan kokatzen diren Hardt eta Negriekin.

TAULA 2 Tentsio demokratiko liberala



(Zubiaga, 2012: 112)

Argi geratzen da jada adierazi dugun moduan Mouffen agonismoa Schmitten eredutik gertu egon arren, gerraren ordezh lehia babestuko duela eta horren ondorioz etsaia lehiakide bihurtuko dela. Aldiz, politikotasunaren eta gatazkaren aldarrikapenak, edozein adostasunen atzean botere harremanak eta bazterketa prozesuak daudela onartzea dakar eta honek Habermasen “elkarrizketa arrazionalaren” gabeziak azaleratzen ditu. Herritar aktiboen eztabaidaren bidezko adostasunaren ordezh hegemoniaren bidezko ordenaren “ezarpen partzial eta prekariora” hobetsiko du.

Gure ikerketa kasuen plano zehatzenari dagokionez, Eskoziako burujabetza gatazka C eta B logiken artean kokatzen dela uste dugu, Kataluniakoa 2006. urtetik aurrera D eta C arteko logikatik B-ra jauzi egin zuela uste dugu eta euskal kasuan aldiz, kontrako noranzkoan A-B arteko logikatik B-C arteko dinamikara igaro dela.

8- Herria eta populismoa.

Herria eta populismoaren inguruko hausnarketa da Ernesto Laclaren lan teorikoaren azken urrats kualitatiboa. *Hegemonia eta Estrategia Sozialista* (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987) idatzi ostean, identitate politikoen eraikuntzaren inguruko ikerketan sakontzea izan zen bere helburua. Herriaren eraikuntza litzateke bere ikuspegitik identitate politiko gorena eta *La razón populista* (2005) horren teorizazio garatuena. Identitate politiko berrien eraikuntzan populismoaren teoriak eskaintzen dizkigun mekanismoen balioa kontuan hartuta, gure ikerketan aplikagarria izango den ikuspegia da beraz bere oinarri nagusiak azaltzea ezinbestekoa dela deritzogu.

Populismoaren auziaren gaurkotasuna nabaria izan arren⁹⁴ gatazka ugari sortzen dituen kontzeptua da eta oraindik oso kutsu ezkorra du. Hori aurre egiteko Laclauk gaiaren inguruan dauden ikerketa garrantzitsuenak aztertu eta zorrozki kritikatzeko dituzten populismoaren garrantzia gutxiesteaz gain honen zilegitasuna kolokan jartzen dutelako (Molina, Grosser, 2008: 141-142). Bere aburuz, honen atzean dagoena *tout court* politikaren ukapena eta gai komunitarioen kudeaketa “komunitate ona” zer den dakien botere administratibo baten esku utzi beharko litzatekeenaren ustea da (Laclau, 2005:10). Hiru kapitulu eskaintzen dizkio populismoari buruzko ikerketen azterketa eta kritikari, besteak beste, Canovan, Le Bon, Taine, Tarde edo McDougallen lanak oinarritzat hartuz (ibidem: 15-88). Gure lanaren helburua ez da populismoaren inguruko azterketa bat egitea baizik eta hegemonia independentista baten eraikuntzan populismoaren teoriak eskaintzen dizkigun mekanismoak aztertzea. Hori dela eta ez ditugu kritika hauek aipatuko eta zuzenean bere proposamenean murgilduko gara.

Laclaren populismoaren baitan fenomeno oso ezberdinak sar daitezke, orain arte populistatzat jotzen ez ziren fenomenoak ere bai. Hori dela eta, lehenik eta behin populismoa politikoa eraikitzeke era bat dela ulertu behar dugu eta ez zedarritu daitekeen ideologia zehatz bat (ibidem:11).

Populismoaren teorian jada aurreko ataletan aipatu ditugun hainbat elementu aplikatuko dira. Bere hitzetan, oinarritzakoak diren hiru kategoria daude: *diskurtsua*, *adierazle hutsak* eta *hegemonia* eta *erretorika* (ibidem: 92-97). Eskola honen printzipioak jarraituz, *diskurtsuaren izaera eratzailea* babestuko du, beraz, elementu ezberdinak deskribatu ordez, diskurtsuaren bidez elementu horiek eratzen direla kontuan hartu beharko dugu. Bestetik *hegemonia kategoria moduan partikular batek adierazpen unibertsala lortzen duenean* erdietsiko dela adierazi dugu. Unibertsaltasun hori ezinezkoa den objektu batek ordezkatzen duenez

⁹⁴ Europar Batasunaren baitan ematen ari diren aldatetako agerikoak dira. Eskuineko eta ezkerreko populismoa eta gure ustez mugimendu independentistak ere honen adierazleak dira.

identitate hegemonikoak adierazle hutsa beharko du (ibidem:95). Hori dela eta *erretorika* txertatuko du, bere hitzetan, adierazle hutsak aldi berean ezinezkoa eta beharrezkoa den objektu bat izendatzen duenez operazio hegemonikoa ezinbestean *katakretikoa* izango delako (ibidem: 96).

Bestetik, herriaren osaketan kontuan hartu beharreko unitaterik txikienak “eskaerak” dira. Jadanik azaldu dugun moduan hauek era *diferentzialean* edo *ekibalentzialean* artikulatu daitezke (ibidem:98). Horretaz gain, isolaturik mantentzen badira bere hitzetan *eskaera demokratikoak* izango dira aldiz era ekibalentzialean artikulatzen direnak *eskaera herritarrak* izango dira (2005:99).⁹⁵

Momentuz esandakoaren arabera, artikulazio populistan beharrezkoak lirarteke (Laclau, 2005: 110):

- Gizartearen banaketa dikotomikoa bi eremutan.
- Dikotomia horrek eremu sozialaren banaketa antagonikoa suposatu behar du.
- Eremu herritarrak, bere eraikuntzarako baldintza moduan, gizarte eskari anitzen ekibalentzien bidez eraikitako identitate globala sortu behar du. Honek lotura ekibalentzialen batuketa baino gehiago suposatuko du.

Horretarako arestian aipatu antagonismoa eta bere izaera eratzailea kontuan hartu behar ditugu. Antagonismoa eta muga politikoen eraikuntza azaltzeko dimentsio ezberdinak izango ditugu kontuan:

1. Antagonismo eratzaileak muga erradikal bat ezarriko du baina honek *hautsitako espazio baten beharra* izango du (ibidem:112). Ordena sozialean ematen den apurketa hori falta⁹⁶ baten ondorio izango da eta komunitatearen osotasuna absente dagoela adieraziko du (ibidem:113). Bete gabeko eskari horrek (falta), erantzule bat izango du, hori dela eta, eskari horiek burutzen dituztenen eta eskari horiek baztertzen dituen “boterearen” arteko banaketa dikotomiko bat sortuko da. *Plebs-a* (partea) bere burua *populus* (osotasuna) moduan identifikatzen hasiko da, eskariak betetzen ez dituen “boterea” komunitatetik kanporatuz⁹⁷.

⁹⁵ Hau jadanik antagonismoaren eraikuntza herritarra eta demokratikoari dagokion atalean azaldu dugu.

⁹⁶ Falta hori bete gabeko eskari bat izango da.

⁹⁷ Komunitatearen osotasuna kolokan jartzen duten neurrian ez dira komunitatearen parte zilegia. Boteredunak, oligarkak, “kasta”, edo “Stablishment” britainiar eta espainola komunitatearen osotasunaren faltaren erantzule bihurtu daitezke eta hortaz ez dira komunitatearen parte zilegia.

2. *Eskaera demokratikoetatik herri eskaeretara* jauzia emateko⁹⁸ jendartearen **marko sinbolikoetan aldaketa bat** ematea ere beharrezkoa da (ibidem:113). Eskaera demokratikoen posizio diferentziala jendartean nagusi den marko sinbolikoaren baitan ematen da, hala ere, euren frustrazioaren ondorioz jada honen nagusitasuna ahultzen hasiko da. Hori dela eta, herri eskaerek alde aurretik existitzen den marko horrekiko geroz eta banatuago egoteaz gain, arrakastatsuak izan daitezten marko sinboliko berri bat eraiki beharko dute. Prozesu horretan “etsai” baten eraikuntza politikoa ere beharrezkoa da (ibidem:114). Banaketa hori adieraziko duten adierazle batzuk pribilegiatuak izango dira: “oligarkia”, “erregimena” edo “talde menderatzaileak” etsaiantzat eta “herria”, “nazioa” edo “behekoak” zapalduentzat. Kondentsazio prozesu horretan hala ere bi elementu hartu behar ditugu kontuan: banaketa sozialaren *rol ontologikoa* eta honen *eduki ontikoa* (ibidem:115). Momentu batean *eduki ontiko* batek jendartearen banaketa adierazteko gaitasuna galdu dezake. Prozesu hau Frantziako Alderdi Komunistaren eta Fronte Nazionalaren adibideen bidez azaltzen du Laclauk: Alderdi Komunistak historikoki sistemaren aurkako botoak bideratzeko gaitasuna izan zuen “*peuple de gauche*” batean oinarritutako muga politiko bat eraikiz. Komunismoaren porrotaren ondorioz eta sozialdemokraziaren zentrorako joeraren ondorioz ezkerria eta eskuinaren arteko ezberdintasunak geroz eta txikiagoak bihurtu ziren. Testuinguru horretan boto erradikal baten beharra mantendu zen arren, jadanik ezkerriaren adierazleak banaketa sozialaren eremutik at zeuden eta espazio hori eskumaren adierazleek bete zuten. Hori dela eta, historikoki Alderdi Komunistarenak ziren “gotorlekuetan” gaur egun Fronte Nazionala da nagusi (idem).
3. Azkenik, euren artikulazioaren bidez “herritarrak” bihurtu diren eskarien baitan ***ezberdintasunaren eta ekibalentziaren artean ematen den tentsioa*** hartu behar dugu kontuan. Alde batetik, artikulazio herritarrak eskaera indibidualei inskripzio azalera bat eskaintzen die eta horren ondorioz momentu zehatz bateko eskaera bat izatetik egonkortasun bat duen “posizio gerra” batean kokatzera igarotzen dira⁹⁹ (ibidem:117). Bestetik, “herriak” (kate ekibalentzialak) bere mugimenduzko¹⁰⁰ lege estrategiko propioak ditu

⁹⁸ Logika diferentzial/indibidualean planteatzen diren eskaera izatetik logika ekibalentzial/populistan planteatzera ematen den jauzia litzateke.

⁹⁹ Honen bidez, epe motzean desagertzeko arriskua zuen eskaera batek kate baten baitan egonkortasuna lortzen du.

¹⁰⁰ Gramscik garaturiko “posizio gerra” eta “mugimendu gerra” aplikatzen ditu Laclauk. Gramsciren definizioa ikusteko beste batzuen artean Sacristanek egindako bilduma egokia da (2010:292).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

eta zenbait eskaera partikularretan dauden eduki batzuk sakrifikatu ditzake.¹⁰¹

Herriaren barne egituraketa

Lotura ekibalentziala eta muga politikoaren eraikuntza ikusi ostean, erlazio ekibalentzialaren ondorioa litzatekeena azaldu behar da: herri identitatea bera. Hastapeneko momentu batean, erlazio ekibalentzialen artean tinkoa ez den lotura bat besterik ez dago baina hauek identitate diskurtsibo batean kondentsatzea lortzekotan jauzi kualitatibo bat emango litzateke populismoaren “herria” sortuz (ibidem:122). Momentura arte eskari ezberdinen arteko bitartekaritza zena berezko “gorputza” lortuko luke. Hurrengo grafikoaren bidez irudikatzen dugu prozesua:

IRUDIA 10 Eskaera Partikularrak eta Ekibalentzien Logika



Iturria: Egileak egina.

Hori lortzeko beharrezkoa da osotasuna ordezkatzeko duen komuneko izendatzaile bat egotea. Hau, arrazoi ezberdinengatik zentralitatea hartzen duen eskaera partikular baten bidez egingo da, partikular baten unibertsalizazioan oinarrituriko operazio hegemonikoaren bidez hain zuzen (ibidem:124). Prozesu hau azaltzeko bi elementu hartu beharko ditugu kontuan:

- 1- **Herri identitatea ordezkatzeko duen eskaera banaturik egongo da:** alde batetik eskaera partikular bat da baina bestaldetik bere partikularitasuna gainditzen duen esanahi bat izango du. Ekialdeko Europar adibidez, 80. hamarkada amaieran sozialismoaren krisiaren testuinguruan “merkatuak” ordena ekonomiko bat baino askoz gehiago ordezkatzeko zuen: “gobernu burokratikoaren amaiera”, “askatasun zibilak”, “Mendebaldearen maila lortzea” etab. (ibidem:124). *Gure aburuz, “independentziak” beste hainbat eskaera ordezkatzeko gaitasuna izan dezake* (Azkune, 2017). Ekibalentzia kateko beste eskariak ere, aldi berean euren eskariaren partikularismoa eta

¹⁰¹ Hau are nabariagoa da hurrengo kontuan hartuz: eskari bakoitzak bata bestearekiko duen lotura kate ekibalentziaren bidez mantentzen du. Hau eraikuntza diskurtsibo kontingente bat da eta ez alde aurretik ezarritako batasun baten ondorioa beraz edozein momentutan aldatu liteke. Gerta liteke

katearekiko mantentzen duten loturak emandako adierazpen herritarra konbinatuko dute.

- 2- **Adierazle hutsten produkzioa:** edozein herri identitatek zenbait adierazleren bidez kondentsatzeko beharra izango du baina honek aldi berean eskarien eduki partikularra geroz eta gehiago galtzea suposatuko du. Herri identitatea ikuspegi “estentsibo” batetik geroz eta osoagoa bihurtuko da eskari gehiago ordezkatzeko dituelako baina bestetik “intentsiboki” pobregoa izango da eskari heterogeneo asko ordezkatu ahal izateko eduki partikular ugari galduko dituelako (ibidem:125). Herri identitatea beraz, joera hutsa duen adierazle¹⁰² moduan funtzionatuko du (idem).

Honen bidez populismoan ohikoak diren *ambiguetatea* eta *lidergoaren garrantzia* azal daitezke. Eskaera heterogeneoak ordezkatzeko, herri identitatean ambiguetasun maila bat beharrezkoa izango da. Bestetik, lotura ekibalentziala sustatzeko lidergoak funtzio garrantzitsua izan dezake. Laclaren hitzetan, azken finean, ekibalentzialki elkaturik mantentzen den multzo heterogeneo bat singularitate bat besterik ez da (ibidem:130). Singularitatearen muturreko forma bestalde indibidualitate bat da. Era honetan, ekibalentziaren logikak singularitatera bultzatzen gaitu eta honek aldi berean taldearen batasuna liderraren izenarekin identifikatzera (idem).

Honekin batera ezinbestekoa da “izendapena” eta honek duen izaera eratzailera kontuan hartzea. Izendapenak ez du errealitate objektibo bat deskribatzen, errealitate hori sortu egiten du. Izena, gauzaren oinarria bihurtzen da. Lau dimentsio hartu behar dira kontuan (ibidem: 135-139):

- **Elkargunea/Point de capiton/Puntu nodala.**
- Elkargunearen identitatea determinatzen duen unibertsalismoaren eta partikularismoaren arteko harremana: **Adierazle hutsa.**
- **Unibertsala eta partikularren arteko artikulazioa** ez da hitzen eta irudien eremura mugatzen: praktika eta erakunde bidez sedimentatzen da. Edozein Estatuk adibidez, operazio hegemonikoan berezkoa den partikularismo eta unibertsalitatearen arteko konbinazioa adieraziko du. Partikularitate batek (plebs-ak) hegemonikoki populus bat osatzea aldarrikatuko du eta honen existentzia aldi berean plebs baten ordezkartzaren bidez soilik izango da posible.
- Bete ez diren eskaeren arteko hasierako harremana ahula izango da euren artean komunean erakundeen porrot bat besterik ez dutelako izango. Maila

¹⁰² Significante tendencialmente vacío.

horretatik harago joateko eta multzo ekibalentzialen batasuna lortzeko **izenaren produktibitate soziala** kontuan hartu beharko dugu. Prozesu horretan hurrengo bi maila hauek ezinbestekoak izango dira:

- Izenak, bete gabeko eskariekiko erakarpina izan beharko du.
- Rol hori bete dezan, “adierazle huts” bat izan behar du.

Honekin batera, “erretorikaren” elementuak baliatuz, desplazamendu erretorikoen bidez izena bere erreferentzia kontzeptualengandik askatzen dela esan dezakegu (ibidem:140-141). Aurreko atal batean¹⁰³ jadanik garatu dugun arren, ideia hau berreskuratu nahi dugu independentismoa bere “partikularitatetik” harago beste eskari edo borroken ordezkari bihurtu daitekeelako. Mugimendu independentista, independentismo soiletik harago beste eremuetan jardutean (osasun zerbitzu publikoen defentsan adibidez), borroken arteko kontiguitatea edo aldamenekotasuna dagoela esango da. Arazo, aktore edota hitzen desplazamenduari metonimia deituko zaio. Borroka ezberdinen arteko lotura denboraldi batez luzatzean, aldamenekotasun harremana, harreman analogiko bihurtuko da eta aldi berean metonomia metafora.

Desplazamendu erretoriko honek, 3 aldaketa nagusi suposatzen ditu:

- 1- Hasieran aipatu borroka ezberdinen arteko partikularitate diferentziala ahulduz doa euren artean homogeneotasun ekibalentzial bat eratuz.
- 2- Aktorearen izaera “ korporatiboa ” galduz doa, izaera “ hegemonikoa ” lortuz.
- 3- Aktorearen izena, Adib: “ Yes Campaign ”, agente sozial zehatz baten izen bihurtzen da eta bere esentzia elementu heterogeneoen artikulazioa zehatza burutzea da. Izen honen bidez, borronte kolektibo elkartu bat gauzatzen da.

Orain arte azaldutakoa herri identitate baten sorreraren forma azaltzen du baina ez digu honek izan dezakeen indarrari buruz hitz egiten. Horretarako ezinbestekoa izango da dimentsio “afektiboa” kontuan hartzea. Laclauk Copjec-en (2003) lanaren bidez psikoanalisiara jotzen du populismoaren maila afektiboa lantzeko. Bere aburuz biek logika bera jarraitzen dute: Freuden psikoanalisiaren bidez “lortu ezin daitekeen osotasuna” eta “irudikagarria den gauza” ezberdintzen ditu (Laclau, 2005:144). Lacanen bidez, aldiz ideia hau garatu eta objektu partzialak osotasun bihurtzen direla adierazten du, hau da, objektu partziala ez litzateke osotasun baten

¹⁰³ Diskurtsoaren elementu egituratzaileen inguruko atalean garatu dugu ideia hau. Laclauen adibide bat erabili dugu hau azaltzeko: sindikatu bat arrazismoaren aurkako borrokaren metafora bihurtu daitekeela adierazi dugu.


parte bat baizik eta “osotasuna den partea” (2005:146). Hau bere erlazio hegemonikoaren oinarriekin zuzenean loturik dago, partikularitate batek ezinezkoa den unibertsaltasunaren rola hartzea hain zuzen (2005:147). Bere hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“La necesidad de constituir un “pueblo” (una plebs que reivindica ser un populus) sólo surge cuando esa plenitud no es alcanzada y objetos parciales dentro de la sociedad (objetivos, figuras, símbolos) son investidos de tal manera que se convierten en los nombres de su ausencia. Pienso que queda claro a partir de nuestra discusión por qué la dimensión afectiva es decisiva en este proceso” (2005:149)

Esandako guztia kontuan hartuz zuzenean artikulazio populistaren funtzionamendua grafiko batzuen bidez aztertuko dugu. Populismoaren hastapeneko fase batean, bete gabeko eskariak euren artean komunean dutena erakundeen partetik jasotako arbuioa litzatekeela esan dugu. Horretaz gain, horietako bat (dimentsio irabazlea) oposizio horren katalizatzailea bihurtu daiteke. Ideia hau hurrengo irudiaren bidez jasotzen saiatuko gara:

IRUDIA 11 Arbuioa eta dimentsio irabazlea


E



Iturria: Errejonek egindako irudian oinarritua (2011: 201).

Operazio hegemonikoaren ondorioz, dimentsio irabazlea osotasuna ordezkatzeko duen partikularra bihur daitekeela esan dugu. Hurrengo irudiaren bidez irudikatuko dugu:

IRUDIA 12 Dimentsio irabazlea eta osotasunaren ordezkapena



Iturria: Laclaren irudian oinarritua (2000:302).

Eredu honetan Tsarismoan oinarritutako operazio hegemonikoaren adibidea azaltzen du Laclauk (2000:302-305). Borobileko beheko parte, eskari bakoitzaren partikularitasuna litzateke eta goiko partean ekibalentzia ahalbidetzen duen komuneko elementua (sistemaren aurka egotea). E1 eskariak gainera guztiak ordezkatzeko gaitasuna izango luke aldi berean katearen parte izanik katearen gainetik ere kokatuz. Aurreko adibidea operazio hegemonikoaren eredu sinplifikatua litzateke barne mugaren egonkortasuna aurreikusten duelako. Hala ere hau errealitatean horrela suertatzea zaila izango da eskariak beti proiektu hegemoniko ezberdinen presioa jasotzen dutelako eta horren ondorioz bere zentzua muga ekibalentzial alternatiboen artean finkatu/mugituko delako (ibidem:165). Horretaz gain ekibalentzia eta diferentziaren arteko tentsioa ez da beti perfektua izango eta batak bestea gailendu dezake. Elementu hauek aintzat harturik, operazio hegemonikoan lau eskenatoki aurreikusi ditzakegu:

- 1- Lotura ekibalentzialaren erabateko nagusitasuna:** ekibalentzia eta diferentziaren arteko tentsioa ezinbestekoa da, baina ekibalentziaren nagusitasuna erabatekoa bada adierazle hutsa edozein ideia eta eskariren karkasa hutsa bihurtzen da. Gauza batek aldi berean guztia ordezkatzeko

duenean jada ez du ezer ordezkatzeko gaitasunik.¹⁰⁴ Errejonek peronismoaren inguruan egiten duen irakurketa oso baliagarria da:

“[...]en la cual corrientes antagónicas se reclamaban del “peronismo”, ilustra la posibilidad de “muerte por éxito” de un significante que, a fuerza de vaciarse, puede volverse inoperante” (2011: 203)

2- Diferentzien erabateko autonomia: kasu honetan diferentziek elkarrekin zuten komuneko elementua galdu eta euren autonomia nagusituko litzateke eremu herritarra disolbatuz. Prozesu honetan ez dago kanpoko aktore baten zuzeneko ekimenik, mugimendu herritarrak muga antagonikoa eta ekibalentzia mantentzeko duen gaitasun ezaren ondorioa litzateke. Neurri batean hasierako M-15 mugimendua logika honetan kokatu genezake. Lehenbiziko momentuan eskari ezberdinen artikulazio ekibalentziala burutzeko izan zuen gaitasuna denboraren poderioz ahuldu zen eta diferentzien autonomia nagusitu zen.¹⁰⁵


3- Iraultza pasiboa eta transformismoa: Gramscik adierazten zuen moduan sistema politikoan nagusi den taldeak aurka dauden taldeen zenbait proposamen eta euren buruzagi, alderdi eta mugimenduak sisteman barneratu ditzake iraultza pasiboaren bidez era honetan indarrean dagoen sistema mantenduz (Gramsci, 1985:137-143; González, 2003:127; Jessop, 2015b:178; Torfing, 1999:111). Aurreko adibidean diferentzien autonomiarako joera aktore herritarren gaitasun ezaren ondorioa zen bitartean, kasu honetan botere politikoaren jardueraren ondorioa litzateke. Laclaren eremuan, eremu herritarraren baitan kokatzen diren zenbait eskari logika diferentzial instituzionalista batean berrartikulatuko lirateke beste eskari batzuk baztertzeko diren bitartean. Botere politikoak bere hegemonia mantenduko luke bere aurkako polarizazioa desaktibatuz eta balizko kontrahegemonia desaktibatuz (Errejón: 2011:205).

Hurrengo grafikoan ikus dezakegun moduan, sistema politikoak eskari bat (E1) betetzeko gaitasuna izango luke sistemara erakarriz eta aldi berean beste eskariengandik bereiziz. Horretaz gain beste eskariak orain bata bestearengandik banaturik geratuko lirateke euren arteko ekibalentzia hautsiz:

¹⁰⁴ Ideia hau hegemoniarekin nahasten den arren kontzeptu ezberdina da.

¹⁰⁵ Honek hala ere, hiru urte beranduago Podemosen artikulazio populistarako beharrezkoak ziren hainbat elementu mahai gainean utzi zituen.

IRUDIA 13 *Iraultza Pasiboa eta Transformismoa*



Iturria: Errejónen irudian oinarritua (2011:206).

4- Kate ekibalentzial alternatiboa eta muga berri baten sorrera:

Tsarismoaren kasuan aipatu dugun moduan, adibide hori helburu heuristikoak dituen eredu ideal batean pentsaturik dago, baina errealitatean sistemak muga dikotomiko alternatibo bat proposatu dezakeela kontuan hartu behar dugu. Iraultza pasiboan gatazka desaktibatu egiten den bitartean orain aztertzen gauden kasuan gatazka mantendu arren, lerrokatzeak aldatzen dira. Eskari nagusia, elkarrekin lehian dauden bi muga artean (logika hegemoniko herritarra eta logika instituzionala¹⁰⁶) kokatzen da “adierazle flotante” bihurtuz. Laclaren arabera (2005:165) hau litzateke adierazle huts eta flotantearen arteko ezberdintasuna:

Adierazle hutsak: herri identitate baten eraikuntzarekin zerikusia du, muga egonkor bat existitzen dela onartzen denean.


Adierazle flotanteak: Muga horren desplazamenduen logikaz arduratu.

Hurrengo irudian¹⁰⁷ ikusiko dugun moduan, E1 “Erakundeen” mugaren baitan edota “Herriaren” mugaren baitan kokatu daiteke beraz bi proiekturen arteko lehian dagoen “adierazle flotantea” da. Demagun E1 herri baten burujabetza eskaera dela. Logika herritarrak eskaera hori Estatu berri baten sorrerarekin lotu dezake eta erakundeen logikak aldiz autonomia estatutu berri baten batekin. Hori dela eta, burujabetza eskaera lehian dauden bi proiektu eta bi muga artean legokeen “adierazle flotantea” litzateke.

¹⁰⁶ Logika instituzionala eta herritarra banatzean, ez gara herria eta erakundeen arteko banaketa zurrin batez ari. Laclaren ereduaz azaltzeko asmoz analitikoki banatu arren, badakigu estatua erlazio soziala dela eta estatua eta herria hertsiki loturik daudela (Jessop, 2008:10)

¹⁰⁷ Laclaren irudian oinarrituta dago (2005:164).

IRUDIA 14 Kate alternatiboa eta muga berriaren sorrera




Iturria: egileak egina.

Esandakoaren arabera beraz, populismoa ez da eduki zehatzak dituen ideologia bat, logika politiko bat baizik (Laclau, 2005:150). Horretaz gain, hegemoniaren eraikuntzarekin ere lotu dugu. Laclauk, politika, hegemonia eta populismoa etengabe erabiltzen dituen kontzeptuak direnez Errejónnek egindako irudia (2011:216) baliatuko dugu hauek euren dimentsioaren arabera ordenatzeko:

IRUDIA 15 Politika, Hegemonia eta Populismoa

108



Iturria: Errejón, 2011:216

Laclairen populismoaren teoriak identitate politikoen eraikuntza aztertzeko tresna baliagarri bat eskaintzen digula uste dugu mugimendu independentistek identitate politiko hegemoniko bat eraikitzeko burutzen duten artikulazioa logika populistarekin lotu dezakegulako. Populismoaren eskemak gainera krisi testuinguruetan interes berezia du erakundeek eskariak era diferentzialean barneratzeko zailtasunak dituztelako eta marko sinboliko “zaharrak” higitzen direlako. Honek identitate politiko berriak nola artikulatzen diren erantzuteko tresnak eskaini arren, egiturazko hainbat dimentsio ahaztu egiten ditu eta horren ondorioz prozesu askoren zergatia azaltzeko darabiltzan baliabideak urriagoak dira. Honi aurre egiteko ezinbestekoa da beste autore batzuen kritika eta ekarpenak jasotzea.

¹⁰⁸ Kontzeptuen hedaduraren araberako sailkapena,

9- Ikuspegi kritikoak.

Arestian aipatu moduan, Laclau eta Mouffek posizio gerra banatu baten bidez maila akademiko zein politikoan euren eragina hedatzen saiatu ziren “Essexeko Eskola” izanik honen emaitza nagusia (Townshend, 2004: 279). Lan honek eremu ezberdinetatik kritika ugari jasotzea suposatu zuen eta ezinezkoa da guztiak atal honetan sakontasunez lantzea. Hori dela eta, gure ikerketaren garapenerako interes berezia duten kritikak jasoko ditugu “Diskurtsoaren Teoriak” eskaintzen digun marko teorikoa aberasteko asmoz.

Jada aurreratu dugun moduan eskola honen “ahulgunetako” bat egiturazko dimentsioek duten garrantzia txikia da beraz elementu hauek barnebiltzen dituzten kritikek lehentasuna izango dute Bob Jessopenak eta Jules Townshendenenak izanik gure ikerketarako interesgarrienak. Beste hainbat autoreen kritikak garrantzitsuak iruditu arren ez ditugu sakonki aztertuko. Azken hauen artean aipagarria da Norman Gerasek, Laclau eta Mouffekin mantendu zuen eztabaida. Marxismo analitikoan kokatzen den Gerasek (Casal, 2009), “Post-Marxism?” artikulua bidez (1987) azken hauek diskurtsotik kanpo dagoen errealitatea ukatzea kritikatu zuen. Honi erantzunez Laclauk eta Mouffek “Post-Marxism without apologies” (1987) idatzi zuten praktika diskurtsibo eta ez diskurtsiboak banaezinak direla mantenduz. Azkenik, Gerasek diskurtsoaren garrantzia muturrera eramatea zituen arriskuak eta bere hitzetan “post-marxismoaren nabarmenkeria” kritikatzeko liburu bat argitaratu zuen (1990). Zizekek bestalde hasiera batean ideologiaren azterketan Lacanen lanaren erabilera goraiatzen duen arren (1989:5-6) borroka ezberdinen artikulazioan klase borrokaren nagusitasuna azpimarratzen du (2000: 215-263). Antzeko ikuspegia mantentzen du Bensaïdek borroka ezberdinen konbergentzian “kapitala bera” bateratze printzipio aktibo moduan defendatzen duenean (2009: 339). Esan dugun moduan lan kritikoak ugariak diren arren Jessopen eta Townshenden irakurketan oinarrituko gara.

“Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoaren”¹⁰⁹ sortzaile den Bob Jessopek Laclau eta Mouffen lanaren kritika zorrotza egiten du estatu kapitalistaren inguruan egiten duen hausnarketan (1990: 289-306). Lehenengo kritika hori, *Hegemonia eta Estrategia Sozialistaren* argitalpenaren testuinguruan kokatzen da. 2008. urtean aldiz, eskola honen lan teoriko nagusiak jada publikaturik zeudenean, Marxen estatuaren teoriaren garapenean Laclau eta Mouffen ikuspegiak izan dezakeen baliagarritasuna aztertzen du. Azken lan honetan, euren proposamen teorikoak historikoki zehatzak diren estrategia politikoak, estatu proiektuak, ikuspegi hegemonikoak eta analisi koiunturalak egiteko baliogarriagoak izan daitezkeela

¹⁰⁹ Strategic Relational Approach.

dioen arren eurekiko jarrera kritikoa mantentzen du (2008b: 158). Hala ere, irakurketa sakonagoa burutzen du estatu kapitalistaren inguruan egiten duen lanean aipatu autoreei eskaintzen dien atalean beraz horren azterketa hobetsiko dugu (1990:289-306).

Jessopek ikuspegi metateoriko batetik maila ontologikoan, epistemologikoan eta metodologikoan dituzten gabeziak aipatu arren, maila ontologikoan mantentzen duten errealismo hutsarekiko¹¹⁰ da bereziki kritikoa (1990: 294). Honen aurrean, diskurtsotik harago mundu erreala eta bere erakundeen berezko ezaugarriak, joerak, botere harremanak etab. kontuan hartu beharko direla deritzo (1990:295). Bere hitzetan:

“Although we have no direct access to these properties, they are both constraining and facilitating in relation to other entities and they are indirectly accessible to knowledge” (idem).

Laclau eta Mouffek Norman Gerasekin izan zuten hartu emanaren baitako adibide batean harri batek jaurtigai moduan dituen ezaugarriak diskurtsiboak direla adierazi zuten (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987). Jessopek era kritikoa adierazten duen moduan, harriaren berezko ezaugarriek (eta ez honen inguruko ezaugarri diskurtsiboek) egiten dute adibidez artilea baino jaurtigai egokiagoa izatea (1990: 295). Bere ustez, fenomeno sozialen inguruan ere antzeko hausnarketa egin daiteke. Hauek, azaleratu egiten diren ezaugarri eta joerak dituzte eta askotan euren existentzia ezagutu ezin den arren bizitza sozialean eragin handia dute (idem).

Maila epistemologikoan “konstruktibismo hutserako” arriskua ikusten duen arren, Laclauren zenbait hausnarketetan “erreala” heldu ezineko marjina moduan definitu eta objektibotasunaren eraikuntza diskurtsiboa mugatzen duela adierazten du (ibidem:296). Honen ondorioz, erreala eta kontzeptuen artean asimetria bat sortzen da, erreala soilik kontzeptuaren distorsio baten bidez azaleratuko delako. Hau, Jessopek Estatu kapitalistaren inguruan egindako hausnarketarekin (Jessop, 1982) bat dator eta “konstruktibismo errealista” baterako hurbilketa ahalbidetzen du (Jessop, 1990:296).

Bestetik, diskurtsoaren teoriak helburu analitiko unibertsalak izan arren praktikan bere jarraitzaileek oso gai zehatzak landu dituzte gehienak subjektuen eta identitateen sorrerarekin, interesen artikulazioarekin, antagonismo sozialarekin eta mobilizazio politikoaren ezaugarriekin lotutakoak izanik (Jessop, 1990:297). Horren ondorioz eskaini dituzten kontzeptuak ere eremu horietatik eratortzen dira.

¹¹⁰ Empty realism.

“Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoarekin” ezberdintasun ugari mantendu arren analisi sozialean fundazionalismoaren ukapena komunean dute (Jessop, 1990:298). Hori dela eta, formazio soziala praktika artikulatzaile kontingenteen ondorio ez-osoan litzateke eta bere batasun erlatiboa ez luke printzipio esentzial bakar batek bultzatuko, elementu sozial ezberdinen arteko lotura ezegonkor eta behin behinekoaren ondorioa litzateke. Jessop honekin bat datorren arren, Laclauk eta Mouffek prozesu hau eraikuntza diskurtsibo batera mugatzen dute (Jessop, 1990:228). Aldebakartasun diskurtsibo honen ondorioz, ordena sozialaren artikulazioa subjektuen identitateen arabera artikulaziora eta identitate eta interesen arabera ekibalentzia kateen sorrerara mugatzen da (idem). Honek, elementu material eta instituzionalak alboratzea dakar. Mouzelisek adierazten duen moduan egitura instituzionalen errefikazioari dioten beldurraren ondorioz beste muturrera joan eta praktika artikulatzaileak hustasun instituzional batean egingo balira moduan jasotzen dituzte (1988:116). Horren ondorioz, instituzioek ekintza ahalbidetu edo mugatzeko duten ahalmena edota formazio sozialen sorrera, egonkortasuna edo epe luzeko eraldaketa ahazten dituzte. Mouzelisen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“They concentrate their fire on reconstructing the concept of hegemony and showing how articulatory practices constantly construct and deconstruct self-identities, subject positions, nodal points, social and political spaces, and so on. But the conditions of existence of such practices, the ways in which practices are both sustained and limited by the more permanent institutional structures of capitalism are never spelt out” (Mouzelis, 1988:113; Jessop, 1990:299).

Honekin lotuta Jessopek “esanahia” eta “esperientziaren” arteko ezberdintasunaren beharra azpimarratzen du lehenengoa aktoreen marko diskurtsiboarekin lotuz eta bigarrena hauen jardura eremuen baldintzekin (1990: 299). Hori dela eta “esanahia” aktoreek eskura dituzten “esanahi” ezberdinen artean burutzen duten eraikuntza prozesuarekin loturik legoke. “Esperientzia” bestalde, mundu sozial eta naturalak aktoreen “esanahi” sistematik harago duten eraginarekin lotzen du (Jessop, 1990:299). Hori dela eta “esanahia” eta “esperientzia” bata bestea baldintzatzen duen ekintza kate beraren bi momentu ezberdin lirateke beraz bata ezin du bestea baztertu. Jessopen aburuz, “Diskurtsoaren Teoriak” euskarri egokia eskaintzen digu “esanahiaren” azterketan baina gabeziak ditu “esperientziari” dagokionez. Bere hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“To explore this circuit of meaning and experience we clearly need an analytic which provides concepts, assumptions and explanatory principles for discursive frames of meaning. *This is the privileged field*

of discourse analysis and it has much to teach us on these issues. But an adequate approach must also facilitate two further types of analysis. It should provide tools for analysing the genealogy and effectivity of the unacknowledged as well as acknowledged conditions of a given action and, likewise, of its unanticipated as well as anticipated effects; and it should offer tools for understanding why only some conditions come to be acknowledged, some consequences anticipated, and some consequences experienced. It is in these areas where discourse analysis has less to offer.” (Jessop, 1990: 300)

Jessopek maila nahiko abstraktuan egindako kritika hau bat dator Jules Townshendek “Essexeko Eskolaren” azterketa enpirikoen inguruan egiten duen kritikarekin. Laclau eta Mouffen jarraitzaile diren David Howartheke, Aletta J. Norvaleke eta Yannis Stavrakakiseke “Diskurtsoaren Teorian” oinarrituriko azterketa kasuak biltzen zituen lan kolektibo bat editatu zuten 2000. urtean. “Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, hegemonies and social change” izenburua duen liburuak Laclau eta Mouffen lanetan ohikoak diren kontzeptu abstraktuak kasu praktikoetan aplikatzen dituzte beraz eskola honen ezagutzarako lan interesgarria eskaintzen digu. Townshendek aipatu liburuaren azterketa kritikoa egiteko McLennanek ezberdindutako (1996) “Diskurtsoaren Teoriaren” “thick” (gogorra) eta “thin” (arina)¹¹¹ bertsioak erabiltzen ditu. *“Thick” ikuspegiak ez ditu elementu sozioekonomikoek eremu diskurtsiboan duten garrantzia kontuan hartzen eta “thin” bertsioak aldiz faktore sozioekonomikoek duten eragina onartzeko gaitasun handiagoa izango luke* (McLennan, 1996: 54-56). Townshenden hitzak zuzenean hartuz:

“The **“thick”** explicitly deny the importance of institutional and socio-economic factors in shaping discourse and the role of “interests” in explaining political motivation. Rather, they stress the overdetermining, performative and affective importance of political discourse. The **“thin”** theorists on the other hand implicitly invite, or explicitly allow, a grater constitutive role for socio-economic factors and preconstituted interests, in effect opening up the possibility of greater methodological pluralism.” (2003:133).¹¹²

“Thick” ikuspegia Jessopek “Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoaren” dimentsio semiotikoa aztertzean kritikatzeko duen “konstruktibismo sozial erradikalaren tentazioaren” adibidea litzatekeela deritzogu (Jessop, 2008a: 238). Townshendek

¹¹¹ McLennanek “minor key” eta “major key” kontzeptuak erabiltzen ditu.

¹¹² Letra lodia guk gehitu dugu.

ere Essexeko Eskolako kideen kasu zehatzen azterketan *“thick” ikuspegia kritikatu eta “thin” hurbilpena hobesten du*. Banaketa honek gure ikerketan izan dezakeen garrantzia kontuan hartuta bi ikuspegiak tartekatzen dituzten kasu enpirikoen deskribapen labur bat egitea beharrezkoa da.

“Thick” ikuspegiaren adibide argiena Barrosek eta Castagnolak Argentinan 1955 eta 1973 urteen artean Peronismoaren eragina aztertzeke egiten duten azterketa litzateke (Howarth, Norval, Stavrakis, 2000: 24-38). Euren lanean Peronek gai sozialak lehia etengabe kokatzeko izan zuen gaitasunari egozten diote bere arrakastan inolako oinarri instituzional eta ekonomikorik kontuan hartu gabe (ibidem: 34). Townshendek egiten duen kritika jasoz, faktore sinbolikoen garrantzia ezin da gutxietsi baina ezinbestekoa da elementu ekonomiko eta instituzionalak kontuan hartzea, hau da, proposamen batzuen arrakasta aztertzeaz gain arrakasta horren oihartzuna ahalbidetzen duten aukerarako baldintzak ere kontuan hartu behar dira (2004: 134).

Howarthe 1976-1986 urteetan Kontzientzia Beltzaren Mugimenduaren (KBM)¹¹³ gainbehera eta Afrikako Kongresu Nazionalaren (AKN) indartzea euren diskurtsoetan oinarrituz azaltzen du “thick” ikuspegira hurbilduz (Howarth, Norval, Stavrakis, 2000: 168-193). Bere aburuz gako “belztasunak”¹¹⁴ apartheidaren aurkako borroka elkartzeko adierazle huts ez bihurtzean datza baina Townshendek adierazten duen moduan, ez dakigu gabezia hauek euren diskurtsoaren ondorio diren edo AKN-ren ezarpen indartsuaren ondorioa (2003:134).

Aipatu lanean beste hainbat kasu enpiriko lantzen diren arren Howarth eta Griggsek Manchesterreko aireportuko lurreratze pista berriaren aurkako mugimenduaren kasua (Howarth, Norval, Stavrakis, 2000: 52-70) da “thin” ikuspegira gehien hurbiltzen dena. “Vegans and Volvos” metafora darabilte ekologista erradikalen eta klase altuko bizilagunen elkartzea deskribatzeko. Aipatu autoreek beste ikuspegi teorikoetako ekarpenak jasotzeko gaitasuna dute, besteak beste, Dunleavyren talde identitateen teoria eta “hautu arrazionalaren” teorietatik hurbil dagoen interesaren kontzeptua (Townshend, 2003:136). “Vegan eta Volvoen” batasunaren porrota azaltzeko bestalde, adierazle huts baten faltarekin lotzeaz gain, baliabideen egiturazko asimetriarekin ere lotzen dute elementu diskurtsiboak elementu materialagoekin lotuz (ibidem:137).

¹¹³ Black Consciousness Movement.

¹¹⁴ “Blackness”

“Thin” ikuspegiaren aplikazio garbiena¹¹⁵ Errejonen (2011) Boliviako MASen lehenengo gobernuaren hegemoniaren inguruko doktorego tesia da. Bere lanean zuzenean Thownsenden kritika jaso¹¹⁶ eta diskurtsoaren teoriaren erabilera azpimarratzeaz gain bere aukerarako baldintzei ere garrantzia ematen die.

“La teoría del Discurso puede ser usada entonces como una caja de herramientas para comprender la hegemonía, con sólo introducir una modificación que sería un “pecado” para sus autores pero que está en el corazón mismo del pensamiento de Gramsci del que ellos parten: *el juego de las lógicas de diferencia y equivalencia, las investiduras del universal por particulares construidas por actos de nominación, no se desenvuelven en el vacío. Las propias dislocación y heterogeneidad, necesarias para que las identidades no estén preconstituidas y la ideología no las “revele” sino que se construyan en la lucha política, son condiciones que dependen de factores como la cohesión, fortaleza y capacidad de regulación y control territorial de un Estado.* La posibilidad de encarnar el universal por parte de un particular, a su vez, dependen también de factores como la posición relativa de esa identidad particular en la estructura económica de una sociedad, su capacidad de movilización- simbólica y material- y su relación con otras fuerzas. El reconocimiento de que todas las identidades políticas son construidas debe de ser acompañado por la constatación de que no todas tienen la misma posibilidad de éxito en sus esfuerzos por ser hegemónicas. **Esto conduce de forma necesaria a estudiar las “condiciones de posibilidad” de la hegemonía.** [...] Laclau, como hemos visto, incurre en peligrosas contradicciones al intentar afirmar la contingencia absoluta de la hegemonía, y acaba reconociendo, cuando hace análisis político de situaciones concretas, la existencia de “límites extradiscursivos” a la construcción de identidades políticas. Entre ambos, esta investigación apuesta por un uso *thin* de la *Discourse Theory* para el estudio de la hegemonía en Bolivia” (Errejón, 2011: 229).

¹¹⁵ Aipagarria da Zubiagak lan ezberdinetan (2009; 2012) Laclau eta Mouffen ikuspegia ekintza kolektiboaren teoriekin eta zehazki MacAdam, Tilly eta Tarrowren (2001) liskarraldiaren mekanismoekin egin duen lotura, baina hau beste atal batean garatuko dugu.

¹¹⁶ Hala ere, ez du adibidez Jessopen Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoa aipatzen eta epistemologiari eskaintzen dion atalean, Essexeko Eskolaren marko teorikoa gizarte mugimenduen “Frame Analsiaren” eskolarekin aberastera mugatzen da beste ikuspegi batzuk baztertuz.

Bat gatoz maila ezberdinetan Jessopek, Townshendek eta Errejonek¹¹⁷ egindako hausnarketekin, diskurtsoaz gain honen arrakasta edo porrota ahalbidetu edo galaraziko duten aukerarako baldintzak kontuan hartzea ezinbestekoa izango delako. Hori dela eta, errealitatea eta fenomeno sozial guztiak diskurtsoen bidez eta zehazki diskurtsoaren teoriaren bidez azaltzea gehiegizkoa litzatekela uste dugu. Eskola honen baitan kokatzen den Torfingek dioskun moduan *Diskurtsoaren Teoria* “metodologia master totalizatzaile” gisa baztertu behar da eta bere erabilera “esentzialismoa gaindituz” eta “brikolaje metodologikoa” aplikatuz indartu daiteke (1999:292). Howarthekek ere ikuspegi honen izaera totalizatzailea baztertu eta ikerketa objektu zehatz batzuk hobesten ditu:

“... dado que este no es un enfoque totalizador que puede aplicarse a *todos* los problemas, es posible demarcar un rango legítimo de objetos de investigación. En general, *éstos incluyen la constitución de identidades políticas, las prácticas de articulación hegemónica entre los discursos y subjetividades particulares, la construcción de antagonismos sociales y el establecimiento de fronteras políticas*, las maneras en que los sujetos son “atrapados” por ciertos discursos y no otros y las fantasías sociales que sostienen dichas identificaciones y el “goce” así procurado.” (2005:47)¹¹⁸

Esandakoaren arabera beste ikuspegi teoriko batzuekin uztartuta eta soilik egoera zehatzen azterketa helburua izanik balio handiko euskarria eskaintzen digula deritzogu. Diskurtsoen deskribapena (euren sorrera, iraunkortasuna eta aldaketa) eta hauek eraldaketa politikoan duten garrantzia azaltzeko ekarpen erabilgarria egiten dute. Townshenden hitzetan:

“The ‘thinnes’ of these accounts could, of course, be interpreted as a weakness, in the sense that little attention is devoted to *explaining* the emergence, persistence and changes in these discourses in terms of political (and state) institutions and material conditions of ‘possibility’. Yet if the task in hand is more modest, concerned with *identifying* emergences, changes and persistences, which involves the application of Laclau and Mouffe’s categories of ‘hegemony’, ‘dislocation’,

¹¹⁷ Aipatu moduan, Errejonek Townshenden lana erabiltzen du bere kritika garatzeko.

¹¹⁸ Horiek dira bere ikuspegitik lehentasuna duten ikerketa objektuak eta horren ondorioz albokoak diren gai batzuk ere kontuan hartu beharko dira: “El análisis de estos temas implica que los teóricos del discurso también están interesados en una serie de temas adyacentes tales como el carácter cambiante de la formación de políticas públicas en tiempos de gobernanza multinivel, las prácticas de grupos y movimientos sociales, el rol de los medios de comunicación y los efectos desestabilizadores del cambio económico y de los procesos de comidificación y burocratización de la vida social” (Howarth, 2005:47).

‘subject position’, the logics of ‘equivalence’ and ‘difference’, ‘floating’ and ‘empty’ signifiers, ‘myths’ and ‘imaginaries’ (as well as Derridean deconstructive methods), then we should view such an approach as a necessary, if not sufficient, element of scientific endeavour.” (2004: 284)

Hori dela eta gure ikuspegitik ez da kontraesankorra adieraztea diskurtsoek errealitatea deskribatu baino errealitate hori eraikitze gaitasuna daukatela baina aldi berean Howartheek esandakoa jarraituz diskurtso partikularren zenbait elementu beste batzuk baino “egiazkoagoak” direla (2000:113-115) edota Gerasek esan bezala errealitatea azaltzerako orduan zenbait diskurtso partikular beste diskurtso batzuk baino “egiazkoagoak” direla (Townshend, 2004:285). Ezin da beraz, errealitate “extra-diskurtsiboak” esanahia eraikitze duen potentziala baztertu. Heideggerren izatea/existentzia banaketan oinarritutako “diskurtsoaren” nozio orokor baten ordezkari diskurtso ezberdinei buruz hitz egitea egokiagoa litzateke (Townshend, 2004:285). Townshenden irakurketa hau, bat dator Jessopek egiten duen “momentu semiotikoaren” eta “momentu materialaren” arteko banaketarekin (2008a:238). Bere hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“Although every social practice is semiotic (insofar as practices entail meaning), no social practice is reducible to semiosis. Semiosis is never a purely intra-semiotic matter without external reference and involves more than the play of differences among networks of signs. It cannot be understood without identifying and exploring the extra-semiotic conditions that make semiosis possible and secure its effectivity.”(2004:167)

Essexeko Eskolaren indargunerik handiena beraz, diskurtso politikoen azterketa eta identitate politikoen eraikuntza da eta gainera praktikan hori izan da euren ikerketa gai nagusia. Hala ere, azterketa horretan “adierazle huts” baten arrakastaren zergatia, adibidez, bere sorrera eta eraldaketarako baldintza “ez diskurtsiboen” arabera baldintzatuta egongo dela deritzogu. Diskurtsoen gaitasun performatiboa ezin dugu bere aukerarako baldintzetatik banatu, hori dela eta, Finlayson eta Valentinek dioten bezala, “zer?” eta “nola?” azaltzeaz gain, “zergatik?” ere azaldu beharko dugu (2002:15). Gure aburuz, posfordismoaren baitan egon den estatuaren eraldaketa aztertzea ezinbestekoa izango eta horretarako Jessopen Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoa tresna aberatsagoak eskaintzen dizkigu. Ez gatoz bat Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren teoriaren printzipio ontologikoekin, hala ere, gure ikerketaren planorik zehatzenean hegemonia independentista berri baten eraikuntza aztertzeko tresna teoriko baliagarria dela uste dugu (Aoiz et.al., 2017).

10- Frame analisia: hegemoniaren azterketarako euskarri metodologikoa.

Eskola honen arazoetako bat garaturiko kontzeptuen abstrakzio maila altua eta aplikazio enpirikorako eskaintzen dituzten baliabide metodologiko urriak dira. Zentzu horretan, interesgarria iruditzen zaigu Iñigo Errejonek bere doktorego tesian Essexeko Eskolaren printzipio teorikoen eta frame analisiaren euskarri metodologikoen artean burutzen duen lotura (2011:263-320). Errejonek, frame analisiaren baitan dauden eskola ezberdinen garapena eta euren arteko ezberdintasunak azpimarratzen ditu. Goffman, Snow, Benford, Gamson edota Gerhards bezalako autore klasikoen lanak jasotzeaz gain, Ramón Máizek nazionalismoaren azterketan garatu ikuspegia ere aintzat hartzen du. Gure ikerketaren xedeak gainditzen ditu frame analisia sakonki aztertzea baita honen baitan garatu diren kontzeptu ezberdinak zehaztasunez aplikatzea.

Hala ere, bere eredurik sinpleena baliatuko dugu aktore politikoek hegemoniaren aldeko lehian euren diskurtsoan erabiltzen dituzten argudioak era koherente batean ordenatzeko. *Diagnostikoa*, *pronostikoa* eta *motibazioa* dira hain zuzen ere markogintzaren teorian kategoriatzat oinarritutakoak (Snow & Benford, 1988).

Diagnostikoaren bidez, arazo bat identifikatu eta egoera bidegabetzat jotzen da. Horrekin batera arazoaren erantzuleak zehaztu eta bidegabekeriaren iturri izatea egotzen zaie. Beste era batera esanda, diagnostikoa *“bidegabekeria marko”* bat eraikiz artikulatzen da, honen bidez sektore zabaletan ahalik eta oihartzunik handiena izateko xedearekin (Gamson, 1992.).

Pronostikoaren bidez kontrara, alde aurretik bidegabetzat jo den arazo hori zuzentzeko konponbide bat proposatu eta berau lortzeko aurrera eraman behar diren estrategiak adierazten dira. Hiru arrazoiengatik da garrantzitsua: (1) Arazoari izaera politikoa emateaz gain berau konpontzeko gaitasuna duen *“Dimentsio irabazlea”* zehazten delako. (2) Dimentsio irabazlean oinarrituta, eremu politikoa ordenatzen duen *“muga”* ezarriko delako (gu/haiek). (3) *Izendapenaren* bidez, ez da alde aurretik existitzen den errealitate bat deskribatzen. Adierazle hutsari esker, arazo partikularra bere korporatibismotik harago doan identitate berri bat eraikitzeko gaitasuna izango du (Errejón, 2011:223).


Motibazioaren bidez mobilizazioaren arrakastarako sinboloak, pizgarriak eta espektatibak eskaintzen dira. Iñigo Errejonek bere doktorego tesian motibazio markoaren baitan 3 dimentsio ezberdintzen ditu: 1) Muga politikoaren

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

moralizazioa; 2) iraganaren interpretazio mitikoa eta 3) konponbide baten proposamena (idem).

Errealitatea teorizazio prozesu oro baino konplexuagoa den neurrian, kasu guztietan ez da eskema hau era mekanikoan aplikatuko. Hala ere, aktore politikoek praktika hegemonikoetan baliatzen dituzten argudioak era koherente batean ordenatzeko euskarri metodologiko egokia iruditzen zaigu. Amaitzeko, hurrengo grafikoan jasotzen dugu markogintza eta hegemoniaren arteko sintesia.

IRUDIA 16 Hegemonia eta artikulazio populista



Iturria: egileak egina.

3 Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy: neoliberal governmentality and the return of sovereignty

“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” – Jean Monnet

“Finally, the crisis has shown the need to strengthen [the Economic and Monetary Union’s] ability to take rapid executive decisions to improve crisis management in bad times and economic policymaking in good times.” – Herman Van Rompuy, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (5 December 2012)

1- Introduction: sovereignty and demands for sovereignty

In accordance with our hypotheses, we believe that in current post-fordist era, there has been a transition from the Keynesian Welfare National State to the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime. As a consequence, we identify two competing dynamics: a process of de-democratization that has empowered private authorities and the decentralization of state powers that has enabled the democratic reproduction of historic nations (H1). It is in the tension between these very dynamics that we situate the key of our research, however, in this chapter we are going to pay special attention to the first one.

With that aim, we have chosen two interrelated concepts¹¹⁹ that will serve us as a guidance: *authoritarian statism* (Poulantzas, 1979) and *the privatization of democracy* (Goikoetxea, 2017). Through them, we cover the most basic common features of current *Western states which will allow us explain the core of our research: the rise of demands for sovereignty based in democratic claims*. However, we need to bear in mind that our analysis will be guided by the next abstract-simple ideas: (1) *sovereignty* as the social relation that articulates the political community and its government. (2) The issue of the *state* as a form-determined social relation. (3) The fact that *the capital relation has a political character* insofar as it involves an articulation of the economic and the-extra economic.

¹¹⁹ We will define them later.

We have said that although similar in all Western countries, *for strategic and structural reasons the de-democratizing tendency has been deeper in the EU (H2)*. Thus, although we are going to give a general picture, the EU is going to get an important part of the explanation. *Moreover, we believe that due to the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and the crisis management encouraged by the European Union and its Member States, we think that the process of de-democratization has been hardened opening up a cycle of mobilization that claims more democracy and sovereignty (H3)*.

With that in mind, we are going to proceed in accordance with the method of articulation from an abstract-simple plain of analysis to more concrete-complex considerations (Jessop, 1982:213-220). It will run as follows:

- 1) Firstly, we are going to reflect briefly upon the concepts of sovereignty and democracy.
- 2) In a second step, thanks to Foucault's studies on governmentality, we will deal with the change from "the liberal art of government" to the new rationality of the "neoliberal governmentality" (Foucault, 2008).
- 3) However, we cannot separate it from its intersection with the capital relation and the state. Thus, we will connect it with the transition from the "Keynesian Welfare National State" to the "Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime" (Jessop, 2008c).
- 4) In this way, we will deal in a more concrete and complex plain of analysis with the tendency towards the privatization of democracy (Goikoetxea, 2017) and authoritarian statism (Poulantzas, 1979). We will consider its articulation in the European Union.
- 5) Finally, we think that the North Atlantic Financial Crisis is not a break but a condensation of the previous tensions and contradictions. We will see its management and the hardened of the privatization of democracy, focusing on the European Union and some of its most important crisis-management measures.

2- Sovereignty and democratization

Calls on participation, active citizenship, governance networks, transparency or co-responsibility¹²⁰ are becoming more and more common whereas the detachment

¹²⁰ As we will see, they are part of the rationality established by the "neoliberal governmentality" (Joseph, 2014).

towards institutions grow, traditional political actors are called into question and even the European Union and many of its Member States suffer a structural crisis.

In relation to that, as said in our third hypothesis (H3), we observe in our closer international context, especially in the so called ‘Western advanced capitalist countries’, a rise of movements that claim the defence of people’s sovereignty against the ‘dictatorship of the markets’ (Buendía, 2011:56-70). We include under this logic, movements such as 15-M, groups against cuts and austerity measures, Occupy Wall Street, growing political parties like Podemos or Syriza and the emergence of renewed leaderships like the ones of Jeremy Corbyn in Great Britain and Bernie Sanders in the USA. We consider the growing relevance of pro-independence movements as part of this very context, a cycle of collective action (Tarrow, 2012:342) that claims more democracy and a recovery of people’s sovereignty. Although from an antagonistic ideological field, the rise of right-wing populism all over Europe or the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union after the victory of ‘Brexit’ are also related to wills of recovering sovereignty.

With that in mind, what do we mean by *people’s sovereignty*? According to Hinsley, ‘the concept has been formulated when conditions have been emphasizing the interdependence between the political community and the more precise phenomenon of its government’ (1986:2). Indeed, as Dussel points out, the power is always (*in potentia*), in the hands of the political community and it becomes real thanks to its institutionalization (*potestas*) (2006:31). That is why we need to separate the *potentia*, the power of the political community as its location, origin and fundament (the hidden ontological level) and the *potestas*, developed through institutions that make this power real, empirical and feasible (*idem*). That separation can only be possible thanks *to sovereignty, the social relation that articulates the political community and its government.*


That very relation has not been undermined; on the contrary, it has been consolidated as a consequence of its growing complexity¹²¹ so the attempts to present sovereignty as superfluous or outdated sink by their own weight (Hinsley, 1986:218-219). In spite of the fact that the relation between the community and the state has changed and become more complex and sophisticated, the most essential features of this relation have not disappeared (*ibidem*:219).

Moreover, following the material principle of politics, institutional structures are grounded on the need of enabling the production, reproduction and growth of the lives of the citizens of the political community (Dussel, 2006:73).

¹²¹ The expansion of modern public services would be an example of this complexity.

However, that process will require enough political capacity and infrastructural power (Mann, 1984:189; Tilly, 2007: 16) in order to provide the necessary means of feasibility to reproduce the political community in itself and for itself (Dussel, 2006:36-37). It will require as well an empowered and mobilized society in order to organize and make political claims. We see the mentioned process in the next simplified graphic:

IRUDIA 17 Political power from potentia to potestas



Based on: Dussel, 2006:27

In abstract simple terms, democracy means the government of the rulers (potestas) according to the expressed preferences and demands of the demos (potentia) (Goikoetxea, 2014a:146). Thus, according to the graphic¹²² the government can command by obeying in accordance with the preferences and demands of its demos reproducing the political community in itself and for itself (Dussel, 2006:36-37). However, it can also act as a fetishised power ruling without obeying and acting as

¹²² Notes: **Arrow a** represents the originary (ontological) disjunction or split within the primary power (potentia) of the political community, which gives rise to the delegation of the exercise of power through institutions and representatives (potestas) ("those who command"). **Arrow b** represents the positive exercise of power as a reinforcement of potentia. **Arrow c** represents those who "command obeying" (obediential power). **Arrow d** shows the fetishization of potestas (in which institutional power affirms itself as the sovereign origin of power, over and against potentia). **Arrow e** represents power exercised as domination or a weakening of potentia, in which those in power "rule by command." (Dussel, 2006:27).

a self-referential government (ibidem:40-47). Despite simple, this graphic shows us the most essential feature of sovereignty as the social relation that articulates the democratic interaction between the government and its demos.

A much more concrete-complex analysis would require deeper research in democracy¹²³. Although it goes beyond the scope of this chapter, we need to make some brief reflections on this issue. According to Tilly, observers of democracy and democratization generally choose, among four main types of definitions¹²⁴: constitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented (Tilly, 2007:7). However, thanks to the relational approach provided by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, *instead of a reified account of democracy, we may consider it a contentious process* (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:264-305).

Therefore, democracy is never a point of departure/arrival that determines the moment from which it operates according to its own definite, fixed and inevitable laws. *It is a process that entails moments of democratization and moments of de-democratization*. Thus, according to Tilly “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation. Democratization means net movement toward broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding consultation. De-democratization, obviously, then means net movement toward narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding consultation” (2007: 13-14).

In addition, with a clear Foucauldian influence Goikoetxea says that “freedom and equality have to be manufactured through mechanisms that subjugate, control and normalize the people so as to make them both *able* and *equally able*, for freedom starts from being *able to* (capacity) and democratic equality from being *as able as the most able*” (2017:64)

With that in mind, she provides us with a synthesis that overcomes both Tilly’s and Foucault’s own approaches. She defines *democratization* as follows:

“as a process that tends to include as *many people as possible* in the *governance of their political and socio-economic system* by empowering them through *public disciplinary and biopolitical techniques and institutions*, which subjugate but also capacitate them

¹²³ We see three different approaches to address the issue in (Blas 2012; Goikoetxea 2012, 2014; Zubiaga, 2009).

¹²⁴ Some classical authors of those approaches are: Andrews and Chapman 1995, Collier and Levitsky 1997, Held 1996, Inkeles 1991, O’Donnell 1999, Ortega Ortiz 2001, Schmitter and Karl 1991, Dahl 1998, Dahl 2005.

so that they can gain *as equal as possible* access to resources and opportunities in order to govern themselves.” (2017:14)

Furthermore, democracy will require both *public state structures (potestas)* and political relations based in *people’s sovereignty*. Thus, we cannot separate democratization/de-democratization processes from *state capacities and social mobilization* (Goikoetxea, 2015b:38; Zubiaga, 2009). On the one hand, no democracy can work if the state lacks the capacity to supervise democratic decision making and put its results into practice (Tilly, 2007:15). According to Tilly, ‘state capacity means the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions’ (Tilly, 2007:16). It would relate to what Goikoetxea calls the *material sovereignty* (2017:101). On the other hand, democratization also needs political mobilization and contention¹²⁵ in order to organize citizens and enable the integration of their demands in the governing process (Goikoetxea, 2015b:38; Zubiaga, 2009:179-252). Moreover, the result will be a *normalizing society*: a society based on disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms (Goikoetxea, 2013b:396).


With that in mind, in current European Union sovereignty is supposed to be “shared” among different political authorities. Thus, if we consider for instance the Basque Autonomous Community¹²⁶, its ideal process of ‘shared sovereignty’ in current European Union would run as follows:

¹²⁵ According to Tilly, democratization and de-democratization depend on some recurrent causal mechanisms that compound into a small number of necessary processes (2007:22). For a deep study of mechanisms and processes that led to democratization/de-democratization see also: (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001; Zubiaga, 2009).

¹²⁶ It is just an example. It would be the same for Catalonia or Scotland.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 18 The ideal process of Basque Sovereignty/ Democratization.



1. Empowered/mobilized 2. Democratic sovereignty becomes feasible thanks to state institutions 3. Biopolitical, regulatory and disciplining mechanisms 4. Empowered/normalized subject/object.

Source: elaborated by the author.

Nevertheless, what is at stake in current Europe? *As Goikoetxea stands out, because of the privatization of democracy the required public political capacities have been left in the hands of private authorities*¹²⁷ (2015b:35). On her view:

“Privatizing democracy refers thus to the process whereby all those mechanisms and strategies used to empower and capacitate the population end up privatized and empowering only the holders of capital.” (Goikoetxea, 2017:1)

“The transference of state capabilities, and therefore, public and political capacities (from decision-taking, law-making and implementation to evaluation, re-regulation, production and

¹²⁷ However, although we observe a trend towards the privatization of democracy we cannot assess it in absolute terms, because there have also been areas that have been democratized (Goikoetxea, 2015:35). The adoption of the basic income would be an example (idem).

distribution) into private hands, whether experts, lobbies, interest groups, executive actors or corporations, are all features of the *privatization of democracy*.” (Goikoetxea, 2017:16)

Furthermore, the growing matrix of scales and arenas such as the European Commission, the Council of the EU or the Frankfurt Group, has benefitted those actors and strategies that can flexibly act through them while sealing off popular forces from decision making processes (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:865-866). Thus, contentious and effective social mobilization has become more difficult because of those ‘scale-jumping’¹²⁸ strategies (Jessop, 2009:98).

It is in this context that demands for sovereignty arise as a political response that seeks the recovery of public authority and public decision capacity (H3). Consequently, we need to analyse which have been the changes that have induced the mentioned privatization of democracy. With that aim, according to our framework we are going begin by considering the changes in the liberal art of government towards a new ‘neoliberal governmentality’ (Foucault, 2008: 192).

3- Neoliberal governmentality

3.1 Governmentality defined

Neoliberalism, as it happens with fashionable concepts such as globalization or hegemony, is one of those buzzwords that has taken the form of an umbrella concept. It is at risk of meaning everything and nothing so we have to bear in mind its own a priori limitations. We cannot define it as mere colonization of the economy into the political or the demise of the national state.

In accordance with the foucauldian approach¹²⁹, we reject all views that fetishized those supposedly ‘universal’ elements such as the state, society, market or civil society by giving them an inherent essence, because they can only be explained as a result of concrete practices (ibidem: 17). All these practices are conditioned by relations of power and, following Foucault’s approach, we are going to use the term governmentality as an analytical grid for these very relations of power (ibidem:186).

¹²⁸ Scale jumping occurs ‘when actors seek to make policy, resolve conflicts, exercise power, and so forth, at the scale that is most favourable to their values, identities, and interests. The motivation for scale jumping is to take advantage of the structurally-inscribed scalar privileging of some forces, some spatial horizons of action, strategies, policies, etc., over others’ (Jessop, 2009:98)

¹²⁹ And in accordance with the strategic relational approach.

Broadly known as the “way in which one conducts the conduct of people¹³⁰” (idem) he defines it exactly as follows:

“By this word “governmentality” I mean three things. First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security¹³¹ as its essential technical instrument. Second, by “governmentality” I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so on – of the type of power that we can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (*appareils*) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (*savoirs*). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalized.” (Foucault, 2009:144).

Governmentality is at the same time both external and internal to the state because they are precisely the general tactics of governmentality what define what is and what is not under the domain of the state (ibidem:145). As Rose points out ‘It is within the field of governmentality that one sees the continual attempts to define and redefine which aspects of government are within the competence of the state and which are not, what is and what is not political, what is public and what is private and so forth’ (Rose, 1999: 18). They are created and defined ‘inside the governmentality field through historical series of conflicts, continuities and new constructions that combine ideologies with practices and technical knowledge’ (Cotoi, 2011:111). Thanks to this approach we do not limit our analysis of neoliberalism to statements about the “retreat of the state” or the “domination of the

¹³⁰ The conduct of “men” in the original.

¹³¹ According to Foucault “the apparatus of security inserts the phenomenon in question, namely theft, within a series of probable events. Second, the reactions of power to this phenomenon are inserted in a calculation of cost. Finally, third, instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded.” (Foucault, 2009: 20-21). In the quoted paragraph Foucault uses the example of a theft in order to compare legal, disciplinary and security apparatuses.

market”, but to define the apparent “end of politics” as a political program (Lemke, 2007:45).

3.2 From the liberal art of government to the neoliberal governmentality

During the period that goes from the 1930 to the 1970¹³², Foucault saw a transition from the liberal art of government (governmentality) towards a new neoliberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008:28). Previously during the XVIIIth century, the classical “liberal governmentality” based upon the reason of “the economists” had replaced the preceding *raison d’Etat* as developed by “the politiques”¹³³ (Foucault, 2009: 448). Whereas the “governmentality of the politiques” was highly interventionist, the new rationality was based on the reason of the “least state” or the “frugal government” (Foucault, 2008:28). According to Joseph, “It is distinguished from other forms of power by its emphasis on free conduct, self-awareness and self-limitation” (2014:6). Government came to be understood as respecting the freedom of social and economic processes through the deliberate self-limiting of government (idem). That *laissez-faire* governance, was legitimated through the liberal concern that one must not “govern too much” (idem).

Classical liberalism focused on exchange and considered the market a space of autonomy that had to be carved out of the state through the unconditional right of private property (Read, 2009:27). However, neoliberalism intensifies the liberal dynamic by opposing one of its main tenets¹³⁴. As Cotoi says following Foucault, “the problem does not consist anymore in the absolute autonomy of the economy but in deciding how the political and social powers will articulate themselves in order to form the market economy” (Cotoi,2011:113). The essence of the market economy is not anymore the exchange but *competition* (Foucault, 2008: 118). For neoliberals, “it is the problem of competition and monopoly, much more than that of value and equivalence, that forms the essential armature of the theory of the market” (ibidem:119).

The classical liberal art of government assumed that the state must refrain from altering free and full competition and its political consequence was the *laissez-faire*

¹³² Keynesian interventionist policies would be according to Foucault a symptom of the crisis of liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008:69)

¹³³ According to Foucault “the police” was the axe of the governmentality of the “politiques” as developed during the XVIIth and the first half of the XVIIIth century (Foucault, 2009:407-443). That regime was highly interventionist, its aim was to regularize the whole social space and its main tool was the discipline (Foucault, 2009:443). Using Foucault’s words “Making the town into a sort of quasi-convent and the realm into a sort of quasi-town is the kind of great disciplinary dream behind police.” (Foucault, 2009:443).

¹³⁴ The *Laissez-faire*.

(idem). For neoliberals however, the laissez-faire was just a “naïve naturalism” because on their view, competence is not a given of nature but the effect of artificially constructed conditions (ibidem:120). That is why the relation between an economy of competition and a state can no longer be one of the reciprocal delimitation of different domains (ibidem:121). ***“There will not be the market game, which must be left free, and then the domain in which the state begins to intervene, since the market, or rather pure competition, which is the essence of the market, can only appear if it is produced, and if it is produced by an active governmentality” (idem). Therefore, competition emerges as the result of continuous effort, of a relentless activity of governmentality (Cotoi, 2011:113).***

For Foucault, it is not a question of freeing an empty space, but of taking the formal principles of a market economy and projecting them onto a general art of government (Foucault, 2008: 131). ***Competition necessitates a constant intervention on the part of the state, no on the market, but on the conditions of possibility of the market (Read, 2009:28). That is why the essence of neoliberal governance is not intervening on the market but on the social tissue, so that the concurrenial mechanism can expand and multiply at all levels and in all regions of the social body (Cotoi, 2011:114). The aim is not so much a society subject to the commodity effect but a society subject to a dynamic of competition, not a supermarket society but an enterprise society (Foucault, 2008:147).***

What is at stake is the generalization and multiplication of forms of “enterprise” from within the social body (ibidem:148). Therefore, we observe a return to the *homo economicus* but not as the ‘partner of exchange’ as in the classical sense, but as an ‘entrepreneur of herself/himself’¹³⁵ (ibidem:266). This new *homo economicus* opposes to the *homo juridicus*. Whereas the *homo juridicus* says to the sovereign “I have rights, I have entrusted some of them to you, the others you must not touch, or: I have entrusted you with my rights for a particular end” (ibidem: 282) the *homo economicus* says “You must not. But why must he not? You must not because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that you are powerless. And why are you powerless, why can’t you? You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know” (idem). Political economy is telling to the sovereign “you cannot know the totality of the economic process so there is not sovereign in economics” (idem). That is one of the most important aspects of the governmental reason, the lack of an economic sovereign (idem).

The rise of civil society as a field of reference is closely linked to that rationality. It is a technology of government that responds to the next enquiry: “the art of

¹³⁵ Himself in the original.

government must be exercised in a space of sovereignty- and it is the law of the state which says this- but the trouble, misfortune, or problem is that this space turns out to be inhabited by economic subjects.” (ibidem:294). In order to govern a space of sovereignty inhabited by economic subjects according to the rules of right, we need that field called “civil society” (ibidem: 296). As Foucault points out, “an omnipresent government, a government which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right, and a government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a government that manages civil society” (idem).

We observe a change from the laissez faire to an active governmentality that needs to spread competition over society. We have seen how in such a task those supposedly universal elements such as civil society or the homo economicus have re-emerged. These very concepts, as others like madness or sexuality, are transactional realities¹³⁶ (ibidem:297). They are transactional because they have not always existed but they are nonetheless real and they offer us a new rationality from which to understand our world.

3.3 Neoliberal governmentality as a new rationality

According to Wendy Brown, we conceive neoliberalism as an order of normative reason that, when it becomes ascendant, takes shape as a governing rationality extending specific formulation of economic values, practices and metric to every dimension of human life (Brown, 2015:30). Thus, over all, neoliberal governmentality offers a new rationality by articulating a new “political knowledge” (Lemke, 2002:59). When we talk about a political rationality we are not dealing with a pure, neutral knowledge which simply “represents” the governed reality (idem). According to Lemke, “it is not an exterior instance, but an element of government itself which helps to create a discursive field in which exercising power is “rational” (idem). It functions as a “politics of truth”, producing new forms of knowledge, inventing new notions and concepts that contribute to the “government” of new domains of regulation and intervention (idem).

For instance, within different organizations, such as the IMF, the EU or most of western states, we see how similar discourses emphasize the free market, good governance, responsible action or accountability (Joseph, 2014:12). Across different areas, from poverty reduction to state-building to EU projects, we see very similar ideas like “devolved power”, “local ownership”, “partnership”, “stakeholding”, “network forms of governance” or “active citizenship” (idem).

¹³⁶ Realites de transaction in French.

Despite being applied in different contexts, they are very similar because they are shaped by the same dominant rationality (idem).

That rationality, establishes a cultural form of governance based on ethical orientations, self-responsibility and the moral obligations invoked by notions of freedom and the exercising of agency (Dean, 2007:73). It calls upon governing through freedom and ruling at a distance rejecting the direct command and control of sovereign authorities (Marandet, 2012). Ruling at a distance implies the need of new technologies of power and it is that way that we understand the rise of trendy catchwords such as governance, New Public Management¹³⁷, the promotion of active citizenship, NGO-s and non-state actors and the involvement of civil society for the sake of efficient and democratic governance (Kohler-Koch, 2007:255). Stecher is clear in that regard:

“El neoliberalismo no implica una desaparición del Estado ni de “lo social”, sino una reorganización de su gobierno a través de “la proliferación organizada de diferencias individuales en una matriz económica (...) de la multiplicación de las libertades de elección”, de fuertes procesos de descentralización, desjerarquización y conectividad en nuevas escalas globales, y de nuevas formas de regulación (ranking, auditorias, estándares, cumplimiento de metas, exigencias de calidad y transparencia, etc.) orientadas por lógicas mercantiles y de competencia”. (2015:1785)

We have to bear in mind the complex interaction between rationalities, programs and technologies because the envisioned aims of a program and its actual effects does not refer to the purity of the program and the impurity of reality, but to different realities and heterogeneous strategies (Lemke, 2002:60). According to Lemke, “Foucault sees rationalities as part of a reality that is characterized by the permanent “failure” of programs” (idem). We see an example in *Discipline and Punish: The prison system was a technology produced by a new punitive rationality*¹³⁸. Although in principle its aim was reducing crimes, it produced the opposite: a delinquent milieu (1995:281). That being the case, can we talk about the failure of a program? According to Foucault, “The prison, apparently ‘failing’, does not miss its target;

¹³⁷ It is the result of applying business management techniques on public administration and entails, inter alia, the need of auditing administration’s performance in fields as different as research groups, prisons, public schools or hospitals (Estévez, 2008:39).

¹³⁸ Imprisonment is not, *per se*, more rational than previous punitive practices such as tortures, torments or the use of scaffolds but a technology of power that responds to a new punitive rationality.

on the contrary, it reaches it, in so far as it gives rise to one particular form of illegality in the midst of others” (ibidem: 276).

Fights and struggles against programs, rather than distorting the original program are already part of the programs themselves actively contributing to fissures and incoherencies inside them (Lemke, 2002:60). Those breaks or gaps between programs and technologies more than being signs of their failure, may be their very condition of existence (ibidem:61).

In accordance with these ideas, we think that neoliberalism might work not instead of a democratic deficit and a decline of liberal democracy; on the contrary, however much the empowerment of civil society and new democratic governance is claimed, the loss of sovereignty and the privatization of democracy can be its raison d’etre.

3.4 Governmentality, hegemony and historical bloc: which place for the state?

From our point of view, the Foucauldian view on governmentality gives us a good tool in order to understand what lies behind most of the changes of the last decades. It tells us which is their rationality or regime of truth and how they work. Moreover, its strength lies in its attention to fine detail, its focus on the micro level (Joseph, 2014:7). In that regard, it is especially useful for the study of governance, specially the governance of minds and bodies (Jessop, 2015b: 166).

However, as Joseph points out, “a theory of hegemony is better at providing an account of things like the wider institutional context, the role of class forces, how particular interests are represented, how projects are constructed and how deeper structural issues are responded to” (2014:9). Whereas governmentality explains what this rationality is and how it works hegemony explains why and how this rationality is dominant (Ibidem:12). It would be necessary thus, to take into account what kind of historical bloc¹³⁹ (Portelli, 1977) intersects with the success of certain governmental practices over others.

Some scholars like the Anglofoucauldians led by Rose and Miller (Musseta, 2009:50) see in governmentality a way of reducing the importance of the state. We still think, however, that grounding the state in a network of governmental practices does not mean that the state is a secondary category that could be dispensed with (Lemke, 2007: 53). On the contrary, it occupies a strategic position because it is a

¹³⁹ Very broadly defined as the mutually supportive relation among the economic base, juridico-political organizations, and the moral and intellectual field.

key codifier of most of the micro practices encouraged by neoliberal governmentality. According to Joseph:

“Domestically we saw in places like the US and UK new forms of state strategy and regulation based on rolling back state provision and promoting the free market while encouraging more individualistic forms of social responsibility. The governmentality approach shows how these became institutionalised through various practices of governance. Rather than being marginalized, the state acts as the main site for the codification of power relations through new governmental projects and modes of calculation. In a two way dialogue, the state shapes new forms of governmentality and governmentality re-shapes the state.” (2014:12)

Foucault himself tell us that in a certain way, all forms of power relation must refer to the state not because they are derived from it but because power relations have become more and more under state control (Foucault, 2000:345). We think that neoliberal governmentality is pushed by states, pushed on states and pushed through states (Joseph, 2014:12). Therefore we need to clarify what kind of state we are talking about. As mentioned above, taking into account the historical bloc (Portelli, 1977) that intersects with the rise of neoliberal governmentality would be helpful in that sense. From our point of view, the current dominant polity in Western countries that reflects the articulation of a different historical bloc from the 1970's onwards is the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime (SWPR) (H1) so we will define its main features in the next section.

4- Excursus on capitalism and the state:

4.1 The articulation of economic and extraeconomic institutions

Crises of governmentality are not just the simple projection of crises of capitalism in the political sphere but nonetheless they are not completely independent of them (Foucault, 2008:70). We have explained the main features of neoliberal governmentality and mentioned that it would also be necessary to take into account a view that considers hegemony and the articulation of historical blocs in order to provide “an account of things like the wider institutional context, the role of class forces, how particular interests are represented, how projects are constructed and how deeper structural issues are responded to” (Joseph, 2014:9). With that aim, despite rejecting a deterministic relation between the economic base and its

supposed superstructure, we must take into account some basic features of capitalism and the capitalist type of state.

Contrary to neoclassical assumptions, there is not a clearly delimited, socially disembedded sphere of economic relations that tends towards equilibrium (Jessop, Sum, 2006: 5). Moreover, *the capital relation has a political character insofar as it involves an articulation of the economic and the-extra economic* (Jessop, 2006:151). What is more, despite the fundamental contradictions and conflicts generated by the very dynamic of capitalism (Marx, 2009), its endurance is enabled by a changing combination of economic and extraeconomic institutions and practices that help to secure, if only temporarily and always in specific economic spaces a certain stability and predictability in accumulation (Jessop, Sum, 2006: 5). Once we have introduced some clarifications, we must bear in mind three basic ideas (Jessop, 2008c: 13):

- Neither capitalism nor the capital-labour relation can be exclusively reproduced through market relations.
- Labour power is a fictitious commodity so it cannot be reproduced solely through the wage form and the labour market.
- As capital accumulation expands increasingly in a more global scale, its dynamic becomes more ecologically dominant in shaping the evolution of social systems and the lifeworld.

Following these points, we conclude that capitalism cannot secure the conditions for its reproduction solely through market forces so it cannot exercise any kind of economic determination in last instance over the rest of the social formation (ibidem:14). *Moreover, one cannot adequately determine the elementary categories of the capitalist mode of production (commodity, money, exchange, wage, capital) without including the distinctive forms of modern politics and the capitalist type of the state* (Jessop, 2006:151).

If we are to understand *the political character of the capital relation as an articulation of the economic and the extra-economic* and if we have said that market forces alone cannot reproduce capitalism we must explain briefly its reasons.

- One of the main features of the capitalist mode of production is *the generalization of the commodity form* and the inclusion under this category of elements such as the labour-power, land (nature), money and knowledge. However much we claim their commodity form, they are just *fictitious commodities* (Polanyi, 1944:124-138) that are not created by markets. This explains why capital is inherently incapable to reproduce itself wholly

through the value form in a self-expanding logic of commodification (Jessop, 2006:151). Therefore, its reproduction depends in an unstable and contradictory way, on changing extra-economic conditions (Jessop, 2008c:22). Among many extra-economic requirements provided by the capitalist type of state we may mention, for instance, the need for a formally rational monetary system, a formally rational legal system, the reproduction of the labour power as a fictitious commodity or the need to address the wider political and social repercussions of capitalist contradictions (Jessop, 2008c: 51-52).

- These problems are reinforced *by the structural contradictions¹⁴⁰ and strategic dilemmas¹⁴¹ inherent in the capital relation* and their changing articulation and forms of appearance (Jessop, 2006:151). Much of them are expressions of the basic contradiction between the exchange and use value in the commodity form (Jessop, 2008c: 23).
- *Conflicts occur over the regularization and/or governance of these contradictions and dilemmas* through a variable mix of temporal fixes, spatial fixes, spatio-temporal fixes, and institutionalized compromises that help to stabilize, the circuit of capital and wider social formation (Jessop, 2006:151). There would be *different modes of regulation and patterns of governance* and which one is going to dominate will depend on the specific social and spatio-temporal matrixes in which they attempt to occur (Jessop, 2008c:25). Thus specific accumulation regimes and their modes of regulation are typically constructed within specific social spaces and spatio-temporal fixes (ibidem:26).

These three factors imply that there is no single best solution to the regularization of capital accumulation so every accumulation regime and mode of regulation will have their own distinctive forms of appearance of the mentioned basic contradictions and dilemmas (idem). Following Jessop's strategic relational approach, the so-called Keynesian Welfare National State was just one set of

¹⁴⁰ According to Jessop "they tend to arise at least under three different types of condition: first, when the overall logic of an institutional ensemble generates opposed developmental tendencies(for example, the growing socialization of productive forces versus continuing private control over the relations of production and surplus appropriation); second, when there is a conflict or tension between the requirements of system reproduction and the logic of individual action (for example, capital in general versus particular capitals); third, when a social relation is so constituted that it tends to produce socially structured conflicts between inherently antagonistic interests (for example capital versus labour)." (2008c:63)

¹⁴¹ In Jessop's view, "a strategic dilemma exists when agents face choices such that, within given parameters and horizons of action, any action that they pursue (including inaction) will undermine some key condition(s) of their existence and/or their capacities to realize a broader set of interests." (2008c:33)

mechanisms among several through which the always problematic delivery of capitalist economic and social reproductions comes to be organized (Jessop, 2008c:25). Since the 1970 onwards, there has been a process in which the dominant elements of the Atlantic Fordism and the Keynesian Welfare National State are changing in favour of the Knowledge-based economy and the Schumpeterian Workfare Competition Regime. We need to address the main features of each regime in order to contextualize the depth of the changes of the last decades and its implications for sovereignty and democracy.

4.2 From the Keynesian Welfare National State to the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime

Following Jessop's approach, we are going to differentiate both kinds of states comparing four features that are highlighted by each term (Keynesian Welfare National State vs. Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime): the distinctive set of economic policies, the social policies, their primary scale and the primary means to compensate market failure (2008c: 71).

According to Jessop, Atlantic Fordism can be defined as an "accumulation regime based on a virtuous autocentric circle of mass production and mass consumption secured through a distinctive mode of regulation that was discursively, institutionally and practically materialized in the Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS)." (2008c:67).

- It was *Keynesian* to the extent that its goal was to guarantee full employment in a relatively closed national economy and to do so primarily through a demand-sided management (Jessop, 2008c:72).
- When it came to the reproduction of labour-power as a fictitious commodity and helping to guarantee the overall social reproduction it was oriented to *welfare* (idem). It tried to regulate collective bargaining within limits consistent with full-employment levels of growth (idem). Moreover, it was related to an expansive definition and to a progressive institutionalization of social and economic rights directly or indirectly attached to citizenship of a national territorial state (ibidem:72-73).
- It was *national* insofar as it was this the primary scale responsible for developing and guiding welfare Keynesian policies on the rest of scales (ibidem:73).
- Finally, it was *statist* insofar as state institutions were the chief complement to the market forces in the Fordist accumulation regime and also had a dominant role in the institutions of civil society (idem)

During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s the KWNS underwent a crisis in the context of the third organic crisis of capitalism (Soltý, 2013: 70-71). It was due to many different economic, political and sociocultural causes but apart from the “objective elements” its discursive mediation was also of paramount relevance (Hay, 1996).

The crisis of Fordism and the KWNS and its particular interpretation opened the door to a new accumulation regime and a new mode of regulation, loosely defined as post-fordism, and a new kind of state which has been called the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime (SWPR) (Jessop, 2008c: 117-170). According to Jessop, “it is a state that aims to secure economic growth within its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders, even where they operate abroad, by promoting the economic and extra-economic conditions that are currently deemed vital for success in competition with economic actor and spaces located in other states” (ibidem:118). We see its main features in the next table:

- It is *Schumpeterian* because it promotes permanent innovation and flexibility in relatively open economies, intervening in favour of the supply and strengthening the structural competitiveness of the corresponding economic spaces (Jessop, 2008c:307). Its primary organizing concept is the knowledge-based economy (idem)
- When it comes to the problematic reproduction of labour-power as a fictitious commodity it can be described as a *workfare regime* because it subordinates social policy to the demands of economic policy (ibidem:308). *The workfare regime* is also associated with downward pressures on public spending and measures of cost containment (ibidem:308).
- It is *postnational* to the extent that the national scale has not a primary role in economic management and in the provision of social policy (ibidem:309). There are new scales and horizons of action that have increased significance which make the national economy less susceptible to effective macroeconomic management and the national territory less important as a power container (idem)
- Finally due to the increased importance of non-state mechanisms in compensating for market failures and inadequacies in the delivery of state-sponsored economic and social policies it has become more *regime-like* relative to the statism of the KWNS (ibidem:311).

4.3 Trends and counter-trends

These changes in statehood reflect some important general trends and counter-trends that interact dialectically as we can infer from the following box:

TAULA 3 Trends and Counter-Trends

TRENDS

- De-nationalization of the state (hollowing out of the state).
- De-statization of politics (from government to governance)
- Internationalization of policy regimes (foreign sources of domestic policy)

COUNTER-TRENDS

- Increased scope for states in interscalar articulation.
- Increased scope for states in metagovernance.
- States contest the forms and implementations of international regimes

Source: Based on Jessop, 2008a: 210.

The de-nationalization of the state (better said of statehood) is related to its post-national character (H1). State powers are transferred, upwards, downwards and sideways so, previous ‘national’ state capacities are reallocated at a supranational, regional or local level (Keating, 2013, 2014). It is precisely there where we can understand the emergence of new political entities that produce/reproduce as democracies old nations such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, Scotland or Quebec (McEwen, 2006; Nootens and Lecours, 2009; Goikoetxea, 2012,2013, 2014, 2015, 2015b, 2017; Azkune, 2016; Azkune and Zubiaga 2018). However, the increased scope of states for interscalar articulation led, for instance, to attempts to re-centralize or to re-take the control of devolved areas by central states (Requejo and Nagel, 2009; Maiz, Camaño, Azpitarte, 2010; Calvo, 2014) provoking new conflictive fields.

When it comes to the *de-statization of politics* it is linked with the shift *from government to governance*. Such a turn, goes hand in hand with the logic of neoliberal governmentality that seeks a lean state (Jessop, 2015b:178). Nonetheless, governance tends to fail so it always needs the participation of the state in metagovernance (the governance of governance conducted by states) in order to deal with governance failure. So states play a key role through its powers (especially through executive action) to influence and correct the governance process (ibidem:175-176). This emerging role on networking, negotiation, noise reduction and coordination occur ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ (ibidem:176) Thus, combining Foucauldian and Gramscian perspectives the current ‘state in its inclusive sense’ can be defined according to Jessop as ‘government + governance in the shadow of

hierarchy' (idem). In the case of the European Union, which is also a Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime, there has been an increasing movement towards metagovernance especially through the work of the European Council, the specialized Councils and the European Commission (Jessop, 2008a:221). Moreover, as we will see later, since the beginning of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis their importance has expanded continually.

Finally, the *internationalization of policy regimes* is also a contradictory process because of the *growing importance of national states* in struggles to shape the development of international policy regimes and the manner in which they operate in the interests of their respective national capitals and electorates (Jessop, 2008c). The power of the national state in the face of internationalization depends on the cohesion of the political establishment or power bloc (ibidem: 250-251).

5- The trend towards authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy:

5.2 The beginning of 'authoritarian statism'

Poulantzas stated in the 1970s that western capitalist societies were undergoing deep changes in statehood and were adopting a new form that he called "authoritarian statism" (1979:247). He described it as the "intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined with radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called 'formal' liberties" (ibidem: 247-248).

For the Greek-French political sociologist, some of the illiberal features of the military dictatorship were typical of the current state of capitalism rather than deviations from contemporary democratic norms (Jessop, 1985: 98), so however exceptional some of its features were, they were deemed to become the new normal democratic state's characteristics (Poulantzas, 1979:254). In his view it was the state form that evolved in a context in which the intensification of the political crises and the crisis of the state were articulated with the economic crisis (ibidem:251). It was at the same time the consequence and the response to the intensification of those crisis elements (idem).

Among the characteristics of this new form we highlight the decline of the parliament, the reinforcement of the executive or the fusion between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (ibidem:265-284). The changing role of the political parties is directly linked to these ideas. They become little more than transmission belts for official decisions and lose their capability for

*proposing alternative state projects and hegemonic visions*¹⁴² (Poulantzas, 1979: 281). He also coped with the overturning of the 'traditional limits' of public and private relations in favour of either violent repression or new forms of social control (Martin, 2008:20). Briefly engaging with Foucault's work on surveillance, Poulantzas suggested the diffusion of a new 'micro-physics' of power directed at shaping the 'social body' (Martin, 2008:20).

We are not going to extend too much on his account because there are more contemporary authors that have developed deeper these very ideas (see for instance¹⁴³: Kaczynski, 2014; Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014; Bruff, 2014). However, we want to highlight the visionary thinking of Poulantzas because he was able to foresee most of the trends in western liberal democracies already in the 1970's. The reflections on 'authoritarian statism' are part of what Jessop once called "The originality, actuality and legacy of Nicos Poulantzas" (Jessop, 1991: 75-108)

5.3 New articulation of authority territory and rights: neoliberal governmentality and the consolidation of the SWPR

5.3.1 Redistribution of powers inside the state: the strengthening of the executive and fast policy making

In a similar fashion, Sassen notices a redistribution of powers inside the state as a consequence of the role it has played in the creation of a global economy (2010:236). Despite paying special attention to the United States¹⁴⁴, she observes the same trends in most of the current western democracies: *a displacement of powers towards the executive, a weakening of the legislative and a decline of the judiciary. Mention also needs to be made of the relative dominance of certain ministries or departments such as the Ministries of economy and justice or the departments and agencies of security* (Sassen, 2012:280; Jessop, 2015b:68-69; Goikoetxea, 2017:7).

Sassen notes how the trend towards the strengthening of the executive at the expense of the legislative began specially in the United States in the era of Ronald Reagan¹⁴⁵ in which executive and presidential powers were reinforced at the

¹⁴² The key elements of the substantive dimension of the state.

¹⁴³ Apart from the already broadly quoted work of Jessop.

¹⁴⁴ She also has as a referential inflection point the decades of 1970s and beginnings of the 1980s (Sassen, 2010:218-232), a period in which we have established the beginning of "globalization" and the transition from the Keynesian Welfare National State towards the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime.

¹⁴⁵ The tipping point that we have linked with the rise of neoliberal governmentality, the crisis of "fordism" and the Keynesian welfare national state and the emergence of the trend towards "post-fordism" and the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime.

expense of the Congress¹⁴⁶ (2010:236). Whereas in a similar process during the “New Deal” the Congress was the main actor, the diffusion of deregulatory policies has led during the last decades to a displacement of power that has weakened the legislative (ibidem:237). *In her view, every time an economic sector is privatised the executive gains power and the legislative sphere loses power (Sassen, 2012: 47). According to Sassen “it loses power because it loses its functions of supervising the economy and formulating norms to regulate it” (idem). We can clearly observe the rationality of neoliberal governmentality as explained above¹⁴⁷. Moreover, the power of the legislative is also displaced, for example, toward specialized “regulatory” commissions (ibidem:238). These commissions are usually formed by “experts” and are supposed to commit to fast policy making in order to respond to the pressures of the market (2008a:193).*

Those changes are related to the growing complexity of the political economy of time as states face temporal pressures in their policy-making and implementation due to new forms of time-space distantiation, compression, and differentiation (Jessop, 2008a:193.). It is in this context dominated by “*fast policy making*” that Scheuerman sets what he has called the “*economic states of emergency*” (2000). His point is closed to that of Sassen. In his view, economic states of emergency are characterized by the executive dominance and constant legal change and dynamism (Scheuerman 2002; 2004). It involves an enhanced power for the executive (which takes fast decisions), a decline in the power of the judiciary (which looks to past precedent) and the legislature (which legislates to the future) (idem).

According to Jessop, fast policy making “privileges those who can operate within compressed time scales, narrows the range of participants in the policy process, and limits the scope for deliberation, consultation and negotiation” (2008a:194). From the view of administrative law, Aman says that *privatizations and fast policy can affect basic public law values* such as transparency, fairness and participation so he claims the need of making markets more accountable through administrative law (2000: 1506). From a similar point of view, Wilson says that *fast-policy privileges efficiency criteria and productivity at the expense of effectiveness and thereby reinforces instrumental rationality and exchange-value over deliberation and use-value* (1999:175).

¹⁴⁶ In her view this is even more remarkable nowadays, not only in the United States but also worldwide (Sassen, 2010: 232).

¹⁴⁷ The *homo economicus* says to the sovereign “You must not. But why must he not? You must not because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that you are powerless. And why are you powerless, why can’t you? You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know” (Foucault, 2008:283).

Indeed, fast-policy is antagonistic to the routines and cycles of democratic politics and apart from privileging the executive over the legislature and the judiciary, it also privileges finance over industrial capital and consumption over long-term investment (Jessop, 2008a:194). It undermines in general the power of decision-makers who have long-decision taking cycles and it tends to destroy institutional memory on the grounds that new circumstances require new approaches, and to block efforts to anticipate future difficulties and policy failures (idem). In such a context as Jessop points out “the present is extended at the expense of both past and future and politics is lived in the mediatized world of spin and presentation, the quick fix, rapid churning of policies, and plebiscitarian democracy” (ibidem:195).

The key of the problem is clearly summarized by Aman: “as certain issues move from the hearing room to the boardroom, public participation diminished, but not the need for public participation; transparency and accountability to the public (beyond the shareholder) are similarly diminished – but not the need for transparency and accountability” (2003:155).

Among the measures to deal with these problems, the ‘*Tobin Tax*’ is one of the most known proposals with the objective of limiting financial capital’s speed and hypermobility. Although in 2012 some EU Member States accorded to adopt a similar tax, it has not been implemented yet.

All in all, these trends tend to consolidate structurally what authors such as Chantal Mouffe or Slavoj Žižek have called “*post-politics*” (Mouffe, 2010: 75-78; Žižek, 2010:33-36) which supposes the end of ideological differences and the need to let experts deal with problems through “professional deliberation”. The strengthening of the “expert”,¹⁴⁸ (defined as “apolitical” by the liberal thought) is directly related to the reconfiguration of the public private divide that we are going to address in the next epigraph.

5.3.1.1 What about the European Union?

As considered in our second hypothesis (H2), for strategic and structural reasons, the above-mentioned changes are even stronger in the European Union. The European Commission¹⁴⁹ as an executive body has expanded its powers. Moreover, it is the principal site for the fusion of executive, legislative and some judicial

¹⁴⁸ Usually white, heterosexual, upper-middle class man.

¹⁴⁹ It is difficult to anticipate its institutional evolution but the tendency seems to be towards the concentration of powers in executive instances. In that regard, Jean-Claude Juncker has proposed the fusion of the executives of the European Commission and the Council. For further information: https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/02/14/actualidad/1518604493_407270.html (Last access: 14/02/2018)

powers (Jessop, 2015b:231). The executives of member states are represented in the legislative branch of the Union through the Council of Ministers and the European Council (idem). Notwithstanding, the European Parliament remains insignificant and whereas party blocks are weak, the role of informal networks and working groups (especially producer groups) gets stronger (idem). Not to mention the role of the European Central Bank as an independent central bank more representative of neoclassical economists assumptions than of wider social and political interests (Gill, 1998:16).

Thus, as considered by Goikoetxea when dealing with the so-called ‘European Union’s democratic deficit’: “The European Union is not just an international organization (for some) or a federal multinational polity (for others), it is also a political-institutional dispositive of global capitalism and therefore, of the privatization of democracy” (2017:28)

5.3.2 Reconfiguration of the public private divide

We know that the public private division is part of the governmental reason itself so we reject any reified account of dichotomies such as public/private or state and society¹⁵⁰. Moreover, we may say thanks to Mitchell that “the essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line difference (Mitchell, 1991:95). It is in this sense that we can understand some processes that have changed what some liberals have called the private “apolitical” sphere and the public and political sphere of institutions (Walzer, 1985).

Since the 1970s onwards there have been some changes in that division in which forms of authority previously exclusive to the public domain are now shifting to or being constituted in the private sphere of markets with the corresponding normative recoding (Sassen, 2010: 254). Sassen, relates three trends¹⁵¹ which give form to that processes (ibidem:255):

- An expansion of the private domain that gains power through the absorption of particular public authorities and the creation of new type of private authorities.

¹⁵⁰ The public/private division hides for instance the political character of power relations in the case of the household and the family (Pateman, 1996)

¹⁵¹ We would rather talk about trends rather than complete transformations because they reflect the interaction between the past strategic selectivity of the state and the strategies adopted for its transformation (Jessop, 1990:260).

- The formation of new public-private arrangements (through the privatization and marketization of public functions) that blur the supposed division between private and public spheres.
- The change in the character of the private interests that insert themselves in public policymaking and thereby shape possibly critical components of the domain of the public.

In order to assort some of those general changes, we are going to consider concretely three important dynamics: the shift *from government to governance*, the emergence of *commercial arbitration* and the rise of *credit rating agencies*.

5.3.2.1 From government to governance

The shift from government to governance is one of the main reasons to consider the Schumpeterian Workfare Regime, more *regime-like* relative to the statism of the Keynesian Welfare National State (Jessop, 2008c:311). According to Jessop, “whereas statehood presupposes a state apparatus, a territory and a population, the notion of governance lacks this core juridico-political or otherwise relatively fixed institutional reference point” (2015b:166). Statehood is related in first instance with the polity whereas governance is closer to politics and policy (idem).

Governance refers in broad terms to “mechanisms and strategies of coordination in the face of complex reciprocal interdependence among operationally autonomous actors, organizations, and functional systems” (idem). In the process that goes from government to governance, some of particular technical-economic, narrowly political and ideological functions previously performed by states have been transferred entirely (or shared with) to other actors (parastatal, non-governmental, private or commercial), institutional arrangements or regimes (Jessop, 2008c:245).

It began to spread in the 1970’s with the aim of dealing with ‘state overload’¹⁵² and, at least rhetorically, it was supposed to encourage the participation of the civil society in a decentralized decision making processes (Estévez, 2008:44). ***Reminding our second hypothesis again (H2), for strategic and structural reasons these general trends are stronger in the European Union. Consequently, as a consequence of its difficulties in state building and the changes in European economy, the EU has been one of the strongest promoters of governance, and specifically, of multilevel governance (Jessop, 2008c:246).***

5.3.2.1.1 The European Union: what place for democratic governance?

Although governance has spread through all scales (and functional domains), not only nation states but also regions, cities or at a transnational level, it is in the EU

¹⁵² In the above mentioned context of the crisis of the Keynesian Welfare National State.

where we are going to pose our attention. Why? *Although the shift to governance encourages the privatization of democracy in every scale, we think that it has been more pronounced in the EU (H2). Thus, whereas national associations and policy-makers face public scrutiny, this is only marginally present at EU level (Kohler-Koch, 2010:112). Furthermore, national associations need a formalized authorization and accountability which reach down to the grassroots level (idem). Finally, decision-makers are exposed to mechanisms of political accountability which do not operate in the case of the European Commission (idem). That is why the trend towards the privatization of democracy through governance practices has been more pronounced in the EU (H2).* Thus, we will try to explain its dynamic further.

The participation of civil society in a decentralized decision making processes, reflexive collaboration or self-organizing networks is at the core of the ‘governance rhetoric’¹⁵³ (Estévez, 2009:44). These ideas are clearly reflected in the White Paper on European Governance of the European Commission:

“...This means that the linear model of dispensing policies from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels.” (European Commission, 2001:8)


“Civil society increasingly sees Europe as offering a good platform to change policy orientations and society. This offers a real potential to broaden the debate on Europe’s role. It is a chance to get citizens more actively involved in achieving the Union’s objectives and to offer them a structured channel for feedback, criticism and protest. This already happens in fields such as trade and development, and has recently been proposed for fisheries.” (ibidem:12)

Democratic representation needs government power which in the case of EU is held by three different institutions: the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. *Whereas the European Parliament and the Council embody the principle of democratic representation, the Commission has neither a constituency nor any other mechanism to link to the citizens of the EU (Kohler-Koch, 2010:108). In order to deal with its representational deficiencies the Commission has tried to engage with civil society through governance. We see again, the strategic selectivity of European institutions and the facilitation of the privatization of democracy through its structures (H2).*

¹⁵³ It is a rhetoric that dovetails with the neoliberal governmentality.

We are going to use the schema provided by Kohler-Koch to explain the articulation between civil society organizations (CSO) and democracy through governance:

IRUDIA 19 Governance and its democratic deficit



Source: (Kohler-Koch, 2010:109)

Following this parsimonious model, CSOs are supposed to receive through different sources citizens' preferences which are channelled into the decision-making process by interacting with the Commission (ibidem:109). European Commission is supposed to consider and take up their suggestions in the formulation of policy proposals and decisions (idem). In this sense, we see first-order responsiveness between CSOs and their grassroots constituency and second-order responsiveness between CSOs and the Commission. As we see in the figure, formal accountability relations do not link the Commission to civil society so it is only subject to horizontal accountability enacted by other EU institutions (idem).

Moreover, *due to its economic origin and the hegemony of the neoliberal agenda, the structurally inscribed strategic selectivity of the European Union facilitates, above all, the participation of business groups associations*. As Wissel and Wolff stand, its weak institutions, lack of a stable civil society and the dominance of resource-heavy actors have displayed a much more favourable strategic selectivity for those groups that embrace the hegemonic neoliberal project (2016:7-8). As a consequence, although according to Kohler-Koch, the Commission has tried to

redress this ‘biased representation’, “in terms of social cleavages and territorial origin, representation is still grossly unbalanced: market-related interest groups and groups situated in the centre and northwest of the EU still outnumber all others” (Kohler-Koch, 2010:111).

What is more, although according to ‘civil society rhetoric’ CSOs are supposed to represent citizens better than elected representatives, in practice it does not match reality (Lord, Pollak, 2009). Indeed, they do not have to prove that they have a mandate from their members (Kohler-Koch, 2010:111). When it comes to accountability we find the same problem: “because of the long chain of delegation and the need to form encompassing alliances in order to have political impact, the Brussels CSO representatives are highly autonomous” (idem). Therefore, the capability of citizens to control CSO is very reduced and at the same time CSOs’ capacity to control the Commission is scarce because they have little chances to hold the Commission to account (ibidem:112).

Governance, especially in Europe, has neither encouraged participation nor public accountability of institutions. The political capacity of citizens to reproduce themselves in accordance with their wills has been reduced through governance mechanisms so it has functioned as a dispositive for the privatization of democracy (Goikoetxea, 2015:36). Thus, as Kohler-Koch points out “the rhetoric of CSOs and the explicit request of EU institutions convey an image of representation that is in contrast with reality” (Kohler-Koch, 2010:112).

The governance approach goes hand in hand with the lean state claimed by neoliberal governmentality (Jessop, 2015b:178). Furthermore, many forms of governance encourage ‘transformism’ and ‘passive revolution’ (Gramsci, 1981:107), which represents “a process of transformation, absorption, and incorporation that translates contentious politics into bureaucratic and technical questions” (Jessop, 2015b:178). If democratization as a process that needs contention (MacAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001; Tilly, 2007) transformism and passive revolution can induce de-democratization.

As Goikoetxea stands out, “Perpetual conflict, not perpetual peace, is what has historically been the mechanism to democratize wealth, knowledge, prestige, authority and welfare” (Goikoetxea, 2017). Translating contention into technical questions through governance processes, instead of enhancing democratization and emancipation can in fact induce the opposite. What is more, the trend towards scale-jumping strategies¹⁵⁴ hinders the organization and participation of

¹⁵⁴ We recall that “Scale jumping occurs when actors seek to make policy, resolve conflicts, exercise power, and so forth, at the scale that is most favourable to their values, identities, and interests.

popular forces and facilitates that of those actors that can take advantage of the structurally-inscribed strategic selectivity of certain scales, horizons of action, policies etc. (Jessop, 2009:98).

For that matter, what has been called ‘European economic governance’, has led to what Stephen Gill called in the 90’s “*a new constitutionalism of a disciplinary neoliberalism*” (1998). It provides an international governance framework that seeks “to separate economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make governments more responsive to the discipline of the market forces and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes (ibidem: 5).

We conclude our reflection on governance in the European Union directly using Kohler-Koch’s words:

“Participatory governance is not about democratic participation, it is about integration and system transformation. It is not by chance that civil society organisation side so often with the Commission against national governments. Their interference supports the political character of the Commission, strengthening a body that is not democratically accountable. They prop up rather than constrain ‘the rise of the unelected’.” (Kohler-Koch, 2008:8)

5.3.2.2 Comercial arbitration

Commercial arbitration is based on the liberal myth of the natural, apolitical, consensual and efficient nature of private economic regulation¹⁵⁵ (Cutler *et al.*, 1999). This myth encourages their divorce from any kind of democratic procedure (Sondow, 2007:11). Indeed, their organizational and procedural rules are not created by any legislative chamber, their substantive law is not determined by any legislation and they do not recognise any appeal to a higher court (idem). *So in these processes, administration’s public judiciary control is privatized because instead of applying general rules a regime arranged between the investor and public administration is the one that is applied* (González, 2015).

However, we cannot infer that this privatization induces the disappearance of the state. Moreover, *in contrast with the old medieval law of merchants which operated largely due to the absence of a state, international commercial arbitration operates because there are states with power to enforce laws and*

The motivation for scale jumping is to take advantage of the structurally-inscribed scalar privileging of some forces, some spatial horizons of action, strategies, policies, etc., over others” (Jessop, 2009:98)

¹⁵⁵ We have already mentioned the need of articulating “the economic and the extra-economic”.

because they operate with the endorsement and support of the states (Sassen, 2010: 265).

During the last decades, the proliferation of International Investment Agreements (IIA) has enabled the spread of private arbitration through their Investor-State Dispute Settlement System (ISDS). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) said in 2013 that there were over 3,200 IIAs in existence; in 2012 a record 58 claims were filed and the total number of known treaty-based claims reached 514 (Cross, 2013:76). However, *ISDS have been accused of inherent bias towards investors and of a democratic deficit; of lacking core judicial safeguards of transparency and independence; and of investing immense power in a small core of professional arbitrators who dominate the ISDS circuit* (idem).

Although it remains to be seen which the final settlements are, the importance of arbitration is due to rise as a consequence of the *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership* TTIP (Hernández & Ramiro, 2015). The European Commission's Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said that the new Investment Court System (ICS) adopted in the TTIP (ISDS has been renamed as ICS) is going to modernise the old dispute settlement system (Hernández, Ramiro, 2015). Notwithstanding those laudable intentions, its most basic principles such as the legal certainty linked to the *lex mercatoria*, provisions guaranteeing fair and equitable treatment of investment and compensation for indirect expropriation are kept (Hernández, Ramiro, 2015). Attending to precedents, *through this kind of clauses, the progressive realisation of environmental, economic or human rights policies can become a target for arbitration claims* (Cross, 2013: 79). Moreover, the CETA agreement between the European Union and Canada already shows that the most controversial elements of the investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS) such as the limitation of democratic rights and the rule of law are kept in the final text (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016: 13).

Despite the fact that arbitration is not directly related to crisis management measures, its impact is going to rise due to the hegemony of neoliberally oriented policies and international agreements.

5.3.2.3 Credit Rating Agencies

Credit rating agencies¹⁵⁶ are private companies that evaluate large debtors and the financial instruments those debtors issue (Bahena, 2010:1). Two U.S. firms

¹⁵⁶ Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and similar companies are commonly referred to as "rating agencies."

They are, however, private entities with no government involvement (Schwarz, 2002:326).

dominate the CRA market: Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Moody's Corp. Fitch Ratings, a British Firm, is the third-most prominent (Bahena, 2010:1). ***They are commonly referred to as "rating agencies" but they are, however, private entities with no government involvement*** (Schwarz, 2002:326). Their work goes beyond rating particular firms and governments to establishing whether they should be subjected to more stringent regulation becoming a de facto standard setting for the financial industry as a whole (Sassen, 2012:266).

They are at first glance what Foucault calls an apparatus (dispositive) of security that “instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded.” (2007: 20-21). They establish their own scale¹⁵⁷ (AAA, AA+ etc.) based in an optimal average, which is used to classify debtor's capacity to pay back debts.

Nevertheless, despite being “recommendations” their classifications act as ***real dispositive of surveillance towards states***¹⁵⁸ ***imposing through private criteria their public action*** (Salazar, 2014). For instance, the European Central Bank obliges euro zone banks to keep the maximum qualification (AAA) (Medialdea, 2011:22). Such is their ability to influence states' activities that Salazar has called them ‘post-modern’ state's apparatus (Salazar, 2014:85). During the so-called “Eurozone sovereign debt crises” in 2011-2012, their downgrades announcements on the value of the Euro and the yields of French, Italian, German and Spanish long-term sovereign bonds significantly influenced capital allocation from ‘ailing states’ into more ‘stable borrowers’ (Baum, Karpava, Schäfer, Septhan, 2014).

However, their role in the financial crisis shows us the above mentioned complex interaction between rationalities, programs and technologies. For example, Enron or Lehman Brothers had the maximum qualification when they collapsed which says much about the accuracy of their qualification (Medialdea, 2011:25). Their clients are the very entities that they are going to rate so they have good reasons for giving a profit-seeking rate (ibidem:26). ***They are a key dispositive of surveillance of the above mentioned “new constitutionalism of a disciplinary neoliberalism”*** (Gill, 1998:16).

5.4 Authoritarian statism and North Atlantic Financial Crisis: condensation of previous trends

¹⁵⁷ We can see their different credit scale in the next link:
<http://www.quadcapital.com/Rating%20Agency%20Credit%20Ratings.pdf> (last access: 06/10/2016).

¹⁵⁸ Or any other debtor.

5.4.2 Authoritarian statism and the crisis management in the EU:

We see again similar patterns in all Western Countries¹⁵⁹ (in the whole North Atlantic arch), however, we are obliged to pay special attention to the crisis management in the EU. Why? As already pointed out, when we talk about Europe, we need to avoid the dichotomy between the national and transnational level by considering its multiscalar nature and its multiscalar strategies (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:864). Moreover, when it comes to crisis management, there has been a generalized trend towards scale jumping in which individual member states¹⁶⁰ are highly conditioned by decisions taken at EU level. As a consequence, the above mentioned trends and contradictions in democratic states towards ‘authoritarian statism’ (Poulantzas, 1979:247) are even harder in the current EU (H2),

Although briefly, we have already said that arbitration is due to increase as a private dispute settlement mechanism as a consequence of the CETA and TTIP agreements and that credit rating agencies have played an important role in the management of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. In this epigraph we are going to focus on the other mentioned trends: *the strengthening of the executive and the privatization of democracy through governance mechanisms and their interrelated scale jumping strategies.*

First of all, we have to bear in mind, according to Solty, that the crisis management in the EU is “over-determined by the fact that there is a large consensus amongst the EU elites that a disintegration of the eurozone must be averted at all costs” (2013:73). The underlying notion is that they consider that the global influence of the EU depends on the Eurozone and deepened integration, so in the end, its debate is not discussed in economic but rather in purely political terms (ibidem:71). Thus, the political aim of most of the measures would be the conservation of the Eurozone and the deepening of European integration.

We have mentioned above the role of new economic governance and of “the new constitutionalism of a disciplinary neoliberalism”¹⁶¹ in separating economic policies from broader political accountability especially since the adoption of the European Single Act and the Treaty of Maastricht (Gill, 1998:5). The management

¹⁵⁹ For instance, Albo and Fanelli talk about ‘disciplinary democracy’ as the political form of ‘permanent austerity’ when analyzing ‘the authoritarian phase of neoliberalism’ in the United States, Canada and Western Europe (Albo, Fanelli, 2014).

¹⁶⁰ Our case studies are part of the European Union.

¹⁶¹ See the epigraph: The European Union: what place for democratic governance?

of the unfolding North Atlantic Financial Crisis has enhanced those aspects leading to what Solty calls the “*authoritarian crisis constitutionalism*” (2013:74), what according to Oberndorfer is a “*new economic governance via authoritarian constitutionalism*” (Oberndorfer, 2013), or what Buff has defined as “*the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism*” (Bruff, 2014).

Coined differently, they all refer to a privatization of democracy by a reconfiguration of state and institutional power in order to disempower nominally democratic institutions by re-empowering non-elected and executive authorities (H1). The importance of the Troika –formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund- in imposing measures having quasi-constitutional status is one of its clearest examples. This kind of “new authoritarian constitutionalism” helps to consolidate a transnational historic bloc that operates within and across nations and regions and seeks to embed neoliberal hegemony politically (Hill, 1998:6).

We are going to engage briefly with some *more concrete-complex considerations by considering the four more important pillars of the institutional shifts in the European Union since the beginning of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (H3)*: the European Financial and Stability Facility (EFSF), the ‘tightening’ of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Euro-Plus-Pact (EPP) and the Fiscal Compact (FC). In a last step, we will consider the overall multiscalar strategies that lie behind all those shifts.

5.4.2.1 The European Financial and Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM):

The EFSF was part of the immediate response to solvency problems of Greece in 2010 but it also provided loans to Portugal and Ireland (Arbulú-Neira, 2012:11). It was transformed in September 2012 into the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:851). Apart from the European member states, it includes the participation of the International Monetary Fund which provides around one-third of the economic provisions (Council of the EU, 2010:6). More than simply being a technical facility it is “an important political vehicle for the implementation of austerity packages designed under the aegis of the Troika and imposed on crisis-ridden member states” (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:851). Thus, the granting of loans will be conditional upon agreeing on austerity demands (idem) and it will provide “a new framework of reinforced economic governance, aiming at an effective and rigorous economic surveillance” (European Council, 2010: 8).

5.4.2.2 The ‘tightening’ of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP):

According to the Commission, “The European Union’s economic governance framework aims to detect, prevent, and correct problematic economic trends such as excessive government deficits or public debt levels, which can stunt growth and put economies at risk (Ec.europa.eu, 2016)”. Its major tools are the “Stability and Growth Pact” and the “Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure” but the EU's annual cycle of economic policy guidance and surveillance is conducted since 2010¹⁶² through the “European Semester” which also serves to implement de Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2014:2).

The tightening of the SGP has been conducted through measures implemented by the European Semester. We are going to highlight the “Six-pack” (2011), the “Two-pack” (2013) and the Fiscal Compact (2012-2013)¹⁶³.

The “six-pack” has tightened some important components of the SGP, such as, its preventive component, its corrective component and its preventive arm (Oberndorfer, 2013:39-41). It is composed of four regulations related to fiscal policy and two regulations that deal with macroeconomic imbalances. Above all, it has become a mechanism of surveillance of national budgets including automatic and coercive sanctions with regard to new public debt (Soly, 2013:75). The deficit limit of 3% of the national gross domestic product (GDP) was reduced to 0.5%, and the debt limit set at 60% of GDP (Wissell, Wolff, 2016:9). When it comes to more indirect consequences, the so called “Scoreboard measuring” of macro-economic imbalances, for instance, functions as a preventive arm (Council of European Union, 2011:4-5). Through this scoreboard, however, highly political and contentious indicators such as the constant rise in ‘nominal unit labour cost’ are turned over to a seemingly technocratic surveillance framework (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:852). Moreover, it can trigger an automatic sanction despite being widely detached from any parliamentary control (idem). Thus, apart from the weakening of the parliamentary arena at both, European and national levels, it entails the avoidance of nearly all popular-democratic control (Oberndorfer, 2013:40-41).

Furthermore, as Oberndorfer stands out, the “*Two-pack*” represents “an attempt to put the previous role of the European Commission on a legal basis within the

¹⁶² The evolution of the EU economic governance in historical context is available in the next link: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/timeline/index_en.htm (last access: 17/10/2016).

¹⁶³ We are going to deal with it separately because unlike the “Six Pack” and the “Two-pack” the Fiscal Compact is an intergovernmental treaty. It was signed by all member states except the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Croatia.

framework of the Troika” (2013:50). Indeed, it also establishes the need for authorisation of national budget plans (ibidem:50-51). As a consequence it reinforces the economic surveillance because obliges member states to report their budget priorities to the EC for assessment and modification (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:852). Thus, administrations have to set budget priorities long before these budget plans are debated within national parliaments (idem). Such a mechanism bypasses the budgetary rights of European national parliaments and strengthens executive state apparatuses, especially the European Commission (idem).

5.4.2.3 The Euro-Plus-Pact (EPP)

According to Sandbeck and Schneider, the EPP “reflects the shift to intensified neoliberal austerity measurements most drastically and explicitly” (2014:853). In order to ‘foster competitiveness’ and ‘the sustainability of public finances’ the members of the Euro zone agreed on four guiding rules for their national economic policy orientation (idem). Inter alia, it includes well known mechanisms such as the throttling of wage increases or the adjustment of the retirement age to demographic developments (idem).

5.4.2.4 The Fiscal Compact (FC).

Despite being related to the above mentioned tightening of the SGP, unlike previous measures, the FC is an intergovernmental treaty which is entirely detached from European law and aims at inscribing austerity regulations of the tightened SGP into the constitutional foundations of the individual European nation-states (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:853). As its article 3.2 states, the signed measures have to be transposed into national law (through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional) and according to article 8 the process will be verified by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The FC allows the imposition of automatic sanctions from the EU executive if the contracting parties do not apply out the rules set in the treaty¹⁶⁴ (idem). In order to retract the sanctions, the public authority concerned is obliged to put forward structural reforms, which have to be approved by the European executive (idem).

5.4.3 Crisis management and the breach of Formal democracy

As we have seen, the crisis management has entailed the reinforcement of previously consolidated trends. Nevertheless, the crisis-management in the EU *has*

¹⁶⁴ The rules set in the article 3 include strict budgetary controls inspired by neoliberal assumptions.

not only supposed an erosion of the moment of substantive democracy but also a breaking with elements of formal democracy (Oberndorfer, 2013:27).

According to Oberndorfer, the above mentioned measures (the Six-pack, The Fiscal Compact, or the Two-pack) “have no adequate legal basis in the “European Constitution” and could be established only through bypassing the ordinary revision procedure (Article 48 of the Treaty of Union) (ibidem:27-28)”. Apart from the political justifying discourses, as Oberndorfer points out, “the juristic argumentation and techniques, such as the use of Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as a blanket clause for the creation of almost unlimited emergency law seem to give Carl Schmitt ‘alarming topicality’” (idem).

5.4.4 Multiscalar authoritarian statism in the EU: final considerations

As already pointed out, when we talk about Europe, we have to consider its multiscalar nature and its multiscalar strategies (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:864; Wissell, Wolff, 2016:9). *As Sandbeck and Schneider brilliantly explain, and directly in line with our second hypothesis (H2), the EU state project has embraced certain scalar strategies with the aim of ‘sealing off popular forces from decision-making processes by flexibly altering the scalar nodal points of policy elaboration so as to take the line of least resistance’ (2014:865).*

In line with our third hypothesis (H3), we see again a leap after the beginning of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis. All of the above-mentioned measures, directly or indirectly, entail scale-jumping strategies. The creation of the so so-called ‘Frankfurt Group’ in 2011 as nodal point for policy elaboration in the Eurozone completely detached from the institutional body of the European Union gives us another clear example (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:866). In a similar fashion, the European Central Bank, the state apparatus with least formal democratic legitimacy in the EU has gained unprecedented competences during the crisis that go far beyond the neoliberal monetary policies it was originally mandated to oversee (idem).

All these scalar strategies are aggravating the strategic selectivity of the state through a new dimension of spatial-temporal selectivity¹⁶⁵ (Jessop, 2008a:136). As a consequence, all these political arenas which have favoured the inclusion of popular forces such as parliaments (in every scale) are increasingly bypassed and

¹⁶⁵ According to Jessop ‘The spatio-temporal selectivity refers to the diverse ways in which spatial and temporal horizons of action in different fields are produced, spatial and temporal rhythms are created, certain practices and strategies are privileged and other hindered according to their ‘fit’ with the temporal and spatial patterns inscribed in the state’s structures’ (Jessop, 2008a:136)

turned into mere approval bodies whereas rapid decision-making processes between national executives and European executive authorities have been strengthened (Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:866).

According to Elsner, financial capitalism is at odds with democracy (2012:132-159). We think that his words briefly summarises the core of most of the mentioned ideas:

“[...] there is a tendency *towards technocratic governance*: The EU “*Economic and Financial Governance (or Government)*“ by the President of the EU Commission, the ECB president, the heads of IMF and ESM, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers, and top bankers, may easily become the *post-democratic prototype* and even a pre-dictatorial governance structure against national sovereignty and democracies. [...] And in fact, the actual *main protagonists of some proactive policy* in general already seem to be the *Central Banks* (FED, ECB, BoE, ...) anyway – entities that have already deliberately put beyond and above democracy by the “neoliberal” counterrevolution.” (Elsner, 2012: 157-158)

4 Spanish Matrix State

1- A dual axis transition: from dictatorship to democracy and from semi-peripheral fordism to semi-peripheral post-fordism (1975-1978)

Although it goes beyond the scope of our research analysing in depth Spanish democracy and state power, we need to introduce firstly some basic features of its most relevant elements. *We have said that current sovereignty demands are related to a loss of sovereignty and a privatization of democracy, and in that sense, we have described the main elements of that process in the previous chapter (H3). But we have also mentioned that inside the Spanish ‘matrix state’ and its own democratic state effects there have been competing state projects with their own processes of democratization, state-building and nation building. We have called them subaltern states (hood) (H4). However, before introducing ourselves in our case studies we need to consider what has happened in the matrix state in order to set them in their relational context.* Thus, we may firstly take into account when and how Spain became a democracy.

In this case, we are going to use categories such as *accumulation strategy, state project or hegemonic visions* that apart from being more suited to a more concrete-complex plane of analysis they keep a coherent structure with the previous reflections.

Thus, it must be stressed that after forty years of fascist dictatorship¹⁶⁶, Spain became a democratic state with the approval of a new constitution in 1978. Franco’s death in 1975 opened up a period known as “la transición”¹⁶⁷ whose historic interpretation is still contentious (Gallego, 2008; Monedero, 2011; Ibañez, 2015). In general terms the “transition in Spain” has been widely addressed inspired by actor-centred explanations that emphasize the building of consensus politics, the skills of the reformist political elite of Franco’s regime, the political moderation exercised by the political opposition (specially the PCE) or the new political culture inspired by democratic ideals (Calvo, 2015:115).

However, apart from the specificities of the process in itself and the dynamic of Spanish contention we cannot ignore the broader worldwide transformations

¹⁶⁶ It has been argued that Spanish dictatorship was authoritarian but not totalitarian or fascist (Linz, 1974) and clearly refuted by Navarro (2013).

¹⁶⁷ The transition.

*towards post-fordism, the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime and the privatization of democracy*¹⁶⁸ (H1). Therefore, we may talk about a dual axis transition: from dictatorship to democracy and from fordism to post-fordism¹⁶⁹.

In that regard we directly quote Nagore Calvo's work:

“The political and economic aspects of the transition in Spain need to be situated within broader processes of global economic and political restructuring and the crisis of Atlantic Fordism. In this respect, the Spanish transition primarily was a transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism. More specifically devolution in Spain cannot be narrowly defined as just a political and administrative process but is closely interdependent with both the Post-Fordist restructuring of the relatively peripheral Spanish economy (including its internal restructuring and the creation of a Basque economy), and its full integration into the European and global economy and political institutions.” (2015: 156)

When dealing with such a process, we must take into account the complex interaction between discontinuity in continuity and the limits imposed to path-shaping strategies by path-dependent legacies (Jessop, 2008a:242). Thus, despite (and because of) the strategic action of old and new elites and their path-shaping effects, whose most important achievement was the democratization of the dictatorship, we cannot ignore the limits imposed by the path-dependent legacies of francoism in every sphere of the state and the social formation¹⁷⁰ (Jessop, 1990:342). However, *the international conjuncture was of paramount importance in order to restructure (path-shaping) the Spanish economy and state in accordance with the dominant neoliberal guidelines* (Etxezarreta, 1991). Therefore, the transition was a process led by old and new political elites which was intertwined with the tensions that arose between the structural limits for change and its conjunctural opportunities.

¹⁶⁸ Explained in the chapter “Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy”.

¹⁶⁹ Which in the Spanish case as we will see will be from “semi-peripheral fordism” to “semi-peripheral post-fordism”.

¹⁷⁰ As we have seen in the chapter dedicated to the SRA (see the epigraph: defining the state), “The nature of state-like institutions and organizations, their articulation to form the ensemble and their links with the wider society will depend on the nature of the social formation and its past history (Jessop, 1990:342). It is in that regard that we must understand for instance, the limited scope of the welfare state, the continuity of francoism in the judicial apparatus, the conservative hegemony when it comes to define Spanish nation and its indissoluble unity or the symmetrisation of the process of decentralization.

Paradoxical as it may seem, whereas most of Western countries were undergoing deep changes towards the privatization of democracy and an authoritarian form of statism (Poulantzas, 1979) Spain was beginning to walk the path of democratization.

1.1 From dictatorship to democracy

When it comes to the internal dynamic of the Spanish contention, according to Zubiaga, a set of mechanisms and processes explain how a protest cycle that had some pre-revolutionary characteristics ended in a process of democratization of a dictatorship (2009a: 253). We highlight inter alia the following mechanisms: “identity shifts” that led people to will a European identity or to focus on different regional/national identities; a great deal of “brokerage” that built bridges between political opponents and moderate sectors of the regime; a “radical flank effect” that favoured the isolation of the most radical positions¹⁷¹ and a convergence of the most moderate ones (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:181-186; Zubiaga, 2009a: 253).

Thus, instead of a complete rupture with the previous regime it was a process of transformation of the dictatorship led by a part of the Francoist elite that integrated a great part of the political opponents¹⁷² reflecting what Vázquez Montalban ironically called the ‘correlation of weaknesses’ of the moment (Vázquez Montalban, 2010). Coalitions were broke (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:26) between the PSOE, former Francoist Ministers, Spanish financial institutions, large foreign investors in Spain, small businesses, labour organizations and formerly illegal nationalist parties linking previously separated actors (Calvo, 2015:116). Mentioned also needs to be made to the importance of internal and external factual powers such as the military hierarchy or the EEUU (Pastor, 2015:298).

In that period, through a process of ‘transformism’ and ‘passive revolution’ the leaders of the political opposition were incorporated into the new system (Gramsci, 1981:107). The ruling Francoist elites were able to conduct a process that integrated some of the demands of the opposition but also their most valuable leaders and intellectuals resulting in a new compromise that restored the lost legitimacy of the Francoist regime (Errejón, Mouffe, 2015:21). Therefore, through the mentioned process the old fascist apparatus was removed and *a renewed power bloc, hegemonic bloc and historical bloc began to consolidate* (Poulantzas, 1973; Gramsci, 1981; Portelli, 1977).

¹⁷¹ With the exception of the Basque Country.

¹⁷² Inter alia, the left wing parties PCE and PSOE, main trade unions and moderate Basque and Catalan nationalists (PNV and CIU). The left wing pro-independence movement and ETA did not take part.

When it comes to its formal procedure it respected Francoist legality. After Franco's death in 1975 and the resignation of the President of the Government Carlos Arias Navarro on 1 July 1976, the King Juan Carlos I appointed the 'reformist' Adolfo Suárez new President. He boosted the approval of the "Law for the Political Reform" that was firstly admitted by Francoist Courts and secondly through referendum. Thanks to this law, general elections were called on June 1977 and a government elected on democratic mandate lead by Suárez (UCD) was formed. A constituent process began with the final approval on referendum of the Spanish Constitution on 6 December 1978.

It is also remarkable the signature of the so-called "Moncloa Pacts" that included some political and economic reforms that despite being signed without considering the main trade unions, it served to stop and demobilize their active and contentious dynamic and has been used since then as a symbol of the "Transitions' Consensus" (Pastor, 2015:298). Indeed, despite including a fiscal reform or the expansion of basic public services such as education and health, its guiding principles were the income policies and the control of the inflation (López & Rodríguez, 2010:149). The Keynesian wage indexing system was removed and salary increases were subordinated to the inflation (ibidem:150). Although the inflation was controlled, that was just the first step of the final goal: the recovery of entrepreneurial benefits that had dropped from the 30% in 1969 to the 12% in 1979 (idem).

Thus, as a consequence of the 'limited agreement' broke between the mentioned political elites, some topics were left out of the debate (Zubiaga, 2009a:254). As a result of the above mentioned process, Spain opened up the door to a new democratic era understood as described by Tilly as "binding consultation" (Tilly, 2007:13-14). However, according to Zubiaga, it was also the moment in which the logic of difference became hegemonic, social mobilization began to decline and the possibilities for a further radicalization of democracy through the construction of 'the Spanish people' were weakened¹⁷³ (2009b: 64-72).

1.2 The political economy of change: transition from semi-peripheral fordism to semi-peripheral post-fordism.

Half-joking, it could be said that Spain was Thatcherist before Thatcher. When the autarchic period¹⁷⁴ was beginning to come to an end, the Phalangist Minister for Housing José Luis Arrese stated in 1957 "Queremos un país de propietarios, no de proletarios"- 'we want a country of proprietors, not proletarians' (López &

¹⁷³ The opposite trend was going to be the dominant one in the Basque Country.

¹⁷⁴ It is a period that began in 1939 and ended in 1959 when the National Stabilization Plan was approved.

Rodríguez, 2011:6). *It was in that period when the pillars of the Spanish macro-economic model were set. This was premised on the development of mass-market tourism from northern Europe and the radical expansion of private home-ownership (idem). It was the beginning of the long wave (1950-1995) of Spanish capitalism that preceded what has been called “the boom” (1995-2007) (López & Rodríguez, 2010: 135-218, Royo, 2009).*

*When it comes to its accumulation regime and mode of regulation, in comparison with other European countries, Spain was only integrated at the margins of North Atlantic Fordism and was thus also semi-peripheral to the cycle of virtuous growth*¹⁷⁵ (Calvo, 2015:31; Letamendia, 2009: 115). Despite setting up the INE (National Industry Institute) in 1941, Spanish industry was weak and highly dependent on foreign technology and energy supplies and its institutional regulation (i.e the regulation of wage relations or the form of the state) was at odds with the classical Western European one (López & Rodríguez, 2010: 141). Thus, a peripheral liberal market economy “coexisted with a highly centralised, bureaucratic and oppressive state, as well as a poorly developed welfare system which could be referred to as a quasi-Keynesian Welfare National State” (Calvo, 2015:57). Those weaknesses affected the posterior reforms and also the current lower social development of Spain in comparison with main OECD countries (Navarro, 2009). We can easily conclude that most of its features were anomalous from the Keynesian-fordist point of view (López & Rodríguez, 2010: 141). Moreover, the oil crisis hit the economy harder than in the OECD countries provoking tough conjunctural and structural consequences¹⁷⁶ (Sudrià, 2012: 198-211).

We must bear in mind that during the autarchic regime, the comprador or ‘purchasing bourgeoisie’¹⁷⁷ (sometimes referred to as the ‘oligarchy’) linked to foreign capital¹⁷⁸ was the dominant one (Poulantzas, 1976:43). However, the last years of the dictatorship showed a reinforcement of the ‘domestic

¹⁷⁵ It can be classified according to Poulantzas as a “dependent state” (Poulantzas, 1976). Its dependent nature is assumed to assigned to it certain functions, ‘functions falling to it in the present phase of imperialism’ (Poulantzas, 1976:21)

¹⁷⁶ Conjuncturally: a transferred of resources outside the country that provoked general impoverishment, a rise of unemployment and fiscal mismatches. Structurally: changes in the prices of energy provoked disruptions on the conditions of production that led in the subsequent years to deep structural changes (Sudrià, 2012:199)

¹⁷⁷ In Poulantzas words when it comes to the comprador bourgeoisie “in Spain, finally, there is the characteristic case of a very substantial banking and financial comprador sector (industrial banks in particular), and industries that directly depend on it. From the political point of view, this bourgeoisie is the true support and agent of foreign imperialist capital.” (Poulantzas, 1976:43).

¹⁷⁸ Mention needs to be made of the special cooperation with the United States.

bourgeoisie¹⁷⁹ more linked to European business partners (ibidem:44-45). This European links, in which the role of German social democracy was also relevant, were going to influence directly the economic reforms initiated by the PSOE during the 1980's (Calvo, 2015:35).

That decade (1980) was going to be of paramount importance in order to set the pillars of the “transition from a semi-peripheral Fordism to what could be seen as a semi-peripheral form of Post-Fordism” (ibidem:57).

2. Democratic Spain as a semi-peripheral Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime (1978- 2008): España va bien.

2.1 Some introductory considerations: accumulation regime, state project and Spanish nationalism

Spanish democracy and its contentious process of democratization/democratization, must be understood in the overall trend towards the privatization of democracy and authoritarian statism (HI). However, this new era has been the first democratic one since the *coup d'état* against the II Republic in 1936 and the end of the civil war in 1939. This fact together with the limited agreement of the above mentioned process of transition has conditioned, inter alia, the hegemonic discursive construction of this new period.

The hegemonic idea of ‘consensus’ has been the main tenet of what has been branded ‘the culture of the transition’ (Fernández-Savater, 2012:37). This culture involves the importance of forgetting the past, the necessity of rejecting conflict and ‘partisan’ political participation in the name of consensus or the role of the European project for achieving democracy and welfare services¹⁸⁰ (Fernández-Savater, 2012:37; Llopis, Monereo, 2014). We think that the famous statement of former President of Government José María Aznar “España va bien” condenses the ‘common sense’ of this epoch (Gramsci, 1981:139).

According to that, once the spiral of opportunities opened up by the transition came to an end (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:181-186) a relatively structural period (Jessop, 1982:253) can be traced between 1978 and 2008. We identify for instance, a set of elements related to the state project and the dominant accumulation strategy that are structurally privileged and are thus difficult to be

¹⁷⁹ Moreover “In Spain, finally, the domestic bourgeoisie encompasses a large part of the autochthonic bourgeoisie, with the Catalan and Basque bourgeoisies in its lead, but also including a section of public capital under the control of the INI (National Industrialization Institute).” (Poulantzas, 1976:41)

¹⁸⁰ We have to bear in mind that Franco’s dictatorship developed a poor welfare system so the welfare state began to expand in an era dominated by neoliberal expansive hegemony.

altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during that period (Jessop, 1982:253). We roughly refer to what has been branded as the “regime of 78”¹⁸¹.

However, as pointed out in our third hypothesis (H3,) a consequence of the financial crisis, that period ended and its structural contradictions emerged opening a new conjunctural moment (idem) and hence a new spiral of opportunities (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:181-186). Mechanistic as it may seem, we think that through this separation we can roughly describe the basic features of the Spanish process of democratization and its most important inflection points. We are going to recall the reflections made above on this matter in order to better understand our point.

¹⁸²On the one hand, the “**structural moment**” can be defined as those elements in a social formation that cannot be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during a given time period: it may include practices as well as their emergent properties and material preconditions and it may be more or less enduring beyond the time period in question (Jessop, 1982:253). It thus refers to the relatively enduring features of institutional orders (Bertramsen, 1991:120). On the other, the “**conjunctural moment**” can be defined as those elements in a social formation that can be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during a given time period (Jessop, 1982:253). It refers to the fact that a given structural selectivity could be transformed by current oppositional strategies. This separation implies that the same element can function as a “**structural constraint**” for one agent (or set of agents) at the same time as it appears as a “**conjunctural element**” open to transformation by another agent (or set of agents) (Jessop, 1982:253). We also need

¹⁸¹ It would be related to what Gramsci called ‘**organic ideologies**’ or ‘**imaginaries**’ (Gramsci, 1999:707). According to Gramsci “one must therefore distinguish between historically **organic ideologies**, those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that **are arbitrary**, rationalistic, or “willed”. To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is “psychological”; they “organise” human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only create individual “movements”, polemics and so on (though even these are not completely useless, since they function like an error which by contrasting with truth, demonstrates it).” (Gramsci, 1999:707). According to Jessop, **these organic imaginaries** can be construed in terms of **accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic visions** (Jessop, 2015b:106). On his view “they help to cement the ideological unity of an entire social bloc at the level of the power bloc and, equally importantly, significant sections of the subaltern groups (Jessop, 2015b:106). (Emphasis added).

¹⁸² We are literally copying some ideas already reflected in the epigraph entitled “First Stage of the SRA: overcoming society-centred and state-centred views” of the chapter “The Strategic Relational Approach”.

to highlight the importance of strategic and/or tactical alliances to transform situations because the same element can act as a “structural constraint” for one agent (or set of agents) or provide a “conjunctural opportunity” for the same agent(s) in association with another agent (or set of agents) (Jessop, 1982:253). It implies that a short-term structural constraint can become a conjunctural element in the longer term (Jessop, 1982:253).

With that in mind, we think that the “Regime of 78” as a relatively coherent structural period has some basic enduring features that influenced the path of the process of democratization in Spain. However, these very features and their contradictions have led the way to a conjunctural moment (especially since 2008 onwards) paving the way for change through strategic action (H3).

It goes beyond the scope of our research analyzing in depth Spanish democracy and state power so we are going to focus on those elements that we consider relevant features of “the regime of 78”. In that regard, we think in accordance with Goikoetxea that “although the social space is multi-dimensional and it is formed from sets of fields that are relatively autonomous, they are more or less subordinated to both the field of economic production and the field of political capacities and structures” (Goikoetxea, 2014a:150). Thus, on the one hand we are going to consider *the Spanish accumulation regime and its related neoliberal state project and hegemonic visions*. On the other, we are taking into account *the territorial articulation of this very state project and its contradictions*, which go beyond a mere territorial or constitutional debate (Pastor, 2012:186). Finally we are going to address briefly the *related national imaginary and the rise of Spanish nationalism* (Nuñez Seixas, 2010).

Our research follows the strategic relational approach which has mostly been used, to study changing discourses of competitiveness, narratives of enterprise, entrepreneurial cities, the economic inspiration of the state project (Jessop, 1998; Jessop and Sum, 2000; Mulvad, 2015) and new economic imaginaries surrounding the emergence of the knowledge-based economy (Jessop, 2008a:51). However, they usually take the ‘demos’ for granted (which is frequently called ‘nation’) avoiding the fundamental issue of its reproduction across time and space (Goikoetxea, 2014a:146). In order to avoid that trap, we are going to consider as well *the territorial articulation of the state project*. Thus, when dealing with it we are going to consider both, *its economic and territorial axis*. We summarise our main points as follows:

- **The political economy:** The Spanish accumulation regime has been fuelled by the **property bubble** and a non interventionist **neoliberal state project**

(Albarracín, 1993; Calvo, 2015:157; López & Rodríguez, 2010). Moreover, both are directly linked to ‘two nations’ hegemonic visions (Jessop, 1990:211; Navarro, 2009:28-31).

- **The territorial project:** When it comes to its territorial articulation, the **hegemonic Spanish state project understands the relation between different polities as being one of subordination** (Kincaid, 1998:13). Indeed, it entails that their processes of democratization are also subordinated to the guiding Spanish one by considering **the existence of a single sovereign demos** in Spanish democracy constituted by all Spaniards, including the Basque and the Catalans (Guibernau, 2013:379).
- Directly linked to the previous approach is the production and reproduction of the **hegemonic Spanish nationalism** that considers Spain as the unique nation (Nuñez Seixas, 2010; Pastor, 2012; Taibo, 2014).

2.2 The Spanish accumulation strategy and its neoliberal state project:

In contrast to the “necessarily right” post-Communist transition in Eastern Europe, the first steps of Spanish democracy were “necessarily left” and, therefore, carried out by the Socialist Party as it had no links with the Franco regime (Calvo, 2015:118-119). The *PSOE became a “governing party”*, “a party that combines sensitivity to the politics of representation and the imperatives of state power” (Jessop, 2015b: 76). Thus, a party that can reconcile the interests of a substantial part of the electorate and key sections or fractions of the dominant classes (ibidem:215-216). We are highlighting this point because that period was critical to introduce some long-standing structural changes. In that sense “governing parties are important forces in producing hegemony and in managing differences within and between dominant class fractions or classes in order to elaborate a consensus that goes beyond a purely short-term tactical alliance” (ibidem: 76-77).

In that regard, according to Petras the renewed *power block*¹⁸³ formed under the González governments¹⁸⁴ (1982-1996) combined old and new political and economic elites and had on the top of the hierarchy the *banking, real estate and speculative groups, corporate executives and lawyers linked to multi-national corporations and high placed state technocrats and executives* (1990:194). Moreover, the political weight of banking and real estate groups was reinforced as

¹⁸³ There has not been any substantial change under the PP governments and has even been strengthened by the economic model based in financialisation, construction and tourism.

¹⁸⁴ What Petras ironically calls “Spanish socialism on the road to Marbella”.

a consequence of the industrial and agrarian dismantling produced after acceding to the European Union (Naredo, Montiel, 2011: 37).

However, after 40 years of dictatorship, it was that European project the one that was discursively used to create a new hegemonic vision that linked democracy, social rights and country's progress to the European Union whereas in practice a tight adjust programme linked to the new neoliberal agenda was implemented (Etxezarreta, 1991:47-69). In contrast to a degree of Euroescepticism present in other countries, the famous quote made by Ortega y Gasset in 1914 "Spain is the problem and Europe the solution" has been a long-standing sedimented meaning in the Spanish common sense.

All these changes played a key role in the political imaginaries, projects and practices condensed in the state project¹⁸⁵. In general terms, we can summarise the features of the neoliberal state project in line with the above mentioned changes towards the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (Jessop, 2008c) as follow: (1) liberalisation, (2) deregulation, (3) privatisation, (4) market proxies in the residual public sector, (5) internationalisation, and (6) reductions in direct taxation (Jessop, 2015a:485). More concretely it included, inter alia, the next changes: the development of 'national champions'; the concentration of the financial sector; the privatisation of public sector companies; withdrawing state support for the mature manufacturing sector; the adoption of a new democratic political system along corporate lines, including the process of devolution and the creation of intermediate governments (the autonomous communities); and the integration of trade unions and business representatives into the social and economic policy process (Calvo, 2015:117).

When dealing with its most relevant features we think that the state project prioritizes the interests of global capital over national capital, global and national financial capital over other types of capital, the interests of capital over those of labour, men over women or matrix state over subaltern states (Calvo, 2014:14; Goikoetxea, 2017).

Moreover, from our point of view the dominant accumulation strategy and its related neoliberal state project have reduced the political capacities of the Spanish state to intervene and act according to the preferences of its demos (H1). Thus, according to Goikoetxea "all those mechanisms and strategies used to

¹⁸⁵ As mentioned above we are dealing with 'organic ideologies or imaginaries' (Grasmci, 1999:707; Jessop, 2015b:106).

empower and capacitate the population end up privatized and empowering only the holders of capital” (2017:1).

In that sense, European integration has played a key path-shaping role and has disempowered state institutions reducing their capacities to penetrate society by introducing multi-level governance¹⁸⁶ and promoting non elected political bodies and executives over legislatives (Goikoetxea, 2017; Mann, 1984:189; Tilly, 2010:47-56). Furthermore, the Euro, the European Central Bank and its related institutions have encouraged further that process (LLopis, Monereo, 2014). We think that its most important features have already been described in the previous chapter so we are not going to repeat its main tenets.

When it comes to the dominant accumulation strategy, parliamentary democracy brought no substantial change so the PSOE government led by Felipe González (1982-1996) promoted a reformist agenda that kept the essential lines of the previous model. During the 1980s the strategy for re-launching the economy was based in “deepening existing ‘specializations’ in tourism, property development and construction, as ‘competitive advantages’ neatly adapted to the new approaches of the emerging global economy, i.e. high capital mobility and growing competition to capture financial incomes” (López & Rodríguez, 2011:7-8). However, in comparison with the relative weight of industry of the previous decades, a partial de-industrialization was boosted as a consequence of the strategic agenda established for the accession to the EEC in 1986 (ibidem:8). In exchange, extremely generous subsidies were granted (1 per cent of Spain’s GDP between 1986 and 2004) which were going to play a key role in building the infrastructure underlying the later construction boom (idem).

Nevertheless, as Calvo points out, while economic reforms tend to be discussed in the academic literature and in public discourses as a Spanish problem, their negative social and economic consequences were most acute in the Basque Country and Catalonia where the industrial base was stronger (2015:117). Between 1975 and 1985 unemployment in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa rose from 2,1 percent to 23.5 percent, in terms of production they fell from first and second to seventh and sixteenth and when it comes to incomes from third and first to eleventh and fourteenth respectively (Cabrera & Rey, 2007:140; Calvo, 2015:117).

In such a context, *European integration opened up great market opportunities for European capital encouraging the semi-peripheral¹⁸⁷ condition of Spain*

¹⁸⁶ See the chapter “authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy”.

¹⁸⁷ From our point of view, Spain is an example of a former core-area (the Spanish Empire) that has gradually lost ground in the so-called “World-System”. Moreover it has also played a semi-

(Wallerstein, 1976:229-233). German, French and Italian multinationals took up key positions within Spain's production structure, buying up most of the big food-industry companies and the public-sectors firms that were being privatized such as Seat, Enasa, MTM-Ateinsa, SKF-Española, Astican or Transatlantica (Chari, 1998:165). Banks, construction firms and the state-owned electricity and telecommunications monopolies were the only ones that were not affected by the 'buying frenzy' for Spanish assets (López & Rodríguez, 2011:8). It is not by chance that their leading fractions are the strongest ones of the power block (Naredo, Montiel, 2011; Petras, 1990:194)

European integration rapidly brought a short economic and financial *belle époque* between 1986 and 1993. It was an early experiment of *bubblenomics* that on the one hand, ended up establishing a new accumulation strategy based in financial and housing rents and on the other, gave up the possibility of setting up a competitive export oriented industrial economy¹⁸⁸ (López & Rodríguez, 2010:157). Thus, Spanish modernizing and international trade integration found its way throughout the activation of its financial and housing markets and demand creation from the speculative dynamics of the households' assets (Naredo, 1996). Its quick rise ended up in a new crisis after the big events of 1992.¹⁸⁹ However, in comparison with the

peripheral role in the European Union with regard to core countries such as Germany, France or Britain (López & Rodríguez, 2011:13). We directly rely on Wallerstein's words:

"There are also **semiperipheral** areas which are in between the core and the periphery on a series of dimensions, such as **the complexity of economic activities, strength of the state machinery, cultural integrity, etc.** Some of these areas **had been core-areas** of earlier versions of a given world-economy. Some had been peripheral areas that were later promoted, so to speak, as a result of the changing geopolitics of an expanding world-economy.

The semiperiphery, however, is not an artifice of statistical cutting points, nor is it a residual category. The semiperiphery is **a necessary structural element** in a world-economy. These areas play a role parallel to that played, *mutatis mutandis*, by middle trading groups in an empire. They are collection points of vital skills that are often poetically unpopular. These middle areas (like middle groups in an empire) partially deflect the political pressures which groups primarily located in peripheral areas might otherwise direct against core-states and the groups which operate within and through their state machineries. On the other hand, the interests primarily located in the semiperiphery are located outside the political arena of the core-states, and find it difficult to pursue the ends in political coalitions that might be open to them were they in the same political arena.

The division of a world-economy **involves a hierarchy of occupational tasks, in which tasks requiring higher levels of skill and greater capitalization are reserved for higher-ranking areas.** Since a capitalist world-economy essentially rewards accumulated capital, including human capital, at a higher rate than "raw" labor power, the geographical maldistribution of these occupational skills involves a strong trend toward self-maintenance. The forces of the marketplace reinforce them rather than undermine them. And the absence of a central political mechanism for the world-economy makes it very difficult to intrude counteracting forces to the maldistribution of rewards." (Wallerstein, 1976:232) (emphasis added)

¹⁸⁸ Being the case of the Basque Country an exception.

¹⁸⁹ The Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona and the Universal Exposition of Seville (Expo 92).

previous ones, it did not last much and as soon as in 1995 the new steps towards the economic boom (1997-2007) had begun.

At that time, Spanish macro-economic policy was already highly determined by European institutions and consequently by the framework of the convergence criteria set for monetary union and the neoliberal doxa consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty and its successors (López & Rodríguez, 2011:9). Thus one of the most important areas of state intervention, and hence of any process of democratization, was left in hands of the European multi-level governance with all that it entails for the privatization of democracy (See for instance¹⁹⁰: Elsner, 2012:132-159; Gill, 1998; Goikoetxea, 2017: 19-47; Kohler-Koch, 2008:8; Llopis & Monereo, 2014:29-54).

According to López and Rodríguez in such a context, four factors proved decisive (2011:9):

- 1- *Low interest* rates led to a continual fall in the price of credit that took Spain from boasting the highest interest rates in Europe to becoming the country with the highest levels of internal indebtedness on the Continent.
- 2- *Monetary union* and incorporation into the *Eurozone*, provided the Spanish economy with an international umbrella, endowing it with strong purchasing capacity abroad and reducing the importance of external deficit in the context of European Union's relative surplus.
- 3- *European Union's Liberalization policy* led to the privatization of public companies in strategic sectors such as electricity and telecommunications.
- 4- *Privatizations in Latin America* specially in the 1998-2001 crisis context, opened up great business opportunities for the internationalization of leading Spanish firms in the financial sector (BBVA and Banco Santander), the telecommunication sector (Telefónica) and the energetic one (i.e Endesa, Gas Natural, Cepsa, Repsol, Iberdrola, Unión Fenosa). In other words, Spanish *grande bourgeoisie* went global.

Apart from opening the door to the financial repositioning of the Spanish economy within the international division of labour, this framework was also of paramount importance for the property-development cycle (ibidem:10).

¹⁹⁰ See again the chapter "Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy: neoliberal governmentality and the return of sovereignty"

In such a context, how did the property bubble become the motor of the economy? *Asset-price Keynesianism*¹⁹¹, *together with the mechanisms linking increased value of private assets to the growth of internal private consumption provide us with the keys to answer that question* (Brenner, 2006:293-294, 315-323; López & Rodríguez, 2011:10). Through the ‘wealth effects’ generated by growth in the value of households’ financial and property assets, a double ‘virtuous circle’ of rising aggregate demand and financial profits, without raising wages or public spending was sustained (López & Rodríguez, 2011:10). Moreover, in the period 1997-2007 deficit spending was transferred from the Spanish state to private households which became in the final years of the cycle the net demanders of financing (ibidem:11).

2.2.1 Which were the results and consequences of the boom years?

Whereas political authority was being left in private hands and the elected public political bodies were disempowered, the ‘wealth effects’ of the so-called Spanish ‘popular capitalism’ hid its democratic lacks and the overall trend towards authoritarian statism (Navarro, 2015; Poulantzas, 1979). Thus, the most optimistic views tend to remark how well Spanish economy was doing. The economy grew by 3.7 per cent in 2007 and in 20 years per capita income had grown 20 points (Royo, 2009:20). At the macroeconomic level, the public deficit was eliminated and the public debt reduced to 39.8 per cent of the GDP, the lowest in the last two decades (idem). Private consumption increased an average of 7 per cent between 2000 and 2007 (López & Rodríguez, 2011: 12) and unemployment fell from 20 per cent in the mid-1990s to 7.95 per cent in the first half of 2007 (Royo, 2009:20).

However, we cannot forget the 10 per cent fall in average real wages¹⁹², the reduction of competitiveness and productivity in comparison with main OECD countries or the negative environmental impact of the model (López & Rodríguez, 2010: 204-208). Furthermore, as long as productivity and competitiveness became practically irrelevant variables its success was founded on a practical reversal of the classical Schumpeterian strategy of income from innovation (López & Rodríguez, 2011: 12).

¹⁹¹ According to Brenner: “Indeed, the strategy that he evolved during the second half of the 1990s- and has continued to implement ever since-might usefully be called ‘stock market, or **asset-price, Keynesianism**’. In traditional Keynesian policy, demand is ‘subsidized’ by means of the federal government’s incurring of rising public deficits so as to spend more than it takes in taxes. By contrast, in Greenspan’s version, **demand is increased by means of corporations and wealthy households taking on rising private deficits so as to spend more than they make**, encouraged to do so by the increased paper wealth that they effortlessly accrue by virtue of the appreciation of the value of their stocks, or other assets.” (Brenner, 2006:293) (emphasis added).

¹⁹² Which promotes private indebtedness.

When it comes to labour reforms, they reduced employment insurances and introduced temporary contracts making it easier to “hire and fire” and reducing job stability (Koch, 2005:339-341). Moreover the increasing dualisation of the labour market has tended to separate stable, well paid workers from precarious and ‘working poors’ (Letamendia, 2009:147-155; Navarro, 2009:28-31) and helped to consolidate ‘two nations’¹⁹³ hegemonic projects (Jessop, 1990:211; Navarro, 2009:28-31). With regard to that, according to Navarro there are “two Spains”: the 30-35% of the population with higher rents, most of them with liberal and conservative trends, has had a huge power in shaping the media and political culture; on the contrary, the other 60-65% has always had a lower influence in the state (2009:29). This imbalance has led to a lower welfare state in comparison with EU-15 countries (ibidem:32-41). For instance, according to Navarro, during the 2000’s an average of 19.7% of the GDP was invested in welfare provisions compared with the average 26.9% of the EU-15 countries and only 6% of adult population worked in welfare services in comparison with the average 11% in EU-15 (ibidem:34). Moreover, the basis of the model¹⁹⁴ is sustained in the hidden¹⁹⁵ work of women that is not considered ‘employment’, its generalized precarious situation and the gender selectivity of the state (Ezquerria, 2011; Goikoetxea, 2015; Jessop, 2008a; Pérez Orozco, 2014).

Such a model has created a powerful power block between main political parties¹⁹⁶ and banking, construction and housing sectors that have strategically inscribed their interests in the structure of the state (Naredo, Montiel, 2011: 37). Thus, key laws such as the 1998 Land Act¹⁹⁷ or policies of reducing public-housing stock, marginalizing renting and providing tax relief for home-buying have been at the core of most of the housing policies (López & Rodríguez, 2011: 14). In a similar way, reforms of the legal framework and the mortgage market or huge investments in transport infrastructure have also been of paramount importance (idem).

All in all, the territorial articulation is one of the most relevant aspects of the state project. In this sense, on the one hand, the “growth machines” character of

¹⁹³ According to Jessop, “one nation strategies aim at an expansive hegemony in which the support of the entire population is mobilized through material concessions and symbolic rewards (as in ‘social imperialism’ and the ‘Keynesian welfare state’ projects). In contrast ‘two nations’ projects aim at a more limited hegemony concerned to mobilize the support of strategically significant sectors of the population and to pass the costs of the project to others sectors (as in fascism and Thatcherism)” (Jessop, 1990:211).

¹⁹⁴ As it is the case in all Western (and no Western) patriarchal societies.

¹⁹⁵ That has structurally made invisible.

¹⁹⁶ Especially PSOE and PP but also CIU or PNV and some regional parties.

¹⁹⁷ Commonly known as the ‘build anywhere’ law, enormously speeded up the procedures for obtaining building permits and made available a huge amount of land for construction (López & Rodríguez, 2011: 14).

decentralized territories have boosted the property and construction boom (López & Rodríguez, 2010: 335). On the other, *the lack of a federal structure¹⁹⁸ based in economic-territorial autonomy and political-territorial parity has led to high levels of imbalances between bigger cities and smaller ones* (Goikoetxea, 2013a: 272). According to Goikoetxea, it has led to marked territorial and socio-economic inequalities both between and within the ACs: between women and men, between provinces and between the capital and the periphery (ibidem: 271). In this respect, since 1979 Madrid's population has increased by 40% and Barcelona's by 20% while 23 provinces have lost most of their population (ibidem: 272). As a consequence, almost half of the Spanish population lives in the seven most populous provinces (idem).

Although the territorial articulation of the state project has been important in that regard, our analysis would be very narrow if we limited its reach to a simple instrumentalist relation between the “State of Autonomies” and the accumulation strategy. Furthermore, it could not provide us with the necessary theoretical and empirical tools in order to understand current sovereignty demands in nations such as Catalonia and the Basque Country (H4). Thus, we are going to deal with this issue further in the next epigraph.

2.3 The State of Autonomies: decentralization in the shadow of hierarchy

2.3.1 Some introductory notes

One of the most remarkable changes introduced by democracy was the process of devolution through which ‘state powers’ were transferred to the newly formed regional and local authorities¹⁹⁹ setting up the new state of autonomies. Although it responded to internal claims and a contentious political dynamic, such as the historical demands of Basque, Catalan or Galician nationalists, it was also in fashion with deeper restructuration of the state that was already leading the way to the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (H1).

It was in that new post-Fordist economic rationale that smaller units began to be seen as having superior institutional and organizational capacity and better able at driving and promoting economic competitiveness (Gómez Uranga and Etxebarria, 2000; Calvo, 2014; Keating, 2013; Keating and Harvey, 2014). As mentioned above, in many aspects the territorial articulation of the Spanish state project has been very functional to the economic growth model and its dependence on property

¹⁹⁸ We will deal with this issue further below.

¹⁹⁹ The Autonomous Communities were created in a process that began in 1977 with the Decree-Law that recovered the Catalan Autonomy. Some of them were completely new and to certain extent “artificially set” while others had deeper historical and institutional roots.

asset-price bubble (López & Rodríguez, 2010: 335). López and Rodríguez focus on the “growth machines” character of decentralized territories that have boosted the property and construction boom (idem). *However, from our view its importance goes far beyond its functionality to certain accumulation strategies. Thus, decentralized territories with state powers have produced democratic state effects, which change our understanding of nations and nationalism (H4).* Let see how the process evolved.

2.3.2 Autonomous Communities in motion

The Autonomous Communities were created in a ‘pre-autonomy’ process that began in 1977 with the Decree-Law that recovered the Catalan Autonomy (Aja, 2003:61). A Decree-Law on 4 January 1978 established the provisional Basque Autonomy that excluded Navarre and after that, the same formula was adopted by most of the regions (idem). Once the Spanish Constitution was approved on 6 December 1978 two ways of getting autonomy were set in accordance with articles 143 and 151 of the Constitution. The so-called ‘reinforced way’²⁰⁰ was specially foresaw for those ‘historical nations’ that already had an Statute of Autonomy during the II Republic²⁰¹ (ibidem:69-70). It was the case of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia and it included a priority process and higher powers than those who followed the so-called ‘ordinary way’ (Aja, 2003:69-70) setting an asymmetry between the so called “nationalities” and “regions” (Máiz & Losada, 2009:183; Fossas, 1999:8). When it comes to Navarre, after the conflictive denial of its exclusion from the Basque Autonomous Community²⁰² it followed a different path to autonomy, the so-called improvement of the ‘fuero’. Through the Organic Law 13/1982, on the Reintegration and Enhancement of the Foral Regime of Navarre (LORAFNA)²⁰³ the renewed Foral Community of Navarre was established (ibidem:76).

In 1982 the Organic Law of the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process²⁰⁴ slowed down the devolution process and standardized the level and degree of devolution

²⁰⁰ Vía reforzada.

²⁰¹ The rest of the regions had to prove a ‘high will for self-government’: the support of 3/4 of the municipalities of each province and the absolute majority of the census of each province (Aja, 2003:70). Andalucía was the only one to follow the reinforced way apart from the historical nations, although Almería did not fulfilled the minimum requirements.

²⁰² Initially apart from the Basque nationalist parties, the PSOE, most of the left-wing political parties and part of the ruling UCD (Adolfo Suárez included) defended the formation of a unique autonomous community. However the position of the UCD in Navarre and the ‘foralist sectors’ that rejected such a project were the dominant ones and Navarre was not included in the project of autonomy for the Basque Country.

²⁰³ LORAFNA: Ley Orgánica del Reintegración y Amejoramiento del Régimen Foral de Navarra.

²⁰⁴ LOAPA: Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico.

between all ACs (Calvo, 2014:5). The Catalan and Basque Government and CIU and PNV appealed in the Constitutional Court and finally 14 of its 38 articles were declared unconstitutional (Anasagasti, 2012). Moreover, in 1992 a new agreement between the PSOE and the PP kept that drive for *harmonization* resulting in the development of a similar institutional infrastructure²⁰⁵ in all ACs (Calvo, 2014:5).

During the first decade of the new millennium the Statutes of Autonomy of Valencia (2006), Cataluña (2006), Andalucía (2007), Baleares (2007), Aragón (2007), Castilla y León (2007) and Extremadura (2011) were renewed²⁰⁶. However, only two processes of renewal have been politically and judicially controversial: the Basque Statute of Autonomy Reform Plan (2004), popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan and the Catalan Statute (2006). Whereas the first one was rejected by the Spanish Congress after having being approved by the Basque Parliament, the Catalan Statute was firstly amended by the Congress and after that legally contested by the Popular Party (PP), the ombudsman (the PSOE member Enrique Mujika) and the Autonomous Communities of Aragon, Balearic Islands, La Rioja, Murcia and Valencia. The Constitutional Court of Spain after deliberating for four years limited the content of the Statute by considering that 14 articles were unconstitutional, reinterpreting 27 more and clearly stating that defining Catalonia as a nation has not legal validity (La Vanguardia, 2010).

We are just giving an introductory overview so we are going to cope with the ‘Ibarretxe Plan’ and the Catalan Statute later. However, it is obvious that despite having different political consequences -being the secessionist contentious episode in the Catalan case the most obvious one (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015:323)- both are clear manifestations of demands for higher political capacities in order to produce and reproduce their demoi differently (Goikoetxea, 2013a; 2013b; 2014; 2017) and not of cultural or national issues strictu sensu, much less a question of ethnicity as some authors have suggested²⁰⁷ (Etxeberria, 1998: 44; Hobsbawn, 2015:150; Kymlicka, 2001: 77; Serrano,1998: 100-101). Furthermore, they represent a crisis of institutional integration and can even trigger a crisis of the state (Jessop, 2015a:258). However, we cannot analyse this phenomenon in isolation but in relation with a broader trend towards the privatization of democracy and authoritarian statism.

²⁰⁵ It included for example the expansion of seventeen regional TV stations, and sub-national administrative structures for the delivery and implementation of welfare services (Calvo, 2014:6)

²⁰⁶ This section has mainly descriptive purposes. For an analysis of the content of those changes see: (Keating & Wilson, 2009: 536-558).

²⁰⁷ Not about these particular contentious cases but about Basque nationalists claims in general. For a critical approach see: Zabalo, 2004:67-85.

2.3.3 Subalternity, decentralization and recentralization: democratization in the era of authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy

We need to pay special attention to certain aspects of the Spanish process of democratization in order to address the contradictory issue of decentralization in an era marked by the trend towards authoritarian statism, the privatization of democracy and the dominance of neoliberal governmentality (Azkune, 2016; Goikoetxea, 2014; Poulantzas, 1979:247; Foucault, 2008). As noted above European Union membership has obviously conditioned and even enhanced these trends. We remain again two interrelated planes of analysis: the privatization of democracy and the articulation of subaltern states within matrix states (H1).

We have said that democratization is “as a process that tends to include as *many people as possible* in the *governance of their political and socio-economic system* by empowering them through *public disciplinary and biopolitical techniques and institutions*, which subjugate but also capacitate them so that they can gain *as equal as possible* access to resources and opportunities in order to govern themselves.” (2017:14). As noted above, it will require high levels of state capacities and social mobilization (Goikoetxea, 2015b:38; Zubiaga, 2009). However, as Goikoetxea stands out, as a consequence of the privatization of democracy that necessary political capacity has been left in the hands of private authorities (2015b:35).

*In a parallel plane of analysis, we also have to bear in mind that the legal-constitutional source of power has paramount political and socio-economic consequences for democratization and the reproduction of the demos*²⁰⁸ (Goikoetxea, 2014a:150). *In that regard, according to our fourth hypothesis (H4), we believe that decentralization has entailed a different spatio-temporal fixation of territory, authority and rights* (Sassen, 2012) *which have led to different processes of demos and nation building and consequently to different processes of democratization* (Calvo, 2015; Goikoetxea, 2013a; 2013b; 2014; 2017; Martínez-Herrera, 2002:421-453).

Through that processes old nations have been reproduced democratically (Calvo, 2015; Canovan, 1996; Goikoetxea, 2013a; 2013b; 2014; 2017; Keating, 2012; McEwen, 2006). *Thus, in the case of the Basque Country and Catalonia we have said that we would rather talk not about regions or nations without states but about subaltern states within states. In that sense those which we have called ‘subaltern nationalists’ (Basque and Catalan nationalists) will consider the ‘subaltern state’ an equal polity and will ask for more political capacities in order*

²⁰⁸ Regardless of whether it is Basque, Catalan, Spanish or European.

to produce and reproduce their demois differently. On the contrary, those who consider the matrix state as the main body and the ‘subaltern state’ a subordinated entity have been considered ‘matrix nationalists’ (Spanish nationalists).

As noted above, *subalternity relates to the relation of dependence between the matrix and the subaltern state.* In accordance with Goikoetxea, “social objects are objective and subjective, in the sense that they are not only institutionalized or objectified power relations but also beliefs, perception and discourses which articulate our meaningful world” (2017:90). Thus, we think that subalternity entails both material and discursive aspects. *When it comes to the material aspect, this dependency is based on the need for the subaltern state to ask for more political capacities in order to produce and reproduce their demois differently (to normalize them through disciplinary, biopolitical and regulatory mechanisms) or to ask for political representation at the matrix state. As long as it is a relational concept, it must be discursively produced and reproduced by political parties, state agents, organic intellectuals, social movements etc. In such a process, the matrix state is used as its constitutive outside.*

Therefore, while subalternity requires a great deal of discursive construction and articulation²⁰⁹ we believe that it also has strong material elements so we are going to try to address some of its main points. *In that regard, we think that subalternity is enhanced its time the political capacities of a political community are reduced. We consider that through that process, the capacities a community has to govern itself according to the preferences of its demos are diminished (H5).* We have already seen how the structural changes of the last decades have entailed a loss of sovereignty which has disempowered citizens albeit the continuous claims for active civil society participation through governance²¹⁰. Thus, we may ask now if in a parallel process the contentious process of democratization/de-democratization in Spain has enhanced the subalternity of the Basque Country and Catalonia fostering nationalist/democratic confrontations.

With that in mind, many authors have claimed that Spain is almost *a federal state and that federalism is one of the best ways of dealing with plurinationality*²¹¹ and

²⁰⁹ There are competing views and discourses in order to impose who the demos is. Furthermore, “it is within this struggle that political distinction emerges and persists, giving rise to different demois, nations and states” (Goikoetxea, 2014a:148).

²¹⁰ As noted above, it is common in the so called Western liberal democracies but especially in the countries of the European Union and it is even more pronounced in the Euro zone countries.

²¹¹ As has been clear so far, we do not conceive plurinationality in current Europe as a matter of cultural diversity.

sub-state democracies in current Europe (Losada & Maíz, 2009; Maíz, 2008; Requejo, 2007). Hence, we will pose a question that will enable us answer our previous query: is Spain a federal state?

2.3.3.1 Is Spain a federal state?

Recovering the mentioned ideas, in this epigraph we will try to answer the next questions: is Spain a federal state? Has it tended towards federalization or de-federalization? In such a process, the political capacities of the autonomous communities have been reinforced or reduced?

In its more basic meaning, “federal principles are concerned with the combination of *self-rule and shared rule*²¹²” (Elazar, 1991:5). In accordance with Daniel Elazar, “federalism thus defined involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanent character that (1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and (3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist” (1991: 12).

In that regard, albeit with different nuances many authors have claimed the federal, asymmetrical and even multinational nature of Spain (Agranoff & Bañón, 1998; Aja, 2003; Börzel, 2002; Losada & Maíz, 2009; Moreno, 2001, 2002). Thus, in Moreno’s view “The deep and widespread process of decentralization can be regarded as one of progressive federalization in line with the asymmetrical nature of Spain’s composition” (2002:406). Although less enthusiastically, Aja also highlights the quasi-federal nature of the autonomic state based in the two levels of powers and the differentiated elements²¹³ that only correspond to some autonomies (2003:51-52). In a similar fashion, Börzel has even compared Spain with the American model of dual federalism by emphasizing the separation of the central state and regional powers (2002:93).

However, as long as they are different concepts, neither federalism means *per se* decentralization nor does decentralization entails federalism (Requejo, 2007:90-94). According to Letamendia, the Autonomic State is the result of the transformation of the unitary State and the response to its most recent crisis (1997:33). It represents the decentralized solution to its failure (idem). What does this involve? *Decentralization consists of a dispersion of power from a political centre to other political centres and tends to consider the demos in a much more monist way than in the classical federal tradition* (Requejo, 2007:91). *According to Zubiaga the autonomic scheme is the result of a concession of the centre and*

²¹² Bold type added by the author.

²¹³ “Hechos diferenciales”.

not the mutual agreement of the implied political communities (Zubiaga, 1999:124). In that sense it is not a “system of dual sovereignty” like that established in the US constitution but a transferred of specific powers or functions from a superior government to a subordinate government (Kincaid, 1998: 14). It entails thus, ab initio, a relation of subalternity between what we have called the subaltern state and the matrix state.

Pérez Royo goes a step further by describing the ‘*anti-federal*’ nature of the *Spanish Constitution as a structural feature* of the Spanish political system (2015:108). On his view, the acceptance of the *Province* (a non-democratic monarchical reminiscence) as the axis of both, *the electoral constituency* and the *territorial representation*, has structurally privileged a bipartisan, monarchical and anti-federal model (idem).

On the one hand, the provisional electoral system of the ‘Act for the Political Reform of 1977’ kept the Province as the electoral constituency in line with the previous Fascist Law. Although it was initially designed for the first elections, it was kept without substantive changes in the constitutional agreements. As a consequence, the calculated deviation of equality became the ‘essential nucleus’ of the ‘constitutional bloc’ (ibidem:110). This very deviation privileges the less populated territories and fosters a bipartisan constitution (idem). On the other, while the Province was chosen as the political unity for territorial representation the two democratic territorial entities -autonomous communities and municipalities- were put aside (Ibidem:124). Therefore, a body with no democratic legitimation became the essential unity for territorial representation while at the same time the Senate lost any hint of being a federal territorial chamber. Directly relying in Royo’s words:

“La constitucionalización de la provincia como la entidad territorial a través de la cual el Senado se define como “Cámara de representación territorial” (artículo 69.1 CE) cierra la puerta de manera insoslayable a cualquier posible definición federal de la Constitución. Más todavía: a cualquier evolución en sentido federal. [...] La provincia no pertenece al mundo de la democracia y el Estado federal solo puede pertenecer a ese mundo. (ibídem:125)”

In accordance with these point, from our point of view²¹⁴ it is clear that, *not only de jure but also de facto, Spain is not a federal state*. However, according to some authors, there are also some political and constitutional ambiguities and undefined

²¹⁴ As already seen there are authors that claim the federal, asymmetrical and multinational nature of the State of Autonomies.

elements that could have made evolve Spain towards a more federal like scheme²¹⁵ (Aja, 2003:48; Requejo, 2007: 147-156; Losada & Máiz, 2009:187). In that regard, Moreno argues that “federalization in Spain has developed in an inductive manner, step by step, rather than resulting from a well defined constitutional separation of competencies and powers.” (2010: 167). Losada and Máiz highlight the continuous interaction between trends towards federalization and counter-trends²¹⁶ towards de-federalization in which the last view has gained weight (2009:187). There have only been some timid attempts to federalize the state when the party ruling at the central government has not obtained an absolute majority and has required the backing of CIU (Catalan nationalists), PNV (Basque nationalists) or Coalición Canaria (Canary Islands regionalists) but the trend towards de-federalization has been the dominant one (Losada & Máiz, 2009:189; Goikoetxea, 2013:11).

Following Losada’s and Máiz’s work we are going to see the process of recentralization and re-symmetrisation by considering three significant areas and the mechanisms applied in each of it (Losada & Máiz, 2009:197-215). The three areas and the query they pose run as follows:

1. ***The distribution of normative power***: who decides, on what issues and which are the tools in order to make that decision effective?
2. ***The financing system***: who raise taxes and how is its distribution determined?
3. ***The political dynamic of recentralization and re-symmetisation***: has the contentious political dynamic reinforced the central government against autonomies?

Moreover, if we consider the empirical work done by Requejo in which he compares 19 federal and decentralized states Spain comes at the bottom of the list (2007: 139). He distinguishes four analytical axes: 1- one-nation - multinational state; 2- unitarianism- federalism; 3- centralization – decentralization; 4- Symmetry – asymmetry (ibidem:136). He also establishes a scale of 20 points in order to manage the data (idem). According to his research, when it comes to ***its grade of federalism***, Spain obtains 6.5 points out of 20 and the 15th position out of 19 (ibidem: 139). Its ***level of decentralization*** obtains 10.5 points out of 20 standing at

²¹⁵ Royo completely dismisses that possibility: “...la opinión más común entre constitucionalistas y politólogos es que la Constitución Española no es una Constitución federal, pero es asimilable a este tipo de constitución. Y no hay nada más lejos de la realidad” (ibidem:125)

²¹⁶ We have already seen in the previous chapter the continuous interaction between trends and counter-trends in the transformation of the state (Jessop, 2008a:210).

number 11 out of 19 in the classification (Requejo, 2007: 139). We see thus that it gets very poor results in both axes so *we can hardly talk about a federal decentralized state, much less about a multinational federation.*

In this respect, according to Blas, the lack of a federal arrangement is directly related to the dominant Spanish nationalism that can only admit homogeneous and uniform federalism while rejecting asymmetrical and plurinational options (2012:126). It is that very view of the Spanish nation not only the hegemonic one in the right, but also in a large part of the political and intellectual left²¹⁷ (Nuñez Seixas, 2010; Pastor, 2012; Taibo, 2014). Furthermore, since the second government of Jose María Aznar onwards (2000-2004) some of its more clear manifestations stopped being stigmatized and started to expand again (Blas, 2013:399).

Last but not least, we must bear in mind the strategic selectivity of the Constitutional Court by privileging some visions of the state project over others (Albertí, 2010:13; Lasagabaster, 2008:105-115). In fashion with the above-mentioned ideas, it reinforces the subaltern condition of autonomies by considering the supreme position of the Constitution and the Constitutional Court itself over Autonomy Statutes, relegating the lasts to a secondary position in the constitutional bloc²¹⁸ (Bayona, 2010:72). The judgment on the Catalan Statute of 2006 has been the most notorious one and has even lead to a degree of ‘judicial activism’ by doing unnecessary interpretative declarations (idem). It has been especially relevant because it has broken two basic features of the constituent pact: the juridical value of the statute as a norm²¹⁹ and its role as a political pact (ibidem: 73). Furthermore, it may have closed the door for further deepening of self-government through statutory reforms (idem).

That being the case, we can conclude by saying that the key issue is not only that Spain is not a federal state but also and most importantly that there are not real prospects for its federal evolution (Taibo, 2014:71); Royo, 2015:125²²⁰). Furthermore, the political capacities of the autonomous communities (and subaltern states) have been reduced. It is in that context in which some of those who embraced

²¹⁷ The creation of Podemos has opened a new door to a “third way” based in the recognition of the right to decide of nations (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018).

²¹⁸ For instance, in the case of the the Spanish Constitutional Court’s judgement on the Catalan Statute in 2010 (Bayona, 2010:72).

²¹⁹ It has considered the Statute an autonomic norm and not a state law (Bayona, 2010:72)

²²⁰ It has been a historical will of catalanism. The newly creation of Podemos revived the hopes for a “federal third way”. It remains to be seen which is the outcome of the Catalan contention and the organic crisis of Spain but, at least at first glance, the political context does not appear favourable towards federalization.

federalism, especially in Catalonia, began to see the federal path as a road to nowhere. Miquel Caminal, one of the most ardent defender of federalism of the last decades graphically described the evolution of some former federalists towards more pro-independence positions when talking about the process “from the utopian federalism towards scientific secessionism²²¹ when it should have been the opposite” (Caminal, 2013).

2.3.3.2 Strong executive and central government

We already know that in Spain political power and capacity is unevenly distributed amongst the supranational European institutions; the Spanish central administration; and the 17 Autonomous Communities’ unequal competences (Goikoetxea, 2014: 148-149). Indeed, as mentioned above there is almost no sphere in which the Autonomous Communities can establish their own policies in an unconditioned way (Fossas, 1999:7). We are going to go a step further in order to complement some ideas already mentioned in the previous epigraph. Therefore, considering its importance in current Western states we are going to consider briefly the role of the executive in Spain.

We are not going to repeat the main points related to *authoritarian statism*²²² of the previous chapter but just say that we see again similar features in the Spanish case. On the one hand, *the power of the executive over the parliament in order to assure a strong state is granted by the Spanish Constitution* (Heywood, 1995:247). It involves that the central government enjoys extensive room for manoeuvre over legislation, which includes the priority of its own bill over those proposed by the opposition, widespread use of legislative devolution, and the option of issuing decree-laws in urgent cases²²³ (Heywood, 1998:105). The capacity to impose reforms by decree law (Article 86 of the Constitution) is just an example of the strength of the executive and it is related to the above mentioned²²⁴ trend towards fast policy-making in order to face the loss of temporal sovereignty (Jessop, 2008a:193; 2010:42).

When it comes to *the President of the Government*, it is constitutionally empowered to monopolise the most important decisions over national policy, as well as the basic organisation of the government so it is not a *primus inter pares* but

²²¹ He uses the word “independentismo”.

²²² We are not going to explain its features as we have already covered this issue in the chapter entitled “Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy: neoliberal governmentality and the return of sovereignty”.

²²³ Although it has become a common legislative practice as we will see below.

²²⁴ See the chapter: “Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy: neoliberal governmentality and the return of sovereignty”.

the unambiguous head of a strong executive (Heywood, 1998:106). Thus, the President and core executive enjoy very significant powers and resources (Heywood, 1998:106). In that regard, *the pre-eminent position of the Ministry of Economy in policy initiation and co-ordination*²²⁵ (Heywood, 1998:111) is also in line with the above mentioned general restructuring of the state (Goikoetxea, 2017; Jessop, 2015b: 68-69; Sassen,2012:280;).

Chari and Heywood have analysed the Spanish policy process and clearly show the *structural trend towards concentration of power rather than its diffusion* (2009). *They study key areas*²²⁶ *such as privatisations, education and the relations with the European Union*²²⁷ *and show that regardless who the ruling party is, the policy process structurally tends to strengthen the executive over the parliament and over social movements and interest groups, and the central government over autonomous communities* (ibidem: 49).

Although policy outcomes may vary depending on conjunctural elements²²⁸, the policy process has been the same through different periods regardless of which was the political party in charge even when support from PNV or CIU²²⁹ was necessary in case of minority governments. We directly rely on their words:

“Our contention is that only by looking in more detail at the interplay between institutionally-driven structural features of Spain’s democracy and socioeconomic model of capitalism and the contingent changes in political composition of governing parties can we properly understand both continuities as well as changes in the policy process. Of particular importance in this regard has been the creation and increasing institutionalization of a very strong core executive in Spain, which has been able to concentrate power in a systematic manner and dominate the policy process to the exclusion of parliament, interest group participation and even smaller, supporting parties when policies are made by minority governments. (Chary & Heywood, 2009: 49).

²²⁵ As Heywood points out it has played a key role in processes of privatisation and in boosting neoliberal policies (Heywood, 1998:111)

²²⁶ Although they limit their empirical analysis to the mentioned areas they claim that it would be applied to other areas as a result of the institutionally-driven path dependency (Chary & Heywood, 2009:49).

²²⁷ They focus on the Draft EU Constitution.

²²⁸ For instance, depending on the economic situation or the ruling party.

²²⁹ To give just one example: “Moreover, evidence from the late 1990s demonstrates that when a minority government – in this case the PP which governed with the support of the Catalan party CiU – wishes to do so, **it can implement measures that run counter to the desires of the regions.**” (Chary & Heywood, 2009: 48) (emphasis added).

4- 2007-2017: Spain after the fiesta

4.2 The crash of the accumulation strategy, the state project and recentralization: crisis management, austerity and authoritarian statism

4.2.1 The end of the ‘fiesta’

Although economic crises *per se* do not necessarily lead to organic crises²³⁰, they are usually one of its main important triggers (Jessop, 2015a:487). Indeed, financial and economic crises have more radical effects when the state is the addressee of calls for crisis-intervention and resolution and the state and politics are affected by crises that hinder or block effective crisis-management (idem). In the Spanish case the economic crisis is intertwined with a much broader crisis of the state²³¹ in which we include some of the above mentioned features of the state project (ibidem:59).

It goes beyond the scope of our research analysing in detail neither the causes of the Spanish crisis nor its management but we would like to make a short comment in order to understand better the crisis of the state in its integral sense and the growing demands for sovereignty. When it comes to the causes, *it follows the overall trend of an era dominated by a finance-led accumulation* (Jessop, 2013:250). Nonetheless, it also has its own specificities linked to the above described accumulation strategy. In this respect, *the very same elements that enabled fast-profits and rapid growth were going to have its reverse by enhancing a quick and deep downturn*. When it comes to its management we can say that it follows the overall trend of further strengthening of the neoliberal project by defining it just a crisis *in* finance-led accumulation or, at most, *in* neoliberalism²³² (idem). Furthermore, its management is directly related to the growing authoritarian statist elements of the state as described above and has enhanced a process of recentralization that has reduced the political capacities of autonomies (Calvo, 2014; Goikoetxea, 2017; Nikolas & Urrutia, 2016; Poulantzas, 1979).

²³⁰ In some circumstances economic crisis do not produce organic crises. In others, organic crisis can be the result of a failure in a ‘national project’ (a war for example) and not exactly the result of economic circumstances or because huge masses have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity (Gramsci, 1999:450-451). We will develop this idea further below.

²³¹ As already mentioned, understood in its institutional and substantive dimensions: crisis of representation, crisis of institutional integration, crisis of state’s capacities, crisis of the power block, crisis of legitimacy and crisis of hegemony.

²³² Instead of a “*crisis of*” that would have required deeper structural changes by limiting for example the finance-dominated accumulation.

The North Atlantic Financial Crisis was initially framed as a global phenomenon that was not affecting Spain's strong economy (Molina, 2012:60-62). However, when in 2008 most of the indicators showed the reality, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero admitted that the crisis had broken out. For instance unemployment doubled its rates in two years (from 8.57 in 2007 to 18.66 in 2009). It did not only affected construction but also the consumer-goods industry and market services and was facilitated by Spanish productive structure and a labour market with a high proportion of employees on short-term and temporary contracts (López & Rodríguez, 2011: 21).

More specifically, according to Nagore Calvo, the Spanish crisis followed a progression that began with the housing bubble, continued with the problems in the banking system and extended to serious financial problems of regional authorities (2014:11). In that context, a vicious circle began as the economic activity came to a sudden stop, the levels of unemployment rose, the revenues collapsed and public debt grew rapidly (idem).

When it comes to its management, although there was a first attempt to adopt some neo-Keynesian measures (August 2008 – April 2010) there was a switch of direction in line with the international conjuncture (Molina, 20012:62-65; Solty, 2013:71-72). Thus, whereas the 'wealth effects' of asset-price Keynesianism went into reverse generating a severe 'poverty effect', the government focused on a policy of socializing the losses of the country's oligarchic blocs²³³ (López & Rodríguez, 2011: 21). Moreover, the pressure at EU, especially Eurozone level, shifted from bank-rescue packages to strict austerity measures²³⁴ for which the 'return of the national state'²³⁵ became crucial (Jessop, 2010). In this respect, the EU has played a central role in determining the content of crisis management policies in Spain but it has been the Spanish state the one that has led their implementation (Calvo, 2014:11). Thus, due to the lack of structures at EU level it is the "national state" which is managing the implementation of most of the measures (Jessop, 2015b: 207-210).

In that regard, following the trend described by Jessop when analysing crisis construals and management in North Atlantic Financial Crisis, "the authorities reacted quickly²³⁶ without much consultation and with timely, targeted, and temporary emergency measures to safeguard the monetary, banking and credit

²³³ Construction companies and large private banks are the most significant ones.

²³⁴ Drastic measures that included budget cuts, wage freezes, the dismantling of social programmes or labour-market re-structuring.

²³⁵ In fact it had never gone.

²³⁶ As we have seen, after a first period of denial.

systems and stimulate demand in vulnerable industrial sectors. In particular the aim was to rescue financial institutions that were deemed too big (or too interconnected) to fail.” (Jessop, 2013:250).

4.2.2 Authoritarian statism and re-centralization

We can see again the same features of the above mentioned²³⁷ post-democratic crisis management (Crouch, 2004) that strengthens the authoritarian statist character of the state (Poulantzas, 1979). As already mentioned it entails the decline of the parliament, the reinforcement of the executive and the fusion between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (idem). Political parties become little more than transmission belts for official decisions and lose their capability for proposing alternative state projects and hegemonic visions²³⁸ (ibidem: 281). On the contrary, the mediatisation of politics is enhanced²³⁹ and the parallel power networks that connect state power to capitalist interests are extended (ibidem: 294-95). Finally, coercion is hardened and control shifts from the criminal act to crime-inducing situation, introducing pre-emption as a policing strategy (Boukalas, 2014: 124). Moreover, “a legal, martial and administrative arsenal is established to prevent popular struggles” (Boukalas, 2014: 124).

In the Spanish case, we see again that there is not a complete rupture with previous trends but a condensation of its contradictions and a reinforcement of its features. In that regard crisis management has also fostered re-centralization and re-symmetrisation intertwined with the enhancement of the Spanish national project at the expense of alternative national projects such as the Basque or the Catalan (Calvo, 2014:13).

We may consider firstly *the strengthening of an already strong executive*. In this sense, although decree-laws were designed to take exceptional and urgent measures (Article 86 of the Spanish Constitution) their use has become a common practice. Through them, they take decisions affecting Autonomous Communities without considering neither their institutional participation nor that of their political representatives.

During the second government of Rodríguez Zapatero (2008-2011), decree-laws were used to take sounding austerity measures. Among them, we highlight public

²³⁷ See the chapter “Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy”.

²³⁸ The key elements of the substantive dimension of the state.

²³⁹ Relevant for the *statu quo* but also for the emergence of counter hegemonic projects as we have seen with the creation of Podemos.

deficit reduction that fostered the reduction of civil servant salaries²⁴⁰ and froze the numbers of the personnel; the freezing of the re-evaluation of the pensions or the suppression of important aspects of the Dependency Law (Casal, 2012:129). During the first government of Rajoy (2011-2015) the trend continued and 35%²⁴¹ of the legislative measures were adopted through decree-laws (Europa Press, 2015).

Another important dimension is related to *the process of re-centralization and the loss of the political capacities by the Autonomous Communities*. In that line, one of the most sounding measures is the limit on the level of indebtedness of regional governments adopted by the central state with the endorsement of Moody's (Calvo, 2014:12; Europa Press, 2011). The accumulation of debt at autonomic and local level is linked with the evolution of the process of decentralization. In this sense, *whereas responsibilities for the delivery of key welfare provisions were devolved, in a parallel process the level of public spending decreased significantly*²⁴² (Calvo, 2014:8). From its peak in 1993 with the 48 per cent of GDP it dropped to 38 per cent in 2006 (Gil-Ruiz & Quintana, 2007:188; Lago, 2012:13). It also coincided with the adoption of the EU Stability and Growth Pact and the Spanish Budgetary Stability Pact that induced a decrease of public debt and a reduction of the interest on debt payments but also a drop on the level of social expenditure (Calvo, 2014:9). Although the above described growth model based in financial and housing rents bubblenomics (López & Rodríguez, 2010:157) provided short-term fast profits that covered the lack of proper funding²⁴³, its crash uncovered its limitations (Calvo, 2014:8).

In relation to that, we have to take into account the constitutional amendment of *article 135* in August 2011. It was in line with the above explained *Fiscal Compact* even before its approval²⁴⁴ (Escudero, 2012:88; Sandbeck, Schneider, 2014:853) and it provides a clear example of the widespread constitutionalization of austerity (Bruff, 2014:124) and the *trend towards enduring austerity states* (Jessop, 2015:233-236).

Article 135 was changed rapidly and with little debate despite the importance of its content. It was agreed by the main Spanish nationalists parties (PSOE and PP) without taking into account neither minority parliamentary groups (which in the Basque Autonomous Community and Catalonia are the majority parties) nor

²⁴⁰ Which broke the previous agreement between the unions and the government.

²⁴¹ The data of the table does not cover the whole legislative period so instead of the 35% shows a final amount of 33.8%.

²⁴² Although it grew in absolute terms it did not grow in line with the GDP (Lago, 2012:12).

²⁴³ We cannot omit for instance the importance of a growing trend for fiscal restraint on the level of central government.

²⁴⁴ The Fiscal Compact was approved on 2 March 2012.

the institutional participation of Autonomous Communities (Goikoetxea, 2017:184). However, it introduced a cap on the budget deficits on all state administrations, including the autonomic governments, and has allowed the central state to gain stronger control over fiscal policy and public spending, which are key mechanisms to control the level of autonomic and local indebtedness (Calvo, 2014:12). Furthermore, it established a constitutional mandate to meet repayments and servicing debt as a first priority, “transferring all tensions and conflicts that could arise (e.g. in terms of implementing public cuts) to primarily regional and local authorities” (idem).

There have been further recentralizing reforms in key areas to self-government. Nikolas and Urrutia along with Goikoetxea²⁴⁵ have dealt in depth with the issue so we just present some of their main points as follows:

- **Labour reform:** it has entailed an increase in corporate power and a weakening of collective bargaining and trade union intervention.
- **Financial services:** it has promoted the transformation of saving banks into private banks.
- **Influence over autonomy powers through state-spending:** the executive has boosted the spending capacity of the central state on areas of exclusive competence of the ACs.
- **Standardizing rules of the financial AID regime:** it has reduced the legal capacity of the ACs in the field of regulation of subsidies and aids.
- **Education:** undermining of self-government competencies through the regulation of key aspects of education.
- **New market configurations:** it is characterized by both financial and jurisdictional limitations on self-government. It privileges private interests in the name of market necessities without considering democratic principles and standards.
- **New legal regime on public servants:** it has reduced the capacity of ACs through measures such as the ban on hiring new personnel in regional and local administrations, limits on internal promotions in universities, uniform regulation for remuneration and working hours, and the prohibition of contributions to pension plans.
- **Healthcare:** regional power was limited by broadening the central state’s competencies.

²⁴⁵ Goikoetxea’s work is partially inspired by the work of Nikolas and Urrutia (2016).

- **European regulation of national legislation:** the implementation of the EU legislation without considering the competences of ACs and thereby depriving and conditioning their capacity to intervene.
- **Local administrations:** legislation on rationalization and sustainability of local governments has changed the face of self-government through strictly economic means. It has promoted the privatization of local communities and territories.

Through those measures, the political capacities of the autonomous communities have been reduced and consequently, the material aspect of their subalternity has been enhanced (H5).

When it comes to the main political parties (particularly PP and PSOE), they have lost their capacity to propose alternative state projects and hegemonic visions (Jessop, 2015b:84-88). In line with the transformation towards the SWPN, we need to highlight the dominance of post-democracy, the end of antagonism and the rise of post-politics (Crouch, 2004; Jessop, 2015b; Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 1999, 2007, 2010; Zizek, 2010). Therefore counter hegemonic proposals are considered “old fashioned” and contrary to the “real democratic management” based on consensus, the search of economic growth, certainty for the “markets” and sensible crisis management in accordance with experts advice and European guidelines²⁴⁶.

In relation to that, we need to highlight their role as transmission belts for official decisions as typical parties of post-democracy (Crouch, 2004; Poulantzas, 1979:281). In an era marked by privatization and sub-contracting, firms wanting a share of this business are well advised to maintain permanent contact with the policy-making core of a governing party (Crouch, 2004:73). While members of the firms spend periods within the advisory circles, party advisers get jobs as lobbyists with the firms (idem). Thus, the inner core becomes stretched from being an inner circle of the party to being an ellipse stretching way out beyond the party’s ranks (idem). This has led to the famous phenomena known as “revolving doors²⁴⁷”. Directly relying in Crouch words:

“From the point of view of party leadership, relations with the new ellipse are much easier, better informed and more rewarding than those

²⁴⁶ Sensible, responsible or serious management are continuously present in their discourses. See for instance: (PSOE) <http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/1551983/09/09/Los-dirigentes-del-PSOE-aprueban-la-politica-economica-sensata-seria-y-responsable-de-Zapatero.html> or (PP) <http://www.pp.es/actualidad-noticia/rajoy-es-momento-apostar-por-politicas-sensatas-no-asumir-riesgos> (accessed 03/02/2017).

²⁴⁷ Puertas giratorias in Spanish. Not only PP and PSOE but most of the “governing parties” are involved in this practice, CIU and PNV as well.

with the old circles of activists. The expertise of the ellipse is of far more use than the amateur enthusiasms that is all that the normal party activist has to offer. If we extrapolate from recent trends, the classic party of the twenty-first century would be one which comprises a self-reproducing inner elite, remote from its mass movement base, but nested squarely within a number of corporations, which will in turn fund the sub-contracting of opinion-polling, policy-advice and vote-gathering services, in exchange for firms that seek political influence being well regarded by the party when in government.” (ibidem:74)

Beyond the ‘revolving doors’, we have to take into account that even the political capacity of the political parties is in doubt. The kind of measures and their post-democratic management are well known but mention needs to be made to the direct pressures of the ECB on Rodríguez Zapatero by imposing measures that went beyond their competences (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014:176). For instance, Jean Claude Trichet and Miguel Fernández Ordoñez sent a letter to Rodríguez Zapatero asking for the liberalization of the labour market, decentralization of collective bargaining, wage restraint and the adoption of deficit reduction measures (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014:176). *We are highlighting this in order to link it to the core idea of the previous chapter, the loss of sovereignty as a structural trend in current states and the role of political parties as little more than transmission belts for official decisions* (Poulantzas, 1979:181).

Furthermore, it goes without saying that corruption directly affects not only the quality of democracy but also the trust on political parties and the state in general. As long as there were numerous scandals already in the 80’s and 90’s we do not see again a complete break with previous trends (Heywood, 2007). What is more, there is a direct link between corruption and the particular form of the transition in Spain, the features of the power block and the connected accumulation strategy and state project (Naredo, Montiel, 2011:36-37). As mentioned above, after the transition towards democracy new and old political and economic elites formed a new power block in which banking, real estate and speculative groups had a leading role (Petras, 1990:194). The accumulation strategy based on the property bubble has fostered corrupt practices that include, inter alia, reclassifications and illegal party funding²⁴⁸ because of the close relationship between certain economic and political elites (Naredo, Montiel, 2011: 37). In this regard, authors of Transparency

²⁴⁸ For further information in the relation between corruption, political and economic elites and the accumulation strategy see for instance: (Naredo, 2009; Recio, 2009)

International's latest Corruption Perceptions Index have said that "Spain is joining countries that have come close to systemic graft" (El País, 2017).

As already noted, these contradictions have intensified after 2008, a period in which media has exposed many high-profile corruption cases. It is in this mediatised 'politics of scandal'²⁴⁹ in which disillusionment amongst the electorate towards mainstream politicians grow and the crisis of legitimacy is enhanced (Heywood, 2007:698). Apart from the objective dimension of corruption, we consider its subjective perception the most relevant aspect when assessing the crisis of legitimacy and representation of the state in its integral sense. In that sense, a total of 80% of Spaniards believe that the government has failed to curb corruption and 66% also believe that corruption is the greatest problem facing the country (El País, 2016). Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index showed in 2016 that Spain was in its worst historical position. Whereas in 2000 Spain achieved rank 20 and in 2008 rank 28, in 2016 its position dropped to rank 41²⁵⁰ (Datos macro, 2017).

Finally, we cannot omit the strengthening of an already hard legislation. For years, a special tribunal such as the "Audiencia Nacional", which replaced the francoist "Tribunal de Orden Público", has been a key actor on developing a specific adaptation of the international 'homeland security' and 'war on terrorism' measures which has had ETA and 'Basque Patriotic Left' as its main target. In line with Boukalas' view, coercion has been hardened and control has shifted from the criminal act to crime-inducing situation, introducing pre-emption as a policing strategy (Boukalas, 2014: 124).

In a parallel line, anti austerity struggles have provoked the strengthening of the legislation by the means of the "Gag Rule"²⁵¹ approved in 2015. Thus, in a context in which social mobilization and protests grow "a legal, martial and administrative arsenal is established to prevent popular struggles" (idem). However, we are not dealing with an isolate reaction but with a worldwide trend, which applies in a similar way regardless of whether we talk about Spain, Quebec, Chicago or Greece (Seymour, 2013). We can briefly sum up our point by directly relying on Seymour's accurate words:

²⁴⁹ Some examples are "Barcena case" (PP), "the Andalucian ERE case" (PSOE), "Punica case" (PP), "Noos case" (Monarchy) etc.

²⁵⁰ We are talking about perceptions so we do not mean that there was not corruption in previous years. Moreover, current corruption scandals are due to corrupt practices during those years.

²⁵¹ Ley Mordaza in Spanish.

The reorganisation of states today in an authoritarian direction is part of a longer-term project to contain democracy while retaining a minimum of democratic legitimacy. That is what the anti-protest laws are about (Seymour, 2013).

In accordance with the above-mentioned ideas, we think that the structural contradictions of the so-called “regime of 78” have led to an organic crisis of the state (Gramsci, 1999: 450-451). We will see its features below.

4.3 Krisi organikoa: ¡No es una crisis es una estafa!

¡No es una crisis es una estafa! Oihukatzen zuten 2011ko maiatzaren 15ean Espainiar Estatuko kaleetan suminduek. Neurri handi batean garaiko zentzu komuna ordezkatzeko duen neurrian epigrafe honen garapenerako baliatuko dugu. Euren artean elkar eraginean ulertu behar diren hiru prozesu baliatuko ditugu gure azalpenaren muina garatzeko: burujabetza galera, demokraziaren pribatizazioa eta krisi organikoa.

Aldez aurretik aipatu hainbat ideia birgogoratuko ditugu²⁵². Duselek adierazi moduan, boterea beti komunitate politikoaren eskuetan dago (*potentia*) eta bere erakundetzearen bidez (*potestas*) bihurtzen da erreal (2006:31). Horren ondorioz, funtsezkoa da aipatu ***potentia eta potestasen arteko banaketa*** burutzea. Lehenengoa, agerikoa ez den maila ontologikoari deritzo, komunitate politikoaren boterearen jatorri eta oinarriari hain zuzen. Bigarrena, botere hori erreal, enpiriko eta egingarri bihurtzen duen botere erakundetua da. Banaketa hori ahalbidetzen duen prozesua ***burujabetza da, komunitate politikoa eta bere gobernu demokratikoki artikulatzen dituen erlazio soziala***.


Horretaz gain, politikaren printzipio materialak jarraituz, erakundeek komunitate politikoaren bizitzaren produkzio, erreproduktzio eta garapena ahalbidetu beharko lukete (ibidem:73). Alta, prozesu horrek gaitasun politikoa eta egiturazko boterea²⁵³ galdatuko du (Mann, 1984:189; Tilly, 2007: 16) komunitate politikoak beretzat eta bere buruarentzat²⁵⁴ erreproduzitzeko gaitasuna izan dezan (Dussel, 2006:36-37). Bestalde, jendarte boteretu eta mobilizatu bat ezinbestekoa izango da menderakuntza prozesu horri aurre egin eta demokratizazioan sakontzeko (Goikoetxea, 2017a). Aipatu ideiak hurrengo grafikoaren bidez laburbilduko dugu:

²⁵² “Authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy: neoliberal governmentality and the return of sovereignty” kapituluaren baitan “Introduction: sovereignty and demands for sovereignty” atalean aipatu ideiak dira hain zuzen ere.

²⁵³ Infrastructural power jatorrizko hizkuntzan.

²⁵⁴ En sí y para sí jatorrizko hizkuntzan.

IRUDIA 20 Botere politikoa potentiatik potestasera



Dussel, 2006:27-n oinarritua

Demokraziak, herriaren/demosaren (potentia) borondatearen araberako gobernua (potestas) esan nahi du (Goikoetxea, 2014a:146). Grafikoaren arabera, agintariak demosaren borondatea jarraituz era obedientzian jardun dezakete komunitate politikoa berez eta bere buruarentzat birstortzea ahalbidetuz (Dussel, 2006:36-37). Hala ere, botere fetitxizatu moduan ere aritu daitezke obedientziarik gabe gobernatuz eta gobernu auto erreferentzial gisa jokatuz (ibidem:40-47). Demokraziaren pribatizazioaren ondorioz, herritarrak boteretzeko eta demosaren borondatearen arabera jarduteko beharrezkoa den gaitasun politikoa autoritate pribatuen esku geratu da. Arestian azaldu definizioa berreskuratuz:


“Demokraziaren pribatizazioak oximoron bat eman dezake; izan ere, demokraziaren bitartez esparru publikoa zabaltzen da, eta pribatizazioak, berriz, kontrako norabidean jotzen du, eta esku pribatuetan jartzen ditu eskubideak, erabakiak hartzeko ahalmena eta instituzio publikoak, bai eta ondasun kolektiboa, jakintza, osasungintza, hezkuntza, baliabide naturalak eta autoritate politikoak ere” (Goikoetxea, 2017b:12).

²⁵⁵ a-b-c ibilbidea: demokratizazioa. A-d-e ibilbidea: desdemokratizazioa.

“Demokraziaren pribatizazioaren ezaugarri da estatuari zegozkion ahalmenak eta gaitasun publiko-politikoak (hala nola erabakiak hartzea, legeak egitea eta ezartzea, horiek ebaluatzea, berriro egokitzea, ondasunak ekoiztea eta banatzea) esku pribatuetara igarotzea (enpresak, adituak, lobbiak, interes-taldeak, eragile exekutiboak) (ibidem:37).

Zer gertatzen da demokrazia pribatizatzen denean eta burujabetza galera bat dagoenean? Demokrazia eta burujabetza galdatzen duten eskaerak azaleratzen direla (H3). ¡Lo llaman democracia y no lo es! ¡Que no, que no, que no nos representan! ¡No es una crisis es una estafa! ¡No hay pan para tanto chorizo! Horiek dira austeritate neurrien aurka protesta egiteko sortu zen M-15 mugimenduaren aldarrikapen nagusiak. Nazioarte mailan demokrazia gehiago eta herri burujabetzaren berreskurapena eskatzen zuen mobilizazio zikloarekin sintonia zuzenean, aldez aurretik izaera pasiboa zuten indarrek konpromiso politiko aktiboa hartu zuten (Aguilar, 2012; Azkune, 2016:34; Buendía, 2011: 56-70; Portos, 2016; Tarrow, 2012: 342).

IRUDIA 21 15- M: Yes We Question this Democracy



Iturria: López & Rodríguez, 2011:29.

Katalan eta Euskal gatazkekin batera²⁵⁶, 15M mugimendua espainiar krisi organikoaren sintoma bat izan zen. Gure argudioa era argiagoan azaltzeko asmoz Gramscik honen inguruan egindako hausnarketak gurera ekarriko ditugu:

“These situations of conflict between “represented and representatives” reverberate out from the terrain of the parties (the party organisations properly speaking, the parliamentary-electoral field, newspaper organisation) throughout the State organism, reinforcing the relative power of the bureaucracy (civil and military), of high finance, of the Church, and generally of all bodies relatively independent of the fluctuations of public opinion. How are they created in the first place? In every country the process is different, although the content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially of peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically add up to a revolution. A “crisis of authority” is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the State (Gramsci, 1999: 450-451)”.

Demokrazia pribatizatzen denean, burujabetza galdu egiten da eta horrekin batera era obedientzian jarduteko gaitasuna ere bai. Honek -beste hainbat kontraesanekin batera teilakatzear- krisi organikoa eragin dezake. Egoera hauetan, estatuaren boterea demokrazia liberalaren kaltetan indartzen da hegemonia burgesa mantentzeko ahalmena ahulduz (Poulantzas, 1979:296-303), estatuaren krisi dimentsioak areagotuz eta batasun nazionala mantentzeko gaitasuna murriztuz (Jessop, 1985:99). Mendebaldeko herrialde gehienek era orokorrean komuneko ezaugarriak izan arren, euren berezitasunak ere badituzte.

Kontraesan hauen eta aktoreen ekintza estrategikoaren elkar eraginaren ondorioz gatazka eta ondorioak ezberdinak izango dira. Hori dela eta, Espainiaren kasuan, M-15, Podemos eta Ciudadanosen sorrera eta Kataluniako liskaraldi sezesionista

²⁵⁶ Osteen egingo dugu hauen inguruko hausnarketa. Ikusiko dugun moduan, Kataluniako liskaraldiak Espainiar krisi organikoa areagotu arren, euskal egoera transformismoa eta iraultza pasiboaren eredutik gertuagoa dago.

horren adibide argiak diren bitartean, beste herrialde batzuetan eskuin muturreko populismoaren loraldia izan da honen ondorioz esanguratsuen.

Esandakoak esanda, nola neurtu dezakegu krisi organikoa? Jessopen estatuaren krisi dimentsioek euskarri egokia eskaintzen digutela begitantzen zaigu. Aurreko taula gogoratuko dugu:

IRUDIA 22 Six dimensions of the state and state power

Dimension	Definition	Significance	Crisis aspects
Three formal dimensions			
Modes of representation	These give social forces access to state apparatus and power	Unequal access to state Unequal ability to resist at distance from state	Crisis of representation
Modes of articulation	Institutional architecture of levels and branches of state	Unequal capacity to shape, make, and implement decisions	Crisis of institutional integration
Modes of intervention	Modes of intervention inside state and beyond it	Different sites and mechanisms of intervention	Rationality crisis
Three substantive dimensions			
Social basis of state	Institutionalised social compromise	Uneven distribution of material and symbolic concessions to 'population' to secure support for state, state projects, specific policy sets, and hegemonic visions	Crisis of power bloc Disaffection with parties and state
State project	Secures apparatus unity of state and its capacity to act	Overcomes improbability of unified state system by giving orientation to state agencies and agents	Legitimacy crisis
Hegemonic vision	Defines nature and purposes of state for wider social formation	Provides external legitimacy for state, defined in terms of the 'common good', 'general will', etc	Crisis of hegemony

Source: Jessop, 2015a: 480

Ikus dezakegun moduan, hiru dimentsio formal eta hiru sustantibo ezberdinu daitezke. Formalak, *ordezkaritza krisia*, *barneratze instituzionalaren krisia eta gaitasun politikoen krisia*²⁵⁷ dira (Jessop, 2015b:58). Sustantiboak bestalde, *botere blokearen krisia (alderdi politikoko eta estatuarekiko txeragabetasuna)*, *ordezkaritza krisia eta hegemonia krisia* (idem). Analitikoki ezberdinu arren, praktikan teilakatu egiten dira beraz euren elkarrekintza aintzat hartzea beharrezkoa da.

Ordezkaritza krisiari dagokionez, bitartekaritza egitura tradizionalen krisia azpimarratuko genuke, alderdi politiko eta sindikatuen kasua izanik adierazgarriena (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018). Hau, botere blokearen krisiarekin, estatuarekiko txeragabetasunarekin eta ordezkari krisi orokortu batekin teilakatzen da. Zentzu

²⁵⁷ Habermasen eraginez, Jessopek "arrazionaltasun krisia" darabilen arren, Tillyren "gaitasunen" ideia gure marko teorikoaren ildoarekin hobeto uztartzen da.

horretan, 2016ko urrian CIS-ek²⁵⁸ egindako inkesta jarraituz, langabeziaren (%72) eta ustelkeriaren ostean (%36), politikariak eta alderdi politikoak hirugarren arazo nagusizat jotzen zituzten herritarrek (%25.7) (CIS, 2016:5). Ustelkeria eta nepotismoa praktika hedatuak direnaren ustea hedatzean, agintariekiko konfiantza eta errespetua galdu egiten da eta alde zurratik izaera pasiboa zuten indarrak politikoki engaiatzen dira aldarrikapen erradikalagoak burutuz.

Botere blokearekiko txeragabetasuna handitzean, talde sozialak euren ohiko alderdiekin hausteko joera handitzen da (Portelli, 1973:126). Espainiar kasuan, alderdien sisteman *ordezkaritza krisia* areagotzeak salbuespeneko bi momentu eragin zituen: (1) M-15 mugimenduaren sorrera eta gainbehera 2011. urtean; (2) Podemosen sorrera eta Ciudadanosen indartzea 2014. urtetik aurrera (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018). PSOE-k eta PP-k indarra galdu duten arren, krisia sozialisten kasuan nabariagoa izan da²⁵⁹. 2008. urteko hauteskundeetan PSOEK botoen %43.87a eskuratu zuen eta PP-k %39.94a. 2016. urtean aldiz, hurrenez hurren, %22.66 eta %33.03 lortu zuten. 2008. urtean elkarrekin botoen %83.81 erdietsi zuten bitartean 2016an %55.69koa izan zen bi alderdi nagusien babesia.

Horretaz gain, alde zurratik leiala zen Kataluniako elite politiko²⁶⁰, kulturalaren eta ekonomikoaren parte bat, “voice” izatetik “exit” izatera igaro da *botere blokearen eta barneratze instituzionalaren krisia* areagotuz (Blas, 2014). Besteak beste, aurrerago aztertuko ditugun “eliteen interesen kaltetzea” edota “irainen bat-bateko ezarpena” prozesu hau azaltzeko gaitasuna duten mekanismoak dira²⁶¹ (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015:8).

Aipatu elementuez gain, monarkia bezalako erakunde baten krisia ere azpimarratu beharra dago. Nóos auzia garatzen zen bitartean eta zenbait eskandalo publikok oihartzuna hartu zuten momentuan (erregea Botsuanan safari batean elefanteak ehizatzen harrapatzea adibidez), Juan Carlos I.aren ordezkari Felipe VI.a izendatu zuten errege 2014. urtean.

²⁵⁸ Galdera hurrengoa zen: ¿Cuál es, a su juicio, el principal problema que existe actualmente en España? ¿Y el segundo? ¿Y el tercero? (MULTIRRESPUESTA).

²⁵⁹ Egoerak aldakorrek diren neurrian, etorkizunean PP-k galera handiagoa izatea ezin da baztertu.

²⁶⁰ CIU adibidez, agintean zegoen alderdiak gehiengo absoluturik ez zuenean sistemaren egonkortasuna mantentzeko aktore garrantzitsua izan da.

²⁶¹ Aurrerago ikusiko dugun moduan, Kataluniako gatazka ez da eliteetara mugatzen. Hala ere, hauek Espainiar botere blokean duten eraginagatik aipatzen ditugu. Ez gatoz bat independentzia burgesiaren asmakizun bat dela adierazten duten zenbait ezkertiarren diagnostikoarekin. Paradigmatikoak bezain erredukzionistak dira Tariq Ali zentzu horretan egindako adierazpenak: “The Catalan self-determination movement is largely led by the Catalan bourgeoisie. That’s the unfortunate truth. They are fighting essentially on the basis of “we are richer than the rest of Spain and why shouldn’t we spend all this money on ourselves?” (Ali, 2014)

Beste maila batean, *lurrealde eta barneratze instituzionalaren krisia*, arestian aipatu estatu proiektuaren kontraesanekin lotuta dago. Krisiaren kudeaketa neoliberalak, birzentralizazioa eta estatu matrizearen berrindartzea eragin duen bitartean, euskal eta katalan nazionalistek gaitasun politiko gehiago eskatu dituzte (azken hauek estatu propioa). Prozesu horretan, PP-k gobernaturako komunitateek jardura aktiboa izan dute. Nagore Calvo adierazten duen moduan “it was the PP-led regional governments themselves that played a central role in politically legitimating this process of re-centralization” (2014:13). Zenbait autonomia erkidegok sustatu politikek, administrazio autonomikoen esku zeuden oinarriko zerbitzu ugari murriztu edo desagerrarazi zituzten defizit publikoaren aurkako borrokari aurre egiteko justifikazioarekin²⁶² (idem). Era paraleloan, komunikabideek krisia eta defizit publikoaren auzia “erregionalismo gehiegi” izatearekin lotzen hasi ziren.

Aurkako ikuspegi batetik, Katalunia eta Euskal Herriko nazionalistek birzentralizazioa kanpotik inposaturiko esku hartze modua ulertu dute. Horri aurre egiteko estatu matrizearekin aldebotasunean oinarrituriko harreman berri bat izateko eskaerak ugaritu dira. Alta, azken hauek harreman horren oinarrian erabakitze eskubidea kokatzen duten bitartean, estatu matrizeak hau nazioaren batasunaren eta konstituzioaren aurkako erasotzat jotzen du. Honek, estatu proiektuaren krisia eragiten du krisi organikoaren tentsio eta kontraesanak areagotuz. Etorrizuna aurreikustea ezinezkoa den arren, 2017ko urriaren 1eko erreferendumaren eta urriaren 27ko Kataluniako Errepublikaren aldarrikapenaren ostean aipatu gatazka areagotu besterik ez da egin.

*Gaitasunen*²⁶³ *krisiari dagokionez*, metaketa estrategiari eta estatu proiektuaren dimentsio ekonomikoari loturik dago. “Boom ekonomikoaren” urteetan, zor pribatuaren hazkundera soldaten murrizketari (zorpetzea eragiten du) eta maileguren interes baxuei (zorpetzea errazten du) loturik zegoen²⁶⁴ (Navarro, 2015:120).

²⁶² Esperanza Aguirre eta Maria Dolores de Cospedalen agindupean zeuden Madril eta Gaztela Mantxa izan ziren aipagarrienak.


²⁶³ Gaitasuna kontzeptuak adiera zabalagoa duen arren (ikus Goikoetxea, 2017), Tilly eta Mannek esandakoari erreferentzia egiten diogu. Tillyren arabera “**state capacity** means the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions” (2007:16). Mannek the **state’s infrastructural power** moduan ezagutzen duena hurrengo litzateke: “its capacities to penetrate society and organize social relations throughout its territory, on the basis of its political decisions” (1984:185).

²⁶⁴ Partikularrek kontsumo orokorrean eta etxebizitzaren erosketan erabilitako dirua eta enpresek lurretan, adreiluan eta azpiegituretan egindako gastuek zorpetze horretan eragin zuzena izan zuten ere bai (Calvo, 2014:10).

Kontrara, eurogunearen arau fiskalak betetzeko, aurrekontu publikoen eta defizit publikoaren gainean kontrol zorrotzak ezarri ziren (Calvo, 2014:10). Horren ondorioz, zor pribatua hazi zen bitartean zor eta defizit publikoak asko murriztu ziren. Horretaz gain, aldez aurretik ikusi moduan Espainiar inbertsio publikoa eta ongizate estatua EB-15 herrialdeekin alderatuta urte luzez baxuagoa izan dela aintzat hartu beharra dago (Navarro, 2009:32-41).

Hala ere, krisi ekonomikoaren eraginez zor pribatuaren hazkundera areagotzearekin batera estatuak krisiaren kudeaketan izandako parte hartzearen ondorioz zor publikoaren hazkundera eragin zuen (Navarro, 2015:121). Espainiako banku-sektorearen erreskate-prozesuak diru publikoaren erabilera masiboa eragin zuen. Europako Banku Zentralak banku pribatuei interes baxuan dirua mailegatu zion bitartean, azken hauek bigarren fase batean Estatuari erreskaterako behar zuen dirua interes altuagoarekin uzten zioten (idem). Honek, benetako banku zentral bat ez izatearen ondorioz, banku-sektorearen erreskaterako dirua lortzeko banku pribatuei interes altuak ordaintzea eragin zuen (idem). Horretaz gain, zor publikoaren hazkundera krisiari aurre egiteko behar sozialen hazkunderari (langabezia sariaren ordainketa adibidez) eta aktibitate ekonomikoaren murrizketaren ondorioz diru sarreren gutxitzeari loturik dago (idem). Zor publikoaren hazkundera hurrengo grafikoan ikus dezakegu:

IRUDIA 23 Zor Publikoa (BPG%)




Iturria: (Martínez & Zubiri, 2014:180).

Arestian esan bezala, “zerga estatuetan” diru sarrera publiko gehienek iturria zergak direla kontuan hartu behar dugu. Hori dela eta, estatuaren interbentziorako funtsezko mekanismoak diren neurrian, estatuaren beste krisiak areagotzeaz gain, krisi fisko-finantzaria eragin dezakete (Jessop, 2015b:71). Espainiar kasuan ezin ditugu egiturazko zenbait faktore ahanzi. Egitura produktibo ahula izateaz gain, urteetan zehar ekonomia hazi egiten zen bakoitzean zergak jaisteko joera nagusitu

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

da, batez ere 1998. urtetik aurrera (Martínez & Zubiri, 2014:178). Horren ondorioz, Espainiako zerga presioa (BPG-aren %34.4) Euro gunearen batezbestekotik behera kokatzen da (BPG-aren %41.5). Hurrengo taulan konparaketa bat ikus dezakegu:

IRUDIA 24 Zerga bidezko diru sarrera EBko Estatu Kideetan, 2014
(BPGaren %)



Iturria: (El Diario, 2016)

Horretaz gain, Errentaren Gaineko Zerga, estatuaren diru sarreraren %42.1 era heltzen da (Garzón, 2014). Alta, langileen diru sarrerak EGZ-ren %85era ailegaten diren bitartean kapitalaren irabaziak %15a besterik ez dira (idem). Datuok aintzat hartuta, zerga egiturak kapitalaren alde eragiten duen hautaketa estrategikoa agerikoa da. Bestalde, horrelako egitura batean, langabezia tasa altuak diru sarrera publikoengan eragin oso larria dute. Zentzu horretan, BPGaren jaitsiera 2007-2009 aldian Espainian (-2.7) EB-27ko herrietan (-4.1) baino baxuagoa izan bazen ere, diru sarrerak jaitsiera gogorragoa bizi izan zuten (-6.0) aipatu herrialdeetan baino (-0.5) (Martínez & Zubiri, 2014:181).

Martínez eta Zubiriren arabera, kolapso hau azaltzeko lau faktore kontuan hartu behar dira: (1) 2007-2008 artean zerga jaitsiera bereziki handia izan zen; (2) aktibitate ekonomikoaren jaitsiera orokorra eta bereziki higiezinaren sektorearen krisia; (3) zerga sistemaren diseinu okerra (dedukzio, zerga salbuespen eta zulo ugariarekin); (4) sistemaren kudeaketa okerra eta iruzur maila handia (idem).

Aipatu egoerak, defizit publikoa eragitearekin batera, zor soberanoaren krisia eta arrisku-primaren hazkundera eragin zuen (idem). Testuinguru horretan, autoritate exekutiboek eta demokratikoki aukeraturik izan ez ziren autoritateek, austeritate neurri zorrotzak inposatu zituzten demokraziaren pribatizazioa areagotuz (Jessop,

2015a; Goikoetxea, 2017). Momentu zehatzeko beharrei erantzuteko neurri koiuntural moduan aurkeztu arren, atxikitze fisko-finantzaria eta gastu sozialaren murrizpenean oinarrituriko izaera iraunkorreko austeritate politika bihurtu dira²⁶⁵ (Jessop, 2015b:234). (ibidem:235).

Arestian aipatu moduan, estatuaren baitan izaera bikoitza duen indartze-ahultze efektuak sortzen ditu. Estatuaren boterea demokrazia liberalaren kaltetan indartzen duen neurrian hegemonia burgesa mantentzeko ahalmena ahuldu egiten da (Poulantzas, 1979:296-303). Besteak beste, *hegemonia krisia* izaten da horren ondorioetako bat (Gramsci, 1998; Jessop, 2015b; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; Portelli, 1973). Hegemonia hedakorrean oinarrituriko “one nation” estrategiak zaildu egiten dira (Jessop, 1990:221; 2015b:87; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987:224). Hau da, ongizate material eta pizgarri sinbolikoak erabiliz sektore sozial zabalen babesa artikulatzeko zailtasunak ugaritzen dira (idem). Horren ondorioz, praktika kontra hegemoniko berrien eraikuntzarako eta artikulazio populisten arrakastarako momentu pribilegiatuak direla esan dezakegu (Azkune, 2016; Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018; Del Amo, 2016; Laclau, 2005).

Testuinguru horretan kokatzen dugu Podemos artikulazio populista eta ase gabe zeuden eskariak elkartzeko gaitasuna (Laclau, 2005). Trantsizioaren garaian egonkortutako hainbat ideia higitzen zeuden momentuan, lehenik eta behin M-15 mugimendua izan zen demokrazia, herritartasuna, duintasuna edo justizia bezalako adierazle flotagarriak biresanahitu zituenak “suminduen narratiba” berri bat eraikiz (Errejón, 2011b:131). Ase gabeko eskariak ekibalentzien logika jarraituz artikulatu ziren identitate kontra hegemoniko berri bat eraikiz (Errejón, 2011b:131; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987: 218-228).

2014. urtean Podemosek diskurtso horren parte bat bereganatzeaz gain, artikulazio populista eraginkor bat burutu zuen eremu soziala era antagonikoan “herriaren” eta “kastaren” artean banatuz (Laclau, 2005). Alta, diskurtso honen arrakasta salbuespeneko izaera zuten bi “gertakarira” hertsiki loturik zegoen: M-15en sorrerara eta Podemos beraren sorrerara (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018). Kontrara, aipatu momentu horiek agortzearekin batera akitu zen. Alde batetik, alderdiak 2014-2016 urteen artean izan zuen hauteskunde arrakastak ezberdintasunaren logikaren gailentzea eta instituzionalizazio prozesu baten hasiera eragin zuen. Bestetik, Espainiar krisi organikoa sustatu zuten zenbait elementu apaltzearekin batera - datu makroekonomikoen hobekuntza motela adibidez - Estatuaren interbentzio gaitasunak handitu dira, zenbait eskakizun sozial bete eta jendartearen eremua banatzeko ahalmena handituz (Poulantzas, 1979:129).

²⁶⁵ 2011ko abuztuko konstituzioaren 135. artikulua honen adibide argia litzateke.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Kontrara, Espainiar krisi organikoa sakontzen eragin handiena izan duen “gertakaria” Kataluniako liskarraldi sezesionista izan da. Honen inguruan sortu den liskarraldiaren ondorioz polarizazioa areagotu da erdibideko posizioak ahulduz eta muturrekoak indartuz. Besteak beste, Podemosen posizioa ahultzearekin batera espainiar nazionalismoaren ikuspegi unitario eta esentzialistenak indartu dira. Ciudadanosek ardatz horretan ikuspegi irmo bat mantendu du, eskuineko artikulazio populista arrakastatsu bat burutu eta politika berriaren diskurtsoa espainiar nazioaren batasunarekin era arrakastatsuan artikulatuz. Honek, Gramsciren hitzen gaurkotasuna gogorarazten digu:

“The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp”(1998:451).

4 Katalunia

1- Sarrera:

1.1 Posfordismoaren tentsioak: txanpon beraren bi aurpegi.

Gure ikerketa galdera berreskuratuz: **zein erlazio dago postfordismoaren baitan egon den Estatuaren eraldaketaren eta mugimendu nazionalista historikoek burutzen dituzten burujabetza eskaeren artean?**


Jada adierazi dugun moduan demokratizazio/desdemokratizazio prozesuak era erlazionalean ulertu behar direla uste dugu. Hori dela eta maila abstraktu eta simple batetik maila zehatzago batera analisi planoak gehituz joan gara. Lehenik eta behin posfordismoari loturiko arrazionaltasun neoliberalak eta bere egiturazte instituzionalak estatu mota Schumpeteriarren (SWPR) aztertu ostean, egungo Europar Batasunean eta Espainiar Estatuan joera nagusiak aztertu ditugu. Hori dela eta orain Kataluniako demokratizazioa plano zehatzago batean aztertuko dugu (H4).

Gure ikuspegitik era paraleloan eta elkarren arteko tentsioan bi prozesu garatu dira. Alde batetik, demokratizazio prozesu katalana (Espainiarra eta Europarra ere izan dena) eta beste alde batetik desdemokratizazio prozesu bat suposatzen duen demokraziaren pribatizazioa (H1). Esan dugun moduan, burujabetza, komunitate politiko baten eta bere gobernuaren arteko harremana era demokratiko batean burutzea ahalbidetzen duen erlazio soziala da (Hinsley, 1986). Honek, gaitasun politikoa eskatuko du eta hau estatu egituren bidez egingarri bihurtuko da (Goikoetxea, 2014; Tilly, 2010). **Gure aburuz, Espainiar eta Europar demokratizazio prozesuen baitan demokratizazio Katalan bat garatu da (H4).** Autoritate eremu ezberdinen artean garatzen den neurrian, burujabetza era eraginkorrean elkarbanatzeko beharrezkoak diren mekanismoak galdatuko ditu.

Hurrengo eskemaren bidez “elkarbanatutako burujabetzan” oinarrituriko demokratizazio katalanaren bide ideala zein izango litzatekeen jasotzen saiatu gara.

IRUDIA 25

Burujabetza/Demokratizazio Katalanaren prozesu ideala: era demokratikoan elkarbanatutako burujabetza (democratic co-sovereignty)



1. Ahaldundua/mobilizatua 2. Estatu erakundeen bidez burujabetza demokratikoa "egingarria" bihurtu 3. Mekanismo diziplinario, biopolitiko, erregulatuak 4. ahaldundutako/normalizatutako subjektu/objektua

Iturria: egileak egin.

Gure ikuspegitik eta Goikoetxearekin bat eginez (2015; 2017), posfordismoaren baitan egon den estatuaren eraldaketan burujabetza ez da elkarbanatu, pribatizatu egin da eta horren ondorioz burujabetza eskaerak ugaritu dira (H3). Atal honetan, hala ere, txanpon beraren beste aurpegian jarriko dugu arreta: demokratizazio katalanean (H4).

1.2 - Katalanismoa eta Kataluniako nazionalismoaren kokapen orokorra.

Egungo politikaren jatorria ulertzeko ezinbestekoa da XIX. mendearen bigarren erditik aurrera sortu zen katalanismoaren oinarriko ezaugarriak kontuan hartzea. Honen baitan, elkar elikatu zuten bi prozesu garatu ziren: berpizkunde kultural moduan ezagutu dena eta katalanismo politikoaren sorrera. Lehenengoari dagokionez, hizkuntzaren, abesti herrikoien, antzerkiaren edota lore jokoaren loraldi bat azpimarratu dezakegu. Hala ere, Renaixença moduan ezagutzen den prozesuak izaera elitistagoa zuen bitartean, kultura katalanari loturiko suspertze herrikoia ere nabarmentzen du Fontanak (2016:315-320). Goiko klaseek ez bezala, azken hauek ez zuten inoiz hizkuntza alde batera utzi eta herri kultura katalan aberatsa ekoizteko

gaitasuna izan zuten (Ibídem, 316-317). Izaera elitistagoa eta herrikoiagoa uztartu ziren beraz lehenengo katalanismo kulturalaren berpizkundean.

Bestalde, katalanismo politikoaren sorrera 1868-1874 artean porrot egin zuten bi estrategia nagusietan kokatzen da (Izquierdo, 2008:10). 1868ko eta 1873ko iraultzaileen porrotean alde batetik, eta Alfonso XII.aren aurka porrot egin zuen bloke katoliko tradizionalistarena bestetik (Ídem). Porrot bikoitz honek Kataluniako bi bloke nagusietan eragin zuen: katoliko karlistengan eta errepublikarengan.

Azken hauen eskutik, Almirallen lehenengo katalanismo politikoa sortu zen. Hori dela eta, ostean izaera anitza izan arren, katalanismoak jatorri errepublikar eta federalista du eta bere oinarritzko printzipioa Kataluniaren autogobernu gaitasunaren defentsa da (Caminal, 1998:80). Hala ere, testuinguru hartan ere Josep Torres i Bagesen katalanismo kontserbadorea sortu zen eta pixkanaka korrante politiko ezberdinak katalanismoaren inguruan artikulatzen joan ziren (Ibídem:86-87). Korrante berri hauen oinarritzko lehenengo dokumentuak “El Memorial de Greuges” (1885), “Missatge a la Regent (1888)” eta “Les Bases de Manresa (1892)” dira (Ibídem: 88-89).

Momentu horretatik aurrera, aldarrikapen politiko guztien oinarritzko ezaugarri bihurtu zen eta horren ondorioz ez zegoen “katalanismo bakarra” (Fontana, 2016:325). Hori dela eta, jatorri herrikoi edo burgesa duen edota aurrerakoia edo atzerakoia den planteatzeak ez du zentzurik ideologia politiko guztiak zeharkatzen zituelako (Ídem). Izquierdok dioskun moduan beraz, eremu konpartitua eta gatazkatsua izan da aldi berean (2008:10).

Bere sorreratik hegemonikoa²⁶⁶ izan den ideia hurrengoa da: Kataluniarentzat ahalik eta autogobernu gehien lortzea eta aldi berean Espainia osoan eragiteko ahalmena lortu eta honen modernizazioa sustatzea (Keating, 1996:147; Caminal, 1998:63).

Zentzu horretan, 1914an *Mancomunitat* izeneko autogobernu ahularen sorrerarekin euren lehenengo²⁶⁷ arrakasta politikoa lortu zuten joera kontserbadoreko Lliga Regionalistaren gidaritzapean (Keating, 1996:147). Azken hauek Primo de Riveraren diktadurarekin izandako harremanaren ondorioz, katalanismoaren hegemoniak ezkerrean jo zuen ERC-ren mesedetan (Ídem). 1931-n Francesc Maciák (ERC) aldebakartasunez Kataluniako Errepublika aldarrikatu arren, 1932an autonomia estatutu bat eta Generalitat-aren berrezarpena lortu zuen. Frankismoaren diktadurapean katalanismoaren hegemonia PSUC-ek lortu zuen eta eurak izan ziren

²⁶⁶ Historikoki independentziaren aldeko jarrerak gutxiengoa izan dira.

²⁶⁷ 1906an Kataluniako ehungintza sektorea babestu zuen zerga sistema ere aintzat hartu beharra dago (Keating, 1996:147).

Frankoren aurkako borrokan lidergoa izan zutenak. Autonomia prozesuaren ostean kontrara CDC-k lortu zuen gidaritzza (CIU koalizio/federazioaren bidez) eta euren esku egon da urte gehien Generalitat-aren kudeaketa. Ezkerreko koalizioak gobernatu zuenean ere (PSC-ERC-ICV) CIUk mantendu zuen eserlekuen gehiengoa eta 1999 eta 2003an izan ezik botoen gehiengoa ere bai.

1.3. Trantsizioa Katalunian

Trantsizioa Katalunian, 1970 eta 1980 urteen artean ezberdindu daitezkeen hiru dinamikaren arabera azaldu daiteke (Caminal, 1998:117-120):

1. Assemblea de Catalunyaren sorrera: 70. hamarkada hasieran Frankismoaren aurkako haustura eta mobilizazioaren sinboloa izan zen. Ezkerrak eta sindikatuek zuten lidergoa eta PSUC zen bere “pal de paller”²⁶⁸. “Llibertat, amnistia, estatut d’autonomia” aldarrikapen ezagunaren sustatzailea izan zen. Francoren heriotzak bere gainbehera suposatu zuen.
2. Consell de Forces Polítiques de Catalunyaren antolaketa: 1975eko abenduan sortua. Joera guztietako hamaika antolakunde katalanistek osatutako kontseilua zen. Alde batetik, askatasun demokratikoen eta Kataluniaren eskubide nazionalen aldeko plataforma moduan osatu zen. Bestetik, alderdi bakoitzak hauteskunderi begira bere eremua definitzen hasteko plataforma moduan ikusten zuten. *Assemblea de Catalunya* iraganeko borroka ezkertiarren sinbolo bezala enmarkatzen hasi ziren bitartean, *Consell de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya* etorkizuneko Kataluniaren mapa politikoa definituko zuen eremu moduan definitzen hasi zen.
3. Tarradellasek gidatutako Behin-behineko Generalitataren²⁶⁹ eraketa: 1977ko ekaineko hauteskundeetan ezkerreko alderdiek lortutako emaitza onak ikusita, etorkizuneko erakundetze prozesuan ezkerren hegemonia aurreikusten hasi ziren sektore ezberdinek. Horren aurrean Adolfo Suárezek “Operación Tarradellas” izenarekin ezaguna dena martxan jarri eta erbestean zegoen ERC-ko presidentea *Behin-behineko Generalitat-aren* buru izendatu zuen. Honen bidez, ezkerren indarra ahuldu (PSUC-ena batez ere) eta Pujolen hegemoniari lehen atea ireki zizkion.

Espainiar trantsizioaren eredu jarraituz, antzeko mekanismoak identifikatu daitezke (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:181-186; Zubiaga, 2009a: 253). **Identitate**

²⁶⁸ Aktore nagusia: oso ohikoa da katalanez “Pal de paller” erabiltzea eremu politiko batean ezinbestekoa den aktorea izendatzeko.

²⁶⁹ 1977an Erbesteko Generalitat-a ordezkatu zuena eta 1980arte indarrean egon zena.

jauziaren bidez, espainiar identitatearekin bateragarria zen identitate katalana era zabalean hedatu zen. Aipamen berezia merezi du nazio ikuspegi katalana eremu anitzetan zabaltzeko PSUC-ek eta CCOO-k izandako gaitasuna, batez ere Kataluniatik kanpo jaiotako herri sektore zabaletan²⁷⁰ (Caminal, 2001:135). Prozesu horretan “Katalanista” adierazle hutsa lagungarria izan zen, ideologikoki zabalak ziren eremuak ordezkatzeko zituelako.

Artekaritza ere nabaria den arren, ezkerreko sektoreen eta PSUC-en hegemoniaren menpe garazetik dinamika elitistagoa izatera pasatu zen. Honek, oinarri zabal sendoa ez zuten alderdien alde jo zuen eta oinarri militante eta gaitasun mobilizatzaile handia zuten ezkerreko eragileen aurka.

Azkenik, **flanko erradikalaren dinamikaren** bidez, Konstituzio eta Autonomia berriaren aldeko adostasun zabala lortu zuten kanpoan ezker independentista eta parlamentutik kanpo geratu zen ezker utziz. Zentzu horretan 1978ko Konstituzioak %90.46eko babesa jaso zuela eta Saueko Estatut-ak %85.15ekoa kontuan hartu beharra dago.

Adostasun horren baitan zehaztu ziren hurrengo urteetako politikaren aukera eta mugak. Hau da, 1978ko erregimenak ezarritako ezaugarrien baitan momentu egituratzaile bat ezarri zen (Jessop, 1982:253). Hala ere, bazeuden momentu egituratzaile horren sendotasuna zalantzan jar zitzaketen hainbat elementu. XX. mendean zehar katalanismo ezberdinek komunean izan duten ideia hurrengoak da: pragmatismoagatik autonomia onartutako gutxieneko autogobernu maila da, ez da azken konponbidea baina momentuko baldintzak kontuan hartuta posible ikusten dena da (Caminal, 1998:115). Ideia horretan oinarrituta euren proiektuan onartutako hainbat printzipiori ezetz esatea suposatu zuen (Ídem):

- Alderdi gehienek *autodeterminazio eskubidea* defendatu arren Konsitutzioak eta Estatutuak ezarritako akordioetatik kanpo geratzea onartu zuten. (Ibídem:116-117). Caminalen aburuz, uko egite garrantzitsutzat jo arren ez zuen etorkizunean honen egikaritzea aurreikusten. Hala ere praktikara eramango balitz eta legeak trabak jarri arren hurrengo galdera egiten zuen: “Tanmateix, es podria dir que si el poble català decideix amb l’ús d’una consulta democràtica (unes eleccions legisaltives per exemple) canviar les relacions institucionals de Catalunya amb l’Estat espanyol, quin demòcrata espanyol gosaria posar-ho en dubte?” (Ibídem:117). Hoge

²⁷⁰ Katalanismoa langile klasearen artean hedatzen egindako lanagatik, besteak beste, Pujolen begikortasuna eta esker ona jaso zuen (Caminal, 2001:135).

urteren ostean, zahartzaro hobeia izan duten hausnarketak egon direla esatea badago.

- Hainbat edukirekin loturiko gaiak ere kontuan hartu behar dira: probintziak Estatuaren antolakunde periferiko moduan onartzea eta Senatuak lurralde kameraren izaera argia ez izatea; autonomien finantzaketa sistema; eskumenen banaketetan hutsuneak edota estatuko hizkuntzen onarpena eta berdintasun bermea eskaintzea (ídem).

Momentu egituratzaile horretan adostasunetik at geratu ziren elementu horiek ostean sortu diren gatazka politiko askoren oinarria izan dira.

1.4 Garai autonomikoaren aktore nagusiak

Miquel Caminalek 1998. urtean ordezkaritza parlamentarioa zuten alderdiek katalanismoaren inguruan konpartitzen zituzten oinarrizko ezaugarriak azaldu zituen. Neurri handi batean 1979tik 2010. urtera arte mantendu diren dimentsioak dira jarraian azaldutakoak:


1. PP izan ezik beste guztiak katalanismo politikoaren mugimendu historiko eta anitzarekin identifikaturik sentitzen ziren.
2. Guztiak PP izan ezik onartzen zituzten nazio katalanaren existentzia eta bere eskubide nazionalak. Caminalen aburuz guztiak kontsidera daitezke Kataluniako alderdi nazionalak²⁷¹ direla.
3. Alderdi guztiak zuten autogobernuaren garapenaren ikuspegi gradualista bat (PP barne eta ERC momentuaren arabera²⁷²). (Caminal, 1998:172).

Ezaugarri horiek kontuan hartuz, katalanismo maila eta ezker/eskuin banaketa jarraituz hurrengo grafikoan aipatu aktoreak antolatu ditugu:

²⁷¹ "Partits nacionals catalans" bere hitzetan.

²⁷² ERC alderdi federalista historikoa zen arren, 80. hamarkada amaiera arte ez zuen independentziaren aldeko jarrera izan.

IRUDIA 26 Estatu Boterearen Dimentsio Substantiboak



Iturria: egileak egina Caminal, 1998:172-n eta Jessop, 2015b:71-90-n oinarrituta.

Sindikatuak dagokienez, CCOO eta UGT izan dira azken hamarkadetan era nabarmenean indartsuenak. Generalitat-ak eskainitako azken datuen arabera, 2015. urtean adibidez CCOO-k 20.678 ordezkarik eskuratu zituen, guztien %42.35a. UGT-k aldiz 19.290ekin %39.86a, USOC-ek 2.350ekin %5.04a eta CGT-k 1.147ekin %2.48a (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2016:7). Euskal kasuarekin alderatuta sindikatu abertzaleen eragina oso urria da, Intersindical-CSC, Intersindical Alternativa Catalana (IAC) eta ezker independentistari loturiko Coordinadora Obrera Sindical (COS) izanik garrantzitsuenak.

Azken urteetan CCOO-k eta UGT-k erabakitze eskubidearen aldeko jarrera mantendu dute eta Pacte Nacional Pel Referèndumeko kideak dira. Gaur egun, euren afiliatuen artean independentziaren aldekoak ugariak dira, CCOO-n kasuan %40ra iritsiz.

Aipatutakoa kontuan hartuz, eragile politiko eta sindikal nagusiek nazio katalanean oinarrituriko nazio eraikuntza prozesu bat bultzatuko dutela deritzogu. Horren ondorioz, Katalunia ez da beste autonomiekin erkagarria den “erregio” bat gehiago izango. Nazio eraikuntza katalana espainiarrarekin batera eman arren, aurrerago ikusiko dugun moduan bere berezitasunak izango ditu. Prozesu horren funtsezko ezaugarriak “lidergo kultural eta ideologikoa” (Portelli, 1977) ezarriko duen eragileak finkatuko ditu. Katalanismoaren hizkuntza berreskuratuz “el pal de

paller” izango da lidergo kultural eta ideologikorako gaitasuna izango duena. Autonomiaren berreskurapenarekin CDC (CIU koalizio/federazioaren²⁷³ bitartez) eta bereziki Jordi Pujol izan ziren “pal de pallerrak”.

Hainbat eduki baldintzatzeaz gain, estrategia politiko nagusiak ere gidatzeko gaitasuna izan zuten. Besteak beste, “Peix al Cove” eta “La puta i la ramoneta” moduan ezagutzen diren estrategiak azpimarratu behar dira. “Peix al Cove” Pujolen garaiaren ezaugarrietako bat da eta Gobernu zentrolean gutxiengoa zuen alderdia babestearen truke eskumen gehiago lortzean oinarritzen zen. “La puta i la ramoneta” bestalde, Madrilen diskurtso moderatuagoa eta Bartzelonan diskurtso erradikalagoa konbinatzean oinarritzen zen. Orokorrean, diskurtso moderatua Uniók babesten zuen eta erradikalagoa CDC-k.

1. 5 Independentismoa: bazterreko mugimendu politikoa.

Independentismoa historikoki ahula izateaz gain hein handi batean ezkerreko mugimenduetara mugatuta egon da. 1969an sorturiko PSAN da ezkerreko independentismo modernoaren lehenengo erreferentea. ERC alderdi federalista historikoa zen arren, 1980. hamarkadan egin zuen independentziaren aldeko hautua. Garai hartan, “Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua” arrakastaren ondorioz independentismoaren loraldi txiki bat egon zen. Horretaz gain, 1983-87 urteen artean Ezker Abertzalearen eredu jarraituz ezkerreko independentismoaren mobilizazio eta antolakuntza maila ere indartu ziren (Vilaregut, 2012:107).

Testuinguru horretan eta ezkerreko independentisten hauteskunde porroten ondorioz (BEAN²⁷⁴ eta Nacionalistes d’Esquerra izanik kasu argienak) bi fenomeno elkartu ziren: ERC-k diskurtsoa berritu eta militante gazteak behar zituen eta kontrara gazte independentistek ordezkari parlamentario eskaini ahal zien alderdi bat nahi zuten (Izquierdo, 2008:230-231). 1986-1987 urteetan, ezker independentistaren hainbat sektore Àngel Colom eta Carod-Roviraren lidergopean ERC-n sartu ziren (Ídem). Hortik aurrera, independentzia bere programaren ardatz bihurtu zen.

Bestalde, MDT, PSAN eta ezker independentistako beste hainbat antolakundek beren jarduera ERC-n sartu gabe jarraitu zuten. Sektore honek, MCAN-en (Moviment Català d’Alliberament Nacional) aterkipean eragile politiko, sozial eta kulturalen sare anitza antolatu du hamarkadetan zehar (Vilaregut, 2012:107)²⁷⁵. Neurri batean ENAM-en (Euskal Nazio Askapen Mugimenduaren) eredu jarraituz, “mugimenduen familia” bati buruz ari garela esan dezakegu (Zubiaga, 2009a:195).

²⁷³ Hasieran koalizioa zena, 2001. urtean federazio bihurtu zen.

²⁷⁴ Bloc d’Esquerra d’Alliberament Nacional.


²⁷⁵ Hauen inguruko azterketa sakonago baterako ikus: Vilaregut, 2012: 99-125.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Terra LLiure-ren desagertpenarekin batera, herri mailako mobilizazioak eta saretze lana izan da euren ardatza. Hala ere, azken hamarkadetan erakundetze prozesuak izan duen egonkortasuna eta zilegitasun maila altuaren ondorioz, herri artikulazio ekibalentzial hegemoniko eraginkor bat burutzeko zailtasun handiak izan ditu eta urteetan zentralitate politikotik kanpo egon den mugimendu politiko bat izan da.

Hauteskundeetan CUP izan da euren ordezkaria, hasiera batean udal mailan eta gaur egun maila autonomikoan ere bai. Besteak beste, Poble LLiure, Endavant-OSAN alderdi politikoak edota Arran gazte taldea eta SEPC ikasle antolakundeak dira gaur egun espazio politiko honen talde garrantzitsuenak. Azken hamarkadetako garapena eta zatiketa ugariak hurrengo irudian ikus ditzakegu:

IRUDIA 27 Kataluniako Ezker Independentistaren eskema



(Iturria: Basilicte.files.wordpress, 2017)

2- Estatalitate subalternoa eta demokratizazio katalana: demos, state, nation building prozesua

2.1 Autonomismoa: estatu proiektu organiko hegemonikoa (1978-2010)

Adierazi dugun moduan, formazio sozialak bere momentu estruktural eta koiunturalen arteko etengabeko dialektikan ulertu behar dira (Jessop, 1982:253). Espainiar Estatuan 1978. urtetik aurrera formazio sozial berrian hurrengo hiru hamarkadak baldintzatu zituen momentu estrukturala ezarri zen²⁷⁶. Jadanik azaldu dugun moduan “78ko erregimen” moduan ezagutzen den horrek garai historiko oso baten oinarritzko ezaugarriak ezarri zituen. Horren baitan, besteak beste, deszentralizazio prozesuen²⁷⁷ garrantzia azpimarratu dugu. Hala ere, jada adierazi dugun moduan hau ezin da aldebakartasunez ulertu, deszentralizazioa “hierarkiaren itzalean” burutu delako eta horren ondorioz birzentralizazioarekin etengabeko lehian.

Autonomien Estatu, momentu horretan ezarri zen estatu proiektuaren oinarri organikoetako bat da. Aldarrikapen historiko batzuen aurrean momentuko oreka politikoak mantentzeko egindako kontzesio politiko bat izateaz gain, **posfordismoaren baitan Lan Erregimen Schumpeteriar Posnazionalerako trantsizioaren logikan ere ulertu behar da** (Calvo, 2015:126).

1978ko erregimena deitu dugun horretan CIU eta PSC izan dira Katalunian aldi berean *botere blokea eta sektore sozial zabalak antolatu eta ordezkatu*²⁷⁸ dituztenak. Hau da, “gobernu alderdi” hauen gidaritzapean artikulatu da sektore sozial zabalak ordezkatzeko gaitasuna duen “erakundetutako konpromiso soziala”. Egiturazko papera izan dute hortaz bloke historiko zabal horren artikulazioan, izaera koherentea izan duen *estatu proiektu organiko* baten osaketan eta sektore zabal horiek interpelatu dituen *ikuspegi hegemoniko* baten artikulazioan.

Maila ekonomikoan, Espainiar metaketa estrategiatik²⁷⁹ partzialki urrundu den eredia garatu arren, honen oinarritzko elementuen presentziak (finantziarizazioa,

²⁷⁶ Ikus “Spanish matrix state” kapitulua. Zuzenean aurreko ideiak berreskuratuz: the “**structural moment**” can be defined as those elements in a social formation that cannot be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during a given time period: it may include practices as well as their emergent properties and material preconditions and it may be more or less enduring beyond the time period in question (Jessop, 1982:253). It thus refers to the relatively enduring features of institutional orders (Bertramsen, 1991:120).

²⁷⁷ Jada esan moduan ez da aldebakarreko prozesu bat, egungo estatuen joera eta kontrajoeren baitan ulertu beharra dago. Hori dela eta, boterearen deszentralizazioa/birzentralizazioaren arteko tentsioa etengabekoa izan da.

²⁷⁸ Kontzeptu hauen garapen teorikoa “The Strategic Relational Approach” atalean burutu dugu.

²⁷⁹ Ezinezkoa zaigu honek Katalunian izan duen aldaera sakonki garatzea. Orokorrean Espainiar Estatu osoan nagusitu den joera aztertzeko ikus “Spanish matrix state” atala.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

turismoa eta eraikuntza sektorearen nagusitasunak) eragin handia izan du. Aktoreen erabaki estrategikoek baina baita berauek hartzeko egiturazko mugek aipamen berezia merezi dute. Arestian jaso moduan, post-fordismoaren logikaren baitan Espainiar Estatuan burutu ziren erreformek, eragin ekonomiko eta sozial negatiboenak Katalunian eta Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoan izan zuten (Calvo, 2015:117). Asturiasekin batera industria sendoenak zituzten eta beste hainbat herrialdeetan gertatu bezala, honen desagerpenak egitura ekonomikoan eraldaketa sakonak eragin zuen (Oliver, 2007:60-64). Hurrengo tauletan aldaketa horren argazki bat jasoko dugu. Industriaren pisuak Espainiar batezbestekoa gainditu arren EAE eta Nafarroakoa baino baxuagoa dela ikus dezakegu. Desindustrializazio prozesu sakonago baten ondorioz eta aurrera eramandako berrindustrializazio politiken eraginez, balio erantsi baxuagoko industria eta zerbitzuen sektorea sustatu ziren (Carreño, 2016:8).

TAULA 4 Egitura Ekonomikoa, jarduera sektoreka

GVA by sector of activity	2008	2008	2008	2008
	primary	industry	construct	service
Total	2.58	17.00	11.41	69.02
Andalucía	4.02	11.25	13.87	70.85
Aragón	4.27	22.01	11.25	62.47
Asturias (Principality of)	1.85	21.68	13.87	62.60
Balears (Islands)	1.04	6.85	10.22	81.89
Canarias	1.13	6.66	11.01	81.20
Cantabria	2.92	21.30	12.80	62.99
Castilla y Leon	6.56	18.41	11.90	63.13
Castilla-La Mancha	8.20	17.39	14.16	60.25
Catalunya	1.33	21.26	9.88	67.54
Comunitat Valenciana	2.12	17.34	12.02	68.53
Extremadura	7.71	10.25	15.92	66.13
Galicia	4.50	18.64	12.99	63.87
Madrid (Community of)	0.14	12.90	9.87	77.09
Murcia (Region of)	5.01	15.89	11.87	67.22
Nafarroa (Foral Community)	2.68	29.05	10.47	57.80
País Vasco	0.98	29.42	9.60	60.00
Rioja (La)	5.97	25.43	11.30	57.29

Iturria: Goikoetxea, 2017: 134

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 5 Egitura ekonomikoa Autonomia Erkidegoen, udalerrien eta sektoreen arabera (%) 2005-2006

Communities	Primary	Industry	Construct	Service
<u>Basque Country</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>60.3</u>
Catalonia (C)	1.3	21.2	9.8	67.5
Valencia (V)	2.1	17.3	12	68.5
Municipalities				
<u>Hernani – BC</u> 19,000(pop.)	<u>0.6</u>	<u>51.9</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>42.1</u>
Tarrega-C 16,534	1.5	28.7	11.5	58.2

280

Communities	Primary	Industry	Construct	Service
<u>Laudio – BC</u> 18,324	<u>0.4</u>	<u>41.9</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>49.5</u>
Cardedeu-C 16,596	0.4	22.8	19.1	57.7
<u>Mungia – BC</u> 15,984	<u>0.7</u>	<u>56.0</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>35.9</u>
Carlet-V 15,527	7.1	18.2	22.0	44.2

Source: Compiled by Goikoetxea (2012) with data from Eustat (2005), Idescat (2006) and IVE (2006)

Iturria: ibidem: 136-137.

Aurrerago ikusiko dugun moduan aktoreen erabaki estrategikoez gain, gaitasun fiskalik ez izateak, hezkuntza arloan sustaturiko politikak, estatu zentralak beharrezkoak diren inbertsioak ez burutzeak eta lurralde antolaketa federalik ez izateak Kataluniako kohesio sozialean eragin zuzena izan du. Hala ere, ez ditugu ideia hauek hemen garatuko.

Bestetik, 78ko erregimen moduan ezagutu den momentu estrukturalaren baitan kokatzen badugu autonomien estatua, horren krisiak zabalduko momentu koiunturalean kokatzen dugu egungo Kataluniako prozesu independentista. Oso mekanizista litzateke esatea Kataluniako “prozesu independentista” 78-ko erregimenaren krisiaren ondorio hutsa dela. Kontrara, are mekanizistagoa litzateke bata eta bestea banatzea. Hau aurrerago azalduko dugun ideia da²⁸¹.

²⁸⁰ Kataluniak Espainiar Erkidego industrilzatuenen batzbestekoa ordezkatzan du eta Valentziak Espainia osoaren batzbestekoa (Goikoetxea, 2017:136)

²⁸¹ Ikus: Krisi organikoa/“Crisis of” atala.

Azter dezagun orain, post-fordismoaren²⁸² eraldaketen baitan kokatu dugun autonomien estatuak mugimendu nazionalisten burujabetza eskaeretan duten eragina.


2.2 Naziorik gabeko estatutik estatalitate subalternora: demos, state, nation building prozesua.

Autonomiak estatu botere mugatua eskaini arren, funtsezko garrantzia du egungo nazionalismoaren azterketa burutzeko. Honen ondorioz, Katalunian eta Espainian errealitate politiko ezberdinak garatu dira bakoitzak bere egiturazko selektibitate estrategikoak, estrukturalki orientatutako aktoreak, diskurtsoak eta botere teknologiak garatuz. **Egitura eta aktoreen arteko hartu eman horretan egituratutako koherentzia berriak egonkortu dira: estatalitate subalternoa. Hartu eman hori era demokratikoan burutu den neurrian, subjektu objektu berria sortu da: demos katalana (H4).**

Horren ondorioz, alde batetik Kataluniako estatalitate subalternoa egonkortu da eta bestetik Espainiar estatu matrizea ere bai. Elkarren artean talka egingo duten proiektuak lehiatuko dira: demokratizazio katalanean sakondu nahi dutenek Kataluniaren ahalmen politikoa areagotu nahi dute eta kontrara demokratizazio espainiarren sakondu nahi izango dutenek Katalunia beste erregio bat balitz bezala hartuko dute. *Hau da, gatazka nazional bat egoteaz gain demokratizazio prozesu ezberdinen arteko talka bati buruz ere ari gara* (Goikoetxea, 2013a:284).

Hurrengo irudiaren bidez, era dialektikoan ulertu behar diren hiru prozesu era grafikoan jasotzen ditugu:

IRUDIA 28 State Nation Demos Building



Iturria: egileak egina.

²⁸² Espainiar kasuan maila zehatzean 78ko erregimen deitu dugun horretan.

Gure ikuspegitik, egungo nazionalismoa ulertzeko oinarritzko eskema hori buruan izatea ezinbestekoa da. Auzi nazionala eta soziala txanpon beraren bi aldeak zirela esan da urteetan zehar. **Egungo testuinguruan, demosgintza, naziogintza eta estatugintza hiruki beraren hiru erpinak direla esan dezakegu (H4).**

Irudian ikusi dugun elkarrekintzaren ondorioz, Espainiar Estatu matrizearen baitan, Katalunian ere berezko Estatu-demos-nazio eraikuntza prozesu bat egon da. **Horren ondorioz gure aburuz, Kataluniako Estatu egiturak, Espainiar zein Europar Estatu egituren baitan kokatutako estatalitate subalternoak dira (H4).** Zergatik? Bere demosaren borondatearen arabera jarduteko beharrezko dituen gaitasun politikoak estatu matrizeari eskatu behar dizkiolako. Hauek, momentuko indar korrelazioen menpe egongo dira. Estatu zentrolean agintean dagoen alderdia gutxiengoan dagoenean eta periferiako alderdi nazionalista baten babesa behar duenean gaitasun politiko horiek garatzeko aukera egongo da²⁸³ (Goikoetxea, 2013a:280). Hala ere, jada ikusi dugun moduan testuinguru horietan ere zentralizatorako eta babesa eskaini dien alderdiaren erkidegoaren interesen aurka jotzeko ahalmena erabatekoa da²⁸⁴ (Chary & Heywood, 2009: 49). *Hori dela eta, Estatu matrizearekiko erlazioa ez da maila bereko bi komunitate politikoaren artean ematen baizik eta bata bestearekiko subordinazio maila batean (Requejo, 2007:91; Zubiaga, 1999:124). Horren ondorioz, deszentralizazioa “hierarkiaren itzalean” garatu dela uste dugu.*

Horretaz gain, estatismo autoritariorako eta demokraziaren pribatizatorako joerak nagusi diren garaiotan tentsio horiek areagotu egin dira (Goikoetxea, 2017; Poulantzas, 1979). Interpretazio gatazkatsu eta kontrajarriak egon arren, Europar Batasunak ere ez ditu “erregioak” ahaldu eta birzentralizazio prozesuan Estatu matrizearen ahalmen politikoa indartu du (Goikoetxea, 2017:186).

Demokratizazio katalanari dagokionez, nazio historikoak prozesua eragin eta baldintzatu arren, estatu gaitasunen eta herri mobilizazioaren elkarrekintzaren ondorioz hirukian jaso dugun dinamika aktibatuko da nazioaren inguruan dauden ikuspegiak moldatuz. Besteak beste, hainbat aktorek Països Catalans aldarrikatzen jarraitu arren, estatu egitura ezberdinen eta demokratizazio prozesu ezberdinen ondorioz, egungo independentzia prozesua historikoki “Principat” moduan ezagutzen den eremuan garatu da.

²⁸³ Hori izan zen Pujolen “Peix al Cove” estrategiaren oinarria.

²⁸⁴ “Moreover, evidence from the late 1990s demonstrates that when a minority government – in this case the PP which governed with the support of the Catalan party CiU – wishes to do so, **it can implement measures that run counter to the desires of the regions.**” (Chary & Heywood, 2009: 48) (letra lodia egileak gehitua).

Estatu egitura demokratikoen eta aktore katalanen arteko dinamikaren ondorioz subjektu/objektu berri bat sortuko da, demos katalana, eta nazio katalana era demokratiko batean birsortuko da: naziogintza, demosgintza eta estatugintza aldi berean burutuko dira beraz. Horregatik, estaturik gabeko nazioen ordeztatalitate subalternoei buruz hitz egin dugu. Hori dela eta, gure ikuspegitik egungo gatazken gakoa ez da “ezberdina den nazio baten kulturaren akomodazioa” baizik eta nola eta zein neurritan hitz egin dezakeen estatalitate subalternoak (H4).

Egungo gatazken gakoa ez da nazionalismoa demokratikoa den ala ez den, zibikoa ala etnikoa den edota homogeneousazioaren aurrean diferentzien errespetuaren kudeaketa egokia egiten den. Kontrara, demokrazia nazionalismo mota bat da eta bere helburuak erdiesteko estatu gaitasunak behar izango ditu (Goikoetxea, 2013b:395). Demokratizazioa bestalde, jendartearen bere sistema politiko eta sozioekonomikoan ahalik eta gehien barneratzea helburu duen prozesua da (Goikoetxea, 2017:3). Mekanismo diziplinario, biopolitiko eta erregulatzailerak dira prozesu horretan demosa mendean hartu eta aldi berean ahalduz dituztenak eta horren bidez euren burua gobernatzeko beharrezkoak diren baliabide eta aukeretara sarbidea izan dezaten gaitasuna eskaintzen dizkienak (Ídem). Prozesu horretan ez dira ez nazioa, ez disziplina ezta homogeneousazioa desagertuko, euren birsorpenaren izaera izango da aldatuko dena (Goikoetxea, 2013b:396).

Hori kontuan izanik burujabetza eskaeren edukia ez dira mugatzen nazio eta nazionalismoaren ikuspegi klasikoan nagusitu diren aldarrikapenetara, demos katalana bere eskaeren arabera gobernatzeko beharrezkoak diren estatu gaitasunak eskuratzea izango da funtsa (H4). Hau da, demos katalana, mekanismo diziplinario, biopolitiko eta erregulatzaileraren bidez normalizatzeko estatu gaitasunak lortzea (Foucault, 2003: 60; Goikoetxea, 2017:231-234). *Zertarako? Demos katalana bere borondatearen arabera ahalduz eta hortaz estatu erakundeek era obedentzial batean jarduteko ahalmena izateko. Edozein komunitate politiko demokratikok bere demosa ahalduz eta beharrezkoak dituen mekanismoei buruz ari garen neurrian, gatazka nazional bati buruz baino (edo gatazka nazional batez gain) gatazka demokratiko bati buruz eta burujabetza gatazka bati buruz ari gara (Goikoetxea, 2013a:284).*

Katalunian ere, demokrazia liberal gehienetan erabilitako antzeko botere teknologiak (politika publikoak adibidez) nagusitzen dira demos hori menderatu/ahalduz eta osasun sistema, hezkuntza sistema, zerbitzu sozialak, lan arloko politikak, berdintasun politikak, hizkuntza eta kultura politikak etab. Honen adibide bat eskaintze aldera, osasun sistema katalanaren oinarriak azalduko ditugu jarraian.

2.3 Model sanitari català: nazio eraikuntza garaikidearen adibide.

2.3.1 Konfidantza eta dependentzia: komunitate politikoaren ardatzak

Jule Goikoetxeak dioskun moduan, estatu erakunde bidez talde sozialei baliabideak eskainiz eta jarduteko beharrezkoak diren baldintzak eta erregulazioak ezarriz, talde horiek objektibitateaz gain erakundeekiko duten *konfiantza eta dependentzia* handitzen da (2014a:161).

Horrela sortu eta birsortzen da nazio demokratikoa eta horrela eraikitzen da politika demokratikoaren erreferentzia eremua: *komunitate politikoa*. Eremu hau existitzen ez bada, ez dago demokratizazio prozesu baten subjektu/objektua izan daitekeen talderik ezta politikoki objektibatutako talde ezberdindurik: *demos katalana*²⁸⁵, ezta ezberdindutako sistema politikoa: *demokrazia katalana* (Ídem).

Jada adierazi dugun moduan, estatu erakundeek norabide ezberdinetan aktibatu daitezkeen “estatu gaitasunak” dituzte: hauek testuinguru zehatzetan diharduten aktore politikoaren agentziaren bidez aktibatzen dira (Jessop, 2008a:37). Hala ere, ez dira mugagabeak izango, egiturek ezarritako muga/aukeren baitan eta aktoreen gaitasunen arabera selektiboak eta estrategikoak baizik (Jessop, 2015b: 55).

Edozein sistema politikotan gertatzen den moduan, aktore eta egituren arteko harremanaren ondorioz, identitate batzuk, interes batzuk eta hortaz aktore batzuk beste batzuen mesedetan hobetsiko dira beti egongo delako bazterketa maila bat²⁸⁶(Goikoetxea, 2017:211). Identitate katalana hobesteaz gain, botere blokearen interesen muinean kokatzen diren aktoreak hobetsiko direla uste dugu. Demokrazia kapitalista eta patriarkal garaikideetan orokorrean gertatzen den moduan klase altuak, gizonak eta jatorrian jaiotakoaren interesak, langileen, emakumeen eta atzerrian jaiotakoaren interesen gaitetik pribilegiatuko dira.

Hori kontuan izanik, **Kataluniako estatu erakundeek, herritarrek hauekiko duten dependentzia eta konfiantza maila handitu dute komunitate politikoaren erreferentzia bihurtuz**. Zentzu horretan egungo jendarteetan ongizate politikek garrantzia berezia hartzen dute. Hauen bidez ez da soilik nazio katalana zentzu historiko kulturalen birsortuko baizik eta *nazio katalanaren*

²⁸⁵ Goikoetxeak bere lanean, “euskal demosari” buruz eta “euskal demokraziari” buruz hitz egiten du.

²⁸⁶ Interesgarria da honen inguruan Jule Goikoetxeak egindako hausnarketa: “Thus, democratization involves socio-economic integration; **not, however, the disappearance of exclusion**, since those institutions that integrate some groups’ demands into the governing process necessarily have to exclude others’, not just because resources are limited but also because groups’ interests are usually incompatible” (2017:211). (letra lodia autoreak gehitua).

*ongizate*²⁸⁷ *erregimena* ere birsortuko da eta egungo demokrazia garaikideetan ohikoa den birsorpen demokratikoa garatuko da.

Paola Lo Cascioren arabera herritarrengan sortzen duten erreferentzialtasun mailagatik osasungintzan eta irakaskuntzan garatutako politikak dira aipagarrienak (2008: 154). Bere aburuz, jada 90. hamarkadan ohikoa zen “*model sanitari català*” edota “*model educatiu català*” bati buruz hitz egitea (Ídem). Bi arlo horiek dira orokorrean aurrekontu publikoetan dotazio gehien jasotzen dutenak. Gomak eta Subiratsek koordinatutako lan kolektiboa harago doa eta “El règim català de benestar” bati buruz hitz egiten dute (2001). Honen baitan, politika ekonomikoak, lan arlokoak, hezkuntza, osasungintza, politika sozialak, migrazio politikak, familia, berdintasuna, hizkuntza eta kultura lantzen dituzte (Ídem).

Kataluniako ongizate sistema sakonki aztertzeak gure ikerketaren helburuak gaindituko lituzke. Horretaz gain, inork gutxik ukatzen du nazioa eta hizkuntzaren arteko lotura, eta hezkuntza sistemek nazio eraikuntza prozesuetan duten garrantzia. Zentzu horretan, Pujolen lehen gobernuaren helburua “irakaskuntzaren katalanizazioa” izan zen (Lo Cascio, 2008:180) eta 30 urte beranduago José Ignacio Wert Espainiar Irakaskuntza Ministroarena “ume katalanak espainolizatzea²⁸⁸”. Hori kontuan harturik, osasun sistema katalanean jarriko dugu arreta **demos, nazio eta estatugintza garaikidearen (H4) adibide bat** azaltzeko helburuarekin.

2.3.2 Model sanitari català²⁸⁹

1980. hamarkadan osasun sistemari loturik egon ziren eliteen ikuspegitik, politika ezberdinak egiteko tresna bat izateaz gain Kataluniaren autonomia berretsi eta sakontzeko tresna bezala ere ulertu zuten (Gallego, 2001:140). Espainiar sistematik ezberdindu eta Katalunian oinarritutako eredu bat eraikitzeke tresna bat alegia (Lo Cascio, 2008:157). Hori kontuan izanda, uste dugu **osasun sistema, demos-estatu-naziogintzan adibide bat eskaintzen digula (H4)**. Gure argudioa garatzeko era osagarrian ulertu behar diren hiru pausu emango ditugu:

- Hasteko kokapen historiko bat egingo dugu, testuinguru orokorraz gain, lurralde, autoritate eta eskubideen mihizaketaren (Sassen, 2010) lehen elementuak azaltzeko.
- Bigarren pausu batean aktore nagusien sarea azpimarratuko dugu.

²⁸⁷ Hautu estrategikoak egingo dituen neurrian, ongizate eta “gaizkizate” erregimena izango da aldi berean.

²⁸⁸ “Nuestro interés es españolizar a los niños catalanes” adierazi zuen:
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/10/10/espana/1349858437.html> (Azken bisita: 2017/07/05).

²⁸⁹ Jule Goikoetxearen azken lana (2018b), atal hau osatzeko funtsezko ikerketa da.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

- Lehenengo bi atal deskriptiboen ostean, azkenik *gure ikuspegitik demoes-tatu-nazio eraikuntzan izan duen eragina* azalduko dugu maila analitiko txertatuz.

2.3.2.1 - Kokapena:

Eredu honen sorreran fase ezberdinak ezberdindu daitezke. Lehenik eta behin, 1981-1986 urteen artean ereduaren ezaugarriak ezarri ziren adostasun politiko zabala lortuz. 1981. urtean CIU-ren lidergopean zegoen gobernuak osasun arloko lehen eskuduntzak lortu eta sistema propioa garatzen hasteko hautua hartu zuen.

Hala ere, proiektu horren garapenean eragina izan zuen egiturazko muga bat hartu behar da kontuan: 1975ean Estatu osoko ospitale oheen %69.3a publikoa zen bitartean, Katalunian kopuru hori %40.6koa zen (Ibídem:154-155). Eremu pribatuaren %20a aldiz, irabazi asmorik ez zuten erakundeen esku zeuden: Eliza, Gurutze Gorria eta ongintzako fundazioak ziren hauen artean garrantzitsuenak (Ídem). Bestalde, lehen mailako atentzioan bi kasuetan %90a publikoak ziren (Gallego 2001:140). Ospitaleak izan ziren hortaz etorkizuneko hautuak baldintzatu zutenak.

Paola Lo Casciok dioskun moduan, alde aurretiko muga horrek bi aukera uzten zituen: osasun arloko egitura publikoak “drastikoki” handitzea edota momentuko baldintzetara moldatu eta eredu mixto bat sustatzea. Azken honek, babes publiko eta unibertuala bermatzea baina kudeaketa eta hornikuntza mixtoa eskaintzea suposatzen zuen²⁹⁰ (2008:157). Egiturazko baldintzek mugatuta, baina baita aukera estrategiko baten ondorioz²⁹¹, CIU-k zuzendutako gobernuak eredu mixtoa sortzea erabaki zuen. Hala ere, honen inguruan ezkerreko taldeek ere adostasun osoa adierazi zuten. PSC-k eta PSUC-ek²⁹² Gobernuak eginiko proposamenari emendakinak egin arren, biak eredu mixtoaren alde agertu ziren batez ere irabazi asmorik ez zuten eragileen papera defendatuz (Ibídem:159).

Urte horietan sistema egituratu zuten hainbat erakunde sortu ziren. Berriki eratutako *Kataluniako Osasun Institutuak* (ICS),²⁹³ alde batetik era zuzenean sare publikoko egituren bidez zerbitzuak eskaintzen zituen eta bestetik kanpo hornitzaileak kontratatzen zituen bere egiturak nahikoak ez ziren eremuetan zerbitzua eskain zezaten (Barbieri, Gallego, 2016:248). Azken jarduera hori antolatzeke, 1985eko dekretu baten bidez *Erabilera Publikoko Ospitaleen Sarea* (XHUP)²⁹⁴ sortu zuten. Honen baitan, jabetza publiko²⁹⁵ eta pribatuko ospitaleak zeuden eta azken hauen

²⁹⁰ Azken hau, neoliberalismotik eta bere “egi erregimenaren” logikan dagoen New Public Management eredutik gertu egon daiteke (Gallego, 1998).

²⁹¹ “Path-dependency” eta “Path-shaping” dialektika ikus dezakegu era argian.

²⁹² 1987an *Iniciativa per Catalunya* (IC) koalizioaren sortzaile izan zen eta bertan barneratu zen oifzialki disolbatu arte. 1990. hamarkadan *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds* (ICV) koalizioa osatu zen.

²⁹³ Institut Català de Salut.

²⁹⁴ Xarxa Hospitalaria d’Utilització Pública.

²⁹⁵ Maila lokalean sortutakoak baina ICS-ren kontroletik kanpo zeudenak adibidez.

artean irabazi asmorik ez zuten erakundeek pisua irabazi zuten (Ídem). Horretaz gain, lehen mailako atentzioaren erreforma eta kudeaketaren deszentralizazioa ere bultzatu zen.

Oraindik Estatu mailako oinarritzko legerik ez zegoen arren, 1981 eta 1986 artean garatu zen prozesuan osasun sistema katalanaren muina ezarri zen. Gobernuak lidergoa izan arren oposizioa ereduaren funtsezko elementuetan bat etorri zen (Lo Cascio, 2008: 162). Honek Espainiar autoritateen aurrean erakundetze katalanaren autoritatea egonkortu zuen:

... **consolidaven l'autoritat de les institucions catalanas**, ja que aquestes, molt abans de la discussió i de l'aprovació d'una normativa d'ambit estatal, fixarien les característiques d'un model que es volia nou, realista i sobretot ideològicament autònom. [...] **per necessitat i per convicció, s'apostava per un model sanitari íntegrament propi**²⁹⁶.
(Ídem:157).

1986an osasun arloko Espainiar legea garatu zen (LEGSA). Hasiera batean PSOEK egindako proposamena ez zetorren bat sistema katalanarekin eta CIUko diputatuek lobby lana egin zuten Katalunian jada martxan zegoen sistemara moldatu ahal izateko²⁹⁷ (Ídem:164). Aldaketa horien ondorioz, Generalitat-ak LEGSA-k ezarritako helburuak bere egin zituen: zerbitzu unibertsala eta doakoa izatea eta lehen mailako atentzioa sustatzea eta erreformatzea (Ídem:165). Bestalde, zerbitzu horien antolaketan Generalitat-ak bere eredia mantentzeko ahalmena lortu zuen (Ídem:166).

1986-1990 urteen artean trantsizio fase bat egon zen Kataluniako legea, LOSC (Llei d'ordenació Sanitaria de Catalunya), onartu zen arte. Honen onarpenean eztabaida eta desadostasunak egon ziren alderdi eta beste eragileen artean²⁹⁸. Lege horren bidez, *Kataluniako Osasun Institutuaren* (ICS)²⁹⁹ lana, eremu publikoan bere menpe zeuden zerbitzuak kudeatzera mugatu zen (Barbieri, Gallego, 2016:248). Sare kontzertatua kudeatzeko aldiz *Kataluniako Osasun Zerbitzua* (SCS) sortu zen.

Azken honen izaeraren inguruan piztu ziren hainbat gatazka. CIU-ren ikuspegitik kudeaketa lanetan zuzenbide pribatuaren baitan jarduteko autonomia izango zuen

²⁹⁶ Letra lodia guk erantsia.

²⁹⁷ Garai hartan PSC-ko kide Ernest Lluch zen Espainiako Osasun Ministroa. Honek osasun arloko hainbat gatazka konpontzea erraztu zuen (Lo Cascio, 2008:164).

²⁹⁸ Hasierako proiektuari 1289 emendakin egin zizkioten oposizioko alderdiek (Lo Cascio, 2008:169).

²⁹⁹ Legeak era nahiko anbiguoan ICS-k pixkanaka indarra galdu behar zuela eta SCS-ren barruan txertatuko zela adierazi arren ez zen halakorik gertatu eta administrazio zuzenbidearen baitan lan egiten jarraitu zuen (Barbieri, Gallego, 2016: 249).

“entitate publikoa” izan behar zuen (Gallego, 2001:154). Aldi berean, proposamen horren bidez eremu politikoko, Exekutiboa eta Osasun Departamenduarekiko batez ere, dependentzia handia zuen entea zen (Ídem). PSC-k eta IC-k pribatizazio arriskua ikusten zuten eta “organismo autonomoa” izatea proposatzen zuten, hau da, maila politikoan independenteagoa baina kudeaketa tarte txikiagoarekin (Ídem). Bestetik, PSC-k gobernu lokalen parte hartzea handitzea sustatu nahi zuen (hiri eta herri handienetan botere instituzional handia zuen) eta IC-k kontrara eragile sozial eta batez ere sindikatuen parte hartzea bultzatu nahi zuen (eremu horren babes handia zuelako) (Ídem).

Hasiera batean CIU-k proposatu proiektuaren elementu asko mantendu ziren arren³⁰⁰, IC-rekin akordio batera heldu ziren hainbat aldaketa eraginez (Lo Cascio, 2008:169):

- SCS-ren izaera publikoa bermatzeko adostasuna.
- SCS-ren zuzendaritza batzordean kuota banaketa orekatzea
- 6 hilabeteko epean babes publikoa herritarren %100ari luzatzeko konpromisoa.
- 3 urteko epean osasun sektoreko langile guztien baldintzen parekatzea lortzea.

Hurrengo taulan, *Kataluniako Osasun Zerbitzuko* (SCS) zuzendaritza batzordearen parte hartze kuota ikus daitezke, eragileen proposamenak eta legeak jasotako kontuan hartuta:

³⁰⁰ 1984 eta 1995 urteen artean CIU-k gehiengo absolutua zuela kontuan hartu behar da.

IRUDIA 29 SCS Zuzendaritza Batzordean parte hartze kuotak

	CIU	PSC	IC	Comissió Parlamentaria de Política Social	LOSC
Generalitat	100%	%50	%50	%60	%60
Administrazio lokalak		%50	%20	%20	%20
Eragile sozialak			%20	%20	%20
Guztira	19	12	20	20	20

Iturria: Gallego, 2001:154.

1990. urtean onartutako legea (LOSC) 1995ean erreformatu zuten. 1990ean onartu ostean, Osasun Departamentuak (DSSS), sistemaren kudeaketan parte hartzen zuten eragile eta administrazio lokalekin (gehienak PSC-ren eskuetan eta maila txikiago batean IC-ren eskuetan) lankidetzan oinarritutako harreman ona garatu zuten (Lo Cascio, 2008:171). PSC-ren alkatetza zuten udalek jarrera oso aktiboa izan zuten legearen garapenean, partzuergoen sustapenean eta hornitzaileen dibertsifikazioan (Ibidem:173). Horretaz gain, osasun arloko eliteen artean Kudeaketa Publiko Berriaren³⁰¹ diskurtsoa hedatzen hasi zen (Gallego, 2001:155). Legearen malgutasuna baliatuz osasun arloan quasi-merkatu bat eratzeko marko egokia izan zitekeela uste zuten (Ídem). Sozialistek ez zuten begi txarrez ikusten joera berria eta Espainia mailan Kataluniako eredia jarraitzeko saiakerak ere egon ziren (ídem).

Testuinguru hartan, PSC-ren babesarekin 1995ean proposatutako erreformak politika katalanaren %70a ordezkatzan zuten alderdien babesa izan zuten. Kasu honetan, IC aurka azaldu zen pribatizazioa sustatu zezakeelako (Lo Cascio, 2008:173). Raquel Gallegoren aburuz aldiz, Kudeaketa Publiko Berria erretorikan nagusitu zen arren ez zen inoiz praktikara eraman eta 80. hamarkadatik nagusi ziren praktikekin jarraitu zuten (2001:155).

Hamarkada horietan ezarritako oinarriak ez ziren hurrengo urteetan asko moldatu. PSC-k, ERC-k eta ICV-k osatutako tripartit-aren garaian, Marina Geli

³⁰¹ New Public Management. Gubernamentalitate neoliberalaren baitan kokatzen den joera da. Administrazio publikoan merkatuaren printzipioak ezartzea da bere xedea. Aurretiaz adierazi moduan, gubernamentalitate neoliberal estatutaren bidez aplikatzen da.

Kontseilariaren gidaritzapean, *Kataluniako Osasun Institutuaren* (ICS) erreforma korapilatsua Parlamentuan aho batez onartu zen (Barbieri, Gallego, 2016:248). 1990-etik aktore eta egitura ezberdinen arteko oreka ez apurtzeko erreformatu gabe mantendu arren, lau urteetako artekaritza lanaren ostean ICS-ren erreforma onartu eta enpresa publiko bihurtu zen (Ibídem, 252).

5.3.2.2- Aktoreak.

Alderdi politikoez gain, aktore sare garrantzitsu batek hartu du parte. Aktore bakoitzak osasun arloko eremu ezberdinetako baliabide osagarriak kudeatu dituen neurrian, euren arteko interdependentzia areagotu da (Gallego, 2001:143). Horren bidez, *sortzen ari zen autoritate eremu berri horrekiko dependentzia maila handitzeaz gain, eragileen konfiantza maila ere handitu zen* (Goikoetxea, 2014a:161).

Alde batetik zerbitzuen probisioaz arduratzen ziren presio taldeen artean Ospitaleen Batasun Katalana (UCH³⁰²) eta Kataluniako Ospitaleen Partzuergoa (CHC³⁰³) dira garrantzitsuenak. UCH-k ospitaletako sektore “teknokratikoagoa” ordezkatzeko bitartean CHC-k maila lokaleko interes politikoak ordezkatzeko zituen (Gallego, 2001:143). Hori dela eta, udaletan PSC-k izandako pisuaren ondorioz, alderdi horretatik gertu zeuden sektoreak gehienbat ordezkatzeko zituzten (Lo Cascio, 2008:163). UCH bestalde elite pribatu batzuen elkartzaren ondorioz sortu zen eta sindikatuekin negoziatzen zuen patronal lana bete zuen (Gallego, 2001:144).

Udal administrazioaren menpe zeuden ospitale publiko eta semipublikoak 80. hamarkadan egoera ekonomiko larrian zeuden eta CHC-ren bidez osasun politikan parte hartzeko bide bat topatu zuten (Ídem). Horretaz gain, garai hartan udalek herritarrengandik osasun zerbitzuak hobetzeko presioa jasotzen zuten eta CHC-ren bidez bideratzen saiatu ziren (Ídem). Honen ondorioz, Gizarte Segurantzaren sisteman probintzietako hiriburuetan kokatutako teknologia altuko ospitale handiak hobetsi ziren bitartean, sistema katalanean lurralde osora iristen zen oinarrizko mailako ospitale sare deszentralizatua hobetsi zen sarbidean ekitatea sustatuz (Ibídem:148). Hori dela eta, eskualdeka antolatutako zentroen sarearen ondorioz herritarrek bizilekutik gertu kalitatezko zerbitzu bat eskuratu dezakete Bartzelonara joateko beharrik izan gabe³⁰⁴ (ABC, 2002).

³⁰² Unió Catalana d’Hospitals. Historikoki CIU-tik gertu egon da. Boi Ruiz adibidez, 1994-2008 artean bere zuzendari orokorra izandakoa eta 2008- 2010 artean bere presidente izan ostean, 2010-2016 urteen artean Artur Masen Gobernuko Osasun Kontseilaria izan zen.

³⁰³ Consorci Hospitalari de Catalunya.

³⁰⁴ 2002an osasun arloko politiken inguruan egindako ebaluazioaren ostean Guillen Lópezek hurrengo adierazi zuen “el Govern ha optado decididamente por potenciar la equidad sanitaria y

Erakundetze prozesu aurretik UCH-k patronal lanak bete zituen eta sindikatuak arauturik eta koordinaturik ez zegoen eremu batean jarduten zuten. 80. hamarkadan ospitale sarea garatzearekin batera lan baldintzen desberdintasunak areagotu ziren (kasuan kasuko baldintza eta indar harremanen araberakoa) (Gallego, 2001:145). 1987an lehen hauteskunde sindikalak egin zirenean aldiz, klase zein sektoreko sindikatuen garrantzia areagotzen joan zen (Ídem). Hasiera batean hauteskundeak ICS-ra mugatu ziren eta CCOO³⁰⁵ eta CESH-SATSE nagusi baziren ere, hauteskunde sindikalak ospitale sare osotik hedatzean (XHUP-etik) prozesu asanblearioen bidez eratu ziren CATAC³⁰⁶ eta CTS-IAC³⁰⁷ sindikatuak³⁰⁸ indartu ziren (ibídem:146).

Azken hauek osasunaren pribatizaziorantz jo duten erreforma eta jarduera guztiak aurkatu eta aurre egiten saiatu dira, ereduaren gabeziak gogor salatuz (Serna, 2010: 112-113). 1987ko Gironako Ospitaleko greba “historikoa”³⁰⁹ izan da azken hamarkadetako mobilizaziorik garrantzitsuenak, baina horretaz gain, aipatu sindikatuek gogor salatu dituzte besteak beste, politikarien ate birakariak edota politika neoliberalak eta interes pribatuen defentsa hobestea (Ibídem: 116-120).

Bestetik, Bartzelonako Medikuen Elkargo Ofiziala (COMB)³¹⁰ begien bistara agerikoa izan ez den baina eragin handia izan duen aktorea izan da (Gallego, 2001:147). Osasun Departamenduarekin (DSSS³¹¹) harreman zuzena izateaz gain, bien arteko lotura ideologikoa eta kideen trukaketa ere ohikoa izan da (Ídem). Lehen mailako atentzioan (EAP³¹²) bultzatu diren erreformetan eragiten saiatu dira dedikazio eskusiboa saihestu eta jarduera publikoaz gain lan pribatua mantentzeko

asistencial mediante una densa red de centros comarcales, de forma que cualquier ciudadano tenga acceso a un servicio de calidad próximo sin tener que desplazarse a Barcelona” (ABC, 2002).

³⁰⁵ Katalunian “Comissió Obrera Nacional de Catalunya” deitzen da eta CCOO-rekin konfederaturik dago.

³⁰⁶ Candidatura Autònoma de Treballadores i Treballadors de l'Administració de Catalunya - Coordinadora de Treballadors.

³⁰⁷ Coordinadora de Treballadors i Treballadores de la Sanitat / Intersindical Alternativa de Catalunya.

³⁰⁸ Gaur egun bi sindikatuak elkarturik dihardute CATAC-CTS-IAC izena du.

³⁰⁹ Egun CUP-eko eta CATAC-CTS-IAC sindikatuko kide den Ramón Sernak dioena jarraituz “La huelga del hospital de Girona contra la reducción del 10 % de la plantilla trastocó los planes oficiales. Iniciada como huelga salvaje, el comité de huelga era la autoridad del hospital, hasta decidía la actividad que se realizaba y la que se aplazaba, y, tras la victoria, se pudo imponer la condición de que no hubiera descuentos. En ella se fraguó nuestro sindicato CATAC-CTS.” (Serna, 2010:112).

³¹⁰ Colegi Oficial de Metges de Barcelona (COMB).

³¹¹ “Departament de Sanitat i Seguretat Social”. Ostean tripartitarekin “Departament de Sanitat de la Generalitat de Catalunya” izendatu zuten.

³¹² Equipos d’Atenció Primària.

(Ídem). Bere jardueren artean, aipagarria da 1995eko legearen erreformaren ostean, medikuek zuzenean enpresa eta elkarte anonimoak sortzearen alde egin zuten presioa (Ídem).

Azkenik, aipagarria da gizarte zibiletik sistemarekiko jarrera kritikoa mantendu duen “Café amb Llet” aldizkari soziala³¹³. Gai anitzak landu arren, osasunaren pribatizazioaren aurka egindako lanagatik izan da ezaguna. Podem-eko buru eta CSQP-eko parlamentari zen Albano Dante eta En Comú Podemeko diputatu den Marta Sibina ziren aldizkariaren zuzendariak. Gizarte zibiletik ere osasun sistema kritikatu duen “La Salut el negoci de la vida” ekimenak, osasunaren pribatizazioaren aurkako dokumental³¹⁴ ugari publikatu ditu.

Laburki hauek dira alderdiez gain egon diren aktore nagusiak. Bakoitzak interes ezberdin eta askotan kontrajarriak defendatu arren, **autonomiaren ostean sortu zen osasun sistema katalanarekiko dependentzia eta konfiantza maila handitzea da guztiek komunean dutena. Beste era batera esanda, demokrazia katalanarekiko dependentzia eta konfiantza maila handitzea**. Zentzu horretan zuzenean Raquel Gallegoren aipua jasotzen dugu:

“El “model sanitari català” ha estat el resultat d’un llarg procés d’acomodació entre els interessos de determinats actors col·lectius públics i privats. Aquest procés ha estat gradual i s’ha caracteritzat per una negociació constant i normalment bilateral, en el si d’una xarxa d’actors que controlen recursos complementaris i que són, per tant, fortament interdependents. Els incentius que es deriven d’una situació com aquesta, afavoreixen pautes de comportament cooperatiu en què **les relacions de poder i dependència mútua s’articulen sobre la base de la confiança a llarg termini. En aquest sentit, el model sanitari català ha aconseguit implicar actors amb ideologies, recursos i preferències diferents en una coalició promotora que comparteix un interès comú: el manteniment del model creat.**³¹⁵” (Gallego, 2001:157)

³¹³ 2004an maila lokalean sortutako dohako egunkaria da. 2014an Katalunia osoan 145.000 ale banatzen zituen. 2015ean bere arduradunak parlamentuan sartzean euren jarduera nabarmen murriztu da. Hurrengo loturan euren webgunea ikus dezakegu: <http://www.cafeamballet.com/es/>

³¹⁴ Hurrengo estekan adibidez, dokumental sail horien baitan ekoiztu zuten “Pagar per viure” ikusi dezakegu: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVvQ_MmE44o

³¹⁵ Aipua 2001eko izan arren ostean garatu diren ekimenek berresten dute: 2007an Institut Català de Salut arautzen zuen legea aho batez onartu zen Parlament-ean.

3- Demokratizazioa eta desdemokratizazioaren arteko tentsioa demos-nation-state building-aren adibide

Estatu egitura guztiak eta demokratizazio prozesu guztiak dira estrategiko eta erlazionalak (Jessop, 2008). Estatu egituretan inskribatutako selektibitate estrategikoen eta aktoreen kalkulu estrategikoen orientazio estrukturalaren arteko tentsioan ulertu behar ditugu (Jessop, 1996:124). Horren ondorioz, aktore batzuk, politika batzuk eta identitate batzuk beste batzuen kaltetan pribilegiatuko direla esan dugu.

Hori kontuan izanik, argi ikusi dugu Kataluniako osasun sisteman aktore, politika eta identitate batzuk beste batzuen kaltetan pribilegiatu direla. 1980. hamarkadatik 2012. urtera arte botere blokearen oinarri izan diren CIU eta PSC eta hauek ordezkatutako interesak hobetsi izan dira eta prozesu horren baitan CHC, UCH edota Bartzelonako Medikuen Elkargoarena ere bai (Gallego, 2001:144-145). Horren ondorioz, sistemak zenbait joera sozialdemokrata izan arren, gubernamentalitate neoliberalaren “egi erregimenetik” gertu dauden eraginkortasunaren diskurtsoa eta merkatuaren beste hainbat dinamika eta elementu ere sustatu dira (Gomà, Subirats, 2001: 343). **Horretaz gain, sistema “katalan” bati buruz ari gara, bere subjektu/objektua katalana izango eta horrenbestez identitate katalanaren birsorpenean eragina duena. Honen birsorpenean funtsezkoa den eremu bat arautu eta objektibatuko du.**

Hala ere, ezin dugu ahaztu demokrazia “herritarrak autogobernuaren bidez boteretzen dituen etengabeko prozesu politikoa” dela (Goikoetxea 2017b:15). Herritarrak beren sistema politiko eta sozio-ekonomikoaren gobernugintzan aritzeko aldiz, teknika eta instituzio publiko diziplinario eta biopolitikoak ezinbestekoak izango dira (idem). Prozesuaren izaera dinamikoari dagokionez, gobernu eta herritarren arteko kontsulta lotesleagoa, babestuagoa, zabalagoa eta berdina lortzeko mugimenduak dakar demokratizazioa³¹⁶ (Tilly, 2010:45). Zentzu horretan, hurrengo elementuak azpimarratuko genituzke:

- *Herritarrek aukeratutako ordezkariek prozesuaren gidaritzan izandako lana. Bi administrazio maila nagusitu dira: Generalitat-a eta herri administrazioa. Honek boterearen kontzentrazioa orekatu du eta nagusiki PSC-ren eskuetan egon diren udalerrri handiak³¹⁷ sistemaren kudeaketan*

³¹⁶ “la democratización significa el movimiento neto hacia una consulta más mutuamente vinculante, más protegida, más igual y más amplia” (Tilly, 2010:45).

³¹⁷ Gogora dezagun bide batez udalerrri horietan bizi izan dela jatorria Kataluniatik kanpo zuen langile klase kopurutsua.

barneratu ditu (CHC-ren bidez batez ere). Horretaz gain, Bartzelonaren metropolitik harago dauden eskualdeetan ere gertuko zerbitzu bat garatu da sarbidean ekitatea ahalbidetuz. Kontrara, zenbait kasutan aipatu elementu horiek ere sare klientelarren sorrera eta ustelkeria kasuak erraztu dituzte. Besteak beste, Reuseko “Innova kasua” izan da oihartzun publiko gehien izan duena (Puente, 2015).

- Bestetik, *fast policy making-aren garaietan, urteetako eztabaida prozesu eta saretze lana* azpimarratu daiteke. 80. hamarkadaren hasieran martxan jarritako prozesua 1990. urtera arte ez zen lege bidez arautu. CIU-k gehiengo absolutua izan arren, eta Espainiar legea 1986an onartu arren, zenbait eremutan oposizioko alderdien aurkakotasuna zela eta urteetan luzatu zen eztabaida. Azkenik 1990ean CIU-k eta Iniziativak babestu zuten eta 1995eko erreforma legea CIU-k eta PSC-k. ICS-ren erreforma bestalde 2007an aho batez onartu zuen parlamentuak lau urteetako artekaritza eta negoziazioen ostean (Barbieri, Gallego, 2016:246).
- Kontsulta zabalagoa izateko eta barneratze maila handiagoa izateko ezinbesteko baldintza da *sistema doako eta unibertsalaren bidez herritar guztiak babestea*. Zentzu horretan barneratze maila altua lortu arren, azken urteetako murrizketek eta privatizazioek kontrako bidea hartu dute desdemokratizazioa sustatuz. Horretaz gain, klase ertain eta altuen interesak estrategikoki hobetsi dira (Clua-Losada, 2012:55). Kontrara, 2017ko ekainaren 15ean onartutako legearen bidez, herritar guztientzako babes unibertsala bermatu zen³¹⁸. Honen helburua, “atzerritar irregularrak” osasun sistematik kanpo uzten zituen PP-ren gobernuaren 16/2012 dekretuaren eragina bertan behera uztea da. Demokratizazioa eta desdemokratizazioaren arteko tentsioa era argian ikus dezakegu.
- Osasun sistema katalanaren ardatza demos/nazio katalana da. Horren baitan kokatu behar dira “*model sanitari català*”, “*model sanitari propi*” eta antzeko marko diskurtsiboak eta horien kanpo eratzailen den Espainiar sistema. Horren ondorioz, 2014. urtean osasun arloko eztabaida sustatu eta akordio batera heltzeko parlamentuak bultzatutako dinamikaren baitan

³¹⁸ Hurrengo loturetan honen inguruko informazioa dago eskuragarri:

<http://salutweb.gencat.cat/ca/inici/nota-premsa/?id=300742>


<http://catsalut.gencat.cat/es/coneix-catsalut/acces-sistema-salut/qui-te-acces-al-sistema-sanitari-public/> (azken bisita 2017/07/10)

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

“Pacte Nacional de la Salut a Catalunya”³¹⁹ eztabaida martxan jarri zen. Argi dago “nazionala” esaten denean, nazioa Katalunia dela.

- Azkenik, herritarrek sistemarekiko adierazten duten asetze eta fideltasun maila altua edozein demokratizazio prozesuren ezinbesteko elementua da. Erakundeekiko dependentzia baina hauekiko konfiantza aldi berean indartzea demokratizazio prozesu ororen sendotasunaren adierazle dira. Hurrengo grafikoan ikus ditzakegu gu emaitzak:

IRUDIA 30 Kataluniako Osasun Sistemarekiko asetze eta fideltasun maila (2012)



Iturria: (CatSalut,³²⁰ 2014:65).

Zein neurritan eragin du orain arte azaldutakoak demokratizazio katalanean? Osasun sistema, beste hainbat eremutan egin daitekeen azterketaren adibide bat besterik ez da.

Edozein **demokratizazio/desdemokratizazio prozesutan ohikoak diren mekanismoak** antzeman daitezke: banaturiko aktoreen arteko artekaritza, koalizioen sorrera, “sistema sanitari català” edo antzeko kategorien sorrera,

³¹⁹ Pacte Nacional de la Salut de Catalunya-ren eztabaida dokumentua hurrengo loturan dago eskuragarri:
http://salutweb.gencat.cat/web/content/home/el_departament/model_sanitari_catala/pacte_nacional_de_salut/pacte_nacional_salut_acords.pdf (azken bisita 2017/07/10).

³²⁰ Hurrengo loturan eskuragarri:
http://catsalut.gencat.cat/web/content/minisite/catsalut/ciudadania/serveis_atencio_salut/valoracio_serveis_atencio_salut/veu_ciudadania/La-voz-de-la-ciudadania-2014.pdf (Azken bisita: 2007/07/10)

sindikatu eta gizarte mugimenduko kideekin izandako gatasketan polarizazioa, legeria aldaketak edota demokraziaren ezarpenak eskainitako aukeren espiralak eta aktore politiko anitzen zertifikazioa horren adibide lirerateke (McAdam, Tilly, Tarrow, 2001:264-304).

Bestetik, osasun sistemaren erakundetzearen bidez espazio bat arautu eta eragile batzuei jarduteko baldintzak eta beste batzuei zerbitzua jasotzeko baldintzak jartzen zaizkie (Foucault, 1995). *Dispositibo erregulatzailerik, diziplinario eta biopolitikoaren bidez, sistema arautu eta subjektu batzuk mendean hartzeaz gain, hauek ahalduntzen dira. Gorputz otzanak,³²¹ gorputz menderatuak eta ahaldunduak dira aldi berean* (ibidem: 135-170). Zentzu horretan, osasun zerbitzuak gorputza arautu baina aldi berean zaindu eta sendatzen dituzten botere teknologia biopolitikoaren artean nagusiak dira (Foucault, 2003; 2008; 2009). *Jendarte demokratikoak segurtasunean eta etengabeko zaintza publikoan oinarritzen diren jendarteak dira, baina baita mekanismo hauen aurka borrokatu eta aurre egiten diotenak* (Goikoetxea, 2017:233).

Kataluniako estatu erakundeek eskaintzen dituzten baliabideen bidez eta talde ezberdinek jarraitu beharreko irizpide eta baldintzen ezarpenaren bidez, *hauen objektibazio prozesua sustatzeaz gain, erakunde hauekiko dependentzia eta konfiantza maila handitzen dute* (Goikoetxea, 2014a:161). Aldi berean, estatu erakundearen interpenetrazio ahalmena handitzen da eremu politiko ezberdindu baten azalera ahalbidetuz (ídem).

Gure aburuz, Kataluniako estatu erakundearen gaitasuna murrizta izan arren, nazioaren birsortze demokratikoa burutu dute demos katalan ezberdindu bat birsortuz (H4). Osasun sistematik harago, beste hainbat politika publiko eta botere teknologia har litezke kontuan, arestian aipatu dugun “règim català de benestarrekoak” adibidez (Gomà, Subirats, 2001:131). Horietaz gain, Lo Casciok, TV3-n garrantzia azpimarratzen du edozein jendarte garaikidetan ohikoa den komunikazio espazio propioaren eraikuntzan (2008:217). Hizkuntzaren normalizazioan lagundu eta kultura katalanaren garapenean plataforma bat eskaintzeaz gain, komunikazio espazio ezberdindua, erakargarria eta dibertsifikatua eskaini du (Ídem). Azkenik, “Barcelona-Brussel.les, vol directe” metaforarekin Kataluniako Gobernuak Europar Batasunean zuzenean eragiteko lan diplomatikoari eskainitako garrantzia azpimarratzen du (Lo Cascio, 2008:217-240).

Esan dugun moduan lurraldea, autoritatea eta eskubideak mihiztatzen dira (Sassen, 2010) errealitate politiko berri bat sortuz: *estatalitate subalternoa*. Zentzu horretan,

³²¹ Foucaulten hizkeran “Docile bodies” ingeleraz edo “Cuerpos dóciles” gaztelaniako bertsioetan.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

1992 eta 1998ko CIS-eko datuetan oinarriturik Kataluniako herritarrak euren erakunde autonomikoen errendimenduarekin aletasun maila handiena zutenak ziren. Hurrengo taulan ikus ditzakegu datuak:

TAULA 6 Autonomiekiko herritarren aletze maila

<i>Comunidades Autónomas</i>	<i>Índice compuesto</i>	<i>Funcionamiento CA</i>	<i>Gobierno</i>	<i>Parlamento</i>	<i>Presidente</i>
Cataluña.....	54 (49-59)	66 (55-76)	58 (40-69)	32 (31-34)	60 (51-69)
Castilla-La Mancha ...	46 (42-49)	50 (44-57)	47 (33-60)	26 (26-26)	57 (46-67)
La Rioja.....	41 (34-48)	47 (33-61)	42 (32-59)	31 (30-33)	44 (27-59)
C. Valenciana.....	41 (37-45)	50 (43-57)	42 (29-55)	29 (24-33)	43 (39-51)
Extremadura.....	41 (32-49)	46 (36-55)	42 (25-66)	26 (21-31)	49 (33-64)
Navarra.....	38 (32-44)	55 (44-66)	37 (25-54)	27 (20-33)	36 (29-44)
Baleares.....	36 (34-38)	41 (41-42)	35 (25-53)	24 (20-28)	41 (37-47)
País vasco.....	36 (26-46)	47 (30-63)	34 (19-54)	28 (15-42)	44 (30-57)
<i>Media CC AA.....</i>	<i>35</i> (28-42)	<i>42</i> (32-52)	<i>36</i> (22-51)	<i>23</i> (18-28)	<i>41</i> (29-53)
Galicia.....	31 (24-39)	36 (27-44)	31 (15-46)	21 (13-28)	39 (28-50)
Madrid.....	30 (20-40)	35 (24-47)	31 (15-46)	17 (11-23)	41 (21-56)
Aragón.....	30 (25-36)	32 (24-39)	31 (20-44)	20 (16-24)	37 (27-46)
Castilla y León.....	30 (23-37)	35 (25-46)	31 (17-46)	19 (13-26)	34 (21-45)
Andalucía.....	29 (25-34)	35 (27-43)	29 (19-46)	20 (16-23)	34 (26-46)
Murcia.....	28 (18-38)	28 (20-36)	29 (11-48)	19 (11-28)	33 (15-48)
Asturias.....	27 (25-29)	32 (30-35)	28 (22-33)	25 (23-26)	24 (16-30)
Canarias.....	24 (18-30)	31 (19-44)	25 (10-40)	15 (10-20)	26 (21-33)
Cantabria.....	20 (13-27)	24 (13-35)	20 (7-32)	10 (5-16)	26 (16-36)

* Mínimos/máximos entre paréntesis. En **negrita** los valores superiores a la media.

(Iturria: Mota, Subirats, 2000:131)

Dinamika autonomikoaren mugen ondorioz, 2000. hamarkadaren hasieran Estatut berri baten beharra zabaltzen hasi zen sektore ezberdinetan. Azter ditzagun honen gako nagusiak.

4- Tripartit-a eta Estatut berria (2003 – 2010).

4.1 Botere erakundetuaren (potestas) krisia: “Crisis in” eta autonomiaren mugak

Estatut-aren erreformaren bidez maila abstraktuan definitu dugun burujabetzaren eskema plano zehatzago batean aztertu dezakegu. Demokrazian, boterearen subjektu kolektibo burujabea komunitate politikoa da, herria da. Era demokratikoan sortu eta birsortzen den herri horri demos deitu diogu (Goikoetxea, 2014a). Potentia deitu diogu komunitate horren jatorrizko botereari, eta potestas botere horren edozein erakundetzeri (Dussel, 2006: 29-34). Burujabetza bestalde, bi dimentsio horien arteko harremana era demokratikoan burutzea ahalbidetzen duen erlazio soziala da (Hinsley, 1986). Dusselen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“El proceso de pasaje de un momento fundamental (potentia) a su constitución como poder organizado (potestas), comienza cuando la comunidad política se forma a sí misma como poder instituyente (2006:30).”

“Se presupone entonces que la institucionalidad política está fundada en posibilitar la producción, reproducción y aumento estable de la vida de los ciudadanos en comunidad política (la potestas) (ibidem:73)”

Erakundetzeak herritarren birsorpen demokratikoa ahalbidetzeko gaitasunik ez dutenean krisi politikoak sortuko dira. Jatorrizko “potentziak” bere boterea aldarrikatu eta erakundeek era obedentzian jarduteko beharrezkoak dituzten aldaketak galdutako du (ibidem:94-99). **Gure ikuspegitik, egungo burujabetza eskaerak, burujabetza galera baten ondorioz indartu dira, hau da, herritarren borondatearen arabera gobernatzeko eta herritarrak gobernu sozioekonomikoan barneratzeko gaitasunen galera baten ondorioz (H5).** Egiturazko aldaketa orokor horiek, hala ere³²², eremuz eremu era ezberdin batean artikulatu dira. Katalunian, demos katalanak bere borondatearen arabera gobernatzeko ahalmenik ez duenean sortuko dira burujabetza eskaerak.

Honekin ez dugu esan nahi lehia politikoa independentista eta zentralista dikotomiara murrizten denik. Are gehiago, sistema politikoek orekarako eta birsorpenerako joera dute (Jessop, 2008a:7) **eta horrenbestez independentziaren orde zerdibideko bideak hobesteko ahalmena. Hortaz, bien arteko harremanean krisiak sortzeko joera egongo den arren, sistemak berak krisiak kudeatzeko baliabideak izango ditu eta horren ondorioz logika diferentzial demokratikoaren bidez barneratzeko** (Laclau, Mouffe, 1987:223). Dinamika

³²² “Authoritarian statism and privatization of democracy” kapituluak ikusi.

hauetan, “politikotasuna” eta gatazka ekidin nahi duten logika para-politiko eta post-politikoak nagusitzeko joera egoten da (Zizek, 2010:29-36). **Honi sistemaren barneko krisia edo “crisis in”** deitu diogu:

Jessopen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“crises [...] may take a familiar form for which crisis-management routines have already been developed and/or which can be solved quickly through trial-and-error experimentation that restores ‘business as usual’. These can be described as normal crises or crises *in* an organization, institutional order, functional system, or wider social order.” (Jessop, 2015a:458)

Zergatik krisia? Momentura arte, CIU-k gidatutako “Peix al Cove” estrategia nagusitu zen eta ERC-k soilik planteatzen zuen Estatut berri baten beharra (Guinjoan, Rodon Sanjaume, 2013:34). 90. hamarkadan zehar CIU-k PSOE zein PP babestu zituen eskumenak lortzearen truke. Kontrara, PP-k 2000. urtean gehiago absolutua lortu ostean ez zuen jada EAJ eta CIU-ren babesik behar eta hortaz, “Peix al Cove” estrategia agortu zen. Bestalde, Aznarren lidergopean diskurtso birzentralizatzailea, kontserbadorea eta neoliberala nagusitzeaz gain (Guibernau, 2013:381) momentura arte estigmatizaturik zegoen espainiar nazionalismoa berpiztu zen (Blas, 2013: 399).

Testuinguru horretan, CIU-k 1980-2003 urteen artean gidatutako gobernu galdu zuen eta PSC, ERC eta ICV-EUA alderdien artean gobernu “Katalanista eta ezkertiarra”³²³ osatu zuten. Tipartit-ak, hurrengo urteetan garatu zen prozesu independentista ulertzeko jauzi kualitatibo bat suposatu zuen: “katalanista” aterkiari esker, oso errotuta dagoen marko bat lerrokatzeaz gain (Snow et.al, 1986: 464-481) banaturik zeuden sektoreen artean artekari lana buru zuten (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001: 26). Honek etorkizuneko erabakitzeko eskubidean eta independentismo anitzaren artikulazioan garrantzia handia izan zuen. Zuzenean Guinjoan, Rodon eta Sanjaumeren hitzak jasoz:

“sota el paraigua de «catalanista» s’hi incloïen perfils tan diferenciats com el votant independentista d’ERC o el votant del PSC de l’àrea metropolitana de Barcelona. Simbòlicament, el nou Govern tripartit va escenificar que existia una Catalunya diferent de la de CiU i que podia governar. De fet, va plasmar políticament la pluralitat de la societat

³²³ “Pacte del Tinell” moduan ezagutzen den akordioan alderdiek gobernu akordioari emandako izena: “Acord per a un govern Catalanista I D’Esquerres a la Generalitat de Catalunya”. Akordioaren testu osoa hurrengo loturan dago eskuragarri:
http://www.ub.edu/OGC/Catalunya_VII_leg_Tinell.pdf (azken bisita 2017/05/05).

catalana i del catalanisme. Més endavant veurem que **aquest pluralisme ha resultat ser una de les característiques clau en l'emergència del dret a decidir.** (2013:34)

Aipatu elementuez gain zergatik suposatu zuen aldaketa kualitatibo bat? Lehen adierazi moduan *demokratizazio prozesu katalana eta espainiarraren arteko artikulazioa krisian sartu zelako. Talkan sartu ziren estatu proiektuen arteko artikulazioa. Alde batetik, Katalunian autogobernu maila handitzea eta honen eskumenak babestea helburu zuen proiektua nagusitu zen eta bestetik PP-k birzentralizazioa eta espainiar nazionalismoaren aldeko hautua berretsi zuen* (Blas, 2013; Guibernau, 2013). *Pérez Royoren hitzak erabiliz komunitate politiko batek bere sintesi politikoa egiten jarraitzeko ezinbestekoa du jatorrizko zilegitasun konstituziogilearen eta zilegitasun praktikoaren artean koherentzia mantentzea (2015:30). Denboraren poderioz, bien arteko erlazioa higitzen bada beharrezkoak dira berau berrezartzeko erreformarako mekanismoak ahalbidetzea (idem).*

Katalunian higadura hori nabaria zen. 1979. urteko Saueko Estatut-ak eskainitako eskumenak ez ziren nahikoak eta horiek gaurkotzeko jarraitutako estrategiak (Peix Al Cove) ere ez. Horren ondorioz, Pacte del Tinell gobernu akordio ezkertiarren lau ardatz nagusien artean lehenengo puntua hurrengoa zen: “autogobernu gehiago eta hobe. Kalitate demokratiko gehiago”³²⁴ (Pacte del Tinell, 2003:2). Helburua, Autonomia Estatutu berri bat onartzea zen. Hau da, jatorrizko zilegitasuna eta zilegitasun praktikoa gaurkotzeko ahalmena izan behar zuen akordioa.

Berau aurrera eramateko bazeuden aurreikusgarriak ziren erreformarako mekanismoak³²⁵, horregatik uste dugu “sistemaren barneko krisi” baten aurrean gaudela (“crisis in”). Are gehiago, *aldaketa galdatzen zuen momentu koiuntural horren bidez egituratze instituzionalaren egonkortzea lortuko zuen momentu estrukturala ezartzea zen helburua* (Jessop, 1982:253). Jessopek dioskun moduan, estatu proiektu egonkorak adostasun konstituzional batean edo konpromiso instituzional baten bidez formalki jasotzen dira (Jessop, 2015b:85) eta kasu honetan xedea, *Kataluniaren autogobernu maila asetzeko gaitasun izango zuen Estatutu berri bat onartzea zen.*


³²⁴Oinarritzko 4 puntuak hurrengoak ziren: 1- Més i millor autogovern. Més qualitat democràtica; 2- Un nou impuls econòmic per a Catalunya; 3- Catalunya, una nació socialment avançada; 4- Una nova política territorial i ambiental. (Pacte Del Tinell, 2003:2).

³²⁵ Mekanismo garrantzitsuenak prozesura formalen bidez araututakoak dira, Estatutuen erreformarako prozedurak adibidez. Ezin dira ahaztu, hala ere, era informalean eliteen artean akordioak egiteko ahalmenek izan dezaketen garrantzia (peix al cove estrategia adibidez).

4.2- Estatut berria: demokratizazio katalanean sakontzeko adostasun instituzionala

Hurrengo taulan dakusagun moduan, testuinguru hartan ERC eta ICV-ko boto emaitzen artean bereziki nabarmendu arren, demos katalanaren gehiengo batek estatutu berri bat eskatzen zuen:

IRUDIA 31 Kataluniako Estatutua Berritzeko Beharra (2005)



Font: Baròmetre Autòmic, CIS núm. 2610 (2005) Iturria: (Guinjoan, Rodon, Sanjaume, 2013: 35)

Hurrengo taulan ikus daitekeen moduan, Espainiar Estatuan 2002-2005 urteen artean, *statu quo-tik* harago zihoazen burujabetza eskaerak Katalunia eta EAEn lortzen zuten babes handiena. Katalunia zen era nabarmenean autonomia gehiago nahi zuen erkidegoa:

TAULA 7 Estatu Proiektuarekiko jarrerak (2002-2005)

	Spanish average (%)	Maximum Average	Minimum Average	Differential max-min	Average Rates of Growth
Centralism	8.7	17.6 (Aragon)	2.3 (Basque Country)	15.3	-5.43
Status Quo	51.4	74.5 (Extremadura)	23.5 (Catalonia)	51	+6.86
Status Quo Plus	26.3	48 (Catalonia)	11.5 (Extremadura)	56.5	-0.75
Secessionism	6.6	29.2 (Basque Country)	0.2 (Castile and León)	29	+4.76
No answer	7.1	11.6 (Andalusia)	2.9 (Extremadura)	8.7	-2.9

(iturria: Grau, 2011: 200)


Adierazi bezala, jatorrizko zilegitasuna eta zilegitasun praktikoa gaurkotzeko ahalmena izan behar zuen akordioa. Zentzu horretan, zuzenean Generalitat-ak

argitaratutako azalpen gidan³²⁶ adierazitako jasoz, Estatut-a izaera bikoitzeko paktua zen:

- **“L’Estatut és un pacte entre el Parlament de Catalunya i les Corts Generals ratificat pel poble de Catalunya.** Un pacte per definir qui som, com ens relacionem, quines tasques assumim i amb quins recursos comptem. Un pacte per atorgar capacitat d’autogovern a Catalunya i, per tant, per apropar el Govern a la ciutadania.
- **L’Estatut també és un pacte entre els governants i la ciutadania de Catalunya.** Un pacte que compromet els polítics catalans, que els obliga a treballar seguint unes regles, afavorint uns valors i garantint uns drets iguals per a tothom.” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006:4)

Edukiei dagokienez *Kataluniako nazioa ardatza izan arren, dimentsio nagusiak estatugintzan eta demosgintzan kokatzen dira (H4):*

IRUDIA 32 Burujabetza eskaeren dimentsio nagusiak



Iturria: egileak egina.

Hori kontuan hartuta, Enoch Albertik dioskuna jarraituz, lau ziren Estatutu berriaren helburu nagusiak (2010: 16):

³²⁶ Hurrengo loturan eskuragarri:

http://ca.sabadell.cat/referendumestatut/d/estatut_resum_cat.pdf (azken bisita: 2017/04/28)

- 1- *Generalitat-en eskuduntza guztiak bermatzea* eta eskuduntza horien aplikazioan autonomia izatea. Hau da, Pacte del Tinellen ezartzen zen moduan, autogobernu maila eta honen kalitatea handitzea.
- 2- *Estatu zentralarekin parte hartzean eta aldebikotasunean* oinarritutako erlazio berriak artikulatzea.
- 3- *Kataluniarentzat finantzazio sistema* berri eta justuagoa bermatzea.
- 4- *Katalunia nazio moduan onartzea* eta bere oinarritzko ezaugarriak bermatzea. Horien artean, katalana berezko hizkuntza moduan babestea eta horren ondorioz sortzen diren eskubide linguistikoak bermatzea litzateke elementu azpimarragarriena Enoch Albertiren aburuz.

Helburu orokor horiekin hasi zen Estatutu berri bat lortzeko prozesua. Erreformatik hiru pauso galdatzen zituen: 1- Kataluniako Parlamentuan 2/3-ko babesarekin onartzea, 2- Espainiar Parlamentuan gehiengo osoz onartzea eta 3- Kataluniako herritarrek erreferendum bidez onartzea.

Lehenengo fasean, hilabeteetako eztabaiden ostean CiU, PSC, ERC eta ICV-EUiA-ren adostasuna jasota, Kataluniako parlamentuaren %89ko babesarekin onartu zen- 135 diputatutik 120k babestu zuten- PP izanik akordiotik kanpo geratu zen alderdi bakarra. Edukiei dagokienez, Katalunia nazio moduan onartzeaz gain, bere autogobernu maila handitu eta Konstituzio Auzitegiaren aurrean legalki babesten zuen³²⁷ (Requejo, Sanjaume, 2013:13). Requejo eta Sanjaumeren azterketa jarraituz, hauek ziren aldaketa garrantzitsuenak (idem):

- a) Estatut-aren testuan, 1. artikuluan Katalunia nazio bat zela era argian adierazten zen.
- b) Katalana, administrazioak hobetsitako hizkuntza moduan definitzen zen eta herritarrek Gaztelaniarekin batera maila batean ezagutzeko beharra ezartzen zen.
- c) Kataluniako botere autonomoa eskumen erasoan aurrean blindatzen zuen.
- d) Generalitat-ak zerga guztiak jasotzea eta Espainiar Estatuarekin aldebiko negoziazioak izatea ere aurreikusten zen.
- e) Azkenik beste hainbat aspekturen artean Kataluniako herritarren eskubide eta betebeharren zerrenda jasotzen zuen.

³²⁷ Kataluniako Parlamentuak onartutako Estatut-aren testua hurrengo loturan dago eskuragarri: <http://www.parlament.cat/document/nom/07b224.pdf> (Azken bisita: 2017/04/20).

Bigarren faseari dagokionez, lehenik eta behin PSC-ren kanpaina mitin ezagunean, Espainiako Presidente izan aurretik, José Luis Rodríguez Zapaterok (PSOE) Kataluniako Parlamentuak onartutako erreforma babestuko zuela adierazi zuela gogoratu behar dugu: “Apoyaré la reforma del Estatuto de Cataluña que apruebe el Parlamento de Cataluña³²⁸”. Hala ere, PSOE-k ez zuen erreforma hori onartu³²⁹ eta akordio bat lortze aldera Kataluniako alderdiek era deskoordinatu batean burututako negoziatioek porrot egin zuten (Requejo, Sanjaume, 2013:13). Testuinguru hartan, oposizioko buru Artur Masek (CIU) eta Zapaterok (PSOE) burutu elkarrizketa sekretu batzuen ostean, Kataluniako Parlamentuaren jatorrizko testua asko murrizten zuen akordio bat erdietsi zuten (Requejo, Sanjaume, 2013:13). PSC eta ICV-ren babesa jaso arren ERC aurka agertu zen. Hauek izan ziren Requejo eta Sanjaumeren aburuz aldaketa esanguratsuenak (ibidem:14):

- A) **Kataluniaren nazio definizioa:** Testuaren artikuluetatik hitzaurrera mugitu zen definizioari balio juridikoa kenduz.
- B) **Justizia:**
 - a. Espainiar Justizia administrazioak eredu deszentralizatu bat izateari uko egin zioten.
 - b. Horretaz gain, Kataluniako Auzitegi Gorena azken instantziako auzitegi izatea ere ukatu zen.
- C) **Eskumenak:** Aldebiko negoziatioetarako prozeduren zein Generalitat-aren botere eskusiboekin murrizpena, besteak beste, hurrengo arlotan: hezkuntza, immigrazioa, portuak, aireportuak, industria, ikerkuntza, unibertsitateak, fundazioak, merkataritza eta tokiko administrazioak.
- D) **Kanpo harremanak eta Espainiar Estatuarekiko harremanak:**
 - a. Kataluniaren eskumen eskusiboekin erlazioa duten tratatuak Europar Batasunarekin zuzenean aztertzeke eskumenaren ukapena.
 - b. Ministro Kontseiluan zein Ordezkaritza Iraunkorren Lantaldean (COREPER) parte hartzeke eskumenik ez.

³²⁸ Ikus adierazpenak lotura honetan: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= QYXqMRqxjw> (Azken bisita: 2017/04/28)

³²⁹ Alfonso Guerraren “nos hemos cepillado el Estatuto” adierazpenak honen adibiderik argiena da: Ikus hurrengo lotura: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MICyPy7jJY> (Azken bisita: 2017/04/28)

- c. Nazioarteko delegazioen mugaketa.
- d. Europar hauteskundeetan Kataluniak hauteskunde barruti propioa izatearen ukapena.
- e. UNESCO-n parte hartze zuzena izateko eskumenik ez.
- f. Generalitat-ak bere eskumenen eremuan kanpo akordioak sinatzeko ahalmenaren ukapena.
- g. Konstituzio Auzitegiko kideak izendatzeko eskubidearen ezeztatpena.
- h. Beste Erkidego Autonomoekin akordioak ezartzeko eskumenaren ukapena.

E) Finantzak:

- a. Aldebikotasuna eta zergen gaineko erantzukizuna ezabatzea.
- b. Kataluniako Zerga Agentziaren eskumenen murrizpena.
- c. Beste Autonomia Erkidegoekin “elkartasun ereduan” erabakiak hartzeko eskumenik ez.
- d. Lurralde historikoen kontzertuaren sistemarekiko aurreikusten zen harmonizazio gradualaren ukapena³³⁰.

Aldaketa hauen ostean, Espainiar Kongresu eta Senatuaren babesa jaso zuen PSOE, CIU, EAJ, IU, BNG eta CC alderdien botoari esker. Azkenik 2006ko ekainaren 18ko erreferendumean, CIU-k, PSC-k eta ICV-k baiezko botoa eskatu zuten eta ERC-k, PP-k eta ezker independentistak³³¹ ezezkoa. Erroldaren %48.85eko parte hartzearekin, %73.24 baietz, %20.57 ezetz eta %5.34 zuri izan zen azken emaitza.

Aski ezaguna den moduan, hori ez zen Estatut-aren erreformaren azken geltokia izan. Arestian³³² aipatutakoa jarraituz, Alderdi Popularrak (PP), Herriaren Defendatzaileak (PSOE-ko Enrique Múgicak) eta Aragoiko, Balear Uharteetako eta Valentziako Gobernuek konstituzio aurkakotasun helegitea jarri zuten. Lau urtez hausnartu ostean, eta auzitegiaren zilegitasunaren inguruan eztabaida publiko handi

³³⁰ Kataluniako Parlament-ak onartu Estatut-aren VIII. Xedapen gehigarrian hurrengoa jasotzen zen: “La capacitat de finançament per habitant de la Generalitat s’ha d’equiparar gradualment, en un termini no superior a quinze anys a partir de l’entrada en vigor d’aquest Estatut, a l’obtinguda aplicant els sistemes de concert i conveni vigents a les comunitats autònomes forals.” Hurrengo urteetako praktikek guztiz kontrako joera izan dute eta horren ondorioz “espoli fiscal” bezalako dinamikak piztu dira.

³³¹ Momentu hartan ez zuen Kataluniako hauteskundeetan parterik hartzen.

³³² “Spanish matrix state” kapituluaren: “Autonomous Communities in motion” atalean.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

baten erdian³³³, 2010eko ekainean eman zuen epaia Konstituzio Auzitegiak Estatuaren eduki ugari murriztuz. Hurrengo taulan era eskematikoan epaiak ezarri zituen aldaketak ikus ditzakegu:

TAULA 8 Estatuaren aurkako epaia

	Artikulu ez-konstituzionalak		Interpretatutako artikuluak	
	Artikuluak	Xedapenak	Artikuluak	Xedapenak
Hizkuntza eta sinboloak	1	1	7	8
Erakundeak	8	10	3	4
Eskumenak	3	3	6	6
Estatuaren parte hartzea	0	0	3	3
Finantziarioa	2	2	6	7
Erreforma	0	0	2	2
Guztira	14	16	27	30

Iturria: Requejo, 2017:24

³³³ Auzitegiko kideen errekusazio eta berritzeen inguruan gatazka politikoa piztu zen.

4.3- Estatu gaitasunak, egingarritasun politikoa eta gobernu demokratikoa

Burujabetza galera argi bat dagoenean, burujabetza eskaerak era argi batean plazaratzen dira (H5). Gure hurbilketa teorikoa berreskuratuz, egungo burujabetza eskaerak pizten dituen mekanismo nagusia burujabetza galera orokorra da. Testuinguru orokor horren baitan Estatalitate subalternoek nola eta zein neurritan duten hitz egiteko ahalmena da jokoan dagoena (H5). Konstituzio Auzitegiaren epaiaren ostean Kataluniako Estatu Erakundeek izaera subalternoa murriztu ordez are gehiago areagotu zen eta herritar askoren hautua Estatu subalterno izatetik Estatu propioa aldarrikatzea igarotzea izan zen.

Zentzuk horretan, Kataluniako herritarren gehiengoak onartutako Estatuaren erreformak izandako garapenak, hasieran aipaturiko **paktu bikoitzaren izaera galdu** zuela hartu behar dugu kontuan. Alde batetik, **Espainiar Estatuaren eta Kataluniaren arteko akordioa izan nahi zuen**. Bi komunitate politikoen arteko harremanak arautu behar zituen adostasun instituzionalak. Katalunian urteetan zehar hegemonikoa izan zen estatu proiektu federala zen honen atzean zegoen lehengai ideologikoa (Caminal, 1998:63). Hala ere, Hirschmannen lan klasikoa baliatuta Asier Blasek dioskun moduan, Kataluniak, Espainiaren baitan bere borondatearen arabera “voice” izateari ateak ixtean herritarren sektore handi batek “exit-aren” alde egin zuen: estatu propioaren alde (Blas, 2013:400). Hori dela eta, aipatu epaiak katalanismo politikoan mugarri bat ezartzeaz gain, Katalunia eta Espainiaren arteko erlazioan ere jauzi bat suposatu zuen (Requejo, 2017:25). Horren eraginez, katalanismoaren baitan independentziaren aldeko posizioak hegemoniko bihurtzen hasi ziren (Ídem.).

Bestalde, adierazi bezala **Estatut-ak Generalitat-aren eta Kataluniako herritarren arteko paktua izateko helburua ere bazuen**. Kataluniako Estatu erakundeek gaitasun politiko gehiago nahi zuten euren demosaren borondatearen arabera jarduteko ahalmen politikoa izateko. Ahalmen politikorik gabe estatu erakundeek ezin dituzte proiektu politikoak “egingarri/faktible” bihurtu, ezin dute euren demosa ahaldundu eta horrenbestez ezin dute bere herritarrekiko era obedientzian jardun.

Egokia deritzogu zuzenean Dusselen hausnarketa jasotzea:

“[...] en el campo político, y en todo sistema político, son necesarias instituciones **no sólo materiales** (para reproducir y aumentar la vida del ciudadano) o **de legitimidad** (para operar dentro del consenso mutuamente aceptado), sino con igualmente **instrumentos administrativos** que permitan cumplir con los fines de las otras dos

esferas (la material y la formal indicadas). Ésta es **la esfera de la factibilidad política.**” (Dussel, 2006:66)

“Si no hay factibilidad instrumental o administrativa dicha comunidad **no tiene poder suficiente para ser gobernable**”. (idem)

“**Sin gobernabilidad no hay vida política; con una gobernabilidad fetichizada tampoco hay vida política estable en el largo plazo**” (ibidem:67).

Demos katalanak komunitate politiko antolatu moduan bere borondatearen arabera sortu eta birsortzeko estatu gaitasunak behar ditu. Dusselek dioen moduan “egingarritasun/faktibilitate” politikoaren eremua ezinbestekoa zaio komunitate politiko bati bizitza politikoa izateko (2006:66-67). Burujabetzarik gabe, demosa eta bere erakunde politikoaren arteko erlazioa ezin da era demokratikoan antolatu. Gaitasun politikorik gabe erakunde politikoek ezin dute euren demosa era obedentzian “ahaldundu” eta gobernatzeko prozesuan barneratu. Burujabetzarik gabe eta estatu gaitasunik gabe demokratizazio prozesuan sakontzea ezinezkoa bihurtzen da eta gatazka politikoaren ateak zabaltzen dira.


Hala ere, prozesu gatazkatsuak ezin dira era lineal eta mekaniko batean ulertu. Antzeko dinamikek, ondorio oso ezberdinak edo oso antzekoak izan ditzaketelako³³⁴. Neurri berean, antzeko logika politikoek, eduki oso ezberdinak edo oso antzekoak izan ditzakete³³⁵. **Hortaz, egituratutako eremuen baitan aktoreek aurrera daramaten jarduera estrategikoa ezinbestekoa izango da ondorioak batzuk edo besteak izateko (H6).** Hori kontuan izanik, Kataluniako gatazka subiranistaren dimentsio material, estrategiko eta diskurtsiboa hurrengo eskemaren bidez laburbildu daitekeela uste dugu:

³³⁴ EAE-ko Estatutu Berriaren ukapenak eta Kataluniako Estatut-aren aurkako epaiak sorturiko ondorio politikoak horren adierazle garbiak dira.

³³⁵ Kataluniako independentismoaren, Podemosen edota Le Pen-en arrakasta herri burujabetza ardatz izanik “herri berri baten artikulazio populistan” datza (Laclau, 2005). Logika politikoa antzekoa bada ere, bakoitzaren edukia oso ezberdina izango da.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

IRUDIA 33 Subalternitatea eta Burujabetza Katalana



Iturria: egileak egina

1. Desahaldundua/Burujabetzarik gabe
2. Herri burujabetza Katalanaren transferentziarik ez: Espainiar Estatu erakunde bidez burujabetza demokratiko Katalana "gingarria" bihurtzeko ahalmenik ez
3. Kataluniako Estatu Erakundeek: mekanismo diziplinario, biopolitiko, erregulatzailezik ez
4. Bere borondatearen arabera ahaldundutako/normalizatutako subjektu/objektua izateko gaitasun falta.
5. Artikulazio diskurtsiboa: Espainiar Estatu Erakundeak kanpo eratzaile gisa erabili/Kataluniako herri ekibalentziala artikulatu.

5- Procès (2010-2018)

5.1- Procès: gatazkaren kausak eta definizioa(k)

2006tik aurrera indartutako mugimendu goiztiarren (Tarrow, 2013:290) eraginari garrantzia kendu gabe, 2010. urtean kokatu behar da egungo egoera ulertzeko gakoa. Adierazi dugun moduan, urte horretan ekainean Konstituzio Auzitegiak Estatut-aren aurkako epaia argitaratu ostean, era argi batean ziklo politiko berri baten hasiera bati buruz hitz egin dezakegu (Blas, 2013:400; Requejo, 2017:25). Autore gehienek, inflexio puntu horretan kokatzen dute “procès” moduan ezagutzen den liskarraldi sezesionistaren hasiera (Guinjoan, Rodon, Sanjaume, 2013; LoCascio, 2016; Requejo, 2017; Requejo, Sanjaume, 2013; Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015). Requejoren lana jarraituz (2017), abiapuntu horretatik aurrera bost inflexio puntu nagusi ezberdin ditzakegu:

1. Estatut-aren epaia eta hauteskunde autonomikoak: 2010-2012.
2. Hauteskunde autonomikoetatik Azaroaren 9-ko prozesu parte hartzailera: 2012-2014.
3. A-9tik 2015eko irailaren 27ko hauteskunde plebisztarioetara: 2014-2015.
4. 2015eko hauteskundeetatik 2017ko urriaren 1-era³³⁶.
5. 2017ko urriaren 1etik aurrerako jauzia: azterketa egiterako orduan, azken urteetako liskarraldi sezesionista izango dugu ardatz eta ez dugu urriaren 1etik aurrera piztu den fase berezian sakonduko. Garatzen dagoen prozesu bat izateaz gain, eguneroko koiunturari loturik aldaketa kualitatibo anitz jotzen dira beharrezkoak diren baldintza analitikoak zailduz. Beharrezkoa denean aipamen bat egiteaz harago ez dugu fase berri hau aztertuko.

³³⁶ Bere lana 2017ko martxoan argitaratu zen neurrian urtarrilean ezartzen du amaiera puntua baina guk urriaren 1a eta horren osteko dinamikara luzatzea erabaki dugu.

Fase ezberdinetan tentsio eta dinamika ezberdinak nagusitu arren, 2010etik aurrera estatu proiektu autonomikoa krisi sakonean sartu zela eta 2012tik aurrera independentzia erdigunean egon dela inor gutxik jartzen du zalantzan. Estatu berrien sorrera ez da maiz gertatzen den “gertakaria” beraz ezinbestean “sezesioa aukera bideragarri moduan duen liskarraldi sezesionista batek” ezaugarri bereizgarri argiak izango ditu (Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015:323).

Hala ere, hain espezifikoak al dira Kataluniako sezesionismoaren kausak eta eskaerak? Era argian liskarraldi nazionalista/sezesionista baten aurrean gauden arren, ba al du beste motako krisiekin harremanik? Hala balitz, krisi horiek aztertzeke erabiltzen diren kontzeptu eta tresna analitikoak baliagarriak al dira?

Independentismoa bazterreko aukera politiko bat izatetik, herritarren sektore zabal batek babesten duen aukera izatera igaro da. **Zergatik?** Jada autore ugari perspektiba ezberdinetatik “procès independentistaren” arrazoiak aztertu dituzte. Gure ikuspegitik, **plano orokor batean liskarraldi independentista azaltzen duen mekanismo nagusia burujabetza gabezia bat da: demosaren borondatearen arabera gobernatzeke eta demos hori gobernu politiko eta ekonomikoan barneratzeko beharrezkoak diren gaitasun politikoaren falta** (H5). Hala ere, horrek plano zehatzago batean zehaztapenak eskatuko ditu. Gure hipotesietan adierazi dugun moduan, *eskaera horietatik abiatuta “liskarraldi sezesionista” bat aktibatu dadin, egiturazko muga eta aukeren baitako tentsioan aktore independentisten jarduera estrategikoa ezinbestekoa izango da* (H6).

Guinjoan, Rodon eta Sanjaumeren banaketa baliatuz (2013:66), estatu propioaren aldeko babesaren igoera “faktore politiko” zein “ekonomikoen” bidez azaldu daiteke. Aipatu banaketa hori erabiliko dugu autore ezberdinek³³⁷ emandako arrazoiak ordenatzeko xedearekin.

³³⁷ Hurrengo autoreen lanean oinarrituta: Blade, 2015; Blas, 2013; Goikoetxea, 2013b; Guibernau, 2013; Guinjoan, Rodon, Sanjaume, 2013; Lo Cascio, 2016; Pastor, 2013; Requejo, Sanjaume, 2013; Requejo, 2017; Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015; Subirats, Vilaregut, 2013; Vilaregut, 2013.

IRUDIA 34 Liskarraldi Sezesionistaren kausak

FAKTORE POLITIKOAK
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Estatut-aren aurkako epaia eta honek sortu zuen sumin eta mobilizazioa.2. Proiektu autonomikoaren krisia.3. Birzentralizazio prozesuaren areagotzea.4. Erabakitze eskubidearen zentraltasuna (politikoki hegemoniko bihurtzea) eta 2009-2011 arteko herri galdeketen bidez hasitako mobilizazio zikloa.5. Printzipio demokratikoetan oinarrituriko Kataluniako nazionalismoaren berritze diskurtsiboa.6. Independentismoak demokratizazio eta aldaketa sozialerako desirak ordezkatzeko aurrera eramandako jarduera estrategikoa.7. Aznarren agintaldiaz geroztik berpiztutako Espainiar nazionalismoaren loraldiak Kataluniako autogobernu borondatearekin sorturiko talkak.8. 78ko Erregimenaren krisia.
FAKTORE EKONOMIKOAK
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1- Krisi ekonomiko larria: langabezia tasa altuak, Generalitat-ari ezarritako defizit helburu zorrotzak, zerbitzu sozialen murrizketak, etab.2- Defizit fiskala eta honi aurre egiteko proposamenen aurrean (paktu fiskala adibidez) Estatu zentralak emandako ezeztapenak.3- Estatu zentralaren partetik azpiegiturretan inbertsio falta.

Iturria: egileak egina Guinjoan, Rodon eta Sanjaumeren lanean (2013:66) oinarrituta.

Ezin da errealitate konplexu bat faktore bakar baten bidez azaldu hortaz horien konbinazioaren bidez soilik uler daitezke liskarraldi sezesionistaren kausak. Elementu hauek kontuan hartuta eta **gure hipotesietara bueltatuz, Kataluniako “prozesua” postfordismoan eman den estatuaren aldaketen baitan sortzen diren kontraesan eta tentsioen logikan ulertu behar direla uste dugu**³³⁸. Horren

³³⁸ Krisi organikoen inguruan Gramsciren aipua birgogoratu: **“In every country the process is different, although the content is the same.** And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony...” (1999:450-451).

ondorioz, berezitasunak berezitasun, Grezian, Italian, Espainiar Estatuan edota Erresuma Batuan antzeko logikak antzeman daitezke (Goikoetxea, 2017:22). **Hori dela eta “gatazka nazionalista baten” ordezkari (edo gatazka nazionalista bat izateaz gain), beste edozein gatazka demokratikoren oinarri den burujabetza gabezia da funtsean mekanismo nagusia (H5).** Horren ondorioz, horrelako gatazketan erabilitako termino analitikoak erabiliko ditugu.

Gure aburuz, **krisi organikoak** (Gramsci, 1999:450-451), **ordena instituzionalen krisia edo “crisis of”** (Jessop, 2015a:458) eta **mobilizazio zikloak/liskarraldi sezesionistak** (Tarrow, 2012:342), Kataluniako prozesuaren plano ezberdinak azaltzeko kontzeptu argigarriagoak dira. Hauekin batera **populismoa eta hegemonia independentistaren** artikulazioaren auzia ere erdigunean kokatuko dugu. Artikulazioaren metodoa eta gure hipotesien logiko erretroduktiboa kontuan hartuz, *krisi organikoaren azterketarekin hasiko gara (H7), ostean ekintza kolektiboa txertatuko dugu (H8) eta azkenik hegemonia independentistaren artikulazioa aztertuko dugu (H9).*

5.2- Krisi organikoa/ “Crisis of”:

Kataluniako gatazka Antonio Gramsci-ren *krisi organikoarekin* eta Bob Jessopen “*Crisis of*” kontzeptuekin lotura zuzena dute. Kontzeptu hauek baliatuz gure ikerketaren enborra den estatuaren eraldaketa eta honen azterketa xede duen estatuaren teoria txertatuko dugu. Lehenik eta behin hauen definizioak jasoko ditugu ostean plano analitikoan murgiltzeko.


Aurretiaz adierazi moduan Gramsci-ren arabera *krisi organikoa* hurrengo litzateke:

“These situations of conflict between “represented and representatives” reverberate out from the terrain of the parties (the party organisations properly speaking, the parliamentary-electoral field, newspaper organisation) throughout the State organism, reinforcing the relative power of the bureaucracy (civil and military), of high finance, of the Church, and generally of all bodies relatively independent of the fluctuations of public opinion. How are they created in the first place? **In every country the process is different, although the content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony,** which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or **because huge masses (especially of peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain**

activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically add up to a revolution. A “crisis of authority” is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the State (Gramsci, 1999: 450-451)”.

Espainiar Estatuaren azterketan ere krisi organiko bati buruz hitz egin dugu. Gure ustez bi dinamikak era dialektikoan ulertu behar dira. Hurrengo irudian jasotzen dugun moduan, *Kataluniako prozesu independentistaren garapenak 78ko erregimenaren krisia areagotzen duen bitartean, honek Kataluniako prozesu independentistari aukera politikoen egitura/espinala zabaldu dio (H7):*

IRUDIA 35 Krisi Organikoa Katalunian eta 1978ko Erregimena



Iturria: egileak egina.

Horretaz gain, gure ikuspegitik, Katalunia eta Espainiar Estatuaren arteko erlazioa “crisis in” edo sistemaren barneko krisi izatetik, “crisis of” edo egiturazko krisi izatera igaro zen. Har ditzagun zuzenean Jessopen hitzak:

“Crises ‘of’ institutional orders, functional systems, or social orders are less common. They typically involve a crisis of crisis-management, indicating the inability to ‘go on in the old way’ in the face of challenges that require radical new approaches to crisis-management and resolution or, indeed, indicating deep-seated contradictions and crisis-tendencies that demand more radical transformation or, even, revolution [...]. The disorienting effects of crisis create the space for contesting previously sedimented meanings, which can occur in

many different fields on many different scales. This can create in turn opportunities to reorder the lines of demarcation that distinguish the polity from its ‘constitutive outside’, to reshape the political field and reconfigure the state apparatus and bases of state power, and to redefine the legitimate themes and topics for policy debate, policy-making and policy implementation. In short, crises are opportunities for political contestation and learning as well as policy learning.” (Jessop, 2015a:458)

Maila instituzionalean plano orokor batean “Crisis of” moduan definitu duguna, harreman zuzena du eskola posfundazionalak “gertakariarekin” eta “politikotasunaren” agerpenarekin egindako hausnarketekin eta honi loturiko “kairos” edo denbora estrategikoarekin (Badiou, 2005; Bensaïd, 2013; Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 1999, 2007; Zizek, 2010; Zubiaga, 2012). Hala ere, “crisis of” kontzeptuak, ingelerako “polity”, “politics” eta “policy” barnebildu eta hiru eremuen “birpolitizaziorako” aukerarako baldintzak aurreikusten dituen bitartean (Jessop, 2014), “politikotasunak” estatu egituren aukerak eta mugak eta ekonomia politikoaren oinarriko printzipioak ahazteko arriskuak ditu “pan-politizismora” joz (Jessop, Sum, 2013:133).

Bata edo bestea baztertu ordez, banaturiko mahaien arteko elkarriketa sustatzen saiatuko gara eskola ezberdinen ekarpenak uztartuz gure azterketa aberasteko xedearekin. Lehenik eta behin estatuaren teoria estrategiko harremanezkoan oinarrituko gara eta ostean “herriaren eraikuntza” eta hegemonia independentistaren azterketan Essexeko Eskolaren baliabide teoriak erabiliko ditugu.

Hori kontuan harturik nola neurtuko dugu krisi organiko/ “crisis of” moduan definitu duguna? Aurretiaz adierazi moduan, estatua eta estatu boterearen sei dimentsioei esker aipatu kontzeptu abstraktuen operazionalizazio zehatzagoa egin dezakegu. Horren bidez, **Mendebaldeko edozein Estatutan bizi den krisiaren antzeko dimentsioak ikus daitezke**. Hurrengo taulan jasoko ditugu berriz ere aipatu dimentsioak:

IRUDIA 36 Estatuaren eta Estatu boterearen sei dimentsioak

Dimension	Definition	Significance	Crisis aspects
Three formal dimensions			
Modes of representation	These give social forces access to state apparatus and power	Unequal access to state Unequal ability to resist at distance from state	Crisis of representation
Modes of articulation	Institutional architecture of levels and branches of state	Unequal capacity to shape, make, and implement decisions	Crisis of institutional integration
Modes of intervention	Modes of intervention inside state and beyond it	Different sites and mechanisms of intervention	Rationality crisis
Three substantive dimensions			
Social basis of state	Institutionalised social compromise	Uneven distribution of material and symbolic concessions to 'population' to secure support for state, state projects, specific policy sets, and hegemonic visions	Crisis of power bloc Disaffection with parties and state
State project	Secures apparatus unity of state and its capacity to act	Overcomes improbability of unified state system by giving orientation to state agencies and agents	Legitimacy crisis
Hegemonic vision	Defines nature and purposes of state for wider social formation	Provides external legitimacy for state, defined in terms of the 'common good', 'general will', etc	Crisis of hegemony
			Source: Jessop, 2015a: 480

Estatu egituren eta aktoreen arteko hartu emanaren ondorioz estatu gaitasun ezberdinak aktibatzen dira. Hori dela eta, estatalitate subalternoetan ere estatuaren eta estatu boterearen dimentsioak eta euren krisi elementuak azter ditzakegu. Dimentsioak analitikoki banaturik azaldu arren praktikan banaezinak dira euren artean teilakatzen direlako. “Spanish matrix state” atalean orokorrean Espainiar estatu integralaren krisia aztertu dugu jadanik eta ez ditugu hortaz aurretiaz aipatu elementuak errepikatuko. Partsimonia informatiboagatik, gure ikerketarako azalpen gaitasun handien duten elementuetan jarriko dugu arreta. Hori dela eta aldeztu aurretik **bi ideia hartu** behar dira kontuan:

- Demokratizazio katalanean, demos katalanak bere erakundeekiko duen dependentzia eta konfiantza maila handitu da. Prozesu horretan, Espainiar Estatu kanpo eratzailer moduan erabili da. Aldi berean, dinamika politikoaren joerak, Espainiar Estatu erakundeak “botere fetitxizatu” eta Katalanak “botere obedentzial” moduan artikulatzea ahalbidetu du³³⁹. Horren ondorioz, herritarren aurrean **Espainiar Estatu erakundeek balorazio baxuagoa jasoko dute eta “krisi dimentsioek” azken hauen kasuan izaera sakonagoa izango dute.**

³³⁹ Ikus aurreko grafikoa.

- Ikuspegi ekonomiko batetik, Kataluniak Espainiar Estatuan orokorrean nagusitu diren joerak jarraitu ditu. Honek, oinarri sozial zabalen adostasuna jasotzeko beharrezkoak diren kontzesio material eta sinbolikoen murrizketa ekarri du. **Prestazio sozial horiek aurrera eramateko, zerga gaitasuna ezinbesteko tresna da eta honen gabeziak gatazka politikoaren sustapena erraztuko du.**


5.2.1 Ordezkaritza krisia eta estatuaren oinarri sozialaren krisia:

Ordezkaritza krisia egungo demokrazien ezaugarrietako bat da. Honek lotura zuzena du estatuaren oinarri soziala antolatu eta artikulatzen duten eragileen krisiarekin. Zentzu horretan, alderdi politiko, sindikatu edota erakunde politikoek euren herritarren aldetik balorazio baxua jasotzea geroz eta ohikoagoa da.

Politikarekiko “txeragabetasuna” edo “asegabetasuna” deiturikoa, Katalunian ere herritarren artean nabaria den errealitate bat da. 2017ko uztailean publikatu zen CEO-ren³⁴⁰ barometroaren arabera, “langabezia eta lan munduko prekarietatearen” ostean, “politikarekiko asegabetasuna” herritarren bigarren arazoa da (CEO, 2017:8). Herrialde gehienetan bezala, hurrengo grafikoan ikus dezakegu demokraziaren funtzionamenduarekiko asegabetasuna azken urteetako desdemokratizazioaren ondorioz handitu egin dela. Hala ere, ordezkaritza krisiaren dimentsio hauek Espainiar Estatuaren datuekin era erlazionalean alderatzen baditugu, Kataluniako eragile zein erakundeekiko konfiantza maila altuagoa dela ikus daiteke. Egungo egoera politikoaren balorazioa jasotzen duten grafikoaren azterketaren bidez, dinamika horren lehenengo adierazleak ikus ditzakegu.


³⁴⁰ Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió.

IRUDIA 37 Kataluniako Demokraziaren funtzionamenduarekiko asetze maila




Iturria: (CEO, 2017:33.)

IRUDIA 38 Kataluniako egoera politikoaren balorazioa



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:34.)

IRUDIA 39 Espainiako egoera politikoaren balorazioa



³⁴¹ Iturria: (CEO, 2017:35.)

Aipatu ideia horiek plano zehatzago batean aztertzeko, alde batetik testuinguru politikoaren “argazki finko bat” eskainiko diguten datuak eta bestetik beraien azken urteetako bilakaera aztertuko dugu. Argazki finko hori 2017ko uztaileko CEO-ren Barometroak emandako datuekin osatuko dugu, jada urriaren 1-eko erreferenduma publiko egin ostean egindako inkestekin. Politikoki esanguratsua den momentua den neurrian jasotako datuek ere garrantzia kualitatibo berezia izango dute. Horretaz gain datu horien bilakaeraren bidez, argazki finko horrek azken urteetako joerari erantzuten dion ikusiko dugu. Bilakaera CEO-k eskainitako datuen arabera egingo dugu, ahalik eta denbora tarte handiena hartzen saiatzen.

1- Kataluniako eta Espainiako politikariekiko konfiantza:


Hurrengo irudietan ikus dezakegun moduan %51.5-ak ez du Kataluniako politikariengan konfiantzarik (%22.5ak ez du batere konfidantzarik) eta %47.6ak aldiz neurri batean konfiantza maila bat adierazten du. Batzbesteko nota 3.84eko da. Espainiar politikarien kasuan aldiz deskonfidantza maila %83.1era igotzen da eta konfidantza maila %16.4-ra jaisten da, 2.03ko batezbestekoa jasoz. Bilakaerari dagokionez antzeko joera ikusten da. Kataluniako politikariak 5.1 eta 3.5 arteko batezbestekoan mugitu dira azken hamarkadan. Espainiar kasuan 2.3 eta 2 artean

³⁴¹ Dolenta (txarra) eta Molt dolenta (oso txarra) askoz ere altuagoak dira Espainiar egoera politikoaren balorazioan.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.


oszilatu dute datuek³⁴². Balorazio baxua jaso arren Kataluniako politikariekiko konfiantza maila altuagoa nabaria da.

IRUDIA 40 Kataluniako Politikariekiko Konfiantza. 2017ko uztailean



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:36.)

IRUDIA 41 Espainiar Politikariekiko Konfiantza 2017ko uztailean



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:37)

³⁴² 2015-2017 urteetako datuak soilik daude eskuragarri.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 42 Kataluniako Politikariekiko Konfiantza. 2007-2017 bilakaera



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:38.)

IRUDIA 43 Espainiar Politikariekiko Konfiantza 2015-2017 bilakaera




³⁴³ Iturria: (CEO, 2017:39.)

³⁴³ Esan bezala eskuragarri dauden datuak erabiliko ditugu urteen tarte txikia izan arren.

2- Kataluniako eta Espainiako Gobernuak:


Erakundeen kasuan, %48.6ak era ezkor batean baloratzen du Gobernu Katalanaren kudeaketa (%19.1arentzat oso kudeaketa txarra egin du azken urtean). Kontrara, %49.1ak era baikorrean baloratzen du gobernuaren jardura. Lortutako batezbesteko nota 4.12koa da. Azken urteetako bilakaerari dagokionez, 4.8 eta 4.1 artean kokatzen da. Espainiar gobernuaren aurrean aldiz, %82.8-k jarrera ezkorra adierazten duen bitartean, %16-ak soilik baloratzen du baikorki. Batezbesteko nota 1.93-koa da. Bilakaera 4.1 eta 2.1 artean kokatzen da. Kasu honetan ere, Kataluniako gobernuaren balorazioa hobea da.

IRUDIA 44 Kataluniako Generalitataren balorazioa 2017ko uztailean



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:40)


IRUDIA 45 Espainiar Gobernuaren balorazioa 2017ko uztailean



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:41)


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 46 Kataluniako Generalitataren konfiantza maila: 2009-2017 bilakaera



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:42)

IRUDIA 47 Espainiar Gobernuaren konfiantza maila: 2009-2017 bilakaera



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:43)


3- Katalunia eta Espainiako erakundeak:

A- Parlamentua

Azkenik, egungo demokrazien funtzionamenduan oinarritzekoak diren hainbat antolakunderen balorazioa ikus dezakegu. Beste behin ere, joera orokorrak errepikatzen dira: ordezkariak politikoarekin harremana duten erakundeek, alderdi politikoek eta sindikatuek balorazio baxua jasotzen dute. Krisi finantzariaren ardatza izan den banka da, hala ere, baloraziorik txarrena jasotzen duena. Bestalde, Kataluniako eta Espainiako erakundeen balorazioa konparatuta ere aurreko joerak antzeman daitezke Katalanek babes zabalagoa jasotzen baitute. Kasu honetan parlamentuan jarriko dugu arreta.

Kataluniako Parlament-ak, herritarren %53.2aren babesa jasotzen du eta %42.2aren aurkakotasuna. Batezbesteko balorazioa 4.54koa da. Espainiar Diputatuen Kongresuak bestalde %29.5aren babesa eta %64.5aren gaitzespena jasotzen du 3.08ko batezbestekoa balorazioa lortuz. Bilakaera aztertuta, Kataluniako Parlament-aren konfiantza maila 5 eta 4.25 artean oszilatzen du beraz ez du aldaketa handirik izan. Espainiar Kongresuak kontrara, 2009. urtean 4.3ko batezbesteko balorazioa jasotzetik 2014an 2.5eko eta 2016an 2.6eko batezbestekoa izatera igaro da.


IRUDIA 48 Kataluniako Erakundeen balorazioa: 2017ko uztaila.



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:45)


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 49 Kataluniako Parlamentuaren balorazioa: 2009-2017 bilakaera



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:47)

IRUDIA 50 Espainiar Diputatuen Kongresuaren Konfiantza maila: 2009-2017 bilakaera



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:48)

B- Alderdi politikoak eta botere blokea:

Arestian aipatu moduan, autonomiaren berreskurapenaren ostean *CIU* eta *PSC* izan dira aldi berean ***botere blokea eta sektore sozial zabalak antolatu eta ordezkatu***³⁴⁴ dituztenak. Hala ere, krisi testuinguruetan botere blokearekiko txeragabetasuna handitzen denean, talde sozialak euren alderdi tradizionalengandik banatzeko joera indartzen da (Portelli, 1973:126). Gure ikuspegitik elkarreraginean ulertu behar diren krisi ezberdinen ondorioz (ordezkaritza krisia, barneratze instituzionalaren krisia, gaitasun politikoen krisia, zilegitasun krisia eta hegemonia krisia) sektore sozial zabalek alderdi hauengan historikoki izandako konfiantza maila nabarmen murriztu da. Prozesu independentista, aldi berean aipatu krisi dimentsio horien ondorio eta beraien sustatzaile izan da.

Unióren desagerpenarekin batera, *PSC*-ren krisia eta urteetan zehar katalanismoaren “pal de paller” moduan ezagutzen zen *CDC*-ren birfundazioa (PdeCat berria) honen adierazle argiak dira. Ustelkeria kasuek (*CDC*-ren %3 kasua izanik ezagunena) hauekiko konfiantza maila murriztea suposatu du. Ezin dugu ahaztu bestalde “Katalunia Operazio” moduan ezagutu denaren baitan politikari independentistak kaltetzeko argitaratutako ustelkeria kasuen asmakizuna³⁴⁵.

Hala ere, *CIU*-k 2010. urtean Kataluniako Parlament-eko hauteskundeetan gehiengo osoa lortu zuela eta soilik 2012. urtean prozesu independentistaren loraldiarekin hasi zela hauteskunde babesa galtzen kontuan hartu beharra dago. Prozesu honen ondorioz eta alderdien egiturazko arazoengatik (*CDC*-ren ustelkeria kasuak izanik nabarmenenak) azken hamarkadetan ardatz izan den *CIU* 2015. urtean desagertu zen. 2016an bestalde, *Unió*-ren desagerpenarekin eta *CDC*-ren birfundazioa PdeCat-en sorrerarekin alderdi politikoen mapa historikoa guztiz aldatu da. Gatazkaren kontraesanen areagotzeak, *Junts Pel Caten* sorrera ere eragin du. Ikusteke dagoen arren, bere garapenak PdeCat-en posizioa indartu (2017ko abenduaren 21eko hauteskundeetan bezala) edo kontrara zeharo ahuldu dezake. Azken honi dagokionez, Jordi Pujol eta *CDC*-rekin gertatu zen moduan, alderdiak espazio politikoa definitu ordez, Puidemonten lidergo karismatikoak definitu dezake espazio politikoa. Hala balitz, PdeCat-en posizioa zeharo ahulduko litzateke *Junts Pel Caten* alde.

PSC-ren kasuan, Tripartit-aren kudeaketa urteen desgasteaz gain, Zapatareroren krisiaren kudeaketa urteek ere zigor gogorra erantsi zien. Bestalde, sektore

³⁴⁴ Kontzeptu hauen garapen teorikoa “The Strategic Relational Approach” atalean burutu dugu.

³⁴⁵ Argigarriak dira zentzu horretan “Las Cloacas de Interior” dokumentalean argitaratu adierazpenak. Hurrengo link-ean daude eskuragarri: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1niEXT8te-U> (azken bisita: 2017/07/31).

katalanistaren irteerarekin batera erabakitze eskubidearen aldeko jarrera aldatu zuten³⁴⁶ honen aurkakoen posizioa indartuz. Horretaz gain, polarizazio testuinguru batean hirugarren bide “federal” bat sinesgarritasunez defendatzeko zailtasunak kontuan hartuta (Estatut-aren porrotaren zama ere kontuan hartu behar da) alderdi egituratzaile izateari utzi dio (Gagnon, Sanjaume, 2014).

Honen kontrako aurpegia litzateke beste alderdien indartzea eta espazio berrien sorrera. ERC-ren loraldia independentismo berriaren indartzearen adierazle argi bat da³⁴⁷. Urteetan maila lokalean errotu ostean, lehenengo aldiz Parlament-an CUP-ek ordezkariak izatea ere prozesu independentistaren ondorio argia da. “Catalunya en Comú” eta “Podem-en” loraldiak Espainiar Estatuaren krisiarekin lotura zuzenagoa dute Katalunian erro sendoak izan arren. Neurri batean PSUC eta ICV-ren ibilbide historikoa berritzeko gaitasuna izan dute espazio berri bat sortuz. Ciutadans-en indartzea Espainiar krisi organikoarekin harremana izan arren, polarizazio testuinguru batean Espainiar nazionalismoa eta lurraldearen batasuna era argi batean ordezkatzeko izandako gaitasunarekin ere lotura du. PP eta PSC-k jada ordezkatzeko ez dituzten sektoreak bereganatzeko izandako gaitasunean datza bere arrakasta. 2017ko urriaren leko polarizazioaren ostean Ciutadans-ek espainiar nazionalismoaren ordezkartzan zuen rola are gehiago indartu da.

Era batean edo bestean, krisi organiko baten testuinguruan soilik jazotzen den alderdi sistemaren krisi baten aurrean gaude. Hurrengo tauletan CIU eta PSCren babesaren garapena ikus dezakegu. Lehenengo taulan hauteskunde datu errealekin eta bigarrenean herritarren pertzepzio subjektiboan³⁴⁸ oinarriturik.

³⁴⁶ Azken honek eragin zuen gaur egun “Pacte Nacional pel Referèndum-eko” buru den Joan Ignasi Elenak alderdia uztea. Elena urteetan zehar PSC-ko sektore katalanistaren aurpegi publikoetako bat izan zen.

³⁴⁷ 2010eko hauteskundeetan azken hamarkadetako emaitzarik txarrenak lortu zituzten (1984 eta 1988. urtean soilik lortu zituzten emaitza baxuagoak).

³⁴⁸ Alderdiekiko “sinpatia”.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 9 Kataluniako Parlamentuko Hauteskundeetan Botoaren bilakaera 1980-2015

Parlament de Catalunya


Percentatge sobre el vot vàlid

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1995	1999	2003	2006	2010	2012	2015
JxSí											39,7
Unió											2,5
CIU	27,8	46,8	45,7	46,2	40,9	37,7	30,9	31,5	38,4	30,7	12,8
PSC	22,4	30,1	29,8	27,5	24,9	37,9	31,2	26,8	18,4	14,4	12,8
ERC	8,9	4,4	4,1	8,0	9,5	8,7	16,4	14,0	7,0	13,7	
PP	2,4	7,7	5,3	6,0	13,1	9,5	11,9	10,7	12,4	13,0	8,5
ICV-EUiA	18,8	5,6	7,8	6,5	9,7	2,5	7,3	9,5	7,4	9,9	9,0
C's								3,0	3,4	7,6	18,0
CUP										3,5	8,2
SI									3,3	1,3	
CC-UCD	10,6										
PSA	2,7										
CDS			3,8								
EUiA						1,4					
Altres	5,8	4,9	2,8	4,7	0,9	1,4	1,4	2,4	6,9	4,5	1,1
En blanc	0,7	0,5	0,6	1,2	1,0	0,9	0,9	2,0	2,9	1,5	0,5

ICV-EUiA en 2015 es presenta dintre de Catalunya Sí que Es Pot (CSQEP)

³⁴⁹ Iturria: Egileak moldatua. Jatorrizko iturria: CEO, 2017.

IRUDIA 51 Alderdiekiko Sinpatia 2006-2017



³⁴⁹ Kontuan hartu behar dugu “PdeCat” “Junts Pel Si” koalizioaren baitan kokatzen dela. Azken inkestek balizko hauteskunde batzuetan Kataluniako Parlamentuan botoen %14.7 eskuratuta 23 eskerleku izango litzuketela adierazi dute. ERC-k kontrara %28.7 eta 43 ahulki lortuko litzuzke. (Castro, 2017). Inkestean datuak eta atzean dauden interesak datu guztiz fidagarriak ez izatea eragiten duten arren, argi dago PdeCatek ez duela beste garaian Convergència zuen egituratze ahalmena. Ez da jada katalanismoaren “Pal de Pallera” (Caminal, 2001). 2017ko abenduko hauteskundeetan Junts Pel Catek, ERC-k baino emaitza hobeak lortu zituen. Hala ere, Convergència zaharra, PdeCat eta Junts Pel Cat mugimendu ezberdinak direla kontuan hartu behar dugu.


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

- PPC (Partit Popular de Catalunya) --- CiU (Convergència i Unió)
 - ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) --- PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya)
 - IU-ICV/EUIA (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa)
 - C'S (Ciutadans. Partido de la Ciudadanía) --- Reagrupament.cat
 - SI. Solidaritat Catalana --- PxC. Plataforma per Catalunya --- CUP --- UPyD
 - Podemos --- Barcelona en comú --- CDC --- Junts pel sí
 - Catalunya sí que es pot --- Democràcia i Llibertat --- En Comú Podem
 - PACMA --- PDeCAT --- Altres partits --- Cap --- No ho sap --- No contesta
- Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió

Iturria: (CEO, 2017).


Ikusi moduan botere blokea eta sektore sozial zabalak antolatu eta ordezkatzeko gakoak ziren CIU eta PSC-ren ahuleziarekin batera aktore berrien indartzea nabaria da. Horretaz gain, ordezkaritza parlamentarioa zuten alderdi gehienak ordezkatzeko zituen “Katalanismoaren” ordezkari politiko irmoagoak galdatzen dituen dinamika nagusitu da. Aurretiaz aurkeztu irudia berreskuratzen dugu 1978 – 2010. urteen artean nagusi zen alderdi sistemaren antolaketa ikusi eta egun nagusi denarekin konparatzeko:

IRUDIA 52 Estatu boterearen dimentsio substantiboak 1978-2019



Iturria: egileak egina.

IRUDIA 53 2010-2018: polarizazioa



Iturria: egileak egina.

Azken irudian ikus dezakegun moduan, independentzia eta erabakitze eskubidea erdigunean kokatu ostean hauen inguruan mantentzen den posizioaren arabera antolatzen da alderdien mapa. Horiz³⁵⁰ independentziaren aldekoak eta berdez independentziaren aurkakoak margoztu ditugu. CUP, ERC eta PdeCat independentzia eta erabakitze eskubidearen alde era argian kokatzen dira, PdeCateko sektore txiki batek balizko hirugarren bide adostu bat nahiago izan arren. PdeCat-en ordeztu, Junts Pel Cat kontuan hartuko bagenu, independentziaren aldeko jarrera irmoagoa dela azpimarratu beharko genuke. Kontrara “Catalunya en Comú” eta “Podem-ek” ordezkatzeko espazioak erabakitze eskubidea defendatu arren independentziaren aurka leudeke euren barnean gutxiengo bat alde egon arren. Azkenik *statu quoa* mantentzeko posizioan gradu ezberdinean bada ere PSC, Ciudadans eta PP independentzia eta erabakitze eskubidearen aurkako jarrera mantendu dute. Berrantolaketa honek lotura zuzena du jarraian landuko dugun estatu proiektuaren krisiarekin.

5.2.2 Estatu proiektuaren krisia, zilegitasun krisia, barneratze instituzionalaren krisia eta gaitasunen krisia

Estatu proiektuari dagokionez, bi dimentsio ezberdin dituela uste dugu: maila ekonomikoan, politika sozialak, inbertsio politikak eta orokorrean estatuak


³⁵⁰ Independentziaren aldeko mugimendu ezberdinek azken urteetan erabili kolorea da.

jendartearen antolaketan izan behar duen papera zehazten duen proiektuen multzoari dagokio (sozialdemokratagoa, neoliberalagoa etab.). Maila politikoan, nazioa eta estatuaren mugen definizioaren eta hauen antolaketari egiten dio erreferentzia (autonomia, federalismoa etab.).

1- Dimentsio politikoa:

Estatu proiektuaren dimentsio politikoaren krisia, zilegitasun krisi batekin eta barneratze instituzionalaren krisiarekin batera emateko joera dago. Duen garrantziagatik maila politikoan estatu proiektu autonomikoaren krisiarekin hasiko gara horren ostean proiektu ekonomikoaren aipu txiki bat egiteko³⁵¹. Honen adierazle argiena hurrengo taulan dakusagu. Orain ere 2017ko uztaileko argazki finkoa azken urteetako garapenarekin batera jarriko ditugu.

TAULA 10 *Autonomia mailaren balorazioa: 2017ko uztaila*




Iturria: (CEO, 2017:57)

³⁵¹ Jada Espainiar Estatuaren lanketan ideia gehienak garatu ditugu.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.


TAULA 11 Autonomia mailaren balorazioaren garapena: 2006-2017



Iturria: Ídem.

Autonomia gabezia horren artikulazioari dagokionez, nabarmena da Estatu independentearen aldeko aukeraren gorakada:


TAULA 12 Erregioa, Autonomia, Estatu Federala, Estatu Independentea: 2017ko uztaia



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:58)

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
TAULA 13 Erregioa, Autonomia, Estatu Federala, Estatu Independentea: 2006-2017 garapena



Iturria: Ídem.


Independentzia bai/ez galdera zehatza denean oraindik ere ezezkoa nagusi litzateke hala ere:

TAULA 14 Independentzia bai/ez: 2017ko uztaila



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:60)

TAULA 15 *Independentzia bai/ez: 2015-2017 bilakaera*



Iturria: (Ídem).


Hurrengo grafikoari jarraituz, aurreko datuak 2006tik aurrera jazotako gertakari politiko nagusiekin gurutzatuz gero, argi dago independentziaren aldeko babesa aukera politikoen espiral baten testuinguruan aktore independentistek aurrera eramandako jarduera estrategikoaren ondorioa dela. Honen azalpen analitiko zehatza jada aurreko atalean aipatu ditugun mekanismo eta prozesuen aktibazioa litzateke (Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 16 Independentzia eta gertakari politiko nagusiak: 2006-2016 bilakaera

Evolución de la opinión de los catalanes respecto a la relación Catalunya - España

Respuestas a la pregunta del barómetro del CEO: ¿Cree que Catalunya debería ser...?



(Aragó, Monreal, 2016)

Independentziaren alde eta aurkakoen arrazoiak kontuan hartzen baditugu, baiezkoaren arrazoiak demos/state building ardatzean kokatzen diren bitartean (kudeaketa gaitasuna, herri eredia aukeratu etab.) ezezkoaren arrazoiak zentzu hertsian “nazionalista” moduan ulertu denaren logikan kokatu behar dira (Espainiar batasuna mantentzea izanik arrazoi nagusia).


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 17 Independentziaren aldeko arrazoiak: 2017ko uztaila



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:66)

TAULA 18 Independentziaren aurkako arrazoiak: 2017ko uztaila



Iturria: (CEO, 2017:67)

Autonomismoaren krisi sakon baten testuinguruan eta estatutaren aurkako epaiaren ostean independentziaren aldekoen babes nabarmen hazi da. Jada Espainiar kasua aztertzean adierazi dugun moduan Espainian orokorrean birzentralizazioarako eta espainiar proiektu nazionalaren birsorpenerako joera nagusitu da (Calvo, 2014:13).

Horretaz gain Katalunian indartu den erabakitze eskubidea eta balizko independentziarako aukera Espainiar estatu proiektu hegemonikoaren oinarritzko printzipioekin talka egin du gatazka politiko sakona sortuz. Horren ondorioz, estatu proiektuaren krisia eragiteaz gain, zilegitasun krisia eta barneratze instituzionalaren krisiarekin teilatzen dela esan dezakegu.

2- *Dimentsio ekonomikoa eta gaitasunen krisia:*

Estatu proiektuaren dimentsio ekonomikoak, zilegitasun krisia eta barneratze instituzionalaren krisiaz gain, *gaitasunen krisia* ere barneratzen du. Demokratizazioa jendartea bere sistema politiko eta sozioekonomikoan ahalik eta gehien barneratzea helburu duen prozesua baldin bada, ezinbestekoa izango da estatu gaitasunak izatea (Goikoetxea, 2017:3). Goikoetxearen ikuspegia jarraituz, burujabetza formalaz gain gaitasun politikoetan oinarrituriko **burujabetza materiala ere ezinbestekoa dela uste dugu** (Ibídem:6).

Eremu honetan bi dimentsio nabarmenduko nahiko genituzke: **aktoreek hartutako erabakiak** eta berauek hartzeko dituzten **eskumen politikoak**.

Lehenengo dimentsioari dagokionez, Gemma Ubasart-Gonzálezek “CIU-ren laborategi posmoliberalari” buruz hitz egiten du (2015:208). 2011. urtetik aurrera Mendebaldeko herrietan nagusitu diren politika neoliberalak Katalunian izan zuten aldaerari egiten dio erreferentzia (Ídem). CIU eta PPren artean adostutako politikek aurrekontu aurrezketak eta sektore publikoa argaltzea izan zuten oinarri: gastu publikoa %10 murriztea izan zen honen gauzapean praktikoa (Ibídem:209). Honekin batera 2003-2010 urteen artean ezkerreko koalizio katalanistak aurrera eramandako neurri sozialen etena eta desregulazioan oinarrituriko jarduera legegilea izan ziren ardatzak (Ídem).

Beste hainbaten artean, berdintasuna eta kohesio sozialerako ardatz diren hiru sektoreetan burutu murrizketak dira adierazgarrienak: osasungintzan, hezkuntzan eta gizarte babesean (Ídem.). Hartu ziren politiken norabidearen adibidea errenta altuena zuten familien ondorengotza zergaren ezeztatzeak erakusten digu (Kataluniako biztanleriaren %3a). Neurri hauek estatu erakundeen esku hartze ahalmenak murriztu zituzten eta kohesio sozialerako tresnak ahuldu zituen desdemokratizazioa sustatuz.


Horretaz gain, turismoa, eraikuntza eta finantzarizazioa ardatz dituen Espainiar metaketa estrategia orokorretik guztiz aldenitu ez arren, jatorri historikoak dituzten berezitasunak ezin dira alboratu. Kataluniako industria indartsuagoa izateaz gain, beste sektoreek Espainiar Estatuan izan duten pisua ez da hain nabarmena izan (eraikuntza, nekazaritza eta zerbitzuak adibidez). Industriak historikoki pisu handia

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

izan badu ere, azken hamarkadetan atzerantz jo duen sektore bat da (Serra, 2007:25-26; Oliver, 2007:60-64). 2000. hamarkadan post-fordismoaren baitan ohikoak diren eraldaketak azpimarratu arren³⁵² krisiaren ezteandak honen gabeziak agerian utzi zituen.

Esandakoaren arabera Espainiar dinamika orokorra kontuan hartuta posizio ezberdinetatik hasi arren, bilakaeraren joera simetrikoak direla dakusagu hurrengo grafikoetan:

TAULA 19 *Sektore ekonomikoen bilakaera Katalunian eta Espainian: 2000-2012*




(Iturria: Borsa de Barcelona, 2013: 27)

³⁵² Hurrengo zioen Josep Oliverrek 2007an Kataluniako ekonomiaren erronkei buruzko monografikoan: “La pérdida de posiciones de sectores industriales menos dotados desde el punto de vista de la intensidad de capital físico o tecnológico, a favor de otros mejor preparados para afrontar las nuevas condiciones de competencia internacional, los importantes cambios en la inversión productiva, con un peso creciente de los activos más directamente vinculados al cambio técnico, y las mejoras exportadoras en la UE y sus grandes mercados sugieren que la estructura productiva industrial está llevando a términos las reformas adecuadas.” (2007:63).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 20 Aktibitate, langabezia eta okupazio tasen bilakaera Katalunian eta Espainian: 1976-2012



(Iturria: Bors de Barcelona, 2013: 33)

Sektore guztietan krisiak izandako eragin gogorrekin batera, langabezia tasa igo zen eta murrizketa politikak sustatu ziren. Aipatu faktoreek diru-bilketaren jaitsiera eragin zuten gastu publikoan betebeharrak aregotu ziren bitartean (krisiaren ondorioei aurre egiteko). Testuinguru horretan sortzen dira “krisi fisko-finantzariak” eta berauei loturik dauden zilegitasun krisia³⁵³, estatu proiektuaren krisia eta hegemonia krisia (Jessop, 2015b: 71). Zentzu horretan Schumpeterrek adierazi zuen moduan, zerga estatu³⁵⁴ batean “krisi fisko-finanzariak” Estatuaren beste krisi dimentsioen areagotzea sustatu dezakete (Schumpeter, 1954; Jessop, 2015b:71).

Neurri handi batean orain aipatu ditugun hainbat elementu, 2007. urtean, higiezin burbuilak eztanda egin aurretik Antoni Serrak aurreratu zituen:

³⁵³ Estatu erakundeei zilegitasuna ematen dieten tresnak ahultzean (zerbitzu publikoak batez ere) honen zilegitasun krisia areagotzen da “zuzendaritza” (leading) eta lidergo etiko politikoa galduz eta geroz eta gehiago izaera “menderatzailea” (dominant) adieraziz (Gramsci, 1999:211).

³⁵⁴ Tax state.

“Pero nadie niega que el elevadísimo peso de la construcción inmobiliaria en nuestra economía decrecerá. Si no se encuentran ocupaciones alternativas para quienes tengan que abandonar la actividad constructora, la tasa de paro, hoy mantenida dentro de límites razonables, se disparará con el consiguiente impacto sobre las cuentas públicas. Los presupuestos de las instituciones públicas empezarán a padecer tanto desde el lado de los ingresos, menor recaudación impositiva, como desde el de los gastos, subsidios de paro y similares. Las tensiones que se crearán pueden desembocar en una reducción de los recursos destinados a la mejor incorporación de nuestra economía a las condiciones que impone el nuevo paradigma productivo. Las partidas destinadas a I+D+i, al sistema educativo en todos sus niveles y a las infraestructuras de todo tipo disminuirán, con lo que se pondría sordina al proceso emprendido en estos últimos años.” (2007:32)

Esandakoa hobeto ulertzeko arestian aipatu dugun **bigarren dimentsioari** so egin behar diogu. Kataluniako kasuan aktore politikoen erabakiez gain, nabarmena da erabakiak hartzeko gaitasun falta, edo Goikoetxearen hitzetan burujabetza materiala (2017: 6), estatu zentralaren partetik jasotako finantzazio eta inbertsio baxua eta honek aurrera eramandako birzentralizazio politikek izan duten eragina (Calvo, 2014; Viver Pi-Sunyer, 2010).

Zentzu horretan erdigunean kokatu beharra dago **defizit fiskalaren auzia**. Zerga Balantzaren argitarapenerako uztailaren 25eko 10/2012 legearen bidez, Kataluniak Estatu matrizeari egiten dion diru ekarpenaren eta honek Katalunian inbertitzen duenaren arteko balantza egiten du Generalitat-ak. Azken datuak 2016an argitaratu ziren baina 2012ko egoerari buruzkoak dira.

*Fluxu monetarioaren*³⁵⁵ *teknika* erabiliz egindako kalkuluaren arabera, 2012an Kataluniako defizit fiskala 14.623 milioi eurokoa zen, bere BPG-aren %7.5a (Generalitat, 2016b:13). Hori kontuan hartuta, Kataluniaren ekarpena administrazio zentralaren sarreraren %18.4 izan zen eta azken honek Katalunian gastatutakoa %13.6 (Ibídem:5).

³⁵⁵ Lurraldean Estatuaren aktibitateen eragin ekonomikoa neurtzen du. Funtsean, herritarrek Katalunian zerga bidez ordaintzen dutena eta lurralde horretan Estatuak inbertsio eta gastu moduan erabilitako diruaren arteko diferentzia litzateke. Krisi eta langabezi garaietan garrantzia berezia du administrazio zentralak lurralde zehatz batean egindako gastua era argian adierazten duelako.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

*Karga-etekina*³⁵⁶ metodoa jarraituz bestalde, defizit fiskala 10.030 milioi eurokoa izan zen, Kataluniako BPG-aren %5.1a (Ibídem: 13). Kalkulu honen arabera Kataluniaren ekarpena administrazio zentralaren sarreraren % 18.1 izan zen eta azken honek Katalunian gastatutakoa % 14.8 (Ibídem:5).

Hurrengo tauletan ikus dezakegu 1986. urtetik aurrera aipatu datuek izandako bilakaera. 1986ko %6.8ko defizita da azken urteetako baxuena eta 2002. urteko %10.1a altuena. Orotara batezbestekoa %8koa izan da.

³⁵⁶ Karga-etekinaren bidez, diru sarrerak karga jasaten duten pertsonen bizitokiari lotzen dira eta gastua onuraduna bizi den lurraldeari. Sistema honekin adibidez, Madrilen AHT-n egiten den inbertsioaren onuradunak ez lirateke Madrildarrak soilik izango baizik eta zerbitzu horretaz etekina jasotzen duten beste erkidegoetako herritarrak. Horren ondorioz, beste erkidego horietan ere inbertsio moduan jasoko da.


TAULA 21 Defizit fiskalaren bilakaera 1986-2012 artean

	Flux monetari ¹	% PIB Catalunya ²	Incidència càrrega-benefici ¹	% PIB Catalunya ²
1986	-2.465	-6,8		
1987	-2.868	-7,0		
1988	-3.466	-7,5		
1989	-4.056	-7,7		
1990	-4.867	-8,3		
1991	-5.174	-8,0		
1992	-5.988	-8,6		
1993	-7.263	-10,1		
1994	-6.732	-8,8		
1995	-6.416	-7,7		
1996	-7.088	-7,9		
1997	-7.018	-7,4		
1998	-6.813	-6,8		
1999	-8.124	-7,5		
2000	-8.532	-7,2		
2001	-8.565	-6,7		
2002	-13.696	-10,1	-10.225	-7,5
2003	-13.036	-8,9	-9.576	-6,6
2004	-13.595	-8,7	-10.101	-6,4
2005	-14.186	-8,4	-10.119	-6,0
2006	-14.493	-7,9	-10.320	-5,7
2007	-15.913	-8,1	-11.136	-5,7
2008	-17.200	-8,6	-11.860	-5,9
2009	-16.409	-8,5	-11.261	-5,8
2010	-16.543	-8,5	-11.258	-5,8
2011	-15.006	-7,7	-11.087	-5,7
2012	-14.623	-7,5	-10.030	-5,1
Mitjana		-8,0		-6,0
Desviació estàndar		0,9		0,6

¹ Segons pressupost equilibrat (hipòtesi ingressos = despeses)

² PIB 2008-2011 base 2008 INE, PIB 1995-2007 base 2000 enllaçat, PIB 1986-1994 base 1986 enllaçat

Nota: A partir del càlcul de la balança fiscal de l'any 2002 i del 2011, s'introdueixen alguns canvis metodològics en el càlcul de la balança fiscal de Catalunya amb el sector públic central.



Iturria: (Generalitat, 2016b:18-19)

Eskumen faltari dagokionez, gu baino era argiagoan adierazten dute ekonomiako bi katedradunek. Josep Oliverrek Kataluniak bere politika ekonomikoa kontrolatzeko dituen gabeziak nabarmentzen ditu:

“Al ser una economía más abierta sufre más por la competencia y por **la falta de instrumentos para controlar la política económica**, como las divisas y costes y otros mecanismos de defensa adecuada”. (Carreño, 2016: 8)

Antzeko zentzuan, Guillen López Casasnovasen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“Hace años ya que **el músculo de las administraciones e infraestructuras catalanas no aguantan el tirón económico y social** de Catalunya” (Carreño, 2016: 8)

Horretaz gain, 2000. urtean euroan sartu zenetik Europar Batasuneko eremu garatueneren ranking-ean postuak galdu ditu. Aipatu urtean biztanle bakoitzeko batezbesteko aberastasuna EB-n 100 puntutan kokatzen zen (egun baino herrialde gutxiagorekin) eta Kataluniak 117 puntu eskuratzen zituen bitartean Espainiak 96 zituen (Ibídem:9). 2014an aldiz Kataluniak 108 lortzen zuen eta Espainiak 91 (Ídem).

Birzentralizazio politikek³⁵⁷ bestalde, aipatu dinamika areagotu eta Kataluniako estatalitatearen izaera subalternoa sakondu besterik ez dute egin (Calvo, 2014; Goikoetxea, 2017; Viver Pi-Sunyer, 2010;).

Aldaketak aldaketa, historikoki industriak pisu handia izan du eta gorabeherekin BPG-aren %20-tik gorakoa izan da. Hala ere, Goikoetxeak dioskun moduan egitura ekonomiko produktiboagoa eta BPG handiagoa lagungarria bada ere, aberastasunaren banaketa da jendartearen kohesioa handitzen duena (2017:135). Ez da soilik kapital ekonomikoaren banaketa baizik eta ezagutza edo kapital kulturalaren hedapena ere kohesio soziala sustatzen dutenak (Ídem.). Zentzu horretan, 2008. urteko datuak jarraituz, Kataluniako “hezkuntza stock-a”³⁵⁸ 10.3 urtekoa zen, Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoa, Madril, Nafarroa, Kantabria, Errioxa, Asturias eta Aragoiren atzetik kokatuz (Generalitat, 2010:63). Bestetik, oinarrizko hezkuntza edo inolako ikasketarik ez zutenen kopurua %42-koa zen bitartean, Ekonomia Lankidetzeta eta Garapenerako Antolakundearen (ELGA)³⁵⁹ herrietan batezbestekoa %29koa zen (Ídem). Azkenik, hezkuntza maila ertaina zutenen batezbestekoa %25ekoa zen Katalunian ELGA-ren batzbestekoa %44koa zen bitartean. Esandakoaren arabera kapital kulturalaren banaketa urriagoa izan da kohesio sozialean eraginez.

³⁵⁷ Jada “Spanish matrix state” kapituluan landu dugun neurrian ez dugu esandakoa berriz errepikatuko.

³⁵⁸ Eremu geografiko bateko hezkuntza mailari egiten dio erreferentzia.

³⁵⁹ OCDE gaztelaniaz.

Aktoreen erabaki estrategikoez gain, gaitasun fiskalik ez izateak, hezkuntza arloan sustaturiko politikak, estatu zentralak beharrezkoak diren inbertsioak ez egiteak eta lurralde antolaketa federalik ez izateak Kataluniako kohesio soziala eta bere lurraldeen arteko kohesioa baxuagoa izatea eragin du (BBVA, 2016; Carreño, 2016: 7-9; Goikoetxea, 2017:135).

Gaitasun formala (burujabetzaren eta eskubideen teoria klasikoa jarraituz) eta gaitasun materiala (erakundetutako gaitasun publiko disziplinario eta biopolitikoaren bidez) ahultzean, demosaren aukerarako baldintza materialak ahultzen dira desdemokratizazioa areagotuz. (Goikoetxea, 2017:13). Kataluniar kasuan era nabarian gaitasun formal eta materialak ahuldu dira desdemokratizazioa sustatuz eta liskarraldi sezesionista baten aukerak areagotuz (H7).

5.3 Krisi organikoa demokratizazioa/desdemokratizazioaren arteko tentsioan: zenbait ondorio

Esandakoa kontuan hartuz, hauek dira momentuz atera ditzakegun ondorioak:

- *Azken 30 urteetako demokratizazio/desdemokratizazio prozesuaren ondorioz, Kataluniako estatu erakundeek euren herritarren dependentzia eta konfiantza handitzen Espainiar Estatu Erakundeak baino arrakastatsuagoak izan dira (H4).*
- Kataluniako egoera politikoa krisi organiko moduan defini dezakegu. Estatu boterearen dimentsioak kontuan hartuta zehazki *ordezkaritza krisia, barneratze instituzionalaren krisia, gaitasun politikoaren krisia, zilegitasun krisia eta hegemonia krisiaren* teilakatze bat identifikatu dugu. *Prozesu independentista aldi berean krisi horren ondorio eta sustatzailea da. Honek bestalde, Espainiar Estatuaren eta 78ko erregimenaren krisia areagotzen du. (H6)*
- Krisi dimentsio horiek aztertuta, egungo *Mendebaldeko edozein Estatutan identifika genitzakeen antzeko tentsio eta kontraesanak identifikatu ditugu (H1)*
- Kontrara, Kataluniakoaren moduko liskarraldi independentista bat “Mendebaldeko herrialdeetan” duela gutxi arte ezohikoa izan den fenomeno politiko bat da³⁶⁰. *Deszentralizazio prozesuen ondorioz emandako demokratizazio/desdemokratizazioek azaltzen dute hauen izaera berria³⁶¹ (H1).*

³⁶⁰ Orain arte, deskolonizazioaren testuinguruko independentzia gerrek, iraultza nazional-herritarrek eta maiatzaren 68ak ezarritako paradigmak izan dira hamarkadetan mantendu direnak. Neurri batean, IRA eta ETA-ren kasuak logika horien baitan ulertu behar dira.

³⁶¹ Quebec, eta Eskoziako kasuetara hurbilpen bat izateko ikus: McEwen, 2005. Euskal kasurako ikus: Goikoetxea, 2013;2014; 2017.

- Maila zehatz-konkretuan espreski Kataluniako kasuan kontuan hartu beharreko berezitasunei garrantzia kendu gabe³⁶², **plano orokorrago batean “Mendebaldeko” herrialde gehienetan egon den burujabetza galerak pizten dituen tentsio eta kontraesanak antzekoak direla uste dugu (H3). Hori dela eta, Kataluniako egoera aurretiaz azaldu dugun Lan Erregimen Schumpeteriar Posnazionalaren (Jessop, 2008c) baitako krisian kokatzen dugu³⁶³.**

Guzti hori kontuan hartuta nabaria da *statu quoaren* krisia eta estatu propioaren aukerak honen alternatiba bideragarri moduan izan duen gorakada. Hori hala izan dadin jada esan dugun moduan *aktoreen jarduera estrategikoa ezinbestekoa da* (H6). Gure ikerketa objektua estatuaren eraldaketaren baitan ematen diren burujabetza eskaerak dira. *Ekintza kolektiboa, dinamika honen planorik zehatz/konkretuenetarikoa litzateke*. Hori kontuan izanik, bere ekarpenak barneratzea garrantzitsua dela uste dugun arren, gure lana tangenzialki besterik ez du ukitzen. Horretaz gain, jada ugariak dira honen inguruan argitaratu diren lanak beraz neurri batean beraien ekarpenak jaso/profitatzera mugatuko gara, batez ere mekanismo eta prozesuetan oinarriturikoak. Horren ostean egungo jendartean ohikoa den *populismoaren inguruko hausnarketa txertatuko dugu hegemonia independentista berri* baten eraikuntza aztertzeko xedearekin (H9).

³⁶² Aldez aurretik jada jasotakoak.

³⁶³ Antzeko zentzuan Goikoetxearen hitzak jasotzen ditugu “The more we lay down the location and timing of concrete democratization processes, the more detailed descriptions we are able to offer. Nevertheless, the more precise the description, the fewer similarities we will encounter among collective processes of empowerment and capacitation for (self-) government throughout history.” (2017:4)

5.4- Baixa al carrer i participa: mobilizazio ziklo liskartsuaren mekanismo eta prozesuak.

Ekintza kolektiboaren definizio klasikoei helduz, gure aburuz **mobilizazio ziklo liskartsu**³⁶⁴ baten aurrean gaude:

“Cuando empleo el término <<ciclo de acción colectiva>>, me refiero a una **fase de intensificación de los conflictos y la confrontación en el sistema social, que incluye una rápida difusión de la acción colectiva de los sectores más movilizados a los menos movilizados, un ritmo de innovación acelerado en las formas de confrontación, marcos nuevos o transformados para la acción colectiva, una combinación de participación organizada y no organizada y unas secuencias de interacción intensificada entre disidentes y autoridades.** Esta confrontación generalizada provoca efectos externos que proporcionan una ventaja, al menos temporal, a los disidentes y les permite superar la debilidad en su base de recursos; exige a los Estados la organización de respuesta amplias, sean represivas, facilitadoras o una combinación de las dos; y produce un resultado general mayor que la suma de las consecuencias de una serie de acontecimientos desconectados” (Tarrow, 2012:342)

Zentzu horretan, hainbat autorek aztertu dute prozesu katalana ekintza kolektiboaren teoria ezberdinetatik abiatuz. Ugariak bezain aberatsak dira azken hamarkadetan gizarte mugimenduen azterketan garatu diren eskolak baita hauen aplikazio enpirikoan azken urteetan Kataluniako kasuan oinarritu direnak. Joan Subiratsek eta Ricard Vilaregutek egindako lanean (2013) zein Maria del Carme Líndezek egindakoan (2013) adibidez, ekintza kolektiboaren agenda klasikoaren aldagaiak erabiltzen dituzte independentziaren aldeko mugimenduaren loraldia azaltzeko. Protesta erreperorioak, antolakuntza baliabideak, diskurtsoa eta markogintza jarduerak eta aukera politikoen egitura dira laburki aipatu ikerketa agendaren ardatzak (Tarrow, 2012: 173-315).

Hala ere, marko teorikoan adierazi dugun moduan, ekintza kolektibo estrategiko eta harremanezkoa (SRA) hobetsiko dugu, mekanismo eta prozesuei lehentasuna emanaz. Hori dela eta gatazka independentista baten aktibazioan, **sezessioaren mekanismo eta prozesuak aktibatuko direla uste dugu** (H8). Gatazka eta jarduera estrategikoaren ardatz nagusia hegemonia berri baten eraikuntza izango den neurrian **garrantzia berezia izango**

³⁶⁴ Antzeko ikuspegi batetik, McAdam eta Flingsteinen lana jarraituz “An **episode of contention** can be defined as a period of emergent, sustained, contentious interaction between at least two collective actors utilizing new and innovative forms of action vis-à-vis one another” (2015:21).

du prozesu batek: hegemonia berri baten eraikuntzak. Honen baitan hegemoniaren mekanismoak aktibatuko dira (H8). ³⁶⁵

Arestian azaldu moduan lau ardatzetan oinarritzen da sezesioaren mekanismoen mapa: *mekanismo sustatzaileak, mobilizatzaileak, liskarraldia egonkortzen laguntzen duten mekanismoak* eta azkenik hau *desaktibatu dezaketenak* (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015:324). Hori aintzat harturik, **zergatik piztu da Katalunian liskarraldi sezesionista bat eta ez Euskal Herrian?** Martínez eta Zubiagaren aburuz, **2008. urtetik aurrera Katalunian sezesioaren mekanismoak era argian aktibatu diren bitartean Euskal kasuan ez da gauza bera gertatu** (Ibídem: 323). Gu ere bat gatoz egiten duten azterketarekin, baina euren lana laburki jasotzeaz gain, azken prozesuari (hegemoniaren eraikuntzari) garrantzia berezia emango diogu.

Mekanismo sustatzaileen artean irainen bat-bateko ezarpena, eliteen interesen haustura eta *aukeren espirala* nabarmentzen dituzte (Ídem.). Azken hauei dagokienez, globalizazioaren eraginez nazioarte mailan egon den estatuaren eraldaketa, deszentralizazio prozesuaren ondorioz egon den demosgintza prozesua eta liskarraldi sezesionistak bide armatuaren ordeztu parametro demokratikoetan bideratzea lirerateke aipagarrienak (Ibídem, 326-327). *Irainen ezarpena eta eliteen interesen haustura* bestalde elementu ezberdinek azaltzen dute. Autonomia fiskalik ez izatea eta estatu zentralaren inbertsio urriak historikoki irain moduan artikulatu arren, krisi testuinguru batean esponenzialki areagotzen dira (Ibídem, 327). Hala ere, kualitatiboki 2010ean Konstituzio Auzitegiak Estatut-aren aurka emandako epaia eta honen aurrean “*Som una nació nosaltres decidim*” lelopean burutu manifestazio jendetsua litzateke momentu garrantzitsuena (Ibídem, 328).

Mekanismo mobilizatzaileei dagokienez, *kategorien sorrera, identitate aldaketa, berrikuntza taktikoa, artekaritza* eta *lehia* aipatzen dituzte. Errepertorio eta diskurtsoaren berrikuntza aurrera eramateko *statu quoarekin* talka egiten duten *kategorien sorrera eta berrikuntza* taktikoa beharrezkoak dira (Ídem.). Kategorien sorrera identitate politiko berri bat artikulatzeko eta polarizaziorako ezinbesteko mekanismoa izango da. Horien artean, marko demokratiko hegemonikoekin lerrotzeko diren (democratic master frame) “soberanismoa” eta “erabakitze eskubidea” dira aipagarrienak (Ibídem, 330). Berrikuntza taktikoaren adibide argiena diskurtso demokratikoarekin artikulatzen den “galdeketa herritarrarena” da (Ídem.). Aipamen berezia merezi du bi dinamiken sustapenean “Plataforma Pel Dret a Decidir” bezalako mugimendu goiztiar batek 2006. urtetik aurrera burutu zuen lana (Tarrow, 2012:290; Vilaregut, 2012a). *Artekaritza* lana momentu ezberdinetan Assemblée Nacional Catalana (ANC),

³⁶⁵ Jada adierazi moduan, azken urteetako liskarraldi sezesionista izango dugu ardatz eta ez dugu urriaren 1etik aurrera piztu den fase berezian sakonduko.

Plataforma Pel Dret a Decidir (PDD), Òmnium Cultural, Associació de Municipis per la Independència (AMI) edota Pacte Nacional Pel Referèndum antolakundeek burutu dute (beste hainbaten artean). Azkenik alderdien arteko *lehiak* garrantzia izan arren, euskal kasuan baino ahulagoa izan da Junts Pel Sí koalizioa izanik horren adibide argietako bat. Honek ez du adierazi nahi lehiarik ez dagoenik. CUP eta PdeCaten artean (Artur Masen inbestiduran argi ikusi zen moduan), ERC eta PdeCaten artean eta berriki sortu den JuntsPelcat eta Pdecat zein ERC-ko sektore batzuen arteko lehia nabaria izan arren, akordio zehatzen bidez apaldu dela adierazi nahi dugu.

Liskarraldia egonkortzen laguntzen duten mekanismo argienak bestalde **eliteen birlerrokatzea eta zertifikazioa** dira (Ibídem, 332). Alde batetik, euren jatorrizko posizioak alboratu eta independentziaren alde kokatu da elite ekonomiko, politiko eta akademikoaren parte bat. Neurtzen zaila den arren, enpresa txiki eta ertainen ordezkariak eta sektore industrialak independentzia babesteko joera handiagoa adierazi duten bitartean kapital handienak (finantzaria, higiezinaren sektorea, azpiegiturena eta energiarena) sezesioaren aurkako jarrera adierazi du (Ídem.). Elite intelektual eta akademikoaren parte garrantzitsu batek ere independentziaren alde jo du (Universitats per la República adibidez) eta elite politikoaren lerrokatzea ere argia izan da. Estatu zentralaren zertifikazio falta izan da bestetik erreferendumaren inguruan azken urteetan piztu den liskarraldi politikoaren sustatzaile nagusia.

Objektuaren aldaketa eta errepresioak liskarraldia *desaktibatze*ko ahalmena izan dezakete. Urteetan zehar eskaera katalanista baretzeko ahalmena zuten hainbat neurrik (estatutu berri bat, zerga eskuduntzak handitzea, transferentzia finantzariak etab.) egun ez lirateke nahiko liskarraldia eteteko (Ibídem:334). Errepresioak bestalde (2014ko Azaroaren 9a antolatzeagatik edo 2017ko urriaren 1a antolatzeagatik) liskarraldia eten ordez gehiago areagotu du polarizazioa sustatuz. Hala ere, urriaren 1aren ostean piztu zen dinamika politikoaren testuinguruan eta batez ere urriaren 27an Kataluniako Errepublikaren adierazpenaren eraginez, errepresioaren aktibazioak jauzi kualitatibo bat eragin du. Zaila da oraindik ere garatzen ari den prozesu baten aurreikuspena egitea, baina bi ideia azpimarra ditzakegu: (1) ez dirudi liskarraldi sezesionista guztiz desaktibatuko duenik; (2) baretuko ez duen arren, aldaketa kualitatibo bat eragin du eta eragile independentistak euren jarduerara estrategikoa moldatzera behartuko ditu.

Aipatu mekanismoen aktibazioarekin batera hiru prozesuren kateaketa ere antzematen dute: **aktore eta identitate berrien eraikuntza, polarizazioa eta difusioa** (ibídem:335). Lehenengo biak hegemoniaren azterketan landuko ditugun neurrian *difusioan* jarriko dugu arreta.

Kanpo difusioari dagokionez euskal kasuaren eta katalanaren artean joan etorriko difusio “ez erlazional³⁶⁶” bat egon da (ibídem:337). Erabakitzekeo eskubidearen teorizazioa eta galdeketa subiranisten filosofia, Lizarra Garaziko Akordioarekin, Ibarretxe Lehendakariak bultzatutako estatutuarekin eta Loiolako elkarrizketekin hasi zen eta ostean 2006/2009 urteen artean Kataluniara “Plataforma pel Dret a Decidirren” eskutik igaro zen eta “Assemblea Nacional de Catalunyaaren” sorrearekin egonkortu zen. Aurrerago ikusiko dugun moduan “Gure Esku Dagoren” sorrera eta burututako herri galdeketak eta Eusko Legebiltzarreko autogobernu ponentziaren inguruan erabakitze eskubidearen eztabaida dinamika honen itzuleran eragin dute (intentsitate baxuagoarekin bada ere).

Kataluniako barne difusioan eragin berezia hartzen duten mekanismoak *artekaritza* eta *eskala aldaketa* liriateke. *Artekaritzaren* bidez banaturik dauden aktoreak elkartzen dira beraz difusioan ezinbestekoa izango da. Prozesu horretan difusio erlazionala (harreman pertsonaletan oinarriturikoa) eta bitartekaritza oinarriturikoa (artekari profesional eta antolatuek egindakoa) bide bateragarriak izan dira (ibídem:341). Jada existitzen ziren “sare katalanistak” elkartzeaz gain, eremu horretatik at dauden sektoreen artean artekaritza lanean Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC) izan da garrantzitsuena. Zehazki, sektore katalanista eta independentistekin, instituzioekin eta alderdi politikoekin “koordinazio artekaritza³⁶⁷” egitearekin batera, ANC-k *ab initio* independentistak ez diren sektoreekin “ordezkaritza artekaritza” lana burutu du (Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015:345). *Eskala aldaketari* dagokionez, Estatuaren erreformarekin maila instituzionalean (top) hasi zen prozesua, maila sozialean (bottom) izan zuen erantzuna fase berri bati bide eginez 2006-2012 urteen artean (ibídem:347). Azkenik 2012. urtetik aurrera bi dimentsioak etengabe uztartu dira mobilizazio soziala eta jarduera instituzionala bata bestea bezain liskartsua izan delako.

Esandakoaren arabera, liskarraldi sezesionistetan beharrezkoak diren mekanismo eta prozesuen aktibazio argia dago. Mekanismo sustatzaileak, mobilizatzaileak eta gatazka mantentzen laguntzen dutenak nabarmenki aktibatu dira. Prozesuei dagokionez, kanpo zein barne mailako difusioa egoteaz gain, eskala aldaketak gizarte maila eta instituzionala uztartu ditu biek ala biek liskarraldi sezesionista sustatuz. Hori kontuan izanik Kataluniako mobilizazio zikloa, ekintza kolektiboaren teoriarik garatu kontzeptuen laborategi praktikoa izan dela esan dezakegu.

³⁶⁶ Pertsona zehatzen lotura zuzenik edo bitartekari lanik gabe.

³⁶⁷ Ion Bodgan Vasiren lanean oinarrituta (2011) artekaritza mota ezberdinak ezberdintzen dituzte: “Coordinating brokerage-koordinazio artekaritza” inplikaturik aktoreak talde beraren parte direnean garatzen da eta “representative brokerage-ordezkaritza artekaritza” azpi taldearen kide batek kanpoko eragileekin harremanak izateko gaitasuna duenean (Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015: 341-342)

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Aipatu lanen bidez, gatazkaren ikuspegi dinamikoena eta aldi berean zehatzena txertatu nahi izan dugu. Hala ere, prozesu horretan, jarduera estrategikoaren ardatz nagusia hegemonia berri baten eraikuntza izango den neurrian ***garrantzia berezia izango du prozesu batek: hegemonia berri baten eraikuntzak. Honen baitan hegemoniaren mekanismoak aktibatuko dira (H8).***

Hegemonia: prozesu zehatza³⁶⁸

Hegemonikoa den jakiteko neurgailu zehatzena erreferendum legal bat izango litzateke. Hala ere, duela gutxi arte independentziaren alde ez zeuden sektore sozial anitzak artikulatzeko gaitasuna izan duela ukaezina da. Azken urteetako mobilizazio jendetsuek, bazterreko aldarrikapenak zirenak hartu duten zentraltasunak (erabakitze eskubidea kasu), erreferenduma eta independentzia agenda politikoaren erdigunean kokatzea eta inkesta gehienetan independentziaren aldekoen hazkundeak, hegemonia berri baten artikulazioaren adierazleak direla deritzogu.

Horretaz gain, Mario Zubiagak landutako “hegemoniaren mekanismo eta prozesuak” aktibatu direla ikus dezakegu: **artekaritza**, **polarizazioa** eta **berrikuntza taktikoa** (2012:123-128). Azken honek, **berrikuntza diskurtsiboa** eta **ekintza kolektiboaren berrikuntza** suposatzen du (Ibídem:128).

Artekaritzaren bidez aurretiaz banaturik zeuden sektore eta aktore kolektiboak elkartu dira (MTT, 2001:142). Hau, herriaren eraikuntzak galdatzen duen kate ekibalentzialen eraikuntzarako funtsezko mekanismo bat da (Zubiaga, 2012: 126). Gure kasuan, Martínezek eta Zubiagak aztertu moduan, “artekaritza”, “difusio” prozesu sakonago baten baitan ulertu beharra dago³⁶⁹ (2015:331). “Artekaritza nahaskorra³⁷⁰” alde aurretik elementu komunak dituzten taldeen artean garatzen den bitartean, “artekaritza ez nahaskorra” banatuago dauden taldeetara ailegaten da. Aipatu autoreek, jadanik katalanismoaren baitan kokatzen ziren aktoreen artean artekaritza “nahaskorra” identifikatzeaz gain, eremu horretatik at zeuden aktoreak elkartzeko gaitasuna izan duen “artekaritza ez nahaskorraren” aktibazioa nabarmentzen dute (ibídem, 342). Horren ondorioz eremu zabaletara bizkor hedatu den difusio bat egon da.

Prozesu horretan besteak beste, momentu ezberdinetan Plataforma Pel Dret a Decidir (PDD), Òmnium Cultural, Associació de Municipis per la Independència (AMI) edota Pacte Nacional Pel Referèndum antolakundeek³⁷¹ artekari lana bete dute. Hala ere guztien artean Assemblea Nacional Catalana izan da garrantzitsuena. Sektore katalanista eta independentistekin, instituzioekin eta alderdi politikoekin “koordinazio artekaritza³⁷²”

³⁶⁸ Kataluniako liskaraldi sezesionistaren mekanismo eta prozesuak sakonki aztertzea gure tesiaren mugak gainditzeaz gain, Meritxel Martínezek eta Mario Zubiagak (2015) jadanik egindako lana errepikatzea suposatuko luke. Aurreko atal batean lan honen laburpena egin dugun neurrian, hegemonia berri baten artikulazioarekin garrantzia berezia dutenengan jarriko dugu arreta.

³⁶⁹ Aipatu ideiak sakonago aztertzeko ikus: Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015.

³⁷⁰ “Miscible” aipatu autoreen jatorrizko testuan.

³⁷¹ Antolakundeek gain, pertsona zehatzek, presio taldeek, espazio fisikoek edota programek ere bete dezakete artekari funtzioa (MTT, 2001:142). Dimentsio horietan sakontzeak gure lanaren mugak gainditzen ditu.

³⁷² Ion Bodgan Vasiren lanean oinarrituta (2011) artekaritza mota ezberdinak ezberdintzen dituzte: “Coordinating brokerage-koordinazio artekaritza” inplikaturatko aktoreak talde beraren parte direnean

egitearekin batera, ANC-k *ab initio* independentistak ez diren sektoreekin “ordezkaritza artekaritza” lana burutu du (ibidem:345).

Polarizazioari dagokionez, populismoak eskatzen duen jendartearen banaketa dikotomikoan ezinbesteko mekanismoa izango da (Zubiaga, 2012:127). “Liskarraldian nagusi diren aktoreen artean dagoen espazio politiko eta soziala zabaltzeaz gain, alde aurretik konpromisorik ez zuten aktoreak eta sektore moderatuenak, mutur batera, bestera edo bietara grabitatzeari eragingo du” (MTT, 2001:322). Beste hainbat mekanismorekin gertatzen den moduan ez da isolaturik agertzen eta normalean aukeren espirala, lehia, kategorien sorrera eta artekaritzarekin konbinatzen da³⁷³ (Ídem).

Polarizazioak, “hirugarren bide autonomiko/federalaren” aukerarako baldintzak murrizteaz gain, independentzia bai/ez eta erreferenduma bai/ez posizioak indartzen ditu. Honen azken adibiderik argiena 2017ko urriaren 1-eko erreferendumak eragin zuen. Aldekoen eta aurkakoen jarrera irmoa are gehiago finkatzeaz gain, erdibideko jarrera³⁷⁴ mantendu nahi zuen Catalunya en Comúrena ahuldu zuen bere barnean tentsioak sortuz eta alde batera edo bestera grabitatzera behartuz.

Egungo estatuaren eraldaketek eta bere krisi dimentsioek *statu quoaren* aurkako sumina handitu arren, hainbat eremutan garatu den demokratizazioaren ondorioz herritarrek euren erakundeekiko duten konfiantza eta dependentzia maila handitzea sustatu dute aldi berean. Krisi garaietan ere egitura sozial orok bere birsorpenerako joera du eta horren ondorioz estatu egituretan *statu quoa* mantentzeko hautaketa estrategikoa nagusituko da (Jessop, 2008a:7)

Hori dela eta, gure aburuz **polarizazioa sezesio prozesu batean mekanismo guztien artean garrantzitsuena izango da**, *statu quoaren* alde grabitatu dezaketan erdibideko posizioak sezesioaren alde finkatu ditzakelako hasiera batean eurek hobetsitako aukera izan ez arren³⁷⁵. 2017ko Urriaren 1-eko erreferendumaren aurrean sorturiko liskarraldian Espainiar Estatuaren partetik aparatu errepresiboak erabiltzeak, Kataluniako herritarren artean geroz eta gehiago “menderatzaile”³⁷⁶ moduan agertzea eragin du (Gramsci,

garatzen da eta “representative brokerage-ordezkaritza artekaritza” azpi taldearen kide batek kanpoko eragileekin harremanak izateko gaitasuna duenean (Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015: 341-342)

³⁷³ Guztiak “Pròces independentistan” aktibatutakoak (Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015).

³⁷⁴ Espainiar Gobernuaren eta Kataluniako Gobernuaren artean erreferenduma legal eta adostua defendatu zuten. Polarizazio testuinguru batean epe motzean faktibilitate baxua duen proposamena defendatzean muturreko jarrerak indartzen dira.

³⁷⁵ Honen adibide argi bat ikus dezakegu Celestino Sánchezen adierazpenetan: “Votaré sí, però és curiós perquè no em sento independentista”. Elkarrizketa osoa hurrengo loturan eskuragarri: <http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/celestino-sanchez-jo-votare-si-pero-es-curios-perque-no-em-sento-independentista/> (azken bisita 2017/08/23).

³⁷⁶ Mendebaldearen eta ekialdearen artean Gramscik egindako ezberdintasun historikoaren eguneratzea litzateke. Hertsadura eta adostasunaren arteko konbinazioa edozein erregimen politikoren oinarria izan arren, Mendebaldeko herrietan gizarte zibil sendoa dagoen neurrian “Estatu integralaren” artikulazioan

1999:211). Hala ere, polarizazioak muturreko posizioak sustatzen dituen neurrian, erabakitze *eskubidearen aurka eta sezesioaren aurka posizio irmoenak* dituztenak ere indartu ditu. Espainiar nazionalismo esentzialistenaren berpizkundearekin batera ulertu behar da Ciudadanosen gorakada. Burujabetza eskaera logika diferentzialaren bidez barneratzeko aukera oro baztertzea (elitearen parte bat erakartzea adibidez), independentisten aurkako errepresioa edota Espainiar Konstituzioaren 155. artikulua erabazteko aukera ere honen adibide argiak dira.

Esanak esanda, dinamika hauek oraindik garatzen dauden neurrian balizko etorkizunari buruzko hausnarketek aintzat hartu behako lituzkeen arren, sakonki aztertzea gure lanaren xedeak gainditzen ditu. Hortaz, azken urteetan hegemonia independentista berria artikulatzen eragin duten mekanismoak aztertzen jarraituko dugu.

Zentzu horretan, **berrikuntza taktikoa** “politikotasunaren” eta honi loturiko “gertakariaren” sorrerari loturik dago (Zubiaga, 2012:128). Honen baitan, **diskurtsioen zein ekintza kolektiboaren berrikuntza** dira azpimarragarrienak. Erabakitze eskubidearen hegemonia, liskarraldi politikoari izaera dinamikoa ematen dion “procés” kontzeptua edota independentziaren ordeztu sektore aurrerakoientzat erakargarria izan daitekeen “Errepublikakatalana” edota “Estatu propioa” lirateke berrikuntza diskurtsibo aipagarrienak. Ekintza kolektiboari dagokionez, 2009-2011 urteen arteko herri galdeketak, 2014ko azaroaren 9-ko “Kataluniako etorkizunari buruzko prozesu parte hartzaile herritarra”, 2015eko irailaren 27ko hauteskunde plebiszitarioak edota 2017ko urriaren 1-eko independentzia erreferenduma eragin sakona izan duten berrikuntzak izan dira.

Esandakoaren arabera, **hegemonia independentista ahalbidetzen duten mekanismoen aktibazio argia egon da (H8)**. Momentuko gorabeheren arabera batzuk besteek baino adierazpen argiagoa izan arren, **erreferendum bat burutzeko Katalunian nagusitu den adostasun zabala eta erreferendum hori galarazteko Espainiar Estatuak hartu dituen erabakiek piztu duten polarizazioa litzateke mekanismorik esanguratsuenak.**

Guzti hori kontuan hartuta nabaria da *statu quoaren* krisia eta estatu propioaren aukerak honen alternatiba bideragarri moduan izan duen gorakada. Hori hala izan dadin jada esan dugun moduan **aktoreen jardura estrategikoa** ezinbestekoa da (H6), batez ere estatu proiektu zehatz baten aldeko artikulazio diskurtsiboa. *Estatu proiektuaren krisiak hegemonia krisi bat* ere suposatzen du eta horren ondorioz hau ordezkatu dezakeen proiektu kontrahegemoniko baten artikulaziorako momentu pribilegiatua. Aztertzen

jendartearen adostasuna lortzea ezinbestekoa da. Krisi egoeratan estatuaren zilegitasun krisia areagotzen da “zuzendaritza” (leading) eta lidergo etiko politikoa galduz eta geroz eta gehiago izaera “menderatzailea” (dominant) adieraziz (Gramsci, 1999:211). Errepresioaren erabilerak honen izaera menderatzailea areagotu eta zuzendaritzarako zilegitasuna galtzea eragiten du.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

gauden kasuan, **“estatu propioaren aldeko hegemonia” berri baten artikulazioa**
izango da gakoa **(H9)**. Hau izango da hurrengo atalean landuko duguna.

5.5- Hegemonia independentista eta artikulazio populista


5.5.1- Sarrera:

Krisi garaietan, egoera politikoaren inguruko interpretazio diskurtsiboek garrantzia berezia hartzen dute, momentu semiotikoaren rola indartuz (Hay, 1996; Jessop, 2008a; Laclau, Mouffe, 1987). Zentz horretan “Crisis of” deitu duguna definitzeko arestian aipaturikoa berreskuratzen dugu:

“[...]The disorienting effects of crisis create the space for contesting previously sedimented meanings, which can occur in many different fields on many different scales. **This can create in turn opportunities to reorder the lines of demarcation that distinguish the polity from its ‘constitutive outside’**³⁷⁷[...] “ (Jessop, 2015a:458)

Gure aburuz, independentismo katalanak bere jarduera estrategikoaren bidez eta erabakitze eskubidea puntu nodal moduan erabilia, hegemonia independentista berri bat eraikitze gaitasuna izan du. Prozesu horretan, estatu matrizea (haiek) kanpo eratzaille moduan erabili dute logika ekibalentzialaren bidez identitate independentista (gu) berri bat eraikiz (H9). Horren ondorioz historikoki independentismotik gertu zeuden sektoreez harago, eremu sozial anitzak biltzeko gaitasuna izan duen identitate politiko berri bat eraiki dute. Gure ustez, argudio nagusien artikulazioa demos-state building ardatzean oinarrituko da (H9):

IRUDIA 54 Diskurtsoaren dimentsio nagusiak




Iturria: egileak egina.

³⁷⁷ Letra lodia guk erantsia.

Independentziaren aldeko arrazoiak aztertuta ere, jada ikusi dugun moduan erabakitzeke ahalmena izatea eta autogobernu ekonomikoa handitzea hobesten dela ikus dezakegu azken inkesten datuen arabera:

TAULA 22 Independentziaren aldeko arrazoiak: garapena



(Bladé, 2015:401)

Independentziaren aldeko eragileen diskurtsoen azterketarako gizarte zibileko taldeek zein alderdi politikoek esandakoa hartuko dugu kontuan. “Procès” moduan ezagutzen den liskarraldian, Òmnium Cultural eta Assemblea Nacional Catalana izan dira gizarte zibileko talde independentista garrantzitsuenak eta horrenbestez gure lanean jarraituko dugun erreferentzia nagusiak. Hori dela eta 2014ko azaroaren 9ko galdeketari begira “Ára es l’hora” kanpaina adierazitakoa aztertuko dugu. Bigarrenik, 2015eko “hauteskunde plebiszitarioen” testuinguruan irailaren 11ko diada nazionalari begira “Via Lliure a la Republica Catalanen”³⁷⁸ adierazitakoa. Azkenik, alderdiei dagokienez PdeCat, ERC eta CUP dira alderdi independentista nagusiak. Azken hauek 2015eko irailaren 27ko hauteskunde plebiszitarioetan zabalduzako mezuak jasoko ditugu.

³⁷⁸ ANC-k eta Òmnium Culturelek koordinatutako dinamika.

Hori kontuan harturik, gure azterketa era osagarrian ulertu behar diren lau pausoren bidez burutuko dugu:

- 1- Eragileen diskurtsoen ezaugarri nagusiak maila deskriptiboan azalduko ditugu.
- 2- Aipatu argudioak “frame” analisiaren dimentsioen arabera antolatuko ditugu: diagnostikoa, pronostikoa, motibazioa marko egitura jarraituz.
- 3- Argudio horiek Essexeko Eskolaren printzipio teorikoekin elkartu eta herriaren eraikuntza eta hegemonia independentista berriaren artikulazioa aztertuko dugu.

2017ko urriaren 1eko erreferendumean adierazitakoa ez dugu jasoko bi arrazoirengatik: lehenik eta behin, beste dinamiketan jada jasotakoa kontuan harturik ez dagoelako edukien aldaketa kualitatiborik. Ez dago independentziaren alde egiteko argudioetan aldaketarik. Horretaz gain, erreferenduma legez kanpoko izateak piztutako polarizazio maila altuaren ondorioz, eztabaidaren funtsa independentziaren aldeko/aurkako arrazoen ordeztu, erreferendumaren zilegitasunaren inguruan eta errepresioaren ondorioz piztu diren liskarren inguruan grabitatu dutelako.

5.5.2- Eragile independentisten diskurtsoa:

5.5.2.1- Ara és l’hora. Units per un país nou.

2014ko azaroaren 9an Kataluniako independentziari buruzko erreferenduma burutuko zela aurkeztu zenean, Òmnium Culturalek eta ANC-k “Ara és l’hora. Units per un país nou” kanpaina abiatu zuten. Honen xedea erreferenduma bultzatu eta estatu berri baten aldeko argudioak hedatzea zen³⁷⁹. Hori dela eta, proiektua martxan jarri zutenean zio nagusietako bat “kanpainaren balore zein antolakuntzaren bidez eraikitzen ari ziren herri berria ordezkatzeko” (Soler, Grinyo, 2014:13). Alde batetik, “kanpaina berritzaile bat izan behar zuen, ezin zuen aurreko mendeko kanpaina izan, gardena eta freskoa izatea beharrezkoa zen” (Ídem). Bestetik euren aburuz, “independentziaren onurak azaldu eta argudiatzea beharrezkoa zen beldurraren kanpainaren eta ziurgabetasunaren aurrean” (Boix, Calvet, Civic, 2014:24).

Kanpaina “berritzailea” egiteko eta “independentziaren onurak” azaltzeko asmoarekin, ANC-k eta Òmniumek argudioak eurek zutenean eman ordeztu, herritarrei galdetu zieten eraiki nahi zuten herriaren ezaugarrien inguruan. Horren bidez, independentziaren aldeko argudioei “herri baten ametsak” deitu zieten “#Si o Si La impressora dels somnis d’un país” kanpainaren bidez (Ídem). Demokraziaren krisiaren aurrean “herri berria eraikitzeko

³⁷⁹ Ekimen garrantzitsuenen artean, 2014ko irailaren 11-ko “Diadan” “Via Catalana” deituriko mobilizazio jendetsua antolatzea eta “#Si o Si La impressora dels somnis d’un país” kanpainaren bidez independentziaren aldeko argudioak ematea leudeke.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

persona guztien nahiak entzuteko momentua”³⁸⁰ zela aldarrikatu nahiz zuten (Ídem). Hurrengo bi irudietan parte hartzea sustatzeko erabili euskarria ikus ditzakegu:

IRUDIA 55 Com vols que sigui el teu país nou?




Iturria: (Boix, Calvet, Civic, 2014).

Argudio horiek jaso, elkartu eta arloka antolatu ostean euskarri ezberdinak erabiliz zabaldu zituzten. Bestek beste, informazio panelen bidez, kanpaina autobus bat erabiliz, hedabideetako propagandaren bidez edota arloka hitzaldiak antolatuz jendarteratu zituzten mezuak (Ídem). Kanpainaren izaera dela eta, “aldarrikapen serioak, freskoagoak ziren eta umorean oinarritzen ziren argudioekin uztartu zituzten” (Ídem). Hurrengo irudietan ikus ditzakegu independentziaren alde egiteko jaso zituzten argudioak.

³⁸⁰ “Ara és l’hora d’escoltar tothom”.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

IRUDIA 56 Ara és l' hora 9N



Iturria: (Boix, Calvet, Civic, 2014).

IRUDIA 57 Ara és l'hora: pensions i dones lliures

**pensions,
seguretat
econòmica
i oportunitats
de futur en
una Catalunya
independent**

A CÀRREC DE
LLUÍS BONET I COLL
ENGINYER I MBA PER ESADE

JOSEP PÉREZ FRANCO
DIPLOMAT EN ECONOMIA I DIRECCIÓ
EMPRESSES - UNIV. ROCHESTER -EUA
I PER IESE - UNIV. NAVARRA
EX-PROFESSOR D'ECONOMIA
APLICADA - URL

**DILLUNS 27 D'OCTUBRE
17:15h**

Casal de la Gent Gran de SALLENT
(Carrer Santa Cristina, 2)

EN ACABAR L'ACTE, HI HAURÀ COCA I BEGUDA PER A TOT HOM.

ARA ÉS L'HORA
9N FEM UN PAÍS NOU

ECONOMISTES PER
LA INDEPENDÈNCIA

JUBILATS PER LA
INDEPENDÈNCIA

**dones lliures
en un país lliure**

CONDUÏT PER
PILAR REBAQUE
ADVOCADA

VICKY MORENO
MESTRA I COEDUCADORA, FEMINISTA ANTIMILITARISTA

SARA CUENTAS
PERIODISTA I FEMINISTA DESCOLONIAL

NEUS MORENO
FEMINISTA I SINDICALISTA PER LA SOSTENIBILITAT DE LA VIDA

TÀNIA VERGE
POLITÒLOGA I PROFESSORA A LA UPF

CLOENDA AMB RECITAL DE POESIA:
CARME SANSÀ

**DIVENDRES 31 D'OCTUBRE
19:00h**

CCDFB, Sant Pere Més Baix, 7 | Barcelona, Metro Urquinaona (L4 i L1)

ARA ÉS L'HORA
9N FEM UN PAÍS NOU

amb el suport de:

#Feministesperlaindependència

FORA EL PATRIARCAT
DRET A LA DIFERÈNCIA
PROU VIOLÈNCIA NO AL MILITARISME
COEDUCACIÓ

381

Iturria: (Boix, Calvet, Civic, 2014).

Irudietan ikus daitekeen moduan, *argudioen funtsa demos-state building ardatzean kokatzen da (H9)*. Pentsioak, eskola publikoa, patriarkatuari aurre egitea, osasun publikoa edota garraio sistema berri bat eraikitzea lirateke, besteak beste, ezarritako lehenetsunak. Horretaz gain, proiektu hegemoniko berri baten eraikuntzan ezinbestekoa den mekanismo baten aktibazioa agerikoa dela nabarmendu nahiko genuke: artekaritza (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:142; Zubiaga, 2009:97). “Artekaritza kate” sakon baten aktibazioa garbia da: ANC eta Òmnium Culturelek jadanik sektore oso ezberdinak elkartzeko gaitasuna duten mugimendu artekariak dira. Horretaz gain “Ara és l’hora” kanpainia bera ere artekari funtzio garrantzitsua betetzen du. Bere baitan independentziaren aldeko sektoreak elkartu eta aktibatzeaz gain, zalantzak dituztenak eta desmobilizaturik daudenak aktibatzeke lana burutzen dute (Boix, Calvet, Civic, 2014:24). Horretaz gain, ekibalentzia eta diferentziaren logikaren etengabeko tentsioan (Laclau,

³⁸¹ Hala ere, dinamika hauetan jendartearen nagusi diren kontraesan eta zapalkuntzak ere topatzen ditugula ezin dugu ahaztu. Bi irudi hauetan ikus daitekeen moduan, “ekonomia eta pentsioei buruz” gizonetako adituek hitz egiten dute eta emakumeen askatasunari buruz emakumeek.

Mouffe, 1987; Laclau, 2005) “Feministes per la independència”, “Jubilats per la independència” edota “Economistes per la independència” bezalako talde ugariaren agerpena ere nabaria da. Independentzia “puntu nodal” bilakatuta, beste hainbat aldarrikapen honen inguruan artikulatzen dira herri berri baten artikulazioari/eraikuntzari ateak zabalduz (Laclau, 2005).

5.5.2.2- Via Lliure a la Republica Catalana

2014ko A-9ko “prozesu parte hartzailearen” osteko giro politikoan, 2015eko irailaren 27an izaera plebisitarioa izan behar zuten hauteskundeak deitu zituzten. Hau da, erreferendum legal adostu bat egiteko ezintasunaren aurrean independentzia bai/ez oinarri izan behar zuten hauteskunde autonomikoak deitu zituen Artur Mas buru zuen gobernuak. Independentziaren aldeko alderdiek irabaztekotan (Junts Pel Si eta CUP) estatu berri baten sorrerarako eta “deskonexiorako” programa martxan jarriko zela adierazi zuten. Horren ostean guztiz bestelako egoera bat jazo arren, testuinguru hartan independentziaren alde emandako argudioek interes berezia dute.

Hori dela eta, ANC-ren gidaritzapean baina “Ara és l’horaren” aterkia mantenduz, “Via Lliure a la Republica Catalana” kanpaina abiatu zuten. 2015eko udan zehar estatu propioaren aldeko argudioak eman eta irailaren 11ko “Diada nazionala” antolatzea ziren ezarritako bi helburuak. Biak elkaturik ulertu behar dira. Alde batetik, Kataluniako Errepublikaren aldeko argudioak 10 ardatzen inguruan ezarri zituzten: lurraldeen arteko oreka, demokrazia, elkartasuna, aniztasuna, berdintasuna, berrikuntza, kultura eta hezkuntza, justizia soziala, sustengagarritasuna eta mundua. Bestetik, irailaren 11ko mobilizazioa ardatz horietan oinarriturik antolatu zuten Bartzelonako Meridiana kaletik Kataluniako Parlamenturaino. Gai bakoitzari ibilbidean zehar eremu bat eskaini zioten eta pertsona ezberdinak ere gaien arabera kokatu zituzten³⁸².

Hurrengo irudiak jarraituz mobilizazioaren metafora argia dela uste dugu: etorkizuneko errepublikaren ezaugarriak eremuka antolatu eta aldi berean herritarrak euren kokapenaren bidez eskari ezberdin horiek ordezkaturiko lituzkete. Herritarrek bultzatuta gezi batek ibilbide osoa zeharkatu zuen errepublikaren ardatz guztiak ordezkaturik. Azkenik euren burujabetzaren egoitza izan beharko lukeen parlamentura ailegatzean bukatu zen ekimena.

Manifestazioa geografikoki antolatzeaz gain³⁸³, sektorialki ere ordezkaturik dago, sindikalistak, gazteak, LGTBI, feministak etab. logika ekibalentzialaren bidez artikulatuz (Laclau, 2005). ANC-k, lurralde irizpideak jarraitzen dituzten taldeak (Assembleas Territorials) eta Kataluniatik kanpoko taldeak (Assembleas Exteriors) izateaz gain,

³⁸² Ikus irudiak.

³⁸³ Irudian ikus daitezkeen moduan, eskualde bakoitzak bere gunea gordeta zuen.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

eremu profesional eta sozial ezberdinetan talde sektorialak ere baditu (Assembleas Sectorials)³⁸⁴. Horrenbestez, ANC-ren antolaketa ereduak berak aipatu artikulazioa errazten duela esan genezake.

IRUDIA 58 Via Lliure a la República Catalana: ekibalentzien logika I



Iturria: (ANC, 2015.)

³⁸⁴ Taldek sektorialak oso anitzak dira: “Inmigració per la independència”, “Bombers per la independència”, “Economia social i solidaria per la independència”, “Empresaris per la independència”, “Dones per la independència” edota “Mossos per la independència” adibide batzuk baino ez dira. Euren helburua, lurralde taldeak iristen ez diren eremuetara heldu, estatu bat ez izateak suposatzen dituen gabeziak salatu eta estatu baten beharra azpimarratzea da:

“Com a lobbies de pressió en els seus àmbits naturals, denunciant les mancances a que ens trobem sotmesos pel fet de no tenir un estat amb plenes facultats de decisió i gestió i proposant alternatives de bon funcionament dins un nou marc de relacions que tots anem visualitzant: el de la Catalunya sobirana, les sectorials han d’emplenar de contingut el missatge de l’ANC.” (Assemblea.cat, 2017).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 59 Via lliure: ekibalentzien logika II



Iturria: (Sánchez, 2015)

Kasu honetan, “Ara és l’hora. Units per un país nou” kanpainarekin alderatuta, ANC-k zuzenean bere argudioak era mamitsuago batean zabaldu zituen. Atal hau da guri bereziki interesatzen zaiguna, hegemonia independentista berri baten eraikuntzan erabilitako estrategia diskurtsiboa azaltzeko erabiliko dugulako. Aurrekoan bezala, demos-state building ardatzean kokaturik dauden aldarrikapenak dira nagusi. Gai bakoitzean

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

erabiltzen duten estrategia oso antzekoa da eta frame analisiaren diagnostikoa, pronostikoa eta motibazioa eskemarekin bat dator. Egoeraren diagnostiko bat egiten dute Espainiar Estatu matrizea kanpo eratzaille moduan erabiliz. Besteak beste, egungo egoera Espainiar Estatuaren kudeaketarekin, Konstituzio Auzitegiaren epaiekin, birzentralizazioarekin, eredu ekonomiko espekulatiboarekin edota politika publikoekin lotzen dute. Horren aurrean, pronostikoaren bidez etorkizuneko errepublikaren ezaugarriak izango liratekeenak garatzen dituzte. Azkenik, motibazioaren bidez, mobilizazioaren alde suspergarri eta emotiboena sustatu nahi dute “ilusioa edo etsipena: zuk erabaki!” edo “ongizatea ala murrizketak: zuk erabaki!” bezalako adierazpenak eginez.

Via Lliuraren udako kanpainaren lehen ardatza izan zen neurrian, lurralde orekari buruz esandakoa jasoko dugu. Eremu guztietan garatu zituzten edukiak aztertzea gure helburuak gainditzen ditu. Horretaz gain, eduki horien izate sustantiboa sakonki aztertzea baino, horien artikulazioan erabilitako logika da kasu honetan gehien interesatzen zaiguna. Hori dela eta, kasu guztietan eskema eta logika bera errepikatzen dela kontuan hartuta, ardatz baten azalpenarekin nahikoa dela deritzogu.

A- Lurralde oreka:

ANC-k zuzenean adierazi moduan, helburua “etorkizuneko Errepublikan erregio guztiak konektaturik egotea eta herriaren garapenean era koordinatu, sustengagarri eta berdinean parte hartzea litzateke” (Assemblea.cat, 2015). Hori lortze aldera, landa eremu zein hiriguneetan oinarritzko zerbitzu eta azpiegiturak garatu beharko lituzkete eta Estatuaren eremu ezberdinak era eraginkor batean komunikatu (ANC, 2015). Hori lortu ostean, energia, uraren kudeaketa edo garrioak bezalako eremu anitzetan beharrezkoak liratekeen azpiegurak garatuko lituzkete (ANC, 2015).

Esan bezala, “Què tenim” atalean egoeraren diagnostiko bat egiten dute Espainiar estatu matrizea kanpo eratzaile moduan (haiek) erabiliz (Mouffe, 1999). Bestetik, “Què volem” atalean etorkizuneko Errepublikaren pronostiko bat egiten dute (gu) berri bat artikulatuz.

TAULA 23 ANC: Diagnostikoa eta Pronostikoa

Què tenim...	Què volem...
Un Estat que es gasta 800 milions d'€ en multes per incomplir el protocol de Kyoto sobre les emissions de CO2.	Un país responsable amb el medi ambient i capaç de sumar-se als compromisos internacionals en la lluita global contra el canvi climàtic.
Un model econòmic que especula amb el sòl, les platges i el paisatge i els ‘ven’ al sector immobiliari.	Gestionar el nostre patrimoni natural per a garantir-ne la conservació i no hipotecar-lo amb finalitats lucratives
Un Govern que dóna via lliure al ‘fracking’ primant la rendibilitat a curt termini a costa d’erosionar el territori.	Capacitat per a controlar aquesta i altres pràctiques abusives amb el territori que suposen una degeneració mediambiental.
Un Tribunal Constitucional que en els últims anys ha tombat fins a 8 textos legals aprovats pel govern català sobre Medi Ambient. Prohibició del fràcking (Ilei 3/2012) Protecció contra la contaminació acústica (Ilei 16/2002) Pobresa energètica (decret-Ilei 6/2013) Rehabilitació, regeneració i renovació urbanes (Ilei 8/2013)	Sobirania plena per a protegir el patrimoni natural del país amb un model sostenible i ecològic.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Què tenim...	Què volem...
<p>Concessió de subvencions per programes relacionats amb el medi natural, biodiversitat, prevenció de la contaminació i canvi climàtic (ordre ARM/2876/2008)</p> <p>Emmagatzemament geològic de diòxid de carbó (lleí 40/2010)</p> <p>Economia sostenible (lleí 2/2011).</p> <p>Normativa referent als panells de catadors d'oli d'oliva verge. (RD 227/2008)</p>	
Un Estat que legisla sobre el territori de forma unilateral segons els interessos privats que li convinguin.	Una política mediambiental consensuada amb les associacions de defensa del territori.
Un Estat que incompleix la Directiva Marc Europea de l'aigua en detriment de l'estat ecològic dels rius Ebre i Segre.	Capacitat per a pressionar en igualtat de condicions, perquè l'Estat espanyol compleixi les directrius europees i garantir el futur del Delta de l'Ebre.
Un dèficit de gairebé 2.000 milions d'€ entre les aportacions al pressupost d'ajuts de la UE i les ajudes que rep la pagesia catalana.	Una redistribució més justa de les aportacions solidàries i les ajudes per als nostres pagesos
Supeditació al discurs únic de l'Estat i als múltiples interessos, sovint contradictoris, que tenen els seus territoris	Veu pròpia a Europa per defensar els interessos de Catalunya en àmbits com l'aigua, l'agricultura, les infraestructures
Un política de subvencions irracional que no ha ajudat al desenvolupament real del territori ni del sector productiu del país	Posar en valor les possibilitats pròpies que tenim per sobre de la política de subvencions, establint alternatives reals i efectives de desenvolupament arreu del territori
Infraestructures insuficients, obsoletes i mal gestionades prioritant inversions polítiques que s'allunyen de les necessitats reals del territori.	Gestionar les infraestructures amb eficiència per incentivar la competitivitat de les empreses catalanes i la creació de llocs de treball.
Un govern que bloqueja el corredor Mediterrani limitant el potencial de les empreses que podria	Un govern que vetlli per als interessos de les nostres empreses dissenyant les

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Què tenim...	Què volem...
<p>aportar uns 68.000 milions d'euros a l'economia de l'Estat.</p> <p>Un Estat que limita el potencial de l'Aeroport del Prat impedint-ne una gestió pròpia i prioritizant Barajas com a eix prioritari de les connexions internacional</p>	<p>infraestructures amb uns criteris de racionalitat i productivitat</p> <p>Un país que aposti per una infraestructura clau com el Prat per tal de convertir Barcelona en un referent aereoportuari del sud d'Europa</p>
<p>Un servei de Rodalies que no s'ajusta a les necessitats del país i que condiciona negativament el dia a dia de les persones. Dels 4.000 milions d'euros compromesos per a Catalunya en el Pla Rodalies 2008-2015, no se n'ha executat ni un 10%.</p>	<p>Un Estat que prioritzi les inversions en aquells serveis públics que afecten a la majoria de la seva població per tal de fer-los més eficients. Una inversió racional que passi per davant dels criteris polítics.</p>
<p>Un Estat que limita el potencial dels ports catalans incomplint inversions imprescindibles i posa en perill acords milionaris per la seva deixadesa</p>	<p>Un Estat que aposti pels ports del país com a centres de dinamització econòmica i que treballi per dotar-los de les infraestructures necessàries per atreure inversions</p>
<p>Infraestructures de gestió catalana que no disposen dels recursos econòmics suficients, com a conseqüència de l'ofec econòmic que pateixen les nostres institucions, per tal d'esdevenir solvents i eficient.</p>	<p>Unes infraestructures pròpies, com els ports de Tarragona i Barcelona o els aeroports de Reus, El Prat o Alguaire, dotades de l'atenció i del finançament suficients per funcionar amb èxit i generar riquesa i llocs de treball al territori</p>

(Assemblea.cat, 2015a)

Diagnostikoa pronostikoa eta motibazioa era koherente batean nola artikulatzen diren ikus dezakegu ANC-ren argudioetan. Horretaz gain, Kataluniako “proces-ean” eta jendartean orokorrean nagusi diren iritziekin erresonantzia zuzena dagoela uste dugu (Snow, Benford, 1988:210). Hauen bidez, zentzu komunean nagusi diren elementuak hartu eta estatu propioaren aldeko argudioetara bideratu dituzte.

5.5.2.3- Junts pel si (ERC- PdeCat)

2015eko irailaren 27ko hauteskundeei³⁸⁵ begira Junts Pel Si koalizioa sortu zuten alderdi eta eragile independentista anitzek. Euren definizioari jarraiki “ERC eta CDC³⁸⁶-k babestutako gizarte zibilaren hautagaitza” litzateke (Junts Pel Sí, 2015a). Horretaz gain, Demòcrates de Catalunya³⁸⁷ eta Moviment d'Esqueres³⁸⁸ alderdiko kideak eta gizarte zibileko eremu ezberdinetako pertsona ezagunek ere osatu zuten hautagaien zerrenda. ANC, Òmnium Cultural, Associació de Municipis per la Independència (AMI) eta Súmateren babesa ere jaso zuen. Azkenik, Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (SI), Reagrupament, Catalunya Acció eta Catalunya Sík ere babestu zuten.

Euren programarekin batera, “Arguments Pel Sí” era grafikoan eta testu laburren bidez zabaldu zituzten. Programa luze eta korapilatsuen aurrean euskarri hauek duten difusio gaitasuna kontuan hartuta, hegemonia berri baten eraikuntza diskurtsiboan eragingarriok izango direla deritzogu beraz azken hauek izango dira atal honetan erabiliko ditugunak³⁸⁹.

IRUDIA 60 Junts Pel si: Círculo virtuoso de la democracia en Catalunya



"Vivimos en un círculo virtuoso. Bienvenidos a la soberanía popular de 10 magistrados presididos por un exmilitante del PP. Mientras se persigue a la gente que expresa una opinión, los

³⁸⁵ Hainbatetan aipatu dugun ideian sakonduz, 2017ko urriaren osteko dinamika ez dugu aintzat hartuko. Kasu honetan, 2017ko abenduko hauteskundeei ere, errepresioaren eta 155. artikuluaen dinamikaren baitan kokatu ziren neurrian, ez dizkigute kualitatiboki azken urteetako hegemonia independentistaren eraikuntzaren azterketarako euskarri egokienak eskaintzen.

³⁸⁶ 2016ko uztailan CDC alderdia desagertu eta PdeCat sortu zuten bere ordez.

³⁸⁷ Unió Democràtica de Catalunya-tik banatutako sektore independentistak osatu alderdia.

³⁸⁸ PSC-tik banatutako Nova Esquerra Catalana eta Moviment Catalunyak osatu zuten alderdia.

³⁸⁹ Programa politikoan garatuago aurkezten dituzten ideien sintesia litzateke "Arguments Pel Sí".

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

grandes corruptos continúan en la calle. Vivimos en un país donde la separación de poderes es demasiado débil y los miembros del Tribunal Constitucional están nombrados por los partidos políticos y en función de sus ideas políticas. Queremos vivir en un país donde todo el mundo sea de verdad igual frente la ley y donde no haya privilegios de ningún tipo. Queremos un país donde la libertad de expresión sea muy amplia y la lucha contra todo tipo de corrupción sea la primera prioridad de la justicia.” (Junts Pel Sí, 2015b)

IRUDIA 61 Junts pel Sí Injusticias no, solidaridad sí



“Sí a la Educación de calidad para todo el mundo. El trato injusto que recibe Catalunya y el hecho que no podamos gestionar nuestros recursos perjudica la educación de nuestros hijos.

Por ejemplo, una familia de cuatro personas deja de ingresar cada año 8.800 euros solo por vivir en Catalunya. Es decir, lo que costaría la universidad de sus hijos. Dicho de otra forma: en las próximas 24 horas, en Catalunya habremos pagado 44 millones de euros que no volverán. Y eso equivale a diez nuevas escuelas que no podremos construir.

Con un nuevo Estado podremos invertir mucho más en educación porque dispondremos de más recursos para becas, para escuelas, para maestros y universidades. Tú lo puedes hacer posible.” (Junts Pel Sí, 2015c)

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 62 Junts pel Sí. Sí a gestionar nuestro dinero para no sufrir recortes



“Con un estado propio gestionaremos nuestros recursos y acabaremos con los recortes Entre todos los que vivimos en Catalunya pagamos cada año 16.000 millones de euros de más al Estado Español, que no vuelven nunca³⁹⁰. Esto no es justo. Este dinero serviría para mejorar nuestra sanidad, la educación de nuestros hijos y los servicios sociales.

Si todos somos iguales, por qué pagamos más y recibimos menos que los otros? Queremos un trato justo para todo el mundo, para conseguir una mejor vida. Sin herramientas no se puede construir el Estado del Bienestar que necesitamos.

Conseguir un Estado propio es la única solución para acabar con los recortes. Tú lo puedes hacer posible.” (Junts Pel Sí, 2015d)

³⁹⁰ Defizit fiskalari “Espoli Fiskal” deitu diote hainbat eragileek azken urteetan. ERC-k adibidez “Prou Espoli. Ara República Catalana” izeneko kanpaina egin zuen 2012. urtean hau salatzeko (Directe!Cat, 2012). Centre Català de Negocis-ek bestalde, “L’impacte de l’espoli fiscal sobre el territori” ikerketa aurkeztu zuen (CCN, 2015)

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 63 Junts Pel Sí Cercanías eficiente



“En un Estado nuevo podremos invertir en infraestructuras al servicio de todas las personas. En Catalunya arrastramos un déficit de inversiones del Estado en todas las infraestructuras y esto tiene consecuencias graves en nuestra vida cotidiana. Los retrasos en Rodalies, los vagones llenos a rebosar, los atascos en las carreteras o la siniestralidad muy alta en las carreteras del Estado de un único carril son problemas que tienen solución si podemos decir cómo se hacen las cosas.

El gobierno español prefiere construir aeropuertos sin aviones, autovías y líneas de AVE donde no pasa casi nadie, solo para satisfacer el orgullo de conectar Madrid con todas las capitales de provincia.

Con un nuevo Estado, podremos invertir por fin en las infraestructuras necesarias, al servicio de todas las personas y no al servicio de los intereses de quienes las construyen. Tú lo puedes cambiar.” (Junts Pel Sí, 2015e)

5.5.2.4- CUP-Crida Constituent

CUP-en kasuan, ezkerreko hainbat eragileekin batera CUP-Crida Constituent koalizioa osatu zuen. Endavantek, Poble Lliurek, Arranek, SEPC-ek, Lluita Internacionalistak, Coordinadora Obrera Sindicalek, En Lluitak, Constituents per la Rupturak, Colectiu Drassanesek, Crida Constituentek eta Corrent Roig taldeek hartu zuten parte ezkerreko koalizioan (Villaweb.cat, 2016)

Beste eragile independentistekin alderatuta irmotasun ideologiko handiagoa duen diskurtsoa ikus dezakegu. Era argian, “Herrialde Katalanen nazio eraikuntza, kapitalismoarekin bukatuko duen jendarte justuagoa eta patriarkatuari aurre egingo dion errepublika aldarrikatzen dute” (CUP-Crida Constituent, 2015:3). Euren programaren xedea burujabetza guztiak berreskuratzea da. Euren hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“Un programa per assolir el control popular de totes les sobiranies, és a dir, no estar sotmesos a cap altre poder que no sigui la veu del poble **per decidir sobre tot el que ens afecta: política, energia, alimentació, urbanisme, sanitat, educació, etcètera.**”³⁹¹ (Ibídem:4).

Kasu honetan ere demos-state building ardatza da nagusitzen dena. Hala ere, aurreko eragileekin alderatuta CUP-ek Herrialde Katalanei buruz hitz egiten du nahiz eta proposamen politikoak etorkizuneko Kataluniako Errepublikari begirakoak izan (hori baita nagusitzen den egitura politikoa). Honek, era argian adierazten digu estatalite subalternoen eragina. Hau da, jadanik esan dugun moduan nazio historikoez harago eta nazio estatu klasikotik harago baina aldi berean bien eraginpean, subjektu politiko berriak sortu direla (Goikoetxea, 2014b). Horregatik, Països Catalans aldarrikatu arren, Kataluniako Printzipatura mugatzen da prozesu independentista.

78 orri dituen programaren funtsa jarraian doazen 9 puntu nagusitan laburtzen dituzte:

- 1. Independència total. Sobirania** política, econòmica, energètica, alimentària, en salut i en educació.
- 2. Som Països Catalans. Construïm la República Catalana popular.** Ruptura amb l’Estat espanyol per fer possible la independència, dur a terme la Declaració Unilateral d’Independència (DUI) i un **procés constituent democràtic i popular.**
- 3. No pagarem el seu deute.** Ruptura amb la Troica per atendre les necessitats de les persones. **Desobeïm** la Unió Europea i trenquem amb l’euro.

³⁹¹ Letra lodia guk erantsia.

4. Els serveis públics, ni tocar-los. Economia social, sostenible, que aturi el TTIP, revertexi les privatitzacions, ga- ranteixi salaris i pensions, i recuperi la propietat, la pro- visió i la gestió 100% pública i democràtica dels sectors estratègics de l'economia. **Prou privatitzacions**, favors i clientelismes. Prioritzem la inversió en **drets socials**.

5. República Catalana decididament igualitària i feminista. Amb **plens drets** per a les persones immigrants, **feminis-ta**, amb l'avortament lliure i gratuït, que aturi la violència contra les dones, reconegui el treball de cures i apliqui polítiques feministes i d'alliberament LGTBI.

6. Terra, aigua i energia, patrimoni del poble. Ecologisme actiu. Els **recursos** imprescindibles han d'estar **al servei de les persones**, gestionats de forma sostenible i no en mans de l'especulació.

7. Alimentació sana per a tothom. Agricultura ecològica i pagesa, sense transgènics, ni productes químics de sín- tesi. Volem un sector primari al servei de la gent. Supe- rem la Política Agrària Comunitària i **frenem la globalit-zació alimentària**.

8. Repartim els treballs i la riquesa. 2 milions de **pobres**, 1 milió d'**aturats**, 200 mil desnonaments. I qui més té, menys impostos paga. Capgirem-ho!

9. Lliures de corrupció: radicalitat democràtica. Llums i ta- quígrafs. La corrupció no és del sistema, ha estat el siste- ma. Cal reconeixement, reparació i garanties de cap més repetició.” (Ibídem, 5-6)

Adierazi dugun moduan, aurreko eragileak *bezala demos-state building ardatzean kokatu arren, eduki antikapitalista argia duen proposamena da CUP-ek egindakoa*. Euren ikuspegitik, kapitalismoa eta patriarkatuaren aurkako borrokan aurrera egiteko Espainia eta Europar Batasunarekin apurtzea galdatzea beharrezkoa da.


Hori kontuan izanik zer elkartzen ditu CUP, Junts Pel Sí (ERC-PdeCat) eta beste eragile politikoak? Aurrerago ikusiko dugun moduan, era ekibalentzian artikulaturiko herri berri baten parte (gu) izango dira. Ikus dezagun lehenik eta behin herri horren artikulazioan erabilitako markoen eskema.

5.5.3- Markogintza independentista

Aurreko atalean eragileek adierazitakoa zuzenean jaso dugu maila deskriptiboa hobetsiz. Independentziaren aldeko argudioak demos/state building ardatzean kokatzen direla ikusi dugu “estatu propioa” “demokratizazio propioaren” sinonimo bihurtuz. Atal honetan argudio horiek markogintzan ohikoak diren diagnostikoa, pronostikoa motibazioa ardatzen inguruan antolatuko ditugu. Aurreko ataleko argudioez gain, momentu zehaztuetan mugimendu independentistaren ordezkariak egindako hainbat adierazpen ere jasoko ditugu.

Hurrengo irudian jasotzen dugun moduan harreman zuzena dago aipatu markoen eta hegemonia berri baten artikulazioaren artean. Zehatzago, Essexeko Eskolaren diskurtsoaren teoriaren artean eta marko analisiaren artean aldamenekotasun eta osagarritasun harreman bat dago (Errejón, 2011:263). Lehenengoak hegemonikoak izateko lehiatzen diren identitate politikoen eraikuntza azaltzen duen bitartean, bigarrenak honen sorreran erabiltzen diren mekanismo zehatzak azaltzen ditu (Ídem.) Osagarriak diren pausoak emango ditugun neurrian, lehenik eta behin markogintza independentista aztertuko dugu ostean hegemonia berria eta artikulazio populista txertatzeko.

IRUDIA 64 Markogintza Independentista



Iturria: egileak egina.

1- Diagnostikoa:

Esan bezala diagnostikoaren bidez arazo bat identifikatu eta egoera bidegabetzat jotzen da.

A- Arazoa: Ahalmen politikorik ez/Estatu egituren falta/Burujabetza demokratikorik ez.

Kataluniako independentismoaren diagnostikoa kontuan hartuta zein da arazoa? **Kataluniako herritarren borondatearen arabera gobernatzeko ahalmen politikoa falta zaiela da arazoaren funtsa.** Horren ondorioz, euren birsortze demokratikoan ezinbestekoak diren ahalmenak euren kontroletik at leudeke: Espainiar Estatuaren³⁹² eskuetan.

Funtsezko planteamendu horretatik abiatuta, eremuz eremu, gabeziek euren berezitasunak izango dituzte. Adibidez, ANC-ren “lurralde orekaren” inguruko irakurketan ikusi bezala (Què tenim), ahalmen politikorik ez izateak Espainiar ereduaren ezaugarriak nagusitzea dakar: Kyotoko protokoloa ez betetzeagatik isunak ordaintzea; higiezin eta espekulatzailen mesedetara dagoen eredu ekonomikoa nagusitzea; sektore produktiboa sustatu ordez dirulaguntzak era irrazionalean banatzea; fracking-a sustatzea; egunerokotasunean ezinbestekoa den tren zerbitzurik ez izatea etab. CUP-ek ere burujabetza demokratikorik ez izateak, “politikagintzan, energian, elikaduran, hirigintzan, osasungintzan edota irakaskuntzan” erabakitzeko ahalmenik ez izatea eragiten duela adierazten du (CUP-Crida Constituent, 2015:3).

Eremu oso ezberdinetan asetu gabeko eskariak ugaritzen dira: trenen funtzionamendu txarra, ikasteko beken gutxitzea, osasun arloko murrizketak... Gainera, krisi ekonomiko eta sozial larri baten testuinguruan gabezia hauek handitu besterik ez dira egiten. Independentismoaren jardura estrategikoaren ondorioz, ANC-ren sektorialen kasua paradigmatikoa da, eremu horietan Espainiar Estatuarekiko “dependentziak” sortzen dituen gabeziak salatzen dituzte³⁹³. **Ez ditugu sakonki aztertuko baina diskurtsoaren logika kasu guztietan berdina da: ahalmen politikoa ez izatearen ondorioz Espainiar erabakien “menpe” bizitzea.**

³⁹² CUP-en kasuan Europar Batasunean ere bai.

³⁹³ Arestian aipatu bezala “Com a lobbies de pressió en els seus àmbits naturals, denunciant les mancances a que ens trobem sotmesos pel fet de no tenir un estat amb plenes facultats de decisió i gestió i proposant alternatives de bon funcionament dins un nou marc de relacions que tots anem visualitzant: el de la Catalunya sobirana”

B- Bidegabekeria: Espainiar Estatuak ez du katalanen autogobernu borondatea onartzen/ inbertsio falta/ birzentralizazioen bidez eskumenak murrizten ditu/ katalanen hitza errespetatzeko galdeketa ez du onartzen/ hautestontziak jartzeagatik herritarrak epaitzen ditu.

Arazoa gobernatzeko ahalmen politikoa ez izatea baldin bada, bidegabekeriak, horren ondorioz sortzen diren hamaika egoera lirateke. Honen adibide paradigmaticoa Estatut-aren aurkako epaia da. Zerga eskumen osorik ez izateak sortzen duen defizit fiskalak ere zentraltasun handia izan du azken urteetan. “Espoli Fiscal” moduan ezagutu denaren arabera, Kataluniak ekoiztutako aberastasunaren ehuneko handi bat ez da Kataluniara itzultzen³⁹⁴ eta horren ondorioz hainbat zerbitzu sozial finantzaziorik gabe geratzen dira. Honen baitan, Junts Pel Síren dokumentuetan ikusi dugun moduan, osasun arloan ematen diren murrizketak, Kataluniako ikasleen kopurua %17koa izatea eta beken %8a bakarrik jasotzea edota azpiegiturretan bizi duten inbertsio gabezia lirateke adibide batzuk.

Azpiegiturei dagokienez egindako kritikak ugariak izan diren arren, trenbideen kasua izan da azken hamarkadan esanguratsuena. 2007an Plataforma Pel Dret a Decidirrek "Som una nació i diem prou! Tenim el dret a decidir sobre les nostres infraestructures" manifestazio jendetsua antolatu zuenetik, erabakitze eskubidearekin eta independentziarekin lerrokatutako markoa izan da independentismoaren eragin eremuak hedatuz³⁹⁵ (Snow et.al, 1986:472-473; (Vilaregut, 2012:264-265). Junts Pel Sí-ren kartelean ikusi moduan, Espainiak “hegazkinik gabeko aireportuak edo bidaiaririk gabeko AVE-ak” eraikitzen dituen bitartean Katalunian Rodalies³⁹⁶ bezalako tren zerbitzuek finantziazio falta handia dutela salatzen dute.

Horretaz gain, arestian ikusi bezala, autonomiaren kudeaketan deszentralizazio eta birzentralizazioaren arteko talka etengabea izan da. Birzentralizazio prozesuen nagusitasunak, honen aurkako erantzun ugari sortu ditu, horien artean “La deslealtad del Estado respecto a Catalunya” txostena³⁹⁷. Honen baitan hiru alor ezberdintzen dituzte: 1- hizkuntza, hezkuntza, kultura eta balio demokratikoei dagokiona; 2- alde biko erlazioen etena, eskumenen transferentzia falta, Konstituzio Auzitegiaren epaien ez betetzea eta Generalitatearen departamendu ezberdinek gastu gehiago jasateak dakartzan ondorioak

³⁹⁴ Kataluniako BPG-aren %8 koa (16.000 milioi euro) dela kalkulatu dute (Informe, 5.orr). Begiratu aurreko atalean honi buruz adierazitakoa.

³⁹⁵ Snowk gidatutako markogintza eskolaren “frame extension” baten aurrean geundeke (Snow et.al, 1986:472-473). Gogoratu, Essexeko Eskolaren kasua aztertzean mugimenduen desplazamendu metonomikoen duten garrantzia azpimarratu dugula ere bai.

³⁹⁶ Renfek herriak konektatzeko kudeatutako tren zerbitzua. Espainiar estatu mailan “Cercanías” moduan ezaguna da.

³⁹⁷ Hurrengo loturan eskuragarri: http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/AppJava/docrel/acord-govern/contingut/download/9621.htm?mode=static (Azken bisita: 2017/09/26).

jasaten dituen; 3- azkenik Kataluniarekin sorturiko zorrak leudeke, “defizit fiskala” izanik garrantzitsuena. Eredu guzti horietan Espainiar Estatuaren jarreraren izaera bidegabea salatzen dute.

Hala ere, 2009. urtean herri galdeketak hasi zirenetik, Kataluniako independentziari buruzko erreferenduma izan da eztabaida politikoa artikulatu duen gai nagusietako bat. Erabakitze eskubidearen hedatzearen ondorioz, tradizionalki independentisten eskaria zena hegemoniko bihurtu da. Zentzu horretan, CEO-ren 2017ko 2. olatuko barometroaren arabera³⁹⁸, herritarren %71.4³⁹⁹ erreferenduma egitearen aldekoa da (CEO, 2017:3). Hori dela eta, bere ukapena Espainiar Estatu kanpo eratzailer moduan finkatzea eta demokraziaren aurkako bidegabekeria moduan artikulatzea ahalbidetu du. Honen inguruan pizten den polarizazioak independentziaren aldeko zein kontrako posizio garbiak indartu eta erdibidean kokatzen direnak ahultzen ditu. 2014ko azaroaren 9-a eta 2017ko urriaren 1-a dira inflexio puntu garrantzitsuenak. Honen inguruan sortu diren talken ondorioz, zenbait autoritate eta ordezkari publikoren aurkako atxilotetak eta epaiketak egon dira bidegabekeria markoa areagotuz. Adierazgarriak dira zentzu horretan Òmniumeko presidentea den Jordi Cruixarten adierazpenak Kataluniako Parlamentuko kideen epaiketen aurrean:

"Un estat incapaç de jutjar el franquisme es veu valent per portar als tribunals els nostres representants. Ni un pas enrere" (Cruixart, 2017)⁴⁰⁰

1- Pronostikoa:

Pronostikoaren bidez, indentifikatutako arazoari irtenbidea bilatzen zaio. Arazoa konpontzeko aurrera eraman behar diren taktikak ezartzeaz gain prozesu horren protagonistak ere zehaztuko dira. Kataluniako independentismoaren kasuan, posizio ideologikoen arabera pronostikoak ezberdinak izan arren komunean izango dutena hurrengoa da: **egungo arazoei aurre egiteko Estatu propioa izatearen beharra.**

A- Dimentsio irabazlea: Estatu propioa, demokratizazio prozesu katalana garatzeko ezinbestekoa den tresna da.

Ikusi dugun moduan, eremuz eremu Estatu propioaren aldeko argudioak garatzen dituzte. Estatu egituren bidez gaur egun ez dituzten ahalmen politikoak eskuratu nahi dituzte demos katalana bere gobernu sozioekonomikoan barneratzeko xedearekin. Hortaz, Estatu izatea ongizate soziala hobetzearen sinonimo bihurtzen da.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ Arestian erabilitako uztaileko barometroa.

³⁹⁹ %48-ak Edozein kasutan babestuko luke eta %23.4-k soilik Espainiar Gobernuak baimentzekotan.

⁴⁰⁰ <https://www.omnium.cat/noticia/omnium-torna-al-tsjc-fer-costat-la-mesa-del-parlament>

⁴⁰¹ Eragile independentisten diskurtsoa aurreko atalean ikusi dugu beraz ez dugu esandakoa errepikatuko. Hala ere, hori osatzeko helburuarekin ANC-k lan arloan Modest Guinjoanen adierazpenak baliatuz egiten

Estatu independentea bai/ez⁴⁰² oinarri duen erreferenduma burutzea da hori lortzeko “hipotesi estrategikoa” (Bensaid, 2013). Azken urteetan hegemoniko bihurtu den erabakitze eskubidea, “demosa” oinarri duen autodeterminazioaren gaurkotze moduan⁴⁰³ ulertu behar da (López, 2015; Nikolas, Zubiaga, Oiarbide, Urrutia, 2016). Honek, Espainian hegemonikoa den estatu proiektuarekin talka zuzena eragiten du polarizazioa areagotuz eta “jarrera argiak⁴⁰⁴” galdatzen dituen eremu politikoaren sinplifikazioa sustatuz. Diskurtsiboki, erabakitze eskubidearen aurka egotea demokraziaren aurka lerrokatzea eragiten du mugaren ezarpena erraztuz.

B- Mugaren ezarpena. espainiar elite zentralistak/ Kataluniako herri demokratikoa.

Kataluniako gobernu demokratikoa oztokatzen duten elite zentralisten (buruzagi politikoak, Konstituzio Auzitegia, mass media etab.) eta herri Katalanaren artean muga politiko bat eraikitzen dute independentista katalanek. Espainiar Estatu kanpo eratazaila moduan erabilita “gu” berri bat artikulatzen dute. Honek garrantzia berezia izango du ostean aztertuko dugun artikulazio populista ulertzeko.

Ezarrirako muga eremuz eremu eta testuinguru politikoaren arabera finkoagoa edo lausoagoa izan daiteke. Azken hamarkadetako dinamika politikoaz gain, 2011. urtetik aurrera Mariano Rajoy buru duen PP-ren gobernuak izandako jarrerak, kanpo eratazaila hori era argiago batean finkatzea erraztu du. Bestalde, jada adierazi dugun moduan polarizazio testuinguruetan haustura dikotomiko bat sortzen da eragile politikoak mugaren alde batean edo bestean kokatzera behartuz. Azken urteetan independentzia bai/ez haustura Kataluniako eremu politikoa ordenatzeko funtsezkoa izan bada ere, erabakitze eskubidea bai/ez izan da eztabaida politikoan gatazkatsuena. Katalunian baiezkota hegemonikoa den bitartean, Espainiar Estatu proiektu hegemonikoarekin talka

duen pronostikoaren adibidea jasotzen dugu jarraian: “Amb Estat propi, com a mínim tres coses ens anirien a favor: 1) crear **les estructures d’Estat** que farien falta comporta generar segons algunes estimacions **50.000 nous llocs de treball**; 2) l’Estat català disposaria de **competències plenes en matèria laboral**, cosa que ara no té i va a remolc de l’espanyol, que no és precisament un model a seguir; 3) l’Estat català podria **fixar un salari mínim** en línia amb el que tenen els països de nivell de desenvolupament semblant, i començar a deixar de competir a base de sous de misèria, especialment entre els més joves. (Guinjoan, 2017)

<https://assemblea.cat/?q=node/12174>

⁴⁰² **2017ko urriaren 1-eko galdera adibidez hurrengoa da: "Nahi al duzu Katalunia estatu independente izatea errepublika gisa?"**

⁴⁰³ Autoreen aburuz “Autodeterminazio Eskubidearen 2.0 bertsioa” litzateke.

⁴⁰⁴ Independentziaren alde/aurka, erabakitze eskubidearen alde/aurka adibidez. Tarteko aukerak proposatzen dituzten “hirugarren bideak” ahultzen dira.

zuzena eragiten du gatazka sustatuz eta mugaren ezarpenean espainiar elite zentralistak/
Kataluniako herri demokratikoa haustura erraztuz.

C- Izendapena: Erabaki nahi duen “herri katalana”.

Izendapenaren bidez, ez da alde zuretik existitzen den errealitate bat deskribatzen. Artikulazio populistan ikusiko dugun moduan, prozesu honi esker aldi berean identitate berri bat eraikitzen da. Hau da, bere etorkizuna era askean erabaki nahi duen herri katalana izendatzen da honen bidez aldi berean “identitate independentista” berri bat eraikiz. Honen baitan bere burua ordezkaturik ikusten duten sektore sozial anitzak artikulatzen dira: langileak, klase ertainak, burgesia txikia, feministak, sindikalistak, CUP-eko, ERC-ko zein PdeCat-eko jarraitzaileak,⁴⁰⁵ PSC-ko kide ohiak, urteetan Espainiar federalismoa defendatu dutenak etab.

Izendapen prozesu horretan, adierazle hutsek garrantzia berezia hartzen dute. Independentistek, “erabakitzeko eskubidea” eta “demokraziarekin” batera, “Katalunia”, “herri katalana”, “Estatu propioa” edota “Errepublikak Katalana” bezalako adierazleak erabiltzen dituzte hegemonikoa izan nahi duen osotasun bat artikulatzeko. Herritar guztiei zuzendu arren, independentziaren alde dagoen “herri katalanak” ez du nazio katalana bere osotasunean ordezkatzeko. Aurretiaz⁴⁰⁶ adierazi bezala, operazio hegemonikoaren gako horretan datza: osotasuna ordezkatu nahi duen parteak, bere burua osotasun horren ordezkari moduan aurkezten du (Laclau, 1998: 83). Eraikitzen den identitate horren bidez, *dimentsio irabazlea* (estatu propioa lortzea) osotasuna ordezkatu nahi duen partikularra litzateke (Apaolaza, 2012; 2015; Errejón, 2011:446). Hegemonikoa izan nahi duen *plebs-a* (partea) bere burua *populus* (osotasun) zilegi moduan identifikatzen hasiko da eskariak betetzen ez dituen “botere zentralista” kanpo eratzailerik gisa erabiliz⁴⁰⁷ (Laclau, 2005:113).

2- Motibazioa:

Honen bidez, mobilizazioaren arrakastarako sinboloak, pizgarriak eta espektatibak eskaintzen dira. Iñigo Errejonek bere doktorego tesian motibazio markoaren baitan 3 dimentsio ezberdintzen ditu: 1) Muga politikoaren moralizazioa; 2) iraganaren interpretazio mitikoa eta 3) konponbide baten proposamena (2011, 320-325). Pròces

⁴⁰⁵ Naiz eta hainbat arlotan muturreko jarrera izan.

⁴⁰⁶ Ikus “Essexeko Eskolaren diskurtsoaren teoria” atala.

⁴⁰⁷ Aurretiaz adierazi dugun moduan, komunitatearen osotasuna kolokan jartzen duten neurrian ez dira komunitatearen parte zilegia. Lekuan leku, boteredunak, oligarkak, “kasta”, edo “Stablishment” britainiar eta espainola komunitatearen osotasunaren faltaren erantzule bihurtu daitezke eta hortaz ez dira komunitatearen parte zilegia.

moduan definitu dugun mobilizazio zikloan amaigabeak dira motibazio markoaren adibideak beraz hurrengo adierazpenetan adibide batzuk baino ez ditugu jasoko⁴⁰⁸.

Muga politikoaren ezarpena eta haustura dikotomiko argia burutzen du Carme Forcadellek 2013ko Diadan egindako adierazpenetan⁴⁰⁹:

"Només tenim **dues opcions: sotmetre'ns a la centralització de l'estat espanyol i desaparèixer com a poble o la independència**. Avui el poble de Catalunya ha sortit al carrer i ens ha marcat el camí, **l'únic digne amb garanties de futur: tenir un estat propi**". (Forcadell, 2013).

Lerrokatze historikoei dagokienez, Ondorengotza Gerran 1714ko irailaren 11ko Bartzelonaren eroraldiari loturikoak dira aipagarrienak. Estatu propioaren aldeko mobilizazio jendetsuenak irailaren 11koak izan dira (2012koa izanik lehen mobilizazio erraldoia) eta data horri loturiko lerrokatzeak amaigabeak dira. Argigarriak dira berriz ere Carme Forcadellek egindako adierazpenak.

"Volem que el 2014, **el tricentenari de la nostra derrota, es converteixi en el primer any de la nostra llibertat**". (Forcadell, 2013)

"El 9-N omplirem les urnes. **300 anys després de la caiguda de Barcelona, hem recuperat la ciutat i el país**". (Forcadell, 2014)

ANC-k beste alor batzuetan mugimendu askotan ohikoa den *iraganaren interpretazio mitikoa* (Errejón, 2011:324) ere burutzen du:

"La República catalana assegurarem el benestar perquè **som un poble compromès històricament amb la justícia social**. [...] Ho farem perquè els catalans **tenim una llarga tradició de moviments sindicals i associatius** en tots aquests àmbits i perquè serem un estat econòmicament més que viable"
(Assemblea.cat, 2015b)

Estatu propioa da *proposatzen den konponbidea* baina horren lorpena zuzenean erreferenduma ospatzearekin loturik dago. Kontsulta baten antolaketa izan da azken urteetan motibazio markoaren eta antagonismo herritarraren artikulazioaren ardatz nagusia. Carme Forcadellek 2014ko Diadan egindako adierazpenak eta urriaren 1-aren aurretiko asteetan esandakoak jasotzen ditugu:

⁴⁰⁸ Partsimonia informatiboagatik, ANC-k edo bere ordezkariak egindako adierazpenak bakarrik jasoko ditugu estatu propioaren aldeko mugimenduaren aniztasuna gehien ordezkatzeko duen mugimendua delako.

⁴⁰⁹ Momentu horretan ANC-ko bozeramailea zen.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

“La independència ja no es proclama desde el balcón, **es fa desde les urnes, som poble, som sobirans, junts avui aquí convoquen la consulta.** Parlament, Govern de Catalunya, President, **posi les urnes.** (Forcadell, 2014).

“La millor manera de demostrar que no tenim por, és anar a votar el dia 1 d’octubre. Us demano que el dia 1 d’octubre aneu a votar. Voteu sí o voteu no, però voteu amb dignitat, voteu amb llibertat i voteu per la democràcia”.

“Acabo amb tres paraules: **Votarem, votarem i votarem!**” (Forcadell, 2017).

Motibazioa alor eta momentu ezberdinetan sustatu arren, garrantzia berezia du momentu politiko liskartsuenetan eta honi loturiko mobilizazioaren maila gorenean. Testuinguru hauetan islatzen da era argi batean aurretiaz jaulkitako errealitate egonkorren dislokazioa eta politikotasunaren agerpena (Laclau, 1990:55-56; Zubiaga, 2014:1). “Gertaera” hauen ondorioz, “Kronos-ari” loturiko denbora huts eta homogeenarekin bukatu eta krisiak eta hausturak oinarri dituen “Kairos-a” nagusitzen da (Bensaid, 2013:54). Denbora uniformearen ordezkari zehatzak eskaintzen dituen denbora estrategikoa agertzen da (Ídem). Egoera horiek dira jarraian aztertuko dugun hegemonia berri baten eraikuntzarako eta artikulazio populistarako momentu pribilegiatuak.

5.5.4- Hegemonia eta artikulazio populista

Aurretiaz adierazi dugun moduan, populismoa politikoa eraikitzeko era bat da eta ez zedarritu daitekeen ideologia zehatz bat (Laclau, 2005:11). Posfordismoaren baitan jazo diren egiturazko aldaketek logika politiko honen indartzea eragin badute, azken hamarkadan pairatu dugun kapitalismoaren krisiak honen loraldia are gehiago areagotu du. Gure aburuz **estatu propioa oinarri duen hegemoniaren eraikuntzak ere “herriaren artikulazioa” galdatuko du** (Aoiz, Apaolaza, Azkune, Olariaga, Urdangarin, Zubiaga, 2017).

Hasteko, artikulazio populistan hurrengo dimentsioak beharrezkoak lirateke (Laclau, 2005: 110):

- Jendartearen *banaketa dikotomikoa* bi eremutan.
- Dikotomia horrek eremu sozialaren *banaketa antagonikoa* suposatuta behar du.
- Eremu herritarrak, bere eraikuntzarako baldintza moduan, gizarte *eskari anitzen ekibalentzien bidez eraikitako identitate globala sortu* behar du. Honek lotura ekibalentzialen batuketa baino gehiago suposatuko du.

Horretarako arestian aipatu antagonismoa eta bere izaera eratzailera kontuan hartu behar ditugu. Antagonismoa eta muga politikoaren eraikuntza azaltzeko dimentsio ezberdinak izango ditugu kontuan⁴¹⁰:

4. Antagonismo eratzailera muga erradikal bat ezarriko du baina honek *hautsitako espazio baten beharra* izango du (Ibídem:112). Ordena sozialean ematen den apurketa hori bete gabeko eskarien ondorio bat izango da (Ibídem:113).
5. *Eskaera demokratikoetatik herri eskaeretara* jauzia emateko⁴¹¹ jendartearen *marko sinbolikoetan aldaketa bat* ematea ere beharrezkoa da (Ídem). Herri eskaerek alde aurretik existitzen den marko horrekiko geroz eta banatuago egoteaz gain, arrakastatsuak izan daitezten marko sinboliko berri bat eraiki beharko dute. Prozesu horretan “etsai” baten eraikuntza politikoa ere beharrezkoa da (Ibídem:114).
6. Azkenik, euren artikulazioaren bidez “herritarrak” bihurtu diren eskarien baitan *ezberdintasunaren eta ekibalentziaren artean ematen den tentsioa* hartu behar dugu kontuan. Alde batetik, artikulazio herritarrak eskaera indibidualei inskripzio azalera bat eskaintzen die eta horren ondorioz momentu zehatz bateko eskaera bat

⁴¹⁰ Hauek “Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren Teoria” atalean sakonago garatu ditugu.

⁴¹¹ Logika diferentzial/indibidualean planteatzen diren eskaera izatetik logika ekibalentzial/populistan planteatzera ematen den jauzia litzateke.

izatetik egonkortasun bat duen “posizio gerra” batean kokatzera igarotzen dira⁴¹² (Laclau, 2005:117). Bestetik, “herriak” (kate ekibalentzialak) bere mugimenduzko⁴¹³ lege estrategiko propioak ditu eta zenbait eskaera partikularretan dauden eduki batzuk sakrifikatu ditzake.⁴¹⁴

Katalunian aurreko baldintza guztiak identifika ditzakegu. Estatu propioa bai/ez *banaketa dikotomiko eta antagonikoarekin* batera erabakitze eskubidea eta erreferendumaren ukapenaren ondorioz erreferenduma bai/ez haustura nagusitu da. Prozesu horretan, Espainiar Gobernu/Estatu kanpo eratzaille gisa egonkortu da. Urteetan nagusi izan den *autonomismoaren ordena sozialaren hausturarekin* batera *marko sinbolikoen aldaketa bat* egon da hegemonikoa zen aukera autonomiko/federalaren itxaropena apalduz eta independentzia aukera egingarri moduan aurkeztuz (Requejo, 2017:30)

Bestalde, azken urteetan krisi sakon baten testuinguruan eta birzentralizazio prozesuaren areagotze prozesuaren ondorioz *ase gabeko eskarien metaketa* ugaritu baino ez da egin⁴¹⁵. Krisiaren kudeaketa neoliberal a oinarri zuten PSOE, PP eta CIU-ren austeritate politikak ase gabeko eskariak ugaritzea eragin zuten. Hala ere, Generalitat-aren eskumen faltak eta birzentralizazio prozesuak, eskarien arteko lotura ekibalentziala ahalbidetzez gain, estatu zentrala kanpo eratzaille gisa irudikatzea erraztu dute. Testuinguru horretan, eragile independentisten jardura estrategikoaren ondorioz, “**estatu propioa izatea**” **beste eskaera guztiak ordezkatzeko gaitasuna** izan dezake “artikulazio populista independentista” berri bat ahalbidetuz.

2006tik 2012ra doan lehen fase batean erabakitze eskubidearen aldeko mobilizazio eta aldarrikapenak honen aldeko hegemonia berri bat artikulatu zuten (Vilaregut, 2012a). Bestetik, 2012ko irailaren 11tik aurrera⁴¹⁶, independentzia oinarri duen identitate politiko berri baten artikulazioa egon da. Nola burutu da?

Lehenik eta behin “izendapenak” duen rol eratzaillea azpimarratu behar da. Hau da, ez da alde aurretik existitzen den errealitate bat deskribatzen, izendapenaren bidez identitate politiko berri bat eratzten da. Hori gerta dadin, izenak bete gabeko eskariekiko erakarpen gaitasun bat izan beharko du. Hori lortze aldera, egokia den *adierazle huts* batek

⁴¹² Honen bidez, epe motzean desagertzeko arriskua zuen eskaera batek kate baten baitan egonkortasuna lortzen du.

⁴¹³ Gramscik garaturiko “posizio gerra” eta “mugimendu gerra” aplikatzen ditu Laclauk. Gramsciren definizioa ikusteko beste batzuen artean Sacristanek egindako bilduma egokia da (2010:292).

⁴¹⁴ Hau are nabariagoa da hurrengo kontuan hartuz: eskari bakoitzak bata bestearekiko duen lotura kate ekibalentziaren bidez mantentzen du. Hau eraikuntza diskurtsibo kontingente bat da eta ez alde aurretik ezarritako batasun baten ondorioa beraz edozein momentutan aldatu liteke.

⁴¹⁵ Guztien artean sinbolikoena urteetan nagusitu den “hirugarren bidea” ordezkatzeko Estatuaren porrota den arren, egunerokotasunari loturiko “gai sozialek” pizten duten sumina ere aintzat hartu behar da.

⁴¹⁶ 2012ko irailaren 11, alde aurretik hasitako prozesuaren inflexio puntu sinbolikoa da.

ordezkatuko du. Prozesu horretan lau elementu⁴¹⁷ izan beharko ditugu kontuan (Laclau, 2005:135-39):

- **Adierazle hutsa:** ez du alde aurretik guztiz definiturik dagoen edukirik. Lehia politiko diskurtsiboaren bitartez eduki zehatz batek behin behinekoz betetzeko ahalmena izango du. *Errepublika Katalana, Estatu Propioa, Katalunia edo Demokrazia* identitate politiko independentistaren artikulazioan etengabe erabili diren adierazle hutsak dira.
- **Adierazle flotagarriak:** adierazle hauek kate ekibalentzian guztiz finkatzea ezinezkoa da eta operazio hegemonikoaren gaitasunaren arabera eremu batera edo bestera mugituko dira. Adibidez, independentziaren aldekoek “erabakitze eskubidea” euren artikulazioan erabili duten neurri berean, Catalunya En Comú-k eta Podemosek ordezkatzeko duten espazio politikoak “Espainian aldaketa soziala” egikaritzeko euren ekibalentzia kate alternatiboan artikulatzen saiatu dira. Adierazle flotagarriak jendartearen dauden eskari anitzek osatzen duten neurrian amaigabeak dira eta horren ondorioz ezinezkoa da guztiak jasotzea. Aurretiaz landu dugun dokumentazioa kontuan hartuta adibide batzuk emango ditugu: *erabakitze eskubidea, zerbitzu publikoen defentsa, Rodalies eta beste garraio azpiegituren hobekuntza, feminismoa, lanaren banaketa, lurralde antolaketa egokia* etab.
- **Point de capiton/puntu nodala:** Adierazle flotagarriak ekibalentzia katean finkatu eta lotu egiten ditu. *Erabakitze eskubidea eta Errepublika Katalanaren* aldarrikapena izan dira azken urteetan beste eskaerak norabide berean finkatu eta lotu dituztenak.
- **Partikularra eta unibertsalaren arteko artikulazioa:** parte batek osotasuna ordezkatzeko duen gaitasunari egiten dio erreferentzia. Arestian aipatu moduan independentziaren aldekoek “El poble de Catalunya”⁴¹⁸ esaten dutenean herri osoa ordezkatzeko ez duten arren, ordezkatzeko balute moduan jokatzen dute.

Hurrengo irudietan orain arte aipaturikoa era grafikoan jasoko dugu. Errepublika Katalana edo estatu propioa lortzea jendartearen egon daitezkeen eskaeretatik bakarra baino ez da. Kontrara jendartearen ase gabeko eskaera ugari daude. Procès moduan ezagutzen den liskarraldian, ase gabeko eskaera horiek (Rodaliesen hobekuntza, zerbitzu publikoen defentsa, lurralde oreka etab.) euren izatearen parte bat galdu dute baina besteekin era ekibalentzian harremanetan jarri dira “Errepublika Katalanaren” alde egoteak elkartu

⁴¹⁷ Zio deskriptiboengatik analitikoki banatu arren praktikan banaketa zurrinak egitea zaila da. Erabakitze eskubidea kate ekibalentzian finkatzen duen puntu nodala izateaz gain, adierazle flotagarri eta adierazle huts ere izan daiteke adibidez.

⁴¹⁸ Aurretiaz jaso ditugun Carme Forcadellen adierazpenak berreskurtatzen ditugu: “Avui el poble de Catalunya ha sortit al carrer i ens ha marcat el camí, l'únic digne amb garanties de futur: tenir un estat propi” (2013).


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

dituelako. Honen adibide paradigmatico moduan arestian jaso dugun “Via Lliure a la República Catalanaren” irudia eta Ernesto Laclauaren artikulazio populistaren eredua jasotzen ditugu.

IRUDIA 65 Via Lliure a la república: artikulazio populista



Iturria: ANC, 2015.



Iturria: egileak egin Laclau, 2005: 164-n oinarritua.


Aurkeztutako eredu oso konplexua den errealitate bat deskribatzeko sinpleegia izan daitekeen arren, hegemonia independentista berriaren zutabeak jasotzen dituela deritzogu. Aurretiaz plazaratu galdera berreskuratuz: **zer elkartzen ditu CUP, Junts Pel Sí (ERC-PdeCat) eta beste eragile politikoak?** Estatu propioa lortzea komunean izateaz gain, polarizazioak, antagonismoak eta kanpo eratzaile komuna izateak proiektu politiko ezberdinak elkartzea errazten du. Horrekin batera prozesu hauetan ohikoa den anbiguotasun mailaren ondorioz, PdeCaten “Mediterraneoko Danimarka”, ERC-ren “Errepublikan soziala” eta CUP-en “independentzia dena aldatzeko” proposamenen artean “konbergentzia diskurtsibo” bat ematen da⁴¹⁹ (Vasilachis de Gialdino, 2007:162).

Essexeko Eskolaren printzipio teorikoak aztertzean ikusi dugun moduan, “desplazamendu” bat egongo da aldarrikapen baten esanahia beste batera transmititzen denean. Desplazamendua egoteko beharrezkoa izango da aldarrikapenaren artean “aldamenekotasun⁴²⁰” bat sortzea. “Kondentsazioa” aldiz esanahi ezberdinak aldarrikapen batean bat egiten dutenean egongo da. Desplazamendua, metonimiarekin lotzen du Laclauk. Kasu honetan burutu den mugimendua oraindik ere begi bistakoa izango litzateke (Laclau, 2003:2). Kondentsazioa bestalde, metaforarekin erlazionatzen du eta hemen aldiz ikusgaitasun hori galtzeko joera legoke. Ideia abstraktu horiek kasu zehatzean aplikatuz, aktore independentistek euren jardura estrategikoaren bidez, banaturik dauden borroka ezberdinen arteko aldamenekotasuna sustazen dutela uste dugu. Horren ondorioz, azken urteetan, jendarteko sektore zabalentzat **Kataluniako Errepublika demokratizazioan sakontzearen metafora bihurtu dela esan dezakegu.**

⁴¹⁹ Euren artean ezberdintasunak eta lehia mantendu arren (Mas-en inbestiduraren ingurukoak argienak izanik) kate ekibalentzialaren baitan elkarrekin independentziaren alde lerrotzeko dira. Terminologia klasikoa berreskuratuz, Mao-k liburu gorrian aipatu “herriaren barneko kontraesanen” adibide bat litzateke.

⁴²⁰ Contigüidad.

IRUDIA 66 Errepublika demokratiaren metafora



Iturria: egileak egina.


Hala ere, ezin da hegemonia independentista berria ulertu erabakitze eskubidearen aldeko hegemonia kontuan hartu gabe. PSC-k⁴²¹, Ciudadansek eta PP-k galdeketa egitearen aurkako jarrera izan duten bitartean, Catalunya en Comú, Catalunya Sí Que Es Pot eta Podemek ordezkaturako espazio politikoak erabakitze eskubidearen aldeko jarrera mantendu du. Honen bidez, independentziaren alde egon daitezkeen sektore batzuen lerrokatze alternatiboa lortu dute⁴²².

“Espainiar Errepublika Plurinazionalen” legokeen “Errepublika Katalana” litzateke espazio honen estatu proiektuaren ardatza (Catalunya en Comú, 2017:55). Erabakitze eskubidea puntu nodal hartuta, independentziaren alde guztiz finkaturik ez dauden sektore eta “eskaera flotagarriak” (demokrazian sakontzea, ustelkeriaren aurka jotzea, PP-ren gobernuen politikei aurre egitea etab.) Espainiar Errepublika Plurinazionalen oinarrituriko artikulazio hegemoniko berri batean finkatzeko gaitasuna izan dezakete. Honek Bartzelona eta bere inguruko herrietan (historikoki PSC-ren eragin eremukoak) arrakasta berezia izan du.

⁴²¹ PSC-k 2012ko hauteskunde autonomikoetako programan independentziari buruzko galdeketa adostu bat defendatu zuen arren ostean honen inguruko jarrera aldatu eta 2015eko hauteskundeetako programatik kendu zuen. Horretaz gain 2017ko Urriaren 1eko galdeketa aurkako jarrera izan zuten.

⁴²² 2015 eta 2016ko Espainiar Hauteskunde Orokorretan Podemosen Katalunian lorturiko emaitza onak honen adierazle bat izan daitezke.

IRUDIA 67 Kate ekibalentzial alternatiboa



Iturria: egileak egina.

Hala ere, polarizazioaren ondorioz eta 2016tik aurrera Espainiar Estatu mahaian Podemosek gidatutako aldaketa politikoaren ideia ahultzearekin batera, erdibideko operazio hau ahuldu egin da. Urriaren 1eko erreferendumak, independentzia deklarazioak eta ostean sortu den testuinguru politikoak, erdibideko hipotesi hau are gehiago ahuldu du.

Azkenik, polarizazio testuinguru batean eta PSC eta PP-ren higaduraren ondorioz, Ciudadansek Espainiar batasuna era irmo batean defendatzen duen proiektua artikulatzeaz gain, politika berriaren aldarrikapenarekin loturiko adierazleak (ustelkeriaren aurkako jarrera, aldetaren gobernu eta ab.) artikulatu ditu. Horren ondorioz, 2015eko irailaren 27ko hauteskunde plebiszitarioetan Espainiar batasunaren proiektua hegemonizatzea lortu zuen Parlament-eko bigarren indar bihurtuz eta 2017ko abenduaren 21eko hauteskundeetan lehen indarra izatea lortuz. Bere posizioa, Podemosen espazioaren ibilbidearen kontrako noranzkoa hartu duela esan dezakegu. Urriaren 1etik aurrera piztu den polarizazioak, Ciudadansen diskurtsoaren dimentsiorik irmoenak are gehiago indartu ditu.

Orain arte esandakoa Paola Lo Cascioren aipu honetan laburtzen dela uste dugu:

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

La reivindicació del **referèndum**, així com **d'un genèric «estat»** foren un calaix de sastre en el qual van cabre irritacions, frustracions i projectes ben diferents. En certa mesura, **els termes mateixos d'estat i independència esdevenien polisèmics**. D'accepció àmplia, **serien capaços d'aglutinar** no tant en un projecte, sinó més aviat en una imponent solidaritat espontània i en un gegantí mecanisme de vertebració, **capes socials amb interessos diferents** (2016:32).

6 Basque Country

1 Some introductory notes

If we are to define the Basque Country and its current nationalist claims, we consider it necessary to begin with a brief historical contextualization⁴²³. According to Zubiaga, although throughout the Middle Ages all the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula vied with each other to build states, the rivalry between Castile and Navarre was particularly fierce (2012b: 96). This rivalry was not merely dynastic, but had deeper roots; underlying it was a clash between two distinct ethnic groups or peoples. From the twelfth century onwards, the western Basque territories which had until then formed part of the kingdom of Navarre became dominions of the crown of Castile (*idem*). To gain the loyalty of the newly acquired territories and their inhabitants, the segmentary kingdom-state of Spain granted them an autonomous “status” although they remained subordinate to the state; the same was done with Navarre after the conquest of 1512 (*idem*). Since then, recognition of the “special status of the *fueros*” has turned into the most telling expression of the Spanish segmentary state, a state whose state-building never reached completion (*idem*).

In France, thanks to a slow but inexorable process of state surgery, schooling, the use of language, cultural practices, means of communication and, above all, the articulation of the territory became the *de facto* instruments that made it possible to crystallize the single ‘imagined community’ that emerged in post-Revolution France⁴²⁴ (Ahedo, 2017:254). Thus, whereas France was able to promote a process of nation and state building strong enough as to eliminate Basque state institutions and partially absorb the Basque nation, it did not happen the same with Spain.

In the XIXth century, the Carlist Wars failed to completely eliminate the particularities that derived from the segmentary situation. In that context, in line with other European cases, the modern Basque nationalism appeared. A combination of certain social preconditions and a political opportunity structure along with a successful national mobilization and nationalist discourse explains the emergence of first Basque nationalism (Máiz, 2008:148). More concretely, new nationalist actors emerged along the lines of national cleavage on the basis of the legal and political residue, called *fueros*, granted in

⁴²³ It merely has introductory purposes. For a deeper contextualization see for instance: Calvo, 2015.

⁴²⁴ We cannot forget the influence of the church or the impact of the two World Wars on building a strong “us” based in French nationhood.

lieu of lost and half-forgotten statehoods, giving birth to a rival process of nation-building centred around both the western and eastern ends of the Pyrenees (Zubiaga, 2012b:97).

Since then, although simplifying, we would say that two main nationalist actors have conditioned Basque politics. On the one hand, the Christian democratic Basque National Party (EAJ-PNV) founded in 1895 has been the hegemonic one. It has had a leading position in the Basque Autonomous Community and governed its territory since the devolution of powers in 1979 (with the exception of the period 2009-2012). When it comes to Navarre, despite being historically weaker, it has strengthened its position as a member of the coalition Geroa Bai that rules the Foral Community since 2015. In the northern Basque Country, its results are the weakest ones and far from its success south of the borders.

On the other hand, the socialist pro-independence movement has its origins in the creation of ETA in 1958 in the midst of Franco's dictatorship. Nonetheless, far from being a homogeneous political space limited to ETA's activity, it relates to a complex and multi-layered movement that has been traditionally known as "Patriotic Left"⁴²⁵ or "Basque National Liberation Movement" (BNLM). Its more known election platforms have been Herri Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok and currently Euskal Herria Bildu. The last, formed by Sortu, Eusko Alkartasuna, Alternatiba and Aralar⁴²⁶, has been the first coalition formed in the "post-ETA scenario". It is the second political force in the Basque Parliament and the third one in the Parliament of Navarre. Its counterpart in the northern Basque Country is the coalition Euskal Herria Bai which obtained the 16% of the votes in Cantonal Elections of 2015 and the 10% in the legislative elections of 2017.

2- Defining the Basque Country.

When we talk about the Basque Country, we refer to that imagined community (Anderson, 1993) formed by 7 Basque provinces: Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Lapurdi, Nafarroa, Behe Nafarroa and Zuberoa. They are divided into two states (Spain and France) and three administrative areas (The Basque Autonomous Community, The Chartered Community of Navarre and the Basque Agglomeration Community⁴²⁷). Thus, rather than a unique and homogeneous imagined community (if something like that has ever existed somewhere), we refer to a multi-dimensional space in which the struggle to define and redefine the meaning of that very space, which is the hegemonic nation/demos, who is part of it or who should decide its future has undergone a combined and uneven development. In that regard, according to Goikoetxea:

⁴²⁵ Ezker Abertzalea in Basque or Izquierda Abertzale in Spanish.

⁴²⁶ It ceased to exist on 2 December 2017.

⁴²⁷ In Basque: Euskal Hirigune Elkargoa. In French: Communauté d'agglomération du Pays Basque.

“Thus, Basque territories are not one to one to any state-territory, they are multi-dimensional assemblages which produce the geography of the Basque nation, overlapping in the south with the Spanish nation and in the north the French nation. Basque territories also contain other smaller nations (Colombian, Moroccan, etc.) which also produce their own assemblages connected with their national state. All these diverse, and in certain dimensions, divergent territorialities are in turn linked to the European assemblages of rights, authorities and capacities made of regional, local, national, state and global geographies.” (2017:100).

As a result, as we can see in the next survey, if we ask ‘how the concept of Euskal Herria is understood⁴²⁸’ in each of those administrative areas we find uneven results. In the horizontal axis we see the place where the question was made and in the vertical one the answer:

TAULA 24 *The meaning of Euskal Herria*

	BAC	FCN	Northern BC	7 territories
BAC	41.2	57.90	0.70	40.90
BAC + FCN	5.2	6.50	0.00	5.00
Northern BC	0.10	0.70	35.50	3.40
7 territories	48.80	30.90	59.80	46.20

(Source: Amurrio et al., 2015:21)

Our research question asks about the relation between the transformation of the state in a post-fordist era (SWPR) and sovereignty demands in historic nations. We believe that the process of state transformation has not only changed the content of these demands but also their spatial imaginary (Jessop, 2015b:138-139; Lefebvre, 2013). As long as state institutions claim to produce a space wherein something is accomplished (the society), they change popular geographical assumptions about politics, political community, and political struggles (ídem). However, this process is also disrupted through resistance and through conflicting attempts to challenge borders (ídem.).

It is in this very conflict in which we situate the claims made by the ‘subaltern states’ against ‘matrix states’, but also the conflict that arise between the sovereignty demands for the whole historic nation (7 Basque Territories) and the demands for current institutional units (The Basque Autonomous Community, the Foral Community of Navarre and the Northern Basque Country). In this case, ***we are going to limit the focus***

⁴²⁸ When we refer to the Basque Country, what exactly does it mean to you?


of our research to the Basque Autonomous Community. We will add some brief reflections on Navarre and Northern Basque Country at the end.

a) The Basque subaltern state.

As already said, despite the limited power provided by autonomies it is crucial to understand their influence in current nationalists demands. Thus, in the Basque Country and Spain we regard the consolidation of different political spaces each one with its own strategic selectivities, structurally oriented actors, discourses and technologies of power (Jessop, 2015b; Lefevbre, 2013). **A new structured coherence has consolidated due to the interaction between different structures and actors: we have named it the Basque subaltern state. As long as that interaction has been conducted democratically, it has produced and reproduced a new subject/object: the Basque demos (H4).**

Therefore, we observe the consolidation of the Basque subaltern state but also of the Spanish matrix state. Consequently, there will be different competing projects: those who want to increase and deepen Basque democratization will advocate for the increase of the political capacities of the Basque Country and on the contrary, those who want to increase and deepen Spanish democratization will treat it as if it were another region. That is to say, besides a national conflict, we are also dealing with the confrontation of two different processes of democratization (Goikoetxea, 2013a:284). Thanks to the next image, we can get the essence of three dialectical processes: we believe that demos building, state building and nation building are at the core of current democracies and are consequently the three points of the same triangle.

IRUDIA 68 State Demos Nation building



Source: Elaborated by the author.

3- On Basque exceptionalities:

First, we need to introduce two exceptional features that play an important role when analysing the Basque process of democratization and sovereignty demands: its federal structure and the Basque protest cycle.

3.1 Basque Federalism:

Before introducing the mentioned demos and nation building process, we must bear in mind one of the most distinguishing features of the Basque Subaltern state: its federal articulation. Although it is not at the core of our research, due to its unique feature in comparison with nations and regions that do not have an official state, it becomes necessary to explain its more relevant elements and its related consequences.

In its more basic meaning, “federal principles are concerned with the combination of *self-rule and shared rule*⁴²⁹” (Elazar, 1991:5). In accordance with Daniel Elazar, “federalism thus defined involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanent character that (1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and (3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist” (1991: 12).

With that in mind, we are going to consider in a more concrete-complex plane of analysis the distinctive federal nature of the Basque political system. For that aim, we are going to rely mostly in Jule Goikoetxea’s work (2013a; 2017).

When it comes to the legal provisions that configure Basque federal articulation, they are the result of the recognition of the historical rights of the chartered (foral) territories by the Spanish Constitution of 1978⁴³⁰ and the Statute of Autonomy of 1979⁴³¹. Consequently, according to Goikoetxea, “the updated Basque Foral structures establishes a quasi-confederal multilevel government system based on two pillars” (2013a:268):

- 1- The *Law of the Historic Territories* (LHT) articulates the territorial representation system. It enshrines the political autonomy of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa⁴³² and functions as if it was the Basque “internal constitution” (Ibídem: 268-269).
- 2- The *Basque Economic Agreement* sets up the pattern of relationship between the Spanish and Basque systems of Public Finance (Ídem.).

⁴²⁹ Bold type added by the author.

⁴³⁰ They are recognized in its “First Additional Provision” that says: “The Constitution **protects** and **respects** the historic rights of the territories with traditional charters (*fueros*).” **Protects** and **respects** are the words used, which implies that they already existed and thus are not created as a consequence of that regulation (Uriarte, 2016:39).

⁴³¹ Article 41 of the Statute of Autonomy.

⁴³² Basque Autonomous Community’s three territories.

Because of those two keystones, we may talk about a quasi-confederal polity (ies) that function on the *principle of subsidiarity* (Ibídem, 269). Indeed, equality and parity are guaranteed thanks to *the federal parliamentary system and the confederal finance system* (Ídem).

3.1.1 The federal parliamentary system:

Due to the parliamentary representation of the LHT, territory has greater importance than individual representation and consequently, each Historical Territory sends the same number of members to the Basque Parliament⁴³³ (Ídem). The “Batzar Nagusiak”, that is, the Territorial Parliaments of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, follow a similar pattern. Thus, at the two levels, Basque legislative bodies privilege territorial over individual representation.

Moreover, the Basque party system branded as ‘polarized pluralism’, allows an average of seven parties to achieve parliamentary representation⁴³⁴ (Ibídem, 270). The political space is divided between right and left and between Basque nationalists and Spanish nationalists (Ibídem, 270). Is this the result of an ethnic view on the nation as mainstream scholars have suggested? (Etxeberria, 1998: 44; Hobsbawn, 2015:150; Kymlicka, 2001: 77; Serrano,1998: 100-101). Quite the opposite⁴³⁵, actually, due to the ‘voluntarist’ nature of Basque nationalism, this division is not based on grounds of ethnic or national origins but on the representation of different political views on the nation and the political body (Blas, 2012: 381; Herrero de Miñón, 1998: 112; Iraola, 2014:117; Zabalo, 2004:83).

3.1.2 The confederal Finance System:

There are two main rules governing this system:

- 1- The *Law approving the Economic Agreement with the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country* (defining the basic rules of the system and the scope of autonomy of Basque institutions regarding approval of tax regulations).

⁴³³ Each territory sends 25 representatives in spite of the fact that there are large imbalances in their number of inhabitants: Araba has around 300,000 inhabitants, Bizkaia over 1,000,000 and Gipuzkoa 700,000.

⁴³⁴ Because of the changes of certain political spaces, EHBildu for instance is the result of the coalition of four different political parties, currently the amount of parties with parliamentary representation has been reduced to 5.

⁴³⁵ According to Blas, the Basque Elections of 1986 gives us a simple example: at that time, less than 25% of the inhabitants of the BAC were able to speak Basque and 29.48% of the population was born outside the BAC. Indeed, considering the amount of people that were children and grandchildren of Spanish migrants the weight of “third generation Basque natives” was very small. However, Basque nationalists obtained 70% of votes and 69.3% of the parliamentary representation. (2012:381).

In a similar fashion Daniele Conersy says ““ (...) the high percentage of voting for the pro-independence coalition Herri Batasuna in areas where immigrants are a majority testifies to the immigrants’ involvement in nationalist politics” (Conversi, 1997:205, Iraola, 2014: 114).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

2- The *Law approving the method for determining the tax contribution*⁴³⁶ of the Basque Country for each five-year period (Corcuera, 2006:9).

When it comes to the *Economic agreement*, it was established for the period 1981-2001⁴³⁷ and renewed in the middle of a high political contention in 2002⁴³⁸ (Uriarte, 2016:110). Its last renewal is the result of the agreement between PNV and PP in 2017 as we will see below. It provides Basque territories with tax autonomy, that is, with the power to establish the tax regulations applicable to the BC and to manage, settle and inspect all taxes levied (Goikoetxea, 2013a:270). After liquidation, each Territorial Government (Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa) must deliver a part of the revenues collected to the Basque Government, which does not have its own fiscal capacity (Ídem.). Despite the fact that it does not involve a complete autonomy, it operates in important taxes such as the Personal Income Tax, corporation taxes or the tax on wealth (Uriarte, 2016:112). In the next boxes, we can see both, those taxes included⁴³⁹ in the Agreement and those excluded:

⁴³⁶ Known as “Cupo”.

⁴³⁷ Law 12/1981 of 23 May.

⁴³⁸ Law 12/2002 of 23 May.

⁴³⁹ In the included taxes, the BAC has normative autonomy so it can apply different tax rates. In the excluded taxes the general law is applied but the Historical Territories can have both, a different form for declaring the tax and different declaration periods.

TAULA 25 The Economic Agreement

Taxes included in the Agreement

1. Personal Income Tax.
2. Corporation taxes.
3. Tax on Wealth.
4. Inheritance and Gift Tax.
5. The Property Transfer Tax and Certified Documents Tax.
6. Gambling Tax.
7. Local Revenue Authorities.
8. Property Tax.
9. Business Tax.
10. Tax on Motor Vehicles.
11. Other Local Taxes.

Taxes excluded from the Agreement

1. Income tax for non-residents.
2. Tax on Deposits at Credit Entities.
3. Special taxes.
4. Taxes on Gambling Activities.
5. Tax on the Value of Energy Production.
6. Tax on the production of spent nuclear fuel and waste resulting from nuclear power generation.
7. Tax on the Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste in Centralized Instalations.
8. Value Added Tax.
9. Taxes on Insurance Premiums.
10. Special Manufacturing Taxes.
11. Carbon Tax.

(Uriarte, 2016:112)

The second feature of the system relates *to the so-called “Cupo”*, that is, the tax contribution that Basque Territories do in order **to cover the expenses afforded by the central state in those none devolved areas**. Thus, it is not paid based on Basque collection but considering Spanish investment. More concretely, it involves four main areas (Ibidem:119):

- i. Central state’s exclusive areas: e.g. Defence, Foreign Affairs, Royal House etc.
- ii. Those areas that should have been devolved in accordance with the Statute of Autonomy but are still a competence of the central state: e.g prisons or the management of social security.
- iii. The funding of solidarity clauses in accordance with the Constitution (Inter-territorial Compensation Fund).
- iv. Repayment and interests of State’s Public Debt.

How much does the BAC pay to the central state? **6.24% of the overall state expenditure in the areas listed above (none devolved areas)**. That amount relates to the “Gross Cupo”.

However, there are some “compensations”⁴⁴⁰ that need to be considered in order to get the “Paid Cupo”. That figure was established in 1980 considering the Basque GDP at that time and so far, it has not been modified (Ibídem:122). Nowadays⁴⁴¹, the population of the BAC represents the 4.66% of the Spanish inhabitants, which means that currently the BAC is paying a 33% above the percentage of its population (ídem.). When it comes to the distribution between the three levels of government, in 2015 for instance, 70% of the budget was for the Basque Government (an amount that already includes the cupo), 15% for the Historical Territories (Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa) and 15% for the 251 municipalities (Ídem.).

As we have said, despite the high level of autonomy provided by the Economic Agreement and its uniqueness in comparison with other European regions, its development and implementation is not the product of a relationship between two equal political communities. Thus, the approval of the Law that determines the tax contribution (Cupo) for each five-year period depends on the will of the central government, which at the same time is highly dependent on the political balances of the Congress of Deputies. The problems usually arise due to the disagreements on the amount to be paid. Proportionally, this amount supposes a larger amount of money for the Basque Treasury than for the Spanish one due to the size difference in terms of budget volume.

The situation that arose after the expiration of the Law 2007/2011 provides us with a prominent example. Thus, its renewal coincided with the absolute majority of the PP in the Congress of Deputies, which blocked the approval of what should have been the Law 2012/2017. There was a disagreement on the amount to be paid, and the Basque Government said that it had paid 1.600M€ above the real cupo during the period 2007-2017. As noted earlier due to the size difference in terms of budget volume, it is a bigger economic burden for the Basque Treasury than for the Spanish one, which serves as a tool for exerting political pressure. When that majority ended after the General Elections of June 2016, the PP needed the backing of PNV to approve the General Budget, which included in the negotiations the renewal of the Economic Agreement and the ‘Cupo’. Thus, the PP agreed a renovation of the Law of the Agreement and the Law that determines the tax contribution⁴⁴² and the PNV agreed to support the General Budget proposed by the PP. As long as the PP was the party with the lowest level of support in

⁴⁴⁰ For instance, the public deficit, the competences devolved to the autonomous community or the new taxes created by the central state that have not been incorporated into the economic agreement are considered compensations.

⁴⁴¹ Considering 2015 data.

⁴⁴² The agreement included 36 points. One of the most prominent points was the economic settlement for the period 2007/2017 valued in 1400M€ (Deia, 2017).

the Basque Country, we see that the transfer of Sovereignty is more related with elite bargaining than it is with popular will.

On a separate issue, we believe that due to both, (1) the tax system in which it is the lower government the one that gives to the higher government the money and (2) the distribution of competences between the BG and the HT⁴⁴³, **subsidiarity and decentralization are at the core of the Basque political structure** (Goikoetxea, 2013a: 270-271).

Does that structure have any *socioeconomic consequence*? In that regard, according to Goikoetxea, the more balanced state of the BAC in comparison with most of the Spanish regions is substantially determined by *its economic-territorial autonomy* (based on the confederal finance system), by *the political-territorial parity* (based on the federal representation system) of its territories and *by the federal culture* they involve (2017:133). Furthermore, the levels of social cohesion in the BAC are among the highest in Europe. She highlights concretely (2013a: 272):

- It has the same rate of work activity among all its territories.
- It has the highest percentage of population with higher education in Spain.
- BAC's income per capita is 33.8% higher than the Spanish average, which has also a higher territorial and socio-economic inequality both between and within the ACs: between women and men, between provinces and between the capital and the periphery.
- In the listed areas, BAC's not only scores higher but also is more equitable.

Which have been the drivers that have made it possible (Ibídem:273-276)?

- Bilbao is not the administrative capital (it is Gasteiz, situated in Araba, in the least populated territory) which has reduced the mechanism of urban concentration/centralization.
- Urban concentration/centralization are usually accompanied by economic policies whereby most of the gross value added comes from the traditional services, rather than from industry. After the deep crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, Basque Provinces have boosted their industrial fabric entering in the so-called 'knowledge economy' and establishing a much more productive economic structure.
- Apart from the distribution of economic capital, the distribution of knowledge or cultural capital is also paramount. In that regard, BG has managed to ensure widespread access to higher public education and consequently the BC has the highest level of population with higher studies and the similar rates of education in each territory.

⁴⁴³ For instance, the BG has regulatory capacity on health care, education and social policies, but the Territorial Governments exercise it on matters such as social welfare, industrial policy and fiscal policy (Goikoetxea, 2013a:271).

- Industry has remained high in every territory due to the economic capacity (economic autonomy) and political authority (through Territorial Governments and Parliaments) to preserve high levels of industry and investment in the towns.

Thus, Araba and Gipuzkoa are not subordinated to Bizkaia neither are their citizens in disadvantage with regard to social provisions vi-à-vis those who live in the most populous or wealthy territory (Íbidem:276). Actually, we cannot forget key dimensions such as the financial system, firm-organization, industrial and training systems, party politics or social and fiscal policies (Ídem). **However, territorial and social cohesion highly depend on which level of government has the power to propose and implement such systems and policies (Ídem). In that regard, we may conclude that the Basque federal structure has enhanced that territorial and social cohesion (Ídem).**

3.2 The Basque protest cycle:

The Basque protest cycle⁴⁴⁴ refers to a process of contentious mobilization that began in the 1960s and lasted until the end of the 2000s⁴⁴⁵ (Tarrow, 2012:341; Zubiaga, 2009: 142). We consider it a cycle because if we analyse the political dynamic of the last decades, it is obvious that we are dealing with a contentious mobilization that exceeds the dynamics of isolated groups (ídem.). However, although the rise and fall of ETA are its more distinctive “events⁴⁴⁶”, it is a process that cannot be limited to ETA’s activity (Zubiaga, 2017:127).

In that regard, one of its main promoters would be the so-called Basque National Liberation Movement (BNLM), a group which we would define as a “social movement family” (Zubiaga, 2009:84). According to Della Porta and Rucht, “A social movement family can be conceived of in a preliminary manner as a set of coexisting movements that, regardless of their specific goals, have similar basic values and organizational overlaps, and sometimes may even enjoin for common campaigns.” (1995:232).

In order to consider the influence of the Basque protest cycle for Basque demos, nation and state building we are going to rely mainly on Mario Zubiaga’s work (2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2017). Therefore, we will proceed through three interrelated steps:

⁴⁴⁴ “Protest becomes a protest cycle when it is diffused to several sectors of the population, is highly organized, and is widely used as the instrument to put forward demands” (Tarrow, 1989:14-15). We have done a more sophisticated definition when defining the “Catalan Pròces” (Tarrow, 2012:241).

⁴⁴⁵ The temporary delimitation of these kind of complex processes must be flexible. We are considering as a reference ETA’s creation and its withdrawal from the armed struggle. However, we cannot limit the protest cycle to ETA.

⁴⁴⁶ Zubiaga uses the term as defined by Alain Badiou.

- 1- We are going to deal with *its main features: the alternative power paradigm, the alternative hegemonic articulation, the logic of equivalence and the agonistic antagonism.*
- 2- We will see the role played by its *main mechanisms: brokerage, polarization and innovation.*
- 3- We think that demos, nation and state building will be its *resulting processes.*

When it comes to its more basic features “the core point of the **alternative power paradigm** is unregulated mobilisation, protest and construction of an alternative authority on the fringe of the political system”⁴⁴⁷ (Zubiaga, 2012b:109). In a similar fashion, Letamendia talks about a “game of mirrors” in which a counter-state and a counter-society are built through a variety of organizations that try to build an alternative power by imitating the centre (1997). Thus, many social movements and alternative political dynamics were promoted⁴⁴⁸ in fields such as environmentalism, feminism, students’ movement, trade unions movements, popular festivals, support to political prisoners etc. However, metaphors aside, we cannot talk about a “parallel world” but as a strategy that is irremediably conditioned by state institutions and interacts complexly with them⁴⁴⁹ influencing the process of demos, nation and state building (Goikoetxea, 2017; Zubiaga, 2012b).

Thus, a political project that could be defined as “left nationalist populism” promoted **the logic of equivalence** between previously unconnected demands and articulated an **alternative hegemonic vision** (Laclau, 2005; Zubiaga, 2009: 191-193; Zubiaga, 2012a:120-121). As a result, the demand for independence has been equivalently articulated with many social demands such as feminism, socialism, ecology, the defence of Basque language etc. (Ídem.). The political logic that lay beneath is close to what Chantal Mouffe calls **agonistic antagonism** that tries to articulate conflict and antagonism “polemos”, with agreement and “living together” more suited to the idea of “polis” (1999:14). Consequently, it is also close to her idea of **radical democracy** that seeks to multiply the spaces for social antagonism in order to put current relations of power under democratic contestation (Ibídem:25).

A set of mechanisms that interact in most of the processes of democratization such as brokerage, tactical innovation and polarization are also visible (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001). When it comes to **brokerage**, it is directly related to the **logic of equivalence**. In

⁴⁴⁷ Not the only one but the one that has been strategically privileged.

⁴⁴⁸ **There are plenty of movements that do not correspond to the BNLM though its influence has been notorious. Ajangiz and Barcena clearly show that from a qualitative and quantitative point of view the Basque Country is a breeding ground for all kind of social movements (2001)**

⁴⁴⁹ Zubiaga for instance, talks about the interaction with the “**influence paradigm**” which is more associated with the institutional logic (idem.). The last, paradigm mentioned by Zubiaga relates to the “**identity paradigm**” which is close to the “**strategic essentialism**” as defined by Spivak.

that regard, according to Zubiaga “the alternative power paradigm promoted by nationalist populism, has brought together different parts of society and articulated them in recent times, coordinating demands that had previously been unconnected or demobilized” (2012b:102). It helped to link social sites and consequently to promote its articulation as *proximate fields* (Fligstein & McAdam, 2015:18). We refer to those strategic action fields with recurring ties to, and whose actions routinely affect, the field in question (idem).

He also highlights the role played by *polarization*, “setting up confrontations between alternative “legitimacies” in every conflict that had arisen from the seventies onwards, an institutional position and a “people’s” position” (idem.) “That is what happened in many areas, including the ecologist, language, feminist, internationalist or peace movements, and in this way what were only “claims” became “hard-to-satisfy demands” (idem). As we have seen, the articulation of those none satisfy demands is one of the keys of populism and a counter hegemonic project (Laclau, 2005).

Finally, *tactical innovation* shows the tension between regulated (institutional) and unregulated activities (including violent ones), that were often linked in a broad and deep mobilization cycle (Zubiaga, 2012b:102). Although the actors were not organically connected and their relations were often stormy ones, “the novel combination that came about by uniting everyone posed a threat to the effectiveness of the political system, keeping the doors to change wide open” (idem).

All in all, we believe that the explained dimensions have induced the broadening of public decision networks and the levelling of the nodes that they incorporate (idem). Therefore, they have encouraged the process of democratization, that is, the net movement toward broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding consultation (Tilly, 2010).

We have said that political capacities and social mobilization are the cornerstones of any process of democratization. Basque state institutions and their capacity to act, intervene and modify social reality along with contentious social mobilization are a good example of such a process. As long as it did not take place in an abstract, universal arena but in a political space (Lefebvre,2013), a complex interaction between demos, nation and state building were promoted.

However, although it would be reductionist to limit Basque protest cycle to ETA it would be more reductionist not to consider its influence. Thus, ETA killed 829 people since 1959 and kidnapped 79 (12 of them died). In the same period, 4.113 people were tortured and 649 suffered different attacks of what was branded as dirty war (Euskal Memoria, 2016). However, without playing down the personal suffering, our attention will be focused on the political consequences of those very actions.

Due to ETA's decision of directly attacking elected representatives during the 1990s, the above-mentioned *brokerage was undermined* (Ahedo, 2012:405). Quite the opposite began to happen and a dynamic that promoted the consolidation of “**distant fields**” began to dominate (Fligstein & McAdam, 2015:18). With this concept we refer to those fields that lack ties and have virtually no capacity to influence a given strategic action field (Ídem.). Thus, those sectors that claim independence especially those closer to the BNLM lost their previous transversality. With the exception of the period of the Lizarra Agreement (1998-2000), this dynamic increased during the 2000s and pushed the pro-independence left to the margins of the system⁴⁵⁰. Moreover, the anti-terrorist consensus, promoted a “*flanking effect*”, “in which forceful action at the extremes of a political continuum drives actors who occupy the middle ground into closer alliances and more concerted claim making than they would otherwise pursue” (MTT, 2001:86). It was clearly reflected by the Ajuria Enea Agreement and the PNV-PSE Governments.

However, that dynamic was not so clear during the 2000s. We think that it went from the “*democrats versus violent people*” frame to the criminalization of nationalists demands under the claim that “*everything is ETA*”. That strategy “led to the to the criminalization of Basque nationalist parties and organizations (i.e. the 18/98 macro-summary, Act 6/2002, etc.); hence, for the past 20 years every Basque nationalist demand has been fiercely repressed or opposed with the help of the Spanish judiciary's particular interpretation of the Constitution” (Goikoetxea, 2013a:278)

When it comes to the relation between more formally structured groups such as political parties and the organizations of the civil society, the contentious dynamic has fostered *dependency* and *hierarchy*. A field that is largely subject to the influence of another is said to be **dependent** on it. If this dependency is **organized hierarchically** “all lower level fields are nested in, and formally dependent upon, all higher levels systems.” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2015:18). Consequently, “Basque civil society has consolidated into a militant subjection that is more compartmentalized and less susceptible to transversality as an inevitable consequence of a violent conflict” (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015: 331).

All in all, we agree with Ahedo when saying that pro-independence populism adopted a central position during the 1980's, lost its ground in the 1990s and was pushed to the margins in the 2000s (2012). Although not being completely determining, the evolution of the Basque protest cycle and its ending, has presented a barrier for the articulation of a new hegemonic pro-independence movement as it happened in Catalonia or Scotland.

⁴⁵⁰ For further information see the work of Ahedo, 2012.

4 Basque democratization

After analyzing what we have considered Basque exceptionalities, we are going to take a step towards a more concrete plane of analysis by considering some features of Basque democratization. **In line with our fourth hypothesis (H4), we believe that the decentralization of powers has enabled the democratic reproduction of the Basque nation.** In both Catalan and Scottish (see below) cases, we have considered the role played by the health system *as one of the technologies of power among the many, used to dominate/empower the demos*. We could do the same with Osakidetza, the Basque health system. However, we believe that in current societies the technologies of power are countless, so in order to consider a different example we are going to see the importance of Basque State Institutions' political capacity in the reproduction of Basque socio-economic classes. With that aim, we are going to rely again in Goikoetxea's work⁴⁵¹ (2014a, 2017).

On her view, *industrial policies, research and development policies and employment, training and social policies* have been essential technologies of power for a different process of democratization in the Basque Autonomous Community, and thus for the material reproduction of Basque socio-economic groups (2017:196).

When it comes to **industrial policies**, they were especially relevant due to the context of severe industrial crisis in the 1980's decade.⁴⁵² In such a situation, Basque administration's objectives were job creation, the reduction of regional income disparities within the Basque Territories and the promotion of high-growth geographical poles through technological research and development (Alonso, 2009:275, in Goikoetxea, 2017:197). Thus, the providing of public and semi-public money for the enterprises was conditional upon certain objectives such as reducing unemployment and socio-economic inequalities between and within the Basque Territories.

In that line, the Basque and territorial governments' main policy programmes included the Reconversion Loans (1981–1984); the Exceptional Plan for Economic Re-launch (1985–1987); and the Plan for Labour Recovery, Restructuring and Reorientation (1992–1993), along with the General Framework of Industrial Policy and Policy Performance of the mid-1990s. The loans, guarantees and subsidies needed by SMEs for their implementation were allocated through the mediation of the BSIs (Alonso, 2009:297-319 in Goikoetxea, 2017:197). In that regard, the Society for Industrial Promotion and Reconversion (SPRI), directly aligned with the Basque government's Department of

⁴⁵¹ Since it has been studied in depth by Goikoetxea, it is not going to be particularly original. However, it makes an important contribution to our research.

⁴⁵² As we will see in Scotland, the lack of political capacities in a similar situation can induce the opposite.

Industry, Innovation and Trade, has been the principal public body for the management and implementation of the various Basque industrial restructuring phases (idem).

Moreover, we also need to consider two key tools: the above-mentioned *tax system* and a *financial system* close to the producer's needs. On the one hand, *the tax system* has been managed predominantly by the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) in coalition with centre and left-wing parties (PSE, EB and EA). According to Goikoetxea, this fact, has allowed a more willing acceptance and widespread trust in the Basque administration's industrial and economic policies by manifold economic and social agents such as the Basque business associations, trade unions and cooperative federations, who have also been able to lobby effectively to bring about specific economic and industrial policies aimed at developing an economic structure based on an SME industrial order (idem). On the other hand, a *financial system* that could facilitate the development of SMEs and the maintenance of their capacity to attract long-term investments was essential. This was achieved by promoting venture capital and mutual guarantee companies, which traditionally share the risks that enterprises' new investments entail. One of the most remarkable long-term results is that savings banks have garnered enough economic and management capacity to be able to acquire competent participation of a strategic nature in many firms, greatly favouring the compatibility of their activity with the economic and industrial development of the country (Ekai Center 2010).

Basque savings and cooperative banks have played a key role in the development of the Basque industrial structure and hence in the reproduction of the Basque industrial-financial classes (Goikoetxea, 2017:199). Although the industrial policies have fostered an endogenous industrial development and a decentralized economic industrial structure for decades, it began "a race to the bottom" since the last global and financial crisis.

With regard to *research and development policies*, although the Statute states that the Basque Autonomous Community has exclusive competences in this field, it has been a controversial issue since it was not until 2009 that the central state admitted its transference. According to Goikoetxea, this is one of the fundamental causes of the weak public investment in the BAC (around 4%, while in Europe it is around 16%) and of the strength of the enterprise sector, including Technology Centres, in the Basque innovation system (2017:202). Nonetheless, there were different programmes, such as the Plan for Industrial Technology (1993-1996) or the Plan for Science and Technology (1997-2000) that defined a technology policy as the basis for industrial policy with the aim of facing the severe economic crisis of the early 1990's.

Thus, despite the constrained competences, the strategic deployment of the Basque State Institutions political capacities has been highly consequential for the reproduction of a Basque business class attached to the new economy of knowledge (particularly to

industrial services) and for the strengthening of their trust in the Basque State Institutions (idem). For instance, of the 13 clusters linked to the new economy, 12 are financed by the Basque government's Department of Industry. Therefore, Goikoetxea says that the capacity for product innovation and high- and medium-quality scientific research and development has been determined not only by Basque financial-industry-type relationships but, most significantly, by the involvement of the BSIs and their public policies (Alonso 2009,275–319; Alonso and Ferrero 2012, 323–326; Hall and Soskice 2001, 147), which have put in place resources and organizational networks able to uphold the development of a particular production regime and socio-economic structure (ibidem:203).

All in all, in addition to the reproduction of certain **business and financial classes** we also need to consider the reproduction of particular **Basque working classes** which, organized in various social movements, trade unions and left-wing political parties have, over the last three decades, put pressure on the BSIs to deepen the democratization (idem).

In that line, *employment, training and social policies* have been important technologies of power although active (and passive) labour market policies were not devolved in accordance with the Basque Economic Agreement until the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) needed the support of EAJ-PNV in order to get the Spanish budget pass in 2010. As a result, most of the policies were developed through inter-institutional programmes with the central and territorial governments, town and city councils, and public agencies founded for specific employment and training needs (idem). They have not only played a key role in the training of workers and their inclusion in the Basque production system but also in the institutionalization of a Basque framework of labour relations.

As long as social inclusion was closely related to a precarious situation with the labour market, employment and social policies have been the two faces of the “social inclusion” coin (ibidem:204). In the absence of competence, the most remarkable mechanisms were the Minimum Income Guarantee (IMG) and Social Emergency allowances, both financed from the Basque Government's budget (idem). These two allowances apart, there have been different mechanisms that have contributed to the reduction of Basque families' poverty. *Thus, Basque State Institutions have played a key role in the the inclusion of certain groups in the social and economic fabric and consequently have been essential for a different process of democratization (H4).*

We have said that democracy will require both *public state structures (potestas)* and political relations based in *people's sovereignty*. Thus, we cannot separate democratization/de-democratization processes from *state capacities and social mobilization* (Goikoetxea, 2015b:38; Zubiaga, 2009a).

Therefore, *the mentioned policies have been essential technologies of power* for a different process of democratization in the Basque Autonomous Community, and thus for the material reproduction of Basque socio-economic groups. A differentiated Basque democratization process entails then the inclusion in the governing process of significant portions of Basque relevant-class forces' demands so that eventually their trust in the Basque State Institutions grows along with their dependency on the resources and opportunities which they provide (ibidem:206). However, having a differentiated welfare regime does not intrinsically mean that Basques are better off than Spaniards or Catalans. It means that the Basque State Institutions have a relatively high capacity to reproduce their own wealth and poverty, and hence their own socio-economic classes (idem).

We need to consider as well the role played by *contentious social mobilization* and especially by trade unions. They have been essential in both, enhancing the inclusion of Basque working classes in Basque democratization and in the reproduction of these social groups as different Basque political classes. As it happens in most of these processes, mechanisms such as brokerage, discursive and political attribution of opportunities, certification, polarization, social appropriation or category formation have been activated at different times (Elorrieta, 2012).

We have considered these technologies of power as an example, among the many, in order to see the role played by state institutions in current societies in the democratic reproduction of historic nations (H4). Therefore, instead of nations without states, we would rather talk about subaltern states within states (H4). Consequently, we believe that demands for sovereignty will be **mainly based in what we have called demos/state building issues**. We are going to address the issue in a much more concrete and complex plain of analysis in the next epigraphs.

5 The Political Statute of the Community of the Basque Country: an institutionalised compromised to deepen Basque democracy


As we have previously said, in democracy, it is the political community the source of the political power. Furthermore, the original ontological power of that very community would be the *potentia* whereas its institutional articulation would be the *potestas* (Dussel, 2006: 29-34). Sovereignty would account for the social relation that allows the democratic articulation of those two dimensions (Hinsley, 1986).

In that regard, political institutions are premised on the possibility of the stable production, reproduction, and enhancement of the lives of the citizens of a political community (*potestas*) (Dussel, 2006:73). Therefore "Politics deals with creating the conditions of possibility for and advancement of the life of the community and each of its members: a possible life, a qualitatively better life" (Ibidem: 74). When they have not enough political capacities to do so, political crises would emerge and the original

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

“*potentia*” will require changes in order to have the necessary means for its self-government (Dussel, 2006: 94-99). We see the empirical reflect of those abstract ideas in the next graphics:

IRUDIA 69 Perceptions of the need to reform the Statutes of Autonomy (%) 2005



453

Source: (Grau, 2011:191)⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵³ Red emphasis added by the author.

⁴⁵⁴ Compiled by Mireia Grau according to data from the CIS survey #2610 (2005).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

Furthermore, we see in the next table that the Basque Country obtained the maximum average of secessionism at that time:

IRUDIA 70 Attitudes towards the state project

	Spanish average (%)	Maximum Average	Minimum Average	Differential max-min	Average Rates of Growth
Centralism	8.7	17.6 (Aragon)	2.3 (Basque Country)	15.3	-5.43
Status Quo	51.4	74.5 (Extremadura)	23.5 (Catalonia)	51	+6.86
Status Quo Plus	26.3	48 (Catalonia)	11.5 (Extremadura)	56.5	-0.75
Secessionism	6.6	29.2 (Basque Country)	0.2 (Castile and León)	29	+4.76
No answer	7.1	11.6 (Andalusia)	2.9 (Extremadura)	8.7	-2.9

(Ibídem: 200)


In that line, we must recall that the referendum on the Spanish Constitution got its lowest support in the Basque Country and the pro-independence option has remained the highest in Spain for years. This conflict has had an antagonist expression during the last two centuries and it is still a source of conflict (Zubiaga, 2017:128).

Furthermore, as already argued, changes in statehood have changed the way of understanding nationalism and nationalist demands. According to Goikoetxea, that community that we have called the demos, also refers in current democratic countries to what traditionally has been called the nation, and which scholars of liberal democratic theory and nationalism have taken for granted, avoiding the fundamental issue of its reproduction across time and space (2014a:146). It is thus as much a nationalist issue as it is a democratic and sovereigntist one. As long as it is a conflictive field, it tends to create crisis. Thus, as previously done with the Catalan Statute, we may consider it a “*crisis in the political system*” because familiar forms for which crisis-management routines were already developed which in this very case were the reform of the Statute (Jessop, 2015a: 458).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

When it comes to its contents, although the idea of the Basque nation was present⁴⁵⁵, the main claims gravitated on issues related to state and demos building (H4). We see firstly the above-mentioned demos-state-nation building triangle and secondly the main sections of the proposal.

IRUDIA 71 Main claims: demos state building issues



Source: elaborated by the author.

⁴⁵⁵ An example of this is the will of enhancing relations with Navarre and Northern Basque Country.

TAULA 26 New Statute

- The Basque People's right of self-determination (Preliminary Heading, Art. 1)
- Basque nationality and citizenship (Preliminary Heading, Art. 4)
- A relationship with the Spanish state based on 'free association' (Heading I)
- The Basque Judicial System (Heading II)
- Direct representation in Europe (Heading VI)
- Exclusive areas of competence of Basque Institutions (Heading IV, Arts. 46–51, 53, 54, 60):
 - Education, Culture and Language Policy
 - Social Policy and Social Security
 - Health-care System
 - Economic Policy
 - Employment Policies
 - Industry, Commerce and Agriculture
 - Tourism
 - Tax System and Financial Policies
 - Housing
 - The Environment and Natural Resources
 - Infrastructures, Transport and Public Works
 - Policing and Public Security
- Exclusive areas of competence of the Spanish state (Heading IV, Art. 45):
 - Spanish nationality and immigration laws
 - Production, trading and possession of firearms and explosives
 - The Monetary and Customs system (non-EU)
 - The Merchant Navy and control of air space
 - Defence forces, the Army and Foreign policy (Diplomatic services)

(Source: Goikoetxea, 2017:146)

In line with our 4th hypothesis, we agree with Goikoetxea that “the broad political support for a New Statute of Free Association (2004) with Spain is not explained by the population’s attraction to Basque culture and identity, but rather by other reasons related to the construction and defence of Basque democracy” (2013:13). In order to carry out further investigation on that point we are going to consider the data obtained by three surveys conducted by “Basque Government’s sociological studies department” in

that very political context⁴⁵⁶. The first one was entitled “Opiniones sobre el Nuevo Pacto Político Para La Convivencia” and published on October 2003⁴⁵⁷ in the middle of a high profile public debate. We see its results below.

We see in the first table issues related to contents of the new Statute, in the second one more general reflections on self-government and finally questions concerning its procedure:

TAULA 27 Contents of the new Statute

Issue	In favour
Basque judicial system	69%
Power to call referendums	79%
Double nationality: Basque and Spanish	56%
Autonomous management of social security	75%
Own voice in Europe and the world	78%
Basque national teams	71%
Capacity to regulate labour relations	78%
Infrastructures and natural resources	71%
Strengthen relations with Navarre	83%
Strengthen relations with the north of the Basque Country	75%

(Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2003:6-8)

⁴⁵⁶ In order to avoid giving too much information we are not going to consider marginal data such as “no opinion/ no reply”. Consequently, the checksums may not add up exactly to the 100%.

⁴⁵⁷ The public debate began on September 2001 when the Lehendakari announced his intentions before the Basque Parliament.

TAULA 28 Reflections on self-government I

Consequences of self-government	Benefit	Prejudice
Obtaining more self-government would benefit or prejudice Basque economy?	46%	21%
Obtaining more self-government would benefit or prejudice the functioning of public services such as education, health, housing etc.?	59%	12%

(Ibídem: 9-10)

TAULA 29 Reflections on the procedure

Procedure	I agree
Should the Basque citizens ratify the process through a consultation?	81%
Should it be hold in a context of no violence and exclusions?	89%
Should the Spanish Government respect the results of that consultation?	84%

(Ibídem: 11-13)

The Basque Parliament approved the new statute on 30 December 2004 by absolute majority (39 votes against 35) with the support of the ruling tripartite formed by EAJ-PNV, Eusko Alkartasuna, Ezker Batua (36) and half of the parliamentarians of Sozialista Abertzaleak⁴⁵⁸ (3 out of 6). However, in a second step an absolute majority of the Spanish Congress of Deputies rejected it on 1 February 2005 (313 votes against and 29 in favour).

It was in that context that a second survey entitled “Autogobernuaren 25 urteen balorazioa eta Estatutu Berriaren Proposamena⁴⁵⁹” was conducted. It is qualitatively interesting because of the coincidence of the 25th anniversary of Basque self-government with the

⁴⁵⁸ The name of the Parliamentary group of the “Abertzale left”.

⁴⁵⁹ Valuation of 25 years of self-government and the new statute proposal.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

rejection of its renewal. It was published on March 2005⁴⁶⁰. The first four tables deal with issues concerning self-government whereas the last one is directly focused on the new statute.

TAULA 30 Valuation of Basque self-government

Issue	Very good/good	neither good nor bad	bad/very bad
Self-government	65%	17%	7%
Health services	81%	14%	3%
Basque language	69%	19%	5%
Infrastructures	69%	21%	4%
Education	69%	22%	5%
Culture	63%	25%	5%
Social welfare	62%	26%	6%
Environment	49%	32%	13%
Economy	47%	36%	13%

(Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2005a: 11)

⁴⁶⁰ The fieldwork was conducted between 18 January 2005 and 2 February 2005.


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Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 31 Comparison with Spain: are the next services better, equal or worst in the Basque Country?

Issue	Better	Equal	Worst
Health services	74%	20%	1%
Transports	48%	36%	4%
Education	59%	29%	3%
Public Works	48%	36%	4%
Social welfare	56%	29%	2%
Security	51%	32%	7%

(Ibidem: 23)

TAULA 32 Which are the two institutions that have helped more in the improvement of the Basque Country?



(Ibidem: 20)

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

TAULA 33 *Consequences of self-government*

Consequences of self-government	Benefit	Neither benefit nor prejudice	Prejudice
Obtaining more self-government would benefit or prejudice Basque economy?	45%	13%	21%
Obtaining more self-government would benefit or prejudice the functioning of public services such as education, health, housing etc.?	51%	13%	17%
Obtaining more self-government would benefit or prejudice democratic coexistence?	46%	13%	22%
Obtaining more self-government would benefit or prejudice the achievement of peace?	48%	12%	18%

(Ibidem: 33-35)

TAULA 34 *Questions about the New Statute*

Do you agree with:	I Agree	Neither agree or disagree	I disagree
The free association between the Basque Country and Spain?	52%	12%	23%
Double nationality: Basque and Spanish	48%	14%	29%
The creation of a commission to solve conflicts between the Basque Country and Spain:	71%	9%	12%
Getting more self-government in all issues?	62%	10%	19%
Managing social security and justice directly from the Basque Country?	59%	10%	21%
Having Basque national teams?	54%	15%	22%

(Ibidem: 43-46)

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Furthermore, a more specific survey was conducted on the rejection of the Statute entitled “Estatutu berriaren proposamenari eta Kongresuan aurkezteari buruzko iritziak”⁴⁶¹ and published on February 2005 in the aftermath of its debate in the Spanish Congress of Deputies. We reflect its main points in the next table:

TAULA 35 *Questions about the rejection of the New Statute*

Do you agree with:	I Agree	Neither agree or disagree	I disagree
The rejection of the new statute by the Spanish Congress of Deputies	19	10	51
Right of the Basque Country to choose its future	81	7	12
Should the Spanish Government respect Basque people’s decisions?	80	10	10
Should the Spanish Constitution recognize the right to decide of Basque citizens?	72	15	13

(Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2005b:20-24)

Considering all this data, and in line with our 4th hypothesis, we totally agree with Goikotxea when she said that:

“Thus, the demand for a status of Free Association was effectively articulated not because the Basque community is a distinct nationality (in the non-political sense of a pre-given cultural unit), but because it is a quasi-confederal political entity (constituted by Freely Associated Territories), which, owing to its political and institutional functioning, has shaped and most effectively met the needs of its population, managing to uphold the claim to the monopoly of authoritative law-making more successfully than the Spanish state itself.” (2013a:286)

Although differently, the Proposed Basque Referendum of 2008 also failed. Basque Government promoted it and its goal was to held a consultation on two questions: The first one was to concern whether to engage in talks with ETA; the second was to be on whether there should be a political debate on the "right to decide about the Basque people". The Supreme Court of Spain prevented its realization instigated by the Spanish Government and, despite its rejection, there were no mass protest demonstrations.

⁴⁶¹ “Opinions on the proposal for the reform of the statute and its presentation in the Congress”.

The continuance of ETA's armed strategy along with deep state repression and the success of the counter-terrorist hegemony based in "democrats vs terrorists" discourse, were the main vectors of the political contention of that moment⁴⁶². Thus, unlike the Catalan case, deep polarization, very weak brokerage and fierce competition dominated the political arena. When it comes to the last, the incumbents vs challengers dynamic (Fligstein, McAdam, 2015:13-16) was spread throughout the whole political field: (1) "Basque nationalists" versus "Spanish nationalists"; (2) within the PNV "Sovereignist sectors" versus "regionalist sectors"⁴⁶³; (3) within the pro-independence left the "Basque National Liberation Movement and Batasuna" versus "Aralar"; (4) within the "Basque National Liberation Movement", "pro-peace process sectors" versus "pro-armed struggle sectors"⁴⁶⁴; (5) within Basque nationalists "Batasuna" versus "PNV"; (6) within PSE "more conservatives" versus "more progressive sectors"⁴⁶⁵.

Thus, although a majority wanted to deepen Basque self-government and agreed on the issue of the consultation there was not a massive popular reaction as it happened in Catalonia and therefore the scope for a equivalential populist articulation in "defence of Basque democracy" was very limited (Apaolaza, 2015; Laclau, 2005; Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015). Furthermore, it was a symptom of the beginning of a new era in Basque politics that has been branded as "the new political time"⁴⁶⁶. When it comes to its features, we need to mention firstly the end of the Basque protest cycle and more concretely of ETA's activity after the failure of Loiola Conversations (Murua, 2017; Zubiaga, 2017:126-129). Secondly, the end of the 'Ibarretxe era' in 2009 due to the government lead by PSE-EE with the support of PP⁴⁶⁷. The generational replacement lead by Iñigo Urkullu and Andoni Ortuzar promoted the adoption of a more regionalist approach when it comes to PNV's leading view and a trend towards de-politicization of the sovereignty demands. That is, the trend to approach it as a technical question and avoid its conflictive nature. Finally, the re-organization of the political space in line with the organic crisis of Spain, the rise of Podemos and the loss of political support of PSE-EE and PP.

⁴⁶² We broadly refer to the period 2000-2011 that relates to the end of the "Lizarrar Garazi Agreement" in 2000 and the end of ETA's armed struggle in 2011.

⁴⁶³ Imaz versus Egibar dispute or Ibarretxe versus Urkullu disputes are just an example. For instance, the last one directly said "hay días que tengo que hacer actos de fe para seguir unido a Ibarretxe". For further information see: https://elpais.com/diario/2009/01/30/espana/1233270013_850215.html (last access 14 December 2017).

⁴⁶⁴ A tension between the sector lead by Arnaldo Otegi and the ones that wanted to keep the political-military strategy. For a detailed description see: Murua, 2017:79-91.


⁴⁶⁵ We refer to the sector represented by Nicolás Redondo and other key figures such as Rosa Díez that founded UPyD and the official sector represented by Patxi López.

⁴⁶⁶ It is an expression widely used to define "post-ETA" politics.

⁴⁶⁷ For the first time, the electoral space represented by Batasuna was banned for Basque Elections, which allowed the majority of PSE and PP.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

With that in mind, before introducing a more concrete and complex level of analysis we reflect the material, strategic and discursive aspects of Basque sovereignty demands and the articulation of the subaltern state in the next image as follows.



Source: elaborated by the author

1. Disempowered/Without sovereignty
2. No transference of Basque sovereignty: lack of capacities to make Basque democratic sovereignty 'feasible' through Spanish state institutions.
3. Basque State institutions: lack of enough disciplinary, biopolitical and regulatory mechanisms
4. Lack of capacities to be reproduced as a subject/object in accordance with its preferences.
5. Discursive articulation: Spanish State Institutions are used as a constitutive outside/ articulation of the Basque Equivalential People.

6- The new political time (2011-2018)

6.1 Introduction

As said in the Catalan case, we understand Basque sovereignty demands in line with the tensions and contradictions that arise in current states (H1). However, we consider *strategic action a key element for the activation of an episode of secession* (H6). With that in mind, in accordance with the method of articulation and our retroductive hypotheses, we believe that:

- When it comes to the structural limits and opportunities for secession (H7), we *do not see an organic crisis at Basque level*. Its absence limits the possibilities for an episode of secession, and on the contrary, the lack of an episode of secession tempers the possibilities for an organic crisis at Basque level. Consequently, it will also temper the contradictions of the organic crisis of the regime of 78.
- Furthermore, *the mechanisms and processes of secession have not been activated* (H8).
- In a close interrelation with the previous points, *there is not a new hegemonic pro-independence articulation* (H9).

In order to explain such a process we are going to take three interrelated steps. First, we are going to consider the dimensions of *the state and their crisis aspects*. Secondly, we are going to bring back the *mechanisms and processes of secession* in line with the explanation of Catalan contention. Finally, we are going to address the issue of the *autonomist hegemony and its populist articulation*.


6.2 Passive Revolution

We believe that there is not an organic crisis at Basque level. Furthermore, for structural, strategic and discursive reasons there is a growing trend towards what Antonio Gramsci called “passive revolution” and its related “war of position” (1985:137-143; 1999:289-301). In current societies, **passive revolution**⁴⁶⁸ represents a process of transformation, absorption, and incorporation that translates contentious politics into bureaucratic or technical questions (Jessop, 2015b:178). Thus, in a context dominated by the organic crisis of the so-called Regime of 78, the process of passive revolution at Basque level tempers its tensions and contradictions. We get its essence in the next graphic:

⁴⁶⁸ We will apply this concept when dealing with autonomist hegemony.

IRUDIA 72 Passive Revolution and the Regime of 78

*Tempers its tensions and
contradictions*



Opportunity/threat Spirals

Source: elaborated by the author

As previously done, we are going to analyse the state and its crisis aspects in order to explain in a relational way the lack of an organic crisis at Basque level. As a previous synthesis, we need to consider two ideas:

- Due to Basque democratization, the levels of trust and dependence of the Basque demos on Basque State Institutions has increased. In such a process the Spanish State has been used as a constitutive outside. Furthermore, in addition to a historic contentious political dynamic, the organic crisis of Spain has fostered its assessment as a “fetishized power” and encouraged the “obediential” valuation of Basque institutions. Consequently, Spanish institutions will get a lower valuation and their crisis aspects will be more pronounced.
- The Basque accumulation strategy has differed from the dominant one in Spain which combined with tax autonomy provides with higher political capacities to intervene. Consequently, the flow of material concessions necessary to maintain the ‘unstable equilibrium of compromise’ which underpins the support of the social bases of the state will be higher.

6.2.1 Crisis of representation and crisis of the social basis of the state

Basque and Spanish political situation⁴⁶⁹

As it happens in most of current Western states, during the last decade there has not been a good assessment of neither Basque nor Spanish political situation. Disaffection with politics and especially with politicians and political parties tend to show an image of mistrust and scepticism towards the political situation. Despite being deep-seated features of current states⁴⁷⁰, their contradictions tend to increase in times of crisis. Paradoxical as it may seem, we see that the valuation of the political situation in Spain and the Basque Country follow a reverse path from 2007 onwards. Whereas in the case of the Spanish political situation, “bad + very bad assessment” has reached its record, “very good + good” receives its minimum valuation. On the contrary, despite beginning with a similar trend, the Basque one has tended to converge and “very good + good” valuation has even overtaken “bad + very bad” in 2017.

We think that at least, three factors prove decisive. On the one hand, the end of ETA’s armed struggle and the reduction of intense state repression has facilitated a change on the political situation and therefore in its perception. On the other, the organic crisis of Spain and its discursive articulation by the Basque political elites has fostered a framed in which “the good and serious management in Basque politics contrasts with the Spanish crisis and its related politics of spectacle” (Urkullu, 2016a). Finally, due to the specificities of Basque State Institutions, its process of democratization and its related healthier economic structure, the privatization of democracy has had a lower impact (Goikoetxea, 2017).

Consequently, despite the neoliberally oriented crisis management (Elorrieta, 2017:238-240), the flow of material concessions necessary to maintain the ‘unstable equilibrium of compromise’ which underpins the support of the social bases of the state, has been higher in comparison with Spain (Jessop, 1990:207). During a crisis, the sacrifices of certain short-term interests by the hegemonic class (fraction), and a flow of material concessions for other social forces are a key to the success of a hegemonic project⁴⁷¹ (Ibidem:208). We believe in that regard that both, the Basque political system and its socioeconomic actors⁴⁷² have been more successful than the Spanish ones.


⁴⁶⁹ **In the Catalan case, we have measured the confidence on politicians. However, we have not found such information in**

⁴⁷⁰ Remind in that regard previous reflections on the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regimes (Jessop, 2008c).

⁴⁷¹ The Basic Income Guarantee would be just an example.

⁴⁷² Mentioned needs to be made to the role played by majoritarian trade unions.

TAULA 36 Basque and Spanish political situation



473


Basque and Spanish Governments:

By comparing Basque and Spanish Governments valuation, we can clearly see the consequences of Basque nation and demos building and therefore of Basque democratization (Goikoetxea, 2013a; 2014a; 2017). In line with Goikoetxea’s view, we believe that Basque State Institutions have shaped and most effectively met the needs of its population and therefore they obtain a better valuation (2013a:286). In the survey, they pose the next question: how would you grade current Basque Government management? Whereas 3% thinks that it is very good, 40% says that it is good, 43% neither good nor bad, 7% bad and 2% very bad. We can see these data compared with the valuation of the Spanish Government in red. In this case, 1% thinks it is very good, 10% good, 30% neither good nor bad, 27% bad and 31% very bad.

⁴⁷³ Oso ona + ona= Very good + good/ Txarra + oso txarra= bad + very bad.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 37 Basque and Spanish Governments




Basque Government ■ Spanish Government ■ (Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2016:108)

Basque and Spanish Institutions:

Furthermore, if we raise the look beyond and below governments and we assess the valuation of other institutions we can see the consequences of “the Basque federal structure in a co-sovereign era” (Goikoetxea, 2017:127- 138). The first graphic assesses the level of satisfaction towards the working of democracy at Basque, Spanish and European level and the second one the satisfaction towards different institutions at those scales.

TAULA 38 Satisfaction with the working of democracy




⁴⁷⁴(Ibidem: 162)

The high level of satisfaction with the way democracy works at the Basque scale in comparison with the Spanish and European one is a symptom of the success of Basque State institutions in shaping and most effectively meeting the needs of its population (Goikoetxea, 2013a:286). Furthermore, as long as contention and social mobilization are also key aspects of any process of democratization (Zubiaga, 2009a), we believe it is also a success of those *a priori* “non-state actors”⁴⁷⁵ such as trade unions, political parties or social movements.

⁴⁷⁴ The graphic reflects the addition of those who answered very satisfied + quite satisfied.

⁴⁷⁵ Key actors if we understand the state in its integral sense (*lo stato integrale*) (Gramsci, 1999:540)

TAULA 39 Satisfaction with institutions




⁴⁷⁶(Ibidem: 165)

When it comes to concrete institutions, we see that those key stones of the Basque Federal structure are the ones that achieve a better valuation. The Foral Provincial Councils, the City Councils and the Basque Government keep a long-standing trend of positive assessment whereas both the Spanish Government and the European Commission get a much lower valuation. It should be emphasized that in the last years the Spanish Government only got a positive assessment once (in 2006 with just 1 positive point). Furthermore, due to the North Atlantic Financial Crisis, their support has drastically dropped whereas in a parallel line from 2007 onwards the satisfaction with Basque State Institutions has grown.

It is in these critical moments in which trust and confidence are undermined and counter hegemonic voices arise more strongly. If we look at the next graphic however, there is an obvious dissonance between the confidence in Spanish institutions and that of Basque institutions.

⁴⁷⁶ Translation: Udala: City Council; Eusko Jaurlaritza: Basque Government; Diputazioa: Foral Council; Espainiako Gobernua: Spanish Government; Europako Batzordea: European Commission.

TAULA 40 Confidence in institutions



(Ibidem: 166)

Due to the political capacities of BSI, they have provided resources and established conditions under which social groups can legitimately act (Goikoetxea, 2014a:161). In so doing, they have not only objectified them, but also increased their dependence and trust in this very state institutions (Ídem). In that regard, according to Goikoetxea, “Trust and dependence are fundamental for the state’s institutions level of interpenetration, which is in turn essential to effectively institute and reproduce a distinct political field (Ídem)”.

Bearing this in mind, and if we have a look at the previous graphic we think again that in such a task BSI have been more successful than the Spanish ones. The above-mentioned institutions got a much higher valuation during a large period so we can easily conclude that they have gained the confidence of Basque citizens better than have the Spanish ones. As noted earlier, in contrast to the most general trends, their confidence level has grown after the financial crisis just the opposite of their Spanish counterparts. Besides that, the fall in support for both the Basque Government and Parliament between 2007 and 2011,


⁴⁷⁷ The green square contains; The Basque Government, City Councils, The Basque Parliament and Foral Provincial Councils. The red one contains: The Spanish Government and the Spanish Congress of Deputies.

coincide with a period in which the ‘abertzale left’ was outlawed and did not get any seat in the Parliament. That fact was crucial to facilitate the first Spanish nationalist government since the restoration of self-government led by the PSE-PSOE with the support of the conservative PP.

Political parties and the power block


According to Jessop, “a crisis in the party system is often associated with a crisis in the state- especially if it affects the natural governing party o parties” (2015b:83). Whereas in the rest of the cases we have seen that interrelation between the crisis of the party system and the crisis in the state, we can only see it partially in the Basque case. We are going to asses firstly the evolution of the electoral support to political parties in the Basque Parliament and secondly citizens’ subjective perception measured by the level of sympathy.

TAULA 41 Evolution of the Electoral Support



(Historiaelectoral.com, 2017)

TAULA 42 Sympathy with parties



(Eusko Jaurlaritz, 2017: 47)

We can clearly see that EAJ-PNV has kept its support practically intact whereas the two main Spanish nationalist parties (PSOE and PP) have dropped dramatically, to the point of becoming the last two parties of the Parliament. However, EHBildu and Podemos have emerged strongly but without the capability of proposing neither an alternative government nor an alternative counter hegemonic vision powerful enough as to compete with PNV's project. Furthermore, after the 2014-2016 electoral cycle PNV increased its previous support and got the governments of all three Foral Councils, the Government of Navarre (with the coalition Geroa Bai) along with the mayors of San Sebastian, Bilbao and Vitoria. Thus, unlike the frequent crisis in the party system common in periods of organic crises, we just see a moderate crisis that mainly affect to PP and PSOE in favour of the rest.

6.2.2 Crisis of the state project, crisis of legitimacy, crisis of institutional integration and crisis of capacities


As previously said we are going to differentiate between the political and the economic dimension of the state project.

1- Political dimension:

The crisis of the political dimension of the state project is usually intertwined with a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of institutional integration. Unlike the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, there has been a more or less stable support for independence that has always kept a high profile in the political debate. However, it has not undergone far-reaching changes during the last years. **Thus, we just see a moderate crisis when it comes to legitimacy, institutional integration and the state project.**

In that line, if we measure **the satisfaction with current Statute of Autonomy**, we see that those who would like to increase its capacities are a majority. That is, those who are satisfy are on average 30% (32% the last data) whereas those who are only partially satisfy or completely unhappy are on average 50%.


TAULA 43 Are you happy with current statute of autonomy?



(Ibidem:41)

However, there is not a concrete question on the “Soziometroa” on **the issue of more/less autonomy** so we are going to consider the question posed by the “Deusto Barometro” on this very topic:

TAULA 44 *Do you want more or less autonomy?*



(Deustobarometro, 2017:49)

As we can see, those who want more autonomy (38%) or directly an independent state (17%) are a majority. If we look at the reasons lying behind, in accordance with the next graphic, when asked about the possible **consequences of increasing self-government** for the economy, the functioning of public services and social coexistence, the majority thinks that it would be beneficial. Thus, we believe that increasing self-government is directly related to demos/state building issues, or according to Goikoetxea, “to the construction and defence of Basque democracy” (2013:13).


TAULA 45 *Major self-government would be beneficial?*

		GUZTIRA / TOTAL
	Ona / Favorecería	52
EUSKAL EKONOMIARENTZAT / LA ECONOMÍA VASCA	Ez ona eta ez txarra / Ni favorecería ni perjudicaría *	10
	Txarra / Perjudicaría	15
	Ed-Ee / Ns-Nc	23
	Ona / Favorecería	57
ZERBITZU PUBLIKOEN FUNZIONAMENDURAKO / EL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS	Ez ona eta ez txarra / Ni favorecería ni perjudicaría *	10
	Txarra / Perjudicaría	12
	Ed-Ee / Ns-Nc	20
	Ona / Favorecería	48
EUSKAL GIZARTEAREN BIZIKIDETZARAKO / LA CONVIVENCIA EN LA SOCIEDAD VASCA	Ez ona eta ez txarra / Ni favorecería ni perjudicaría *	14
	Txarra / Perjudicaría	14
	Ed-Ee / Ns-Nc	24
	Ehunekiko bertikalak / Porcentajes verticales	100

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.


However, if we consider directly **the issue of independence** we can get very different results depending on the source. As already seen “Deustobarometro” limits its support to 17%; “Soziometroa” raises this figure up to 23% and 30% would be supportive depending on the circumstances; “Euskobarometro” to 28% and the research entitled “Imagining the Basque State” up to 42% in the BAC and 40.7% in the seven Basque territories. We see the data below:

TAULA 46 Soziometroa: Support to independence 1998-2017




(2017b: 50)

TAULA 47 Soziometroa: Independentzia bai/ez




TAULA 48 Imagining the Basque State: attitude towards independence



Source: Amurrio et.al, 2015:33.

TAULA 49 Euskobarometro May 2017




Be that as it may, we clearly see that independence receives a support broad enough as to keep the issue actively in the political debate. Although if we consider the data provided by the research “Imagining the Basque State” it gets a majoritarian support, it does not seem a plausible hypothesis in the short term. In that line, we need to consider that when asked about the need for change, whereas a large majority of the people would like a drastic change in the Spanish political life, the figures dwindle significantly in relation to Basque politics. We associate the first idea with the crisis of PP and PSOE and the success of Podemos in the General Elections of 2015 and 2016. When it comes to the second one, the wills for change at Basque level are articulated under PNV’s autonomist hegemony that claims: **“we need to change but we live well enough to change too much”**⁴⁷⁸. Thus,

⁴⁷⁸ We will see its articulation in the epigraph related to the autonomist hegemony.

instead of independence (complete change) a third way related to the improvement of the status quo is boosted (partial change). We will see its articulation below.

TAULA 50 Desires for political change



(2016: 155)

Considering the mentioned data, most of the people relates the increase of self-government with benefits for the economy, the functioning of public services and social coexistence. Furthermore, according to the data provided by the research on the Basque State, the majority of people of the seven territories of the BC who currently are against independence would support it⁴⁷⁹ in case of guaranteeing better social policies, a more democratic state and a greater level of social co-existence (Amurrio et.al, 2015:43-45). The figures are even higher if we focus only in the BAC (ídem.). When it comes to “the economic case for independence”, only those citizens of the BAC that are against independence would change their minds in the case of improving the economic situation, whereas those of the rest of the territories would keep primarily their original negative vote (ídem.). Hence, the balance between competing state projects will determine the issue of independence.

Therefore, we can conclude that current demands for sovereignty are mainly based in what we have called demos/state building issues, so the key is not so much the defence of the Basque culture and identity understood in a pre-political sense, but “how and to what extent the Basque Subaltern State can speak”. Sovereignty demands are so far primarily limited to “the improvement of the *status quo*”. Indeed, we just see a moderate crisis of the state project, a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of institutional integration. However, as it happens in Scotland and Catalonia, it seems

⁴⁷⁹ They would change a current “no vote” to a “yes vote”.

that a hypothetical pro-independence hegemony will depend on linking it with a more democratic and socially fairer society. Therefore, it will depend on political actors' strategic ability to propose a new state project and articulate it upon a new hegemonic vision. We will analyse it below.

Economic dimension, modes of state intervention and capacities

When dealing with the economic dimension of the state project, we must bear in mind that it is related with a legitimacy crisis, a crisis of institutional integration and a crisis of capacities⁴⁸⁰ and state intervention (Jessop, 2015b:58). We have described democratization according to Goikoetxea “as a process that consists of the inclusion of *as many people as possible* in the *governance of their political and socio-economic system* by empowering them through specific technologies of power that in our place and time are *public disciplinary and biopolitical techniques and institutions*, which subjugate but also capacitate the people so that they can gain *as equal access as possible* to resources and opportunities in order to govern themselves.” (Goikoetxea,2017:3). On her view it will also require political capacities (material sovereignty) and an unchallengeable site of authoritative judgement (formal sovereignty) (Ibidem: 6)

Thus, we must consider the decisions taken by main actors but also the political competences to take them.

With that in mind, when it comes to the economic dimension of the state project, we see a divergence with the dominant Spanish accumulation strategy specialized in tourism, financiarization and housing and its related state project (Calvo, 2015; López & Rodriguez, 2011). We need to take into account “the causality of Basque State Institutions political capacity in determining the amount, composition and (re) distribution of socio-economic capital, both of the Basque socio-economic groups and of the entire territory of the BAC” (Goikoetxea, 2017:194-195). In that line, the use of certain technologies of power, such as industrial policies along with, research and development, employment, training and social policies, have played a paramount role (Ídem).

In our case, they were enabled by Basque capacities through competences in economic planning and industrial policies, active labour policies⁴⁸¹ and tax and fiscal competences

⁴⁸⁰ “Although the term capacity has a broader meaning (see in that regard Goikoetxea, 2017) we refer in this part to Tilly’s and Mann’s interpretations. According to Tilly “**state capacity** means the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions” (2007:16). We also include what Mann calls the **state’s infrastructural power**: “its capacities to penetrate society and organize social relations throughout its territory, on the basis of its political decisions” (1984:185).”

⁴⁸¹Active labour market policies have been a conflictive field for years and so they were boosted through inter-institutional programmes. However, a deal was struck to devolve them according to the Foral system

(idem.). According to Nagore Calvo, while the EU and Spain had moved towards a neo-liberal agenda in which industry could not be directly supported, the Basque government tried to develop a plan for industrial intervention during the decade of the 1980' (2015:142). Thus, whereas Spain dropped the use of direct intervention to deal with the pressing demands of the industrial crisis during that decade, “the Basque government pursued its own, more interventionist (given the scope of its powers) policy agenda that including developing an industrial policy focused on the specific problems of the industrial infrastructure in the BAC.” (Ibidem:140).

Therefore, apart from the relatively high political capacities⁴⁸², there is an underlying concept of capital that differs from the dominant hegemonic one not only in Spain but also in most of the European countries. Thus, we see a more ‘productivist concept of capital’ that corresponds to the profit-producing capital different from a ‘money concept of capital’ associated in ideal-typical terms with interest-bearing capital⁴⁸³ (Jessop, 2016:4). Does it have any consequence? We believe that it is in line with a different mode of regulation. Thus, according to Goikoetxea, the BAC’s welfare regime has similarities with the German model classify as a Coordinated Market Economy, due to their industrial, financial, training and production regime (2017:207). Therefore, it affects the economic structure but also broader elements related to social cohesion. We see some of its consequences hereunder:

TAULA 51 GVA by Autonomous Community, municipality and sector (%) 2005-2006

Communities	Primary	Industry	Construction	Services
Basque Country	<u>1.0</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>60.3</u>
Catalonia	1.3	21.2	9.8	67.5
Valencia	2.1	17.3	12	68.5
Municipalities	Primary	Industry	Construction	Services
<u>Hernani- BC</u> 19,000 (pop)	<u>0.6</u>	<u>51.9</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>42.1</u>
Tarrega- C 16,534 (pop)	1.5	28.7	11.5	58.2

and the Economic Agreement in 2010 and in exchange, PNV supported the PSOE led government Budget (Goikoetxea, 2017:203).

⁴⁸² Very narrow if compared with an independent state but higher than the average non-independent “regions” (Goikoetxea, 2015a:208).

⁴⁸³ For further research on the strategic selectivity of Basque State Institutions and the precedence of industrial classes, see: Goikoetxea, 2017 or Calvo, 2015.


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

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(Source: Goikoetxea, 2017:136)

Nevertheless, having a more productive economic structure and a higher GDP helps but does not necessarily lead to greater social and territorial cohesion (ibidem:135). Thus, the production and redistribution of economic capital along with knowledge or cultural capital are the key for higher levels of social cohesion (ídem). When it comes to the redistribution of cultural capital, the BAC has one of the highest levels of population with higher studies⁴⁸⁴ (44.10 per cent) in the European Union (ídem.). However whereas in 1993 the social expenditure achieved the 24% of the GVA and 29% in the EU, in 2007 it was of 18.8% and 26.2 at EU level (Jurado, 2013:40). If we take the data of 2009 it grew to 24.06% of the GVA due to the needs of facing the crisis costs (ídem.). Without belittling this data, another key indicator when it comes to social justice relates to income distribution. In that line, as we see in the next graphic, by considering the Gini index and the 80/20 ratio, the income distribution is also among the highest in Europe:

TAULA 52 Gini Index



Source: Antón, Colinas, Iruarrizaga, 2013:15.

From a more dynamic and contentious approach, we see broad processes of democratization and nation building (McAdam, Tilly, Tarrow, 2001:227-264). Briefly, they are the result of the activation of mechanisms such as *brokerage* between key

⁴⁸⁴ The percentage is very similar in every territory (Goikoetxea, 2017:136).

stakeholders and authorities;⁴⁸⁵*competition* between different levels of government; *polarization* between authorities, trade unions, left wing parties, social movements and ETA; *opportunity spirals* opened up by the beginning of the autonomic state and post-fordist re-structuring and the *certification* of business associations, trade unions and Basque Government.

However, we also notice “a race to the bottom” since the last global and financial attack (crisis) against public political capacities (Goikoetxea, 2017:200). From 2008 to 2012 the number of companies decreased by 10.2 per cent and employment by 7.8 per cent (ídem). In the same period, in the industry and energy sector the number of companies decreased from 14,035 to 12,059 and the wealth of the industrial sector fell from 16,532 in 2008 to 14,565million euro in 2012. As regards employment, 45,801 jobs were lost (ídem). On the contrary, in the same period all the data related to the services sector increased. We can see the mentioned trend by analysing the evolution by sector during the last 20 years.

TAULA 53 GDP by sector and year

GDP by sector and year	Primary	Industry	Construction	Services	Taxes
1995	1.9	28.75	5.6	55.9	7.8
2015	0.6	24.4	5.6	60.2	9.2

Source: Círculo de Empresarios, 2016:45.

When it comes to unemployment rates, we see as well a rise and fall that is superior to the EU average but lower than the Spanish one:

TAULA 54 Unemployment rates

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BC (7)	9.6	11.0	12.4	15.1	15.3	14.4	13.3
BAC	9.9	11.1	12.3	16.2	15.8	14.7	12.6
Catalonia	17.7	19.2	22.5	23.1	20.3	18.6	16.0
Spain	19.9	21.4	24.8	26.1	24.5	22.1	20
EU-28	9.6	9.7	10.5	10.9	10.2	9.4	8.6

⁴⁸⁵ According to nagore Calvo, “the Basque government’s industrial policies were the outcome of intensive communication between tight-knit interpersonal networks among leading members of the ruling PNV and representatives of Basque industry.” (2015:140).

(Gaindegia, 2017)

Furthermore, the reduction on tax collection has been much higher than that of the GVA which indicates a sharp increase on tax fraud (Jurado, 2013:40). The tax pressure is also lower than in EU 28 (8.6 points lower in 2012) and there is a trend to reduce the Business Tax and increase the weight of the Income Tax (and concretely of Labour Tax) in the general tax structure (ELA, 2016:11). In a parallel line, although we see a clear drop in the budget that coincided in 2013 with the return of PNV to the government, it raised again in 2014 and 2015. The data of 2016 (10.933,4 M€), 2017 (11.059,7 M€) and 2018 (11.486,4M€) have kept a growing trend (Azpiazu, 2017:8).

Due to their importance as public disciplinary and biopolitical techniques, health and education receive a great part of public budgets and are an important contentious field for broad social sectors as different strikes and mobilizations show.

When it comes to **health**, it gets around the 30% of the budget but it has suffered significant cutbacks during the last years. **Pharmacy** along with **Funding and contracting** are the more relevant sections and consequently the ones that get a higher amount out of the entire budget. When it comes to pharmacy, it suffered a severe cutback due to the introduction of the pharmaceutical co-payment and the disappearance of the public funding for prostheses (Abaunza, 2016:17). Funding and contracting suffered a cutback of 100 M€ between 2010 and 2014 that provoked staff, equipment and bed reductions as well as social unrest, strikes and protests (ídem). In absolute terms, health investment achieved 5.3% of the GDP in 2009 and 4.8% in 2016. Although the trend changed in 2013/2014 with a significant increase of investment, pharmacy has kept a negative tendency. However, a research that compares Spanish Autonomous Communities states that the The BAC showed the clearest behaviour towards a weak policy of austerity and privatization, as opposed to La Rioja, Madrid, and the Balearic Islands (Bacigalupe et. Al, 2016:3). Furthermore, together with Andalucía, it has been the Autonomous Community in which the restrictions to migrants without residence permit have been lower (ídem.)

Education has also suffered significant budget reductions. The investment dropped from 4.27 of Basque GDP in 2009 to 3.50 in 2018. **Universities, pre-school and primary school** and **secondary school and vocational training** are the most important sections. If compared with the rest of the areas, **universities** suffered the cutbacks before (in 2010), a deeper disinvestment (80M€ between 2010 and 2013) and a lower reinvestment (Ídem.). They provoked strikes and social unrest because they were accompanied by a rise on university tuition fees⁴⁸⁶. However, in order to prevent massive cuts on staff, most of the

⁴⁸⁶ We observe a clear example on the fees paid to write this very PhD. They were increased from 40€ per year in 2016 to 266€ from 2017 onwards. However, most of the education fees are below the Spanish


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

cuts focused on infrastructures, materials and supplies (ídem). When it comes to the rest of the areas, they follow a similar pattern although the harder cuts began in 2012. In this case, they promoted staff reduction, closure of classes and extending working hours that also provoked strikes and social mobilization.



Thus, we see a reduction of the state capacities for intervention that has fostered the disempowerment of the Basque demos and consequently a process of de-democratization. We see the mentioned data graphically below:

average and they suppose the half of the tuition fees in Catalonia and Madrid. For detailed information see: <http://www.observatoriuniversitari.org/es/files/2017/01/Por-que-precios-tan-distintos.pdf> (last access: 12/12/2017).

TAULA 55
Reduction of the state's capacities for intervention



Source:
Compiled
by the
author
from:
Abanza,
2016



Apart from the decisions taken by different actors, we also need to bear in mind the process defined by Goikoetxea as “privatization through Spanish centralization and Basque subordination” (Goikoetxea, 2017: 220). We have dealt with the issue when analysing the ‘Spanish matrix state’.

All in all, a much more stronger economy, lower levels of unemployment along with tax and fiscal autonomy have resulted in a more limited crisis when it comes to the mechanisms of state intervention (Jessop, 2015b:70-71). There is not a deep “fisco-financial crisis” if compared with the overall Spanish or Catalan situation. As previously said, these kind of crises usually trigger or intensify existing crises so its absence may also diminish them. More concretely, fisco-financial crises “could lead to demands to redesign political representation, reform the state’s internal structures and operations, alter the amount and modalities of state intervention, recompose the social bases of the state, redefine state strategies, and alter the balance between consent and coercion to address hegemonic and wider organic crisis” (Jessop, 2015b:71). Up to know there has not been such a situation.

If we use the terminology of the School of Essex the capacity of state institutions to integrate social demands through the democratic logic of difference has been higher reducing the scope for the articulation of a new people capable of representing unmet social demands (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; Laclau, 2005)

Unlike the other case studies, the lack of a deep fisco-financial crisis diminishes the crisis aspects of the state and reduces the scope for its deeper reconfiguration. **Thus, the legitimacy crisis, the crisis of institutional integration and a crisis of capacities and state intervention are comparatively lower** (Jessop, 2015b:58). **Furthermore, crises are also the result of certain discursive practices, which in the Basque case have tried to highlight “the good and serious management in Basque politics against the Spanish crisis and its related politics of spectacle” (Urkullu, 2016a).** In such a way, anger and indignation are strategically re-directed towards the Spanish matrix state, which is used as a constitutive outside. Consequently, the *status quo* is reinforced *ad intra* (Basque level) and put under fire *ad extra* (Spanish level).⁴⁸⁷ We will see its concrete articulation below.

6.2.3 Crisis in: Basque democratization and the organic crisis of Spain.

According to the above-mentioned ideas, these are so far our preliminary conclusions:

⁴⁸⁷ We see a clear example in the results of the elections. Whereas the results of PP and PSOE in the BAC have been the lowest for decades, the ones obtained by ruling PNV have remained high and have even increased during the 2011-2016 election period.

- Due to the process of democratization/de-democratization of the last thirty years, **Basque State Institutions have been more successful than the Spanish ones on increasing trust and dependence** of the citizens of the Basque Autonomous Community. Through the interaction between nation, demos and state building processes, they have produced and reproduced a new subject/object: the Basque demos (H4).
- Therefore, current **sovereignty demands are based on the will of achieving higher political capacities in order to produce and reproduce the Basque demos** in accordance with its preferences. In other words, sovereignty demands are not only based on being a different nation but also and especially on being a democratic political structure that requires political capacities to function democratically. **The key is not the accommodation of a distinctive cultural identity but how and to what extent can the Basque subaltern state speak (H4).**
- Unlike the other case studies (Spain, Catalonia, Scotland and Great Britain), we cannot consider the current situation in the Basque Autonomous Community as an “organic crisis”. Despite the organic crisis of Spain and its weaknesses in the BAC, we just see a **“moderate” crisis of representation, crisis of institutional integration, crisis of political capacities, crisis of legitimacy and crisis of hegemony**. The lack of a process of independence is both its cause and its consequence. **That is, in a dialectic between structure and action, we believe that the strength of current *status quo* is a structural barrier for a process of independence but at the same time, it is the lack of a process of independence which strengthens current *status quo* (H6).**
- This situation could be described as a **“crisis in the institutional order”** for which familiar crisis-management routines have already been developed (Jessop, 2015a:458). **Elite bargaining, passive revolution and transformism** would be the informal channels to handle the crisis. They can have a more formal institutionalised compromise such as the renewal of the Statute of Autonomy.
- We have said that the Catalan “procès” is both a trigger and a consequence of the organic crisis of Spain. On the contrary, ***passive revolution* and *the transformist operation*** at the Basque level reduces the instability and the organic crisis of Spain and helps the **consolidation of a new “structural moment”** (Jessop, 1982: 253).
- Due to the strategic (in)action of Basque nationalists, **there is not a new counter-hegemonic pro-independence articulation:**
 - The BNP (PNV) has articulated a successful hegemonic imaginary in which both, the Spanish state but also an independent Basque state (although to a lesser extent) are used as its constitutive outside. We may call this operation **a populist institutional articulation.**

- Neither EHBildu nor any pro-independence actor have succeeded in articulating a pro-independence hegemonic project. Its path dependence legacies have had greater relevance than its path-shaping strategies.
- Spanish nationalism has been unable to articulate an appealing discourse after the end of the democrats versus violent dichotomy and its related “anti-terrorist hegemony”.

Thus, we are going to proceed through two interrelated steps in order to deal with the more concrete and complex planes of our analysis: (1) we are going to bring back the *mechanisms and processes of secession* in line with the explanation of Catalan contention; (2) we are going to address the issue of the *autonomist hegemony and its populist articulation*.

6.3 Mechanisms and processes

In this case, the political closeness with Catalonia acts as *connecting vessel*. Thus, although analytically distinct the two cases are in connection so we are not going to repeat ideas already explained in the Catalan case. Therefore, we will try to focus on the specificities of the Basque (lack of) contention. We are going to begin with catalysing mechanisms, that is, those which are instrumental in triggering a secessionist contentious episode.

Catalysing mechanisms: opportunity spirals, infringement of the interests of the elites and sudden imposition of grievances.

When it comes to the **opportunity spirals**, in line with global structural changes⁴⁸⁸ we are witnessing the rise of movements that claim more democracy and more sovereignty that connect, in its more basic features, with sovereigntist movements in historic nations. Moreover, the proximity of Catalan and Scottish contentions have opened up new opportunities hardly conceivable a few years ago. The end of ETA’s armed activity is also an opportunity factor without which the secessionist contentious cycle would not have been activated easily. In the Basque case, however, the difficulty of managing the consequences of the conflict is retarding the effect which that circumstance might have of intensifying sovereigntist demands (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015:7).

With regard to *the infringement of the interests of the elites*, unlike the Catalan case, ‘the existence of the Economic Arrangement, which grants wide-scale fiscal autonomy to the Basque chartered territories, has saved the Basque elites’ interests from being particularly affected’ (ibidem:8). The activation of the *sudden imposition of grievances* has been very weak, or one could say non-existent. ‘There has been no clear objective prejudice that could be construed as a grievance by both nationalist families, the one,

⁴⁸⁸ See the previous chapters.

moderated, led by the PNV (BNP), and the one clustered around the nationalist left. There did not exist, as in Catalonia, any obvious general economic prejudice or a shared political plan that had been wrecked' (idem). On the one hand, as seen above, the rejection of the new statute did not entail a massive popular reaction. On the other, the Spanish government's anti-terrorist and penitentiary policy affected almost exclusively the nationalist left (idem).

Mobilizing mechanisms: category formation, identity shift, tactical innovation, brokerage and competition.

Category formation⁴⁸⁹ is essential for both *identity creation* and *polarization*. In line with Catalonia, the emergence of key concepts connected to a democratic master frame such as 'sovereignism' and 'the right to decide' are the most remarkable elements (ibidem:10). In direct connection with this "category formation", there arises **tactical innovation in the repertoire of mobilization** –"consulting with the citizens"–, which extends coherently with the democratic discourse (idem). Thus, with a clear influence of Catalan and Scottish processes, Gure Esku Dago has organized a series of mobilizations with the aim of promoting the right to decide. Along with main trade unions (especially ELA and LAB), it has been one of the most important **brokers** of recent Basque politics. Finally, as seen above a fierce **competition** has prevailed over the last years. More concretely, after the period of illegalization of the nationalist left an internal mechanism of competition within Basque nationalism was strongly activated, making it difficult to gather the necessary strength to fuel a secessionist episode (ibidem:12).

We believe that in this case, it makes more sense to analyse both, **facilitating and deactivating mechanisms** together. **Facilitating mechanisms:** the de-alignment of elites and the certification of the process carried out by external agents, particularly international ones. **Deactivating mechanisms:** the adaptation of the subject of the demand to repressive contexts and/or to alternative political proposals made by the kin-state.

As long as there is not a secessionist episode, it is obvious that those **facilitating mechanisms** that usually assist its consolidation have not been activated. Thus, in the absence of a clear infringement of the interest of the elites, **we do not see a switching of loyalties that could entail a more permanent de-alignment**. Moreover, we believe that deactivating mechanisms in one case hamper the activation of an episode in the other and vice versa. In that regard, **the lack of certification** by neither Spanish nor international agents in the case of Catalonia has retrenched even more a hypothetical diffusion to the Basque Country. Had the Catalan referendum been allowed or at least certified by external agents, it could have opened up a new opportunity spirals to a Basque episode.

⁴⁸⁹ We will consider these ideas further below.

On the contrary, its *repression* offers little encouragement to the mobilization of the most moderates sectors reducing its feasibility in the short-term.

Moreover, *alternative proposals* made by the matrix state to the PNV (for example the Cupo agreement) and the degree of understanding between both Spanish and Basque Governments, does not only reduce the possibilities to a Basque episode but also counterweights the Catalan one. Thus, in stark contrast to Catalonia, we see a clear *certification* of PNV⁴⁹⁰ as a preferential partner of any minority government in Spain.

Although in an incipient phase, there is also an ongoing process of debate on the renewal of Basque home-rule, which could entail an '*internal certification of the right to decide*'. However, it is too early to put forward such a result in a context of constant change and a high degree of uncertainty.

Apart from this mechanisms they also mention three *broader processes: identity sift, polarization and diffusion* (ibidem:14-15). In order to avoid redundancy, on the one hand, we are going to refer directly to what we have said when analysing the Catalan case and on the other, we are going to gather them inside a more concrete process: *hegemony*.

Hegemony as a concrete process:

We have included inside hegemony the next concrete mechanisms: (1) *brokerage*, (2) *tactical innovation on discourses and repertoires of contention* and (3) *polarization*.

Although *brokerage* is an essential mechanism, we think that its scope has been limited. First, we have to bear in mind that "Basque civil society has consolidated into a militant subjection that is more compartmentalized and less susceptible to transversality as an inevitable consequence of a violent conflict." (Ibidem:11). Consequently, we see a limited brokerage among those a priori miscible sectors, such as Basque nationalists themselves. Thus, although Gure Esku Dago and the main Basque nationalist trade unions have been able to gather previously separated sovereigntist actors, their impact has been higher on those people closer to the nationalist left. Moreover, they have had a much weaker influence outside those sectors that are not connected to Basque nationalism. Thus, the lack of a strong brokerage limits the predominance of the *logic of equivalence* necessary for a new hegemony (Laclau, 2005). Consequently, an attendant process such as the *internal diffusion* has also been weak in the Basque case.

⁴⁹⁰ Also certified by economic elites as a 'guarantee for stability'. See for instance the meeting between Basque Lehendakari (President) and big business representatives:
<http://www.elcorreo.com/economia/urkullu-ofrece-estabilidad-20180314203008-nt.html> (Last access: 15/03/2018).

The *tactical innovation on discourses and repertoires of contention* is also remarkable and its closely related to a process of *external diffusion*⁴⁹¹. After decades of violent repertoires, peaceful occupation of public space, resistance, civil disobedience or even ‘Audio-visual Cultural Artefacts of Protest and Demand’ are now the dominant ones (Letamendia, 2015). Most of them are in tune with the dominant repertoires in Western countries. Thus, although the secession option does not seem viable in the short term, we see a return of “sovereignism” and more specifically of the “the right to decide” to the political scene after its previous diffusion from the Basque Country to Catalonia. More concretely, according to Martinez and Zubiaga “one can detect a kind of “back-and-forth diffusion”, a “return diffusion” which takes that category and tactical innovation from the Basque Country⁴⁹² to Catalonia, and later from Catalonia to the Basque Country” (2015:337). The emergence of Gure Esku Dago⁴⁹³ in 2013 a platform similar to the Catalan *Plataforma pel Dret a Decidir* would be its more concrete expression. Moreover, PNV, EHBildu and Podemos⁴⁹⁴ have also supported the claims in favour of the right to decide and most of the activities promoted by them. The platform is mainly based in the southern part of the Basque Country⁴⁹⁵.

When it comes to its discourse, the frame structure based on 1) diagnosis, 2) prognosis and 3) motivation can be easily deduced from their guiding principles⁴⁹⁶: 1) We are a people; 2) We have the right to decide; 3) It is the age of citizens (Gure Esku Dago, 2015:4). We see thus a discursive innovation from the classical right to self-determination that in addition to its capacity for expansion, it is attuned to a dominant democratic master frame (Ibídem: 330). *Tactical innovation on discourses and repertoires* of contention, are crucial for the emergence of the political, which enables the social rupture that opens the door to hegemonic struggles (Zubiaga, 2012:126). In that regard, apart from this *category formation* (sovereignism and right to decide) its relevance is in line with certain

⁴⁹¹ When it comes to the external diffusion, we directly rely on what we have said when analysing the Catalan case.

⁴⁹² Although they did not mention directly “the right to decide”, there were some initiatives in the Basque Country that already get its essence, such as, the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement in 1998 and the Charter of Rights of the Basque Country promoted by Udalbiltza in 2002. The first document that explicitly tried to regulate it was the New Statute of Free Association (2004) (Nikolas et.al, 2016:12).

⁴⁹³ The movement “Nazioen Mundua” created in 2007 was a pioneer for the posterior creation of GED.

⁴⁹⁴ To a lesser extent, some members of the PSE-EE have also supported the initiative. The most relevant figure was Gema Zabaleta former Basque Minister of Labour and Social Affairs who left the party in 2017 due to the application of the article 155 of the Spanish Constitution in Catalonia.

⁴⁹⁵ For further information on its view about the North of the Basque Country see:

http://kazeta.naiz.eus/es/info_kz/20170626/gure-esku-dagoren-izpiritua-iparraldean-jada-hedatutako-jarrera-da (Last access: 1 December 2017).

⁴⁹⁶ In Basque: 1) Herri bat gara; 2) Erabakitze Eskubidea dugu; 3) Herritarron garaia da. For further information see: <https://www.gureeskudago.eus/eu/nor-gara> (Last access: 1 December 2017).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

innovative repertoires, such as a human chain, the scheweing days or popular consultations. We believe that they can be summarised thanks to the next images:

IRUDIA 73 Gure Esku Dago



Source: Compiled by the author from: Gure Esku Dago (2018).

⁴⁹⁷ **A)** Human chain hold on June 8 2014 between Durango and Pamplona. **B)** Mosaic in Zurriola Beach formed by 10.000 people in San Sebastian on November 8 2014. **C)** A woman voting in the popular consultation hold on 5 November 2017 in Galdakao (Biscay). **D)** Sewing day in Vitoria in May 2015. People sewed their fabrics together as a symbol of “the unity of different wills”.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Notwithstanding its relevance, its impact has been much lower than in Catalonia and obviously much less than in Scotland. All in all, GED has tried to pose the right to decide in the midst of the political debate. As we see in the next box, we are coping with an issue that receives a broad support among different Basque territories:

TAULA 56 Support to the right to decide

	Araba	Bizkaia	Gipuzkoa	Navarre	North BC	BAC	BC (7)
In favour	62.2	57.1	79.1	57.1	52.9	71.3	66.8
Against	28.0	34.9	12.2	34.9	31.0	19.0	23.3
Don't know	7.2	5.5	6.2	5.5	13.9	7.20	7.40
No Answer	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.50	2.50
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: (Amurrio et al., 2015:27)

Finally, as already said, *polarization* is a key mechanism not only for hegemony or secession but also for any process of democratization (Zubiaga, 2009). Although trade unions and social movements are actives (especially feminism), the lack of strong polarization is one of the key features of current Basque politics. This is especially clear with regard to demands for sovereignty. After a decade of a two-axis polarization – the institutional one mainly represented by Ibarretxe Governments and the one related to the Basque Protest Cycle- the lack of polarization is prevailing. Thus, while more differential positions are reinforced (PNV-PSE agreement or PP-PNV agreement) the political scene gravitates towards the centre making a movement towards secessionist positions more unlikely.

All in all, we can conclude by saying that mechanisms and processes of secession have not been activated. More concretely, the mechanisms of a key process such as hegemony have neither been activated. Although, at this point in time, there is not a “secessionist contentious episode” and secession is not foreseeable in the short term demands for sovereignty have not disappeared. Thus, we are going to analyse in the most concrete and complex plane of our analysis the issue of autonomist hegemony and its populist articulation.

6.4 Autonomist hegemony and populist articulation:

6.4.1 Introduction:

Although independence and self-government have been at the core of Basque political debates for many years, in recent times the issue of sovereignty has re-emerged in line with the closer international context (Apaolaza, 2012, 2015; Galfarsoro, 2015; Goikoetxea, 2013a, 2014, 2015, 2017; Olariaga, 2015; Zubiaga, 2015). *When we say closer international context, we refer to sovereignty demands that result from different dimensions of the contradictions of the so-called Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime and more concretely, that derive from the privatization of democracy (H1).*

As already mentioned, it is in periods of social crisis when discursive interpretations of reality take special importance enhancing the role of the semiotic moment (Hay, 1996; Jessop, 2008a; Laclau, Mouffe, 1987). However, as long as they are complexly interwoven, one cannot be understood without the other. Thus, although struggles to interpret an uncertain conjuncture could shape subsequent developments, the ability to win such struggles depend not only on *structural factors (strategic selectivities)* but also on *discursive factors (discursive selectivity)* (Jessop, 2008a:48).

In that regard, “in the same way that a given context is *strategically selective* – selecting for, but never determining, certain strategies over others – it is also *discursively selective* – selecting for, but never determining, the discourses through which it may be appropriated” (Hay, 2001; Jessop, 2008a:49).

On this basis, *we believe that both structural and discursive factors have enabled a coherent autonomist hegemony (H7)*. We have said that Basque State Institutions have been more successful than the Spanish ones on increasing trust and dependence of the citizens of the Basque Autonomous Community. In that line, not only Basque institutions receive higher ratings but also most of the socioeconomic results are higher than the Spanish media. Furthermore, instead of an organic crisis, we just see a “moderate” crisis of representation, crisis of institutional integration, crisis of political capacities, crisis of legitimacy and crisis of hegemony⁴⁹⁸. With that in mind, the narrative that articulates both, the wills to achieve higher political capacities with the deeply sedimented idea that says that “Basques live better than Spaniards”⁴⁹⁹, may easily be articulated under the frame

⁴⁹⁸ See the previous epigraph.

⁴⁹⁹ We can see for instance the data provided by the EITB focus of May 2016 that asked about the “quality of life in the BAC in comparison with Spain”: 71.2% said that it was better and 11.4% said that it was much better. However, when asked about the “quality of life in the BAC in comparison with Europe” 38.4% said that it was worst and only 6.5% said that it was better. For further information see the next link: <http://www.eitb.eus/es/noticias/economia/detalle/4088762/eitb-focus-vivimos-espana-europa/> (Last access: 30 November 2017)

“we need to change but we live well enough to change too much”. We believe that it is this very idea the one that lies behind current autonomist hegemony lead by PNV.

As long as we are not dealing with a completely determined and structurally constrained process, a different narrative could have been articulated under the flag **“we need to change and achieve a Basque state in order to live better”**. It is the discursive hypothesis lead by EHBildu and different pro-independence sectors. Up to know its impact has not been strong enough as to become hegemonic, and do not seem that it would be in the short-term.

We need to mention a third attempt lead by Podemos that has combined the respect to the right to decide and the plurinationality of Spain with a proposal for a political change against the government of the PP. Their success in the General Elections of 2015 and 2016 in the BAC show that these ideas were appealing for broad sectors of Basque society. In a simplified manner, we can resume their proposal as follows: **“In order to live better we need to change Spain which will also enable a change in the Basque Country”**. However, considering their results in the Basque Elections of 2016, the end of the “populist moment” in Spain and the response to the Catalan contention, it seems that its feasibility is fading little by little (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018).

Finally, those sectors lead by PP and PSE-EE that historically promoted the flag of “constitutionalism” have been deeply affected by two phenomena: the lack of a coherent discursive renewal after the end of democrats versus violent dichotomy and its related “anti-terrorist hegemony” and the negative impact of the organic crisis of Spain for their project in the BAC.

We believe that both structural and discursive factors have strategically favoured the first attempt. However, notwithstanding the absence of a secessionist contentious episode at Basque level, there has been a longstanding pro-independence movement that has kept the issue in the political agenda. Moreover, we identify currently at least three⁵⁰⁰ interrelated processes that deal with self-government and sovereignty:

- v. The parliamentary debate on the renewal of Basque home-rule⁵⁰¹. As already mentioned, there has been an ongoing debate on the issue of autonomy during the last decades. Since January 2017⁵⁰², Basque Parliament has boosted an

⁵⁰⁰ Although with a lower public impact, there is an ongoing process of debate on Basque socio-political structure lead by Eusko Ikaskuntza that may affect the other dimensions. It goes beyond the scope of our research coping with it. For further information see: <http://www.eusko-ikaskuntza.eus/eu/eremu-tematikoak/egituraketa-sozio-politikoak/en-2/> (Last access: 29/11/2017).

⁵⁰¹ As long as it is an ongoing process, the latest proposals have been published once this analysis was finished. However, after studying their content they do not change substantially the core of our research.

⁵⁰² A similar proposal failed during the legislative period 2012-2016.

official proposal to update current self-government with the support of PNV, Podemos and PSE, the abstention of EHBildu and the rejection of PP.


- vi. The grass root oriented movement lead by Gure Esku Dago that seeks to put into practice the ‘right to decide’ of the Basque people.
- vii. The grass root pro-sovereigntist space lead by main Basque trade unions (ELA and LAB).

Thus, we are going to consider Basque nationalists sovereignty demands and the grounds on which they are based. Strictly speaking, unlike the cases of Òmnium and ANC in Catalonia, Gure Esku Dago cannot be labelled as “Basque nationalist”⁵⁰³. However, in accordance with our approach, those who understand that both ‘matrix states’ and ‘subaltern states’ are equal political bodies will be called ‘subaltern nationalists’ so we can include Gure Esku Dago in this definition.

With that in mind, we are going to consider firstly, the claims made by Gure Esku Dago around the right to decide. In a second step, we are going to divide two main groups: on the one hand, we are going to consider PNV’s sovereignty demands because they are more related to the actualization of self-government rather than with a direct claim for independence. On the other hand, we are going to deal with those actors that actively support independence such as EHBildu, Sortu, ELA and LAB.

Our research question asks about the relation between the transformation of the state in a post-fordist era (SWPR) and sovereignty demands in historic nations. We think that due to those changes sovereignty demands gravitate towards demos and state building issues. When it comes to the logic beneath their discourse, we are going to follow again the scheme provided by the frame analysis in order to analyse in a second step its populist articulation (Errejón, 2011; Snow et.al, 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988).

IRUDIA 74 Hegemony and populist articulation



⁵⁰³ As long as it is a platform that only claims the exercise of the right to decide.

6.4.2 Gure Esku Dago⁵⁰⁴

Apart from the above-mentioned ideas, Gure Esku Dago has promoted different proposals in order to put into practice the right to decide. The most important one is the so-called “Citizen’s Agreement”⁵⁰⁵ presented in June 2017 and the human chain that will link the three provinces of the Basque Autonomous Community in June 2018. The demonstration will begin in Donostia and finish in Gasteiz at the gates of the Basque Parliament. There they will hand over the Citizens' Agreement to the authorities. In between these events, they are ‘filling with social content’ the Citizen’s Agreement trying to find 2019 reasons to decide in different thematic areas. We believe that the process is similar to the one promoted⁵⁰⁶ in 2014 by ANC and Òmnium Cultural through the campaign ‘Ara ‘es l’hora. Units per un pas nou’ and in 2015 through the ‘Via Lliure a la Republica Catalana’.

Thus, as we can see in the next images they ask a question: why should we decide? They try to answer it by gathering people with different political sensitivities. *The topics under debate are again related to demos building issues such as welfare, citizenship, culture or the defence of the land (H4).*

⁵⁰⁴ “It is in our hands” in English.

⁵⁰⁵Its core ideas run as follows: sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, agreement, legality, participation, efficient, political equality, social justice and responsibility. The text is available online in the next link; <https://www.berria.eus/dokumentuak/dokumentua1711.pdf> (last access 19/03/2018).

⁵⁰⁶ However, it does not have a clear pro-independence inspiration but a more general ‘sovereignist’ one.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

IRUDIA 75 Gure Esku Dago: Zergatik Erabaki?



Source: Gure Esku Dago, 2018.

The very dynamic promotes brokerage and the logic of equivalence. Thus, as we can see in the different testimonies,⁵⁰⁷ each one links its own main claim with the right to decide. For instance, *feminist* Amaia Zufia wants the right to decide “in order to decide freely no matter if she is lesbian, women or migrant”. The *former deputy* Emilio Olabarria wants the right to decide in order to “manage our pension system”. The *renewable energy cooperative member* Erika Martínez, wants to “decide the access and management of energy”. Finally, the *trade union leader* Garbine Aranburu defences “the right to decide labour relations and social protection because they are essential tools to build a better society”.

Thus, their *diagnosis* suggests that we are a people but we cannot decide in many essential aspects. Their *prognosis* that we have the right to decide and that it is an essential tool to build a better society. Finally, their *motivational* aspect is linked to the idea that it is the age of citizens and that active civil society needs to push to more formally elected politicians.

⁵⁰⁷ We are just considering a few as examples. They are available online in the next link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLWF6qEKqYQ> (last access 19/03/2018).

Nonetheless, apart from the mentioned approach, the right to decide has become itself an empty signifier in which at least four different meanings compete to fill its content and articulate a new hegemonic project (Zubiaga, 2015). Thus, whether for promoting secession, for renewing the Statute of Autonomy, for the radicalization of democracy or with the intention of boosting the political change in Spain, it is currently the point of departure for most of the demands for sovereignty. We will see its evolution below.

6.4.3 EAJ PNV

When it comes to EAJ-PNV, its vision on Basque nation has been closely linked to the institutionalisation of Basque self-government. In order to analyse their approach, we are going to consider mainly two political documents. (1) ‘Batasuna eta indarra’ approved in 2016 by party’s General Assembly and which establishes their political line for four years (2016-2020). (2) The proposal for the debate on a new statute of the Basque Parliament also released in 2016⁵⁰⁸. Furthermore, we are going to include public statements of party’s most relevant spokespersons. Due to their role, we are giving special relevance to Lehendakari Iñigo Urkullu (President of the Basque Government) and PNV’s president Andoni Ortuzar.

The key of their approach is the need to get a bilateral relation vi-à-vis Spain. That is, to get a relation in which the BAC is considered and equal political entity vi-à-vis Spain and not a subordinated one.

1- Diagnosis:

A- Problem: homogenization, lack of political capacities, re-centralization, subordination, lack of recognition of the Basque nation.

Which is the main problem according to the PNV? The lack of political capacities to govern Basque people. In that regard, central government’s approach is considered to promote homogenization by equalizing all autonomous communities without considering the differences laid down in the Spanish Constitution between those which respond to a historical will for self-government and those which are just the result of a process of decentralization (PNV, 2016b:8). In line with this approach, they clearly declare that the Basque Autonomous Community is not just a mere community and they claim the right to be recognized as a “state”:

“Euskadiko Autonomia Erkidegoa **ez da autonomia erkidego soil bat**. Eta hori argi eta garbi utzi beharra dago etorkizunean Estatuekin eman daitekeen akordio politikora begira. Euzkadik estatus berria behar du zeinen bidez Euskal Herria Estatu gisa aitortua izango den.” (PNV, 2016a:21)

⁵⁰⁸ As already said there is a newer one but it does not change substantially the key of our research.

Furthermore, they see Spanish **centralist tradition** as part of system's DNA (PNV, 2016b:9). In their view, this has caused the rupture of the political balances of the Spanish political and constitutional system in favour of a much more unitary view of the state (Ídem). Thus, nearly all governments have promoted recentralization through all the tools at their disposal: the National Reform Program submitted to the EU, the amendment of article 135 of the Constitution, the CORA report, the use of decree-laws, the use of a legislative policy that seeks to pre-empt the competences of autonomies etc. (Ídem:13). In the end, it creates in the practice a relation of subordination in which the central state reinforces its position as the hierarchical superior even in those devolved areas, especially in those related to economy:

“Estatuak hain hedadura handia ematen die bere eskumen-tituluei, uste baitu edozein eremu materialetan legetu ahal duela, bai eta autonomia-erkidegoen eskumen eskusiboetan ere. Estatuak nagusitasun ia osoa bereganatu du politika publikoak hartzean, eta, bereziki, izaera ekonomikokoetan.”
(Ídem:14)

In their view, there is a fact which is paramount to understand the problem: the absence of a political agreement that recognizes properly the historical nations in Spain (Ídem:12). That being the case, three reasons determine the current situation: (1) the lack of recognition of the Basque Country as a political subject and its right to decide; (2) the reluctant attitude and even the complete opposition of the Central Government to keep a bilateral relationship based in a reciprocal and bilateral agreement; (3) the absence of effective tools to defend the attacks against self-government. (Ídem:5).

These reasons are directly interrelated and in their view, the only way to solve them is *the adoption of a new statute* (Ídem). That would be part of what we have called the prognosis, as we will see later.

B- Injustice: a 'low quality' autonomy: the absence of competences already recognized by the Statute of 1979, economic shortcomings etc.

Because of the above-mentioned problems, current situation is defined as one with a 'low quality political autonomy' (PNV, 2016b:12). Consequently, despite being an Organic Law, the Statute of Autonomy of 1979 has not been fully complied and 35 competences that were already recognized in 1979 have not been devolved yet (Ídem:5-6; Urkullu, 2017). Furthermore, not complying the Statute has caused economic damages to the Basque Country. They directly quote a report of the PNV-led Basque Government of 1995 to state that the impossibilities to apply the Economic Concert to all the Basque competences prevents acquiring the legally corresponding funding level (idem). In that regard, according to a report of the PNV-led Basque Government of 2015, the Basque Budget may be twice as high as it is today had all the competences been devolved

(Erkoreka, 2015)⁵⁰⁹. Thus, in PNV's view in order to solve country's main problems and their related injustices *a new Statute of Autonomy* becomes indispensable.

2- Prognosis:

A- Winner dimension: Basque self-government as a solution: bilateralism, right to decide, independence of the XXIst century and a new statute of autonomy.

A new Statute of Autonomy is regarded as the main tool to face current 'adulterated context' and, in that way, recover the original idea of modern Basque self-government, its recognition as a nation and the assurance of its capacity to evolve and deal with current society's political wills and socioeconomic needs (PNV, 2016b:5). However, they reject those views that claim federalism but take current autonomies as a referent point, because in their view "that differentiated Basque identity is not only based on a different language or culture but on the view of a majority of Basques that consider themselves a nation"⁵¹⁰ (PNV, 2016a: 21). Thus, the key to this is granting 'more and better self-government'⁵¹¹ as stated in the agreement to govern the BAC between PNV and PSE-EE (PNV-PSE-EE, 2016: 61-71).

Thus, the recognition of the Basque nation cannot be reduced to rhetoric but to a **bilateral relationship** with the states (PNV, 2016a:22). **Bilateralism** entails both, the way to achieve a new agreement (between two equal political entities) and the tool to enforce the two sides to respect this very agreement in the future (PNV, 2016a:22). Thus, in case of conflicts a dialogue between the BC and the Spanish Government should be encouraged in order to solve them by consensus (ídem). That scheme would not be limited to Basque competences but also to all 'basic laws' that condition Basque self-government and which respond to a hierarchical conception of sovereignty (Ídem.). In case of not reaching an agreement, an arbitral tribunal should be created by representatives chosen by both sides (Ídem.). Although the arguments to define bilateralism are endless, they follow the same logic: the definition of the Basque Autonomous Community as an equal political entity

⁵⁰⁹ According to the PNV member and Basque Government's spokesperson Josu Erkoreka: "un Estatuto de Gernika "completo", con todas las transferencias pendientes ejecutadas y "a pleno rendimiento económico-financiero", podría "multiplicar casi por dos el actual presupuesto" de la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca, que es de 10.638 millones." https://elpais.com/ccaa/2015/09/15/paisvasco/1442332310_732906.html

⁵¹⁰ "Horregatik, batzuek ondo zehaztu gabe proposatzen duten konponbide federalak ez du balio, elementu "federatu" horiek gaur egungo Autonomi Erkidegoak baldin badira. Euskal nortasun berezitua ez datza soilik ezaugarri kultural batzuetan edo hizkuntza berezitu batean, baizik eta hiritargoaren gehiengo batek Euskal Herria Nazio jotzen dutelako errealitatean"

⁵¹¹ These are exactly the same words that the above mentioned government agreement between PSC, ERC, and ICV used in 2003: "Més i millor autogovern: més qualitat democràtica" (Pacte del Tinell, 2003:2).

vis-à-vis Spain. In order to materialize that goal, a new statute would be the necessary tool.

“Bilateralism” is used as a nodal point: on the one hand, it claims a recognition of the Basque Country as an equal political entity vis-à-vis the central state and in the other, it becomes the tool to reach new political agreements with the central state. Whereas the first idea attracts the more pro-independence sectors, the second is more prone to articulate all the sectors that do not want independence at embrace a certain degree of “regionalism”.

The right to decide is seen as one of the means to achieve that goal. Firstly introduced by former Lehendakari Juan José Ibarretxe in article 13 of the “The Political Statute of the Community of the Basque Country” of 2005, it entails in current PNV’s hegemonic view, the right of Basque people to decide its future on the previously agreed pact with the Spanish state. In that regard, we rely directly on current Lehendakari’s words. When asked about how does he understand the right to decide Iñigo Urkullu says:

Lo fundamental es el concepto de autogobierno. No abarca solo su desarrollo competencial. Comprende el reconocimiento de Euskadi como nación, un sistema efectivo de garantías y la capacidad de consulta a los ciudadanos. Antes de la consulta, los partidos deben acordar la actualización del autogobierno. Luego, se debe negociar un pacto con el Estado como con el Estatuto en 1979, que ha sido modificado unilateralmente desde el propio Estado. **El derecho a decidir es la consulta legal y pactada de ese acuerdo.**” (Urkullu, 2016c)

However, the right to decide has become itself an empty signifier in which at least four different approaches compete to fill its content and articulate a new hegemonic project (Zubiaga, 2015). We will cope with it further below but we anticipate that inside the PNV itself there are different views (more pro-independence in Gipuzkoa but not so in the rest of the provinces) and the very idea of ‘the right to decide’ serves as a bridge among party’s inner approaches.

With that in mind, *PNV’s sovereignty demands are not based on what has been branded as ‘primitive and ethnic nationalism’ but on the will of achieving higher political capacities in order to deepen Basque democratization. Thus, the key of their demands gravitate around issues related to demos and state building (H4)*. If we consider the already quoted document ‘Batasuna eta indarra’ that establishes their political line for four years (2016-2020), its content mostly refers to articles of the Political Statute rejected by the Congress of Deputies in 2005 (PNV, 2016a:26-27). When it comes to the definition of the Basque nation, they also refer to the so-called ‘Loiola Agreements’ that defended the relationship between the Basque 7 provinces (idem.).

Moreover, PNV's current aim has mainly two objectives that correspond to the above-mentioned idea: 'more and better self-government'. This means that on the one hand, they want to get more competences and on the other, they want to protect the existing ones. It is clearly summarised by Iñigo Urkullu in the following passage:

“[...] Por ello, ha pedido el voto para que el Gobierno español "se tome en serio la industria y la innovación, que se respete el autogobierno y **en Euskadi se gestionen las Pensiones, que las infraestructuras se gestionen en Euskadi: Puertos, Aeropuertos, Ferrocarriles, Alta Velocidad; y defender las joyas del autogobierno: Educación, Sanidad y Protección Social**". "El Partido Nacionalista Vasco va a seguir aquí, a pie de fábrica". (Urkullu, 2016b).


In that line, we need to cope with the idea of the **XXIst century independence**. As mentioned above, despite talking about the need to recognize the Basque state (PNV, 2016b:21), there is always a certain degree of ambiguity with regard to the future of the Basque Country so a combination of more “pro-independence” claims are usually interspersed with much more moderate claims for self-government. Therefore, the term **XXIst century independence**⁵¹² is a good synthesis of this very ambiguity. When asked about it on an interview that dealt with the issue of independence, Catalonia and self-government Iñigo Urkullu directly said:

P. Pero su nacionalismo se ha identificado con independencia.

R. El concepto de independencia es del siglo XIX. Nuestro nacionalismo en el siglo XXI es solidario, pretende más autogobierno para desarrollar las potencialidades del país en una soberanía compartida. En un mundo globalizado, la independencia es prácticamente imposible” (Urkullu, 2016c)

According to all those ideas, we can say that bilateralism, the right to decide and XXIst century independence function as the main nodal points of PNV's current hegemonic operation. It keeps the ability of articulating at the same time deeply sedimented meanings in Basque society and party's inner different political views. We will analyse it deeper below but we can get the essence of this strategy in the next graphic:

⁵¹² It has been widely used by Iñigo Urkullu. For instance, we see his defence of XXIst century independence when asked about independence in the debate of the Basque elections of 2012: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=120&v=NLmFQNIJzS0 (from 1:29 onwards)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Political frontier: as long as every identity needs a constitutive outside, a political frontier needs to be fixed. In this case, it is created between those who keep a hierarchical vision of the state and those who want to increase the political capacity of the BAC vis-à-vis the central state. However, it also excludes more implicitly those positions that claim directly an independent state. We will see its articulation below.

In order to put an end to the prognosis we can say that **nomination** does not describe an already existing reality it creates it. Different signifiers such as the above-mentioned right to decide, democracy, or the common “good management” are used in order to nominate and create “the Basque citizens” that claim higher degree of self-government in order to live better.

3- Motivation: good management.

Finally, when it comes to *motivation*, it is generally related to the discourse that enhances **the capacity of Basque institutions and particularly of PNV to do a proper management in comparison to the one of Spanish parties and institutions**. Andoni Ortuzar words are clear in this regard:

"Aquí se gobierna llegando a acuerdos con todos, se mantienen los servicios públicos y las ayudas sociales, se ayuda a la industria y a la creación de empleo, nos preocupamos de los sectores que peor lo están pasando, los desempleados, los jóvenes, los pensionistas, hay un Gobierno, unas

Diputaciones y unos Ayuntamientos que han demostrado el saber hacer, el buen gobierno, la buena gestión del PNV.” (Ortuzar, 2016).

Therefore, we see an attempt to *moralize the political frontier* (Errejón, 2011: 326) in which good institutional management contrasts with the Spanish corruption and politics of spectacle (Urkullu, 2016a). This very idea serves to justify the prognosis and to *propose a feasible a solution*. That is, as long as Basque institutional management has been better than the Spanish one, they claim more self-government and a new Statute of Autonomy in order to guarantee that the “good management is enhanced”.

6.4.4 Pro-independence approach

Some previous considerations:

When it comes to the pro-independence approach, we see a discursive convergence (Vasilachis de Galdino, 2007:162) between those actors that claim, despite from different views, the need for a Basque state. Thus, EHBildu (and the coalition members Sortu, EA, Alternatiba and Aralar⁵¹³), ELA and LAB along with smaller trade unions or the social movement “Independentistak” claim clearly the need for a Basque independent state. Due to its importance, the abertzale left understood in its broader sense, has had a paramount role in articulating the pro-independence movement so we have to take into account a few considerations before analysing the currently dominant discursive logic.

As considered above, the end of the contentious protest cycle that has dominated Basque politics from 1960’s onwards has influenced, inter alia, its discursive articulation (Zubiaga, 2017:126-129; Azkune, Zubiaga, 2018:74-75). During that era, despite the continuous adaptations, the influence of a revolutionary approach has prevailed in its core (Letamendia, 1997; Odrizioiola, 2016; Olariaga, 2015).

Despite promoting for years a relatively successful counter-hegemonic articulation and a political logic close to what Chantal Mouffe calls *agonistic antagonism*, its limits are directly related to the end of the protest cycle in which they were born (Azkune, Zubiaga, 2018:74-75; Zubiaga, 2012b:102). Thus, that very cycle has strategically privileged⁵¹⁴ some discourses over others even though their resonance has been fading little by little in ‘the new political time’. We concretely refer to the ones related to the ‘resolution of the Basque conflict’, the recognition of the right to self-determination⁵¹⁵ on a negotiation table or the ones related to the “abertzale paradigm” based on the achievement of the

⁵¹³ Currently is also formed by independent people with no party affiliation. Furthermore, Aralar has recently disappeared as an autonomous political party.

⁵¹⁴ As already mentioned, Basque pro-independence movement has articulated many social demands in a logic of equivalence. However, the evolution of the protest cycle and the predominance of ETA’s activities has fostered the privileging of some discourses over others.

⁵¹⁵ Currently replaced by the more overarching ‘right to decide’.

Basque state in order to defend the Basque nation (Apaolaza, 2015; Apaolaza, Galfarsoro, Olariaga, 2012; Galfarsoro, 2008). Regarding the last, according to some critical views, they have adopted a logic that has relied on the defence of ‘particulars’ instead of resignifying ‘universals’⁵¹⁶ reducing in that way their capacity to become hegemonic (idem; Apaolaza, 2012, 2015).

Be that as it may, they have strategically promoted a strategic and discursive renewal especially from 2011 onwards with the aim of linking independence with demos and state building issues (Ezker Abertzalea, 2016:9-10). Nevertheless, in the interaction between path shaping strategies and path dependent legacies they have not achieved yet a narrative powerful enough as to articulate a new hegemonic vision in line with the Scottish or Catalan nationalism (Azkune, Zubiaga, 2018; Apaolaza, 2012, 2015; Apaolaza, Galfarsoro, Olariaga, 2012; Galfarsoro, 2015; Goikoetxea, 2014a; Olariaga, 2015).

We directly rely on the reflection carried out between 2015 and 2016 by the abertzale left during their internal debate entitled “Euskal Herria Zutik eta Abian” (hereafter Abian):

“Aurrera begirakoa da bigarren gogoeta. Sektore gehiago bildu behar badira, horrek eskaintza independentista gaurkotzea edo birsortzea eskatzen du, errelato independentista berri bat eraikitzea, Euskal Estatuaren aldeko hautua gero eta sektore gehiagorena izan dadin. **Nazio izaeratik eratorritako arrazoiez gain euskal herritarren beharrei erantzuna eman behar die eskaintza berrituak**, behar materialei –lana, etxebizitza, elikadura, lurra, energia, babes soziala, hezkuntza, osasungintza...– zein aspirazio sozial konpartituei –parte-hartzea, parekidetasuna, askatasun demokratikoak, aniztasun kulturala, askatasun sexuala...–. Berdintasunak, demokraziak eta justizia sozialak eskaintza independentista berriaren ikurrak behar dute izan.” (Ezker Abertzalea, 2016:10).

After this brief contextualization we are going to analyse the pro-independence discursive articulation. As mentioned above, the parliamentary debate on the renewal of Basque home-rule has been at stake at least since 2012 onwards so it has also influenced the pro-independence discourses. **We are going to take as a reference the main political actors:** (1) EHBildu and the Abertzale Left. (2) ELA and LAB trade unions that lead what has been known as ‘The majority of Basque trade unions’ (Elorrieta, 2016: 208).

1- Diagnosis:

⁵¹⁶ For further reflexion on the dichotomy particular/universal and its adequacy see the epigraph “Unibertsala eta partikularra” in the chapter “Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren Teoria”.

A- Problem: the end of the autonomist era/ lack of political capacities/ lack of state structures/ lack of sovereignty:

First, ‘the end of the autonomist era’ establishes the overall frame of the diagnosis. Whereas the ‘Abertzale left’ had historically kept a critical approach towards the autonomy, it was ELA the one that began to migrate from its initial positions during the end of the 1980s (Elorrieta, 2016:214). Thus, after their internal crisis in 1988, they distanced progressively from the support to autonomy opening a new political cycle which had its tipping point in the famous statement of 1997 in Gernika: “The Statute is dead⁵¹⁷” (Elorrieta, 1998:31). Therefore, the diagnosis is shared with the majority of political actors, including PNV, Podemos and to a lesser extent PSE: “current statute of autonomy does not provide the Basque Country with enough self-government capacity” (ELA-LAB, 2017; EHBildu, 2017; Ezker Abertzalea, 2016). Thus, the more concrete reflections have this general frame as its source.

According to EHBildu, due to the centralist nature of Spain the evolution of the Basque autonomy has been completely subordinated to the central state (2017:5). They summarize its consequences in five points: (1) The Spanish State has rejected the historic character of the Basque nation and its capacity to decide; (2) It has denied a bilateral relationship based in equality and agreement; (3) It has posed continual obstacles to the development of the Statute of Gernika; (4) It has closed the door to current social and political demands; (5) There is not a proper system to respond against the breaking of Basque powers.” (EHBildu, 2017:6).

When it comes to ELA and LAB, on the one hand, they criticize current legal and political status because it ‘denies the capacity to decide of Basque people in many areas’ and on the other, the role of the political establishment because it ‘privileges certain economic elites’ (2017:3). They summarize their diagnosis in the four points: (1) Labour reform, collective bargaining and pension reform: lack of sovereignty, precariousness and impoverishment go hand in hand; (2) Basque budget and tax policies: autonomous powers are used to benefit the economic elite; (3) Bilateralism does not work; (4) Lack of sovereignty to decide on key issues related to living and working conditions.” (ELA LAB, 2017:4-6). Therefore, according to the sovereigntist trade unions current situation

⁵¹⁷ “**El Estatuto ha muerto**, lo han matado los centralistas. Lo que pudo ser una oportunidad, se ha convertido en una trampa. Que no se nos mal interprete, nosotros no decimos, no lo hemos dicho nunca, que no tengamos nada de Estatuto, lo que subrayamos es que lo que tenemos es insuficiente, absolutamente insuficiente y además irreconocible. Para que se nos entienda bien, nosotros no tenemos mayor interés en un autogobierno que se agota sin dimensión social alguna.” (Elorrieta, 1998:31)

impedes to take decisions on key issues which prejudices Basque people while benefits certain political and economic elites (both Basque and Spanish).

In a similar fashion, Sortu establishes the dichotomy ‘independence vs. unemployment and precariousness’ (2016). On their view, the effects of neoliberalism are encouraged for not having a state (Sortu, 2016:11). Thus, whereas in 2007 Basque economic structure was similar to the German one, currently is increasingly tending to look like the Spanish one (Ibídem:12). Consequently, industry is losing its previous weight in favour of services, which affects not only the GDP but also the overall working conditions promoting precariousness (Ibídem:17). Furthermore, the situation is worst for those who are forgotten: women and young people (Ibidem: 26-32). In this basis, the ‘Basque dignified state’ is regarded as the necessary tool to face that situation (Ibídem: 34).

B- Injustice:

In line with the mentioned ideas, the injustice would relate to all those situations that result from not having a state.

In that line, Sortu reaches general conclusions after the above-mentioned ‘independence vs. unemployment and precariousness’ dichotomy. These very conclusions represent the ‘injustice’ aspect of the diagnosis. On their view: (1) Their richness is our misery; (2) The ‘hispanocentric’ approach precludes any chance of building a fairer society; (3) Spain is a failed state from the territorial and economic point of view which condemns our industrial economy and our working conditions; (4) Unemployment, precariousness and poverty prevail; (5) The face of precariousness are young people and women.” (Sortu, 2016:32-33). In order to find a solution they offer a clear prognosis: **it is time to build a dignified state**” (Ibidem:34).

However in comparison with Thatcherism in Scotland or with the ‘Procès’ in Catalonia, the ability to frame the ‘imposition of grievances’⁵¹⁸ has been much more reduced (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015:327). In that regard, unlike the massive reaction against the sentence of the Constitutional Court on Catalan Statute, the rejection of the New Statute of Free Association in 2005 was not articulated as a clear grievance (Ibidem:328). Furthermore, the economic concert has reduced the grievances of Basque elites making it more difficult to articulate a widespread frame of injustice that would cast a vision of independence as more appealing than the *status quo* (Ídem.).

The injustice, especially in the case of the Abertzale left, has been more connected to repression and the consequences of the conflict. Therefore, the banning of political

⁵¹⁸ As mentioned above, the authors distinguish the “infringement of the interests of elites” and “sudden imposition of grievances” (Martínez, Zubiaga, 2015:327). However, in order to simplify we are dealing with them together under a more general “frame of injustice”.

groups, the premise “everything is ETA” and the imprisonment of political leaders along with representatives of culture and civil society⁵¹⁹ or the practice of torture in the midst of ETA’s armed campaign promoted an ‘action-reaction’ dynamic and enhanced an ‘anti-repressive’ injustice frame. However, that frame did not represent a majoritarian position in the Basque Country and was blurred by ETA’s activity⁵²⁰. Although ETA abandoned violence in 2011, the difficulty of managing the consequences of the conflict (ETA’s disarmament and dissolution, the situation of the prisoners and the reparation of victims) has retarded the possibilities of a sovereigntist contention similar to the Catalan one (Ibidem:327).

Thus, issues related to repression have overtaken other aspects when it comes to the articulation of the injustice (Ezker Abertzalea, 2016:39). In that regard, despite the wills to articulate a new hegemonic project, in the interaction between path shaping strategies and path dependent legacies, the last ones have hampered their will to go forward in the pro-independence strategy (Ídem.).

2- Prognosis: unilaterality/right to decide/a dignified state

A- Winning dimension

The prognosis and its winning dimension is clear: the need of an independent state in order to face different social problems. Thus, *it is not simply projected in ‘classic nationalist terms’ but in democratic ones (H4)*. Their main strategic hypothesis (Bensaïd, 2013: 75) rests on the ‘exercise of the right to decide’ of Basque people. However, it is not a priori limited to the previous pact with the matrix state (bilateralism) but to the previous will of Basque people (unilateralism) (Sortu, LAB, Ernai, 2014; EHBildu & EH Bai, 2015; EHBildu, 2017; ELA & LAB, 2017).

In that regard, according to Arnaldo Otegi, EHBildu’s General Coordinator:

‘The best tool that Basques can have in order to protect the people and respond to their social demands is our own state. [...] We do not want our own state because we are a different nation so we do not raise it exclusively

⁵¹⁹ For instance: the banning of Batasuna, the trial 18/98, or the closure of the newspapers “Egunkaria” and “Egin”.

⁵²⁰ In that sense, we agree with Martínez and Zubiaga when they say that: “In the Basque case, repression of the sovereigntist demand has been facilitated by ETA’s armed activity. Its persistence has given the central state legitimacy to be able to use anti-terrorism legislation as a general means of contention, applicable not only to ETA, but also to whomever might seek to achieve their sovereigntist objectives by other means” (2015:334-335).

in national terms, but **we need a Basque state because we need to protect the people**⁵²¹ (Otegi, 2017a)

Otegi compares the future Basque state with current *statu quo* and says that:

“For EHBildu the new status is called Basque state. A state through which we are going to recover national sovereignty⁵²² **in order to build a dignified and decent state and not an imperialist and corrupted one** as it is the Spanish state”. [...] “The abertzale left does not claim self-government only for identity reasons, but **because it is the way to create a much more advanced social model** in which the rights of the people will be defended and the right to housing, health, culture and gender and wage equality will be guaranteed.” (Otegi 2017b)⁵²³

In a similar fashion, Maddalen Iriarte, EHBildu’s spokesperson in the Basque Autonomous Parliament claimed that “we need to exercise the right to decide in order to get our own state, **because that is the best tool to ensure Basque people’s welfare**”⁵²⁴ (2017).

LAB in its national assemblies’ statement of 17 September 2015⁵²⁵ entitled “sovereignty to decide sovereignty to transform” declared:

⁵²¹ «El mejor instrumento del que nos podemos dotar los vascos para proteger a la gente y hacer frente a las demandas sociales es un estado propio», ha indicado, para añadir que «no queremos ser un estado propio por ser una nación diferenciada y no lo planteamos en exclusiva en términos nacionales sino que necesitamos un estado vasco porque necesitamos proteger a la gente».

⁵²² Joseba Gabilondo provides us with a sharp criticism of that view when considering ‘EHBildu’s fetishism’ (2017:232-242). On his view, EHBildu claims for national sovereignty although they know that in current European Union sovereignty remains in Troika’s and Germany’s power (ibidem: 233). Thus, they make two fetishistic proposals in order to face that problem: socialism and international solidarity (Ídem.). However, they are not able to develop a proper definition of what socialism or international solidarity mean, and they even recognize that putting them into practice will be very difficult, even unlikely (Ídem: 232-242).

⁵²³ Por ello, para EH Bildu "el nuevo estatus (de Euskadi) se llama Estado vasco" y pasa por "recuperar su soberanía nacional" para así "construir un Estado digno y decente, no un Estado imperialista ni corrupto como el español". Otegi ha asegurado que la izquierda abertzale no reclama autogobierno únicamente "en términos identitarios", sino que es la manera de crear "un modelo social más avanzado", en el que "se defiendan los intereses de la gente y se garantice la vivienda, la sanidad, la cultura y la igualdad de género y de salario".

⁵²⁴ She made the claim before the Basque Parliament's plenary of general politics of 21 September 2017. In addition to being the most prominent plenary of the Parliament, it was pronounced in the midst of a high-profile debate on the issue of Catalan independence process.

⁵²⁵ It is qualitatively interesting because it was made in the context of the Catalan plebiscitary elections. It clearly supports Catalan independence and says that what is at stake with Catalan elections is not only the parliament of Catalonia but also the independence of the Basque Country (LAB, 2015:3).

“Independence is the most efficient tool to build a system completely oppose to capitalism. Independence means to recover the capacity to decide of the working class and the popular sectors⁵²⁶”

“For LAB, **the fight for independence is a fight to guarantee the rights of all the people that lives in the Basque Country**. We have decided that vital issues such as the boosting of public services, pensions, an equitable distribution of wealth, the rights of women or the creation of quality jobs must not be left in the hands of a State that wants them annihilated⁵²⁷” (LAB, 2015:2).

In the above-mentioned document, although ELA and LAB do not mention directly a Basque state, they talk about a path towards that direction based in a unilateral sovereigntist process (2017:6). They make concrete proposals: (1) Putting policies in favour of the people: in order for that to happen ‘it would be necessary a new political status with complete competences and sovereign tools’; (2) In order to advance in that political status, it is essential to activate a sovereigntist process that will boost an alternative and new social model; (3) It is necessary to set aside bilateralism when it comes to the relations with Spain. (ELA LAB, 2017:7)

As we see, **the arguments are based on what we have previously called ‘state and demos building dimensions’** so they are in tune with current nationalist demands in western countries (H9). **However, unlike the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, arguments on independence that focus on its pros and cons have not been at the core of public debates⁵²⁸.**

The Basque state is the final goal and **the right to decide** is the means to achieve it. Thus unlike PNV’s hegemonic view, it is not seen as the referendum to approve a new status of autonomy but as the strategic hypothesis (Bensaïd, 2013:75) in order to get the Basque state. In that regard, most of the proposals of the pro-independence actors connect **the right to decide** of Basque people with **a unilateral process of sovereignty** and the **achievement of a state** (Sortu, LAB, Ernai, 2014; EHBildu & EH Bai, 2015; EHBildu, 2017; ELA & LAB, 2017). Although they claim the right to decide in the whole Basque Country, their proposals have as starting point current administrative units: the Basque Autonomous Community, Navarre and the Northern Basque Country. The most relevant

⁵²⁶ “La independencia es el instrumento más eficaz para construir un sistema diametralmente opuesto a los parámetros del capitalismo. Independencia supone recuperar la capacidad de decisión para la clase trabajadora y para los sectores populares que hoy luchan en todos los ámbitos de nuestra sociedad.”

⁵²⁷ “Para LAB, la lucha por la independencia es una lucha para garantizar los derechos de todas las personas que viven en Euskal Herria. Y hemos decidido que cuestiones tan vitales como impulsar los servicios públicos, las pensiones, el reparto equitativo de la riqueza, los derechos de las mujeres o la creación de empleo de calidad no pueden quedarse en manos de un Estado que ha decidido aniquilarlos.”

⁵²⁸ **We see an exception on the inte**

ones are the ones that develop the so-called ‘Basque way’⁵²⁹: Euskal Herria Bidean (debated by Sortu, LAB and Ernai in 2014); Herri Borondatearen garaia (debated by EHBildu and EHBai in 2015); Aldebakarreko Burujabetza Prozesu Sozial baten alde (proposed by ELA and LAB in September 2017).

As already noted, rather than with a codified law, we are dealing with an **empty signifier** whose content is in dispute among different actors (Zubiaga, 2015). In that regard, pro-independence left wing sectors have not only tried to articulate it with the right of Basque people to hold a referendum on independence⁵³⁰ but also with broader social issues such as ‘the empowerment of citizens’ and the ‘radicalization of democracy’ (Ídem.).

When it comes to the right to hold a referendum, according to EHBildu and EHBai:

“Until now we have claimed the recognition of the right to self-determination in order to decide. It has not been possible. The closeness of the states have not allowed it. Now, **we are going to decide in order to get the right to decide**. [...] We will get the capacity to decide by taking decisions and implementing them, not by waiting to a formal recognition.” (2015:10)

Thus, in addition to an evolution from the classical right to self-determination to a defence of a broader ‘right to decide’ (López, 2015:24-28; Nikolas, Zubiaga, Oiarbide, Urrutia, 2016:27-30), we observe **a defence of unilateralism** instead of bilateralism. Furthermore, a few lines below they introduce a view that articulate it with broader social issues:

“We want **to apply the right to decide in all societal fields**, to live as Basque citizens and to choose how to live as Basque citizens; to guarantee minimum living standards to everybody, to guarantee equality between men and women, that is, to achieve social justice (Ibidem:10-11). “

For their part, ELA and LAB equalize **the right to decide and the Basque framework of labour relations and Social Protection** (2017:7). They consider both the two faces of the same coin. In that regard, they believe that “in order to make our claims effective, and in this way improve our life and working conditions, we need to take our decisions in our country (ídem).” More generally, they also talk about the need of a new political status with full powers and sovereign tools in order to respect **the right to decide of Basque workers** (Ídem).

⁵²⁹ Inspired by the “Catalan way” it refers to the idea of promoting a process of sovereignty based in the democratic decision of Basque citizens (EHBildu & EHBai, 2015:5).

⁵³⁰ Close to the classical right to self-determination.

In a similar fashion, “Euskal Herriko Eskubide Sozialen Karta”⁵³¹ claims in the 10th point of its social programme “**the right to decide about our economic, social and political model** in order to guarantee social, labour, cultural and environmental rights⁵³²” (2015:3).

Similarly, feminist collectives claim their right to decide on their own bodies against patriarchy. In that line, Euskal Herriko Bilgune Feminista concretely says:

“Priests, judges, the assembly of wise men, gods, laws, doctors, traditions, the state and many others, break every day **the right to decide on our own bodies** that we have as women”⁵³³ (2015:20).


Thus, we may say that the right to decide is an empty signifier that serves to represent different social demands (Laclau, 2005; Zubiaga, 2015). More concretely, it serves as a nodal point that up to now has articulated left wing sovereigntist sectors and pro-independence sectors but has not been powerful enough as to articulate a new social majority. Furthermore, those issues more related to independence have been the hegemonic ones.

⁵³¹ The Charter of Social Rights of the Basque Country. It is a social movement formed by left-wing oriented actors. ELA and LAB along with other trade unions such as ESK, STEE-EILAS and a variety of political actors are the main promoters. They organized the meeting “Alternatiben Herria” (The Town/People of Alternatives) in 2015 in Bilbao and in 2017 in Pamplona.

⁵³² “Eskubide sozial, laboral, kultural eta ingurumenari dagozkionak bermatu ahal izateko, geure eredu ekonomiko, sozial eta politiko propioa erabakitzeko eskubidea.”

⁵³³ “Apaizek, epaileek, jakintsuen biltzarrek, jaungoikoeak, legeek, medikuek, ohiturek, estatuak eta beste makina batek egunero zanpatzen digute emakumeoi gure gorputzengan erabakitzeko dugun eskubidea.”

IRUDIA 77 Pro-independence hegemonic articulation



Source: elaborated by the author.

When it comes to **the political frontier**, although Spanish centralism and the regime of 78 are used as a constitutive outside, they also focus on those actors that are considered to support current status quo, especially PNV. Apart from the previous quotations we include Arnaldo Otegi’s declarations in that regard: "El régimen del 78 no vale para construir el futuro de este pueblo ni para garantizar a la gente sus derechos sociales más básicos" (2017b).

Finally, **nomination** in case of pro-independence sectors has also changed in line with current demands for sovereignty. During the decade of 60’s and 70’s the Marxist-inspired “Basque working people”⁵³⁴ was used in order to modify historically dominant nationalists approaches and attract those working class sectors that were born outside the Basque Country (Zubiaga, 2012b:109). Although we do not see a clear redefinition, there is a trend to talk generally about the “Basque people” or the “Basque citizens” that want to decide in order to achieve a “dignified state”.

⁵³⁴ Pueblo Trabajador Vasco.

3- Motivation:

When it comes to motivation, they follow the already mentioned process. On the one hand, the *political frontier is moralized* and the constitutive outside is called undemocratic, imperialist and corrupted (Otegi, 2017b). Thus, *a solution* is proposed which is based in putting into practice the right to decide in order to get a better democracy and to build a dignified state (ídem.)

6.4.5 Hegemony and populist articulation⁵³⁵:

As already mentioned, *a process of independence in current western countries will require the articulation of a new hegemonic project powerful enough as to attract previously unconnected social groups. Thus, from our point of view, this very hegemonic project will require what has been known as ‘the articulation of the people’⁵³⁶ (H9).*

We do not observe such a process in the Basque case. More concretely, we do not see the conditions that populism requires according to Ernesto Laclau (2005:110):

- 1- The dichotomic division of society into two camps — one presenting itself as a part which claims to be the whole.
- 2- That this dichotomy involves the antagonistic division of the social field.
- 3- That the popular camp presupposes, as a condition of its constitution, the construction of a global identity out of the equivalence of a plurality of social demands.

We also need to take into **account antagonism and its constitutive nature**. Thus, in order to explain antagonism and the construction of a political frontier we are going to consider the next dimensions:

- 1- The notion of a constitutive antagonism, of a radical frontier, **will require a broken space** (Ibidem:112). That rupture of the social order, will be the consequence of the accumulation of unmet demands (Ibidem:113). So from the very beginning we are confronted with a dichotomic division between unfulfilled social demands, on the one hand, and an unresponsive power, on the other (Ídem.).

⁵³⁵ As long as we have already explained all those ideas related to hegemony and populism above, we are going to be concise in that regard. For further information, see the chapter “Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtsoaren teoria” or the epigraph “Hegemonia eta artikulazio populista” of the chapter dedicated to Catalonia.

⁵³⁶ As already noted, populism relates to a logic to articulate the political and it is just one way among others to produce hegemony (Errejón, 2011:216). That is, hegemony relates to a more general category and populism to a more concrete way to articulate it. From our point of view, a new pro-independence hegemony will need the ‘articulation of the people’.

- 2- The movement from democratic to popular demands also requires **the construction of a new symbolic framework**. Thus, apart from being less and less sustained by a pre-existing differential framework, the popular demands will need to construct a new one. In such a process, the political construction of ‘an enemy’ will also be required (Ibídem:114.).
- 3- Finally, we have to bear in mind **the tension we have detected between difference and equivalence** within a complex of demands which have become ‘popular’ through their articulation. On the one hand, that inscription undoubtedly gives the demand a corporeality which it would not otherwise have. It ceases to be a fleeting, transient occurrence, and becomes part of what Gramsci called a ‘war of position’: a discursive/institutional ensemble which ensures its long-term survival (Ibidem:117). On the other hand, the ‘people’ (the equivalential chain) has strategic laws of movement of its own, and nothing guarantees that these laws would not lead to sacrifice, or at least substantially compromise, the requests involved in some of the individual democratic demands (idem).

Unlike the cases of Catalonia and Scotland, we do not identify a similar process in the Basque case. In that regard, there is **neither a dichotomic and antagonistic division** around the issue of an independent state (yes/no division) nor between those in favour/against the right to decide. Furthermore, **‘autonomism’ and its related social order** are strong enough as to consider the existence of a new competing pro-independence symbolic framework. Thus, the reform of current Statute of Autonomy in order to manage Basque democracy seems to be more appealing than independence for a majority of the population.

On the other hand, due to the above-mentioned reasons, despite a deep crisis there has not been an organic crisis at Basque level. This is a consequence of a more industrial prone accumulation strategy, a higher infrastructural power/political capacities, a differentiated process of democratization and a more social democratic state project. Thus, **although the unfulfilled social demands are numerous**, the levels of social cohesion of Basque society are higher and the political capacities of state institutions to act, disorganize and short-circuit popular demands remain strong (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018; Poulantzas, 1979:169).

What is more, the organic crisis of Spain and its discursive articulation by the Basque political elites have fostered a framed in which “the good and serious management in Basque politics contrasts with the Spanish crisis and its related politics of spectacle” (Urkullu, 2016a). Thus, Spain is used as a constitutive outside and Basque institutions are presented as the best guarantee to meet those unfulfilled demands. On the contrary, when it comes to sovereignty demands the logic of difference within current status quo has been the dominant one.

Therefore, if we consider the above-mentioned dimensions, we may say that:

- i. There is not a broken space.
- ii. A new symbolic framework has not been articulated.
- iii. The logic of difference has prevailed over equivalence.

With that in mind, what can we say about current situation? Does it make sense to deal with hegemony and populism if we do not identify at first glance a populist articulation? We still think it makes. Although we are coping with an ongoing social process and it is risky to foresee its evolution, we may say that up to now, PNV's autonomist articulation has been the most successful one. Moreover, it is in line with a more general **strategy of transformism and passive revolution**⁵³⁷. In that regard, in relation to the posed questions we need to explain a process that we dare to call "institutional populist articulation".

6.4.5.1 The Basque Oasis: institutional populist articulation

Institutional populist articulation? Is it that *contradictio in adiecto* possible? We believe that due to the political confrontation between Spain and the Basque Country, there is a constant tension between difference and equivalence that make it possible⁵³⁸.

As long as Spain has not been able to promote historically an effective expansive hegemony, there has always been a degree of passive revolution in its governance project (Gramsci, 1985:137-143; 1999:289-301). That is, as long as the state has been unable either to reproduce the Basque Country as a Spanish political subject or to represent the Basque Country as a distinct political subject (Goikoetxea, 2013b:395), it always needs a degree of passive revolution to achieve 'a peaceful governance'.

In that line, we have said that matrix nationalists are those who understand the 'matrix state' as the main political body and the 'subaltern state' a subordinated entity (one region among others). Subaltern nationalists are on the contrary those who understand that both 'matrix states' and 'subaltern states' are equal political bodies. It is in the political interaction and discursive incomunication (the discursive practice based on the lack of communication, Goikoetxea, 2010) between matrix and subaltern nationalists that political (nationalist/democratic) confrontation arises (Goikoetxea, 2017:141).

It is due to that inherent confrontation that Basque institutional management if ruled by a Basque nationalist party always has a degree of antagonism and therefore the conditions of possibility of populism. On the one hand, Basque demands for sovereignty will not ever be completely fulfilled (ídem.) which facilitates the logic of equivalence. Furthermore, there will always be a trend to use the Spanish state as a constitutive outside,


⁵³⁷ A key strategy as long as Spain has been historically unable to assimilate different nations through **expansive hegemony (Gramsci,**

⁵³⁸ Although slightly different, we may see a similar reflection in Zubiaga, 2017:132.

which also facilitates the equivalential logic ‘ad intra’. On the other, the crisis-management mechanisms established to handle these very problems (elite bargaining etc.) may have the ability to reconstitute that chain through the logic of difference (accepting some demands an integrating them in the institutional systemic logic while other demands are ruled out). We believe that it has been the management of those tensions the key to understand PNV’s populist/autonomist hegemony.

We need to explain the process through **three interrelated dimensions**: the first two, are related to the systemic/differential admission of some demands and the third one to the equivalential articulation of others.

When it comes **to the first one**, we can observe such a process in the next graphic⁵³⁹:



Source: Elaborated by the author based on (Errejón, 2011:206)

D1 would represent a generic ‘sovereignty demand’⁵⁴⁰ whereas D2, D3 etc. relate to a variety of unfulfilled social demands. However, this is not a minor issue but a key one in order to understand currently Basque democratization. As previously said, **sovereignty demands** are based on the will of achieving higher political capacities in order to produce and reproduce their demoi differently (to normalize them through disciplinary, biopolitical and regulatory mechanisms). However, as long as Basque demands for sovereignty will not ever be completely fulfilled⁵⁴¹ (Goikoetxea, 2017:141), we may include under this generic claim, certain issues related to self-government that can be acceptable under current *status quo* horizon. For instance, we refer to the devolution of some powers already foreseen in the Statute of 1979, the agreement on the Economic

⁵³⁹ See the epigraph “Iraultza pasiboa eta transformismoa” in the Chapter dedicated to School of Essex.

⁵⁴⁰ A demand to increase Basque political capacities and to deepen Basque democratization.

⁵⁴¹ Because it would hamper Spanish governability.

Concert and Cupo, the renewal of the Statute of Autonomy⁵⁴² under certain circumstances etc.

As already seen this is always a contentious fact so it depends on the strategic choices of main actors and the balance of forces of the moment, especially the lack of an absolute majority of the Spanish ruling party. In that line, we observe a strategy of **transformism** and **passive revolution** boosted by the ruling Spanish elites⁵⁴³ and accepted by main Basque actors. Unlike expansive hegemony, **transformism** can be seen as a defensive type of politics pursued by the hegemonic force in a situation of political and economic crisis (Torfing, 1999: 111). It involves the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which vary in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups – and even of those which come from antagonistic groups and seem irreconcilably hostile (Ídem). The preferred method of transformism is co-optation, or, in other words, the expansion of relations of difference (ídem.). It is directly related to **passive revolution**, that is, to a process of transformation, absorption, and incorporation that translates contentious politics into bureaucratic or technical questions (Jessop, 2015b:178).

In that regard, due to PP's minority government⁵⁴⁴ (from 2015 onwards) and its necessity to get PNV's support to govern Spain in the midst of Catalan pro-independence contention⁵⁴⁵, elite-bargaining is presented as a feasible and sensible political strategy under "there is no alternative"⁵⁴⁶ slogan (Esteban, 2017). Thus, PNV and PP achieved an agreement in 2017⁵⁴⁷ in which Basque nationalists backed PP's General Budget proposal in return for 36 concessions in demos and state building issues⁵⁴⁸. Despite not being strictly related, in 2017 and 2018 the Basque Government led by PNV and PSE also approved the Basque Budget thanks to PP's abstention. Consequently, the supposed 'enemy' becomes the 'fair-weather friend' in order to get social and economic benefits for Basque people and expand self-government (Ortuzar, 2017).

⁵⁴² However, we have already seen the denial of the Statute in 2005.

⁵⁴³ Since 2011 led by PP.

⁵⁴⁴ As Goikoetxea points out, due to "the Spanish party system (two-party or majoritarian system), in which the government of the day needs the backing of the main nationalist parties, either the Basque (PNV) or the Catalan (CIU), in order to govern Spain when the party in power is in the minority. To secure this backing the government has to give something in return, which, in the case of the PNV, is the transfer of those competences that have not yet been devolved (2013a:279).

⁵⁴⁵ In such a context, there is no possibility for a support of Catalan nationalists as happened in previous epochs. Thus, PNV along with Coalición Canaria become the main partners.

⁵⁴⁶ It resembles the famous Thatcherite slogan TINA.

⁵⁴⁷ A similar agreement was achieved in 2010 between PNV and PSOE to transfer some competences already foreseen in the Statute of 1979.

⁵⁴⁸ We can see the list of those 36 points in the next link:

<http://www.deia.com/2017/05/03/politica/euskadi/los-36-puntos-del-acuerdo-para-el-apoyo-de-los-pge-de-2017> (Last access: 23/11/2017).

Therefore, there is a climate of political understanding between the parties that have played a structural role in organizing and representing the power block and broad social sectors during the so-called regime of 78. Whereas in the Catalan case we have seen a dialectical relation between the organic crisis of Spain and the pro-independence contention⁵⁴⁹, on the contrary, the ongoing process of passive revolution at Basque level could temper its contradictions and facilitate a new structural moment (H7). It is just an ongoing trend so it remains to be seen which could be its future evolution.

Having said this, we need to deal with **the second dimension** of the democratic logic of difference. We have to bear in mind that the impossibility of Basque and Spanish nations to represent completely and without fissures the Basque political space promotes the dislocation of Basque society (Zubiaga, 2017:128). This dislocation has had an antagonist expression during the last two centuries and it is still a source of conflict (Ídem.). However, the articulation of key signifiers of the nationalist project can favour different strategies.

Thus, although there are always tensions between the logic of difference and equivalence, we think that currently⁵⁵⁰, the more regionalist approach and the logic of difference prevails. Therefore, a new chain that may attract both, pro-independence and regionalists sectors is articulated through key nodal points such as “bilateralism”, “right to decide” or “XXIst century independence”. However, as long as we are dealing with ‘empty signifiers’, they are not completely fixed and a degree of ambiguity prevails. Nevertheless, the more regionalist view of them are currently the leading and hegemonic ones (see above).

These tensions may have limitations in practice: bilateralism is in opposition with currently hegemonic Spanish nationalists approaches,⁵⁵¹ the legal interpretations on the right to decide up to now have been rather narrow (Lasagabaster, 2008) and the general trends in Europe seem to be more disempowering rather empowering for those who do not have their own state (Goikoetxea, 2017). **Be that as it may, in terms of articulating an hegemonic project the key is not so much related with a description of reality but with the articulation of a coherent narrative.**

⁵⁴⁹ The crisis of the Regim of 78 has fostered pro-independence contention and at the same time, pro-independence contention has fostered the crisis of the Regim of 78.

⁵⁵⁰ At least since 2009 when Juan José Ibarretxe left the forefront of political activity.

⁵⁵¹ For instance, when asked about bilateralism, central governments’ representative in the BAC Javier De Andrés says that he understands that kind of relations when it comes to the Governments of France or Greece. (De Andrés, 2017). “Preguntado por la bilateralidad que reclama el Gobierno Vasco, el representante del Ejecutivo central en Euskadi ha dicho que él entiende ese tipo de relación cuando se trata de los gobiernos de Francia y Grecia.”


In that line, the described operation enables the attraction of sectors that directly support independence but also the ones that prefer to keep an autonomist approach. It represents people that actively take part in social mobilizations in favour of the right to decide as the ones promoted by Gure Esku Dago but also those who believe that the right to decide should be limited to the agreement between the Basque Country and the matrix state. Furthermore, it may attract those sectors that defend the right to decide but are not clearly Basque nationalists.

Although its tensions evolve according to a complex balance of forces, the political evolution of this paradigm, tends to exclude the more pro-independence related issues such as a consultation on independence and also other grass root⁵⁵² related topics more linked with a social agenda based in the radicalization of democracy (Basque framework of labour relations, Basque curriculum, feminists claims etc.). However, up to know, a lack of definition predominates so it remains to be seen if the future evolution of the issue could entail a more populist and equivalential articulation around the mentioned nodal points (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018).

Finally, the **third dimension** would relate to the populist articulation and the logic of equivalence. It is related to what some critical views **have ironically called ‘the Basque Oasis’** (Meltxor, 2016; Ubarretxena, 2016). In that process, *Spain is used as a constitutive outside and Basque institutions are presented as the best guarantee to meet many unfulfilled demands (H9)*. The defence of Basque self-government against Spanish centralism, economic instability, cronyism and widespread corruption etc. represents as well the defence of a better health system (Osakidetza), of a better education system, a boost to job creation, the construction of fairer social provisions, of infrastructures etc. *Thus, the unfulfilled demands are directly associated with the Spanish state (constitutive outside) and the good management and different aspect of social welfare are equivalentially articulated with the increase of self-government (H9)*. We describe the process in next graphic:

⁵⁵² For instance, Iñigo Urkullu thinks that “it is alarming that social movements with no responsibility at all may constrain political parties’ activities in Catalonia” (Urkullu, 2016d).

IRUDIA 79 Populism and self-government



Source: Elaborated by the author based on: Laclau, 2005:164.

Therefore, Basque self-government becomes the metaphor of keeping better social services and living standards than the Spanish average and has the ability to attract many different social sectors.

We believe that the complex interrelation of the three dimensions has as a result the above-mentioned institutional populist hegemony. In that regard, at least up until now, ‘independence’⁵⁵³ or having a ‘Basque state’ has not been a nodal point strong enough to compete with that imaginary and fix equivalentially unfulfilled social demands ‘under the flag of democracy’. However, as long as social demands and political imaginaries are continuously produced by social actors, we are not only dealing with some kind of structural limit, but also with some actors’ strategic inability to create a new organic imaginary⁵⁵⁴.

Without a doubt, independence has been a powerful nodal point and the main booster of a left wing populist articulation for decades (Zelik, 2017; Zubiaga, 2009a; 2009b). Nevertheless, it has not succeeded yet in articulating a new-style democratic hegemony (Apaolaza, 2015; Goikoetxea, 2017; Urdangarin, 2017; Zubiaga, 2014b). Thus, although

⁵⁵³ “Independence”, “Basque Republic”, “Own State” could be similar/analogous nodal points.

⁵⁵⁴ The Scottish case would be the more clear counter example. Independence was not a prominent social demand when the Edinburgh Agreement was signed in 2012; in fact, it was only when the referendum campaign began when support for independence started to grow.

we have seen a discursive renewal, there is not a clear metonymic movement⁵⁵⁵ (Laclau, 2003) between independence and welfare related issues. To put it another way, **up to know, independence is not the metaphor of achieving a more democratic and socially fairer society.**

If we consider the process of democratization and its effects, there are higher differences between the BC and Spain than between Catalonia and Spain or Scotland and the UK. Therefore, there are more raw materials for the articulation of Basque distinctiveness (Goikoetxea, 2014a:147) and more objective elements to justify independence from demos and state building reasons in the Basque Country than in Scotland and Catalonia. **However, a much more differentiated process of democratization⁵⁵⁶ may be strategically articulated to promote a new pro-independence hegemony (we are able to do things well so we need to change in order to live better) or to defend the renewal of the status quo (we live well enough to change too much). In such a dispute, at least up to know the last approach seems to be the dominant one.**

⁵⁵⁵ See the reflections make on displacement (contiguity and metonymy) and condensation (analogy and metaphor) in the chapter “Essexeko Eskolaren diskurtsoaren teoria” or in the next articles: Azkune, 2016:54 and Azkune, 2017:101.

⁵⁵⁶ In a sense that there are higher differences between the BC and Spain than between Catalonia and Spain or Scotland and the UK. Therefore, there are more raw materials for the articulation of Basque distinctiveness (Goikoetxea, 2014a:147) and more objective reasons to justify independence from demos and state building reasons in the Basque Country than in Scotland and Catalonia.

7 Britainiar Estatu Matrizea

1- Sarrera:

Gure ikerketan, posfordismoaren baitan emandako estatuaren eraldaketan bi dinamika ezberdinak ditugu: estatismo autoritariorako eta demokraziaren pribatizaziorako joera alde batetik eta nazio historikoak era demokratikoan birsortzea ahalbidetu duten estatu egituren deszentralizazioa bestetik (H1). Prozesuak era banatuan ulertu ordez, elkarreraginean eta bata bestearen baitan etengabeko tentsioan ulertu behar direla uste dugula esan dugu. Autoritate pribatuaren ahalduak burujabetza galera bat eta desdemokratizazio prozesu bat eragin du eta horri erantzunez burujabetza eskaerak areagotu dira (H3). Bestetik, borroka nazionalista garaikideen gakoak, demogintza, naziogintza eta estatugintza prozesu ezberdinen arteko talkan datza. Kultura bereiztu baten babesa baino, demokratizazio prozesu ezberdinen ondorioz sortzen diren autoritate eta legitimitate ezberdinen arteko lehia da gakoak (H4).

Espainiar kasuan ikusi dugun moduan, Britainiar kasuan ere aipatu prozesuek krisi organiko bat eragin dute. Brexit-a eta eskoziar independentzia prozesua tentsioan dauden bi dinamika horien adierazleak dira. Biak dira aldi berean, Britainiar estatuaren krisi organikoaren ondorio eta sustatzaile (H7).

Hori dela eta, kapitulu honetan Britainiar estatuaren baitan jazotako aldaketak eta honek Eskoziar izan duen eragina aztertuko dugu. Hurrengo Kapituluaren bestalde, Eskoziar demokratizazioa eta independentzia prozesua sakonago aztertuko ditugu. Zehazki kapitulu honetan, elkarreraginean ulertzen ditugun hiru dinamika izango ditugu oinarri:

1. Thatcherismoa, momentu egituratzaile gisa (Jessop, 1982:253), hurrengo hamarkadetako ordena ekonomiko, sozial eta instituzionalaren ezaugarri nagusiak ezarri zituela uste dugu. Zehatzago, *Lan Erregimen Posnazional Schumpeteriarraren ezarpenean eta demokraziaren pribatizaziorako prozesuan ezinbesteko inflexio puntua da (H1)*. Honen oinarrian dagoen metaketa estrategia, estatu proiektu neoliberalak eta britainartasunaren artikulazio hegemoniko berria aztertuko ditugu.
2. Lurralde antolaketari dagokionez, Eskoziako kasuan jarriko dugu arreta. Estatu fordistaren garaian, eskoziar estatu egituren eraginez demokratizazio prozesu mugatu bat garatu zela uste dugu. *Horren ondorioz, naziorik gabeko estatu baten ordez, estatalitate subalternoa bati buruz hitz egingo dugu (H4)*. Thatcherismoak

sustatutako demokraziaren pribatizazioaren ondorioz, bere izaera subalternoa areagotu eta honi aurre egin nahi zioten burujabetza eskaerak piztu zirela ikusiko dugu. Britainia Handia eta Eskoziaren artean gaur egunera arte iraun duen hausturarekin batera, artikulazio hegemoniko berriaren garrantzia azpimarratuko dugu. Devolution prozesua tentsio horien ondorioa litzateke.

3. Azkenik, gaur egungo Britainiar estatuaren *krisi organikoaren* dimentsio garrantzitsuenak aztertuko ditugu. Gure aburuz, Thatcherismoaren garaian ezarritako momentu egituratzailearen kontraesan eta tentsioen kondentsazioaren adierazlea da. Brexit-a eta Eskoziar independentzia prozesua, krisi organiko horren ondorio eta sustatzaile dira aldi berean.

2- Post-fordismoa, krisi organikoa eta Thatcherismoa

Thatcherismoa, 70. hamarkadan Britainiar Estatuaren krisi organikoaren baitan ulertu beharreko fenomeno politikoa da. Honen inguruan irakurketa anitzak burutu diren arren, gure ikuspegi teorikotik hurbil dauden bi korrontek burutu zuten “Hall-Jessop” eztabaidaren ondorioak jasoko ditugu. Stuart Hall eta “Cultural Studies” taldeak Thatcherismoaren irakurketa diskurtsibo eta ideologikorako joera izan zuen bitartean (1979; 1987; 1988), Jessopek buru zuen taldeak ekonomia politikoa eta estatuaren teoriaren ekarpenak baliatu zituzten bere azterketarako (Jessop et al. 1985). Gallasen aburuz, biek ala biek ekarpen bateragarriak egin zituzten neurrian euren arteko sintesiak eskaintzen digu argazkirik aberatsena (2016:21). Lehenik eta behin azken hauen ekarpena jasoko dugu ostean ikuspegi “diskurtsiboena” txertatzeko.

Hasteko, Britainia Handian “Flawed Fordism” moduan ezagutu den ereduaren nagusitasuna aipatu beharra dago (Jessop, 1989:270). Horren ondorioz, masa produkzioan, soldata altuetan eta masa kontsumoan oinarrituriko zirkulu birtuoso fordistak gabezia sakonak zituen beste herrieekin alderatuta (Jessop, 1989:270). Produktibitatea herri kapitalista aberatsetan baino gutxiago hazi zen, soldataren erregulazio fordista akastuna zen eta masa kontsumoa eskaeraren kudeaketaren bidez eta soldata sozialaren bidez sustatu ziren (ídem.). Hori dela eta, metaketa estrategia Keynesiarra eta esku hartzean oinarritutako estatu proiektua sustatu arren, ez zen gai izan XIX. mende amaieratik lehiakortasun arazoak zituen Britainiar oinarri industrialak zaharberritzeko ezta estrategia korporatibista egokia aurrera eramateko (Gallas, 2016:76).

Gerra osteko adostasunak enplegu betea eta ongizate unibertsala sustatzeaz gain, nazioarteko egoera lagungarriak gabezia hauen ondorioak estaltzen lagundu zuen (Jessop, 1989:270). Hala ere, 1960. hamarkadan jadanik arazoak nabariak ziren. Epe luzeko ondorioei erreparatuta, produktibitate eskasak, inflazioak eta desindustrializazio progresiborako joerak, ordainketa balantzan etengabeko arazoak sortu zituen (ídem).

Petrolioaren krisiak gabezia hauen eragina areagotu zuen eta ostean ikusiko dugun moduan, Thatcherismoak sustatu zituen politika deflazionistek desindustrializazio prozesua sakondu eta inportazioen sarrera sustatu zuen (ídem).

Gabeziak gabezi, menderakuntza eta ahalduntzerako ezinbestekoak diren mekanismo diziplinario eta biopolitikoaren hedapen eta publikazioa handia bizi izan zuen garaia izan zen (Goikoetxea, 2017:83-88). 1942an aurkeztu Beveridge txostena jarraituz, gerra osteko ongizatearen ardatz ziren National Health System eta National Insurance sortu ziren (beste neurrien artean). Hasieran desmerkantilizazio maila altua sustatu arren, hurrengo urteetan ez zen sakondu beraz eredu sozialdemokratatik aldendu eta Sping Andersen banaketaren arabera eredu liberalera jo zuen (McEwen, 2006:57). Desfamiliarizazio maila bestalde baxua zen eta sustatzen ziren politika gehienak ideologia patriarkala oso errotuta zuten (Paterson, 1994:106). Hala ere, Nicola McEwenek egindako azterketak era argian lotzen ditu ongizatearen garapena, Britainiar nazio sentimenduaren hazkundera, erakunde publiko britainiarraren zilegitasuna eta nazionalismo periferikoen ahultasuna (2006). Ostean ikusiko dugun moduan, 80. hamarkadatik aurrera kontrako norabidea hartu ostean kontrako ondorioak eragin zituzten.

Esandakoak esanda, krisi organikoaren elementuak nabariak ziren (Gramsci, 1999:450-451). Hasteko, Britainiar Estatuan *ordezkaritza krisiak* izaera bikoitza zuen: parlamentarismoaren krisiaz gain langilegoa eta enpresariak ordezkatzeko xedea zuen eredu korporatibista ere krisian zegoen (Jessop et.al. 1984:45). Parte hartze demokratikorako bide nagusien ahulezia horrek, Estatuaren *zilegitasun krisia* areagotzea besterik ez zuen eragin (ídem.). *Barneratze instituzionalaren krisia* estatuak politika koherenteak artikulatzeko zuen gaitasun faltak eragin zuen neurri handi batean (Jessop, 1989:271). Horretaz gain, Irlandako gatazkaz harago, lehen aldiz batasun nazionala kolokan jar zezakeen Eskoziako independentismoaren loraldia ere 1967-1979 testuinguruan eman zen (Hassan, 2009:1).

Botere blokearen krisia ere nabaria zen. Kapital industrialak zituen egiturazko arazoez gain, sustatu ziren erreformek finantza kapitalak aurretiaz “merkatu hierarkian” zuen nagusitasuna areagotu zuen. “City-aren” epe motzeko interesak hobesteaz gain, luzera begira honek **kapital industrialaren berreskurapenean zuen interes faltak, desindustrializazioa prozesuan eragin zuen** (Gallas, 2016:76-77). Bestalde, gerra osteko sistemaren oinarri ziren Alderdi Laborista eta Alderdi Kontserbadorearen sektore moderatu eta aurrerakoienak ere krisian zeuden (Hall, 1979:16). Laboristek zailtasunak zituzten aldi berean krisiaren kudeaketa burutu behar zuen gobernu alderdia eta langile klasearen interesak defendatzen dituen alderdia izateko (ídem.). Bestetik, Kontserbadoreen buru zen Edward Heathen “sozialismoa” eta “estatu kolektibismoa”

gogor kritikatzeko zuen diskurtsoaren bidez, Margaret Thatcherren eskuin erradikalak Toryen kongresua irabazi zuen 1975ean (ídem.).

Estatuaren interbentzio mekanismoak ere krisiaren ondorioz mugaturik geratu ziren. Erakunde korporatibisten gabeziaren eraginez, fordismoak galdatzen zuen kapital eta lanaren arteko koordinazioa oso akastuna zen eta ez zegoen soldata eta etekinen arteko orekarik (Gallas, 2016:76). Hazkunde mugatuak eta soldaten igoerak etekinen murrizketa eragin zuen. Honi aurre egiteko prezioak igo zituzten inflazioa sustatuz eta soldaten igoera erreala ezer ezean utziz. Honek, maila makroekonomikoan estagnazioa eragin zuen. Horretaz gain, gobernu laboristak enplegu osoko politikak alde batera utzi zituen eta langabezia hasi zen. Testuinguru horietan ohikoa den moduan, krisiari aurre egiteko baliabideak gero eta urriagoak ziren bitartean krisiaren ondorioei aurre egiteko beharrak handitu ziren (gastu sozialaren bidez), krisi fisko finantzaria eraginez (Jessop, 2015b:71).

Baldintza horietan 70. hamarkadan sistema politikoarekiko sumina handitzearekin batera klase borroka areagotu zen. 1978-1979 artean *Winter of Discontent* moduan ezagutzen dena izan zen inflexio puntua. Krisi sakon horren adierazle izateaz gain, Estatu Britainiarren eraldaketarako interbentzio estrategikoaren unea ere izan zen, Thatcherismoaren hasieraren inflexio puntua (Hay, 1996: 253). Krisi horren eraikuntza diskurtsiboan lortutako arrakasta ezinbestekoa izan zen Thatcherismoaren hegemonia berria eta estatu proiektu neoliberalaren sustatzeko (Ibidem: 255). Horren ostean, 1979ko maiatzean Hauteskunde Orokorak irabazi zituen garai berri bati hasiera emanez.

Zer da Thatcherismoa? Zein izan zen Britainiar politikan izan zuen eragina? Zein da zehazki Eskoziako burujabetza eskaeretan izan zuen eragina? Galdera sakon hauen inguruan lan ugari garatu dira beraz aipu batzuk besterik ez ditugu egingo. Bere definiziorik orokorrean, Thatcherismoa lidergo karismatikoko baten bidez gidaturiko establishment-aren berrantolaketa bat izan zen (Gramsci, 1999:451; Jessop, 2016:133). Aurreko hamarkadetan ez bezala, langile erresistentzia ez zen nahikoa izan beraz 1940tik botere blokeak burutu zuen lehen ofentsiba arrakastatsua izan zen (Gallas, 2016:62).

Koiuntura aldaketaz harago, 78ko erregimenarekin adierazi dugun moduan, testuinguru horretan gaur egunera arte indarrean dagoen formazio sozialaren ezaugarriak baldintzatu duen *momentu estrukturala* ezarri zen (Jessop, 1982:253). Bere definiziorik orokorrean, neoliberalismo Britainiarra era erlatiboki koherentean euren artean indartzen diren politika multzoa litzateke (Jessop, 2016: 135). Zehazki, “neoliberal regime of condensation” moduan ezagutzen denari buruz ari gara (Gallas, 2016:63). Horretaz gain, *mundu mailan demokraziaren pribatizazioari eta desdemokratizazioari atek zabaltzeko garaiaren bultzatzaile garrantzitsua da* (Goikoetxea, 2017).

Thatcherismoak, *metaketa estrategia eta estatu proiektu neoliberalaren artikulazio berritzaile bat burutu zuen*. Alde batetik, politika monetarista eta fiskalei lehentasuna

eman zieten politika industrialak alboratuz (Gallas, 2016:63). Horren bidez, botere blokearen baitan jadanik finantza sektoreak zuen gailentasuna areagotu zen frakzio industrialak are gehiago ahulduz (ídem.). Bestetik, merkatu librearen aldeko hautuaren ondorioz, Britainiar lehiakortasuna pribatizazioen eta finantzen liberalizazioaren bidez sustatzea zuen xede. Honen lehengai ideologikoa, elite txiki baten aurka zuzentzen zen “herri kapitalismoaren”⁵⁵⁷ eta “jabetza demokratiaren” defentsa zen. Jabetza pribatua eta lehiakortasuna jendartearen eremu guztietatik hedatzea da bere xedea, beraz, *gubernamentalitate neoliberalaren printzipioekin bete betean lotzen da* (Lemke, 2002; Foucault, 2008; Read, 2009; Cotoi, 2011; Stetcher 2015). Etxebizitzaren jabetza pribatuaren sustapena eta pribatizatzen ziren sektoreen akzioen erosketa⁵⁵⁸ dira herri kapitalismo horren sinbolo garrantzitsuenak.

Era laburrean hauek lirateke politika aipagarrienak⁵⁵⁹:

- Estatuaren jabetzakoak ziren aktiboen pribatizazioa, sektore estrategikoen pribatizazioak garrantzia berezia izanik.
- Desregulazioa eta ekoizpen merkatuan lehiaren areagotzea. Gasa, elektrizitatea eta komunikabideak dira honen adibide esanguratsuenak. Udalen zerbitzu publikoak eremu pribatuari zabaltzea ere dinamika honen baitan leudeke.
- Finantza industriaren desregulazioa.
- Sindikatuen boterearen murrizketa.
- Zerga egituraren eraldaketa erregresiboa errentaren gaineko zergak jaitsiz eta BEZ eta Poll Tax zergak igoz.

Prozesu horrek *estatismo autoritariorako joera* indartu zuen edo Stuart Hallen lana jarraituz, *autoritarismo populista* indartzeko joera (Poulantzas, 1979). Hallek berak onartzen duen moduan, kontzeptu hau Poulantzasen lana irakurri ostean garatu zuen, beraz jada azaldu dugun “estatismo autoritarioaren” bertsio Britainiarraren aurrean geundeke (Hall, 1988: 151). Politika demokratikoan etengabe agertzen den adostasuna eta hertsapenaren arteko tentsioan *hertsapena hobesteagatik definitu zuen autoritario* (ídem). Poliziaren garrantzia handitu, kartzela sistema indartu eta zigor zuzenbidea gogortu zen (Gallas, 2016: 64).

⁵⁵⁷ Thatcherrek zuzenean adierazi zuen moduan, herri kapitalismoa gehiengo sozialak ahalduntzeko bidea litzateke: “Popular capitalism is nothing less than a crusade to enfranchise the many in the economic life of the nation.” Ikus hurrengo lotura: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CjSmaYJvTqI> (azken bisita 2018/01/02).

Bere proiektuaren artikulazio diskurtsiboaren gakoak era argian azter daitezke 1986an Alderdi Kontserbadorearen Konferentzian emandako diskurtsioan: <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106498> (azken bisita 2018/01/02).

⁵⁵⁸ “A society where owning shares is as common as having a car”

⁵⁵⁹ Honen azterketa sakonagorako ikus: Gallas, 2016.


Hertsapenez gain, *boterearen kontzentrazioa eta zentralizazioa* indartu ziren parlamentua eta alderdi politikoen eragina murriztuz (Jessop et al., 1985:47). Kabinetearen, administrazio zentralaren eta Lehen Ministroaren botereak indartu zituzten. Horren bidez, sistema presidentzialistaren ezaugarriak nagusitzen hasi ziren: gobernuaren zilegitasuna Lehen Ministroaren ospean eta herriari zuzenean hitz egiteko gaitasunean oinarritzen hasi zen (ídem.). Gobernuaren eta estatuaren goi administrazioaren autonomia areagotzearekin batera *politika publikoen proposamen eta egikaritzea (estrategia ekonomikoa barne) erregulazio demokratikotik aldenduz* joan ziren (ídem.). Honen ondorioz, estatuaren antolakuntza formaletik kanpo publikoki kontuak eman behar ez dituzten sareen indartze bat egon zen (Cabinet Officen sarea izanik adibide argiena) (Jessop, 1990:187).

Horretaz gain, *administrazio politiko lokalen eskumenak murriztu* zituzten era honetan laborismoaren botere gune garrantzitsuenak ahulduz eta eremu horietan politika neoliberalen ezarpena ahalbidetuz. Botere lokalak, zerbitzuen hornitzaile izateaz gain erosle bihurtu ziren eta erabakiak hartzeko ahalmena “zuzendari exekutiboen” eta goi mailako administrarien kontrolpean geratu zen (Fraser, 2013:17). Finantzaketa, etxebizitza politikak, hezkuntza sistema, garraioak edota defentsa zibila bezalako arloak botere zentralaren zuzendaritzapean geratu ziren. Horren ondorioz, Gary Fraserrek era argian dioen moduan “power shifted from elected politicians to the private sector” (2013:16).

Aipatu eraldaketen bidez, botere lokalak, alderdi politiko, sindikatu eta eragile sozialak ahuldu eta botere exekutibo eta teknokratikoak ahaldundu zituzten demokrazia pribatizatuz eta desdemokratizazioa ahalbidetuz (Goikoetxea, 2017:20).

“Maniobra gerra” horren arrakasta, 70. hamarkadan maila ideologikoan eskuin erradikalak buruturiko “posizio gerrari” hertsiki loturik dago (Jessop et al. 1985:41). Lehenik eta behin kontuan hartu behar dugu, *Bigarren Mundu Gerra osteko “Britainiartasuna”* gaur egungo perspektibatik adostasun sozialdemokrata moduan sailkatu daitekeen arren, bere ezarpenean lidergoa kontserbadoreen sektore “aurrerakoiek” izan zutela (Jessop et al. 1985:40). Hala ere, “nazio bakarraren” (one nation strategy) ideiarene ondorioz jendartearen gehiengora heltzeko xedea zuen hegemonia hedakorra zen nagusi maila sinboliko zein materialean ongizatea sustatuz (Jessop, 1990: 211). Hori dela eta, sektore oso zabalek ongizatearen oinarrien inguruko adostasunak konpartitzen zituzten. Hurrengoa litzateke bere adierazpen grafikoa:

IRUDIA 80 Bigarren Mundu Gerra osteko “Britainiartasuna”



Iturria: egileak egina.

Thatcherrek gidatutako proiektu hegemonikoak, britainiar gizartean muga politiko berri bat ezartzeko gaitasuna izan zuen II. Mundu Gerra ostetik indarrean zegoen “one nation” proiektu hegemoniko horrekin bukatuz (70. hamarkadan krisian sartu arren indarra mantendu zuena) (Jessop, 1990:183). Horren bidez, britainiar nazionalismoa eta aurreko hamarkadetan zentzu komunekoak ziren printzipio sozialdemokratikak era estrategikoan berrartikulatu zituzten proiektu alternatibo bat osatuz. Zehazki, “nazioa eta herria”, “klasea eta sindikatuen” aurka polarizatzearekin batera, ekonomizismo neoliberalaren kontzeptu abstraktuak masiboki kontsumigarria zen filosofia berri batean itzuli eta hedatu zuen *artikulazio populista* eraginkorra burutuz (Hall, 1979:17; Laclau, 2005).

Zentzu horretan, proiektu thatcheriarrak bi ideia eta teoria uztartu zituen: *ekonomizismo liberala* (herri kapitalismoa, individualismo lehiakorra, monetarismoa etab.) eta kontserbadurismo *organikoaren filosofia zaharrak* (nazioa, familia, autoritatea etab.) (ídem.). Bi ideia nagusi hauetan oinarrituta muga politiko bat eraiki zen hainbat elementu kanpoaldean utziz. Antikolektibismoaren bidez proiektu thatcheriarrak ekibalentzia kate bat osatu zuen. “Kolektibismoak” beste hainbat ideien artean “sozialismoa”, “estatalismoa”, “adostasun politika”, “ez eraginkorra den korporatibismoa” edota “botere gehiegi duten sindikatuak” ordezkatu zuen. Sozialdemokraziaren krisia eta bai britainiar ekonomiaren zein nazio britainiarraren gainbehera luzea ideia eta praktika hauekin eta hauen ordezkari ziren erakundeekin lotu ziren.

Bestaldetik, “thatcherismoa” eta “antikolektibismoaren diskurtsoa” egoera horri aurre egiteko alternatiba bakar moduan agertu ziren. Honen bidez, “thatcherismoa” “norbanakoaren askatasun eta ekimenarekin” lotu zen sindikatuen eta kudeatzaile publikoen botere ez eraginkorraren aurrean; “herri eta estatu britainiarraren berritze politiko eta moralaren ordezkari” bueltarik gabeko gainbeheraren aurrean; “legea eta


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

ordenaren berrezarpena”, “lidergo argia” eta “estatu indartsua” gizartean emandako autoritate galeraren aurrean, adostasun politikak sorturiko desordenaren aurrean eta pisutsuegia eta ahulegia den ongizate estatuaren aurrean (Hall, 1979; 1988).

Hallen ikuspegitik thatcherismoak arrakasta izan zuen sozialdemokraziaren krisia azaltzeko gaitasuna izateaz gain eredu alternatibo bat eskaintzeko ahalmena izan zuelako. Herria subjektu politiko “populista” bihurtzeko saiakerak arrakasta izan zuen garai hartan “jendearen arazoez arduratzeko” gaitasuna izan zuelako. Alderdi Laboristak kapitalismoa Estatuaren bidez eta “negoziazio korporatiboaren” bidez erreformatzeko saiakerak izandako porrotaren testuinguruan (1978-1979 artean bizitako “winter of discontent” honen adierazle dira), Thatcherren proiektuak sistema zaharraren aurka nagusi zen sumina baliatu eta alternatiba erradikal bat eskaini zuen. Laborismoa “ustelduta zegoen estatuaren aparatu burokratikoarekin” identifikaturik geratu zen bitartean, Thatcher honen kanpoaldean kokatu zen, herriarekin batera “duintasuna eta askatasuna” ordezkaturik.

Bi nazioen estrategiaren ondorioz (two nations strategy) kontzesio materialak mugatu eta estrategikoki adierazgarriak ziren sektoreen babesaren mobilizazioa sustatu zuten (Jessop, 1990:211). Era dikotomikoan ezarritako mugaren bidez, diskurtsiboki erlazio antagonikoak eraiki ziren batzuk barneratuz eta beste batzuk kanporatuz. Esan bezala, Thatcherismoak, garrantzia handia duten adierazleen hegemonia bereganatu zuen (“herria”, “nazioa”, “askatasuna”, “indibidualismoa” etab.) aldi berean aurreko ordena sozialean garrantzia handia izan zuten beste hainbat adierazle bazterrean utziz (“sozialismoa”, “kolektibismoa”, “Estatua” etab.). Hurrengoa litzateke Thatcherismoaren “Britainiartasun” neoliberal/kontserbadorean adierazpen grafikoa:

IRUDIA 81 Thatcherismoaren “Britainiartasun” neoliberal/kontserbadorea



Iturria: egileak egina.

Zeintzuk dira bere eraginak?

Gallasen aburuz, *maila ideologiko eta politikoan klase proiektu moduan Thatcherismoak lortutako arrakastaren* ondorioz, 1940. hamarkadatik kapitalak ezagutzen ez zuen nagusitasuna lortu zuen (2016:62). Sindikalismo militanteenaren aurkako lehia aurreko hamarkadetan ezinezkoa izan ziren garaipenez gain⁵⁶⁰, sindikatuen legea aldatu, etxebizitzaren jabetza pribatua era masiboan sustatu eta finantza sektorearen bultzada lirateke arrakasta horren adierazlerik argienak (ibidem:276). *Epe ertainera kapitalaren metaketa ziurtatzeari dagokionez kale egin zuela* nabartzen du bestalde. Hauek lirateke horren adibide argienak: burtsa-merkatuak 1987an eztanda egin zuen; 1980. hamarkadako hazkundea (Lawson Boom moduan ezaguna dena) burbuila espekulatibo baten ondorioa zela argi geratu zen 90. hamarkada hasierako ezteandaren ondorioz; hurrengo hamar urteetan 2 atzeraldi ekonomiko egon ziren.

Epe luzeko eraginei dagokionez, egiturazko arazoaren ondorio den Britainiar Krisi Organikoa (Brexita barne) litzateke politika neoliberalen porroten ondorioa. Demokraziaren pribatizazioan sakonduz herritarrak boteretu behar zituzten mekanismoak autoritate pribatuak ahaldu dituzte (Goikoetxea, 2017). Bestetik, Tony Blairrek gidaturiko “New Labourra”, proiektu organiko horren korrante aurrerakoia litzateke beraz ez zuen egiturazko aldaketarik sustatu (Jessop, 2016:133). Gure ikerketarako “Blairismoaren” erreformarik aipagarriena estatu egituren deszentralizazioa eragin zuen “devolution” prozesua izan zen. Kontrara, ezin dugu ahaztu botere exekutiboa indartu eta legegilea ahultzea xede zuen “Standing Order 14”⁵⁶¹ 2003. urtean bere gobernuak bultzatu zuela. Esandakoak esanda, kapitulu honen amaieran krisi organikoaren azterketan sakonduko ditugu epe luzeko eraginak beraz hemen ez dugu dimentsio hau gehiago sakonduko.

⁵⁶⁰ 1984-85eko meatzarien greba eta meategien itxiera da honen adierazpenik argiena.

⁵⁶¹ Hurrengo loturan eskuragarri:

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmstords/17507.htm> (azken bisita (2018/01/26)).

3- Britainiar Estatu eta lurraldearen artikulazio politikoa

3.1 United Kingdom: Batasunaren oinarriak eta Eskoziar estatu erakundeak

Erresuma Batua, Britainia Handia eta Ipar Irlanda elkartzen dituen erresuma da. Ohikoa da eguneroko hizkuntzan biak sinonimo moduan erabiltzea, guk orokorrean Irlandari buruz aipurik egingo ez dugunez Britainia Handiari buruz hitz egingo dugu batez ere.

Eskoziari dagokionez, lehenik eta behin, testuinguru labur bat egitea beharrezkoa da. Erresuma Batua, Ingalaterra eta beste nazioen arteko batasun akten bidez sorturiko Estatu asimetrikoa dela hartu behar dugu kontuan (Loughlin, 2009:93). *Ezin da maila bereko komunitate politikoen arteko adostasun moduan ulertu, prozesuan Ingalaterrak beste hiru nazioekiko (Eskozia, Gales eta Irlanda) posizio dominantea mantendu duelako eta Ingalaterraren artetik hertsapen maila handia egon zelako (idem; Keating, 2009:18).*

Hala ere, Britainiar Estatu⁵⁶², deszentralizazio maila bat eta partean aniztasuna onartzen duen eredu “Anglo-Amerikarraren” adibide da (Elazar, 1991:194). Maila sinbolikoan, Ingalaterra eta Batasunaren artean ezberdintasuna mantendu zen, nagusi den nazioaren (Ingalaterra) eta komuna den nazioaren (Britainiarra) artean ezberdinduz eta Britainiartasunaren barnean beste nazioen bereizgarriak⁵⁶³ onartuz. Irlandako gatazkak, Eskoziako Highlandetako herritarren kanporatzeak⁵⁶⁴ edota urteetan zehar Eskozia eta Galesen egon diren burujabetza eskaerek adierazten duten moduan prozesu baketsu bat izan ez den arren, ez du sistema kontinentaleko nazio estatu uniformizatzaile eta zentralistaren eredu jarraitu.

Bere izaerari dagokionez, Letamendiak Estatuaren sailkapen klasikoa jarraituz adierazten digun moduan, aipatu prozesua “*Estatu ahul*” moduan ezagutu denaren adibide paradigmaticoa litzateke: gizarte zibilaren garrantzia handiagoa, demokrazia maila altuagoa, zentroarekiko leialtasuna, burokrazia apala, zuzenbide publiko berantiarra, hezkuntza eta unibertsitate sistema pribatu indartsua eta lurralde administrazio auto erregulatua lirateke bere ezaugarriak aipagarrienak (1997:38).

Zehazki 1707ko Treaty of Unionen bidez Ingalaterra eta Eskoziaren artean burutu zen batasunak ez zuen Estatu unitario ezta federalik ezarri, “*Batasun Estatu*” bat baizik. Batasun aktaren ondorioz, Britainia Handirako legebiltzar bakarra eratu arren, eskoziar gizarte zibilaren eta administrazioaren oinarritzko hainbat ezaugarri mantendu ziren,

⁵⁶² Britainiar Batasunaren aldagai ezberdinak aztertzen dituen irakurketarako ikus: Keating (2009). Batez ere, “Understanding the Union” kapituluak.

⁵⁶³ Kirol selekzio ezberdinak honen adierazle sinboliko ezagunena da.

⁵⁶⁴ Highland Clearances moduan ezaguna dena.

justizia sistema, gobernu lokala, hezkuntza sistema eta finantza erakunde banatuak⁵⁶⁵ izanik aipagarrienak (Keating, 1996: 197-198).

Hori dela eta, 1707an independentzia galdu arren, Eskozia historikoki ez da inoiz zentzu hertsian “estaturik gabeko nazio”⁵⁶⁶ bat izan. Are gehiago, **ahalmen politikoa zuten hainbat estatu erakunde izan dira eskoziar nazioaren ezberdintasuna birsortzeko ezinbestekoak izan diren tresnak** (Paterson, 1994).

Prozesu horretan estatua, jendartea eta ekonomiaren eraldaketekin batera moldaketak etengabeak izan dira. Kasu honetan ere, *Estatu egiturak eta bere botere teknologikak zenbat eta konplexuagoak bihurtu diren neurrian, geroz eta dependentzia eta konfiantza maila handiagoa sustatu da herritarrengan. Era paraleloan, erakundeak eskoziar nahien arabera jokatzeko eskaerak areagotu egin dira. Beste era batera esanda, Eskozia komunitate politiko moduan egonkortu eta bere demokratizazio propioa garatu den neurrian, demokratizazio horretan sakontzeko eskaerak areagotu dira (H4)*. Argigarriak dira zentzu horretan Lindsay Patersonen hitzak:

“The forms of Scottish autonomy have changed as the state and society and the economy have changed, and what one generation might regard as autonomy might be felt by their successor to be dependency” (Paterson, 1994:4)⁵⁶⁷

Eskoziar autonomiaren eta estatu erakundearen bilakaera aztertzea gure ikerketaren xedek gainditzen ditu⁵⁶⁸. Hala ere, laburki hurrengo elementuak azpimarratuko ditugu: 1707ko batasunaren ostean *Secretary of State for Scotland* kargua sortu arren, eskoziar gaien gobernuaren ardura XVIII. mende amaieran Lord Advocate-n esku geratu zen. 1885ean *Secretary for Scotland* kargua sortzearekin batera bere eskumenak handituz joan ziren. Horren ondorioz, 1926an Kabineteko kide izatera igaro zen, gaur egunera arte dirauen *Secretary of State for Scotland* kargua berriz ere sortuz. Hauen esku geratu zen gobernu funtzioak betetzen zituen *Scottish Office* kudeatzea.

3.2 Scottish Office: demokratizazio mugatua

⁵⁶⁵ Eskoziar bankuek eskoziar diru-papera igortzeko eskumena dute.

⁵⁶⁶ Honen adibide argia, Eskoziar nazionalismoaren azterketan aitzindari izan zen David McCronek lana du: 1992. urtean “Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a stateless nation” liburu klasikoak argitaratu zuen baina 2001. urtean liburu horren 2. edizioa argitaratzean, “stateless” titulutik kendu zuen eta “Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a nation” izendatu zuen, Eskoziak historikoki estatu erakundeak izan zituela argudiatuz.

⁵⁶⁷ Lindsay Patersonen 90. Hamarkada hasieran Eskoziar Parlamentuaren aldeko mugimendua gori goriantz zegoenean plazaratu zuen aipatu hausnarketa klasikoak bihurtu den “The autonomy of Modern Scotland” liburua.

⁵⁶⁸ Ikus Lindsay Patersonen lana bilakaera horren azterketarako.

Estatuaren botere teknologien garapenak, eta batez ere ongizate estatuari loturiko erakunde eta politika publikoen hedapenak, Scottish Office-aren erantzukizun eta ahalmena handitzea eragin zuen. Honen esku, Eskoziako Hezkuntza Departamendua, Eskoziako Osasun Departamendua, Nekazaritza Departamendua, Arrantza Departamendua eta Espetxe Departamendua zeuden. Azken hirurak Scottish Home Department-ren barruan elkartu ziren 1939an.

Ez zegoen parlamentu propiorik ezta zuzenean hautatutako gobernu demokratikorik. Hala ere, deszentralizazio administratiboaren ondorioz demokratizazio mugatu bat garatzeko oinarriak zituzten. Patersonek, XX. mendean zehar Britainiar ongizate estatuaren baitan Eskoziak zuen autonomia aztertu zuen eta bere lana hartuko dugu oinarri. Lau eremu nagusi aztertzeko ditu: ekonomia, etxebizitza, hezkuntza eta osasuna. Bere lanean azaldutako elementu garrantzitsuenak jasoko ditugu.

Maila ekonomikoan, politika Keynesiarrek estatuaren parte hartze eta zuzendaritza sustatzearekin batera, botereen zentralizazioa eragin zuten eta horren ondorioz Scottish Office-ak politika ekonomikoaren gaineko kontrol gutxi zuen (Ibidem: 118). Hala ere, adostasun sozialdemokrata eta “one nation” proiektu hegemonikoaren arrakastaren ondorioz, alderdi eta sektore sozial zabalek babesten zituzten politika ekonomikoaren oinarritzko printzipioak (Jessop, 1990:183; Paterson, 1994: 117). Horren ondorioz, politiken diseinuan ahots berezirik izan ez arren, ongizatean oinarrituriko nazionalismo britainiarra Eskoziar interes nazionalak bultzatzeko tresna bateragarri moduan ikusten zen (ídem). Patersonen hitzak zuzenean jasoz: “It was this general equating of Scottish and British interests that allowed Scottish ministers to speak on the whole range of economic matters affecting Scotland even those topics for which they had no formal responsibility” (1994:118).

Eskumen gehienak politiken inplementaziora mugatu arren eta baliabide eta araudia Britainiar estatuak zehaztu arren, “politika ekonomiko erregional autoktonoak” garatu zituzten sindikatu eta patronala Scottish Office-aren politiken inguruan “lobby” lana egitera behartuz (Ibidem:121).

Etxebizitzari dagokionez, XIX. mendetik zeuden gabezien ondorioz autoritate lokalen eta estatuaren arteko lankidetzak sustatu zen merkatu pribatuaren gabezien aurrean parte hartze publikoa sustatuz (Ibidem:123). Scottish Office-ak eremu honetan geroz eta eskumen handiagoak lortu zituen eta Eskoziar etxebizitza politika bereiztuak garatu zituen hurrengo printzipioetan oinarrituta: subsidioen bidezko laguntza publikoak eta autoritateen aldetik etxebizitza publikoen eraikuntzaren sustapena⁵⁶⁹ (ídem.). Scottish

⁵⁶⁹ Aurretiaz esan bezala, adostasun zabalak zeuden printzipio hauen inguruan eta Kontserbadore zein Laboristek bultzatutako politikak izan ziren. 1950-1980 urteen artean etxebizitza berrien hiru laurdena

Office-aren inguruan etxebizitza arloan *policy network*⁵⁷⁰ propioa garatzeaz gain, Ingalaterran nagusi ziren printzipioetatik urrundu ziren politikak garatu zituzten (ídem).

Batasunaren sorreratik izandako autonomiaren ondorioz, **Hezkuntza** arloan beste edozein eremutan baino independentzia handiagoa izan zuten. Arlo honetan ere, Britainia Handi mailan adostasunak zabalak ziren eta berezitasunak inplementazio zehatzetan garatu ziren. Eskoziar hezkuntza politikak lau talderen arteko gobernu sareak ezartzen zituen: Scottish Education Department⁵⁷¹, gobernu lokalak, irakasleen sindikatuak eta aurreko hiruren ordezkariak elkartzen zituen Advisory Comitees ziren eskoziar hezkuntza politikak zehazten zituztenak (íbidem: 125). Kasu honetan ere, adostasunak Eskozian Ingalaterran baino zabalagoak ziren eta urte luzez politika bereizgarriak garatu zituzten.

Osasunari dagokionez, 1948an *National Health Service* sortzearekin batera Scottish Office-ak *National Health Service Scotlanden* eskumenak lortu zituen jada alde zuretik osasun sistema gobernu lokalaren esku zegoelako. Hortik aurrera garatu zen sistema britainiar ereduak ezberdindu zen. Medikuek ez ziren kategoria administratibo berezietan banatu eta horren ondorioz komunitateetan erro sendoagoak zituzten (íbidem:128). Honekin batera, medikuntza pribatuak pisu baxuagoa zuen baita klase ertain altuenetan ere. Azkenik, osasun politikak hezkuntzan aipaturiko antzeko politika sareen bidez ezartzen ziren eta Londreseko zentralizazioaren aurkako etengabeko jarrera mantendu zuten (idem.).

Antzeko joerak nagusitzen dira politika publiko gehienetan⁵⁷² beraz **eskoziar demokratizazio**⁵⁷³ *mugatu* bati buruz ari garela uste dugu (H4). Hauteskunde eta parte hartze demokratiko zuzenaren bidez aukeraturiko Eskoziar parlamentu bat ez zegoen neurrian, *input zilegitasun* zuzen baten falta zegoen eta ezin dugu zentsu hertsian eskoziar demokrazia bati buruz hitz egin. Hala ere, gure aburuz hurrengo dimentsioak hartu behar dira kontuan:

- Eskoziar nazioak bere burua nazio britainiarren parte osagarri moduan ordezkatu sentitu zuen urte luzez.
- Westminsterreko legebiltzarrerako hauteskundeetan aukeraturiko ordezkariak osatzen zuten gobernu⁵⁷⁴ eta 1970. hamarkada arte ez zen boto dibergentzia

sektore publikoak eraikiak ziren, Ingalaterra eta Galesen aldiz laurden batekoa zen proportzioa (Paterson, 1994:124).

⁵⁷⁰ Scottish Office-ak sustaturiko agentziek, autoritate lokalek, Scottish Housing Association eta diseinuetan parte hartzen zuten arkitekto eta ikuskariek osaturikoak adibidez.

⁵⁷¹ Scottish Office-aren departamendua.

⁵⁷² Kontrara, gizarte segurantzaren ez zegoen ia ezberdintasunik.

⁵⁷³ Demokratizazioaren definiziorako ikus "authoritarian statism and the privatization of democracy" kapitulua.

⁵⁷⁴ Gobernuak izendatzen zituen Secretary of State for Scotland eta Scottish Office-ko kideak.

handirik egon Eskozia eta Erresuma Batuko beste nazioen artean⁵⁷⁵. Hala ere, ez zegoen Secretary of State for Scotland eta Scottish Office-aren gaineko kontrol demokratiko zuzenik (democratic accountability).

- Parte hartze publikoaren eta ongizate sistemaren hedapenaren inguruko “adostasun sozialdemokrata” zabala zegoen bai Eskozian zein Britainia Handian eta gobernu aldaketek ez zituzten oinarritzko printzipioak aldatzen.
- Eremu ezberdinetan garatu ziren *policy network* ezberdinetan, demokratikoki aukeratutako eskoziar autoritate lokalen presentzia egoteaz gain sindikatu eta arloko eragileen presentzia ere bazegoen. Horren ondorioz, marko britainiarraz gain, erakunde horien erabakien aurka jotzeko, politiziaziorako eta mobilizazio sozialerako marko eskoziar mugatu bat ere bazegoen.
- Hala ere, zentsu hertsian gobernu zentralaren erakundeek sustaturiko deszentralizazio administratibo bati buruz ari gara, kontrol demokratiko zuzenik ez zuen neurrian elite lokal bat hobesteko joera zuena (Keating, 2005:11).

Hori kontuan izanik, ***eskuduntza administratibo ugari zituen eta eremu eskoziar bereiztua sakontzen eragin arren, ez zuen eskoziar hautesleen kontrol demokratiko zuzenik beraz Britainiar demokraziaren baitako demokratizazio mugatu bati buruz ari gara***. Hala ere, sistemaren oinarriak 60. hamarkadara arte egiturazko aldaketarik gabe mantendu ziren⁵⁷⁶. Britainiar Fordismoaren eta Estatuaren krisiaren lehenengo adierazleekin batera aldiz, bere mugak gero eta agerikoagoak ziren. Testuinguru horretan SNP lehenengo aldiz bazterreko aukera izatetik zentralitate politikoan kokatzera ailegatu zen. 1959ko hauteskundeetan botoen % 0,5 jasotzetik 1970ean %11,4ra igo zen eta 1974an %30.4ra. 1967an Winnie Ewingen Hamiltoneko garaipenari esker lehen⁵⁷⁷ aldiz SNP-k ordezkari bat lortu zuen Westminsterren eta hortik aurrera autonomiaren aldeko aldarrikapena erdigunean jarri zuen. Ewingek jada 1968an era argian adierazten zuen independentziaren helburua autogobernu demokratikoagoa sustatzea zela:

“Nosotros, los hombres y mujeres de Escocia, mejoraríamos la calidad de nuestra vida si dispusiéramos del pleno control de los asuntos económicos, políticos y sociales de nuestro país” (Moreno, 1995:163).

Besteak beste, Iparraldeko Itsasoko petrolioaren aurkitzean, SNP-k “It’s Scotland’s oil” kanpaina arrakastatsua martxan jarri zuen. 70. hamarkadan krisi organikoa gero eta nabariagoa zen testuinguruan, Eskoziar autogobernuaren aldeko aldarriak areagotu ziren,

⁵⁷⁵ 1920. hamarkadan ere boto dibergentzia egon zen eta Home Rule-aren aldeko mugimenduak piztu ziren.

⁵⁷⁶ Autogobernuaren aldeko mugimendu ezberdinak egon arren ez zuten arrakastarik izan.

⁵⁷⁷ SNP moduan lortu lehenengoa. Bigarren Mundu Gerra ostean epe labur batez koalizio baten baitan ordezkari bat lortu zuen.

SNP 1974. urteko urriko hauteskundeetan Laboristen atzetik bigarren indar bihurtu zen⁵⁷⁸ eta Gobernu Laboristak Gales eta Eskoziarentzat “devolution” prozesu bat martxan jartzea onartu zuen⁵⁷⁹.

Lehen adierazi dugun moduan, belaunaldi batentzat “autonomia” zena hurrengo belaunaldiarentzat “dependentzia” bihurtzen hasi zen (Paterson, 1994:4). **Gure ikerketa galderak berreskuratuz: zein erlazio dago postfordismoaren baitan egon den Estatuaren eraldaketaren eta mugimendu nazionalista historikoek burutzen dituzten burujabetza eskaeren artean? Zein da zehazki Eskoziako burujabetza eskaeretan duen eragina?** Testuinguru horretan, oraindik Ongizatezko Nazio Estatu Keynesiarra nagusi bazen ere, ostean gertatu zenaren aurrehistoria dela esan dezakegu.

Hori dela eta Ongizatezko Estatu Britainiarraren baitan zituzten estatu erakundeak eta eragileek horiekiko erlazioan jokatu zuten jarduera estrategikoaren ondorioz, Eskoziar askok ez zuten bere burua naziorik gabeko estatu moduan ikusten, “estatalitate subalterno” moduan baizik (H4). Berriz ere Patersonen hitzak jasoko ditugu zuzenean:

“The protest took a nationalist form because the Scottish semi-state had encouraged the development of a sense of Scottish national interest. When the state then seemed to be failing to deliver the material well-being that it had promised, new ways of organising the state were proposed more insistently. At the same time, there emerged a critique of the Scottish Office as being insufficiently democratic.” (1994:168).

3.3 Eskoziar subalternitatea: Thatcherismoa klima hotzean.

Eskozia eta Britainiar proiektuaren arteko haustura kualitatibo bat suposatu zuen Thatcherismoak ezarritako momentu estrukturalak. Horren ondorioz, Eskoziarrek bere borondatearen arabera gobernatzeko zituzten mugak agerian utzi zituen gatazka politikoa areagotuz (H5). McAlpinek, Lindsayk eta Wrayk adierazi bezala “Thacherrek irudikatzen du Eskoziako nazio nortasunak bere burua haren kontra definitzeko aurkitu zuen etsaia. Irudikatzen du Eskoziak bere interesak Estatu britainiarrarekin bat zihoazela sinesteari utzi zion unea” (2013:72).

Hasteko 1979. urteko devolution prozesuaren porrota aipatu behar da. Honek, bestek beste, Eskoziar Parlamentua sortzea aurreikusten zuen. Baiezkoak %51.67ko babesarekin irabazi arren, orotara ez zen errolda osoaren %40ra heldu⁵⁸⁰ (%32.9koa izan zen) eta

⁵⁷⁸ Laboristek %36.3 eta 41 eserleku lortu zituzten SNP-k botoen %30.4 eta 11 eserleku.

⁵⁷⁹ SNP eta Plaid Cymruren arrakastaren ondorioz, 1968 amaieran Harold Wilson Laboristak “Konstituzio Batzorde Erreal” bat sortzea agindu zuen eta 1973an aurkeztu zuten “Kilbrandon Txostenak” deszentralizazio prozesu bat gomendatu zuen.

⁵⁸⁰ Erroldaren %40aren babesaren baldintza, George Cunningham parlamentari laboristak ezarritako emendakin baten ondorioz ezarri zen.

horren ondorioz ez zen Eskoziar parlamenturik osatu. Urte horretan bertan Margaret Thatcherrek hauteskundeak irabazi ostean prozesuarekin jarraitzeko atak itxi ziren.

Adierazi bezala, *“subalternitatea” kontzeptu erlazionala izanik, dimentsio material, estrategiko eta diskurtsiboen arteko elkarrekintza konplexuaren ondorioa da. Eskoziar kasuan horrela operazionalizatuko dugu.* Gure aburuz, 1979tik aurrera aurreko hamarkadetan eskoziar estatu/nazio eraikuntzaren ardatzak izan zirenak kolokan jarri ziren desdemokratizazioa sustatuz. Era paraleloan elkar elikatu zuten bi prozesu garatu ziren: (1) eskoziar demokratizazioaren eta estatu/nazio eraikuntzaren ardatzak izan zirenak Thatcherismoak ahuldu edo guztiz ezabatu zituen bitartean, (2) eskoziar autogobernuaren beharra geroz eta gehiago hedatu zen jendartean zehar. Prozesu honi hertsiki loturik, hurrengo ere azpimarratu behar da: (1) Britainiartasuna balio kontserbadoreetan oinarrituta berrartikulatu zen bitartean, (2) Thatcherismoa kanpo eratzaille moduan erabilia balio sozialdemokratetan oinarrituriko Eskoziar nazioaren berrartikulazioa eman zen.

Lehenengo prozesuari dagokionez, planorik orokorrean jada ikusi bezala, Thatcherrek eremu gehienetan *autoritate pribatuak geroz eta gehiago ahalduntzearekin batera, botere exekutiboa indartu eta zentralizazioa sustatu zuen (H1). Honen bidez, eskoziar erakundeen ahalmen politikoa murriztearekin batera aktore pribatuak indartu zituen.* Horretaz gain, eskoziarrek kontserbadoreen politikak euren aurka zuzendutako erasotzat jo zituzten. Zehazki David McCronen hitzak zuzenean jasoz:

“In Scotland, the attack on state institutions – the nationalised industries, the education system, local government, the public sector generally, even the Church, institutions which carried much of Scotland’s identity- was easily perceived as an attack on ‘Scotland’ itself (2001:122)

Plano zehatzago batean hurrengo azpimarratuko dugu. Maila ekonomikoan eskumenak oso mugatuak izan arren hamarkadetan zehar “politika erregional autoktonoak” garatu zituztela esan dugu (Paterson, 1994:121). Thatcherismoak kontrara honen aurka era zuzenean jo zuen. Eskoziar iritzi publikoan ongizatearen oinarritzat jotzen ziren sektore ekonomikoak gogor kolpatu zituzten. Ontzi eraikuntza, siderurgia eta meatzaritza izan ziren kaltetuenak baina industria astun osoari eragin zion (Mitchell & Bennie, 1995:94). 1979an eskoziarren 1/3 industrian egiten zuen lan, 1984an 1/4a baino gutxiago eta 1989an 1/5 . Hurrengo taulan dakusagun moduan joera hori denboraren poderioz areagotu besterik ez da egin:

IRUDIA 82 *Sektore ekonomikoen bilakaera; 1989-2015*

	1989	1999	2009	2015
Lehen sektorea	%1.5	%1.9	%1.9	%1.3
Energia eta Ur hornidura	%2.9	%2.2	%3.4	%3.8
Industria	%20.5	%14.9	%8.7	%8.6
Eraikuntza	%6.6	%5.5	%7.9	%6.8
Zerbitzuak ⁵⁸¹	%68.4	%75.5	%77.6	%79.1

(iturria: Nomis, 2018)

Industriaren gainbehera, *post-fordismoaren baitan finantziarizazioaren* aldeko hautua egin zuten ekonomien ezaugarri komuna da eta Britainiarra honen adibide paradigmaticoa da (Jessop, 2016: 135). Eskozian bestalde, *autogobernuaren beharra* lehen lerroan jarri zuen mobilizazio orokorra eraginez eta lantegien biziraupena Eskoziaren osasunaren ideiarekin lotuz (McAlpin, et.al 2013:73). “Elizek, Eskoziako Sindikatuen Kongresuak (STUC), politikariek eta “Eskoziako Herritar” taldeek bat egin zuten Eskozia osoa hartuko zuen industriaren eraispenen gaineko fronte batean”⁵⁸² (ibidem:72).

Laborista eta SNP-ko kideek gobernatutako Erakunde lokalen eskumenak murrizteaz gain, Scottish Office-aren zilegitasuna bere historiako baxuena zen. Gobernu Kontserbadoreen garaian (1979-1997) *Secretary of State for Scotland* eta *Scottish Office-ko* arduradunak gobernu zentralak izendatu zituen Eskozian botoen gutxiengoa izan arren. Aurreko urteetan salatzen zuten defizit demokratikoa (democratic unaccountability) era nabarmenean agerian geratu zen. Ikuspegi hau, Eskoziarrek babesten ez zituzten politikak hartzearekin batera areagotu besterik ez zen egin. 1989. urtean ezarri zen etxebizitzaren gaineko “poll-tax” zerga da honen adibiderik argiena. Honen bidez, etxebizitza guztiei zerga berdina ezarri zitzairen diru sarrerak kontuan hartu gabe eta aurreko zerga progresiboa bertan behera utziz (Mitchell & Bennie, 1995:94). Horretaz gain Eskozian,

⁵⁸¹ Datu hauen arabera zerbitzuen sektorea handiagoa da ez dutelako petrolio kontuan hartu. Eskoziari buruzko kapituluaren ikusiko dugun moduan, petrolio kontuan hartuta datuak nabarmen aldatzen dira, zerbitzuak %61era jaitsiz eta mehategi eta petroleoa ateratzea %21era igoz.

⁵⁸² Eskoziar memoria kolektiboan hamaika lantegitan aurrera eramandako borroka, “Eskoziako Sozialistaren” ideia jaulkitzen lagundu dute (McCrone, 2002:139). Hauek lirateke esanguratsuenak: Upper Clydeko Ontziolak, Clydebanke-ko Singer, Carron Iron Works, Bathgateko Leyland British, Corpach Paper fabrika, Invergordon fundizioa, Linwood, Caterpillar eta Ravenscaig (McAlpin, Lindsay, Wray, 2013:73).

Ingalaterran eta Galesen baino urtebete lehenago ezartzeak “Eskoziaren aurkako neurritzat” jo zuten protesta dinamika gogorra zabalduz (ídem.). Bestetik, aurreko hamarkadetan etxebizitza publikoen eraikuntza/jabetza oinarri zuen politikaren ordean, hauen eraikuntza/jabetzaren pribatizazioa eragin zuten politikak sustatu ziren.

Hezkuntza sisteman sustatu erreformek ere erantzun zabala jaso zuten. Irakasleen sindikatu nagusienak, hitz berri bat asmatu zuen gobernu kontserbadoreek Eskozian ezarri zituzten politikak deskribatzeko: “Englishing” of Scottish education” (ídem.). Gubernamentalitate neoliberalaren “egia erregimena” jarraituz, hainbat arlotan pribatizazioak sustatzeaz gain erakunde publikoetan merkatu ikuspegia txertatu zuten Eskozian publikotasuna eta balio sozialdemokratak nagusi ziren bitartean (Paterson, 1994:169). Eskoziar independentziaren sinbolo zen lege sistema ere aldatzen saiatu ziren klase ertaineko eliteen protesta gogorra eraginez (ídem.).

Eskoziar demokraziaren aurkako erasotzat jo ziren bai Thatcherismoa bai bere osteko gobernu kontserbadoreak ere (H5). 1979an eskoziarren %52ak uste zuen Eskoziar gaietan Kontserbadoreengan konfiantza izan zezaketela. 1990eko abuztuan egin zen inkesta batean aldiz %13-k soilik uste zuen Britainia Handiko Gobernuak Eskoziar interesak era egokian babesten zituela (Mitchell & Bennie, 1995:99). Inkesta beraren arabera, %79ak uste zuen Alderdi Kontserbadorea, Eskozian garrantzia gutxi zuen alderdi Ingelesa zela (ídem.).

Honen aurrean, devolution prozesuarekin jarraitzeko 80. hamarkadaren hasieran Eskoziar Parlamentuaren Aldeko Kanpaina⁵⁸³ martxan jarri zen. 1989. urtean eragile politiko, sozial eta sindikal gehienek⁵⁸⁴ “Eskoziako Konbentzio Konstituzionalean”⁵⁸⁵ elkartu ziren Legebiltzar propioa eta autonomia aldarrikatuz (McAlpin, Lindsay, Wray, 2013:73).

Gure hipotesietara bueltatuz, prozesu guzti honen atzean dagoen mekanismoa burujabetza gabekia bat dela uste dugu, Eskoziarren borondatearen arabera gobernatzeko eta eskoziarrak gobernatze prozesuan sartzeko ahalmen politikoaren falta (H5). Hori dela eta, ez zen estaturik gabeko nazio baten defentsa, are gutxiago kultura ezberdin baten babesa. “Estatalitatearen izaera subalternoaren” ondorioz bere demokratizazio prozesua garatzeko “ahotsa” izatea zen eskatzen zutena (H4). Berriz ere Patersonen hitzak gure egiten ditugu:

⁵⁸³ Campaign for a Scottish Assembly.

⁵⁸⁴ Alderdi Laborista, Alderdi Liberal Demokrata, Eskoziako Berdeen Alderdia, Alderdi Komunista, Eskoziako Sindikatuen Kongresua, Eskoziako Garapen eta Industria Kontseilua, Enpresari Txikien Federazioa, Eskoziako Eliza, Eliza Katolikoa eta beste hainbat elkartek hartu zuten parte. SNP-k hasieran parte hartu zuen arren alderdi barruan “maximalista” eta “gradualista” artean zeuden tentsioen ondorioz eta independentziaren gaia ez zela eztabaidatuko jakin ostean Konbentzioa utzi zuen (McAlpin, Lindsay, Wray, 2013:73).

⁵⁸⁵ Scottish Constitutional Convention.

“The only way to understand that is to continue to remind ourselves again that, **in crucial respects, what was being attacked was indeed a separate state**, not merely the field agencies of a unitary power” (Paterson, 1994: 170)

Hala ere, prozesuak ez dira “gertatzen”, aktoreen jarduera estrategikoari hertsiki loturik daude (H6). Gatazka hauetan, interpretazio diskurtsiboek eta hegemoniaren eraikuntzak garrantzia berezia hartzen dute (H9). Hori dela eta, arestian aipatu bigarren dimentsioa kontuan hartuz, Thatcherismoa kanpo eratzaille moduan erabilia balio sozialdemokratetan oinarrituriko Eskoziar nazioaren berrartikulazioa eman zela aintzat hartu behar dugu.

Kontserbadoreen diskurtsoan, Eskozia, ekonomikoki diru laguntza publikoen menpekoa, “subsidiatuta” eta ez lehiakortzat jotzen zen ‘marvellously tolerant English’-ekin⁵⁸⁶ konparatuta (Mitchell & Bennie, 1995:94). Thatcherismoaren “Britainiartasunean”, Eskozia bazterrean geratu zen eta batez ere Ingalaterrako hegoaldean erresonantzia zuten ideiak baliatu ziren. Alderdi Kontserbadoreak ez zuen Eskoziako botoen beharrik agintean mantentzeko beraz politikoki ez zion zuzenean hauteskunde higadurarik eragiten.

Burujabetza faltak bestalde, Eskoziarren hautuen arabera gobernatzea oztopatzen zuen, ase gabeko eskarien metatzea eraginez eta eremu anitzetan gatazka sozialak sortuz. Hauek, Thatcher eta Toryen aurka (haiek) mantentzen zuten jarreraren ondorioz euren artean era ekibalentzian artikulatu ziren (gu) berri bat eraikiz (Azkune, 2017:92). “Gu” horren ezaugarritzean, Eskozian urteetan zehar “sedimentatutako” ideiak azpimarratzen zituzten merkatuaren eta pribatizazioaren gorespenari aurre egiteko. Beste hainbaten artean McCronek hurrengoak azpimarratzen ditu: Ingalaterran baino klase ezberdintasun txikiagoa aldarrikatzen zuen “igualitarismoaren ideia”; balio komunak eta kohesio maila handia dituen “kolektibismoaren” ideia; Eskozia borrokalari eta Sozialistaren aldarrikapena; Hezkuntza sistema garatuarena eta honi loturik historikoki Ingalaterrak baino alfabetatze maila altuagoa izateren ideia (McCrone, 1992: 88-120).

Eskoziar demokraziaren defentsa, beste eskari guztiak ordezkatzeko gaitasuna izan zuen artikulazio ekibalentzial argia eraginez (H9). Honen adibide on bat eskaintzen digu berriz ere Patersonen lanak:


“the assertion of Scottish democracy allowed feminists to raise women’s rights in the debates about Scotland’s future to an extent that had never happened before: they, and also campaigners against racism, now had a semi-

⁵⁸⁶ Daily Express egunkarian 1990eko otsailean egindako adierazpenak dira. Mitchell eta Bennieren aipu osoa jasoz: “Mrs Thatcher informed Scots that they were privileged to be subsidized by the ‘marvellously tolerant English’ (1995:94).

official national ideology of Scottish democracy with which they could challenge anyone who was advocating constitutional or political change” (1994:173).

Borroka ezberdinen arteko kontiguitate⁵⁸⁷ harremanaren ondorioz desplazamendu bat eman zen (Eskoziar demokraziaren defentsa eta borroka feminista, arrazismoaren aurkakoa, langileen defentsa, industriaren defentsa etab.). Thatcherismoaren aurkako borrokaren eraginez Eskoziar demokraziaren defentsa eskaera ezberdin horiek ordezkatzeko gaitasuna zuen metafora bihurtu zen (Azkune, 2017:101; Laclau, 2003:2).

IRUDIA 83 Eskoziar demokraziaren metafora



Iturria: egileak egina.

Prozesu horretan erabili zuten markogintza estrategia horrela laburtuko genuke:


- **Diagnostikoa:** *Statu quoak* Eskoziarrek erabakitakoaren arabera gobernatzea oztopatzen du.
- **Pronostikoa:** Eskoziar demokrazia posiblea izateko, Eskoziarrek erabakitako legebiltzarra eta erabaki horiek aurrera eramateko eskumen politikoak beharrezkoak dira. Gehienek “home rule” aldarrikatu arren askok zuzenean independentzia aldarrikatzen zuten. 90. Hamarkada hasieran lehen aldiz %40ra gerturatu zen independentziaren aldekoen kopurua.
- **Motibazioa** “Scottish solutions to Scottish problems”.

⁵⁸⁷ Ikus Essexeko Eskolaren diskurtsoaren teoria kapituluaren baitako “diskurtsoaren egituraketa eta adierazleak” atala. Zehazki “desplazamendua” eta “metonimia” eta “kondentsazioa” eta “metaforari” dagozkionak.

Sakonki landuko ez dugun arren, **“hegemoniaren mekanismo eta prozesuak” aktibatu zirela ikus dezakegu** (H8). Aldez aurretik banaturik zeuden sektoreen arteko **artekaritza** nabaria da, batez ere borroka zehatzetan: industriaren defentsan, poll-tax-i aurre egiteko mobilizazioetan edo autogobernu eskaeratan etengabeko dinamikak izan ziren. Devolution prozesua sustatzeko Eskoziar Parlamentuaren Aldeko Kanpaina, Eskoziako Konbentzio Konstituzionalaren sorrera edota erreferendumean YES botoa eskatzen zuten eragile guztiek osaturiko **“Scotland FORWARD”** lirateke honen adibide paradigmaticoenak. Horiei estuki loturik daude Thatcherismoaren aurkako **polarizazioa** eta **berrikuntza taktikoa**. Azken honek, **berrikuntza diskurtsiboa** eta **ekintza kolektiboaren berrikuntza** suposatzen du (Zubiaga, 2012:128). Berrikuntza diskurtsiboa agerikoa da eta jada azaldu ditugu bere ezaugarri nagusiak. Ekintza kolektiboaren berrikuntzan ere aipagarriak dira adibidez poll-tax galarazteko boikotak, etxe okupazioak edota saltzeko aginduak bertan behera uztea (McAlpin et.al, 2013:73). Autonomia bestalde, herritarren gehiengoaren eskaera bihurtu zen eta berau aldarrikatzeko historiako manifestazio jendetsuenak burutu ziren. 1992ko abenduan Europar Batasunaren gailur bat burutzen zen bitartean Edinburgon egin zen **“Scotland demands democracy”** martxa da honen adibiderik argiena. Mobilizazio soziala eta bere baitan aktibaturiko mekanismoek hegemonia berri baten eraikuntzan ezinbestekoak izan ziren.

Esandakoa kontuan hartuz, 80. hamarkadatik aurrera nazio identitatea, sozialdemokraziaren defentsa eta autogobernuaren aldarrikapenak euren artean elkar elikatu ziren dimentsioak izan ziren era argian adierazteko **“Eskozia ezberdina zela”** (McEwen, 2006:139). Eraikitako **“Eskozia sozialdemokrataren”** hegemoniaren grafikoa horrela laburtu dezakegu:

IRUDIA 84 Thatcherismoaren aurkako “Eskozia sozialdemokrata”



Iturria: egileak egina.

Gutxieneko eskaera Eskoziar Parlamentuaren sorrera zen eta hau Eskoziar demokraziaren garapenarekin hertsirik loturik zegoen. Gure tesiaren oinarria berreskuratuz gakoa hurrengo zen: *nola eta zein neurritan hitz egin zezakeen eskoziar estatalitate subalternoak? Beste era batera esanda, “Eskoziar ezberdintasuna” kontuan hartuz (eskaera sozialei dagokionez) nola lortu “Eskoziar berdintasuna” (eskaera horiek praktikara eramateko tresna eta baliabideei dagokionez)? (H4)*. Zuzenean McCrone eta McEwenek honen inguruan egindako aipuek guk baino hobeto jasotzen dute idea:

“[...] a Scottish Parliament was seen as a means to an end, and that end was better government and an expected improvement in social and public welfare” (McCrone, 2001:123)

“The establishment of a Scottish Parliament came to be regarded and promoted, not just as a vehicle for the expression of Scottish national identity, but as a pre-requisite for better public services and progressive social and economic change in line with Scottish policy priorities” (McEwen, 2006:139)

1997an Tony Blairren gobernu Laboristak Gales eta Eskoziako devolution prozesuak martxan jarri zituen. Eskoziaren kasuan bi galdera proposatu ziren: lehenengoak Eskoziar Parlamentuaren sorrerari buruz galdetu zuen eta bigarrena azken honek zergak moldatzeko eskumena izateari buruz. Parlamentuak %74.3ko baietza jaso zuen eta zergak moldatzeko eskumenak %63.5. Horren ostean, hurrengo kapituluan landuko dugun Eskoziar demokratizazioaren sakontzea ahalbidetu zuten estatu egituren deszentralizazioa garatu zen.

4- Britainiar Krisi Organikoa: Disunited Kingdom

Demokraziaren pribatizazioaren ondorioz herritarrak boteretu eta bere gobernu sozioekonomikoan barneratzeko beharrezkoa den gaitasun politikoa esku pribatuetan utzi dela adierazi dugu (Goikoetxea, 2017:16). Zentzu horretan, Thatcherren garaian ezarritako egiturazko aldaketek, Mayorren garaian eta “Blairismoan” jarraikortasuna izan zuten (Jessop, 2016). **Ipar Atlantikoko Krisi Finantzariaren ondorioz aldiz desdemokratizazio prozesua areagotu eta burujabetza eta demokratizazio eskaerak ugaritu dira (H3). Ikusiko dugun moduan, hauek ezkerreko zein eskuineko artikulazio populisten bidez bideratu dira eta horren ondorioz eduki demokratiko eta xenofoboak izan dituzte. Hala ere, euren atzean dagoen mekanismo nagusia burujabetza galera bat da.**

Adierazi dugun moduan, krisi testuinguruetan, aurreko tentsio eta kontraesanak kondentsatu eta garapen “normalaren” erritmoa hautsi egiten da (Poulantzas, 1971:59). Kasu honetan, Thatcherismoaren garaian ezarritako momentu egituratzailearen haustura eta *momentu koiuntural* berri batean zabalera eragin zuen (Jessop, 1982:253), ekintza politikoari aukeren espirala zabalduz (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:181-186). Argigarriak dira zentzu horretan Colin Hayen hitzak:

“For in a way this is an internal and an external crisis- a UK crisis, a Eurozone crisis, a crisis of the West, even a global crisis. But, from a UK perspective, it is also far worse than that. Why? **Because the origin of all of these associated crises lies in the Anglo-American capitalism of which the UK, since at least the 1980s, has been perhaps the key architect.** It is a crisis of Anglo-liberal excess and of a globalisation couched in this image” (2014:61)

Hayen hausnarketak bete-betean gure hipotesiekin bat egiten du, beraz, arestian aipatu ditugun thatcherismoaren epe luzeko ondorioak hartu behar ditugu kontuan. Honi erantzuteko, hein handi batean Jessopek Brexit-a eta Britainiar krisi organikoa azaltzeko buruturiko lana erabiliko dugu (2016). Lehenik eta behin metaketa estrategiaren ezaugarri nagusien ondorioak aztertuko ditugu bigarren pauso batean Brexita eta krisi organikoaren ezaugarriak aipatzeko.

Laurogeigarren hamarkadan bultzatu zen *metaketa estrategiaren* eraginez, Europako zenbait herrialdeetan hobetsi zen Ezagutzaren Ekonomia⁵⁸⁸ ordez finantzen gidaritzapean oinarrituriko metaketa⁵⁸⁹ hobetsi zela hartu behar dugu kontuan (Jessop & Sum, 2013:416-421). Horren ondorioz, azken hamarkadetan kapital produktiboaren ordez,

⁵⁸⁸ Knowledge-based economy. Batez ere 90. hamarkadan Europako zenbait herrialdeetan hegemonikoa bihurtu zen.

⁵⁸⁹ Finance-dominated accumulation ingeleraz.

zorpetzea eta interesen etekinean oinarrituriko finantzarizazioa sustatu dira (Jessop, 2016:135).

Zeintzuk dira horren eraginak? Behar sozialak asetzeko xedea duen balio erabileraren ordeza, aldaketa balioan oinarrituriko diruzko etekina pribilegiatu da (idem). Zehazki, kapital finantzaria eta kapital industrial transnazionala beste kapitalaren frakzioen ordeza eta klase subalternoen ordeza pribilegiatu dira (idem.). Londreseko Citya nazioarteko finantza kapitalaren erreferentzia zentroa bilakatu da aurretiaz zuen boterea areagotuz eta azken urteetako finantza eskandalu ezagunenaren gune bihurtuz.

Desindustrializazioa izan da aipatu txanponaren beste aldea. Mantendu den industria sektorean kanpoko kapitalari ateak zabaldu dizkiote gobernu ezberdinek “open for business” dinamiken bidez. Horren ondorioz, britainiar industriaren garapena, estatuaren estrategia ekonomiko koherente baten eskuetan egon ordeza, nazioarteko estrategietan txertatzeko gaitasunen araberakoa izan da (idem.). Aipatu dinamikek erregioen arteko desoreka sustatu dute Londres eta Ingalaterra hego-ekialdea estrategikoki hobetsiz.

Azken finean, estatu gaitasun baxuen eta estrategia neoliberalaren ondorioz, ekonomia erreala ahula eta etengabeko etekinak bilatzen dituen finantza sektore hipertrofiatuaren indartzea izan dira ondorioak (idem:137).

Elementu horiek kontuan hartu behar ditugu Brexitaren eta Britainiar krisi organikoa plano zehatzago batean azaltzeko. Zeren ondorioa da Brexita? Gure aburuz, burujabetza galera baten eta desdemokratizazio prozesu baten ondorioa da. Galdera sakona izan arren Jessopen kokapena egokia iruditzen zaigu:


“The Brexit conjuncture reflected a long-running split in the establishment, a worsening representational crisis in the party system, a growing crisis of authority for political elites, a legitimacy crisis of the state and a crisis of national-popular hegemony over the population.” (ibidem:134)

Hori kontuan izanik, Britainiar estatuaren krisi organikoaren dimentsio nagusiak aztertu ditzakegu. Hasteko, *ordezkaritza krisiaren* adibide argia da azken hamarkadetan botere blokea eta sektore sozial zabalak artikulatu dituzten Tory eta Laboristen krisia. Barruti indibidualetan oinarrituriko first-past-the-post sistemak era argian bipartidismoa hobesten duen neurrian, zaila da era arrakastatsuan alderdi berriak sortzea. Horren ondorioz, ordezkaritza krisia ezin dugu parlamentuan duten ordezkari kopuruarekin ezta botoen ehunekoarekin neurtu. Euren kide kopuruak eta orientazio estrategikoei aldiz datu kualitatibo sakonagoak direla uste dugu.

Hori kontuan izanik, hurrengo datuetan ikus dezakegun moduan gerra osteko loralditik azken hogeita hamar urteetan galera jarraia bizi izan dute. Laboristen kasuan, Blairren lehenengo urteetan igoera txiki bat antzeman daitekeen arren, daturik aipagarriena

Corbynen lidergoaren ostean establishmentaren aurkako diskurtso berrituaren ondorioz lorturiko gorakada da. Kasu honetan, alderdi berriak sortzeko dauden egiturazko mugak kontuan hartuta, barruan zegoen outsider batek, alderdi zahar baten eraldaketa sustatu du Bernie Sandersek AEB-etan egin zuenaren antzera (Del Amo, 2017:79). Beste hainbat herrialdeetan bizi den artikulazio populista eta herri burujabetzaren adibide argia eskaintzen digu (Azkune, 2016:34). UKIPen indartzea ere txanpon beraren beste aldea litzateke. Hala ere, bere eraginik handiena diskurtso politikoa baldintzatzea eta Europar Batasunetik ateratzeko beste alderdiei presioa egitea izan da. Zehazki, Toryen diskurtso eta planteamenduetan eragitea eta mapa politikoa eskuinera biratzea izan da euren arrakasta nagusia. Hala ere, Brexitaren ostean Nigel Farage alderdiaren buruak dimititu zuen eta etengabeko krisian sartu da.

IRUDIA 85 Alderdi kideak milaka: 1929-2017 bilakaera




(Keen & Jackson, 2018:9)

Honekin batera gobernuekiko konfiantza galeraren garapena argia da. Britainiar gobernuak inoiz sinisten ez zutenen kopurua 1974an %10koa zen bitartean, 2009an %40koa zen (Cousins, 2011).

⁵⁹⁰ Ezkerreko zutabeko datuen erreferentzia milaka.

IRUDIA 86 Britainiar gobernuak “*ia inoiz sinisten ez dituztenen*” ehunekoa (almost never trust)




. Iturria: Cousins (2011)

Alderdien beherakadarekin batera, sindikatuen gainbehera eta honi loturiko soldata diferentziaren hazkundera da aipagarriena. Hurrengo grafikoan ikus dezakegun moduan, 1980tik aurrera era ia proportzionalan bat egiten dute sindikatuen kideen kopuruaren jaitsiera eta goiko klaseen (top 1%) diru sarreraren hazkundera. Lehen adierazi bezala thatcherismoaren garaipen aipagarriena sindikatuak garaitzea izan zen eta bere ondorioek gaur egunera⁵⁹¹ arte iraun dute.

⁵⁹¹ Sindikatuen presentzia sektore publikoan %93koa den bitartean sektore pribatuan %23koa da eta horren ondorioz greba kopurua ere sektore publikoan nagusitzen da (Cousins, 2011).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 87 Sindikatuen kide kopuruen jaitsiera eta soldata ezberdintasunaren hazkundera



Iturria: (McGaughey, 2016:23)


Estatuak krisiaren kudeaketan izan zuen parte hartzearen eraginez estatuaren *krisi fiskala* sustatu zen eta horren ondorioz estatuaren interbentzio mekanismoak ahuldu ziren. Honek lotura zuzena du *soberania materialaren galerarekin eta gaitasunen krisiarekin*. Aipagarriak dira, finantza sistemaren krisian diru publikoaren erabilpena; sustatu diren zerga jaitsierak; krisiari aurre egiteko behar sozialen hazkundera (langabezia saria adibidez) eta ekonomiaren hainbat sektoreetara zuzendutako dirua (ibilgailuen sektorerantz adibidez) (Hay, 2014:62). Hala ere, arrazoiz nagusia aktibitate ekonomikoaren jaitsieran kokatzen da (ídem). Hori kontuan izanik, arazoa estatuaren baitan egon ez arren, honen inguruan nagusitu diren eraikuntza diskurtsiboek estatuaren zorrean jarri dute arreta (ibidem:65). Horren ondorioz, metaketa estrategiaren krisiaren ordezkor publikoaren krisiaren irakurketa nagusitu da aurreko paradigma kolokan jarri beharrean berau indartuz⁵⁹² (ibidem:72-73). Horri aurre egiteko gastu publikoaren murrizketa bultzatzeaz gain austeritate politikari izaera estrukturala eman diete (Jessop, 2015b:234). Momentu zehatzeko salbuespeneko politikak, epe luzerako egiturazko politika bihurtu dira sektore sozial zabalak kaltetuz, aktore pribatuak boteretuz eta demokraziaren pribatizazioa areagotuz (Goikoetxea, 2017; Jessop, 2015a:488).

Bestalde, Jessopek adierazten duen moduan, botere ekonomiko eta politikoaren *oinarri soziala* mantentzeko euskarriak ahulak dira (2016:137). Honek beste dimentsioek sustatzen duten *estatuaren zilegitasun krisia* areagotu besterik ez du egiten. Gerra osteko ereduaren ongizatearen hedapena eta enplegu betearien ordezkor, herri kapitalismoa,

⁵⁹² "Paradigm challenging" ordezkor "paradigm reinforcing" irakurketa nagusitu da.

populismo autoritarioa eta kultura enpresarial diziplinarioa dira bere ardatzak (idem). Zehazki, esportazioetan oinarrituriko inbertsio produktibo eta epe luzeko lehiakortasuna bultzatu ordez, Espainiar kasuan ikusi dugun moduan, herri kapitalismoaren oinarri den etxebizitzaren jabetza eta Keynesianismo pribatizatua⁵⁹³ sustatu dira (idem). Honek, goi mailako klaseak indartu, klase ertainak txikitu eta klase baxuenen kopurua handitzea eragin du (idem.). Aurreko grafikoan ikusi dugun ezberdintasunaren hazkundearen logika berean, gini koefizientea oinarri hartuta hurrengo datuak ikus ditzakegu:

IRUDIA 88 Gini Adierazlearen bilakaera: 1961-2015/16



Iturria: Equality Trust (2016)

Honekin batera, *lurralde eta barneratze instituzionalaren krisia* edo batzuek “*Batasunaren krisia*” (Cairney, 2014) izendatu dutena hartu behar da kontuan. Zentzu horretan, 2014. urteko Eskoziako independentzia erreferenduma eta horren osteko dinamika politikoa Britainiar krisi organikoaren ondorio eta sustatzaile dira aldi berean (Azkune, 2016). Idazteko momentuan⁵⁹⁴ zehazturik egon ez arren, Brexitaren ondoren bigarren erreferendum baten aukera zabalik mantendu da Batasunaren krisia areagotuz. Horretaz gain, Irlanda Iparraldearen eta Irlandako Errepublikaren arteko harremanen inguruko gorabeherak ere Batasun horren krisiaren beste adierazle bat lirateke.

Azkenik, *Ingalaterra komunitate politiko moduan Batasunetik era ezberdindu batean geroz eta gehiago identifikatzen hasi da, historikoki indartsua zen Britishness baten ordez Englishness berri bat eraikiz*. Honek kanpo eratzaille moduan Europar Batasuna erabili du Brexitaren artikulazio diskurtsiboan gakoa den papera jokatzuz (Henderson et. al, 2016). Ingalaterran, nazio identitateari buruz galdetzean 1992. urtean %31-k bere


⁵⁹³ Privatized Keynesianism edo Asset Price Keynesianism dira honi erreferentzia egiteko erabiltzen diren terminoak. Laburki hurrengo esan nahi du: soldatak eta eros ahalmena bera egin arren, kontsumoa mantentzeko finantziario pribatua hedatzea

⁵⁹⁴ 2018ko martxoan.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

burua English moduan definitzen zuen bitartean %63-k British moduan definitzen zuen (Jeffery et al, 2014:8). 2014an aldiz biek jasotzen zuten identifikazio maila bera. Hurrengo grafikoetan ikus dezakegu azken urteetako garapena eta honek Europar Batasunaren aurkako jarrerekin duen lotura:

IRUDIA 89 Exclusive national identity, England 1992-2014



Source: 1992, 1997 British Election Study, 2011-2014 Future of England Survey, all other years British Social Attitudes Survey

Iturria:(Jeffery et al, 2014:8)

TAULA 57 Europar Batasunarekiko jarrera eta nazio identitatea

Europar Batasunarekiko jarrera	Guztira	Nazio identitatea	
		English	British
Gauza ona	34	23	42
Gauza txarra	34	45	26

Iturria:(Jeffery et al, 2014:16)

Erresuma Batuko beste nazioetan gertatu den moduan, *identitate ingelesa britainiarraren kaltetan indartu da*. Hala ere, kasu honetan ezberdintasun argia dago: identitate ingelesa eta Europar Batasunaren aurkako jarreraren arteko loturak estuak dira. Honekin batera, devolution prozesuaren ostean Ingalaterrak zuzeneko ordezkartzarik ez izateak

bidegabekeria⁵⁹⁵ sentimendua sortu du (Kenny & Gover, 2016:1). Parlamentu propiorik ez izateak, besteak beste, West Lothian Question⁵⁹⁶ moduan ezagutzen den gatazka sortu du. Honen ondorioz, Ingalaterrako parlamentariak Eskozia, Gales eta Irlanda Iparraldeari itzulitako eskumenetan erabakitzeke ahalmenik ez duten bitartean, azken hauek Ingalaterrako gaiei buruz erabakitzen dute. Auzi honek, sistema konstituzionalean aldaketak egiteko proposamenen ugaritzea ekarri du, English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) izanik azken urteetan indartu dena (idem). Horretaz gain, Britainia Handia estatu federal bilakatzea, Ingalaterrak devolution prozesu propioa izatea edota Ingalaterrako erregioei autonomia gehiago ematea izan dira proposamen eztabaidatuak (idem.). 2015eko otsailean egindako inkesta batean adibidez %44ak Ingalaterrak parlamentu eta gobernu propioa izatea babesten zuen %28a aurka agertzen zen bitartean⁵⁹⁷.

Guzti honekin batera, nazioaren “interes orokorra”⁵⁹⁸ ordezkatzeko gaitasuna duen hegemonia nazional herritar baten faltak, **hegemonia krisi** bat sortu du (Jessop, 2016:134). Testuinguru horretan ulertu behar dira lehian dauden artikulazio populisten indartzea. Ezkerreko ikuspegitik, Corbynen lidergopean gizarte mugimendu izaera hartu duen Laborismo berriak, “for the many not the few” lelopean establishmentaren aurkako banaketa dikotomikoaren bidez artikulazio arrakastatsua burutu du (Del Amo, 2017:79). Eskuinak ere, UKIP-en eraginaren ondorioz, Europar Batasuna eta immigrazioa kanpo eratzaille moduan erabilia artikulazio populista xenofoboa sustatu du. Azken honek, Brexit-aren emaitzan eragin zuzena izan du. Azkenik, Eskoziako independentismoak Toryen eta Britainiar establishmentaren aurkako antagonismoaren bidez, artikulazio independentista berri bat burutu du (Azkune, 2016; 2017).

Thatcherrek, gerra osteko “one nation strategy” baztertu eta “two nation” proiektu hegemonikoa sustatu zuen. Gaur egungo hegemonia krisia horren ondorio zuzena da. Burujabetza galera baten ondorioz, Ingalaterrak ahots handiagoa nahi du eta kontrara Eskoziak eta Galesek (azken honek neurri txikiago batean) ez dute euren burua

⁵⁹⁵ “The transfer of legislative powers to Scotland and Wales has created a series of constitutional anomalies, and there is evidence to suggest these are one source of a growing sense of grievance in England about its constitutional position within the UK.” (Kenny & Gover, 2016:1).

⁵⁹⁶ For how long will English constituencies and English Honourable members tolerate ... at least 119 Honourable Members from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exercising an important, and probably often decisive, effect on English politics while they themselves have no say in the same matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland?

⁵⁹⁷ Should England have a devolved government? zen egindako galdera. Hurrengo loturan eskuragarri: <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/should-england-have-a-devolved-government-like-scotland-and-wales-english-views#table> (azken sarrera: 2018/02/15)

⁵⁹⁸ Adierazi dugun moduan interes orokorraren ideia fikzio bat da, beti sektore batzuk pribilegiatuko dituelako.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

ordezkatuta sentitzen. Brexitak aurreko tentsioak areagotu egin ditu, Ingalaterraren botoek baldintzatu dutelako emaitza Eskoziako bigarren erreferendum bati ateak irekiz. **Guztiak ordezkatzeko zituen Batasun indartsutik, “Disunited Kingdom” metafora nagusitzen ari da.**

Britainiar krisi organikoa eta Brexita, demokraziaren pribatizazioaren eta burujabetza galera baten ondorioa dira. Lan Erregimen Postnazional Schumpeteriarraren baitako kontraesanen baitain ulertu behar dira (H3). Gure aburuz, hurrengo kapituluan aztertuko dugun Eskoziar independentzia prozesua txanpon beraren beste aldea besterik ez da.

8 Scotland

1- Some introductory notes

The first Scottish nationalist party was set up in 1928 and current SNP in 1934. However, there were already demands for self-rule in the end of the XIXth and the beginning of the XXth century, most of them conducted by Liberals and the Labour Party. Nonetheless, almost all political actors, including the Conservatives, recognize that Scotland is a nation and there has always been a degree of Scottish nation building.

For years, the Labour Party was considered the ‘national party of Scotland’. Its symbolic importance grew even more during Thatcherism a period in which they were accused of playing ‘the nationalist card’. As seen in the previous chapter, Thatcherism established a new structural moment (Jessop, 1982:253) in line with the transition towards postfordism. Devolution, was one of the results of its tensions and contradictions.

The Labour Party played for years a paramount role in organizing those substantive dimensions of the state and state power (Jessop, 2015b: 70-88). However, as long as the SNP was its main competitor and both have kept a similar position on the left/right split⁵⁹⁹, Scotland has been traditionally considered more social democratic than England. As we will see, these distinctiveness has sharpened even more after devolution.

2- Devolution: state powers and Scottish democratization

As already said, as long as there was no direct democratic accountability before 1998, we could hardly talk about a Scottish democracy or a Scottish demos. *However, considering the state effects of certain institutions, we have highlighted the importance of a ‘limited democratization inside the British democracy’.* Nonetheless, we do think that devolution entailed a decisive step towards the evolution/creation of a Scottish democratization. Its aim, Blair underlined, was a limited delegation of responsibilities through which ‘the Union will be strengthened and the threat of separatism removed’ (Davidson, 2014:7). In the 1990s George Robertson, the then shadow Scottish secretary, argued that ‘devolution will kill nationalism stone dead’. On the contrary, critics of devolution, both Tory and Labour, wailed that the scheme would prove a “slippery slope” toward independence.

⁵⁹⁹ Their main difference layed in their attitude towards independence.

However, as long as the state is a complex social relation devolution ‘per se’ guarantees neither of these things. It is only through the complex and reciprocal interaction between the structurally inscribed strategic selectivities and strategically calculated structurally oriented action that we observe different outcomes within certain limits (Jessop, 2008a:46). Nonetheless, we believe that it is an essential condition of possibility for the creation of a democratic system and the reproduction of a different demos. Thus, *from our point of view, as a consequence of the mentioned interaction, devolution has entailed the democratic reproduction of the Scottish nation and therefore the production of a new subject/object: the Scottish demos (H4).*

As with all processes of democratization, the technologies of power used in Scotland to dominate/empower the demos are very similar. We refer, to technologies such as education, health, social services, culture, the heteronormative family and so on. We believe that the devolution of powers has increased the political capacities of Scottish State Institutions to dominate/empower and reproduce the Scottish demos.

Devolution consists of a dispersion of power from a political centre to other political centres. In that sense, it is not a “system of dual sovereignty” like that established in the US constitution but a transferred of specific powers or functions from a superior government to a subordinate government (Kincaid, 1998: 14). It entails thus, ab initio, a relation of subalternity between what we have called the subaltern state and the matrix state.

When it comes to its division, a policy area is devolved unless reserved in law to the UK Government (Cairney, 2014:306). It allows some exercise of power normally associated with sovereignty in the areas of law, home affairs and the police. Its main powers, however, are economic, social and cultural. First, *devolved economic powers* include agriculture, fisheries, planning, economic development, training and tourism. Second, *devolved social powers* cover policies in health, social work, housing and local government. Third, *devolved cultural powers* enable control over policies in education, the arts and sport, and the natural and built environment (Law & Mooney, 2012:167).

More concretely, we can see the *reserved and devolved policy* areas in the next box⁶⁰⁰:

⁶⁰⁰ We must bear in mind the Scotland Act 2016 gave extra powers to the Scottish Parliament and that the Brexit issue and how will affect Scottish powers has not been resolved yet. For a detailed list of devolved powers at this stage see:
http://www.parliament.scot/images/Parliament%20Publications/ListDevolvedPowers_1999-2016.pdf
(last access: 27/03/2018).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 58 Devolution and policy areas

Policy areas reserved	Policy areas devolved
International relations	Health
Defence, national security	Education and training
Fiscal and monetary policy	Economic development
Immigration and nationality	Local government
Drugs and firearms	Law and home affairs
Regulation of elections	Police and prisons
Employment	Fire and ambulance services
Company law	Social work
Consumer protection	Housing and planning
Social security	Transport
Regulation of professions: The civil service	Environment
Energy, nuclear safety	Agriculture
Air transport, road safety	Fisheries
Gambling	Forestry
Equality	Sport
Human reproductive rights	The arts
Broadcasting, copyright	Devolved research, statistics

(Source: Cairney, 2014:307)

Unlike the Spanish case in which re-centralization and conflicts with autonomies have been constant, the UK-Scottish Government relationship has been smooth, with the former unlikely to challenge the latter's responsibilities (Cairney, 2014:306). The UK government continued to appoint a Minister for Scotland. This posed little problem when the same parties ruled at both London and Edinburgh but resulted in higher political tension⁶⁰¹ when different parties ruled the separate Parliaments from 2007 onwards (Law & Mooney, 2012:168). According to Cairney, there have been certain intergovernmental conflicts, particularly:

- When devolved public services overlap with reserved social security and taxation arrangements – including, housing, child poverty and fuel poverty;
- In criminal justice, where there are potential loopholes across borders.
- In industrial policy, where the Scottish Government has limited powers to 'save' large companies, and the EU has strict rules on state aid.

As already said, whereas a new conception of Britishness founded upon a spirit of free enterprise, order and self-reliance, the dominant political discourse in Scotland nurtured a collectivist definition of Scottish national identity in tune with a continued commitment

⁶⁰¹ Much more attenuated than the one in Spain.

to social democracy and the post-war welfare state (McEwen, 2006:137). Although dominant since the 1980's, after devolution its emphasis has grown. Thus, according to Law and Mooney, "across education, criminal justice, social care, medicine, council services and related fields, a distinctively Scottish ethos of social solidarity and egalitarianism is thought to pervade welfare reform. Many of the key devolved powers concern social policy, which accentuates the perception, if not always the reality, of policy distinctiveness" (2012:163). Policy pronouncements about a 'New Scotland' are routinely prefaced as providing 'Scottish solutions to Scottish problems' (idem).

In a similar fashion, Scott and Wright say that: "[...] overall reductions in welfare are hardly likely in Scotland, Scottish policy in areas such as health, higher education and social care has consistently demonstrated a commitment by Scottish politicians to respond to what they identify as Scottish needs, maintain the idea of a socially democratic society and provide proof to Scottish voters that devolved administrations could make a difference" (2012:441).

Moreover, Law and Money offer us a vision very close to our *fourth hypothesis (H4)*:

"Policy-making is tied to contested visions of Scotland as the project to align the social justice community to the national community continues unabated. In this respect, **social policy is pivotal to contemporary nation-building, identity and interest formation within multinational states**. While this is not unique to Scotland, it appears to have a particular potency for mobilizing interests and constructing collective identity by appealing to welfare solidarity (2012:174).

We can easily conclude, in line with our approach,⁶⁰² that *a differentiated process of nation/demos/state building has taken place, that sovereignty demands to deepen such a process will be requested and that the matrix state will be used as a constitutive outside*. Thus, we are going to consider the issue of the Scottish health system in order to give an example of contemporary nation and demos building processes.

3- Scottish Health System

As seen above, *the health system is one of the technologies of power among the many, used to dominate/empower the demos*. According to Stewart, "healthcare policy is the archetypal example of post-devolution distinctiveness in the United Kingdom" (2013:241). In that regard, whereas education and criminal justice were already different, health policy in Scotland was broadly consistent with that in England until devolution (idem).

⁶⁰² See our definition of subaltern states.

We see thus, the regulation of a space, which establishes certain conditions not only to act (especially to professionals) but also to receive a service (especially to citizens) (Foucault, 1995). Through regulatory, disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms, individual and collective bodies are not only regulated, dominated and subjugated but also empowered (idem). Thus, those capacities and power techniques that modulate our individual and collective bodies and make them docile tend to be the relatives of those which make us equal and free (Goikoetxea, 2017a:1). ***In current democracies, health policies are one of the most important biopolitical technologies to that effect. Therefore, it is amongst many others, a key democratizing technology and an essential instrument for the democratic reproduction of a nation.***

Along with education, almost all health policy is devolved, ***giving to the Scottish Government an ample scope to develop its own policies and to deepen their own process of nation and demos building*** (H4). Nonetheless, when it comes to health-care, aspects such as pay and conditions, and pensions and negotiations and professional training/standards still take place at the UK level (Cairney, 2014:314).

All in all, we would like to highlight ***three ideas*** that will show us the relevance of strategic action and state public capacities in current demos and nation building processes (H4).

First, we need to consider ***two divergent paths between England and Scotland***. Whereas both, New Labour and Conservative policies in England have tended towards marketization and privatization, Scottish Governments have kept a more social democratic approach when it comes to health policies. In that regard, “Scottish policy makers have continually and robustly reasserted the principle of co-operation and collaboration with professional groups and public sector workers- with the result that the extent of marketization, managerialism and consumerism of the NHS in England has not been as evident in Scotland” (Scott & Wright, 2012:445). Whereas the dominant approach in England is in fashion with the regime of truth of neoliberal governmentality, the Scottish one is closer to the post-war settlement. In that line, according to Greer, “Scotland’s health policy bets on professionals as the state’s allies in providing effective, efficient, legitimate health care and health care rationing. The logic, if not the forms, are close to the 1974 NHS- and the criticisms are the same as well” (2004:63).

It is not only a matter of content, but also of public perception and discursive articulation. Thus, several researches show the involvement of the health policy community⁶⁰³ in the reproduction of that very idea. For instance, interviews with public health stakeholders and practitioners, found explicit rejection of England’s marketised approach and approval of a perceived Scottish ethos of collaboration (Stewart, 2013:242). However, the clearest

⁶⁰³ Which in this case play a key role as ‘organic intellectuals’.

discursive articulation is the one made by SNP's spokespersons. The former Cabinet Secretary for Health and current First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, for example, emphasized the Scottish Government's commitment to reducing the role of private sector involvement in the Scottish NHS, arguing that there was a 'real battle of ideas between different parts of the UK about the future directions of health care. It is a battle between the values of the market, internal competition and contestability on the one hand⁶⁰⁴ and the values of public ownership, cooperation and collaboration on the other' (Scott & Wright, 2012: 445).

Secondly, we would like to consider *the issue of public involvement as a sub-field of health policy*. As mentioned above, in an era in which fast-policy making, executive branches and private authorities are privileged, enhancing public access to citizens and giving them resources and opportunities in order to govern themselves is crucial for any process of democratization. Thus, without belittling the limits of current parliamentary systems, most of the policies are decided by a democratically elected Scottish Parliament. Moreover, since devolution different governments have made several proposal to boost public involvement in health policies.

Ellen Stewart analysed them in 2013 and showed a relative coherence between different governments. However, she stresses a change when the SNP took power as a minority government in May 2007, because it quickly established both the NHS generally, and public involvement specifically, as priorities (2013:249). According to Nicola Sturgeon, they made changes with the aim of fighting centralisation and giving more weight to the concerns expressed by local people (ibidem:250). Inter alia, Stewart highlights the enshrinement in law of a patients' Rights Bill (idem). Moreover, the assertion of the public's co-ownership of the NHS complicates individualistic proposals such as an annual Ownership Report for every household in Scotland (idem). However, the most relevant when it comes to public involvement relates to the direct election of non-executive members of health boards (idem). On her view, "the SNP's interpretation of public involvement locates proposals primarily at the level of organisational governance, while a New Labour interpretation offers an advisory function that is integrated more extensively with the (privatised) patient realm than the (public, even political) realm of the citizen" (ibidem:252).

On Stewarts view, SNP's proposals have reignited debates about the accountability of NHS services to local communities that have been largely dormant since New Labour placed a more privatised interpretation of public involvement at the heart of its vision for the NHS (ibidem:253). In that regard, Nicola Sturgeon said that 'Elected health boards

⁶⁰⁴ She refers to the dominant approach in England. Thus, she is using England as a constitutive outside by doing a dichotomic division between 'neoliberal England' and 'social democratic Scotland'.

... are the best way of ensuring that boards will no longer be able to ride roughshod over community opinion, as has happened in the past' (Ibidem:252). Without belittling the lacks of current system, we do see a clear attempt to promote a different Scottish health system as part of a broader process of Scottish democratization and nation building.

In that line, our third point will deal with a process of *mutual certification between Scottish state institutions and social actors*, which is not a minor issue in an era marked by an overall crisis of legitimacy. We clearly see this mutual certification in Cairney's analysis on the territorialisation of interest representation in Scotland (2014). Thus, on the one hand, the Scottish Government has become a key policy-maker in some areas and has signalled a strong desire to engage with pressure participants to make policy. On the other, this development has prompted groups to reorganise, to allow them to engage regularly with Scottish policy-making institutions, and has allowed relatively small groups to engage, despite having limited resources (Cairney, 2014:318).


More concretely, the Scottish branches of professional UK groups—including the BMA, RCN and groups representing the 'allied health professions'—enjoy high autonomy on Scottish matters but have small staff and budgets (ibidem:314). However, the Scottish Government's policy-making approach and agenda compensates to a large extent, since groups can more easily maintain a government presence, particularly when their aims are broadly in line with the government agenda, a feature that is often absent in the UK Government. All focus on Scottish NHS delivery and issues such as Scottish public health (idem).

All in all, there is a distinctive social policy agenda with which groups must engage, focused more on the maintenance of 'universalism' and less on the 'marketization' of public service provision than in the UK (ibidem:318). Consequently, groups seeking to influence the policy outcomes in Scotland cannot afford to bypass the Scottish Government and focus simply on the UK or EU (idem)

According to Stewart, factors constraining divergence include the continued financial dependence of Scotland on Westminster via block grant funding and the continued UK control of issues such as the remuneration of health service employees and professional regulation (2013:241). We need to consider the paramount role of taxes in state intervention and the dependency that it creates in the so-called "tax state" (Jessop, 2015b:70). Consequently, one of the most important nationalist claims not only in Scotland but also in most of Western countries relates to taxation powers. We can see the devolved and reserved revenue and expenditure in Scotland in the next graphics.


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoziari.

IRUDIA 90 Devolved and Reserved Revenue in Scotland 2016-17



Source: The Scottish Government, 2018

IRUDIA 91 Devolved and Reserved Expenditure in Scotland 2016-17



Source: The Scottish Government, 2018


Limited as they are, Scottish taxation and expenditure powers have increased since devolution. Their 'adequacy' or not must be assessed relationally, so we believe that unionist parties will consider them 'enough' whereas pro-independence actors will treat them as insufficient. Nonetheless, the more the taxation and expenditure powers grow, the more the political capacities are to deepen Scottish democratization.

With the ideas put forward above, we do not want to overemphasize a sort of ‘democratic paradise’ but to stress the importance of strategic action and state powers in reproducing democratically a nation. The health system is one among the many technologies of power that explains contemporary demos and nation building processes. **In line with our fourth hypothesis (H4), we believe that the decentralization of powers has enabled the democratic reproduction of the Scottish nation and that sovereignty demands relate to demos and state building issues.** With that in mind, directly inspired by Goikoetxea’s work⁶⁰⁵, we believe that:

“the *Scottish State Institutions*, by providing resources and establishing the patterns and conditions under which these groups can legitimately act, not only objectify them, but also increase their dependence on and trust in these very state institutions. Trust and dependence are fundamental for the state institutions’ level of interpenetration, which is in turn essential to effectively institute and reproduce a distinct political field. Just as without such a distinct political field there can be no group defined as the subject and object of a differentiated process of democratization, neither can there be a politically objectified distinct group: the *Scottish demos*, or a distinct political system: a *Scottish democracy*. (2014a:161)”

Therefore, what is at stake in current sovereignty demands? As already said, *subalternity* relates to the relation of dependence between the matrix and the subaltern state. It entails material, strategic and discursive aspects. When it comes to the material aspect, this dependency is based on the need for the subaltern state to ask for more political capacities in order to produce and reproduce their *demos* differently (to normalize them through disciplinary, biopolitical and regulatory mechanisms) or to ask for political representation at the matrix state. This need is strategically articulated by political, social and economic actors. As long as it is a relational concept, it must be discursively produced and reproduced by political parties, state agents, organic intellectuals, social movements etc. In such a process, the matrix state is used as its constitutive outside. As seen in the Catalan and Basque cases, we believe that the next graphic shows us the material, strategic and discursive articulation of sovereignty demands.

⁶⁰⁵ She refers to “Basque State Institutions”, “Basque demos” and “Basque democracy” so we have just changed them by “Scottish State Institutions”, “Scottish demos” and “Scottish democracy”.




Source: elaborated by the author

1. Disempowered/Without sovereignty
2. No transference of Scottish sovereignty: lack of capacities to make Scottish democratic sovereignty feasible through British State Institutions
3. Scottish Subaltern State: lack of enough disciplinary, biopolitical and regulatory mechanisms
4. Lack of capacities to be normalized/empowered on the basis of its political decisions.
5. Discursive articulation: British State Institutions as a Constitutive Outside/ Articulation of the Scottish equivalential people.

4- Sovereignty and organic crisis

As said when dealing with the British state, we believe that there is also an organic crisis at Scottish level. Moreover the two dynamics should be considered dialectically. **As the next image reflects, whereas the Scottish pro-independence contention encourages the organic crisis of the British state, the British crisis opens up opportunity spirals to Scottish pro-independence actors (H7).**

IRUDIA 92 Sovereignty and Organic Crisis



Source: elaborated by the author

In order to explain such a process we are going to take three interrelated steps. First, we are going to consider the dimensions of the state and their crisis aspects (H7). Secondly, we will analyse the independence referendum and its aftermath by applying the mechanisms of secession (H8). Finally, we are going to address the issue of the pro-independence hegemony and its populist articulation (H9).

4.1 Crisis of representation and crisis of the social basis of the state.

Scottish and British Institutions

By comparing Scottish and UK Governments valuation, *we can clearly see the consequences of Scottish nation and demos building and therefore of Scottish democratization (H4)*. In line with Goikoetxea's view⁶⁰⁶, we believe that Scottish State Institutions have shaped and most effectively met the needs of their population and therefore they obtain a better valuation (2013a:286). In that regard, The Scottish Social

⁶⁰⁶ As already seen her work relates to Basque State Institutions.


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

Attitudes (SSA) Survey 2016 asked participants the next questions about trust in government:

- Trust in government (UK and Scottish) to work in Scotland's best interests.
- Trust in government (UK, Scottish and local) to make fair decisions.
- How good government (UK, Scottish and local) is at listening before taking decisions.

We see the results and their temporal evolution in the next graphics:


IRUDIA 93 Trust in the Scottish and UK Governments to work in Scotland's best interests (1999-2016, % trust 'just about always'/'most of the time')



Source: SSA (2017:7)


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 94 Trust in the UK GOvernment, Scottish Government and Local Council to make fair decisions (2006-2016, % trust 'a great deal'/'quite a lot')



Source: SSA (2017:9)

IRUDIA 95 How good are the Scottish Government, UK Government and own Local Council at listening to people's views before taking decisions? (2004-2016, % 'very good' / 'quite good')



Source: SSA (2017:11)


The Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) Survey 2016 asked participants questions about who has and who should have most influence over how Scotland is run.

- Which of the following do you think has most influence over the way Scotland is run: the Scottish Government, the UK Government, local councils in Scotland, or the European Union?

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoziari.

- And which do you think ought to have most influence over the way Scotland is run, the Scottish Government, the UK Government, local councils in Scotland, or the European Union?


IRUDIA 96 Who has most influence over the way Scotland is run? (1999-2016, %)



Source: SSA (2017:14)

We clearly see the importance of state institutions on shaping social reality and therefore of changing popular geographical assumptions about politics, political community, and political struggles (Jessop, 2015b:139). *Thus, despite its limited powers vis-à-vis the ‘matrix UK Government’, since devolution the social perception on the influence of the Scottish Government has grown steadily and was even ranked first in the last survey in 2016 (42% vs 41%). However, when asked who ought to have most influence over the way Scotland is run (see the graphic below), the Scottish Government got an outstanding first place with a gap of 60 points.*

IRUDIA 97 Who ought to have more influence over the way Scotland is run? (1999-2016, %)




Source: SSA (2017:15)

It reflects both, a lack of correlation between who should run Scotland and who currently is more influential in its governance and a deep detachment towards the UK Government. Attitudes towards the National Health Service provides us with a prominent example in that regard. Following the trend of the previous years, 37% of the people thought in 2016 that the standards in the NHS had decreased and only 13% thought that they had improved (SSA, 2017:34). However, among those who said standards in the NHS had improved, 54% attributed this to Scottish Government policy, 16% to UK Government policy and 24% to “some other reason” (idem). Among those who said the standards in the NHS had fallen, 40% attributed this to UK Government policy, 25% attributed it to Scottish Government policy, and 18% to “some other reason” (idem.).

When it comes to the Parliament we see similar attitudes. Devolution was seen as an opportunity for ‘new politics’ breaking with the old British policy process (Keating, 2005:15). Therefore, “home rule should not merely substitute a Scottish Parliament for the Westminster one, but should provide a framework for a broader and more radical reform of government” (idem). In that regard, although we notice a degree of disappointment during its first years, having a Scottish Parliament was seen from 2010 onwards as giving ordinary people more say in how Scotland is governed.

IRUDIA 98 Does having a Scottish Parliament give ordinary people more say in how Scotland is governed (1999-2016, %)



More concretely, when asked, which Parliament do you have more confidence in to make the right decisions, 59% responded The Scottish Parliament, 18% the Westminster Parliament and 23% neither of them⁶⁰⁷ (YouGov, 2014:5). Finally, in line with the previous reflections, those who think that Scottish Parliament should make all decision have grown dramatically in the last years:

TAULA 59 Attitudes towards Division of Powers between Scottish Parliament and UK Government, 2010-16

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Scottish Parliament should make...	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
All decisions	28	43	35	31	41	51	49
All except defence and foreign affairs	32	29	32	32	27	30	31
All except defence, foreign affairs, taxation and welfare	27	21	24	25	22	12	12
No decisions	10	5	6	8	6	3	4

(Social attitudes indyref 1 indyref 2:14)

Political parties and the power block:

The fall of traditional parties (especially the Labour Party) and the rise of the SNP must be understood in connection with the *crisis of representation* and the organic crisis of the British state (Jessop, 2016). As mentioned above, “a crisis in the party system is often associated with a crisis in the state- especially if it affects the natural governing party or parties” (Jessop, 2015b:83). From our point of view, it is the case of the *Scottish Labour*

⁶⁰⁷ The data were published on December 2014.

Party and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats. In a similar view, Michael Keating says: “there is no more British party system” (2015a:15).

The previously strong Labour has lost support steadily since devolution, being the last UK elections (2016 and 2017), the Scottish Parliament Elections (2007, 2011 and 2016) and the Local Elections (2017) the clearest examples. Moreover, its previous strongholds, especially working class areas such as Glasgow, are now SNP’s safe areas and the ones with the highest average support for independence. We think that the Labour Party played for years a paramount role in organizing those substantive dimensions of the state and state power (Jessop, 2015b: 70-88). However, strange as it may seem, the foundation of that strength had quite a weak base. In that regard, “Its infrastructure in Scotland was always weak, with historically low membership levels compensated by a strong institutional presence, whether in unions, tenants’ associations and a web of influence and patronage in local government and civil society” (Keating, 2015a:15).

Thus the crisis of the party system has completely changed the political landscape, and the referendum is again its consequence but also its booster (H7). In that line, “the referendum campaign and the disastrous decision to ally with the Conservatives (who had very little to contribute) shook Labour’s already precarious support in working class communities and large sections of the professional middle classes as well” (ídem). As a consequence, the SNP has taken over both their roles: as the main centre-left force in Scotland committed to social welfare; and now as the brokerage party that goes to Westminster to shout for Scotland and bring back the goods (ídem). From being “the party of Scotland”, it is currently the third party in the Scottish Parliament and were even overtaken by the Conservatives⁶⁰⁸ in the last Scottish and UK Elections. The continuous changes in leadership (8 since the end of the referendum) have also been a heavy burden in its recovery.

Thus, the traditional British party system has changed in line with the crisis of representation and the more general organic crisis of Britain. It is in that dynamic that we understand the reinforcement of the SNP and even the Conservative revival. The crisis of the Labour party is its clearest sign and even if it is “to make a comeback in Scotland it will be as a different, less British Party” (ídem).

4.2 Crisis of the state Project, legitimacy crisis, crisis of institutional integration and crisis of capacities

⁶⁰⁸ For further information about “the conservative revival” see: <http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2017/10/the-three-characteristics-of-the-scottish-conservative-revival/> (last access: 12/02/2018).

As previously said we are going to differentiate between the political and the economic dimension of the state project.

1- Political dimension:

The crisis of the political dimension of the state project is usually intertwined with *a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of institutional integration*. Due to the state effects of devolved powers, trust and confidence towards Scottish state institutions have grown and most of the population wants to increase their capacities. However, it does not imply that suddenly a majority of the population backs independence. Moreover, further devolution of powers has been the option that gathered more support for years. Meanwhile, a referendum on independence was held in 2014, a second referendum is highly likely in the short-term and support for independence⁶⁰⁹ has risen up to historic records. We are going to analyse it more deeply in advance but from a mere descriptive approach, we think that such a process must be situated in the next context:

- *The organic crisis of the British state.*
- *The strategic action of pro-independence actors before, during and after the referendum campaign.*
- *The Brexit vote.*

We believe that the crisis of the state project is the result of the complex interaction between these dimensions. Thus, although more powers were devolved in 2012 (Scotland Act 2012) and 2016 (Scotland Act 2016) the issue is far from being solved. We are going to take back the topic in the next epigraph.

2- Economic dimension, modes of state intervention and crisis of capacities

When dealing with the economic dimension of the state project, we must bear in mind that it is related with a *legitimacy crisis, a crisis of institutional integration and a crisis of capacities*⁶¹⁰ and *state intervention* (Jessop, 2015b:58). In that regard, the features of the Anglo-American capitalism along with the ‘enduring states of austerity’ that resulted

⁶⁰⁹ For a quick and easy access to data, the Wikipedia entry on opinion polling on Scottish independence shows its evolution. Available in the next link:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_Scottish_independence (last access: 13/02/2018)

⁶¹⁰ “Although the term capacity has a broader meaning (see in that regard Goikoetxea, 2017) we refer in this part to Tilly’s and Mann’s interpretations. According to Tilly “**state capacity** means the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions” (2007:16). We also include what Mann calls the **state’s infrastructural power**: “its capacities to penetrate society and organize social relations throughout its territory, on the basis of its political decisions” (1984:185).”

from crisis-management policies have reduced the capacities for state intervention and increased the social unrest towards the *status quo*⁶¹¹.

First, we must consider the decisions taken by the main actors but also the competences to take them. In Scotland, the most important devolved powers are health, education and housing whereas central policy areas such as most taxation, social security, benefits and employment policy, remain under the control of the UK Government. Due to the last devolution acts (2012 and 2016) and the ongoing effects of Brexit they are in constant change.

When coping with the Basque case we have talked about “the causality of Basque State Institutions political capacity in determining the amount, composition and (re) distribution of socio-economic capital, both of the Basque socio-economic groups and of the entire territory of the BAC” (Goikoetxea, 2017:194-195). We have highlighted the role played by Basque capacities through competences in economic planning and industrial policies, active labour policies⁶¹² and tax and fiscal competences (idem.).

We believe that Thatcherism and the lack of political capacities in Scotland have shown us precisely the opposite. *The lack of autonomous powers determined the direction of the Scottish economy in line with the British accumulation strategy, promoting a dramatic drop of industry and the growth of services.* Thus, “the economy has become dangerously dependent on consumer spending and inflated housing market, which gives people the illusion of wealth and encourages them to borrow” (Keating & Harvey, 2014:121). In that line, the financial sector has over-expanded at the expense of the productive economy, creating vulnerabilities exposed by the financial crisis of 2008 (idem.). The financial collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Clydesdale Bank and their subsequent public rescue by the British Government are a clear example in that line. We see again the previous data:

TAULA 60 Economic Sectors: 1989-2015

	1989	1999	2009	2015
Lehen sektorea	% 1.5	% 1.9	% 1.9	% 1.3
Energia eta Ur hornidura	% 2.9	% 2.2	% 3.4	% 3.8

⁶¹¹ See the chapter Britainia Handia.

⁶¹²Active labour market policies have been a conflictive field for years and so they were boosted through inter-institutional programmes. However, a deal was struck to devolve them according to the Foral system and the Economic Agreement in 2010 and in exchange, PNV supported the PSOE led government Budget (Goikoetxea, 2017:203).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

Industria	%20.5	%14.9	%8.7	%8.6
Eraikuntza	%6.6	%5.5	%7.9	%6.8
Zerbitzuak	%68.4	%75.5	%77.6	%79.1

(Source: Nomis, 2018.)

TAULA 61 UK, excluding Scotland, output by sector (2011)

Sector	Proportion of total output
Agriculture	1%
Mining & quarrying	0.4%
Construction	6%
Manufacturing	10%
Services	80%

Source: Nomis, 2018.

TAULA 62 Scotland, output by sector (2011) – includes 90% of North Sea oil and gas output

Sector	Proportion of total output
Agriculture	1%
Mining & quarrying	21%
Construction	6%
Manufacturing	9%
Services	61%

Source: Nomis, 2018.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.


That very tendency has continued up to our days, and was further boosted by the financial crisis. However, as we can see in the next graphics by considering the oil of the North Sea the data change substantially. The importance of mining and quarrying stands out from the rest and influences in having a smaller “services sector”. Furthermore, it has played a key role in the development of “the economic case for independence” especially since the famous campaign “It’s Scotland’s oil”. If we consider the key labour statistics we see the lack of divergences between Scotland and the rest of the UK.

TAULA 63 Graph 3: Key labour market statistics (January - March 2014)

Geography	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Inactivity rate
Scotland	73.5%	6.4%	21.4%
UK	72.7%	6.8%	21.9%
UK excluding Scotland	72.5%	6.8%	22.0%

(Source: Nomis, 2018)

IRUDIA 99 Unemployment Rate: Scotland and UK



(Source: Nomis, 2018)

We see that it is the issue of oil the one that makes a real difference when it comes to general economic and structural data. Thus, compared with other cases of secession, the economic differences between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom are rather small (Harvey & Keating, 2014:122). The Scottish *GDP per capita* has been around 96 percent of the UK average and *the fiscal balance* has also been in equilibrium (idem). However, when it comes to the last, depending on the results of the oil revenues, the fiscal balance is usually slightly better although it is a highly volatile sector (idem). The SNP has argued that Scotland has paid much more than it has received since the 1980's. Furthermore, it has proposed the creation of an oil fund in line with the Norwegian style. When it comes to *inequality* it grew during the 1980s and currently is about the UK average, if London is taken out- levels in London are quite massive (idem). Inequality between regions and cities resembles as well the British one. Although slightly reductionist, we could say that Edinburgh would be 'the Scottish London' whereas Glasgow resembles Liverpool.

Keating points out the paradox that, while Scotland has continued to converge with England on many social and economic indicators, its politics are diverging (2009:48). In a point close to ours he says that "the conflict is not so much about cultural or ethnic differentiation but rather over competing projects for the rebuilding of political communities at new levels and the search for institutions that can reconcile economic competitiveness and social solidarity within new spaces" (idem). It is precisely that fact one of the most important issues to understand current sovereignty demands.

We will remain some of our ideas. We have said that *subalternity* relates to the relation of dependence between the matrix and the subaltern state. It entails *material*, *strategic* and *discursive* aspects. When it comes to the *material aspect*, this dependency is based on the need for the subaltern state to ask for more political capacities in order to produce and reproduce their *demos* differently (to normalize them through disciplinary, biopolitical and regulatory mechanisms) or to ask for political representation at the matrix state. **This need is strategically articulated by political, social and economic actors.** As long as it is a relational concept, it must be *discursively* produced and reproduced by political parties, state agents, organic intellectuals, social movements etc. In such a process, the matrix state is used as its constitutive outside.


We will see its relational dynamic by considering the austerity measures at UK level and the SNP's Government response. First, in a rather contradictory way, the SNP has broadly appealed for a social democratic state project that aspires to imitate Nordic states while keeping a market liberal orientation in certain areas (Ibidem:121). When it comes to the last, the White Paper on independence propose to cut corporation tax to three percentage points below whatever level is chosen in the rest of the United Kingdom and includes a proposal to cut and eventually abolish Air Passenger Duty (ibidem:125). On the contrary,

it has been committed to welfarist social provisions and the White Paper includes certain proposals in that regard (rolling out universal childcare for instance) (idem).


When it comes to their action in Office, in general terms, Scottish Governments have promoted social democratic policies in certain key areas such as health or education. There has been certain disagreement on the degree of policy divergence between Scotland and England. According to Gill and Scott, we see a difference in highly visible initiatives such as the ban on smoking introduced some years before it was brought in in England, the introduction of free personal care for the elderly, free public transport for those over 60, free university tuition, gratuity of prescription drugs or public assistance to face the Bedroom tax. But in other sectors too the new politics of Scotland has produced policies that whilst not an obvious 'race to the top' are definitely not involved in a 'race to the bottom' (Keating, 2010). Since devolution, a different community has emerged more committed to traditional social democratic form of welfare provision than the pursued for England by various UK Governments. Furthermore, there is a growing confidence in the capacity of the Scottish Government to initiate real change in the nature of welfare in the country (Gill & Scott, 2012:443).

On the contrary, in line with the general trend towards the privatization of democracy the austerity measures promoted by the Conservative Governments from 2010 onwards (in coalition with the Liberal Democrats for the period 2010-2015) have induced a process of de-democratization at a UK level with significant effects in Scotland. We will consider in that regard the last UK welfare reforms and their impact. As we can see in the next images, last decade's welfare spending follows a downward trend if considered its share of the GDP. More concretely, we see the impact of the reforms boosted from 2010 onwards and the reduction in welfare spending compared to 2010/2011 baseline. It consisted of £19 billion in 2015-2016 and it will rise up to £47 billion in 2020-2021. As we see in the next images, in Scotland that entailed a drop of £1.9 billion in 2015-2016 and will suppose £3.9 billion in 2020-2021.

IRUDIA 101 UK Welfare Spending Trends as Nominal cost, Real cost and as share of GDP




IRUDIA 100 Actual and Forecast UK welfare spending compared to a 2010/11 baseline



Source: Scottish Government, 2017: 25-26

IRUDIA 102 Reductions in Social Security spending (Scotland-level) from Coalition and Conservative government policy



Source: ibidem: 29

From our point of view *those measures have encouraged Scottish subalternity*: (1) They are promoted by a government with scarce support in Scotland; (2) They have reduced Scottish (and British) public political capacities to act, intervene and include the population in tis socioeconomic governance. We see thus, (1) the lack of an unchallengeable site of authoritative judgement (formal sovereignty) and (2) a decrease of the political capacities (material sovereignty) (Goikoetxea, 2017:6). *However, its strategic and discursive articulation is crucial in order to be understood as a grievance*

and fix the matrix state as a constitutive outside. The words of the Scottish Social Security Minister Jeane Freeman are clear in that regard: “This report presents the stark reality of the UK Government's austerity programme which imposes unjust welfare cuts that not only continue to cause misery and push more people into poverty, but also directly affect local economies across Scotland and attract international criticism. The UK Government is responsible for all of this damage to individual lives and local communities, and we will continue to use every opportunity to press the UK Government to reverse these unjust policies (2017)”.

It shows us again the relational tension between democratization and de-democratization in current states and how they affect sovereignty demands. *Thus, we believe that the main mechanisms in their activation is the lack of sovereignty in order to govern in accordance with the decisions of the demos (H5). Furthermore, what is at stake is not just the defence of a nation but how and to what extent can the subaltern states speak (H4).*

4.3 Crisis of: Scottish democratization and the organic crisis of Britain.

According to the above-mentioned ideas, these are so far our preliminary conclusions:

- Due to the process of democratization/de-democratization of the last decades, Scottish State Institutions have been more successful than the British ones on increasing trust and dependence of the citizens of Scotland. *Through the interaction between nation, demos and state building processes, they have produced and reproduced a new subject/object: the Scottish demos (H4).*
- Therefore, current sovereignty demands are based on the will of achieving higher political capacities in order to produce and reproduce the Scottish demos in accordance with its preferences. In other words, sovereignty demands are not only based on being a different nation but also and especially on being a democratic political structure that requires political capacities to function democratically. *The key is not the accommodation of a distinctive cultural identity but how and to what extent can the Scottish subaltern state speak (H4).*
- We can describe the Scottish political situation as *an organic crisis*. By considering the dimensions of the state and state power, we identify *a crisis of representation, a crisis of institutional integration, a crisis of capacities, a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of hegemony*. Unlike the Catalan case, in which political and socioeconomic grievances have been clearer, *the strategic action of pro-independence elites have played a paramount role (H6). Moreover, the referendum on independence and its aftermath are at the same time its consequence and its booster. This, in turn, enhances the organic crisis of the British State (H7).*

- By analysing the dimensions of the state and their crisis aspect, we have identified contradictions and tensions common to all Western countries. On the contrary, this kind of conflicts are rather new, and we believe that are the result of the processes of democratization/de-democratization induced by decentralization and changes in statehood. *Thus, we consider them a result of the transition to the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime and its own contradictions (H1).*

With that in mind we are going to proceed to the more dynamic and strategic dimension of our research. Thus, in a more concrete and complex plane of analysis we will analyse the referendum on independence and its aftermath, its contentious dynamic and the discursive articulation of a new pro-independence hegemony.

5- Referendum on Scottish independence and the dynamic of contention.

As we have said, *the Scottish pro-independence contention is both a trigger and a consequence of the organic crisis of the British state (H7)*. However, we need to consider the issue in a much more concrete plane of analysis in order to get its strategic dimension and avoid any kind of determinism or the search of inevitable laws and their causal explanation. *Thus, it would be reductionist to say that the Scottish pro-independence contention is just the consequence of the organic crisis of the British State. On the contrary it would be even more reductionist to separate both processes (H7).*

Holding a referendum on Scottish independence was a central part of SNP's strategy since devolution began. However, two factors made it highly unlikely. First, as long as the electoral system⁶¹³ was designed to avoid an absolute majority, the required parliamentary quorum seemed improbable. Second, and strange as it may seem, unlike the demands for devolution of the previous decades or the Catalan "pròces", there was neither a big grassroots pro-independence mobilization nor a dramatic increase of those who supported independence. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the population preferred the devolution of further powers, a third option that has been colloquially known as "devolution max" or "independence light" (San Jaume, 2015:360).

Against all odds, SNP's absolute majority in Scottish Elections in 2011 made the impossible possible and the beginning of the debate. Lord Wallace Tankerness, Advocate General for Scotland, said that a Scottish Parliament bill to organise an independence

⁶¹³ Specially the Additional Member System.

referendum without the approval of Westminster would not be legal⁶¹⁴ (ídem.) However, it recognised SNP's democratic mandate and urged for a legal change in order to hold a referendum. Unlike the Spanish case, the tension between the principle of legality and the principle of democracy was solved by giving prevalence to the last. Therefore, after a great deal of debate the terms of the referendum were sealed by the so-called Edinburgh Agreement⁶¹⁵ in October 2012.

Although Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon tried to include devo-max and proposed a multi-option referendum⁶¹⁶, the British Government rejected the idea and opted for the clarity criteria and a single question. The Scottish Government saw the multi-option referendum as a win-win option for them. On the one hand, they could accomplish their promise to hold a referendum and on the other, they assured at least winning further powers. They would have been able to claim victory if the result was either independence (unlikely) or Devolution Max (very probable). On the contrary, with an In-Out referendum, the British Government expected a clear victory for "no" and the possibility of ending with the debate for a generation. It was the last view the prevailing one in the Edinburgh Agreement, yet the result was not the one foresaw by its boosters.

In that regard, the Scottish referendum shows us that the 'event' creates its conditions of possibility *a posteriori* (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018). We see in that line the evolution of the support for independence and how it began to rise due to the referendum campaign:


⁶¹⁴ See his statement in the next link: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/advocate-general-scottish-government-consultation-wont-remove-legal-problem-with-referendum> (last access: 05/02/2018).

⁶¹⁵ Entitled "Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland". Available in the next link: www.gov.scot/Resource/0040/00404789.pdf (last access: 05/02/2018).

⁶¹⁶ Full independence, devo-max and status quo.


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

IRUDIA 103 Support for Independence- 36 year trend



(Source: Ipsos Mori, 2014)

IRUDIA 104 Support for independence 1999-2016



(Source: Scottish Social Attitudes, 2017)

Thus, the increase in the support for independence was not the result of a passive accumulation of forces but of the reflexive and strategic action of actors (Bensaïd, 2013:54-55). Furthermore, it was a top-down process lead by the political elites that only took a grassroots form once the referendum campaign had begun (Azkune, 2016). Therefore, it was the very call of the referendum what opened up a spiral of opportunities, in a clear *expansion of movement's own opportunities* (Tarrow, 2012:290-291). For obvious reasons, as long as their aim was 'to settled the debate for a generation or perhaps for a lifetime'⁶¹⁷, from British Government's point of view we *see an expansion of others' opportunities* (ídem). When it comes to the last, we believe that a multi-option referendum could have resulted in a clear majority for "devo-max", facilitating its systemic inclusion

⁶¹⁷ These were the words of David Cameron the day after the referendum. For further information: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2014/sep/19/david-cameron-scottish-independence-debate-devolution-video> (last access: 13/02/2018)

under the logic of difference and closing the door to the emergence of “the political” (Mouffe, 1999; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; Laclau, 2005). Yet the result has been far more complex.

According to Bensaïd, the time and the space of strategy⁶¹⁸ differ radically from those of Newtonian physics, “absolute, true, mathematical” (Lowy, 2017:149). In opposition to Greek Cronos, which is sequential, quantitative and chronological, strategical time is a heterogeneous time, kairotic – that is to say it is about seizing the right or opportune moment (Bensaïd, 2013:54). But before a crossroads of possibilities, the ultimate decision includes an irreducible share of *wager* (Lowy, 2017:149).

This kairotic moment would be better described as *a secessionist contentious episode* (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001). Thus, in order to operationalise the above-mentioned “strategic action” in a more concrete and complex plane we are going to rely again on the mechanisms and processes of secession (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015). Although we are going to put our focus mainly in the referendum campaign, we are going to consider as well some new elements produced by the Brexit vote.

Catalysing mechanisms: Infringement of the interests of the elites, sudden imposition of grievances and opportunity spirals.

When it comes to the *catalysing mechanisms*, the most important one is *the opportunity spirals* opened up since the absolute majority of the SNP in 2011. Since then, an issue which was neither at the core of the political debate nor among the priorities of the population⁶¹⁹ jumped from the edges to the centre. We identify the next tipping points: 1) the Edinburgh Agreement and the establishment of an In-Out option. 2) The evolution of the referendum campaign and its grassroots orientation. 3) The aftermath of the referendum and the electoral successes of the SNP. 4) The Brexit vote.

Thus, *the interpretation cannot be sequential, quantitative and chronological in the sense that it was not a powerful pro-independence movement what pushed for a referendum on independence but on the contrary, it was the referendum on independence which created the possibilities for a powerful pro-independence movement (H6).*

A more questionable issue is the one related *to the infringement of the interests of the elites and the sudden imposition of grievances*. When it comes to the first, as we will see

⁶¹⁸ In his words of “revolutionary strategy”. However, it would be excessive to consider the referendum a “revolutionary strategy” although it was closed to what may be consider in our times a “democratic revolution”.

⁶¹⁹ The lack of strong grassroots pro-independence movements or being a low-polling option are clear examples in that regard.

below, some business sectors have argued in favour of independence claiming that Scotland contributes more than it receives. From the opposite point of view unionist parties have argued that Scotland gets more than its fair share. Be that as it may, the issue has not been as relevant as in the Catalan case and has not been widely articulated as a clear infringement. In any event, it has been the issue of Oil what has been articulated as a grievance since the 1970's and has been a high-profile argument of the "economic case for independence"⁶²⁰. With regard *to the sudden imposition of grievances*, the Brexit vote seems to be clearer in that regard and can be decisive for a second referendum. As it happened with Thatcherism, it has been articulated as a clear grievance on Scottish democratic interests and has entailed what was called a necessary 'substantive change' to call a second referendum.

Mobilizing mechanisms: category formation, identity shift, tactical innovation, brokerage and competition.

When it comes to the *mobilizing mechanisms*, *brokerage* is the most notorious one (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2011:26). We highlight first, the setting up of the official *Yes Scotland* that lumped different pro-independence organisations, individuals and parties such as the SNP, the Green Party or the SSP together. However, in a dynamic that we dare to call a "*brokerage spiral*" many groups were created in very different strategic action fields even at a distance of the official campaign (McAdam, Flingstein, 2015). *Women for Independence*, *Business for Scotland*, *Crofting for Yes*, *Trade Unionists for Yes*, *National Collective*, *Scots Asian for Yes* or *Pensioners for Independence* are just a few examples. Although small, even in parties that supported the No vote groups like *Labour for Independence* and *Liberal Democrats for Independence* were formed and a group of English people living in Scotland created *English Scots for Yes*. Those who were critical with the official campaign and kept a more leftist approach founded the *Radical Independence Campaign*⁶²¹, which was able to articulate a disorganized left and promote a different vision on independence (Boyd & Morrison, 2014; Foley & Ramand, 2014). Activist websites like *Bella Caledonia* or the anti-neoliberal *CommonWeal* think-tank played also a key broker role.

In contrast with the pre-referendum scenario, a wide array of pro-independence movements emerged and many people began to get involved in politics for the first time. Thus, with regard to the *tactical innovation*, calling a referendum was in itself a clear innovative "event". However, it was the grassroots character of the yes campaign what challenged the dominant Western "post-political" scenario (Zizek, 2010). In that line, The Sunday Herald talked about 'two campaigns': one traditional and led by the suits, arguing

⁶²⁰ Although it seems to have lost weight due to the fall of oil prices.

⁶²¹ For further research in the pro-independence left wing groups see: Azkune, 2016.

in conventional media set-piece debates, the other a ‘ground war’, ‘one-to-one, door-to-door, intentionally bypassing the media’ (Davidson, 2014:14). RIC activists for instance, concentrated their efforts on working class areas with a traditional low turnout. They said: “*We recognised early that those voters who would buck the polling trend would be those voters who don’t talk to pollsters and hate politicians; those voters who have told our activists “You are the only people to ever ask me what I think about politics”.* (RS21, 2014:29)

In a similar fashion, Keating highlights “the ‘ground war’ fought in communities and through social media, which largely escaped the control of the two official campaigns. This was marked by an extraordinary level of engagement [...] Here Yes supporters, including those outside the SNP, were omnipresent and the No campaign strangely absent” (2015b:86). In line with our hypotheses, he says that “the result was a public debate about the future of the country going well beyond narrow constitutional questions and which reflected the lack of trust in conventional politics found right across Europe these days. The Yes side was much more present and visible in this ground war, while the No side concentrated on the official campaign” (ídem).

In that regard, according to Davidson, “Glasgow’s George Square became the site of daily mass gathering of Yes supporters, meeting to discuss, sing or simply make visible the size and diversity of the movement. [...] In the summer of 2014, Glasgow came to resemble the Greek and Spanish cities during the Movements of the Squares to a far greater extent than in the relatively small-scale Scottish manifestations of Occupy” (ídem). It is a clear example of the spread of similar forms of action and similar claims across borders, that is, of the process that Tarrow calls a *transnational diffusion* (2012:401).

Furthermore, as already seen, over the last decades *competition* in Scottish politics has fluctuated as follows: between Labour and the SNP on who represents the ‘national party of Scotland’ committed to social welfare; and between Scotland and Westminster. Moreover, there was a great deal of competition inside the SNP between those sectors called “gradualists” and those called “fundamentalists”, those left-wing and those more focus on independence etc.⁶²² (Lynch, 2013). The same can be said of radical lefts sectarianism whose most notorious case was the split in the Scottish Socialist Party in 2006 when Tommy Sheridan was put into trial.

However, the referendum campaign prompted a *Yes/No competition* in which Labour was re-aligned with its historical enemy (the Conservatives) while different pro-independence actors were able to broke coalitions more focused on their external ‘enemy’

⁶²² Gradualists wanted to go step-by-step and claimed the devolution of powers whereas fundamentalists preferred to talk directly on the issue of independence and some of them even opposed devolution. There were also left-wing splits such as the one of the 79 group.

than in their internal competition. It did not mean homogeneity or lack of competition at all, as the strong differences between groups such as the SNP or Business for Scotland and the Radical Independence Campaign (RIC) clearly show. The very creation of the RIC had in its source a critical approach towards the official Yes campaign for keeping a view on independence too focused on not changing too much the status quo (Azkune, 2016). However, we observe a process of “discursive convergence” (Vasiliachis de Valdino, 2007:162) in which internal differences are blurred and the clash against the constitutive outside is stressed (Mouffe, 1999; Laclau, 2005). Therefore, whereas the Scottish Labour has had as much as eight leaders since October 2014, the SNP and the yes parties were notably reinforced after the referendum.

When it comes to *the formation of categories*, unlike Catalonia or the Basque Country where the ‘right to decide’ has been the most prominent category, the national recognition of Scotland by the United Kingdom has tempered its claim. However, the articulation of key signifiers such as ‘Yes’, ‘Independence’ or ‘Scotland’ as a means to build a different and better society has been a powerful tool in articulating a new hegemony. We will deal with the issue further in the next epigraph.

The *identity shift* is closely related to that process. Making independence socially ‘attractive’ for those people who are not satisfy with the *status quo* has resulted in a shift of those who did not back independence before. This is especially clear in the case of working class areas and formerly great heartlands of Labour support such as Glasgow, Dundee, North Lanarkshire or West Dunbartonshire (Davidson, 2014:21). On our view, the shift is facilitated at least by the next dimensions: a broad recognition among most of the actors (even Conservatives) that Scotland is a nation; the lack of a different language strong enough as to compete with English⁶²³; a common centre left political hegemony; a tolerant attitude of English opinion in respect of Scotland’s independence. Therefore, polarization is lower and political positions are more miscible than in Catalonia, and even more than in the Basque Country.

When it comes to the *facilitating mechanisms* that assist the consolidation of the secessionist episode, we have mentioned the *de-alignment of elites* and the *certification of the process* carried out by external agents. The clearest example of *certification* is the Edinburgh Agreement between the two governments and the most striking difference with the Spanish Governments attitudes towards Catalan and Basque contentions.

The de-alignment of elites is partially in line with the mentioned identity shift. Thus, although historically left-wing movements have opposed independence arguing for the priority of the unity of British working class, during the last years a great deal of them

⁶²³ The loss of the Gaelic is to a large extent the result of the Highland Clearances of the 18th and 19th centuries. When it comes to the “Scots” spoken in the Lowlands it is very close to English.

have changed their position. Thus, left-wing intellectuals, trade unions and left oriented social movements are less likely than in the past to be associated with the Labour Party and more prone to back independence (Keating, 2014:332). Although most of the trade unions adopted an official position of neutrality, there were a lot of trade unionist involved in the Yes campaign. When it comes to academics, they were mostly neutral although groups on both sides such as *Academics for Yes* and *Academics Together* were formed.

From an opposite side, **business** is more reluctant to support independence. According to MacKay⁶²⁴, a majority of business leaders indicate that the potential costs and risks of independence to business outweigh the perceived benefits and opportunities that might occur (2014:22). Those who have their headquarters in Scotland and their trade in the UK appear to be more reluctant. More concretely, a significant number of **medium and large companies** have the majority of their trade in the rUK (typically 90% rUK, and 10% in Scotland), and appear far more affected than companies whose trade is mainly in Scotland, or is diversified globally. In that line, “Business leaders of **smaller medium-sized**, private companies exporting globally, and smaller firms whose trade (both customers and suppliers) is predominantly in Scotland are the most likely to emphasize the opportunities presented by the possibility of Scottish independence.” (idem.)

When it comes to their political engagement, some prominent business people close to the think tank **Reform Scotland** have come out in favour of radically extended devolution and even independence, presenting a vision of an entrepreneurial, low-tax country (Keating, 2014:330). **Business for Scotland** is the biggest group with a clear Yes position. It consists of individuals from small and medium enterprises, and promotes independence arguing that Scotland currently contributes more to the UK finances than it takes out (idem). In general, business is cross-pressured on the national question, but it is less hostile to devolution than 30 years ago. However, most of the business groups, especially those related to big business such as the Scottish branch of the **Confederation of British Industry**, while clearly hostile to independence, chose for a long time not to come out openly for the union, choosing instead to pose a series of very hard questions on the pro-independence side (idem).

All in all, only some small and medium-sized business leaders seem to support independence so it does not seem that there is a clear de-alignment of economic elites. On the contrary, notwithstanding SNP’s government’s tax friendly approach, as long

⁶²⁴ MacKay’s report presents the findings from 75 semi-structured interviews into the future of the UK and Scotland with senior business leaders in medium and large companies in six industries of strategic importance to Scotland. They include electronics and technology, energy, engineering and industrial manufacturing, financial services, food and drink, and life sciences. Available online: <https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/sites/default/files/papers/Evidence%20from%20Business%20Summary%20Report%20Final.pdf> (last access: 19/02/2018).

as Scottish politics have tended to be more left wing it seems that the Union could be more attractive for business interests.

Finally, when it comes to **deactivating mechanisms**, against all odds the No victory did not entail the weakening of the pro-independence movement nor the end of the conflict. Furthermore, two days before the vote the leaders of the three main unionist parties David Cameron, Ed Milliband and Nick Clegg made a joint statement in the Daily Records known as ‘The Vow’. They promised more powers for Scotland in the event of a No vote so in the end they were admitting some kind of ‘devolution max’. In the aftermath of the referendum, the Smith Commission was established to cope with the devolution of further powers promised by ‘The Vow’. The process ended up with the approval of the Scotland Act 2016 that gave extra powers to the Scottish Parliament.

We must bear in mind that *alternative political proposals made by the matrix state are usually an effective deactivating mechanism*. However, we clearly see the strategic and relational aspect of politics: what could have been a “good deal” it is seen know as insufficient and “was widely criticized as an effort by the Westminster parties to agree a deal among themselves, with no time for public input or indeed a mature consideration of how their proposals might work” (Keating, 2015:90). Moreover, as the independence issue had been debated as such length while more devolution had been excluded from the Edinburgh Agreement, this was interpreted as a return of the ‘old style’ politics (idem.). Thus, despite losing in 2014 and getting more powers in 2016 the issue is far from being solve, much less after the Brexit vote and the possibility of holding a second referendum on independence.

The concatenation of the previous mechanisms, have lead to three broader processes that are strictly connected with the articulation of a new hegemony: *polarization, diffusion and the creation of new actors and identities*.

We believe that the *Yes/No competition* is interspersed with another key process: *polarization*. It entails, “the enlargement of the political and social space between the claimants present in a contentious episode and gravitation toward one, the other, or both ends by certain formerly uncommitted or moderate actors (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:26). As long as the British Government accepted the legality of the referendum, its activation is considerably less intense than in Catalonia or in the Basque Country during its contentious protest cycle. However, the rejection of the multi-option questions favoured its activation and the gravitation towards independence of people who initially preferred “devo-max”. That being said, it is true that the SNP Government presented an attenuated vision of independence and that unionists abandoned the defence of the status quo and brought their positions closer to devo-max. Thus, there was enough polarization as to present the social division of society in two fields “Yes/No”, but on the contrary, it

was limited and did not provoke a deep antagonism. Typically, without the activation of polarization, secession and the creation of new states is unthinkable (Martínez & Zubiaga, 2015: 15).

When it comes to *diffusion*, we need to consider its *external* and *internal* sides. With regard to the first, we have already seen a *non-relational*⁶²⁵ *transnational diffusion* that entailed the spread of similar forms of action and claims similar to the ones made by the anti-austerity movements. On the contrary, sovereignty demands in Catalonia and the Basque Country have had a lesser impact in Scotland than *vice versa*. Thus, the Scottish case has been considered by Basques and Catalans as a model in order to cope democratically with sovereigntist claims.

We believe that *internal diffusion* has carried out a far more important role. *Brokerage* and *scale shift* are the most significant mechanisms in that regard. We have already seen the *scale shift from an elite lead official campaign to massive grassroots movements* that boosted the participation of those who usually are sceptical towards politics, especially the youngest ones. The *brokerage spiral* was also crucial as long as it offered a space to participate on the basis of each one's main demand (ecology, feminism, welfare, business etc.) while at the same time articulate them with independence bringing together previously separated domains.

The last process relates to *the creation of new actors and identities*, which is in our view the most important one in times of crisis. It is through this that a new interpretation of reality articulates a coherent narrative powerful enough as to attract different social sectors, especially those who were not previously worried about independence. As long as it is at the core of the issue of *hegemony*, we will deal with it in the next epigraph.

So far, we see a moderate and unequal activation of the mechanisms of secession (H8).
More concretely we believe that:

- When it comes to the catalysing mechanisms, the opportunity spirals has been the most prominent one although the sudden imposition of grievances provoked by Brexit is the key one in the debate of a second referendum. However, the infringement of elite's interest is not so clear and it is usually a key for secession.
- We see a more clear activation of the mobilising mechanisms. Among them, we would highlight brokerage and the identity shift.
- With regard to facilitating mechanisms, the most important one is the acceptance of the official referendum. Furthermore, the de-alignment of certain intellectual and left wing elites is also remarkable.

⁶²⁵ Without the direct contact or mediation of people.

- The clearest aspect is that de-activating mechanisms have been far from success as the chances for a second referendum are high.
- The concatenation of that mechanisms have led to broader processes out of which polarization is the weakest one.

With that in mind, in order to close this epigraph at a more concrete level, *we believe that those necessary mechanisms for the articulation of a new hegemony and the creation of a new identity have also been activated partially (H8)*. Thanks to *brokerage*, previously distant areas have been connected favouring the equivalential articulation of separated demands (Zubiaga, 2012:126). *Tactical innovation* on discourses and repertoires of contention have been crucial for the emergence of the political (idem). Finally, *polarization* has favoured the gravitation towards independence of people who initially preferred options that were more moderate. Nonetheless, polarization may not have been strong enough as to make a decisive break with the matrix state. To conclude this theme, we show the mechanisms of hegemony in the next graphic and next we will move on the issue of hegemony and the new people, the last and more concrete plane of our research (H9).

6- Hegemony and the new people.

In accordance with the mentioned ideas, building a new hegemony is not only at the core of current sovereignty demands but it is also a crucial aspect of any movement that challenges the status quo. As mentioned above, “the disorienting effects of crisis create the space for contesting previously sedimented meanings, which occur in many different fields in many different scales. This can create in turn opportunities to reorder the liens of demarcation that distinguish the polity from its ‘constitutive outside’” (Jessop, 2015a:458). *Thus, we consider the referendum campaign and its aftermath situation a privilege moment for contesting previously sedimented meanings and construct a new hegemony. Moreover, we believe that its articulation is the more concrete expression of a successful sovereigntist strategic action (H9)*.

Unlike the Basque and Catalan cases, in which arguments in favour and against independence have been most of the time overshadowed by the issue of the legality of a referendum, the Scottish campaign put the arguments on the centre of the political debate. Moreover, the campaign was a time of unprecedented political engagement, one that completely changed Scottish politics⁶²⁶. It is therefore a great ‘social laboratory’ full of high value documents in order to understand what is at stake in current nationalist

⁶²⁶ According to recent reports, Scottish public passion for politics has increased since the referendum and it is much higher than in the rest of the UK. For further information see: http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14425238.Scots_more_politically_engaged_than_rest_of_UK_since_independence_referendum_report_says/ (Last access: 12/02/2018)

demands and how a new pro-independence hegemony is articulated. Due to the limits of our research, we are not going to consider the arguments of the “no campaign” and just only a few of those who supported yes.

Our research question asks about the relation between the transformation of the state in a post-fordist era (SWPR) and sovereignty demands in historic nations. *We think that due to those changes sovereignty demands gravitate towards demos and state building issues (H4)*. When it comes to the logic beneath their discourse, we are going to follow again the scheme provided by the frame analysis in order to analyse in a second step its populist articulation (Errejón, 2011; Snow et.al, 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988). In that regard we believe that a **diagnosis is done in which the UK Government is used as a constitutive outside. A prognosis proposes a solution based in becoming independent and motivation serves as a call to arms or rationale to action using deeply sedimented ideas in Scottish politics**. Our main references⁶²⁷ would be the next ones:

- The White paper on Scottish independence entitled “Scotland’s Future you guide to an independent Scotland”⁶²⁸. It was the blueprint of The Government of Scotland. As long as it was an official document, it was the most complete one in terms of the topics considered and their depth. **It was also the most diffused one so we are going to rely mostly in its content**. It consists of 10 chapters⁶²⁹ that offer arguments in favour of independence in a wide range of areas. In all those topics, the arguments follow the same logic so we are going to consider just a few examples. We are also reviewing a small additional publication entitled “Scotland’s Future: it’s in your hands”.
- Many umbrella groups campaigned in favour of independence, yet it supersedes our possibilities considering all their arguments. **However, in order to complement Government’s official vision we are going to analyse the vision of groups such as the Common Weal, National Collective or the Radical Independence Campaign**.

⁶²⁷ For further information and direct access to more images, the Twitter account of Yes Scotland is a good source: <https://twitter.com/YesScotland> (last access: 5/02/2018).

⁶²⁸ The document was sent free of charge to everyone who requested it. I got a copy myself while my research stay in Edinburgh in 2014. It is currently available online in the next link: <https://www.berria.eus/dokumentuak/dokumentua1219.pdf> (last access: 5/02/2018).

⁶²⁹ The content of the chapters run as follows: 1) The case for independence; 2) Scotland’s Finances; 3) Finance and the economy; 4) Health, wellbeing and social protection; 5) Education, skills and employment; 6) International relations and defence; 7) Justice, security and home affairs; 8) Environment, rural Scotland, energy and resources; 9) Culture, communications and digital; 10) Building a modern democracy.

Diagnosis:

A- Problem: lack of political capacities/ social inequality/ Scotland governs itself better/privatisations

Which is the main problem? The key is the lack of political capacities in order to govern according to the wishes of the Scottish people. Consequently, the necessary means to govern Scotland democratically would be out of their control: in hands of the UK Government and Parliaments. In that line, the Scottish Government deals with a variety of areas in which the arguments follow the same logic so we are just considering a few. As we will see in the prognosis, one of the reasons to become independent would be “Building a more prosperous country” but current status quo make it impossible so the diagnosis is clear in that regard:

“Both before and after devolution, the key economic powers necessary to deliver growth and prosperity remained with Westminster. Control of taxation, public spending limits, regulation of business and industry, and competition policy all rest in London. Successive devolved Scottish governments have had considerable success in reducing unemployment, increasing employment and promoting inward investment. **But the fundamental economic decisions that affect Scotland are taken in Westminster, often by governments that have no popular mandate in Scotland, and in the interests of an economy and society with different priorities from Scotland.”**

(The Scottish Government, 2013:42)

IRUDIA 105 The cost of Westminster



Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 106 Achievements

Even with limited devolution, Scotland already does many things better than other UK nations:

- Record numbers achieving university places
 - 13% rise in students from deprived areas getting into university
 - 97% rush-hour ScotRail trains on time
 - Scottish A&E outperforming rUK for 29 consecutive months
 - Crime at a 42-year low
 - Built the same number of new homes in the last 10 years as the whole of the rest of the UK put together
 - Fracking banned



Imagine what we could achieve with the full powers of a normal, independent country

As we see in the image, the diagnosis also gives a positive assessment of devolution and says that independence would entail greater capacities and, as a consequence, a better government. Concretely, the Scottish Government says:

“A Scottish Parliament with limited powers has already shown what is possible. The Scottish Parliament has delivered free personal care for the elderly, kept our NHS in the public sector and restored free education for our students. **With powers over our tax system, social security, immigration and defence, the Scottish Parliament will also be able to make better choices for Scotland on these issues**” (Ibidem:41)

A similar view is expressed with regard to the National Health Service. They use the English system as a constitutive outside, while they praised the virtues of the Scottish public service.

IRUDIA 107 Protect your NHS




“Scotland has taken a very different approach to health and social care from that taken by Westminster governments over the years. We have maintained a commitment to the NHS as a public service [...]

Without devolution, NHS Scotland – like its counterpart in England- would have been repeatedly re-organised by the Westminster Government of the day, regardless of the needs of the health service in Scotland. It would now be exposed to private competition and an unfair system of social care.” (Ibidem:170).

On their view, independence will not only improve NHS's funding but also the ability to address directly inequalities "which are the root cause of many of the country's remaining health issues" (Ibidem:171). In that regard, criticism about UK's social inequality is also a longstanding element on Scottish political discourse. As noted above, since Thatcherism, the contrast between conservative England and social democratic Scotland has been a hegemonic idea. As we see below, in this case this very idea is strategically re-articulated in order to give a 'welfarist' justification for independence:

IRUDIA 108 Poverty




The United Kingdom is currently one of the most unequal societies in Europe [...]. In an independent Scotland we would be able to establish our own welfare system with our own priorities – providing a system that supports most vulnerable and helps young people into work. This would be a stark contrast to the UK government's austerity measures which are set to have a negative impact on people and families for years to come" (The Scottish Government, 2014:6).

B- Injustice: Impositions by the UK Government and Parliaments.

If the central problem is the lack of political capacities, the injustice relates to all its consequences. In this case, as we see below, it is directly framed as "Westminster's impositions":

IRUDIA 109 Westminster and the Government of Scotland



(Source: Yes Scotland, 2014)

We see in the first image the antagonistic comparison between Scotland and the Conservative stronghold of South-East England. As long as Scotland and England have diverged in their voting, it has been a longstanding and deeply sedimented idea that no matter what Scottish people votes⁶³⁰ because in the end a Conservative majority will rule the country due to their voting strength in the South-East of England. The second image is closely related to that very idea. Scotland has been traditionally called “a Tory-free zone⁶³¹” so in case of a UK Conservative majority their elected MPs tend to oppose most of the ruling policies. In that regard, the Scottish Government directly says:

“For 34 of the 68 years since 1945, Scotland has been ruled by Westminster governments with no majority in Scotland. Policies are imposed on Scotland even when they have been opposed by our elected Westminster MPs. Under the current Westminster Government this democratic deficit has resulted in: - The privatisation of the Royal Mail. - Unfair welfare changes such as the “bedroom tax”. - Cuts in capital spending, harming economic recovery. - A commitment to spend as much as £ 100

⁶³⁰ The Labour Party has historically claimed the need to get a Labour Government in the UK in order to represent Scottish interests.


⁶³¹ They lost all their seats in 1997 and since then they only got 1 out of 59. However, in the UK General Elections of 2017 obtained 11 in what has been considered the “Scottish Conservative Revival” (Curtice, 2017).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

billion on the lifetime costs of a replacement nuclear weapon system.”
(2013:41)

The issue of nuclear weapons is also seen as an imposition and according to the image below even “an obscenity”. The rejection of Trident nuclear system has been one of the main tenets of the Yes Campaign. In the continuous interaction between the diagnosis and the prognosis, the Governments proposal says: “We are one of the richest nations on the planet and could choose to use that wealth in a different way from Westminster. For example, we can choose to invest in childcare instead of spending money on nuclear weapons.” (ibidem:27)

IRUDIA 110 Nuclear weapons



Since the 1970's another key issue is the one related to oil. The SNP promoted the successful slogan “It's Scotland's Oil” in order to make their economic case for independence. Despite the passage of time, the axis of the campaign are similar⁶³² and entail that Scotland could use North Sea's Oil revenues to fund public services. The image and the Governments proposal are clear in that sense.

⁶³² It seems that it is changing slightly in the last years. Oil revenues have dropped and in case of a second referendum the economic case for independence may not rely so much in oi. See for instance: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-39178324> (last access: 08/02/2018)

IRUDIA 111 It's Scotland's Oil



“Scotland is an energy-rich nation. We have the largest oil reserves in the EU as well as huge renewable energy potential. **But under successive Westminster governments our energy wealth has not been invested, instead it has gone straight to the UK Treasury.**

Independence gives Scotland the opportunity to harness this energy wealth for the people of Scotland. **With independence we can ensure that taxation revenues from oil and gas support Scottish public services, and that Scotland sets up an Energy Fund to ensure that future generations also benefit from our oil and gas reserves.”** (ibidem:18)

Prognosis:

A- Winner dimension: A more democratic and fairer Scotland.

If the problem is the lack of political capacities in order to govern according to the wishes of the Scottish people, independence becomes the necessary tool to build a more democratic and fairer Scotland. Beyond particular differences, this is the lowest common denominator of the different pro-independence approaches.

In that line, the Scottish Government says that “there are three over-riding reasons for Scotland to become an independent country. These are: 1) To create a more democratic Scotland. 2) To build a more prosperous country. 3) To become a fairer society⁶³³.” (40-45). Thus, in their view “Independence is not an end in itself. The Scottish Government wants us to have the powers of independence so that people who live here can build a different and better Scotland.” (2013:3)

⁶³³ These issues are explained in greater depth in the text.

With the aim of ‘modernizing Scotland’, they believe that a written constitution is necessary. They try to include again a welfarist vision on their project. Directly relying on their words: “The Scottish Government will be just one of many voices contributing to the debate and helping to shape Scotland’s written constitution. However, there are certain provisions that the Government believes should be considered by the constitutional convention, such as equality of opportunity and the right to live free of discrimination and prejudice, a constitutional ban on nuclear weapons being based in Scotland, and certain social and economic rights, such as the right to education, the right to healthcare and protections for children” (2013:21).

IRUDIA 112 A better, fairer Scotland



In a similar fashion, they state that “the central purpose of independence is to make life better for people living in Scotland” (40). The chapters of the White Book explain with detail which are the benefits of independence in each and every area. As long as their arguments follow the same logic, we are not going to consider their content.

However, if we take the image as an example, we see that those policies that were fiercely criticize in the diagnosis, are now presented as having a feasible solution thanks to independence. Therefore, we can easily conclude that they strategically link the matrix state with the problem, they use the UK as a constitutive outside, whereas becoming independent is re-articulated as the nodal point that links all those unmet demands and gives them a surface of inscription (Laclau, 2005).

From a more left wing perspective, The Radical Independence Campaign found the progressive case for independence of Yes Scotland appealing, compared to Westminster, yet they do not defend their vision (Foley & Ramand, 2014:4). They kept a critical approach and tried to go a step further defending what they called a radical vision for independence (idem). In their view “A Yes vote is more than a protest against the injustices of UK capitalism. It can be the first step towards a better society, one that sets precedents of social and environmental justice, rather than dehumanising its citizens in a race to the bottom. (ibidem:10).

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

More concretely, they proposed what they called a “Radical Needs Agenda” that can be summarised⁶³⁴ as follows: a green new deal; nationalisation of North Sea oil; setting up an independent Scottish currency; progressive taxation and redistribution; end all privatisation and renationalise infrastructure; free childcare, equal pay and maternity leave; fund education; exit from US-UK military alliances; Scrap Trident⁶³⁵; working class power; empowered participatory governance; land reform; maximum working week; substantive measures of economic progress; freedom of movement for people, not money (ibidem: 110-117).

From a feminist perspective, Cat Boyd and Jenny Morrison criticized⁶³⁶ their male partners for not considering a feminist perspective on independence (2014). Although they see independence as a necessary step they propose 7 immediate demands “that put women workers before the needs of private capital” and “can provide a starting point for an independent women’s agenda” (Boyd & Morrison, 2014:63). They refer to: a compulsory living wage; make precarious employment illegal; tax the rich, not the poor; community gender budgeting; land reform; end methodological bias; socialisation of care (ibidem: 64-69).

From a completely different approach, according to the next image Business for Scotland says:

⁶³⁴ They explain the content of each measure in more detail.

⁶³⁵ The above-mentioned nuclear weapons system.

⁶³⁶ According to Morrison: “Issues such as income inequality or the power of big business are placed as central to the British political system and, therefore, to winning a majority to break away from that system. **In contrast gender is not considered a central issue which may be an influential, uniting political idea. As a result discussion of gender can be justified as superfluous to the central struggle for a yes vote.** Such subtle discourses discouraged feminist activists from raising critiques and so impeded the integration of their concerns into the centre of the campaign” (2015).

Available on-line: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/81169/1/democraticaudit.com-Can%20gender%20equality%20exclude%20feminist%20politics%20The%20case%20of%20the%20Radical%20Independence%20Campaign.pdf> (last access: 08/02/2018)

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 113 Business for Scotland



The Business for Scotland Declaration

"We believe that it is fundamentally better for Scottish business and the Scottish economy, if all appropriate economic decisions, fiscal and legislative levers, are controlled by those best placed to understand, and who care about the needs of our economy – that is, the people of Scotland.

Becoming an independent country means Scotland's economic future will be in Scotland's hands, and that business and economic policies will be tailored to suit the changing needs of Scotland, within the distinct Scottish business and economic landscape.

There is no doubt that Scotland has existing significant economic strengths and untapped potential, in many business sectors. We are blessed with talent, resources, creativity and entrepreneurial spirit. We have the opportunity to make our nation a better and more successful place to live and work, for this and future generations of business owners and their employees. We can build a greener, fairer, more prosperous society that is stronger and more successful than it is today within an independent Scotland.

We believe that Scotland becoming an independent country and maintaining access to the EU marketplace, and the wider economic benefits that brings, will provide significant opportunities for Scottish businesses to become more entrepreneurial, confident, successful, ambitious and international, whilst simultaneously boosting the brand image and international standing of Scotland as a nation.

Scotland trading on its own terms, with the other home nations and with our friends and neighbours in Europe and across the world, as a self-governing, independent country will become one of the wealthiest, most progressive and respected nations in the world."

(Source Business for Scotland, 2014)

Beyond that general approach, different sectorial groups (Yes brokers) offered arguments in favour of independence in a clear logic of equivalence. For instance, National Health Services for Yes, Scots Asians for Yes, Scottish Pensioners for Independence, Yes LGTB, Crofting for Yes and a long etcetera.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskoizian.

B- Political frontier

As seen in the previous arguments a political frontier is built between those who defend a “democratic Scotland” and those who want to keep “the neoliberal status quo”. A multi-option referendum could have blurred the differences and strengthen intermediate positions. Although we must recall that the level of polarization was much lower than the one in Catalonia or the Basque Country, a Yes/No vote enhanced the dichotomous separation of the society into two fields and fostered antagonism and the emergence of the political (Azkune, 2016; Laclau, 2005; Zubiaga, 2012). The next image is a good illustration of those ideas.

IRUDIA 114 Yes/No football pitch



(Source: Yes Scotland, 2014)

A football pitch with two teams in which Labour is the striker of a team full of right-wing organizations is a good metaphor of the dichotomy between “us” and “them” articulated by pro-independence actors. For decades, Labour accused the SNP of being “tartan Tories” and most of the left-wing parties, social movements and trade unions opposed independence. However, during the referendum, a new political frontier was built and labour was displaced from its previous position to a new one shared with “strange bedfellows” in the “Better together” campaign. Thus, as we see in the next images, labour became part of the traditional anti-tory rhetoric, a position difficult to refute with traditional left wing and working class discourse in a context in which most of the leftist have changed sides to independence.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

IRUDIA 115 RIC Sack the Tories



(Source: Radical Independence Campaign, 2014)

IRUDIA 116 Yes and Scottish Labour



(Source: Yes Scotland, 2014)

C-

Motivation:

Motivation serves as a call to arms or rationale to action using deeply sedimented ideas in Scottish politics. We see in that regard the widespread use of slogans such as “Scottish solutions to Scottish problems”, “A better fairer Scotland starts with Yes”, “Scotland’s future it’s in your hands”, “Time to bring your government home”, “Britain is for the rich Scotland can be ours”, “Another Scotland is possible” “Vote Yes and say goodbye to the Tories” and a long etcetera.

As it happens in the Catalan case, the very idea of building a new country becomes in itself a motivating cause especially for those who are not usually involve in politics and are reluctant to trust traditional campaigns.

Hegemony and the articulation of “the people”

After explaining the main logic used to articulate the pro-independence discourse, we identify the conditions that populism requires according to Ernesto Laclau (2005:110):

- 4- The dichotomic division of society into two camps — one presenting itself as a part which claims to be the whole. As mentioned above the Yes/No division enhances this dichotomy and in this case, the Yes campaign claims to represent the “whole Scotland” versus the “undemocratic neoliberal status quo”.
- 5- That this dichotomy involves the antagonistic division of the social field. As long as devo-max was refused, the chances for an intermediate position were closed. Therefore Yes and No involve an antagonistic division of the social field.
- 6- That the popular camp presupposes, as a condition of its constitution, the construction of a global identity out of the equivalence of a plurality of social demands. In that regard, the Yes movement was able to create a new pro-independence identity out of the equivalential articulation of many unmet social demands (NHS groups, anti-Trident groups, feminists, ecologists, young people and the great deal of umbrella groups campaigning for Yes are a good example). Although they were different and each group made its own claims (logic of difference), they were equivalentially linked due to their support to independence.

We also need to take into **account antagonism and its constitutive nature**. Thus, in order to explain antagonism and the construction of a political frontier we are going to consider the next dimensions:

- 4- The notion of a constitutive antagonism, of a radical frontier, **will require a broken space** (Ibidem:112). That rupture of the social order, will be the

consequence of the accumulation of unmet demands (Ibidem:113). So from the very beginning we are confronted with a dichotomic division between unfulfilled social demands, on the one hand, and an unresponsive power, on the other (Ídem.).

On the one hand, the Financial Crisis, the promotion of austerity politics and in general terms the privatization of democracy, tend to disempower the population which consequently leads to **the accumulation of unmet demands**⁶³⁷. In that line, in a context in which social needs increase the cut on social welfare tends undermine even more the social basis of the state. On the other hand, Westminster's Governments have been widely considered **unresponsive**⁶³⁸ to Scottish needs, especially when the Conservatives are in office. We have clearly seen above which is its discursive articulation.

- 5- The movement from democratic to popular demands also requires **the construction of a new symbolic framework**. Thus, apart from being less and less sustained by a pre-existing differential framework, the popular demands will need to construct a new one. In such a process, the political construction of 'an enemy' will also be required (Ibídem:114.).

We have clearly seen those dimensions in the previous epigraph. We believe that its construction is sustained in the previous anti-thatcherite Scottishness. However, in this case independence has been placed at the centre of the political debate with a welfarist discourse whereas labour was displaced from its previous position to a new one shared with the "Better together" campaign and becoming part of "the new enemy".

- 6- Finally, we have to bear in mind **the tension we have detected between difference and equivalence** within a complex of demands which have become 'popular' through their articulation. On the one hand, that inscription undoubtedly gives the demand a corporeality which it would not otherwise have. It ceases to be a fleeting, transient occurrence, and becomes part of what Gramsci called a 'war of position': a discursive/institutional ensemble which ensures its long-term survival (Ibidem:117). On the other hand, the 'people' (the equivalential chain) has strategic laws of movement of its own, and nothing guarantees that these laws would not lead to sacrifice, or at least substantially compromise, the requests involved in some of the individual democratic demands (idem).

As already noted, different social demands were equivalentially articulated and become popular thanks to the role played by independence as a surface of inscription strong enough as to represent them all. It does not mean that they will remain static or that they

⁶³⁷ We are not going to repeat here the above-mentioned ideas on fisco-financial crises, the reduction of the capacities for state intervention and how it encourages the crisis aspects of the state.


⁶³⁸ See the opinion polls

will be fully represented by independence. However, they were partially fixed in an equivalential chain in which independence had the ability to represent them all.

With that in mind and as mentioned in the Catalan case, we identify the construction of a new political identity whose main tenet is independence. By considering the performative role of discourse, we have said that it is not limited to describe the reality but to create a new identity. In such a process, we are going to consider four key elements:

- **The empty signifier:** it relates to the signifier that has the ability to attract different demands and fill itself with their content. We highlight in this case: Scotland, Yes and Independence. They can be synthesized as “Scottish independence”.
- **Floating signifiers:** it relates mostly to those signifiers that represent the unfulfilled social demands. For instance: The defence of the National Health Service, Feminism, anti-austerity claims, anti-trident etc.
- **Point de capiton/ nodal point:** in this case, independence links equivalentially the floating signifiers and fixes the political frontier.
- **The articulation between the universal and the particular:** a particular view of Scotland tries to represent the totality.

IRUDIA 117 Populism and Scottish Independence



Source: elaborated by the author based on: Laclau, 2005:164.

Each of these demands, in its particularity, is different from all the others (this particularity is shown in the diagram by the lower semicircle in the representation of each of them) (Laclau, 2005:165). All of them, however, are equivalent to each other in their common opposition to the status quo (this is what the upper semicircle represents) (ídem). This, as we have seen, leads to one of the demands (Scottish independence) stepping in and becoming the signifier of the whole chain — a tendentially empty signifier. But the whole model depends on the presence of the dichotomic frontier: without this, the equivalential relation would collapse and the identity of each demand would be exhausted in its differential particularity.

As mentioned in the Catalan case, we believe that the explained model cannot explain in depth a very complex reality. However, it offers us a general view of which is *the strategy pursued by pro-independence actors in order to build a new political identity and, in that way, a new hegemonic vision (H9)*. It helps us understand how independence grew from a support of 30% at the time of signing the Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012 to the figures that nobody could have predicted before. With a historical turnout of 84.59% the no won with a large margin: 55.30% of the people supported No and 44.70% voted Yes. However, in the aftermath of the referendum those parties who supported yes saw a surge in members whereas Labour plunged into a crisis. In a matter of weeks, SNP grow from 25.000 to 100.000 members, the Scottish Green Party from 1720 to 8.500, the Scottish Socialist Party from 1.500 to 3.500 and new political coalitions such as the left wing RISE were formed (Azkune, 2016:53).


We believe that George Kerevan words are clear in that regard:

“The Scottish Labour leadership, abetted by the metropolitan media, wrongly tarred proponents of independence as tartan romantics—or even anti-English bigots. The reality is that, by the end, the Yes campaign had morphed into the beginnings of a genuine populist, anti-austerity movement like the ‘Indignant Citizens’ in Greece or the May 15 Movement in Spain. Put another way, it was class politics—not old-style nationalism—that fired the Yes campaign.”
(2014)

The contiguity between independence and the rest of the “demands”, has provoked a displacement among terms, problems and actors. This is what in rhetoric is considered a metonymy (Laclau, 2003:2). The consolidation of such a process will turn the contiguity into an analogy and the metonymy into a metaphor. Thus, pro-independence actors have been able to represent the fight against cuts and in favour of a more social democratic state project making independence its metaphor. The good electoral performance of the

SNP or the warm welcome offered by “Occupy London” to Nicola Sturgeon⁶³⁹ are two concrete examples.

IRUDIA 118 Scottish Independence as a metaphor of democracy



Source: elaborated by the author.

It is difficult to foresee the future so we must be cautious about our predictions. However, it seems that the Scottish question is far from being solved and that a second referendum on independence is highly likely in the short-term. Be that as it may, democracy, sovereignty and statehood will be crucial concepts in the immediate future. Once again, what is at stake is how and to what extent can the subaltern states speak.

639

[http://www.thenational.scot/news/14897702.Nicola Sturgeon is backed by Occupy protesters in London/](http://www.thenational.scot/news/14897702.Nicola-Sturgeon-is-backed-by-Occupy-protesters-in-London/) (last access: 22/3/2018)

9 Ondorioak

“Erantzun guztiak bagenituela uste genuenean, bat batean galdera guztiak aldatu zituzten.” – Mario Benedetti

Gure ikerketa lana hein handi batean indibiduala izan den arren, ezagutza beti da kolektiboa. Aldez aurretik hainbat autore eta eragilek egindako lanaren fruituak jaso eta etorkizunari begira uzta berriak biltzeko asmoz daude idatzita lerrook. Helburu horrekin, esandakoak gogoratu eta gure ikerketaren ekarpenak azpimarratzen saiatuko gara atal honetan.

Tesi honen helburu nagusia, postfordismoaren baitan egon den Estatuaren eraldaketaren eta mugimendu nazionalista historikoen burutzen dituzten burujabetza eskaeren arteko erlazioa aztertzea izan da. Xedea konplexua den neurrian, ezinbestean berau aurrera eramateko tresna analitikoek konplexuak izan behar dutela deritzogu. Hori dela eta, problem-solving ikuspegiak baztertu eta teoria kritikoan oinarritu gara *egun indarrean dauden erakunde eta botere harremanak era kritikoan aztertu eta aldi berean a priori banaturik dauden prozesu eta errealitateen arteko lotura burutzeko.*

Era argian atera dezakegun lehen ondorioa horri loturik dago. Nazioa eta nazionalismoaren inguruko ikerketek burutu beharreko lehen hausnarketa honen inguruan eraiki den *falazia epistemikoari* aurre egitea da. *Estatu ofizialik ez duten nazioak aztertzerako orduan demokrazia eta nazionalismoaren artean berdinen arteko ordezkari ez zilegia* burutzen jarraitzea, egungo burujabetza eskaerak ulertzeko behar ditugun tresnei uko egitea dela iruditzen zaigu. Guk burutu dugun lanketa teoriko/enpirikoa horri erantzun nahi dion proposamen bat besterik ez da izan eta neurri batean beste hainbat autoreek aldez aurretik egindako lanean du oinarria. Ikerketa prozesuak itxiak ez diren neurrian ez ditugu guk esandakoak dogmatzat jotzen. Hala ere, etorkizunari begira honen inguruan oinarritzko premisa batzuk argi geratu direla deritzogu.

Egungo herrialde gehienetan ez du zentzurik nazioa, demokrazia eta estatu egiturak era banatu batean ulertzea dimentsio guztiak era dialektiko batean loturik daudelako. Hasteko, **“nazionalista”** eta **“ez nazionalistaren”** arteko banaketak ez du justifikazio teorikorik. Hori dela eta, nazionalismo ezberdinen arteko hartu eman erlazionalaren azterketa hobestea beharrezkoa dela uste dugu. Horretaz gain, demokrazia nazionalismo mota bat den neurrian, *gatazka demokratikoak gatazka nazionalistak direla (15-M eta austeritatearen aurkako mugimenduak orokorrean) eta gatazka nazionalistak gatazka*

demokratikoak direla esan dugu (Eskoizia, Katalunia, Euskal Herria). Horren ondorioz, gure ikerketan, kataluniar, euskal eta eskoziar kasuak era isolatuan aztertu ordez espainiar eta britainiarrarekin era erlazionalean⁶⁴⁰ azaldu ditugu. Hauen azterketan, nazionalismoaren ikerketa klasikoak gainditu eta estatu egiturek eta demokratizazio prozesuek lehentasun analitikoa izan dute.

Aipatu hautuaren bidez *nazionalismoa eta demokraziaren ikerketetan nagusi den falazia epistemikoa gainditzen* saiatu gara. Etorkizuneko ikerketek ere honen beharra kontuan hartu behar izango dutela uste dugu. Horretaz gain, edozein izanik ikergaia, *Estatua/gizartea dikotomiarekin* haustea ere ezinbestekotzat jotzen dugu. Gizartea estatalizatua dago eta estatua jendartean dauden aktore ezberdinek aurrera eramandako estrategien ondorioa da. Hortaz, aktore politikoek “estrategikoki kalkulaturako egiturazko orientazioa” dute eta egiturek “egiturazko hautaketa estrategikoa” (Jessop, 1996:124).

Estatalitate subalternoa ildo horretan aurrerapauso bat emateko gure tesiak egindako ekarpen teorikoa da. Egiturak, diskurtsoak edo estrategiak hobetsi ordez, guzti horien sintesia jasotzeko gai izan daitekeen kategoria eraikitzea izan da gure helburua. Orain arte, ikerketa gehienetan “erregioa” edo “bireskalatzea”⁶⁴¹ bezalako metafora espazialak erabili dira azken hamarkadetako deszentralizazio prozesuen azterketarako (Keating, 1998, 2012, 2013, 2014; Paasi, 2003). Hauek aldi berean, “post-subiranotasunaren” ideari hertsiki loturik daude (idem). Nazionalismoari buruzko ikerketetan ekarpen bat suposatu arren, problem-solving paradigmatan baitan (Cox, 1981) ulertu behar direla deritzogu. Zentzu horretan, Andaluzia, Gaztela Mantxa, Turingia eta Ingalaterrako Hego Ekialdea, Eskoizia, Euskal Herria eta Kataluniarekin analitikoki erkagarriak izan arren, ontologikoki errealitate ezberdinei buruz ari garela uste dugu.

Estatu egituren deszentralizazioak, *per se*, ez dizkigu analitikoki beharrezkoak diren elementuak eskaintzen. Gaztela Mantxako osasun zerbitzua, mantxatar demos baten eraikuntzan ezinbesteko botere teknologia da. Hala ere, bere osotasunean aktore politikoek honen bidez aurrera daramaten estatu proiektuak ez du Espainiar estatu proiektuarekin lehiarik egiten. Mantxatar estatu proiektua, Espainiar estatu proiektuaren parte da eta honen inguruan artikulatzen den ikuspegi hegemonikoa ere bai. Kontrara, nazio historikoak aztertzen ditugunean, aktoreen jarduera estrategikoa kontuan hartzea ezinbestekoa da, egitura horiek estatu proiektu ezberdin bat garatzeko baliatu ditzaketeelako. Komunitate politiko demokratikoaren subjektu nagusia nazioa izaten jarraitzen duen neurrian, *nazio demokratikoen eraikuntzan sortzen diren talkak dira egun azaldu beharrekoak. Hor kokatzen dugu, egungo gatazka nazionalisten muina.*

⁶⁴⁰ Adierazi dugun moduan, euskal kasua EAE-ra mugatu da. Iparraldea txertatzekotan, Frantziar Estatua ere aintzat hartu beharko litzatekeela uste dugu.

⁶⁴¹ Re-scaling ingeleraz.

Gatazkak baldin badira azaldu beharrekoak, hauen baitan parte hartzen duten aktore eta egiturak dira ezinbestean ikerketa objektuak. Ikuspegi estrategiko eta harremanezkoa baliatzen dugun neurrian, *harreman horien izatea* deskribatzeko gaitasuna duen kategoria baliatu dugu: *subalternitatea*. Komunitate politiko (ez) berdinen artean ematen den harremanaren izatea deskribatzen duela deritzogu. Aurreko adibidea berreskuratuz, inork gutxiuk uka dezake Gaztela Mantxak, Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoak baino gaitasun politiko gutxiago dituela. Hala ere, ez da estatalitate subalternoa bat subjektiboki aktore politikoek ez dutelako subalternoa moduan artikulatu eta herritarren gehiengoa nazionalki espainiarra sentitzen delako. Kontrara, aldez aurretik determinaturik egon ez arren, nazio historikoek zentro politikoa kanpo eratzaile gisa erabiltzen dutela uste dugu. Horretaz gain, euren demokratizazio propioa garatzeko estatu gaitasunak eskatuko dizkiete estatu matrizeari. Tentsio material, estrategiko eta diskurtsibo horien baitan sortzen da subalternitatea. Horren ondorioz, *tentsio material, estrategiko eta diskurtsibo horiek izan beharko lirateke gaur egungo nazionalismoaren ikergai pribilegiatuak*.

Marko teorikoaren garapenari dagokionez, printzipio kritikoak jarraituz *inspirazio post-diziplinarioa* hobetsi eta hainbat eskolen ekarpenak txertatu ditugu. Almonden metafora berreskuratuz, banaturiko mahaietan zerbitzatu diren plater ezberdinak elkartzen saiatu gara bereizirik zeuden lurrin eta zapoak elkartu eta gure gatzozpinak botaz. Irakurle eta ebaluatzaileen esku geratzen da azken buket-aren egokitasuna balioztatzea.

Edonola ere, *Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoa, Ekintza Kolektiboaren Mekanismo eta Prozesuak* eta *Essexeko Eskolaren Diskurtoaren Teoria* elkartzeak hurrengo ahalbidetu du:

- 1- Aldez aurretik harremanik ez zuten eskolak harremanetan jartzea.
- 2- Azalpen erretroduktiboa eta teoria eraikuntza uztartzea.
- 3- Gure analisia burutzeko, osotasuna era koherente batean ulertzeko tresnak eskaintzea. Hau da, analisi abstraktuena eta zehatzena era koherente batean egituratzea.
- 4- Azken ideia horri loturik, osotasuna ulertzeaz gain, analisi plano ezberdinetan beharrezkoak diren tresna zehatzak ere eskaini dizkigute.

Eskola teorikoei dagokionez, *Ikuspegi Estrategiko Harremanezkoak* lehentasuna izan du egitura eta aktoreak aintzat hartu arren, ez diolako ez bata ez besteari lehentasun ontologikorik ematen. Proposatzen digun markoaren ikergai pribilegiatua estatuaren teoria izan bada ere, beste edozein ikerketarako heuristika egokia eskaintzen digu. Gure ikerketan etengabeko presentzia izan duen ikuspegi izateaz gain, estatalitate subalternoa eta matrizearen definizioan ezinbesteko iturri teorikoa izan da. Tesiaren egituraketan eta azalpen erretroduktiboan izan duen eraginaz aparte, honen atal abstraktuenen garapenaren inspirazio ere izan dugu. Zehaztasun maila handitzean eta honekin batera analisi plano

gehiago txertatzean beste eskolei ateak ireki eta garrantzia galduz joan da. Hala ere, abstrakzioaz harago estatuaren krisi dimentsioen azterketarako beharrezkoak diren tresnak eskaini izana azpimarratuko genuke. Honen bidez, esentzialismoak gainditu eta gatazka nazionalista garaikideetan “Mendebaldeko” edozein Estatutan identifikatzen genitzakeen antzeko tentsio eta kontraesanak identifikatu ditugu.

Bestalde, MacAdam Tarrow eta Tillyren “Dynamics of Contention” lan klasikoa izan da ikerketaren dimentsiorik dinamikoena aztertzeko lanabesa. *Mekanismo eta prozesuen* aplikazioa zeharka ikerketaren atal ezberdinetan baliatu arren, garrantzia berezia izan du liskarraldi sezesionisten aktibazioen azterketan. Kasu honetan, Martínezek eta Zubiagak (2015) egindako lana baliatu eta gure beharretara egokitu arren, Eskoziako kasuan ekarpen kualitatibo garrantzitsua suposatu duela uste dugu. Tresna teoriko honek, *a priori* inolako loturarik ez duten dinamika politikoen azterketan antzeko mekanismo eta prozesuak aktibatzen direla erakusten digu. Hori da hain zuzen gure ikerketaren inspirazio nagusietako bat eta hor topatzen dugu ikuspegi honen bertutea.

Azkenik, *Essexeko Eskolaren diskurtsoaren* teoria eta hegemoniari buruzko eztabaidak modan daudela ukaezina da. Kopiatu eta itsasteko baino, ikerketa zehatzen garapenerako inspirazio gisa egokiagoa dela deritzogu (Aoiz *et al*, 2017). Eskola honek abstrakzioarako joera nabaria duen arren, gure kasuan tesiaren planorik zehatz eta konplexuena azaltzeko baliatu dugu. Honen baitan, aktore politikoen euren diskurtsoaren egituraketan erabiltzen duten estrategia antolatzeke “frame analisiaren” eskemaren garrantzia azpimarratu nahiko genuke. Bien arteko uztarketak, 9. hipotesiari loturiko (H9) herriaren artikulazioa eta hegemonia berri baten eraikuntza aztertzeko tresna egokiak eskaintzen dizkigutela ikusi dugu. Kasu honetan ere, gure ikergaitik harago beste hainbat gatazka politikoren azterketarako lanabes baliotsua da.

Hautuak hautu, metodologikoki ikerketa bat aurrera eramateko eskura dauden aukerak azkengabeak izan arren, *artikulazioaren metodoa* baliatzea erabaki dugu. Honen bidez, ikuspegi kritikoak galdatzen dituen printzipioei heldu eta egungo errealitatearen azaleko itxuretatik harago, dinamiken sakoneko kausa eta mekanismo eragileak antzematen saiatu gara. Honi esker, hasieratik kasu azterketan sartu ordez hauek ulertzeko beharrezkoak diren alde aurretiko hausnarketa teorikoak burutu ditugu.

Zentzu horretan, ikuspegi kritiko batetik ezinbestekoa da erroetara jo eta egungo gatazken muina ulertzea. Artikulazioaren metodoaren bidez, azalpen erretroduktiboa eta teoria eraikuntza uztartu ditugu egungo burujabetza eskaeren funtsera joz. Gatazka nazionalistak gatazka demokratikoak dira, eta alderantziz. *Burujabetza*, komunitate politikoa eta bere gobernuaren arteko harremana era demokratikoan gauzatzea ahalbidetzen duen erlazioa soziala den neurrian, *demokrazia eta nazionalismoari buruzko edozein ikerketaren abiapuntua dela deritzogu*. Gure ikergaia beste bat izanda


ere, tesian landutako lehenengo, bigarren eta hirugarren kapituluak berberak edo oso antzekoak izango lirateke. Hau da, M-15 eta Podemosen sorrera, Greziar krisia, Brexita, demokratizazio feminista edota eskuineko populismoa bezalako fenomeno ezberdinen azterketa burutu nahi izango bagenu, aipatu kapituluaren funtsa antzekoa izango litzatekela uste dugu.

Horrekin ez dugu adierazi nahi guk burutu lana amaitua denik, edota edozein ikerketa burutzeko guk esandakoarekin nahikoa denik, ezta gutxiago ere. Esan nahi duguna hurrengoa da: egungo jendartean bederen, *burujabetza*, *kapitala* eta *estatuaren* arteko eragin-trukea aintzat hartzea beharrezko abiapuntua dela. Horretaz gain, gure lanean pisu gutxi izan arren, *ardatz patriarkala* ere kontuan hartu behar izango dugu.

Zergatik da beharrezkoa? Dialektika klasikoa gogoratu, demokratizazioa eta desdemokratizazioa, aurkariaren arteko batasun eta lehia jarraian ulertzen ditugu. Zentzu horretan, egungo Europar Batasunean eta “mendebaldeko” herrialde kapitalista aberatsenetan, *dinamika politiko gehienak demokratizazio eta desdemokratizazioaren arteko talka* etengabe horretan kokatzen diren neurrian, aipatu kontzeptuak berauek aztertzen hasteko oinarritzko kategoriak dira.

Logika horretan ulertu behar da proposatu dugun *lehenengo ikerketa galdera: Zein erlazio dago postfordismoaren baitan egon den Estatuaren eraldaketaren eta mugimendu nazionalista historikoek burutzen dituzten burujabetza eskaeren artean?* Gure lehenengo hipotesian (H1) adierazi bezala, **tentsioan dauden bi dinamika ezberdin** garatu direla ikusi dugu: autoritate pribatuak ahaldu dituen **desdemokratizazio prozesu bat eta nazio historikoak era demokratikoan birsortzea** ahalbidetu duen estatu egituren deszentralizazioa. Alde batetik, desdemokratizazioaren sakontzea ahalbidetu duten egiturazko aldaketak aipatu ditugu. Horri loturik, hirugarren kapituluaren, estatismo autoritariorako eta demokraziaren pribatizatorako joerak sakontasunez lantzen saiatu gara. Zentzu horretan, aurretiaz garatu dugun grafikoa berreskuratuko dugu ideia nagusien muina birgogoratzeko. Sinplifikazio arriskua ahaztu gabe, irudi honen bidez egun nagusi den estatu egituren ezaugarri garrantzitsuenak azaldu ditugu.

IRUDIA 119 The privatization of democracy and its tensions in current statehood



Ikuspegi kritikoaren xedea, azaleko adierazpenetatik harago erro sakonagoa duten mekanismoak identifikatzea da. Zentzu horretan, arrazionaltasun neoliberalaren egi erregimena era akritikoan lantzeak hurrengo eragin dezakeela deritzogu: **demokrazia beraren izenean, demokraziaren pribatizazioan eta desdemokratizazioan sakontzea**. Gure lanaren bidez, horri aurre egin nahi dion ikerketa agenda bat mahaiaren gainean jarri eta berau jorratzeko erabilgarriak izan daitezkeen metodologia eta kontzeptuak azaldu ditugu. Jada adierazi moduan, eskema honen bertuteetako bat, beste edozein ikerketarako abiapuntu izan daitekeela da.

Neurri batean Goikoetxeak abiatutako ikerketa planteamenduari jarraiki (2017a), demokraziaren pribatizazioan eragiten duten eraldaketek lehentasuna izan dute. **Ikerketa postpositibistak eta azalpen erretroduktiboak, sakoneko dinamika hauek agerikoagoak diren prozesu zehatzekin elkartzea ahalbidetu digu**. Inork gutxi lotu ditzake, *a priori*, Kataluniako liskarraldi sezesionista, Europar Batasunaren gobernantza mekanismoen indartzearekin⁶⁴² adibidez. Planteamendu positibista bat jarraituz, Kataluniako independentismo maila eta gobernantza mekanismoen indartzearen arteko korrelazioa aztertuko bagenu, ez genuke inolako signifikazio estatistikorik lortuko. Kontrara, gure ikerketaren bidez osotasun konplexu baten plano ezberdinak direla dakusagu. Ondorio zehatzena, eraikitako explanandum-aren **‘ezinbesteko kontingentzia’** dela hain zuzen ere (Jessop, 1982:212).

Kasuen azterketari dagokionez, **analisi erlazionala** hobetsi dugu. Hori dela eta, bata edo bestea era isolatuan ulertu ordez, elkarreaginean aztertu ditugu. Honek, lotura zuzena du nazionalismoaren falazia epistemikoa gainditzeko asmoz egin dugun hautu metodologikoarekin. Hau da, gakoa demokratizazio eta estatu proiektu ezberdinen arteko lehia baldin bada, begien bistakoa dirudi prozesu horien kontraesan eta lehia dela aztertu beharrekoa. Horren ondorioz, “matrix eta subaltern state” kategorien bidez **esentzialista ez den ikuspegia** lehenetsi dugu.

Espainiar eta Britainiar kasuak lantzean, alde zuzenetik egindako hainbat hausnarketa plano zehatzago batean kokatzea izan da gure xedea. Kasu honetan ere, oso ezberdinak diren errealitate bik antzekotasun ugari dituztela ikusi dugu. Biek ala biek, 80. hamarkadan postfordismoaren baitan egiturazko aldaketak sustatu zituzten demokratizazio/desdemokratizazioaren arteko tentsioan aro berri bat irekiz. Espainiar kasuan, 78ko erregimenaren egiturazko ezaugarriak azaltzea funtsezkoa izan da 2008tik aurrera piztu den momentu koiunturalaren tentsio eta kontraesanak ulertzeko. Britainiar kasuan ere, Thatcherismoaren marka azaldu barik nekez ulertu daitezke azken urteetako gorabehera politikoak.

⁶⁴² Goikoetxearen lana (2017a) aintzindaria da zentzu horretan.

Ezberdintasunak ezberdintasun, bietan aztertu ditugu demokraziaren pribatizatorako eta estatismo autoritariorako joerak eta nazio historikoak era demokratikoan birsortzea ahalbidetu duten estatu egituren deszentralizazioa. Horien bidez, espainiar eta britainiar demokratizazio eta desdemokratizazioekin batera, aztergai izan ditugun nazioek berezko demokratizazio eta desdemokratizazioa izan dutela ikusi dugu. *Deszentralizazioa hierarkiaren itzalean*⁶⁴³ da prozesu hauen tentsioak era egokienean deskribatzen dituen metafora. Subalternitatearen ideari hertsiki loturik, estatu matrizeak egungo demokratizazio prozesuak baldintzatzeko duen gaitasunaren adierazlea litzateke. Espainiar kasuan, birzentralizatorako joerak era argian ikusarazten dute aipatu metafora. Britainiar kasuan aldiz, birzentralizazioa ez da hain ageriko prozesua izan. Hala ere, estatu matrizeak sustatu austeritate politikek Eskoziar desdemokratizazioan duten eragina horren adibide dela ikusi dugu.

Itzalaren tamaina, kasuak kasu, testuinguruko baldintzen arabera aldatu egingo da. Guztien artean adibiderik argiena Kataluniako egoerak adierazten duela deritzogu. Kasu honetan, Espainiar Konstituzioaren 155. artikulua aplikazioak, demokrazia Katalanaren erabateko eklipsea eragitera ailegatu da.

Sezesioaren auziaren kudeaketari dagokionez, Britainiar estatu proiektua malguagoa dela begitantzen zaigu. Zentzu horretan, honen inguruan irakurketak ugariak izan dira. Askoren aburuz, Erresuma Batuak tradizio demokratiko luzeagoa du eta honek nolabaiteko eragina izan du Londres eta Edinburghen artean sezesio erreferendum bat adostekoan (Blas, 2015:268). Horretaz gain, Blasekin bat gatoz eta “ezin da ahantzi Erresuma Batua konposaturiko estatu nazional anitz gisa aurkezten duela bere burua, ez da estatu bat nazio batentzat, baizik eta estatu bat lau nazioentzat” (idem). Bestalde, konstituzio idatzirik ez duenez, malgutasun legegilea handiagoa du (idem). Hala ere, hautu estrategikoen garrantzia ezin da gutxietsi. Arestian adierazi moduan, Britainiar Gobernuaren ustez, erreferendumaren bidez “ezezkoak” aise irabazi eta auzia denbora luzez itxiko zen.

Aipatu faktoreek eskoziar erreferenduma deitzea erraztu zuten. Espainiar kasuan, bestalde, aurkako dinamika jazo da. Nazio bakarraren aitortza, honen lehentasun hierarkikoa eta konstituzioaren irakurketa itxia nagusitu dira (Lasagabester, 2008). Horren ondorioz, legezketasun printzipioaren eta printzipio demokratikoaren arteko tentsioan lehenengoa pribilegiatu da. Horretaz gain, ikuspegi estrategikoenari dagokionez ez dago emaitzaren inguruan ziurtasunik. Katalunian balizko erreferendumaren zertifikazioa egongo balitz, “ezezkoaren” garaipena ez litzateke hain argia izango.

⁶⁴³ Decentralization in the shadow of hierarchy ingeleraz. Jessopek (2008a), metagobernantzari buruz erabili metaforaren analogia da.

Horretaz gain, balizko euskal erreferendum bati ateak irekiko litzkioke Espainiar krisi organikoa are gehiago sakonduz.

Hausnarketa zehatzetatik harago eta arestian esandakoa gogoratuz, gure ikergaia M-15 eta Podemosen sorrera, Ciudadanosen indartzea, Brexita, UKIPen eskuineko populismoaren arrakasta edota Jeremy Corbynen hazkundearen azterketa balitz, ikerketaren planteamendua oso antzekoa izango litzateke. Kasu honetan, 1, 2, 3, 4 eta 7. kapituluetan esandakoak sakoneko aldaketarik gabe baliatuko genituzke. Berriz ere, burujabetza, kapitala, estatua eta demokraziaren arteko eragin-trukea aintzat hartzearen beharra agerian geratzen da. Gure lana norabide horretan pauso txiki bat emateko saiakera izan da.

Lehentasun analitikoa zuten kasuen azterketari dagokionez, originaltasunaren beharra nabarmendu nahiko genuke. Zentzu horretan, *Kataluniako* “procès” independentista gori gorian mantendu da azken urteetan. Honek, bizirik jarraitzen duen fenomeno politiko bati buruzko hausnarketen beharra agerian uzten duen arren, informazio gaindosiaren arriskua ere badakar. Maila akademiko zein mediatikoan anitzak dira egin diren lanketa, irakurketa eta kronikak eta zaila da azterketa originalak egitea. Zer esanik ez dago, *euskal errealitatea* gertutik ezagutu eta zientifikoki aztertu dutenei berritasunak eskaintzeko dauden zailtasunei buruz. *Eskoziar* kasuari dagokionez, Euskal Herrian ezezagunena den errealitatea izan arren, mundu mailan urte luzez lehen mailako arreta akademikoa jaso du. Hori gutxi balitz, Kataluniako kasuan gertatu den moduan, 2014ko erreferendumaren ostean gaiarekiko interesa areagotu eta lanketa teorikoa biderkatu da. Hala ere, gure muga baitan auzi guztietan berrikuntzak proposatzen saiatu gara.

Gure ekarpena berriz ere, errealitate zehatzak dinamika zabalago baten baitan ulertzeko emandako pausoetan kokatzen dugu. Horretaz gain, maila teorikoan proposatu dugun “estatalitate subalternoaren” ideia lehen aplikazio praktikoa da, etorkizunean gehiago garatu beharko dugun ikerketa agenda baten hastapeneko pausoa hain zuzen. Aipatu bi elementu horien uztarpena da gure aburuz esku artean dugun lanaren ekarpen nagusia.

Hasteko, egungo egoera azken hamarkadetako estatuaren eraldaketaren kontraesanen baitan kokatzeko hautua berretsi dugu. *Bestetik, agerikoak diren irakurketak hobetsi ordez nazionalismoari buruzko ikerketetatik at geratzen diren dimentsioei lehentasuna eman diegu. Hau ez da apeta metodologiko bat, egungo nazionalismoaren azterketan funtsezkoa deritzogun hautu epistemologiko bat baizik.* Honen bidez, hiru eremutan aurrerapausoak ematea izan da gure helburua:


Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

- Nazionalismoaren ikerketa agenda berritzen laguntzen saiatu gara.
- Estatuaren ikerketa eremua hedatu eta estatuaren teoria berritzeko proposamen bat burutu dugu.
- Aurreko bie hertsiki loturik, demokraziari buruzko ikerketa eremua ere hedatu eta berritzen saiatu gara.

Hori aintzat harturik gure bigarren eta hirugarren ikerketa galderetan hurrengo itaundu dugu: Zein da zehazki (estatuaren eraldaketak) Kataluniako, Eskoziako eta Euskal Herriko burujabetza eskaeretan duen eragina? Zein da burujabetza eskaera horien estrategia eta artikulazio diskurtsiboan duen eragina?

Zentzu horretan, edukiak ugariak izan arren eta kasuak kasu xehetasun eta ñabardura ezberdinak azpimarratu ditugun arren, gure tesiaren oinarria hurrengo irudiak laburbiltzen duela uste dugu.

IRUDIA 120 Tesiaren oinarri nagusiak



Iturria: egileak egin.

Jada adierazi dugun moduan, *demosgintza, estatugintza eta naziogintza era dialektikoan harremanetan dauden hiruki beraren hiru erpinak dira*. Azken hamarkadetako demokratizazio/desdemokratizazio prozesuen ondorioz, hainbat eremutan estatalitate subalternoak euren herritarren dependentzia eta konfiantza maila handitzen estatu matrizeak baino arrakastatsuagoak izan dira. Honek ondorio ximple bezain sakonak ditu. *Ximpleak*, logikoa dirudien moduan, demokratizazio prozesu horretan sakontzeko beharrezkoak diren estatu gaitasunak eskatuko dituztelako. *Sakonak*, oinarritzko hainbat funtziotan estatu matrizea ordezkatzeko gaitasuna izan dezaketelako. *Lehia politikoa hortaz, ez datza ezberdina den kulturaren akomodazioan ezta ezberdintasun horren*

babesaren aldarrikapenean. Gakoa, gure tesiaren izenburuan jaso dugu: nola eta zein neurritan hitz egin dezakete estatalitate subalternoek?

Honek, nazionalistatzat jo diren aldarrikapen eta mobilizazioak aztertzerako orduan ondorio ximple eta sakonak ditu ere bai. ***Ximpleak***, nazionalista moduan ezagutzen diren eragileen aldarrikapenen edukiak, hauek aurrera eramateko estrategia diskurtsiboak edota erabilitako borroka erreperitorioak nekez ezberdindu daitezkeelako demokratiko moduan ezagutzen diren horietaz. Proposamen analitiko ezberdin batetik planteatu arren, Manuel Castellsen (1997) proiektu identitatearen hausnarketatik hurbil koka dezakegu gure ikuspegia. ***Sakonak***, berdintasunak “liga berean” jokatzeko gurariak handitu ditzakelako. Zentzu horretan, demokrazian sakontzeko tresna gisa estatu propioa aldarrikatzea, sezesioaren inguruko paradigmaren eraldaketa bat eragin du (Sanjaume, 2013). Britainia Handia eta Espainia bezalako herrietan era paraleloan antzekotasun ugari (ezberdintasun nabariak ukatu gabe) dituzten bi liskarraldi sezesionista jazotzea, sakontasun horren sintoma argiak dira.

Ikerketa lan honen planteamenduan ere eragina argia da. Paisös Catalans osoa eta Euskal Herri osoa azertu ordez, Kataluniako Autonomia Erkidegoa eta Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoak (EAE) izan ditugu aztergai. Hau, nazio historikoekiko hurbilpenean estatu egiturek duten eragina aintzat hartzearen ondorio da. Hala ere, honekin ez dugu adierazi nahi euskal kasuaren azterketarako adibidez, Iparralde eta Nafarroa ez direnik kontuan hartu behar, analitikoki unitate bereizi moduan tratatu behar direla baizik. Zergatik? Arestian aipatutakoa gogoratu, lurraldeotan demokratizazio maila eta mota desberdina delako, Ipar Euskal Herrian euskal instituziorik ez dagoelako, eta EAEk eta Nafarroako Foru Erkidegoak (NFE) ezberdin erabili dituztelako beren erakunde estatalak eta beren ahalmen politikoak (Goikoetxea, 2017b:153). Gure lanaren mugak direla eta jorratu ezin izan ditugun arren, aipu labur bat egingo dugu.

EAEko gatazka nagusia “erdigune-periferia” bereizkeriatik sortzen da; NFEko gatazka nagusia, aldiz, espainiar periferiek euskal periferia nazionalistarekiko duten erreakzioa da (Goikoetxea, 2017b:200). Nafarroako erregionalisten eta espainiar autoritate zentralen arteko aliantzak forma anitzak hartu ditu, baina euskal nazionalistak boteretik baztertzeko balio izan dute beti, euskal kulturaren garapena eta euskararen erabilera mugatuz (idem). Honen ondorioz, nafartasunaren eta euskaltasunaren arteko oposizioa sortu da, Ulsterren unionismoaren eta errepublikanismoaren arteko gatazkaren antzekoa edo valentzianismoa eta katalanismoaren borrokaren antzekoa (Blas, 2017). Nafar identitateak, gatazka horien sustatzaile eta ondorio dira aldi berean (Rivera, 2018). Honek berriz ere, estatu egituren eta estrategia politikoen arteko harreman estua aztertzearen garrantzia agerian uzten du.

Iparraldeko kasuak bestalde, era argian erakusten du deslurraldetze eta berlurraldetze dinamikek identitate ezberdinen “objektibizatzeko” prozesuan, leialtasunen ezarpenean eta proiektu politikoak aurrera eramaten duten eragina. Existentzia soziala, dimentsio objektibo erakundetuek eta subjektiboek osatzen dute, baina bata desagertzen bada, epe luzera existentzia soziala desagertuko da (Goikoetxea, 2017b:195). Frantziar Iraultzaren ostean, nazionalismo frantsesak Euskal Herriaren deslurraldetze prozesua aurrera eramatearekin batera “frantziarrak” sortzeko estrategia nazionalizatzaile eraginkorra jarri zuen martxan. Existentzia sozial “frantziarra” bere dimentsio objektibo zein subjektiboaren bidez era eraginkorrean ezarri zen (bi Mundu Gerra tarteko). Ahedoren lanak (2017), honen aurrean euskal abertzaleen berlurraldetze estrategia saiakera ezberdinak azaltzen ditu. Azken hamarkadetakoak dira aipagarrienak, bazterrekoa zen aldarrikapenak erabateko zentraltasun politikoa hartzeaz gain, demokrazian lurraldeak duen gaurkotasuna era argian azaleratzen duelako.

Hala ere, errealitatea dinamikoa den neurrian aldaketa ugari izan dira azken urteotan. 2017tik aurrera indarrean dagoen Euskal Hirigune Elkargoa izan da urteetako lan horren gauzatze praktikoa, eta etorkizunean lurraldea, autoritatea eta eskubideen arteko mihizadura ezberdin bat eraikitzeko abiapuntua. Nafarroaren kasuan ere, 2015. urteko udal eta foru hauteskundearen ostean, Gobernuan zein udal askotan gehiago politikokoak aldatu dira aurreko egoera irauliz. Herrialde Valentziarrean eta Balear eta Pitiusa Uharteetan ere, Nafarroan jazotakoaren antzeko prozesua antzeman dezakegu. Goizegi da, honen inguruan sakoneko ondorioak ateratzeko eta etorkizuna baldintzatuko duen momentu egituratzaile berri bat ezarriko duen adierazteko. Gure tesian landutakoa jarraituz, baliteke Nafar edo Valentziar burujabetza eta demokratizazioa oinarri duten proiektu subiranista berriak artikulatzea.

Lurraldeen arteko harremanari dagokionez, etorkizunean ikusiko dugu zein den proposamen politikoaren egituraketa zehatza. Hipotesi moduan, nazioaren batasunaren aldarrikapena ahuldu eta egitura politiko ezberdinen federazioaren aldarrikapena nagusituko dela uste dugu. Honi hertsiki loturik, EHBilduk adibidez, “estrategia konfederala” deiturikoa onartu zuen 2017ko urrian burutu Konferentzia Politikoan. Honen bidez, hiru errealitate sozio-politikoek egokitutako prozesu eratzailak aurreikusten dituzte, EAE, Nafarroa eta Ipar Euskal Herrikoa.

Esanakoak esanda, begien bistakoa dirudien azken galdera bat ere egin diogu gure buruari. *Errealitateak antzekoak baldin badira, zergatik Katalunian eta Eskozian liskarraldi sezesionista bat aktibatu da eta Euskal Herrian ez?* Errealitateak antzekoak dira, baina lehia politikoaren eraginez sortzen diren ondorioak ez. Hau, azterketaren atalik biziena eta horrenbestez aldagarriena da. Egunerokotasun politikoaren erritmo bizilasterrak asko zailtzen du honi buruzko hausnarketak zehaztasunez egitea. Doktorego tesi baten tempus analitikoak egokiagoa da egiturazko aldaketa eta joerak deskribatzeko,

orainaren gorabeherak eta etorkizunean jazo daitezkeen gertakariei buruzko iragarpenak egiteko baina. Hala eta guztiz ere, oraindik bizirik dauden prozesu politiko hauen inguruan gure ekarpena egiten saiatu gara.

Lehenik eta behin, tesiaren ildo orokorra jarraituz beste edozein gatazka aztertzeke balia litezkeen kontzeptuen erabilera azpimarratu nahiko genuke. Egitura eta ekintzaren arteko harreman estua aintzat harturik, **krisi organikoa** (Gramsci, 1999:450-451), **ordena instituzionalen krisia edo “crisis of”** (Jessop, 2015a:458) eta **mobilizazio zikloa** (Tarrow, 2012:342), egungo gatazka nazionalisten plano ezberdinak azaltzeko kontzeptu argigarriagoak direla uste dugu. Hauekin batera **populismoa eta hegemonia independentistaren** artikulazioaren auzia ere erdigunean kokatu dugu (Apaolaza, 2012; Aoiz *et al*, 2017). Beste behin ere, guztiz bestelakoak diruditen gatazka demokratikoen azterketa burutu nahi izango bagenu, antzeko tresnak erabiliko genituzkeela azpimarratu nahiko genuke.

Krisi organikoa, estatuaren sei dimentsioen bidez operazionalizatu dugu. Horren ondorioz, *ordezkaritza krisia, barneratze instituzionalaren krisia, gaitasunen krisia, botere blokearen krisia, zilegitasun krisia eta hegemonia krisia*, gure aburuz, demokrazia garaikideen tentsioak aztertzeke ezinbesteko kategoriak dira. Krisi organikoek prozesu independentistek aukera politikoaren espiralak zabaltzen dizkiete eta aldi berean sezesio prozesuek estatu matrizeen krisi organikoa areagotzen dute. Hau era mekanikoan ulertu ordez, *attribution of threat and opportunities* mekanismoaren aktibazioari hertsiki loturik legoke (McAdam, Tarrow, 2001:70).

Espainiar Estatuan, 78ko erregimenaren krisian aipatu dimentsio horien teilakatzea identifikatu dugu eta Katalunian ere bai. Biak ala biak estuki erlazionaturik daude. Euskal kasuan⁶⁴⁴ kontrara, alde batetik ez ditugu krisi dimentsio horiek identifikatu eta bestetik, Espainiar krisi organikoa *statu quoa* indartzeko xedearekin artikulatu dela deritzogu. Horren ondorioz, transformismoa eta iraultza pasibotik gertu dauden dinamikak identifikatu ditugu. Nafarroa eta Iparraldeko kasuak ez ditugu aztertu, beraz tentu handiz hartu behar dira hauen inguruan esandakoak. Hala ere, azken urteetan lurralde horietan jazo diren aldaketak antzeko prozesuen ondorio direla adieraztera ausartuko ginatke.

Egitura eta agentziaren arteko lehian, hor kokatzen dugu Katalunia eta EAEn arteko (Euskal Herri osoarena ere bai) lehen ezberdintasun nabaria. Hori aintzat harturik, erkagarriak al dira aipatu dimentsiook Eskoziako egoerarekin? Baietz uste dugu. Lehen esan bezala, aldaketa ugari bizi ditugun garaiotan zaila da alde aurretik fenomeno konplexu hauek aztertu eta euren norabidea zein izan daitezkeen zehaztea. Ikerketa honen hasieran, 2014. urtean, zaila zen eskoziar erreferendumaren edo Brexita bezalako prozesu

⁶⁴⁴ Gure analisia EAEn mugatu dela kontuan hartu behar dugu.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak
Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

baten ondorioak aurreikustea. Hala ere, biak ala biak Britainiar krisi organikoarekin loturik daudela deritzogu.

Hurrengo taulan, aipatu *krisi organikoaren adierazleak* elkarrekin jasoko ditugu. Erkapena egiteko, hurrengo sailkapena⁶⁴⁵ egin dugu:

- Krisiaren adierazleak argiak direnan: BAI.
- Krisiaren adierazleak argiak ez direnan: EZ.
- Krisi egoera partziala denean: Neurri batean.

TAULA 64 *Krisi Organikoa: Espainia, Katalunia, EAE, Britainia Handia eta Eskozia*

Krisi Organikoa	Espainia	Katalunia	Euskal Herria (EAE)	Britainia Handia	Eskozia
Ordezkaritza krisia	BAI	BAI	EZ	BAI	BAI
Barneratze instituzionalaren krisia eta Estatu proiektuaren krisia	BAI	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI	BAI
Botere Blokearen krisia eta Estatuaren oinarri sozialaren krisia	BAI	BAI	EZ	BAI	BAI
Zilegitasun krisia	BAI	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI	BAI
Gaitasunen krisia (Dimentsio ekonomikoa)	BAI	BAI	Neurri batean	Neurri batean	Neurri batean
Hegemonia Krisia	BAI	BAI	EZ	BAI	BAI

Iturria: egileak egina.

⁶⁴⁵ Sailkapenaren arrazoiak atal bakoitzean landu ditugu beraz ez ditugu errepikatuko.

Horri loturik, Katalunian eta Eskozian *politikotasunaren* agerpenarekin harreman estua duten antagonismoa eta gatazkaren garrantzia azpimarratu beharra dago (Mouffe, 1999:21). Horretaz gain, bi kasuetan independentzia bazterreko aukera izatetik epe laburrean herritarren ehuneko handi batek babesten duen aukera politikoa izatera igaro da. Gure aburuz, prozesuok, eskola politiko posfundazionalak (Laclau, Badiou, Rancière) definitzen duen *gertakariaren* ideari hertsirik loturik daude (Zubiaga, 2012:128). Zubiagaren hurrengo definizioak, Katalunian eta Eskozian bizi izan diren gertakariak ondo deskribatzen dituela iruditzen zaigu:

“el acontecimiento, el momento democrático no sólo es imprevisible para sus promotores, sino que su propia aparición inesperada crea la necesaria inquietud en la lógica institucional/sedimentada como para que las puertas del cambio social y político se entreabran” (idem).

Euskal kasuan, bestalde, sezesioaren auziari dagokionez ez da antzeko prozesurik jazo. Protesta zikloaren amaierarekin batera, agortutako salbuespena ez da guztiz itxi eta aukeren espiral berriek ez dizkiote, oraindik behintzat, gertakari berri bati atea ireki (Azkune & Zubiaga, 2018:74-75). Lehen adierazi bezala, zaila da etorkizunari begira aurreikuspenik egitea, gehienetan, gertakariak bere aukerarako baldintzak *a posteriori* eraikitzen dituelako (idem).

Analisi plano zehatzago batean, egonkortasuna eta aldaketa azaltzeko xedearekin, *mobilizazio ziklo berri bati atea ireki dizkieten sezesioaren mekanismoen aktibazioa* aztertu dugu. Aurreko kapituluetan landutakoa errepikatuko ez dugun arren, guztiak elkarrekin aurkeztea erabaki dugu lurraldeen arteko ezberdintasunak era grafikoan ikus daitezen. Erkapena egiteko, krisi organikoaren eredua jarraituz, hurrengo sailkapena⁶⁴⁶ egin dugu:

- Era argian aktibatu direnan: BAI.
- Ez direnean aktibatu: EZ.
- Guztiz aktibatu ez direnean: Neurri batean.

⁶⁴⁶ Sailkapenaren arrazoiak atal bakoitzean landu ditugu beraz ez ditugu errepikatuko.

Can the subaltern states speak? Estatuaren eraldaketa eta burujabetza eskaerak Katalunian, Euskal Herrian eta Eskozian.

TAULA 65 Mekanismoak: Katalunia, Euskal Herria, Eskozia

Mekanismoak	Katalunia	Euskal Herria (EAE)	Eskozia
Eliteen interesak kaltetzea	BAI	EZ	Neurri batean
Irainen bat-bateko ezarpena	BAI	EZ	Neurri batean
Aukeren espirala	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI
Kategorien sorrera	BAI	BAI	BAI
Identitate jauzia	BAI	EZ	BAI
Berrikuntza taktikoa	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI
Artekaritza	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI
Lehia	Neurri batean	BAI	EZ
Eliteen birlerrokatzea	BAI	EZ	Neurri batean
Zertifikazioa	EZ	EZ	BAI
Objektuaren aldaketa	EZ	BAI	EZ
Errepresioa	BAI	BAI	EZ

TAULA 66 Prozesuak: Katalunia, Euskal Herria, Eskozia

Prozesuak	Katalunia	Euskal Herria (EAE)	Eskozia
Barne Difusioa	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI
Kanpo Difusioa	BAI	BAI	BAI
Polarizazioa	BAI	EZ	Neurri batean
Artekaritza	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI
Berrikuntza Diskurtsiboa	BAI	BAI	BAI
Ekintza Kolektiboaren Berrikuntza	BAI	Neurri batean	BAI
Hegemonia	BAI	EZ	Neurri batean

Iturria: egileak egina.

Begien bistakoa da sezesioaren mekanismo eta prozesuen aktibazioa argiena Katalunian eman dela. Eskozian, hainbat mekanismo aktibatu arren, oinarrizkoak diren batzuk ahulagoak direla ikusi dugu. Bi kasuen artean ezberdintasunak ugariak izanda ere, zertifikazioa eta polarizazioari loturikoak dira aipagarrienak. Eskoziar erreferendumaren onarpenak, Quebecekin batera, mugari berri bat ezarri zuen burujabetza eskaeren kudeaketa demokratikoan. Honek bestalde, sezesioak galdatzen duen polarizazio maila baxuagoa izatea eragiten du. Katalunian aldiz, zertifikazio ezak polarizazio eta errepresio sakona eragin dute. Kontrara, praktikan, independentzia egingarri ez den proiektu politikoa bilakatu daiteke. Kontraesan eta tentsio horien ondorioetan kokatzen dugu bien arteko ezberdintasunik aipagarriena. Azkenik, jada azaldu arrazoiengatik euskal kasuan funtsezkoak diren mekanismoen aktibazio ahula dakusagu.

Hegemoniaren inguruko lehiak duen garrantzia azpimarratu dugu ere bai. Jessopen eredia jarraituz, hegemonia estatuaren dimentsio sustantiboekin lotu dugun arren (2015b: 86-88), kasu honetan ez ditugu metafora ekonomikoak eta ekonomia politiko kulturalari dagozkion proiektu hegemonikoak aztertu. Hegemonia independentista ikertzea izan da xedea eta horretarako, egungo gatazka demokratikoetan gertatzen den moduan, herriaren artikulazioa erdigunean kokatu dugu. Prozesu hauek ez dira hustasunean ematen, arerio politiko anitzen hartu emanean baizik. Gure kasuan, ikerketaren ildoarekin lotura handiagoa duten eragile gutxi batzuen diskurtsoak aztertzer mugatu garen arren, honen inguruko lanketa sakonago batek beste hainbat eragileren artikulazioak aztertzea galdatuko luke.

Eskoziar kasuan, legezko erreferendumak edukien inguruko eztabaidek lehentasuna izatea ahalbidetu du. Era argian ikusi dugu aktore independentistek estatu propioa lortzea, ongizatearekin eta jendarte demokratikoagoa erdiestearekin era ekibalentzian artikulatu dutela. Katalunian ere antzeko argudio eta artikulazioak topatu ditugun arren, erreferendumaren legezotasunak baldintzatu du azken urteetako jardunbide politikoa. Euskal kasuan ere paradigma demokratiko berriek, edo autore batzuen esanetan unibertsalen defentsak (Apaolaza, 2012; 2015), lehentasuna hartu dute. Urteetako protesta zikloaren ondorioz independentismoa errepresio auziekin lotzeko joera nagusitu da hainbatentzat. Azken urteetan kontrara, demokrazia, erabakitze eskubidea eta burujabetza ardatz duten metafora berrien sorrera antzematen dugu (Olariaga, 2018:44). Guztien artean, dena den, egun arrakasta duen populismo instituzionala da aipagarriena. Euskal ongizatea autogobernuarekin lotu eta Espainiar Estatu kanto eratzailer moduan finkatzen duen operazioa hain zuzen.

Gure ikerketa galderan itaundutakoari erantzunez, *krisi organikorik ez egotea, sezesioaren mekanismoen aktibazio eza* eta *hegemonia independentista arrakastatsu bat ez artikulatzea* lirarteke euskal kasuaren eta besteen artean dauden ezberdintasun

nabarienak. Ikusi dugun moduan, banaturik aztertu arren, hiru dimentsio analitiko horiek estuki erlazionaturik leudeke.

Gure ikerketaren planorik zehatz eta konplexuena da azken galdera horri loturikoa. Horren ondorioz, errealitate enpirikoarekin harreman estuena duen atala ere izan da. Lanean zehar aipatu ez ditugun arren, paradigma positibistaren baitan azken urteotan argitaratu diren hainbat ikerketek gure lanak aintzat izan ez dituen dimentsioak osatzeko baliagarriak izan daitezkeela uste dugu. Zentzu horretan, Jason Sorensen lanak (2012), Asier Blasenak (2015) edo Alexandra Remondenak (2017) sezesioa eta berau eragiten duten aldagai ezberdinak aztertzen dituzte ikuspegi konparatuan. Logika horretan kokatzen dira besteak beste, hizkuntza ezberdin baten eragina, sezesioaren lurraldea ondo definitua izatea, herrialdearen aberastasun maila edota jatorrizko estatuak sezesioarekiko mantentzen duen jarrera. Gure ikerketa paradigmarekin bat etorri ez arren, gure lanean maila enpirikoan sakontasunik izan ez dituzten dimentsioak garatzeko osagarri egokiak iruditzen zaizkigu.

Esandakoak esanda, prozesu zehatzen azterketan bi eredu ezberdindu genitzakeela begitantzen zaigu. Alde batetik, Kataluniako mugimendu independentistak *bottom-up eredua* jarraitu du. Testuinguru politikoa baldintzatu zuten hainbat gertakariarekin batera (Estatut etab.), gizarte zibilean errotuta zeuden sare katalanistak artikulatu eta berriak sortu ziren. Horren ondorioz, 2005. urtetik aurrera erabakitze eskubidearen aldeko mugimendu indartsua artikulatu zen herri zein hirietan. Sare hauetatik gertu zeuden sektore sozial askok era garbian independentziaren aldeko hautua egin zuten 2012. urtetik aurrera. ANC eta Òmnium bezalako antolakundeek eta sektore sozial zabalek babesten zituzten mobilizazio jendetsuek alderdi politikoen jarduera baldintzatu eta independentziaren hautua erdigunean kokatu zuten.

Beste alde batetik, Eskoziako kasua *top-down ereduaren* adibide argia da. Erreferenduma deitu aurretik ez zegoen independentziaren aldeko mugimendu indartsurik eta inkestetan lortutako babesak %20-30era mugatzen zen. Honek, elite politikoen jarduera estrategikoaren garrantzia agerian usteaz gain, hurrengo adierazten du: independentzia prozesuek sortzen dituztela independentistak eta ez duela zertan alderantziz izan behar. Bizirik dagoen prozesu bat den heinean zaila da aurreikuspenak egitea, baina litekeena bigarren independentzia erreferenduma bat deitzea da.

Euskal kasuan ez da liskarraldi sezesionista argirik egon, baina etorkizun batean antzeko prozesurik egotekotan, Kataluniako eta Eskoziako ereduaren erdibidean kokatuko litzatekeela uste dugu. Gizarte zibileko eragileek alderdi eta eragile politikoen lotura hierarkikoagoa duten neurrian, ez dirudi Kataluniakoaren antzeko prozesu bat garatuko litzatekeenik. Kontrara, urteetan zehar herritarren ehuneko esanguratsu⁶⁴⁷ batek

⁶⁴⁷ Ikus aurreko kapituluetan datu zehatzak.

independentziaren aldeko jarrera mantendu izana eta gizarte zibil mobilizatu bat izateak Eskoziaren antzeko prozesu bat irudikatzea zailtzen du. Esan bezala, noizbait liskarraldi sezesionista bat egotekotan, aipatu adibideen erdibidean kokatuko litzatekeen eredu jarraituko lukeela uste dugu. Katalunian baino “elitismo” maila altuagoarekin eta Eskozian baino oinarri sozial artikulatuagoarekin. Honek, hala ere, gure ikerketaren helburuak gainditzeaz gain, edozein ikerketaren aurreikuspen gaitasuna ere gainditzen du.

Esandako guztia kontuan hartuta, gure xedea ez da izan positibismoak dioen bezala, leku guztietan momentu guztietan frogagarria den analisi unibertsala egitea (Dreyfus, 1986:11). Horren ondorioz ez ditugu era exhaustiboan errealitatea azaltzeko gaitasuna duten baieztapenak proposatu. Aitzitik, sarreran adierazi dugun moduan, ikerketa post-postibistetan *azalpenaren justifikazioa* konplexua da, barne eta kanpo mailako irizpideak galdatzen dituelako. Hori dela eta, alde batetik, *barne mailan*, azalpena eraikitzeak irizpideak sortzen saiatu gara eta bestetik, *kanpo mailan*, besteak erakartzeko pertsuasio lanean interbentzio teoriko eta praktikoak garatu ditugu⁶⁴⁸ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:34).

Zentzu horretan, *barne mailari* dagokionez, gure hipotesiak onartu edo baztertzen ditugun adierazteko, ez dago froga moduan signifikazio estatistikorik edo antzeko neurgailurik. Aldiz, ikerketa post-postibista batek eskatzen dituen parametroak erabiltzen saiatu gara. Hau da, era malguagoan baina publikoki defendagarriak diren printzipioak: argudioen arteko koherentzia, sinesgarritasuna, funtsa, trinkotasuna, babes frogatzailea, osotasuna eta sakontasuna.

Bestetik, *kanpora begira*, besteak erakartzeko pertsuasio lan horren lehenengo fasea epaimahaiari dagokio eta ostean lan hau era kritikoa aztertuko duen orori. Hala ere, horri dagokionez hausnarketa bat aintzat hartzea beharrezkoa dela deritzot: ikerketa post-positibistetan argia ez dago soilik erantzunean, horri heltzeko egindako ibilbidean baizik. Zentzu horretan, "erantzun guztiak bagenituela uste genuenean, bat batean galdera guztiak aldatu zituztela" zioen Mario Benedettik. Gure garai eta tokiko liskarraldi nazionalisten inguruan erantzun borobilik ez dagoen neurrian ez dugu halakorik bilatu gure lanean. Are gehiago, hainbatetan errepikatu diren erantzunekiko asegabetasunak bultzatu gaitu ikerlan hau burutzera. Zentzu horretan, zein da gure garai eta tokiko galdera nagusia? Nazio historikoen burujabetza eskaeren aurrean ezinbestean plazaratuko den galdera xume bezain konplexua dela deritzogu eta gure tesiaren izenburuan jasotzen saiatu gara: “Can the subaltern states speak?”.

⁶⁴⁸ Bukaerarik ez duen lan bat izan arren.

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