

TOWARDS A LESS SIMPLE BUT SOUNDER (PSYCHOLOGICAL) PRAGMATICS, III: Updating and elaborating notions^a

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ABSTRACT

Before processual analyses of the activities of linguistic emission and reception are performed, a modicum of elaboration of the notions and technical devices previously suggested is necessary. First, theoretical resources previously developed are revised in two different fashions: some require to be elaborated in higher detail, while in other cases what is needed is to remove, at least in part, some restrictions initially laid down for simplification purposes. Then some notional clarifications and new specific distinctions and notions are suggested for the study of emission, since the fact that this kind of linguistic performance is all but ignored in traditional (psychological) Pragmatics calls for an attempt to dispel some confusions originating in such a virtual neglect, and, on the other hand, for creation of a suitable array of such theoretical tools.

1. Introduction

In Part II of present essay (Sánchez de Zavala, 1995; from now on P.II) some general ways of using the notions introduced in its Part I (Sánchez de Zavala, 1994c, i.e. P.I) were explored in a preliminary fashion.

For convenience, I list the main notions and their abbreviations. Firstly, the key notions: *meant agent*, or better *implicitly meant agent* (to be called IMAGT; see P.II Note 8 and §4.3), *meant partial situation* (MPST), *meant activity* (MACT), and *implicitly meant background situation* (IMBST), *plus meaning activity* (MNGACT) and *focussed (part of) current situation* (F_{CST}).

Then, the 'ontological relations' between IMBST and F_{CST}. They may be: identical, in the sense that the former is a 'part' (possibly the 'improper part') of the latter; or IMBST may be as '*real*' as F_{CST}; or finally IMBST may be *not-'real'* when compared to F_{CST} (where several degrees of 'unreality' may be distinguished: P.I Section 2, examples (4)-(5) and their discussion). Also, the 'ontological statuses' of the *meant items* above (but for MACT: see directly below) or of parts thereof, when compared with items (belonging to their respective categories) that 'inhabit' F_{CST}: either *overtly 'real'*, *plainly 'real'*, or *not-'real'* (again possibly in several degrees).

Finally, the degrees of *commitment to* (the relevant) MPST's '*reality*', are incorporated in some or other of the different MACT's facets ('cognitive' or

otherwise).¹ As regards so-called cognitive facet, they are of two different sorts. First, three linear scales of 'ordinary' values, ranging from the positive maxima (*endorsement of overt 'reality', acceptance of plain 'reality', and preparedness to dispel 'unreality'*) to their polarly opposed negative counterparts. And second, three 'extra-high' positive driving or operative values (P.II §4.2): an (*assumedly effective*) *intention to have MPST's non-'reality', at least as regards some part YPS of it, (directly) dispelled; an (assumedly effective) intention for MPST to (directly) be overtly 'real'; and an establishment of MPST's plain 'reality'*.

The present part of the essay provides some elaborations and clarifications needed before specific processual study of emission and of reception activities is broached in its final part (to be called P.IV), which will be subsequently published. Section 2 addresses two issues that are directly material for these studies, in that it continues the task, initiated in P.II, of revising and developing the suggested theoretical devices. Its first Subsection expands the array of notions and technical terms to be used in relation to the central notions *ontological status* and *meant item*. Subsection 2.2 is devoted to relax a few of the simplifying restrictions up to the moment accepted; specifically, it introduces a 'dimension' of a subject's attitude not far from an affective one, and some aspects of anticipated timing of events. The sequel of the paper, i.e. Section 3, is devoted, on the contrary, to clarifications and developments immediately regarding linguistic emission. For this activity, that in present framework was from its very start assigned the key role in linguistic performance, has been traditionally handled in too cavalier a fashion; and this has resulted in important misapprehensions and in a lack of needed theoretical tools.

In Subsection 3.1 it is shown that, contrary to common prejudice, there is no one-to-one relationship between utterances and their motivational sources, in that there are motivations that, being quite unspecific, are able to usher in entirely different utterances. And secondly, the claim is argued that the so-called *intention in action* that assumedly 'guides' and determines actual generation of an utterance may be rather underspecified when compared with the utterance specificity. (A key fact that must, at the very least, be accomodated, on pain of inability to account for central aspects of the role of language in human thought and action.)

Subsection 3.2 addresses a different subject also misrepresented in a pervasive notion about language use; namely, the matter of conversation (certainly a crucial kind of language activities). For the counter-distinction conversation vs. soliloquy is commonly traced to a conceptual distinction between collective action and individual action. Here it is shown that there is a significant deception lying at the core of the latter distinction; and the implications of this fallacy for common concepts of conversation are succinctly surveyed. Subsection 3.3 tackles the issue of developing an array of notions to characterize, in a strictly psychological manner, the different basic choices ('basic moves') open to a subject when he or she is about to issue an utterance. These 'basic moves' and their interactions are probed in turn, and, after offering an overview of gained results, they are examined from the standpoint of how their main combinations show up in actual linguistic form.

2. A general review of theoretical resources

There are several matters, some discussed in a preliminary way in previous Parts of the essay, others deliberately ignored there, that should be reviewed before specific study of any of the two main sorts of linguistic activity is launched.

2.1. Revisiting old notions

Although in P.II some revision was carried out of the main notions previously introduced to tackle the elicitation of linguistic activities, it proves necessary to further examine these notions in order to take full advantage of the distinctions that emerged in that revision. (A development which will be completed in next Subsection 2.2 by a partial elimination of some of the simplifying restrictions assumed up to this moment in the investigation.)

2.1.1. 'Ontological statuses'

Consider first the notion 'ontological status'. In P.II Section 2 it was shown that, assuming F_{CST} is also meant (for obviously it may -in fact should- be so construed), two facts are forced on us: (a) there may be several meant domains having the very same degree or level or 'reality', but separate, discontinuous with each other; (b) different MPSTs included in a single, encompassing, 'bigger' MPST may show different sub-levels of 'reality'. A natural generalization from (a) and (b) combined is: there may be several MPSTs forming separate 'reality' domains; specifically, they may be located, either within a single level of attributed 'reality', or otherwise; and if the former, either they may be allocated to exactly the same level, or to different, finer grain sub-levels.

In this way we arrive at Fauconnier's notion of *mental spaces* or, in more popular technical terms, *discourse domains* (an unsurprising result, since, as indicated in P.I Section 5, the notion *ground level of attributed 'reality'* was partially inspired by Fauconnier's ideas). On the other hand, the fashion in which it is here resorted to *pretense play* in order to illuminate linguistic meaning (Sánchez de Zavala, 1989, §1.2; 1990, §2.1; 1991, Section II, §§1.1-1.3; 1994a, §4; 1994b; 1994c, §4) seems to be currently mirrored in specific proposals by other writers to use the notion *pretense* in order to solve certain puzzles. E.g. Récanati (1995) suggests that apparent reference to items located in non-actual (belief, fictional, etc) worlds is in fact *pretended* reference; and he also suggests, following Sperber & Wilson's lead on irony, that in ironical discourse a speaker *pretends* to be a different person, or to have beliefs, feelings, etc. other than those that in fact he or she has.²

As previously pointed out (P.I Section 5), a subject may change his/her F_{CST} and so establish a new *ground level of 'reality'* encompassing a domain, e.g. an IMBST, that up to that moment was neither identical to nor included in the previous *ground level*. (Briefly said: a non-'real' domain, or one as 'real' as -old- F_{CST} , but not identical to it.) An extremely plausible, or maybe unavoidable, assumption regarding a **shift of this kind** (in F_{CST} s and the *ground levels of 'reality'* it establishes) is: it does **not** 'erase' or **obliterate the previous ground level**.

Take an example. While you are engaged in some or other (conscious) interaction with your physical setting, a reminiscence pops suddenly up in your mind. If you

begin considering the experience you then had, and recollecting your hopes and fears (obviously levelled at events or states non-real at the time), as well as the memories that then intruded in your thought (bringing back to you scenes of events that you deemed real, but certainly disjoint from your then current 'real' situation), none of these past perceptions and intuitions is likely to dislodge you from the original, bottom-rock 'real' setting. (No matter how engrossed you become in your reminiscence, at most you only fleetingly confuse those old prospects and recollections with present ones. You eventually 'come back' from them with no feeling of landing on a strange and unknown world; and if an unusual event suddenly turns up nearby, quick return to your original, present situation is guaranteed and, I would say, unsurprising.) Similarly could be argued as regards fictional worlds, either personally built on the spot, or more or less accepted ready-made from, say, a novel or a play.

In sum, attention may shift focus so that a new *ground level of 'reality'* is defined that encompasses an IMBST initially acknowledged as **not** being identical to, or included in, the original F_{CST} . On the basis of this new F_{CST} , *identity, difference* and *non-'reality'* are established in the familiar way, marking different 'ontological statuses' of *meant items* originated in later MNGACTs, i.e. associated to later utterances; and the process may be iterated.

If we assume that such an iteration does not introduce drastic changes, i.e. that the preservation of 'ontological' relationships keeps going on, we must accept the following implication. This sequence of shifts does **not** level out these successive 'ground levels', which so preserve their 'ontological relations', forming an in principle unbounded hierarchy down to the rock-bottom level provided by the perceptible environment where the subject currently is. (With only a modicum of idealization it may be suggested that either the whole hierarchy down to the rock-bottom level, or its yet not climbed down part, again down to the bottom level, remains available to the subject. Although, but for the step at which he or she is linguistically operating, it is for the time being ignored.)

2.1.2. Meant, simple and complex

In P.II Section 3 a distinction was made between two different readings of "meant"; convenience counsels introduction of some systematic abridgement to explicitly indicate which reading is currently meant. To this end, M_I and M_L may substitute for M when the **intended** meaning and the **linguistically expressed** meaning are respectively referred to. And a slight refinement allows easy rendition of finer distinctions; e.g. M_{L1} , M_{L2} ,... may be used to represent *linguistically expressed meant items* that are *further and further elaborated* (say, *specified, enriched, or whatever*) as more and more kinds of information are incorporated into the *meant item* specified by strictly linguistic means.

M_{L0} could then symbolize this 'initial' or pristine *linguistically expressed meant item* (to the exclusion of any non-linguistic information). Clearly, what features or properties of, say, a specific M_I PST are included in its M_{L0} PST will change with semantic assumptions. So, a Semantics positing very rich semantic structures -a very rich *timeless meaning of the relevant (complete or incomplete) utterance-type*, in Grice's (1969) parlance- may need, and so assume, only a few steps of *further elaboration*; specifically, *pragmatic elaboration*. While a highly abstract

Semantics calls in addition for one or more preliminary steps of *cognitive elaboration*.³

It seems natural to assume that, after completion of all *elaboration steps*, a M_{L_n} PST is reached, for some or other n , that is identical with the *intended meant item*, with M_I PST -in Grice's (1969) terms, identical with the *utterer's occasion-meaning*. Now, this may be true in many cases; but, as it will be seen in §§3.1.1-3.1.3, such an *intended meant item* may be rather vague, showing the fuzziest contours when compared with the utterance it 'originates' -and so there would be non identity. On the other hand, as it will be argued in P.IV, it is quite possible that pragmatic *elaboration* eventually ushers in something not having the form of an M_{L_n} PST, but a quite different one; a collection of items where, in addition to a final M_{L_n} PST for some n , impressions and conjectures, say, about the state of mind of the speaker (mainly his/her *driving agencies*) play the most prominent roles. (If this is correct, in certain cases a hearer, not only by stopping short of building a final, all-encompassing pragmatic *elaboration* of the form M_{L_n} PST, but even by playing down information provided by M_{L_0} , might be maximally true to the speaker's actual behavior and 'intentions'.)

These typographical abbreviations may be augmented so as to be able to denote ambiguously either an *intended meant item* or a *linguistically expressed meant item* (in turn, either ignoring degrees of elaboration or irrespective of them): M_X , where symbol X may be considered as a variable ranging over symbols $\{I, L, L_0, L_1, L_2, \dots\}$ -so that its use is in a sense tantamount to dropping any index on M .

A second complication stems from the fact that the intended interpretation of an utterance may be multiple. I.e. there may be several M_I PSTs associated to a single MNGACT. (No doubt, virtually any M_I PST includes 'smaller' M_I PSTs in a downward proliferating hierarchy. In many instances this is an utterly trivial issue; nonetheless, these cases will be addressed shortly below, so that non-trivial kinds are identified.) In fact, our framework leads one to also expect -why not?- multiple IM_I BSTs, M_I ACTs and IM_I AGTs. An expectation apparently borne out by examples such as (1)

- (1) a. Justice does not belong to this world. Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.
- b. Certainly, justice belongs to this world. Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.

(where the ironical nature of (1b) should be obvious). For one thing, hardly can it be claimed, regarding both (1a) and (1b), that the IM_I BSTs elicited by the two included sentences are in effect a single IM_I BST; notice that in both cases the first IM_I BST clearly has some or other notional or value-theoretical nature, while the second plainly is factual). Again, in (1b) the IM_I AGT associated to the second sentence is presumably the speaker himself/herself, while that associated to the ironical first sentence must be someone else (cp. P.II §4.3, and present paper Notes 7 and 41). Finally, even ignoring that the difference in IM_I AGTs apparently forces a difference in M_I ACTs, the sentences in (1b) are different as to the latter, since the *acceptance* and *endorsement* intensifier "certainly" only operates on the first one.

This multiplication of *meant items* is completely general. For even when an utterance does comprehend a single sentence where a single proposition is expressed, the speaker

may well mean two -or more- different 'things', i.e. several M₁PSTs; every example offered by Grice in his papers on conversational implicatures bear witness to this claim, since in each the 'primary' or 'literal' interpretation is not ousted out by the *implicature* -it is simply dislodged from its role of **main** (in fact, single) intended message.

Coming back to the matter of M₁PSTs inside others like proliferating Russian puppets, it may be asked when exactly two (or more) sentences occurring in a single (spontaneous, fluent, impromptu) utterance are to be considered as associated to different 'parts' of a single, more inclusive M₁PST. A general answer to the issue is out of question here; but a few indications may indeed be offered.

Notice first that, as against (1), both (2a) and (2b)

- (2) a. ??Justice does not belong to this world, and Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.
- b. ??Certainly, justice belongs to this world, and Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.

are hardly acceptable if proffered in earnest, i.e. not as facetious utterances playing on their own incongruity. Because of this fact, combined with the internal cleavages observed in (1), I take it that "and" merges the M₁PSTs associated to the sentences it links in a single, more embracing M₁PST -an operation that simply cannot be done as regards the sentences in (1).

On the other hand, regarding "for" and "but" we find clear indication that, not only they do not semantically 'include' "and": more importantly, they do not merge the M₁PSTs at issue. (This is also presumably the case with many other similar particles and expressions.) The key fact is that both utterances represented in (3)

- (3) a. Justice does not belong to this world, for Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.
- b. Certainly, justice belongs to this world, but Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.

are fine. (If "for" and "but" exchange their places in (3), then both utterances display an ironical mien, unless there is also a change in the assumed moral values.) A third -and in itself rather trite- remark is that both utterances in (4),

- (4) a. Justice does not belong to this world, as proved by the fact that Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.
- b. Certainly, justice belongs to this world, which would never lead us to expect the fact that Sarajevo's snipers keep shooting children and other innocent people at their good pleasure.

and as many pairs of utterances as we care to concoct in a similar vein, do embed the relevant M₁PSTs in a single M₁PST (having as associated IM₁BST some or other 'universe' of items liable to moral valuations and able to enter into a number of relations, such as logical, evidential, etc, with each other).⁴

If the above interpretations are correct, it follows that particles and expressions such as "but", "for", "therefore", and many others, do not make any contribution to a M₁PST. They express that a specific M₁ACT is established that relates to two (or

more) M_I PSTs; a M_I ACT which so 'links' them, but without building out of them and their relationship any new and all-inclusive M_I PST.

Assume that the interpretation previously advanced (in P.II Section 2) about the role played by "not" is to be extended *mutatis mutandis* to the linguistic counterparts of other so-called (logical) connectives -but excluding from them, of course, "and". If for convenience we adopt the label "***non-positive (linguistic) connectives***" to denote all of these counterparts, we may arrive at the following generalization: *discourse markers* operate essentially in the same fashion as *non-positive connectives*. The hypothesis is, in other words, that these connectives, and discourse markers generally, do **not** contribute to any MPST: they provide instead a MACT -or a set of them. (An apparently intuitively satisfying hypothesis which obviously cannot be delved into here.)

As to the seemingly trivial case of syntactic embeddings, problems arise galore. True, complement clauses (as hinted at when discussing example (19) in P.II Section 2) do not seem to offer special difficulties, even though the few cues suggested when discussing (in §2.1.1 above) Fauconnier's *mental spaces* should be duly developed. But other clausal embeddings would require special attention. For instance, the fact that *syntactic amalgams* (Lakoff, 1974) and parentheticals (in a wide sense including non-restrictive relative clauses) have deserved positing an structure generated independently from that representing the 'main clause' (Goodall, 1986, Espinal, 1991) certainly suggests their requiring postulation of quite independent sets of *meant items*. Even restrictive relative clauses, so adequately described (from an intuitive semantic standpoint) as taking advantage of a *resource situation* in Barwise & Perry (1983), may demand setting up independent *meant items*. Obviously, none of these matters can be investigated here.

Now to typographical means to conveniently refer to several M_X PSTs, each associated to a part (an included clause or phrase) in a whole expression uttered. (An association that cannot be, in general, a one-to-one mapping, because of the potential for *implicatures*.) The simplest way to do it is by mere sequential numbering. So, M_X PST₁, M_X PST₂, and so on will denote the 'partial' M_X PSTs matching the 1st, 2nd,... 'parts' (clauses, phrases) in the utterance; and the global or 'highest' M_X PST (if there is any) encompassing all the 'partial' ones may be conveniently labelled M_X PST_h.

If there are several of the latter, as it will happen when *non-positive connectives* or discourse markers link several sentences, M_X PST_{h1}, M_X PST_{h1}, and so on, may be used instead. As to the 'partial' M_X PSTs respectively included in M_X PST_{h1}, M_X PST_{h1}, etc, they may be denoted by M_X PST₁₁, M_X PST₁₂,...; M_X PST₂₁, M_X PST₂₂,...; and so on and so forth.

A final, wholly different issue is this. First of all, observed that, notwithstanding the obvious difficulty to pinpoint in pretense play a counterpart to the notion *addressing somebody*, the notion is implicit in common feature (a) (see P.I §4.1); for when referring to a *spectator-player* one is certainly **not merely** considering an *onlooker* who happens to be *able to interpret how the actor-player acts* and in fact *does* it. If this is correct, the notion must be inherited by traits (i)-(ii) (refer to P.I §4.2), and should accordingly have received some acknowledgment when the general 'blueprint' for linguistic activity was developed (in P.I Section 5); or at least where the different

meant items were reviewed (in P.II Sections 2-3). Anyway, how should the gap be filled?

Apparently, the activity of addressing someone, when it is performed, is inextricably entangled with the MNACT; and of course the addressee may in a most ordinary and unsurprising way be mentioned -by "you", a (probably honorific) title, or any name or nickname vocatively used. In other words, whenever the addressee is explicitly 'represented', he or she occurs as a (most times non-highest) MPST, exactly like the speaker or any other 'thing'. This suggests that MNACT not only has an implicitly meant agent, or IMAGT; it may also have an **implicitly meant addressee** -a description that may be abridged as IMADDR.

Why *implicitly meant*? Because there are all sorts of manners to linguistically indicate that the utterance is addressed to somebody without representing him/her in a MPST; a possibility that perhaps shows its most extreme form in the fact that imperative sentences, which are used to build perhaps the paradigmatic class of **addressed utterances** (and obviously taken up as such), are in standard English **the single exception** to the 'rule' that any tensed sentence must have a non-empty subject. (So, we have not only M_Is, but also M_Ls: the addressee is meant, but **necessarily** in an implicit fashion.) The upshot is, then, that it seems reasonable to postulate the 'existence' both of IM_IADDRs and of IM_LADDRs.

2.2. Relaxing simplifying restrictions

Since P.I §3.2 it was deliberately chosen to fully ignore any influence of emotions (i.e. of affective states generally) on the processes leading to elicitation of linguistic activities. And in P.I Appendix 2 it was also pointed out that timing, both of anticipated EFFs prompting to a spell of this activity, and of results expected to ensue from the latter, is certainly of paramount significance for any pragmatic study; nevertheless, it was judged preferable to steadfastly ignore the matter, for simplicity. Now we are in a position to begin toning down such restrictions, even though any attempt to thoroughly dispense with the simplification would indeed be premature. (Once in a while -e.g. in §3.1.1- some brief excursion will be made outside the most general confines set up for present investigation, i.e. those defined by spontaneous, impromptu, unreflective linguistic activity.)

2.2.1. 'Ontological', affective, and something in between

We have basically defined how a subject may linguistically act using a single sort of notions, which might well be considered notions belonging to a **hard (mental) Semantics**: those concerning the level of 'reality' to which a subject allocates whatever is meant (or directly implied) in using the expressions in an utterance. For want of a better name, such levels were labelled by the tag '**ontological**'. Now, closely associated to such 'ontological statuses/levels' were the (assumedly also meant) relations from an assumed (implicitly meant) speaker to such meant items.

These relations were intended to include as a particular case the familiar so-called propositional attitudes -only applying if the meant partial situation is a state, process, event, or some other item of the sort.

But the relations were, somewhat inconsistently, named *cognitive* (in order to clearly distinguish them from *conative* and *affective* relations).⁵

It may be wondered whether there is in a MACT some facet that, on one hand, is not concerned with levels or degrees of 'reality' (i.e. is not 'ontological' in our sense), and on the other is not clearly either emotional or volitional.

Of the latter two facets of sides in MACT, the first one, I take it as obvious, plays a significant role in exclamations (see P.II Appendix). The second kind seems to be active -although apparently in some inhibited or subdued fashion- in optative utterances (P.II examples (5), (6), (44) and (45)), as well as, trivially, in commands, requests, etc, i.e. in so-called *directives*.

Apparently there is some such facet or side lying somewhere in between the opposing loci of the dryly 'ontological' and the affective cum conative. I will briefly review two kinds of expressions in which such middle-ground speaker's attitudes are couched.

Consider first "too much/too many".⁶ As opposed to mention of specific amounts (no matter how great), to common quantifiers, and even to "a terrific amount" and similar phrases, "too much/many" implicitly refers to a standard currently accepted by the speaker, and so indicates a strictly *personal* or *subjective appraisal*. This is clearly shown by the following contrast

- (5) Eat three tons of food/thirty thousand potatoes, please (to be healthy and strong)!
- (6) Eat everything/all potatoes in the world, please (to be healthy and strong)!
- (7) Eat a huge amount of food/huge numbers of potatoes, please (to be healthy and strong)!
- (8) ???Eat too much/too many potatoes, please (to be healthy and strong)!
- (9) You eat too much/too many potatoes (to be healthy and strong).

(where, of course, it is assumed that the sentences are uttered in earnest, not ironically).⁷ Unnecessary to say, "too little/few", and also, *mutatis mutandis*, "too big/small", "too far/close", "too fast/slow", and so on, pattern exactly in the same way -the 'culprit' is obviously "too". And some appraisal adjectives (perhaps to be called *astonishment adjectives*) are commonly also construed as *subjective appraisal* expressions, as witnessed by the contrasts in (10)-(13).

- (10) This car is really very fast!/wonderful!
- (11) I would like to buy a very fast/??a wonderful car.
- (12) Janet is an extremely beautiful/incredible girl.
- (13) I'm looking for an extremely beautiful/??an incredible girl.

Sometimes the subjective nature of an appraisal becomes an issue, as in the following exchange.⁸

- Joan: (14) How silly!
 Bill: (15) a. That is not a silly behaviour.
 b. This is unfair/??not true.
 Joan: (16) To me, it is quite silly.

Consider now next two examples. The reference of "the first pilot of Williams-Renault" is the same person than that of "Hill", but this is a fact about the world that fans

of Formula 1 races are familiar with, certainly not anything linguistically forced on the hearer/reader of (17).

- (17) Surely Schumacher is right in claiming that it is Hill who should be blamed for the fact that the first pilot of Williams-Renault nearly caused a crash at 200 mph in Magny Cours.

On the other hand, irrespective of knowledge about matters in the world (and assuming that there is not a previous sentence about, or a deictic gesture pointing to, a third Formula 1 racing pilot), in (18) "the idiot" must be co-referential with either "Hill" or "Schumacher":⁹

- (18) Surely Schumacher is right in claiming that it is Hill who should be blamed for the fact that the idiot nearly caused a crash at 200 mph in Magny Cours.

the obvious *subjective appraisal* shown in "the idiot" seems to be sort of a tag put on an underlying pronominal -here clearly "he"- responsible for the co-reference. (Equivalently, "the idiot" -and similarly "the fool", etc- can be re-interpreted as a pronominal. The point is that neither "the first pilot of Williams-Renault" nor any other 'objective' definite description can be so re-interpreted.) If this account for the well-known violation of Principle C in Binding theory is correct, we have new evidence that the semantic-pragmatic category *subjective appraisal* may have significant effects on linguistic form. And there are still other kinds of expressions showing a *subjective appraisal* by the speaker; e.g. utterance (or, speech-act) adverbs such as "frankly", "honestly", and so on.

The sum total evidence suggests that there is, either a facet in MACT where it is carried out this kind of ratings, or else an entirely separate (*meant*) *relation* from IMAGT to MPST. Let us call the appropriate parameter *subjective appraisal*, say. Notice now the fact that, if "regular" is not defined in an ad hoc fashion, it would be blatantly incorrect to assume that in every regular utterance this parameter shows a (non-null) 'value'. Then, both parsimony and consideration of this fact seem to counsel the first approach. (In §§3.3, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4 more arguments will be offered in support of this policy.)¹⁰ I will follow this tack from now on, and will accordingly assume that it may either have the 'value' *subjective slant* or a null or fully neutral 'value'. (The latter being the outcome, it might perhaps be speculated, when the actual, psychological real subjective slant in a speaker's stance -or, if you prefer, in psychologically factual MACT- falls below a certain threshold.)

2.2.2. On time and anticipated timing

As previously remarked, in the first stages of present investigation matters were substantially simplified by ignoring the matter of time; specifically, **when** EFFs are deemed to occur. Now time will be reintroduced in a very simple and schematic way: by setting up typographical conventions that allow specific reference to appraised timing of anticipated (or perceived) EFFs.

An EFF may be either perceived as *currently* taking place (to be denoted by a *c* index) or anticipated as taking place at a *later* time (index: *l*); and in either case it may

be anticipated not as momentary or brief, but as *extended* for some time afterwards (*e*) -otherwise (i.e. when seen as more or less instantaneous) it will not be specifically marked.¹¹ And an EFF of any of these kinds may also be anticipated as *repeating* itself a number of times (*r.*). Now, a particular case of extended EFF occurs when it is anticipated as ceaseless from the moment it is established, i.e. as *unceasing* (*u*) -clearly a special kind where no repetition is allowed. From a different standpoint, and irrespective of *extensions* (either *unceasing* or not), consider the time at which an EFF is anticipated to arise in the future, irrespective of whether it arises only once, or in a repetition (even a repetition of a currently perceived EFF). This time may remain *non-definite* (*n.*) to a subject; otherwise its timing will bear no typographical mark. (In other words, any EFFs but those being *bare*, i.e. non-repeated, c, ec, or uc, may be 'prefixed' by an n. mark.) Finally, any extension (including an unceasing one) and any sequence of *repetitions* of an EFF may be anticipated, regarding its intensity, as essentially unchanging (no mark), as *increasing* (*I.*), or as *decreasing* (*D.*).¹² A few examples of this classification follow

- (19) a. EFF_c: Maggie unintendedly drops in the pool the sweet she was about to eat (but she may ask her elder sister Rosie for another one).
 b. EFF_{ec/D.ec}: same inadvertent action by Maggie as in previous case, but now she knows that Rosie has no more sweets about her.
 c. EFF_{uc/D.uc}: Johnny's hobby horse (a gift from his father shortly before his death) gets smashed in his mother's car crash.
- (20) a. EFF_{r.c}: Johnny is given a very bitter pill to swallow with his breakfast and learns that he must take it every morning.
 b. EFF_{r.ec}: while going out to school, Johnny sees a bee furiously diving towards him from an old, abandoned beehive now inhabited by a fresh swarm; and he fears to be stung every morning.
- (21) a. EFF_{n.r.c}: Johnny is given a very bitter pill to swallow with his breakfast and learns that every time he gets a cold he will receive this treatment.
 b. EFF_{n.r.ec}: Johnny sees a bee entering the window and furiously diving towards him, and notices that the backyard is swarming with bees from an old, abandoned beehive now inhabited by a fresh swarm (so that he fears they will enter the house once and again).
- (22) a. EFF_i: while having breakfast, Johnny learns that the doctor prescribed him a very bitter pill to swallow with a glass of water that night, just before going to bed.
 b. EFF_{ei}: Johnny notices that nasty bully Tom is grimly looking at him and fears to be given a beating when classes are finished and he leaves the school to go back home.
 c. EFF_{ui/D.ui}: Johnny learns that his hobby horse will be raffled next week in a charity ball planned by his mother.
- (23) a. EFF_{r.i}: same case as in (22a), but now the treatment is to be repeated every night.
 b. EFF_{r.ei}: Johnny learns that nasty bully Tom has sworn to give him a good beating every Friday, when the gymnastics class is over and both go out from school.
- (24) EFF_{n.i}: Johnny notices that his brother's furious punching in the basement will sooner or later overturn the tin mug where he proudly keeps his collection of bugs.
 etc

(where, of course, it must be assumed that Maggie is highly sweet-toothed, that Johnny is very fond of his hobby horse, and so on). Obviously, these temporally simple EFFs may be combined, as shown in example (25).

- (25) EFF_{c+n.l.}: Maggie unintentionally drops in the pool the sweet she was about to eat (but she may ask her elder sister Rosie for another one); on the other hand, she notices that her stern aunt Mary has seen her careless action (so that poor Maggie anticipates being severely scolded at the first opportunity).

As to timing of linguistic activities in response to such EFFs, some general constraints on co-occurrence of specific timings of EFFs and specific *general ways of (simply, directly) acting* can be pointed out by now. Assuming, for simplicity, **no indirect response** activity, the following constraints should hold.

- (i) *General way [a]* is apparently ill-suited when an EFF₋ is at issue: a subject's currently moving to a different situation does not seem a hopeful way to forestall a later 'unfavourable' EFF. (As succinctly argued in P.I Note 23, its 'favourable' counterpart [*a'*] should probably be outrightly excluded, since it is unlikely to foster 'favourable' EFFs, irrespective of their temporal properties.)
- (ii) *General ways [b.3]-[b'.3]* are generally unsuitable as a response to an anticipated EFF₋ (and perhaps even less fit when this is in fact an EFF_{-n.l.}) -unless the EFF ensues from either lack of knowledge, or lack of some ability that may be acquired through use of language by the subject himself/herself. In these cases, a subject might currently build, or begin building, the lacking capacity.

An interesting fact is that *general ways [b.3.c]-[b'.3.c]* do not look promising for an EFF_{-n.l.}. If for convenience we consider only adverse EFFs, it seems obvious that hardly can a subject safely predict that his/her current resolve to impassively face such an EFF will be preserved unblemished at that unknown future time. Again, the restriction must be bounded; now in order to allow for an assumption to the effect that a drastic and lasting change in the subject's mind may be caused by linguistic means -perhaps of the kind that builds on an 'extra-high value' for MACT (cp. P.II §4.2), but apparently not necessarily so, since conceivably persuasion (including self-persuasion) might do the trick.

On the other hand, it should be remarked that a very good prospect, almost irrespective of how remote it is the anticipated time of fulfilment of its promise, puts one in a position apparently nearer to goal/aim *G9'* (and a bad prospect, on the verge of being farther removed from it, and possibly of undergoing the aversor in *G5'*). This implies that even an anticipated EFF_{-n.l.} may be thought of as secondarily having a current, strictly internal EFF -a change in mood, in feelings, in hopes or expectations, or whatnot. (And similarly for rather bad prospects, although of course it will ensue in an contrary psychological state.) The effect could be denoted by an abbreviation such as siEFF_{-ec.} or siEFF_{-c.}; but since its being current is definitional, it may conveniently be denoted in a more compact fashion by siEFF. Then, how can a subject respond to an siEFF? There are apparently only two routes **always** open to him/her, two *general ways of (simply, directly) acting* in order to immediately meet this siEFF on its own grounds: [*b.3.c*]-[*b'.3.c*] and [*c*]-[*c'*].

Notice first of all that, as against what the specific examples offered in P.I Appendix 2 might suggest, to launch a [*b.3.c*] way of acting (when bad prospects are at issue) is not necessarily to 'harden' against adversity. As just intimated, we may launch an attempt to counter the bad feelings, the negative mood arising from the anticipated

menace; to directly improve our feelings (say, recalling better times, or paying attention on some favourable sides of our personality that will come to light when the hardships eventually materialize).

True, as per the allusion above, none of suggested routes to current improvement, i.e. none of the *[b.3.c]-[b'.3.c]* or *[c]-[c']* ways, is by itself any direct step towards removing/enhancing the genuine EFF, the one that was anticipated to occur in future time. Specifically: neither its external, its main or actual side, nor its internal (either delighting or bothering) side. But these ways, if effective, provide instant strengthening of elation/bliss in 'favourable' cases, and a measure of relief and comfort in 'unfavourable' ones. As a matter of fact, they may even improve the prospects for future actual countering of the snag (if snag there is), in that high spirits are a non-negligible factor in coping with difficulties.

We will shortly see that *[c]-[c']* ways seem unlikely to actually operate as regards a siEFF; if this is correct, then a person oppressed by negative feelings stemming from anticipation of future blows has in practice a **single** (linguistic) manoeuvre available for **immediate** alleviation: use of a *[b.3.c]* way of acting. (And similarly *mutatis mutandis* as regards *[b'.3.c]* way if there are brilliant prospects.)

This observation about current, secondary, 'internal' EFFs of anticipating future full EFFs leads to a plausible prediction: in regular, normal or most frequent cases, a *[b.3.c]* way opposing an siEFF will be, either directly impinging on the very category of *driving agencies* giving rise to it, or on a 'general use' *driving agency*. If the list of 'permanent' goals suggested in P.I Appendix 3 is for the time being accepted as valid, examples may be found in *agencies* involving goal/aim *G9'*, or goal/aversor *G5'*, as above mentioned).¹³

In sum, the constraint regarding *[b.3.c]-[b'.3.c]* may be worded as follows:

- (iii) *General ways [b.3.c]-[b'.3.c]* do not look promising for an EFF_{-n,l-}. The restriction must be bounded, in order to allow for an assumption to the effect that a drastic and lasting change in the subject's mind may be caused by linguistic means -perhaps of the kind that builds on an 'extra-high value' for MACT (cp. P.II §4.2), but not necessarily so, since self-persuasion) might be enough. On the other hand, an EFF_{-c-} in general, including a siEFF, may in principle be tackled by a *general way [b.3.c]-[b'.3.c]*.
- (iv) *General ways [c]-[c']* are hard to accept (for empirical reasons) as actual ways along which people respond to an EFF_{-c-}, since ordinarily the required change in appraisal may be rather hard to carry through on-the-spot (as it would be necessary in spontaneous, fluent, off-hand activities); such changes usually take quite a substantial time. (It seems likely that a subject may misconstrue his/her own change as per *[b.3.c]-[b'.3.c]* for a change of the kind described in *[c]-[c']*.)

There is a different, less general kind of constraints (to be surveyed in P.IV). A constraint in this class is only concerned with some or other 'permanent' goal or attractor/aversor; for obvious reasons it will be clearly earmarked by prefixing to its Roman number its associated G-number.

As regards indirect activities (refer to P.I Appendix 2), the interesting cases arise, understandably enough, when direct ones are difficult or impossible to perform. Now, constraints (i) through (iii) all concern situations where a subject anticipates an EFF_{-l-}; and the subject must address the *preliminary problem* posed by the fact that, as he or she

deems it, the conditions that must prevail in order for the *final agent* to solve the initially perceived *global problem* do not actually obtain. Now, no matter how the subject acts in order to overcome the *preliminary problem*, it is in the final agent where, regarding performance of the devised *final activity*, it must exist or be elicited an ability and disposition to successfully face constraints (i)-(iii) -and maybe, in addition, such an ability and disposition must be maintained unimpaired until the time(s) to carry it out does (do) come. In other words, whenever the *global problem* is posed by an EFF_{-i}, the new, *ancillary* EFF which defines the *preliminary problem* involves the above condition on the final agent and the capabilities that he/she/it must possess.

On the other hand, constraint (iv) is apparently preserved, or even strengthened, through indirectness in activity; for the appraisals' resilience we presumed does not seem likely to be overcome (in due time, i.e. almost in no time) by interpolating a *preliminary activity*. If this is correct, a *global problem* arising from an EFF_{-c} must be simply tackled by a *general way* of acting other than [c]-[c'].¹⁴

3. General issues in emission

As required by specific trait (i) of linguistic activities (see P.I §§4.2 and 4.3), emission and reception must be tackled separately. And the suggested rejection of common assumption (c) (P.I §2.2) prescribes prior addressing of emission. However, before broaching the task of specifying our highly schematic 'blueprint' in a way suitable for emission activities (a task that will be deferred to P.IV), a few broad issues should be raised. The first one concerns the matter of motivations to speak; a second issue regards the notion *conversation* (or, more generally, *linguistic exchange*), which is commonly considered almost coextensional with *linguistic activity*; and a third, different issue bears on what are the basic 'linguistic moves' that may be accomplished in emission. (There are still other important issues to be addressed, such as that regarding what 'tactical ends' are such moves put to; in other words, how these basic emission operations may be combined to ensue in appropriate ways of linguistically acting. But they will again be deferred to P.IV.)

3.1. Roots of an utterance's emission

Two different matters must be addressed here. The first one concerns the range of motivations underlying linguistic emission, from the full variety of specific prompts to speak to most general and non-specific motivations (i.e. to those that **do not** determine contents of the utterance). The second issue regards whether it is **necessary** for any spell of emission activity (especially when motivation is quite specific) that a specific intention or plan drives it. It will be seen that both issues can be tackled if a few and by now non-controversial assumptions are accepted.¹⁵

3.1.1. Motivations to speak

The issue concerning us here is the nature and kind of motivations to speak. There are three preliminary remarks to be made in this connection.

First, undoubtedly in many a case there is a specific motivation, in that clearly the speaker attempts to achieve a specific result by means of his/her utterance, or by means

of some specific consequence of it. Any *bona fide* command or request provides obvious evidence for the assertion; and similarly occurs when attempting to build a global plan to attain a goal, or in a one-step reflective enquiry -e.g. when trying to articulate the single or final guess that would solve a theoretical puzzle.

On the other hand, in a similar way than (and maybe evolving from) the drive to babble highlighted by psychologists (Locke, 1992), speaking seems to be a rewarding activity in itself, apparently carrying an intrinsic (but so non-specific) motivation.

In our terms: if a subject is not currently engaged in linguistic activities, any F_{CST} seems to show an 'unfavourable' face, in that it is not as 'favourable' as it could be -cp. P.I §3.2. (I would guess that this is especially true as regards emission activity.) A putative fact that could be traced to a 'permanent' *driving agency*: presumably one's own linguistic emission activity, or at least one's participation in a linguistic exchange, provides in a wide variety of circumstances a significant part of *optimal stimulation* -a well-known attractor, as acknowledged under the label G3 in P.I Appendix 3.

Such a motivation, while maybe being a factor among others in many emission episodes, is definitely a main motivational component in small talk, chatter, and other forms of idle conversation. And it seems likely that it is also a crucial motivation in rambling 'inner speech', i.e. where there is no real interest in getting at any conclusion, nor in illumination about any specific matter at hand (these probably being themselves quite blurred). Be it as it may, non-specific motivation to speak can certainly be an effective, and sometimes the only effective, motivation for a specific utterance.¹⁶

Finally, speech may also occur where the notion *specific motivation* would apparently be misplaced. Not very seldom one engages in this activity not having in mind a definite aim, but only a rather blurred, vaguely specified goal; to learn something about John and/or his whereabouts, to do some further digging into an only half-way explored deep problem, or just to stimulate your linguistic partner so that he or she volunteers some or other interesting news, are a few ordinary examples.

If correct, these remarks demonstrate a wide variety of motivational sources for linguistic emission activities. It should be noted in this context that our theoretical approach does **not** posit or assume an **intended message** that would be entertained **in advance** of the process directly ensuing in the uttered words. A message, by the way, which because of its own specification would guarantee a measure of specificity in its speaker's motivation. (The message at issue would amount, in our terms, to a 'standard set' of *meant items*: MPSTs plus their IMBST, associated 'ontological' and subjective appraisal facets of their respective MACTs, as well as, possibly, an IMAGT different from the speaker and an IMADDR.)

Building on observations about linguistic activity previously reported (P.I §§4.1-4.2), all that is needed in this approach is as follows. (1) *Driving agencies*: cp. P.I §3.2. (2) Some (partial) responses (such as words, schematic constructions and routines combining these items), which even may in some cases be triggered (almost) automatically: P.I Appendix 1. (3) *General ways of (simply, directly) acting* in response to a current (hierarchical) combination of the *agencies*: P.I §3.2 and Appendix 2. (4) A set of *ontological statuses* (relative to F_{CST}) from which a choice must be made regarding IMBST and MPSTs (plus the associated *commitments* to MPST's

'reality' for a MACT): P.I Section 5, and P.II Sections 2 and 4. And (5) a *leaning to chop re-tellings*, i.e. a bent towards only giving linguistic expression to a *core* of MPST: P.II Section 3 and §4.1.17

This emphatically does **not** mean that such an intended message **cannot** be accomodated whenever positing it is called for. Nothing in the theoretical framework advanced prevents 'messages' from being in the repertoire of (almost) automatically triggered responses operative in a subject -an observation that applies not only to messages rather specific as to content though lexically not fully specified, but also to those known in toto, down to every morphological and prosodic specification. For clearly even complete utterances, from one-word blurts ("*Ouch!*", "*No!*", etc) to complex ready-made curses and expostulations ("*What a pest!*" and so on), may have entered the repertoire whole.

Here we may in a most literal fashion keep to our general policy of looking at processes of 'handling' language as essentially similar to any other process where a specific competence is exploited. Just assume that, whenever a repertoire message, either is quite specific in content though not fully specified as to lexical items, or only includes schematic constructions and routines combining them, the speaker proceeds in a way not basically different from a subject's filling in details and particulars as the successive stages of a plan are implemented one after the other. For, as it is well-known, a plan is always to some extent a schematic contraption (see §3.2 below).

Some minimal extensions of the general approach abided by in this essay, namely extensions where, along with strictly unreflective, impromptu speech, other, hardly more complex ways of speaking are acknowledged, may be briefly mentioned here.

In what perhaps is the simplest possible extension, a subject, in a quick, prior (or partially overlapping) spell of inner linguistic activity, builds some approximation to a specific message that would fulfil the currently appropriate role, i.e. it would counter the 'unfavourability' of the EFFs perceived or anticipated to crop up in F_{CST} -or foster their 'favourability'. Then, as regards the second inception process (that having as output the final, presumably 'public' utterance), new, definitely 'unfavourable' EFFs are perceived/anticipated to directly flow from the subject's not having yet uttered it (or perhaps from his/her vexation at such current conditions): if the previous EFFs were 'unfavourable', the new ones are identical to them; and if they were 'favourable', the new EFFs are consequential to not improving the 'favourability' of F_{CST} through uttering that message. In either case these new EFFs may be straightforwardly offset by actual utterance of the message.

A slightly further, albeit clearly more interesting extension is as follows. Between two processes similar to those considered in previous extension a new one (in fact, a mere elaboration in the *initial phase* of the second process) steps in. In such a new process the output of the first inception process is assessed, and an 'unfavourable' EFF is estimated (the one to be operative in the familiar way in the last inception process). Such an EFF is deemed to come from the following ORITM: a specific 'part' or aspect in the utterance devised in the first inception process. The EFF will be countered in the last process by introducing suitable changes in such an (anticipated) utterance.

Many extension directions may indeed be explored after the first, minimal one suggested is carefully worked out. (Obviously I cannot delve into the matter here.)

The key point is, then, that in general it is **not necessary** to assume that there is an anticipated 'message', although in some instances it may be quite apposite to do so. I return to the issue in §3.1.3 below.

3.1.2. Are intentions to speak specific?

The question to be addressed here should obviously not be merged with that associated to §3.1.1 above. In order to do so, I will be solely concerned with **immediate** intentions, i.e. with so-called *intentions in action*, and with actual *implementation of* the associated plans. Two facts must be kept in mind in this context. First, virtually every proper plan, i.e. one envisioning more than a single, isolated basic action, is more or less sketchy, as repeatedly emphasized by the literature on action (refer to P.I §2.3). Second, without regard to the sketchiness of the associated **plan**, in each instance the *implementation* is commonly considered to be driven by the relevant *intention in action*.¹⁸

As suggested a few paragraphs back, let us build on our stated policy of seeing use of language as no more than a particular case of exploitation of a specific competence (no matter how unique). Notice first that an intention in action, at least as they seem to be conceived by their more staunch advocates, does not in general specify each of the (possibly, myriads of) basic actions that are performed in the process of executing it. No theorist, I think, claims that while you are having the intention in action *I'm going to that bench (so that I'll get some sunshine)*, i.e. while you *are* actually moving to that other park bench, you also go through a fantastically rapid sequence of intentions in action such as *I put my right foot on the ground -and I lift my left foot- (so that I may advance towards that bench)* -not to mention that each of these must in turn be specified, because e.g. how rapidly and to which height do you lift your feet is a function of how uneven do you estimate the ground immediately in front of you is. Obviously, these are cases of a subject's depending on automated skills, which to some extent 'take care of themselves', adjusting in an automatic or almost automatic way to the perceived particulars of your immediate physical neighborhood. As just claimed, a huge number of specifics are being continuously filled in the schematic initial plan, say in *Get up and go to that other bench*; and your automated walking skills perform them with only a modicum of conscious or half-conscious monitoring.

Now, this is precisely what it was claimed (P.I Appendix 1) regarding any complex, well practiced activity such as skiing, musical instruments' playing, and so on; a category in which speaking is obviously to be included. So the issue boils down to whether the intention in action associated to issuing (in a spontaneous, fluid, impromptu, unreflective manner) an utterance is of the form *I say so-and-so (in order to ...)*, or rather of the form *I (by speaking) A (in order to ...)*, where "A" stands for comparatively crude descriptions of actions, such as *[I] supply the asked for information*, or *[I] rebuff him*, or *[I] provide some comfort*, etc -and only seldom, in some special kinds of occasions, include complete or almost complete syntactic and lexical specifications.¹⁹

For our purposes, strictly phonological specification may be considered automatically filled in when syntactic and lexical information is given. On the other

hand, since, as it is well-known, such a basic feature of an utterance as its general prosodic contour predates syntactic and even most lexical competence in the child, this contour should be thought of as implicitly included in, i.e. determined by, the intention assumedly mirrored in the alluded description.

In other words, the general case is apparently that intentions in action for the kind of utterances the present framework deals with, i.e. for spontaneous, fluent, impromptu, unreflective utterances, most times rather unspecific as compared with their specific, detailed linguistic 'contents'. A claim that predicts correctly what daily experience suggests about speakers (including ourselves, of course) once in a while wondering immediately afterwards how they were able to say whatever was in fact said.

From a cognitive standpoint, this is not so bizarre as it might seem at first blush. Consider the following claim: whatever a subject talks about, he or she does **always** have so specific beliefs, feelings, etc about it that **every item** mentioned or alluded in his/her utterance **could not** have been referred to but in a **single** way -on pain of being untrue to the currently active part of such beliefs, feelings, and so on. (Of course, the domain where the alluded distinctions are to be construed as taking place is not an ideal grammatical and lexical competence, but the actual linguistic competence of the subject at issue. Even more: this actual, individual competence biased by that subject's lexical and syntactical preferences -or habits, currently active cliches, etc.) This appears to me a highly dubious claim, to say the least. If this sentiment points in the right direction, it seems quite likely that at least the lexical choice is somewhat indeterminate, accidental or 'random' in some circumstances. In any of these instances, then, the relevant *intention in action* will be **less than** perfectly **specific**, in that such a choice is partially not 'guided', but it occurs, so to say, by itself.

If a previously advanced (P.I §3.2) hypothesis is correct, this claim can be strengthened when speech emerging from the *early processing stage* is considered.²⁰ It is difficult to see what theoretical value the very notion of a *specific intention in action* may have as regards this kind of speech, since here a theorist apparently posits the specific content of this *intention* by a simple back projection in time (no matter how short) of the (almost) automatically triggered operations that combine words and schematic constructions in the repertoire -a clearly *ex post facto* move.

In general, in the linguistic emission cases at issue (those where fetching and combining pre-established, repertoire items are triggered in an -almost- automatic fashion by specific features of F_{CST}), the notion *specific intention* does not seem to serve any useful purpose. Phenomenologically it is unwarranted: first, a subject may not be aware of having any such intention (while, say, in parking one's car so that its fenders do not spoil the paint in some nearby parked car, it is quite usual to be acutely aware of one's own intention to do so); and second, even in retrospect the presumed intention may remain concealed, no recollection of it being available -as witnessed by fairly common belated self-comments such as "*How did I say this?*" or "*Am I a nerd, to let fly so!*". Descriptively it does not seem to add but a quite possibly fallacious similarity to cases where the speaker **does** have an intention to utter a rather specific 'message' and he or she uses such an intention, now *in action*, to

(perhaps even carefully) guide his/her emission activity. And from an explanatory standpoint it is clearly otiose, as just observed.

Nonetheless, the case for *specific intentions in action* still has available a last-ditch, apparently unassailable argument. For certainly there are neurophysiological phenomena immediately prior to, and driving, overt action (see e.g. Kalaska & Crammond, 1992, Georgopoulos et al., 1993, Schwartz, 1994); and since there is no reason why in speech should occur differently, we only need to construe *intention in action* neurophysiologically to be assured of its existence, irrespective of the peculiar traits of an utterance.²¹

But this manoeuvre fails on several counts. In the first place, the suggestion of such a construal is a suspect move -a more plausible interpretation of these neurophysiological phenomena being that they **are** (the temporally first parts of) the uttering action itself when its neurological substrate, side, or facet is considered. (Alternatively, such phenomena are just -the temporally first parts of- the actual process occurring in the subject, its 'action' nature being a feature that supervenes on them.)

A second, more serious difficulty is that, even if the construal is accepted, the suggestion must be developed, on pain of irrelevance. For similar phenomena occur when you sneeze, move a limb while asleep, and in general, just immediately before performing any non-intentional movement. In other words, because of the blanket nature of the suggestion, it cannot be accepted unless empirical evidence is offered for two claims. First, that there is a cleavage between relevant neurophysiological phenomena preceding a spontaneous, off-hand, unreflective **intended** non-linguistic action (such as reaching for a pencil, closing a door through which disturbing noises enter, or scratching one's itching cheekbone) and those preceding **unintended** movements. Second, that, as regards such phenomena, an impromptu utterance sides with intended action, not with unintended movements.

Not even this demonstration, though, would vindicate the neurophysiological construal of specific intentions in action for utterances. For, as above pointed out, the notion *specific intention* (whether *in action* or *future*) implies a close similarity to an action consciously anticipated and (in somewhat detailed fashion) planned. If this appraisal is correct, an utterance of the kind at issue should, as to associated neurophysiological phenomena, pattern more closely with consciously intended actions than with unintended movements.²² (Certainly, while an adequate specification is lacking about what "pattern closely" operationally means in this context, this constraint cannot provide a criterion. A first inkling of what differences and similarities may be involved in the needed comparisons can be gleaned from Pascual-Leone *et al.*, 1993.)

The discussion might be summarized by saying that, if as suggested we keep to spontaneous, fluent, impromptu, unreflective use of language, a claim to the effect that a speaker does necessarily drive or 'guide' his/her specific utterance through a *specific intention in action*, i.e. as specific as the utterance itself, seems to be quite unplausible -not to say untenable.

In AI work, and also in other work taking its lead from AI developments (e.g. Airenti et al., 1992, Beun, 1993, or Korta, 1994: Chs.2-3), this underspecification is thoroughly ignored. Consequently, neither this work, nor any other in the same vein, can describe, and indeed even less explain, the basic human capability to be

cognitively innovative; i.e. the surprising ability of a human being to speak (perhaps under his/her breath, but not necessarily so) in such a way that the speaker himself/herself realizes that **significant new** miens or even facts regarding whatever he or she was speaking about have been (unanticipatedly) articulated in his/her utterance.²³ Certainly, the formulae where the (linguistic) 'intentions' assumedly had by a speaker are compactly represented in the kind of work at issue might be modified, maybe only slightly, so that the slack between both levels of specificity would be accommodated. Nevertheless, other features apparent in them, such as their uncritical incorporation of the basic notions in conventional speech-act theory, raise serious doubts about the theoretical value of such summary representations -no matter how useful they may be for endeavours such as building robots able to 'talk', or even to 'converse'.

The reason why it is so is not far to find. As already remarked, an utterance of this kind is the result of highly complex well entrenched and practiced quasi-automatic processes -a condition which does not allow but highly schematic plans (and, similarly, intentions, either for the future or in action). These, in turn, require to be filled in, duly specified while being implemented. But this highly complex operation occurs in a fashion befitting the nature of that processes; i.e. in a substantially automatic way, or in other words, without specific, detailed intentions in action that would guide or drive such a specification while the implementation takes place.

As to the particular sort of linguistic emission that originates in an *early processing stage*, even the claim that for each utterance there is an *intention in action*, no matter how unspecific, driving it, seems at best rather implausible. Admittedly, this is an extreme case; but if the sceptic stand is well grounded, then it adds to the likelihood that in a 'regular', not so extreme case, the assumed *intention in action* driving it may be less that fully specified.

3.1.3. Conclusions on sources of emission activity

The preliminary explorations offered concerning our two inquiries, taken together, amount to a double claim. First, as regards the assumption that a speaker **had in mind**, in advance of his/her utterance, a **representation of the 'message'** he or she phrased through it, the advanced theoretical framework leads to a **rejection** of its general validity. Second, specially as regards speech originated in an *early processing stage*, the assumption that a **fully specific intention in action** -or in other words, a **fully specific immediate intention**- drives a subject's uttering activity is apparently to be also **rejected**.²⁴

So, the present theoretical approach not only disavows from the outset substantive assumption (e) of most current pragmatic approaches (refer to P.I §2.1); without any *ad hoc* stipulation, it is in a position to investigate linguistic emission ignoring a subtler assumption, almost unavoidably associated to assumption (e) and pointed out (in P.I §2.2) when discussing the latter. An assumption contradicted both by everyday experience (as mentioned in §3.1.2 above) and by observations due to several essayists, literary writers, philosophers and psychologists since at least 1806.²⁵

The assumption, of course, is to the effect that, in ordinary cases of spontaneous, impromptu speech (in fact, in current literature virtually no other cases are dealt

with), a speaker selects, no matter how consciously, the expressions that form his/her utterance in such a way that through them a message he or she **had already in mind** is given (ignoring infelicities, etc) adequate linguistic expression. For instance, according to Sperber & Wilson's Theory of Relevance, the selection is made so that the addressee, in conjecturing its intended interpretation (a process necessarily carried out as per the Principle of Relevance), arrives just at this message -barring again possible errors regarding the extent and state of activation of the addressee's *encyclopaedia*, etc.

As repeatedly alluded to in present essay and elsewhere, this assumption not only misrepresents the mental events apparently occurring in most instances of actual impromptu speech. It simply blocks understanding, let alone explanation, of any *cognitively innovative* use of language, as succinctly described a few paragraphs back. As to the significance of this human ability, perhaps it may best be demonstrated by pointing out kinds of language use centered on its actual implementation; e.g. forms of soliloquy such as reflective enquiry and conception/development of a plan for future action.²⁶

On the other hand, the fact that the present approach **can** address the issue certainly does not guarantee that the latter is adequately tackled. A first problem is raised by the hypothesis that, at least whenever emission is originated in an *early processing stage*, an *intention* (either previous or immediate) to build the specific expression uttered is simply lacking. The possibility was alluded in §2.2.1 above by saying that, as regards speech originated in that *stage*, for no n is $M_{L_n}PST$ identical with M_1PST , since the latter may not exist, or at best be exceedingly vague, showing such fuzzy contours that it cannot be profitably compared to any $M_{L_n}PST$. The problem is: in instances of this kind, how 'ontological statuses' for M_1PST (and perhaps even for IM_1BST) may be determined? The question involves a second one: how to conceive then of the associated M_1ACT ? I will briefly touch on the matter in §3.3.1 below (see also Note 34).

Another enigma regards the timing of a (more or less) *specific intention in action* (whenever it is actually built, unnecessary to say). How and when exactly are the *driving agencies*, combined with the *general ways of (simply) acting*, possibly combined with other mental items, transmogrified into such an *intention*? In order to adequately confront this challenge it is clearly necessary to develop a comparatively detailed chart of the inception process of emission activities; but this, in turn, requires broaching the second topic introduced at the very beginning of present Subsection 3.1, i.e. how to develop a workable processual scheme for linguistic emission -a topic which will be addressed in P.IV.

3.2. Independent and teamed-up activities

It has been argued, most forcefully in Searle (1989), that individuals may have intentions to act entirely different from the 'regular' ones, i.e. from those associated to, and driving, their individual actions; namely, 'we-intentions' 'joint intentions', or 'collective intentions'. As regards intention-in-action, for instance, a collective intention of this kind would somehow include in its 'contents', not only the action being executed by the individual at issue, but also the collective action envisioned (i.e. intended) to be ensuing from that individual action and the individual actions to be carried out by the other individuals in the group.²⁷ (Unnecessary to say, in actual collective action, as

against one that only shows an appearance of being so, each of these other actions would similarly be guided by a collective intention had by the relevant individual).

I will from now on substitute "separate" vs. "teamed-up"/"teaming-up" for the pair of words "individual" vs. "collective", in spite of the former pair being certainly more obstreperous.

There is reason to the terminological shift. For, as already indicated, both 'individual' intention and 'collective' intention are meant to be intentions only had by, and only operating in, individuals; but, unsurprisingly, this use of "collective" time and again results in confusions. As to "joint" and "cooperative" to mark the second term of the dichotomy, they are objectionable, I think, on other grounds; so I will also shun its use in this connection.

Now, the notion of separate action used by Searle is modelled on examples of so-called basic actions, either isolated, or immediately resulting in some other action. (The latter is caused by the basic action or, more generally, is an end achieved by the basic action as means to it.) E.g. you lift your arm; or a man pulls the trigger of his gun -which results in the gun firing, which in turn results in some other man being mortally wounded. But executing a single, isolated basic action cannot be accepted as the general case of doing a separate action; on the contrary, it is a very peculiar, extreme case. For, as pointed out in Hobbs (1989), most if not virtually all actions by an individual pursuing separately his/her own goals and aims, i.e. entirely unconcerned with other individuals' actions and intentions, are performed taking into account 'reactions' by other parts of the world that must necessarily 'collaborate' to the endeavour; otherwise success cannot not be attained. In a sense, if we disregard the extreme, limit cases just mentioned, an individual cannot but 'collaborate' to a 'teamed-up' action being carried out by a variety of agents (even though in many cases none of the 'collaborators' are human beings).

Even the man that pulls the trigger depends on the gun mechanical parts operating properly, and must take into account the movements of his would-be victim in order to be able to aim at him -unless he closely approaches, a different action, formed by a complex sequence of basic actions, that may fail if the implicitly assumed 'collaboration' by the ground turns up not to occur (the ground collapses, say, and the would-be killer tumbles and falls, so that he cannot reach his goal).²⁸ Mechanical (and now electronic) devices are incessantly being perfected by making them, on one hand, more and more simple to operate, i.e. requiring only a few basic actions, if possible only a single one, and on the other hand, increasingly immune to wrong operation, i.e. 'foolproof'. But this is not the general case. If you want to fly a kite, not only you must run down the slope of the hill and let go more and more of the line: you must watch how the kite moves as a consequence of your action (and other factors beyond your reach, such as the wind); and you must constantly change the details of your action in response to its 'response' to that very action. So, in this instance of what common approach would deem 'separate' behavior, there is in a sense teaming-up action: you cannot fly a kite without a kite, and your intention is that the kite and you play (i.e. do) your respective roles in (contributions to) the total, teamed-up or collective action *The kite being flied by me* -though certainly the kite has no intention of being flied by you (and you know it too well).²⁹

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Even if there is no device 'collaborating' with the individual that separately tries to reach his/her set goals, this individual, if he or she really wants to be able to eventually succeed, may need to pay attention to how is he or she actually approaching these goals, and keep adjusting his/her action in response to how other items 'respond' to this action. (A distinctive feature of one of the central examples of collective action, team play.) To take one of Searle's examples of non-collective action: each of the persons that separately run for shelter from the rain, in spite of his/her thoroughly ignoring what others do, may be forced to make sure once and again where he or she is relative to the shelter (maybe by halting momentarily and looking around), and possibly to modify the direction of his running after each observation, if the shelter is far, the terrain uneven and unfamiliar, and the rain is associated to strong gusts of wind and dense mist shreds.

A simpler (and less inclement) example. You are ecstatically walking on the Continental Divide (say, nearby Monarch Pass, Colorado). Suddenly, in your exhilaration, you fancy passing the fingers of your right hand over the more eastward parts of your shadow outline. Now, while you crouch, your shadow changes in shape; you must decide whether to do it while stooping or sitting on your heels. In either case you should move carefully your hand, so that your fingers (but their very tips) remain within the shadow; and any movement of your body to ease the desired action may change the outline itself, and so necessitate new, unanticipated movements (implemented by basic actions). Is your shadow 'collaborating' with you? Hardly. Is your hand guided by a teamed-up intention where the other members of the team are the other parts of your body? Too bizarre a proposition, I think, to be seriously entertained.

The upshot of these considerations seems to be as follows. Not only an individual, when (rationally) acting, is prompted to do so by how the world is, as he or she appraises it, and/or by how he or she expects it to be next or in some more or less distant future time -so that the intended action is meant to change these expectations for the better. Ignoring some limit cases of single, isolated basic actions, an individual anticipates, no matter how dimly, that the very development of his/her action will be 'responded' by some or other parts of the world in a fashion that will force him/her to keep tuning up his/her initial expectations, and consequently to keep modifying his/her initially envisioned action -in order to be able to eventually attain, with the joint 'assistance' or 'collaboration' of that parts of the world, his/her set goals. If we do not take the terminological decision to reserve the expressions "we", "collective", "joint", or "team up" for cases of action with other humans, every action (but limit, negligible cases) should aptly be called *we-action*, *collective action*. Anyway, irrespective of terminological decisions, a subject engaging in an action not included in the negligible kind just mentioned, must act in the fashion (and, if you like, have the intention) characteristic of full *teaming-up* action.

From a different standpoint, this is as it could have been anticipated from the general theory of planning and acting, were the complex interdependence of processes and events in the world acknowledged. For, ignoring limit cases (such as a 'plan' to fire a gun the subject has in his/her hand, duly operating and loaded, and having the appropriate finger on the trigger), a plan is always sketchy, as already pointed out. Otherwise it could not succeed, since there is a host of critical variables whose

precise values cannot in general be known in advance. Then, many details must be filled in response to current circumstances, while the successive 'parts' of the plan, or sub-plans to reach its subordinate, secondary goals, are being executed. But the execution itself results, in the general case, in new, unanticipated circumstances (i.e. values of the critical variables), which necessitate new decisions as to other 'parts', or 'sub-parts', of the original plan. The interaction between agent (no matter how 'separate') and setting (even if it does not include other agents of his/her ontological category) is in general unavoidable.

Certainly, other human beings are extremely complex parts of the world, having their own preferences, habits of action, and goals. This implies that, in general, you cannot build sensible expectations concerning them and how they will behave next, or in some more or less remote future, nor concerning how they will 'respond' to your action, either linguistic or otherwise, unless you take into account these properties -or, in Dennett's words, unless you adopt the *intentional stance*. The implication is, if you want to have some people as partners in your endeavour to reach a specific goal, you must take steps to ensure that they also accept it and are prepared to pursue it jointly with you (or that they they form the appropriate intentions).

Coming to linguistic cases: even when a speaker deliberately addresses somebody else, i.e. another member of the relevant linguistic community (not, say, his/her pet), it is **not always necessary** for him/her to assume that both he/she and the addressee entertain roughly symmetrical mutual assumptions about what is taking place in their current contact. This may be necessary only when the speaker wants to be correctly grasped as having engaged in communicative action regarding the addressee. (In such cases the associated, culturally defined *script* includes this condition, or a variant showing only a minor difference from it.)

So whenever this occurs, even though we find a supremely important (non-soliloquial) use of language, this way of using it is only a specific case of a general fashion of linguistically acting as addressor. Think of a 'collaborating' item, i.e. an item such that (part of) a subject's action is directed towards having it to behave in a specific fashion (e.g. the kite in the previous example). If we consider it as a 'precursor' of an addressee, we may even say that properly communicative use of language is no more than the extreme limit of a continuum of ways of acting (linguistically or otherwise) -the virtually universal fashion of acting, where while doing it, how the world is likely to 'respond' to the subject's current action, and how in fact it does, are kept into account.

Ironically, the two clearest, most salient examples of the opposite way of acting, those that, if everything else is disregarded, may lead us to believe that there are only two polarly opposed fashions to act (either performing an individual action, or a collective one), are: doing a basic action such as raising one's arm, and engaging in soliloquy.

3.3. Basic 'moves' in linguistic emission

If "action" is used roughly in its ordinary sense, i.e. as denoting a stretch of (at least partially external) activity unified by an overarching intention or purpose, classical speech-act theory may be best construed, not as centrally dealing with linguistic action, but with interpersonally/socially effective kinds of linguistic action. In other words, as a

theory of an (universal, or nearly universal) institution governing linguistic action and the most general uses it is put to; an institution grounded on 'natural' facts about human action and interaction, as well as on presumed cultural universals, and finally (in some cases) on specific institutions regulating, among other things, use of language.³⁰

This institutionally-focussed approach to speech acts, arguably traceable to Austin's inspiration in legal studies, is summarily discarded in some critiques of conventional speech-act theory, notably that due to Sperber & Wilson (cp. P.II §4.1, Appendix, and especially Note 15) The latter writers substitute for it an approach centered solely on linguistic action; nonetheless, it should be noticed that in their notion of this action is already incorporated that of cultural universal, as evidenced by their own argument against accepting *promises* as genuine speech acts.

The domain of strictly linguistic action is the one to be explored here, albeit now its cultural elaborations, whether universal or otherwise, are altogether expunged from it. In other terms, in considering linguistic action (by a speaker), methodological solipsism will be assiduously adhered to. On the other hand, for reasons advanced in P.II Note 15, this approach must be completed by a (guardedly) reinstated survey of ways of 'using' this action, ways which take into account their anticipated results (and sometimes also the anticipated consequences of these) -a domain where institutions of widely different degrees of universality may be inextricably involved. (The issue will be deferred to P.IV.)

Now, in the advanced theoretical frame the number and variety of kinds of linguistic emission actions are too many to be conveniently described; in addition, the fact that -as acknowledged in §2.1.1 above- a single utterance does have a potential to comprise several 'parts' (mostly) independently 'valued' as to *meant items* results in an exceedingly vast combinatorial outcome. The obvious way to drastically reduce this intractable proliferation is to ignore taxonomical matters but in the 'highest' *meant items*; in other words, to pay attention only to MPST_{HS} (not to other MPSTs), to IMBST_{HS} (ignoring other IMBSTs), etc. (Nevertheless, there is reason to think that *implicitly meant agent* should perhaps be exempted from this restriction; see below.) A minor problem is to be considered first of all, though: the issue of systematic order. Are there any discernible cues as to the sequence in which the different kinds of *meant items* should be inspected?

On one hand, an 'ontological status' relative to (matching items in) F_{CST} was considered (P.I Section 5, P.II Section 2) as primarily assigned to an IMBST, in spite of its seemingly derived nature; for an IMBST is a background situation, only implicitly meant, where some or other specifically meant partial situation is assumedly 'located'. In other words, it is the 'arena' where MPSTs occur what it was assumed to have primacy as regards such statuses. But, on the other hand, not only it was posited (P.II Section 2) that at least in some cases a MPST's 'ontological status' may be construed as being assigned through the associated MACT ('assigned' by dint of a factual acknowledgement, so to say); the hypothesis was argued for and accepted (P.II §4.2) that, if a MACT has an 'extra-high value', then a new, previously non-occurring 'ontological status' of the associated MPST emerges -which amounts to a claim that, as regards MPSTs, these 'values' of MACTs do **change** their 'ontological statuses'.

The fact that an IMBST is the target for primary allocation to 'ontological statuses' results in a problem anticipated a few paragraphs back (in §3.1.3) being effectively wiped out. For as a consequence of this fact, whether or not a speaker does mean in advance anything closely comparable to whatever he or she will eventually phrase in his/her utterance, i.e. whether there is at all a M_IPST not significantly different from some M_{L_n}PST (for obviously the problem does not arise regarding either M_IACT nor IM_IAGT), is simply immaterial for allocation to statuses. (Almost directly below, when addressing the issue of selection between different 'values' of MACT, a different but related problem, not yet defused, will be briefly perused.)

A different dimension of variation, although maybe a minor one (see directly below), becomes apparent from so obvious reflections from a speaker's *subjective stance* as, on one hand, exclamative utterances (see P.II Appendix), and on the other hand, quantifying expressions formed with "too", astonishment adjectives like "incredible", "wonderful", etc, and negative appraisal NPs used as (anaphoric) pronominals, in the manner of "the idiot" -see examples (9), (10), (12) and (18) in §2.2.1 above. As pointed out there, parsimony leads to see all these phenomena as manifestations of a single parameter, a facet in MACT different from the 'ontological' one that may be called *subjective appraisal* and that has as 'values', either a null one (presumably resulting from a thoroughly affectively neuter MACT), or a non-null or definitely *slanting* 'value' (taken from a range of them; see §3.3.3 below). Notice that, in a similar way to the differences as to 'ontological status' that may be found between a M_IPST_h and some M_IPST included (or: embedded) in it, here an utterance showing no (non-null 'value' for) *subjective slant*, i.e. a *neuter* 'subjective appraisal' M_IACT_h, may nonetheless include some 'part' clearly showing a non-null 'value' for it, or in other words a *slanting* M_IPST. Witness the examples, (9), *wonderful* variant of (10), *incredible* variant of (12), and (18). The parallel behavior of this presumed MACT's facet and its 'ontological' facet may be construed as evidence for an argument that *subjective appraisal* is indeed a specific facet in MACT. Be it as it may, *subjective appraisal* may be considered a minor dimension or parameter regarding 'basic moves', in that, as pointed out, it is quite common for an utterance to show not the slightest sign of it.

Again, whether the speaker himself/herself or someone else is the 'value' for the IMAGT associated with a MACT (and a MPST, of course) is clearly a fourth fact independent from whatever 'values' obtain as regards the previous considered parameters regarding *meant items*.³¹ This seems to be the final 'dimension' along which how a speaker acts as such is to be considered, as per the general framework so far developed.

Now, there is a fifth 'dimension' or parameter to be added, although it is clearly specific to only one kind of emission activity, i.e. to other-addressed speech. For, as argued in §2.1.2 above, we should acknowledge the 'existence' of *implicitly meant addressees*. It is not crystal-clear what the 'values' should be of this fifth parameter; i.e. what 'values' may IMADDR (in fact, both IM_IADDR and IM_LADDR) take. Certainly, many distinctions between utterances are directly keyed to differences as regards the addressee -as in distinctions related to politeness, to take the most well-known example. Nevertheless, it is again not obvious how these differences should be best mirrored in theoretical machinery (even politeness, it may be argued, should be incorporated, not directly 'into' IMADDR, but as modulating *scripts* specifying broad interactional

patterns). And on the other hand the high numbers of distinctions that might be so 'coded' creates a problem of its own. I will follow again the policy of recording in my machinery, for the time being, only the most basic distinctions -if possible, only binary distinctions. As a tentative proposal the simple distinction between a specifically meant addressee, and, to use the common phrase, 'whoever it may concern', may be here adopted.

The distinction can be defined in several, slightly different ways. For present purposes, a gross definition such as the following one is enough: In the first case there is an assumption about existence and uniqueness of addressee(s): there is a specific property (also meant by the speaker) distinguishing him/her/them: a 'genuine' addressee is addressed because he or she is such-and-such, or else does so-and-so or is (deemed) able to do it. On the other hand, in the second case the speaker, so to say, sends his/her utterance simply hoping that there may be some one interested in it: the utterance is addressed, but no one is specifically an addressee. In other words, it is each hearer himself/herself who defines whether or not the utterance is addressed to him/her -because the distinguishing property is just to take up (no matter what the motivation) the addressee's role.³²

The proposed distinction can also be traced to non-linguistic, even to non-interpersonal, forms of interaction (cp. §3.2 above). If for convenience we assume individualization of wind gusts, a kite you try to fly would be a counterpart to a 'genuine' addressee. On the other hand, the different gusts that may hit your kite and help it to go upwards 'select themselves'; you count on some or other gust of wind pushing upwards your kite, and you act on the line 'addressing' it/them; but you cannot count on any specific one doing it -maybe there is no one 'prepared' to do it and your kite simply does not take flight, or capsizes as soon as you stop running.

As to linguistic examples, prescriptions, general bans ("*Do not trespass*" written in a sign), legal injunctions, etc, are examples of use of language having nonspecific addressee(s). Also belong to the class most if not all utterances that conventional speech-act theory classifies as *declarations* (the matter deserve some investigation, but it will not be attempted here).

If the suggestion is accepted, the 'ordinary' value for this parameter may be called *specific addressee* -and the other one, unsurprisingly *unspecific addressee*. Alternatively, the fifth parameter may be considered as being not less general than the other ones; then, it would have a *null* 'value' in non-other-addressed speech, and a non-null 'value' otherwise -where two particular ones, *specific* and *nonspecific*, would obviously occur. At present stage of research, though, not much seems to hang on which alternative is chosen. So, without further argument I will take on the first one discussed, i.e. a 'minor' parameter only relevant for other-addressed speech.³³ For this reason I will ignore it from now on, until specific study of this kind of speech is tackled in P.IV.

In conclusion, it is apparently adequate to assume that the basic 'moves' in linguistic emission activity are **not** basic **actions**, but basic **resources played upon** in so acting. And these resources may be best scanned by examining first the main ('ontological') side or facet in relevant $MACT_h$, then $IMBST_h$ and $MPST_h$, next a 'minor' parameter concerning $MACT_h$, and finally $IMAGT_h$ (or perhaps $IMAGT$). But for $MACT_h$, each is to be inspected, of course, concerning its specific 'values' as above indicated; regarding $MACT_h$'s 'values', the single feature deserving careful attention at this juncture

is likely to be their general cleavage; i.e. 'ordinary' or 'acknowledgement' vs. 'extra-high' as to the main, 'ontological' facet, and null vs. *slanting*, as to its 'minor', *subjective appraisal* facet. In other words, specific 'values' of (both facets of) $MACT_h$ are plausibly to be only of minor significance, and their detailed scrutiny will be postponed to a different, later investigation.

3.3.1. Agents' main 'ontological' attitudes

As we know, the choice between kinds of 'values' for the facet in $M_I ACT_h$ we previously called 'ontological' results in a linguistic emission 'move' that proves irreducible to any other and critical for the import of an utterance. This may be elaborated as follows. An 'ordinary, acknowledgement value' does not significantly change the world (as it is perceived by the subject): the $M_I ACT_h$ at issue simply **acknowledges** **how** the subject stands relative to $M_I PST_h$ (which may indeed be a highly vague item, as reminded in §3.1.3 above), i.e. how he or she **appraises** its **assumedly given 'ontological status'**, and **how is** he or she **committed to its** (actual or lacking) **'reality'**; in other words, a 'value' of this kind does not modify that status. Certainly, the speaker does effect some change in F_{CST} , in that the outcome of his/her MNGACT, the utterance, was not previously there, and from that moment on it may ensue in sundry results and consequences, some of them intended, perhaps even anxiously desired, and others not so. But nothing else changes in the world by the mere fact of such MNGACT having been performed. On the other hand, an 'extra-high value' for $M_I ACT_h$ (assumedly) **forces** a significant change in the world the speaker perceives; by the simple fact of having performed such a MNGACT, a 'part' of the world that is centrally paid attention to, i.e. $M_I PST_h$ (or some of the *meant items* $M_I PST_{h1}$, $M_I PST_{h2}$,...), is secured a **different, higher 'ontological status'** than the one it had before, i.e. a status closer to that showed by the 'inhabitants' of F_{CST} ; for it becomes *overtly 'real'*, say. (Cp. P.II §4.2.)

As above mentioned, there is a problem related to these 'extra-high values', a problem directly involved in an $M_I PST$ (assumedly) gaining a '*real*' 'ontological status' (either *overtly* or *plainly real*). What if such a *meant item* is highly vague, having positively indeterminate contours? Will the speaker expect that such a clouded, equivocal, muddled mixture of many different possibilities will become a 'real' fact? Which fact? The puzzle can be effectively tackled only by empirical investigation; after all, if sometimes we long almost for **any change** in current situation, conceivably a subject who thinks he or she is able to bring out, by speaking, a momentous change in the situation confronting him/her, and who feels that situation highly abhorrent, deadly sickening, or something such, is apt to utter an expression to that end, even if not knowing what precise change is going to follow from his/her words.

Nonetheless, it is still possible to probe into the quandary in a general, preliminary way. On one hand, hardly anyone will think that he or she may bring out changes at will: most of the assumedly effective prompts for the world to dramatically change are specific formulae 'causing' specific changes, that will be envisioned as such by the speaker. (True, some of these changes -such as those that presumedly result from uttering "*Open sesame!*" and similar charms- may ensue in

a situation with open-ended possibilities; but these are then brought about by linguistically ordinary means, such as pleas, commands, and so on.)

Assume, though, that this were not the case, i.e. that none of these formulae were used, nor even existed -for, as I have argued at several junctures, Pragmatics must consider such eventualities. Even if this is so, a (non-accidental) use of such means to operate on the world implies a definite aim; and this seems to exclude the (almost) involuntary kind of emission characteristic of utterances emerging from the *early processing stage* of linguistic activities -the stage where a serious problem could arise, from lack of a specific enough intention to speak.³⁴ Finally, whenever there is no established formula (take Joshua's urge to the sun and the moon, or Mary Shelley's giving a temporary title to the story she just began to write), the relevant M_1PST -or better, $M_1PST_{h(i)}$, as it will be argued shortly below- must be fully apparent and unambiguous in the subject's mind, even though there may be several (maybe a large number of) different $M_{L0}PSTs$, or $M_{L0}PST_{h(i)s}$, to express it. In conclusion, how a subject may behave is unknown; but apparently, for any sensible behavior the predicament vanishes.

3.3.2. 'Reality' level background

The second basic choice is, of course, that ensuing in the different 'ontological relations' to F_{CST} that the speaker assigns to IM_1BST_h . Selection of an *identical to F_{CST} status* amounts to a choice to talk about the world as it is; in other words, then the speaker, to the exact measure that he or she avoids redundancies or -as worded in P.II Section 3- *chops retellings*, does **demonstrate**, reveal or **disclose how** that part or aspect of **the world** (something, then, *overtly 'real'*) **is in effect**.³⁵

At issue is only the nature of the 'ontological arena' where the relevant M_1PST is to occur (or more generally, where M_1PST_{h1} , M_1PST_{h2}, \dots , i.e. some M_1PST_{his} , are to occur); a nature that the chosen option determines in a final way. So it is not surprising that specific M_1PSTs included in M_1PST_h may diverge as to 'ontological status' from IM_1BST_h , and so be either *plainly 'real'* or *non-'real'*: cp. P.II Section 2. (This may again be more generally phrased by referring instead to specific M_1PST_{ijs} -where "i" ranges over natural numbers indexing successive M_1PST_{hs} , and "j" over similar indexes for successive 'partial' M_1PSTs included in a given M_1PST_{hi} .)

A second remark to preclude possible misunderstandings. It should be obvious that the expression "how (...) the world is" does **not** necessarily denote a **state** of (the relevant part or aspect of) the world: in a similar way to how "partial situation" (in our sense) does, it ambiguously covers **also processes, events** and the like.

If an IM_1BST_h as *'real'* as F_{CST} , *but different from it*, is selected, the speaker chooses to talk about a 'separate reality'; about things, events, etc that, in spite of being *plainly 'real'*, are not included in the realm that defines the *ground level of 'reality'* -i.e. in F_{CST} . He or she does so by, on one hand, meaning something presumedly belonging to that sort of 'reality' (a $M_1PST_{h(i)}$ or a sequence of M_1PST_{his}), and on the other hand, indicating how does he or she accept attribution to it of such a *plain 'reality'*. In other terms, the speaker does not talk about the world up to the moment conceived as actual, but **reports about** something presumedly being a part or aspect of a **different** (although in a sense not less

actual) **world**, and about his/her own **commitment to its** presumed, peculiar kind of **'reality'** -for such a **'real' world was first made accessible through that very MNGACT**.³⁶

Obviously, the above remarks on 'ontological relation/status' selection also hold here. In other words, specific M_{IPST} s included in M_{IPST}_h may freely have any 'ontological status' different from *plainly 'real'*. And the report at issue may in principle be about objects, processes, events, etc -about any M_{IPST} .

The third, final option open to a speaker regarding 'ontological statuses' for $IM_{IBST}_{h(i)}$, i.e. a *non-'real' status*, amounts for him/her to (quasi) refer to something that he or she reckons to be non-existent.³⁷ So, the speaker, putting aside how anything deserving to be deemed 'real' is, or in other words, momentarily disregarding the actual world as it in fact, **establishes as meant** some part or aspect of a **world** at most **only possible, made up by his/her very MNGACT** -a part or aspect that he or she is interested in.

Clearly, even ignoring speculations, hypotheses, suspicions, guesses and other items of similar breed, the alluded establishing is not a nonsensical activity -as it might look like at first blush. For although any presumedly future or just possible event, process or state is *eo ipso* non-real, there may well be excellent reason to talk about it, either under one's breath or to someone else. For, How could we estimate what the future might keep in store for us, ponder or discuss alternative courses of action, or prompt others to take steps in the right direction but by mentioning such events, possibly actions that we or some other agent might carry out?³⁸

Unnecessary to say, both remarks made apropos the first option in 'ontological status' selection are again still valid *mutatis mutandis*. Specific M_{IPST} s included in M_{IPST}_h may well have an *overtly 'real'* or a *plainly 'real'* 'ontological status'. And the linguistic 'setting up as meant' is not limited to objects: it may equally well represent processes, events, or whatever.

3.3.3. A slant towards subjectivity

The third 'basic move' comes from selection of either a null 'value', or a full slanting 'value', regarding the 'minor' or *subjective appraisal* facet of $M_{I}ACT_h$. In other words, it offers the result of a subject showing his/her current evaluative position as regards the appropriate M_{IPST}_h . (No doubt, such a subject is the speaker, or more precisely the *meant agent* associated to the relevant utterance.) Its first option leaves everything as it was reviewed so far (and will be considered, for convenience, the 'ordinary' case). On the other hand, a speaker, in selecting a *subjective slant* 'value', indicates overtly a subjective evaluation of his/her regarding the world; in other words, such a speaker **reveals how** he or she **values** at the current instant **whatever** he or she **talks about**.³⁹

Perhaps the 'values' can range from (a) *upholding of a standard or deviancy exposing* (as in example (9) previously mentioned), to (b) *astonishment/surprise disclosing* (see previous example (12) and also examples (62)-(64) in P.II), and finally to (c) *definitely valuating*, i.e. from esteeming/prizing to derogating (examples (10) -in its *wonderful* version-, (14), and (18) above).

It might be claimed that there are some 'hybrid' or mixed 'values'. Consider e.g. admiration, where surprise and positive valuation seem to blend (cp. example (61)

in P.II, from Sperber & Wilson, 1986, or (10) in its alluded version); and similarly for a 'mixture' of surprise and negative valuation, symmetrical to admiration -see e.g. (14).⁴⁰ Now, even though there seems to be no reason to exclude mixed *slants* (even Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1987, admit mixed emotions!), it seems to me that, as to these particular 'mixtures', a *definitely valuating slant*, when it regards a whole utterance, i.e. when it is a 'value' of M_{IPST}_h , always ensues in such an apparent 'mixture' of surprise and the *valuation* itself; cp. (14) to (15a) and (16).

3.3.4. Choosing a meant agent

The final basic 'move' to be considered concerns the choice of IM_{IAGT}_h (or perhaps IM_{IAGT} : see next Note). Obviously everything asserted above as regards the other 'moves', i.e. about selection of 'values' for the other 'highest' *meant items* set up by MNGACT (M_{IACT}_h , IM_{IBST}_h , and M_{IPST}_h) was predicated on the implicit assumption that IM_{IAGT}_h was the speaker. Now, there are at least two main 'dimensions' along which the 'value' at issue may range when it does not include, or does not only include, the actual speaker, i.e. when it does **not** take its ordinary, straightforward 'value'. First, **number** of IM_{IAGT}_h s (or IM_{IAGT} s); for, as suggested in P.II §4.3 *ad finem*, if the relation to the other *meant items* in the utterance is implicitly attributed to someone else than its actual utterer, the latter may well still 'be there' as some kind of 'partial' *meant agent*.⁴¹ Second, **degree to which** the actual speaker, while being the agent that performs the MNGACT, is **openly**, forthrightly, **not involved** (either positively or negatively) in what the IM_{IAGT}_h (s) -or IM_{IAGT} (s)- 'does' ('do'), i.e. **in the relation** M_{IACT}_h to *meant item* M_{IPST}_h (and indirectly to IM_{IBST}_h).

In different terms, the degree to which the actual speaker's 'use' of the utterance is overtly an external one, a way of 'using' it, so to say, after the fact. i.e. the degree to which the utterer 'uses' the utterance as someone who, having spotted it, decides that issuing it, irrespective of whether he or she deems its 'contents' acceptable or otherwise, is suitable to his/her current purposes.

The first 'dimension' is conceptually unproblematic. The second one, because of the seemingly continuous domain it covers, is less lucid. It apparently ranges from fully overt non-involvement, through rather cloudy non-involvement or a partial, equivocal involvement, to a definite -although most times somewhat subdued- involvement. Open non-involvement ensues in *represented utterances*, and these range in turn from quotes and recitation to theatrical or movie play, use of more or less stereotyped expressions, and finally to impersonation and other ways of speaking in the manner of somebody else's. Moving further 'down', the non-involvement degrades gracefully through indirect speech, free indirect speech, and so on, until it reaches ways of using language such as irony, facetious speech, or speaking in the capacity of holder of a specific social position (in business, politics, or an obvious institution); eventually, some forms of subtle, dim, almost quiet untruthfulness may be found in this downward progression (forming perhaps its final stop).⁴²

Obviously, in purely *represented speech*, although the original, represented utterance may have been the result of a spontaneous, off-hand activity, the actual speaker (if there is any!) hardly may be considered as speaking in a spontaneous,

impromptu fashion (and so his/her activity lies beyond the reach of present investigation). Both impersonation and, still more clearly, utterance of unscripted lines by an performing actor/actress may cross the border towards a spontaneous, fluent, off-hand activity; and of course there is no general reason to exclude from the latter category an utterance such that its utterer is rather involved in the relationship amongst its *meant items*.

The 'dimensions' noted show a strong affinity. But for isolated (and probably rare) instances of situations in which several people utter exactly the same words, it seems quite difficult for a speaker to *represent* an utterance with multiple IM_1AGT_{hs} -or IM_1AGTs . And, on the other hand, in many cases of low *degree of open non-involvement* (i.e. of non-negligible degree of involvement) in the relationship amongst *meant items*, several IM_1AGTs , not infrequently including the actual speaker himself/herself, crisscross their respective M_1ACTs -as we found in §2.2.1 above while discussing ironical (8). But although clearly the 'dimensions' are not independent, maybe neither are they reducible to each other. For a speaker, when overtly using a proverb, a cliché, and even a commonplace, not only is in a sense merely quoting; in fact, the expression is implicitly referred back to the collection of its previous utterers, i.e. to some IM_1AGTs ; in other words, *open non-involvement* may co-occur with more than one IM_1AGT . Anyway, the individuals so alluded remain in most cases utterly unknown to the current speaker, and they usually belong to a rather poorly clear-cut group of people -a prestige group, or people that is in the ball, or just the linguistic community at large. So, a slight extension in the construal of the notion IM_1AGT allows a theorist to preserve a quite substantial association between a single (individual or collective) IM_1AGT and a *high degree of open non-involvement*. When considering the other extreme, it certainly might be the case that not every utterance that should be included in it shows two (or more) IM_1AGT_{hs} -or IM_1AGTs -, but the odds seem indeed to be against the hypothesis. A rapid review of examples of such a typical kind of non-negligible involvement as ironical utterances apparently shows that they may be construed as playing on a 'split' IM_1AGT (or something of the sort); if this is correct in every instance of irony, it provides significant evidence for a general case against the just mentioned hypothesis. I cannot press the issue here, though.⁴³

The choice of a 'value' for IM_1AGT_h -or IM_1AGTs - interacts with choices regarding other *basic moves* in a simple, in effect quite drastic way. As above remarked, if the ordinary, straightforward 'value' is chosen, i.e. if the actual speaker is the only $IM_1AGT_{(h)}$, everything comes out as reviewed when discussing the other *basic moves*. If, on the other hand, $IM_1AGT_{(h)}$ is openly someone else on whose doings as such the speaker is not at all involved, obviously the *meant items* cannot have a higher 'ontological status' than that attributed to him/her.

So, a non-'real' $IM_1AGT_{(h)}$ such as a fictional character, or an actual, living person in an only possible, assumedly not 'historical' setting (such as it commonly happens in impersonation), can only be **fancied**, **imagined** to enter in a relationship with the other *meant items*, since these are now non-'real', i.e. they are partial situations and relations to them that are meant only in the non-'real' domain where such $IM_1AGT_{(h)}$ 'inhabits'. And a just plainly 'real' $IM_1AGT_{(h)}$, say, a living person -even the actual

speaker himself/herself- but not just at current time, not at the very instant of the actual MNGACT (i.e. in a past time, no matter how recent), may only be **reported** as performing his doings, i.e. as meaning whatever he or she assumedly meant, in that domain (which is indeed 'real', but nonetheless disjoint from F_{CST}). An isolation from F_{CST} that comes to the fore most clearly when the basic move relative to $M_{I}ACT_{(h)}$ is choice of an 'extra-high value'. For these 'values' are distinctive in that they **change** the former 'ontological status' of a $M_{I}PST_{(h)}$: as a consequence, this must be included in F_{CST} , or else be in a domain as 'real' as F_{CST} (although separated, isolated from it). But now -when $IM_{I}AGT_{(h)}$ is either plainly 'real' or non-'real'-everything attributed to $IM_{I}AGT_{(h)}$ recedes one or two steps from F_{CST} ; the assumed change cannot be any more assumed to actually take place -it is only reported, or just fancied.

Obviously, irrespective of how much involved the speaker is in meaning activities not attributed to him/her as current speaker, and also irrespective of what he or she contributes to the total *meant items* set up in the utterance, the conclusions also hold regarding whatever is assumed to be meant by an $IM_{I}AGT_{(h)}$ that is, (1) a fictional character, or (2) someone else than the actual speaker, or finally (3) an actual person but either in an only possible setting or in some (recent or remote) past time. In other words: inasmuch as some *meant items* are attributed to some $IM_{I}AGT_{(h)}$ of the kind at issue here, everything said in previous paragraph applies.

The situation may be summed up in the following way. Assume that an $IM_{I}AGT_{(h)}$ 'other than' the actual speaker (at the very moment of speaking) is to some extent either, (A) such that the speaker, through his/her utterance, is able to 'enlist' that agent into meaning exactly as he or she (the actual speaker) does, or else, (B) the very speaker himself/herself, but in a different capacity.⁴⁴ If so, as a consequence of what we have seen, the *meant items* attributed to that $IM_{I}AGT_{(h)}$ will come *overtly 'real'* only to the extent that either (A) or (B) are the case. In other words, only then, and to that precise extent, will they 'inhabit' and/or be operative in F_{CST} .

A possible interpretation of the assumed effectiveness of some ritual formulae, including those used in the Roman Catholic Church for Consecration (cp. P.II §4.2), is that a suitable speaker uttering one such expression does in effect attribute it to Divinity, or to some super-human Powers, and that the necessary 'enlistment' is achieved because of gracious Divine Mercy towards Man, or because of some or other coaxing of such Powers. And as regards emissions commonly believed to be less successful, a host of other examples could be added: an infant trying to drive his/her parents to urge some wondrous toy to come out of the blue; an unrequited loving youngster quietly mumbling love expressions addressed to himself in an effort to endear himself to his object of love, etc.

3.3.5. Overview on 'moves' and their interaction

Summarizing: there are four (general) 'basic moves' (each concerning a basic resource to be played upon) open to a speaker. (There is also a *minor* 'basic move' that it is assumed to have sense only for other-addressed speech, and that consequently, as above announced, will be consistently ignored in this survey. See though §3.3.6.2 below *in finem*.)

On the first 'basic move': a speaker, either '**acknowledges**' to what extent he or she is **committed** to the highest possible '**ontological status**' (i.e. '**reality**') of the relevant **meant partial situation(s)** - $M_{I}ACT_h(s)$ -, or else he or she (assumedly) **forces** a **different, 'higher' 'ontological status'** for it (them). (For convenience, I will use the abbreviations "AKN" and "FOR" for these two options.)

If AKN is chosen, then, by setting up some **meant partial situation(s)** -and expressing that option-, a speaker may: (1) **demonstrate** or **disclose** how some part or aspect of **the world is in effect**; (2) **report about** some part or aspect of a '**real**' world **first made accessible through his/her very meaning activity**; or finally (3), while **setting up as meant** some part or aspect of a world at most **only possible, evince how** is he or she **prepared to have it changed into** a 'part' or aspect of **the world**, i.e. to its becoming overtly 'real'. If, on the other hand, FOR is chosen, then a speaker, by establishing some **meant partial situation(s)** -and expressing that option-, may do any of the following: (1) (assumedly) **have** some part or aspect of **the world to 'really' become as specified** by that partial situation; (2) **establish in the world**, as not less (plainly) 'real' than anything else belonging to it, some **specific features or properties** (maybe involving specific consequences) **of his/her utterance** that are **reported in it** (specifically, in that partial situation); or else (3) (assumedly) **have** some part or aspect of **the world to 'really' become as per whatever was meant (as only possible)** in that partial situation.

The options available regarding the second 'basic move' may be labelled, respectively, ID, EQ, and NR. Their just described combinations with the options in the first 'move' will be denoted by "AKN-ID", "AKN-ED", "AKN-NR" (or just "ID", "EQ", "NR"), and "FOR-ID", "FOR-EQ", "FOR-NR", respectively.

As regards the cases where the option selected in the first 'basic move' is AKN, everything asserted about them assumed that the 'ordinary' *value* was again chosen in the third 'move'. (If the first 'basic move' ensues in the 'extra-high' *value* FOR, there is no choice regarding the third one; a *subjective slant* 'value' cannot be selected, as explained in §3.3.3 above. This unavoidable association will be denoted by "NULL+FOR" -see directly below.) The 'ordinary' option (NULL) for the third 'basic move' is as follows: the speaker shows no subjective slant in his/her utterance, which is so offered as **wholly neutral** as to strictly **subjective appraisal**. On the other hand, a speaker that takes a different option (SLNT) in this 'move' **explicitly indicates** his/her (non-null) **subjective definite valuation, or slant**, regarding whatever he or she **talks about**.

Everything said up to the moment assumes a specific choice regarding the fourth 'basic move': the 'ordinary' or 'straightforward' *value* (STRGHT). When any other 'value' is selected (OTHERW), to the precise extent that (some part of) the utterance is implicitly attributed to a *meant agent* that both, (a) is (assumedly) **not** to be 'enlisted' into meaning exactly whatever he or she (the actual speaker) does and in the very same F_{CST} , and (b) is **not** the current speaker at that very moment, the associated *meant items* **recede** one or two steps from F_{CST} -they are at most **reported, or else just imagined**. A fact implying that if, in addition, in the first 'basic move' FOR is chosen, then the **changes** it assumedly determines in the world are (to the precise extent

alluded) associated to a 'world' only reported or imagined, and so **are made** (to that extent) utterly **ineffective in the 'real' world**.⁴⁵ (In order to refer to full combined 'moves' the abbreviations suggested will be prefixed to those labelling the first two 'basic moves' -even though "STRGHT" will be dropped as prefix if no confusion is likely to arise. On the other hand, for convenience, the suggested abbreviations will sometimes qualify complete or partial utterances, sometimes sentences or phrases.)⁴⁶

3.3.6. How 'basic moves' show in language

A methodologically significant issue regarding a 'basic move' is how does it show up in linguistic form; for if this is wholly unknown, empirical tests of any predictions of a theory based on the advanced frame may hardly be supported, or confuted, by linguistic evidence. Unfortunately, to raise the issue amounts (see §2.2.1 above) to ask for the relationship between M_I and M_{L0} *meant items* -an extremely complex and contorted one, as shown by a number of examples in P.II (Section 3, §4.1, and Appendix).

In fact, the key relationship is that involving a $M_{L0}PST_{h(i)}$ and its associated $M_IPST_{h(i)}$ when this has the same 'ontological status' as IM_IBST_h -assuming, of course, that such a M_IPST_h exists (refer to §2.1.2 above). This is no more than the familiar compositional independence brought about by so-called opaque contexts. So, even if Nantucket had no parks in Melville's times, (26)

(26) Melville wondered how could he stroll through Nantucket parks, streets
and alleys without being much observed.

may arguably be an ID utterance, in that it presumedly mirrors an aspect (a past aspect indeed) of the world; while if offering a remembrance (perhaps by a still more Mathuselahan Captain Bildad), it must be labeled by "EQ". (By the same token, the indications of a question, and so of a NR utterance, found in the 'opaquely' embedded clause are irrelevant.) And, assuming that (27)

(27) You should find out whether Melville strolled through Nantucket parks,
streets and alleys without being much observed.

is uttered by someone aware of such a pitiful condition of old Nantucket, if it is in effect a NR utterance (a command, a request, or the like), then it cannot be said to have any internal flaw -in spite of its facetious nature, that as we know may be traced to a, let us say, mild OTHERW choice in the fourth 'basic move'. Whereas the assumption that it is issued as an ID utterance disclosing modal aspects of the world that directly regard the addressee results in its being seriously flawed -in that it is the $IMAGT_h$ which now carries a ('strong', albeit again silent) OTHERW choice. If, on the other hand, the offending reference to Nantucket parks is dropped, as in (28),

(28) Melville surely strolled through Nantucket streets and alleys without
being much observed, for he was a rather subdued man.

the first 'highest' sentence, being a hypothesis, clearly builds a NR partial utterance (although admittedly an ID construal would be possible if no *for* tag occurred); while what comes after "for" is, in the fashion of (26), either an ID or else an EQ partial utterance (conjuring up again old Captain Bildad). Unnecessary to say, there is nothing essentially new in these theoretical construals.

We will systematically review these relationships, beginning with the central combinations of 'values' for the identified 'basic moves'. In other words, it will be first explored what formal properties, if any, show utterances embodying (STRGHT-NULL-AKN-)** choices; i.e. those where some or other of the 'values' {ID, EQ, NR} is chosen in the second 'basic move' while the 'ordinary values' are chosen in the first, third, and fourth 'moves'.

3.3.6.1. Phrasing the central combinations of 'basic moves'

The paradigmatic manner to say how the world is is obviously an assertion; these, in turn, are canonically rendered by using a declarative sentence (where the main verb is **not** a performative verb in canonical performative form). This might be considered the canonical form for a (STRGHT-NULL-AKN-)ID utterance were it not that an alternative possibility should be reckoned with. In many cases, most often in answers, a NP, and more generally any single phrase, may be the only expression in an ID utterance -as demonstrated in P.II examples (22), (30), and (31), and also in (29b)-(31b) below

- (29) a. How was Jeanette looking today?
b. Just lovely/Rather haggard.
- (30) a. Where do you think the picture should be placed?
b. In front of you/Over there.
- (31) a. What were the children doing?
b. Jumping all over the place.

(although non-pro-drop languages, understably, show significant restrictions regarding VPs).

Consider now exclamations, apparently also ID utterances, since they point to assumed facts -the emotional complement being presumably provided by the non-'ontological' facet in $M_{I}ACT_{h(i)}$ we know. An exclamation may not only occur showing any of the alternatives just mentioned; it may exhibit quite similar features to wh- questions (as discussed in P.II Appendix). This implies that an exclamation does have potential to display a peculiar, distinctive canonical form for NR utterances (cp. P.II §4.1). But apparently the latter kind of forms does not generalize to ****-FOR-ID: even the furthest stretches of belief as to one's ability to change the world at will -assisted perhaps by some or other 'enlisted' super-human Power- do not seem enough to confidently expect that issuing a bare exclamation will operate the desired change. If this is correct, only declarative sentences and phrases generalize to *-ID utterances as their canonical forms.

Ignoring fictional utterances (both those belonging to fiction speech proper, and lies), which will be briefly discussed directly below, there are at least two main classes of NR sentences: hypotheses, conjectures, etc, and requests, injunctions, and so on. (As we know, optatives cannot be included within the 'main' combinations of 'basic moves', since they result from a non-'ordinary' option, namely SLNT, in the third 'move'.) As it is well known, instances of the first class are not infrequently signalled in specific ways, e.g. by "if", or explicitly introduced (usually in a 'higher' clause) as descriptions of not real -or not known to be real- states of affairs. And the second class (including its specific subclass, questions) was for our purposes sufficiently examined in P.II §4.1,

where an account was offered of the seemingly unique canonical linguistic forms of the latter subclass.

In sum, irrespective of the specific hypotheses accepted as to the two main classes of NR utterances just reviewed, canonical forms for them are apparently rather reasonably identified. On the other hand, fictional speech seems to have no identifying linguistic properties: everything that is said or might be appropriately said in specific circumstances may again be said about a fictional world (or assumed to be so by the speaker) where identical circumstances would obtain. The fact is obvious to the point of deserving no elaboration whatsoever, but nonetheless quite surprising: it amounts to a sort of second, shadowy embodiment for every combination of 'values' chosen in our 'basic moves'.

Notice that not only ID utterances are replicated in this way, parading not the slightest mark that could identify them -a feature on which, by the way, the very potential for lying builds. Questions, commands, magical spells and charms, promises, apologies, fictional speech itself (in an apparently unbounded recursive strategy) may also occur without limit in a rich enough work of fiction. And similarly for offhand, unrehearsed, impromptu or almost impromptu spoken fiction (such as telling stories to children).

How is it possible that such an important class of NR utterances receive no linguistic mark at all? Discussion of this noteworthy phenomenon will be deferred to a later passage, after other ways of speaking with identical properties has been addressed.

Let us turn to EQ utterances. Is there a specific paradigmatic way of reporting about 'real' items (events, objects, or whatever) that are first made accessible through the very meaning activity of the speaker (so that in a sense they were not 'there', in the world, before his/her utterance was issued)? Apparently, (STRGHT-NULL-AKN-)EQ utterances are formally indistinguishable from (STRGHT-NULL-AKN-)ID utterances: sentences, NPs, other XPs, etc, may be used to talk about the 'real' world in its fullest sense, and about its peculiar, 'separate' extension here discussed. (Unnecessary to say, questions, requests, and so on may also be issued concerning *plainly 'real'* -as opposed to *overtly 'real'*- items. In discussing this matter, though, our subject shifts to NR utterances; and everything indicated above about them might be repeated here verbatim.) The inescapable conclusion seems to be that only the specific content of the expression used, which must be traced back to the relevant $M_{I}PST_{h(i)}$, makes the difference. If so, the canonical forms of utterances of this kind deserve no separate mention, since they have been implicitly talked about when addressing the kind first discussed above.

This raises a problem -why to distinguish between these different ways of being 'real'? Perhaps the distinction, though intuitively 'natural', is in fact spurious, for there is no way to find linguistic consequences of an utterances being originated having in mind, as regards its $IM_{I}BST$, one of these two (apparently different) 'ontological statuses' as against the other one. The skeptical suggestion is, though, too lavish: none of these statuses can be disposed of, on pain of being unable to account for the distinction between, say, magic charms and authoritative declarations that change social relationships, on one hand, and, on the other explicit performative utterances (no matter what its specific 'speech act': assertive, directive, commissive,

expressive, or whatnot). The issue, and some of its implications, will be addressed below.

3.3.6.2. Other combinations of 'moves'

We will review first how utterances where the first 'basic move' is executed by selecting the 'extra-high value' FOR -and where, as we know, the third 'basic move' cannot be but selection of its 'ordinary value', i.e. NULL. These, in turn, will be surveyed by examining first the linguistic features specific to utterances where in addition the second 'basic move' selects the option ID. Then the same issue will be raised about choice of NR, and finally about the EQ option.

Is there any paradigmatic way to (assumedly) have some part or aspect of the world to actually become as specified by the partial situation meant in an utterance? The answer must be, No. Certainly, a whole class of these uses of speech, namely, those who (assumedly) change the physical world, mostly rely on specific ways of speaking. But these are in fact more than that: they are prescribed, nearly or thoroughly unyielding formulae not to be meddled with. They may, on one hand, be wholly external to language, as in charms and magic spells, which obviously belong to a category of actions that may well dispense with speech (as it occurred with Aladdin and his lamp). On the other hand, they may be institutionally specified, and so foreign to linguistic activity proper, to its "infinite use of finite means" -as it was most clearly indicated by Austin when he wrote about "an accepted conventional[,] (...) particular procedure [being] invoked" and "executed (...) correctly" and "completely" (Austin, 1955, Lect.III).

Other linguistic procedures not originated in formal institutions leave open a choice among a range of -sometimes noticeably supple- formulae. Consider e.g. apologies, greetings, and so on. If just after the funeral services are finished you approach (not with jesting manners, etc.) the family and say "*I'm very sorry*", or any similar sentence, then to all ends and purposes you did express your condolences -even though the widow may know well (and know that you know, etc) that in fact you were not just elated, but delighted, happier than ever in your life.⁴⁷ And if when going to your office you unexpectedly meet in the corridor the most despicable and mean of persons (and he is positive that this is your deep belief/feeling about him), but you civilly say "*Hullo!*", then neither he nor anyone else (i.e. no one familiar with our linguistic habits) can say that you didn't greet him. And so on and so forth. In most, if not all of these cases it seems difficult to pinpoint what exactly is meant by the uttered words (in our jargon, what the *leaning to chop retellings* left unsaid); nevertheless, I think it undeniable that these utterances effect a change in the (relative statuses of people in the) world -be it the social world, the moral world, or whatever. (In conventional speech-act terms, so-called *expressives* should be considered as a particular class of *declarations*.)⁴⁸

With only a modicum of exaggeration, the conclusion may be worded as follows: In this domain there are no canonical forms, in that its 'forms' are not genuinely linguistic; they must be learned individually, as if they were words from a different language -which sometimes they are (cp. "*Abracadabra!*").

There is also a third and apparently most natural way "to do things with words": to **describe** the world **as it** (assumedly) **is** -or as it will become in due time- **as a**

result of that very description being uttered.⁴⁹ Think e.g. about a witch who, while perhaps suitably handling a puppet, curses an ill-fated (presumably remote) addressee by announcing him/her through space, and possibly also through time, "*You die a miserable death*"; or about mathematical biologist Jones who, eying contentedly the latest, carefully scrutinized version of his proof of an evolution-theoretical version of Fermat's Last Theorem, cries in happiness, "*You are, in fact, Fermat-Darwin-Lorenz-Jones' First Theorem!*".⁵⁰

A more mundane example may have some interest. If Professor Smith, after considering with his students several alternatives as to how to finish the paper they are writing under his guidance, utters in earnest (32),

(32) I'll be here tomorrow.

meaning any of (33)

- (33) a. I put myself under the obligation of being here tomorrow.
 b. I accept/I am now under the following obligation: (for me) to be here tomorrow.

(or something of the sort), he is surely describing an event or a state of the world (the moral world, for sure) and by doing so he is *changing* the previous state of affairs so that at current time it is the case that the (moral) world includes that event/state. Again, there is no evidence at all that Smith follows a specified procedure, or utters a prescribed formula. True, the fact that (32) is not meant in a sense closely parallel to (34),

(34) (Certainly,) Bill Clinton will be here tomorrow.

i.e. that (32) is not a mere prediction, implies that our familiar *leaning to chop retellings* has been at work, and this in turn implies that what is linguistically omitted is well-known to everyone in such circumstances.

Now, these may widely change and still utterances of the form (32) will be most naturally interpreted as per (33); and similarly *mutatis mutandis* for an unbound variety of prima facie descriptions of future actions by the speaker. Assuming our theoretical frame, it follows that what gets omitted is universally or nearly universally known -being either a cultural universal or common knowledge in the relevant culture.⁵¹ Why there is no linguistic *signalling*, as it was found in the parallel case of questions? A possible answer is that we view people as comparatively autonomous, voluntary agents (in spite of the complex frame of physical, technological, social and interpersonal conditions and rules that constrain their actions); and as a consequence, a 'prediction of one's own behavior' interpretation of (32) and similar utterances is felt as highly unlikely.⁵² (Coming back to speech-act-theoretical notions, it might be asserted that we should forget about *commisives* as a class independent from *declarations*.)

The putative escape hatch that the third way to utter words with this kind of intent should provide proves, then, to lead nowhere. For it implies that there are in principle no specific forms distinctive to this 'value' -they are in effect, according to the claim itself, just the ones we knew for the 'ordinary', 'acknowledgement' *value* of the parameter involved in this 'basic move'.

We turn to the assumed ability to have the world to comply with a linguistic *signalling* that some specific 'part' or aspect of it becomes as per a meant partial situation; and where in addition the latter is meant as non-'real', as an at most only possible partial situation. Does performance of this (assumed) ability endow the associated utterance with some distinctive properties? Even a person not very familiar with instances of such a genre of accomplishments may plausibly think, No.

A classical example of these feats is Joshua's injunction (cp. P.II §4.2) to our familiar celestial bodies (in order for Jahveh) to have them halt and stand still on the sky -until his men finish slaying the enemies' armies. If we disregard the exalted overtones befitting such momentuous circumstances, as well as the embellishments that literary tradition might have incorporated later, both Joshua's intent and words seem but ordinary, actually trivial -what is unusual is only the contents of the command (the addressees and the wondrous deed exacted of them). On the other hand, assume that in a certain legal system, a witness, upon being urged by the President of the Court to say (what he or she thinks is) the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth about a particular subject, is legally considered to do so, no matter what his/her ensuing behavior (so that if silence follows, the witness legally doesn't know anything at all concerning the subject; etc). Hardly can be imagined that such critical injunctions may be delivered in a casual, improvised way: almost certainly they will be issued in a pre-specified, highly unambiguous and dignified fashion. In other words, it seems to be more than likely that the task may only be discharged by use of an institutional formula.

Certainly, I have indulged in a good amount of evidentially unsubstantiated reconstruction as regards Joshua's exploit; and the legal example was thoroughly concocted for the sake of the argument. The facts may have been quite different, and Pragmatics, it may be argued, has again no say on legal matters. True, but the point of the examples was to glean some plausible conclusion from scarce, almost non-existent evidence. If hard data prove quite different than it was imagined, then Pragmatics cannot indeed but accept them as they are; in the meantime, though, plausible conjectures seem material.

In conclusion: here we are seemingly confronted by the same dilemma it was apparently found above. Either there are established verbal procedures, more or less rigidly constraining the speaker, or the command, request, etc. is entirely regular from a formal standpoint; and in neither case it may be said that specific (linguistic) canonical forms disclose the particular combination of 'basic moves' here at issue.

To complete the set of options to be chosen in the second 'basic move' (when the first one ensues in an 'extra-high value' FOR), let us briefly pore over whether or not are there specific ways to establish in the world features and/or (possibly institutional) properties of an utterance that are reported in that very utterance. Clearly, in a sense, they are -in a rather Pickwickian sense, though, for the specification simply prescribes a linguistic form such that the reported features or properties actually occur as features or properties of that utterance. In other words, the linguistic form of the utterance must be a sentence that truly describes (some aspect(s) of) the very action of uttering it. No more (and no less) is needed.

Why is this so? Admittedly, we are dealing with a (somewhat shadowy) world that, in spite of being not less 'real' than the *ground level of 'reality'*, i.e. than F_{CST} , is

different from it. In other words, that world is in a sense 'separate' from CST, from the actual setting where the utterance takes place (going over progressively to the world at large). Anyway, aren't there in the dim, dusky world at issue other denizens than properties of utterances? The prime examples of items in the 'separate world' now discussed (see P.I Section 5) are events and scenes remembered. Now clearly, even though such scenes may be very vividly recalled, even to the point of feeling them as again 'alive', it does not seem correct to say that a subject (by saying something or other about the scenes or events) actually establishes them in the current world: at most the feeling is, not 'the things out there'. Assuming this is correct, some one may jump to the conclusion that it might be possible to establish in the actual world a remembered experience (*Erlebnis*) by describing it, or by uttering words liable to be uttered in the original experience, or by some other similar means. Maybe. But then it would be a special case (perhaps an interesting case for empirical Psychology) of FOR-ID emission activity, not one to be typed as FOR-EQ.⁵³

In addition to this, the ways of saying so are more diverse than conventionally believed. Not only properties of utterances not quite envisioned by speech-act theory when dealing with *explicit performative sentences* can be both mentioned and established (cp. examples (52) and (56)-(60) in P.II §4.2.): as shown by (35)-(37),

- (35) In uttering this sentence I'm putting myself under the obligation of being here tomorrow.
- (36) By the very fact of uttering this sentence, the obligation to be here tomorrow is fully and unconditionally accepted by me.
- (37) Showing my full endorsement of the obligation to be here tomorrow is the only aim of my uttering this sentence.

even the scheme advanced in P.II (55) was too rigid and narrow (although it must be acknowledged that these sentences, and others that could substitute for them to the same effect, sound indeed somewhat perplexing).

But this seems to be due to the fact that in our culture (if not universally) there are far simpler ways to let know this kind of 'contract': just to utter (32), or else, if any possible misinterpretation is to be forestalled, (38)

- (38) I promise/swear to be here tomorrow.

(where, of course, a FOR-ID utterance similar to those in (33) is embedded in a FOR-EQ utterance -to put it tersely). In other words, we probably encounter here one more instance of general implicatures based on the maxim of Manner -if the convenient Gricean conceptualization is used.

Nonetheless, as just intimated, in an important class of cases we find very distinctive, ritual ways of building FOR-EQ utterances. For, ignoring quite unnatural ones such as those offered in P.II example (52), a property specifically referred to in an utterance of this kind must be, so to say, **visible by itself** in the utterance (otherwise its mention by a speaker would be simply felt as a falsity). But then, what is the point of mentioning it? Apparently, in order to make the audience acutely, perhaps **undeniably** aware of it; an interest that has a ring in it of unique to critical human interactions (as it could be just seen in (38); for promises, whether universal or not, are indeed key determiners of

interpersonal relationships). Now, there is a marked (and unsurprising) tendency for critical human interactions to be the first ones to be regulated, even regimented in formal institutions; i.e. to be performed complying with prescribed, specific procedures. So, it is quite common that the properties a FOR-EQ utterance refers to are socially important, institutionally regulated effects; more specifically, that they again belong to the kind of effects that make an utterance a FOR-** one. As a result of this embedding of one utterance of the latter type into one of the former, the properties to be named in the highest sentence (the one forming the backbone of the FOR-EQ utterance), i.e. the properties directly associated to the embedded, lower FOR-** sentence, must be named in fixed, regimented ways. (Consider "*I declare open the first hearing of the case ...*", or "*I christen you, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, with the names ...*", etc.) In this sense, (some kinds of) FOR-EQ utterances have forms as submitted to rules and institutional procedures as might be desired; so much so, in fact, that, as it was suggested regarding some FOR-ID utterances whose institutional rigidity they inherit, they should **not** be deemed as having canonical (linguistic) forms -they are linguistic shadows cast by extra-linguistic rituals.

Let us turn now to the non-'ordinary' option in the third 'basic move', i.e. to SLNT utterances. As previously indicated, these may be sorted in two main classes, exclamations and optatives, according to whether the second 'basic move' selects any of the options ID or EQ, or else the option NR. (Again, the first 'move' must necessarily have chosen AKN, for otherwise in the third one the only possible option would be NULL.)

Regarding the linguistic form of these utterances, it should be first observed that we have tacitly assumed that the *implicitly meant agent* only *indicates* his/her particular evaluative position, or *slanting subjective appraisal*, regarding the appropriate M_1PST_h -rather than overtly mentioning that appraisal. If we assume that such *subjective appraisal* position occurs 'explicitly' in M_1PST_h (though not in the associated $M_{Ln}PST_h$, of course), sentential schemes (67) and (68) suggested in P.II Appendix may still be valid, and the main types of exclamative sentences seem to be accounted for. (And closely similar schemes could be posited for optatives, without ad hoc modification.) The penalty to be paid for this preservation of the schemes previously posited is, though, a blatant redundancy, best to be avoided. Alternatively, the claim may be that the syntactic, morphological, ... prosodic features peculiar to exclamations (and optatives) only indicate a *slanting 'value'* for the *subjective appraisal* facet of M_1ACT_h , so that, if the symbols used in P.II (67)-(68) are maintained, (39) and (40)

(39) YPS

(40) GPS_F

would respectively substitute for that sentential schemes. Since we still have a filled gap in (40), even though the extremely close parallel with wh-questions is substantially relaxed, it seems possible to account for the use of similar syntactic, ... prosodic resources in both kinds of utterances. On the other hand, in (39), where only a $MPST$ **with no special features** is represented, the parallel with (41) of P.II (repeated below for convenience)

(41) [= (41), P.II] x does something specifically apposite so that YPS .

is lost, and so it happens with the suggested underlying MPST for question (31) of P.II, again conveniently repeated here.

- (42) [= (31), P.II] a. Somebody fills in the gap in a representation of *GPS*.
 b. Somebody fills in the gap in *RGPS*.

As a consequence, the problem that was pointed out at the end of P.II as still not solved, completely vanishes.

Regarding optatives and related utterances (such as desideratives), not only they are sometimes explicitly indicated to be such, as in the following examples;⁵⁴

- (43) I wish I had time to go to Nepal.
 (44) I certainly would like to be made a baronet.

they also show in many languages specific constructions, sometimes quite similar to some canonically occurring in questions, as in (45).

- (45) May I be a Nobelist!

The issue arises about why this is so and, more generally, about whether it is possible to account for the differences and similarities found in the three classes of NR utterances. Regarding the first issue the answer is close at hand. For let us come back to the sentential schemes (41) and (42), suggested in P.II §4.1 for request, commands, etc -and repeated here for convenience.

- (41) [=P.II (41)] *x* does something specifically apposite so that *YPS*.
 (46) [=P.II (42)] *x* does something specifically apposite so that an event, process, or state *YPS* is the case, where *ZPS* occurs.

Apparently an optative utterance quite directly points to a partial situation that might be described in a fully explicit fashion by such sentential schemes, if only a modicum of re-interpretation is done. Namely, now *x* is no more restricted to (a class of) members of the relevant linguistic community, and, of course, the alluded 'doings' are neither restricted to those feasible by that range of people.⁵⁵

In other words: in a parallel fashion to the proposal regarding questions and some other requests, such as those for help, let us accept the claim that a *leaning to chop retellings* ensues in omission of everything assumed to be universally known. Then the so-called *envisioned action* is here more sensibly than ever omitted, since the speaker has ordinarily not the slightest notion about who or what is *x*, the agent, nor about what sort of 'action' would he/she/it perform were the desired result to become 'real'.⁵⁶ Which leads to an utterance where, as regards the relevant $M_I P S T_{h(i)}$, only a phrasing of the *core (partial situation)* occurs in the matching $M_{L0} P S T_{h(i)}$. (If (41) is the appropriate scheme, *YPS* is the *core*; if (46) is the apposite one instead, the core is *ZPS*.) And as regards $M_{L0} A C T_{h(i)}$, some *signalling* of the matching $M_I A C T_{h(i)}$ specific to optatives, desideratives, or whatever, must certainly occur.

Now, to combinations of the OTHERW option for the third 'basic move' with the different options for the other ones. The exploration, but for one specific case deserving separate mention, can be carried out very rapidly.

From the definition of the notion labelled OTHERW it follows that the $I M_I A G T_{h(i)}$ at issue is at most an item being as 'real' as any item located in CST (obviously the highest

level F_{CST}); in other words, it may at most be dubbed an EQ or *reported* item. Obviously, both the matching $M_{I}ACT_{h(i)}$ and $M_{I}PST_{h(i)}$, as well as the associated $IM_{I}BST_{h(i)}$, must be also (at most) *reported*, EQ items. (Since these are respectively, a relational activity attributed to the agent at issue, the other term of the relation, or in other words the result of the activity, and the domain where the agent is assumed to perform this activity.) So there is no canonical form for these utterances.

Notice, on the other hand, that things are somewhat dusky as regards $IM_{I}ADDR_{h(i)}$ (when there is any). At first blush it might be claimed that an $IM_{I}ADDR$, in spite of its being an (implicitly) *meant item*, is directly associated to $M_{I}ACT$, i.e. to an activity not by any means reported, but occurring in CST. The implication seems to be that an $IM_{I}ADDR$ must necessarily be located in an $IM_{I}BST$ *identical to* F_{CST} . But in fact this is not so. For certainly, if you address someone you are doing something *fully 'real'*, something having the very same 'ontological' status than CST (it modifies its 'contents'); and similarly for the person you address, as well as for yourself: everyone 'inhabits' CST. But there is no obstacle to 'addressing' fictitiously someone (even out of a stage): in soliloquy you may for the last time rehearse what you are going to say to your debtor, or to your lover, or to your dentist. In conclusion: it doesn't seem to be much difference with what is the case regarding speakers: a person either speaks or not; if he or she does, a real person is speaking; but $IM_{I}AGT$, being a *meant agent*, behaves differently from an 'ontological' standpoint: it may be identical to the actual speaker ('value': STRGHT), or not ('value': OTHERW) -just the case we are considering. Similarly, the *meant item* $IM_{I}ADDR$ may be identical to the actual addressee(s), and so a *fully 'real'* entity 'inhabiting' CST; or else it may be otherwise.

This suggests that the main distinction in this 'minor' dimension/parameter should also be the cleavage between the actual addressee(s) and otherwise. Perhaps. But first, being an addressee is less of an absolute property than being a speaker: in a sense an addressee is always (no more than) **intended as** such; while a speaker **does have** the property of being so. Second, we may assume that $IM_{I}ADDR$ (when it occurs) is governed by parameter $IM_{I}AGT_{h(i)}$ exactly like the other *meant items* are, so that an OTHERW 'value' in this parameter would determine an 'at most *reported*' addressee (which could again, by happenstance, be identical to the actual addressee). Finally, the difference between *specific* and *unspecific addressee(s)* seems to be so basic, and to have so many consequences, that it seems desirable to maintain it; so, in order not to end up with a complex, non-binary parameter, for the moment being I will keep to it (assuming that the assumption just described applies).

A second consequence of the definition has also been pointed out in §3.3.5: that such 'loss of contact' with CST, i.e. with the actual domain where results from STRGHT-FOR-*/FOR-*/ utterances are assumed to show up, determines that these results **cannot be assumed** to actually occur. For they are again, at most, *reported* results occurring in the, at most, *reported* domain where everything has *receded*.

Now this fact suggest immediately a possible solution to the riddle posed (in §3.3.6.1 above) by fictional speech; i.e. by a class of NR utterances that apparently include every combination of options for 'basic moves', but where every resulting utterance is 'ontologically' shifted in such a way that (1) their relative 'ontological positions'

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are maintained, and (2) the 'ground level' is a NR level. The puzzle resulted from the difficulty to specify in a precise way what 'ontological status' should be globally assigned.

Assume that in this kind of speech the IM_IAGT is other than the actual speaker, in the precise sense of "other" laid down in the definition of OTHERW -i.e. that conditions (a) and (b) in §3.3.5, last paragraph, are satisfied. In other words, assume that it is in fact a fully NR subject.⁵⁷ Then, everything that was surprisedly noticed regarding fictional utterances follows. The only remaining issue (an interesting one, no doubt) is how to distinguish different types of speech belonging to this general class. I will not delve into the matter in present essay; I simply would like to point out that, fulfilling previous suggestions (P.II Note 8 and §4.3 *in finem*), an OTHERW-****-AKN-NR combination of 'values' (plus a suitable pointer to a *gap*, etc) might accomodate really problematic non-standard questions -although most or all that occur in the literature do not need that recourse is made to 'basic move' OTHERW.

It should be now possible, or so it seems, to explore how the 'basic moves' and their combinations may be put to use by a speaker when engaging in fluent, unreflective, impromptu speech.

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Notes

^a As stated in the first Notes of the "Preliminary steps" of present essay, this is a (by now, much) revised version of a previous essay entitled "How to build a sounder, albeit less simple (psychological) Pragmatics", completed by February, 1994. The immediate stimulus for the revision was provided by some critical comments and advice forwarded to me by Prof. Jacob Mey, which operated on my own displeasure about a number of features in my presentation (a displeasure which was in turn mainly aroused by older remarks by my friends and colleagues Teresa Bejarano, Pompeu Casanovas and Violeta Demonte on previous versions of the essay). All of these critiques and suggestions are here gratefully acknowledged. But any responsibility of the scholars originating them for any remaining shortcoming or error must be emphatically denied, since, first no attempt was made to comply with all of them (it would have been too Herculean a task for my capabilities), and second none of these people has discussed with me the new developments here advanced, nor has been even offered any opportunity to glance at this presentation. (July, 1995)

¹ See Note 5.

² Notice, first, that Récanati is in effect expanding the panoply of concepts native to his initial approach by an extra notion (having as its only role to dissipate the dilemma he finds). Second, his 'solution' either rests on a dubious assumption, or plays dangerously close to an equivocation on *as if* (*pretense*) behavior. The assumption: there must be some or other difference between the 'referring' action itself performed by a speaker when he or she means to 'refer' to an item located in a non-actual world, and when the intention is to refer

to an item in the actual world -I mean, a difference other than the difference in statuses he or she assigns to these items. The equivocation: a speaker, when 'referring' to an item in what he or she thinks is a non-actual world, may behave as if it were located in (what to his/her mind is) the actual world, in that he or she behaves *exactly in the same fashion* in both cases; this behavior, though, may also be construed as being an *actual pretense*, i.e. as showing a fictional attitude on the part of the speaker. Now, when the assumption above is *not* accepted (as it is the case with the present framework), the former construal is enough (in fact the latter is redundant). Récanati, though, seems to subtly shift from the former to the latter construal -an unacceptable move if he really rejects the assumption. I cannot press the issue here.

As indicated in P.II §4.3 (final indented paragraph), the notion of *irony* at issue may be accommodated in present theoretical framework by simply taking advantage of the potential offered by the notion IMAGT (a previously introduced, indeed in this framework unavoidable notion).

- 3 In this vein, the spartan Selective Semantics postulated by Bouchard (1993, 1995) would require some preliminary *elaboration step(s)* where a subject's knowledge/assumptions concerning the **kinds** of the items being talked about would be used to flesh out the highly abstract semantic representations provided by syntactic and semantic competence -and so arrive to representations comparable to, say, those posited in Jackendoff's (1983, 1990) Conceptual Semantics.

On the notions *linguistically expressed meaning* and *pragmatic elaboration* (seen from a Récanatian standpoint) and their relation to minimalist syntactic approaches see Vicente (1993).

- 4 I think that Grice's (1967) somewhat puzzling refusal to consider what is meant (in his technical term, "said") by *He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave* as including what is meant by *It follows from his being an Englishman that he is brave* may be traced to a difference exactly parallel to that between (3) and (4).

- 5 The mere fact that the ranges of 'values' posited (in P.I Section 5) for a MACT were suggested as alternative 'values' of the relevant subject's *degree of commitment to MPST's 'reality'* might have cast some doubts as to their inclusion in a **strictly cognitive** facet of MACT. As to the range of 'values' matching situations where the relevant MPST is deemed 'non-real', i.e. *preparedness to have 'non-reality' dispelled*, it is still more difficult to accept as *strictly cognitive* -at most it might have a hybrid nature, partially conative.

Unfortunately, the missorting went unnoticed in P.II, even where it was advanced (P.II Section 2) that these 'values' are best construed as being in some way or other instrumental (or "catalysts", as it was once worded) in the assignment of 'ontological statuses' to MPSTs. True, the construal still considered a so-called assignment of status as in effect a sheer acknowledgement of a 'factual' condition; but the apparent certitude about keeping within a "strictly cognitive" domain could well have grown somewhat shaky.

The real, genuine error begun when 'extra-high' *values* for MACTs were introduced (P.II §4.2). For these *values* are certainly not strictly cognitive (not even conative); apparently they should instead be considered, in effect, as wholly **active** or **operative**. They indeed keep having as relata only such abstract entities as 'ontological statuses'; a fact that, in addition to separating them from affective or full-blooded conative facets of MACT, warrants thinking about them as still having an '**ontological**' nature -no matter how idiosyncratic. On the other hand, it seems to me that these taxonomic blunders left untouched any argument where the mistakenly classified theoretical items played a role.

- 6 I learned about the idiosyncratic behaviour of "too (much/many)" and the other expressions at issue in examples (5)-(13) from I. Bosque (1994) -which refers to a personal communication by E. Barjau.

- 7 If, as suggested, in (this kind of) irony IMAGT is not the speaker himself/herself, the fact that an ironical construal of (8) dispels any anomaly or paradox is accounted for, since now the speaker urges no more to behave against his/her own best judgement. Note, though, that this account necessitates an incremental allocation of the urge and the appraisal of the urged behavior. In other words, in order not to voice again an inconsistent 'desire', it should involve something similar to the *local domains* and the *domain shift* assumed by

Récanati (1995) in his resolution of the (restricted) discourse domain puzzle offered by the celebrated McCawley's example (i).

(i) The dog got in a fight with another dog.

In sum, for the ironical construal of (8) we may assume a 'shift' from one 'local' IMAGT to a different one -from an IMAGT other than the speaker to one identical to him/her. An account implying that the ironical effect derives from the 'split' IMAGT.

An alternative account may keep ascribing both the urge and the judgement to a single IMAGT (presumably other than the actual speaker); now the ironical effect might result from the very fact of issuing such a self-conflicting injunction. (I cannot pursue the matter here, already alluded to in §2.1.2 above; it will be briefly touched upon again in §3.3.3 below and Note 41.)

8 It may be countered that the questioned versions of (11) and (13) are not really so bad. Certainly; even examples such as (ii),

(ii) Meet surprising girls while driving through fabulous Majorca your wonderful Paramount coupe!

sporting three adjectives of this kind, is not unlikely to be seen (and/or heard) almost anywhere, apparently to no one's linguistic astonishment. However, the counter-example has patently no force; for, as it will be shown in §3.3.3, in this way a quasi-representation of the presumed prospective consumer's own subjective appraisal is achieved (a would-be anticipation apparently thought to induce a desire for the advertised item). Anyway, frequent use of a *subjective appraisal* expression, especially -as in (ii)- in non-actual, non-spontaneous appraisals, eventually erodes its *subjective* nature -which determines its replacement (as *subjective*) by a different expression.

A final remark. Notice que the appraisals on which the whole offered framework builds, i.e. those giving rise to *driving agencies* (refer to P.I §3.2), are also **necessarily subjective** (even though they do not show by themselves in language). Now, *general way of (simply) acting [c]* is just the route to act in response to some *driving agency* by modifying the associated *appraisal*. There is, then, an undeniable connection between *way [c]* and *subjective appraisals* in general; right now, though, I am not able to see the connection but in an exceedingly dim manner.

9 Certainly, inasmuch as a quite 'natural' interpretation of (18) construes the characterization of the fact spoken about as (almost) literally taken by the speaker from a briefing, statement, or whatever, by Schumacher, "Schumacher" is a less preferred antecedent than "Hill" for "the idiot". (No doubt, a key factor is also knowledge about how the world of language users, of contests, etc is. People do not usually refer to themselves by a third person expression, nor using a disparaging epithet, etc.)

10 It was certainly an error in P.I §§4.1-4.2 not to have noticed this difference between *pretense plays* and linguistic activity episodes, and so not to have included the appropriate specifically linguistic trait. From which obviously derives that this facet or side of MACT is missing amongst the proposals advanced in that Part Section 5 (and of course in their development in P.II).

11 I think that most, if not all, *c* EFFs are in fact *ce* ones, since a strictly transient condition, leaving no traces, seems hardly capable to evince any not merely reflex response. But matters are still cloudy and I will ignore the presumed association.

12 No doubt, an EFF anticipated as extending indefinitely in future time but also as being briefly, sparsely punctuated may in some cases be best construed as an EFF_{-u-}, and in others as an EFF_{-r-}. Problems of practical classification such as this one, though, are obviously irrelevant here.

13 Think of overt or even quiet verbal abusing of an agent that threatens to substantially increase a subject's distance to his/her optimal being, or menaces his/her autonomy (no matter how slight it currently is already). Obviously these, and others similar to them, are methods to 'let off steam' in association with *G9'*, and maybe also with *G5'*. As to recalling past cheerful scenes, or imagining possible happy outcomes of the current plight, they may be amongst the useful ways of taking advantage of *G9'*.

- 14 A natural assumption in a theory dealing with (comparatively brief) spells of spontaneous, fluent, off-hand activity of a specific kind is that a subject does not modify 'on flight' one of these spells, even if he or she notices a change in some relevant aspect of the current situation (i.e. relevant to that kind of activity). The subject may, then, be assumed to (try to) engage immediately in a new spell whenever the perceived change is indeed estimated material.
- If sentences and separately uttered phrases in impromptu speech are hypothesized to be 'comparately brief', the assumption above may be accepted (no doubt, for simplicity) in a theoretical framework such as the present one. Obviously, this additional hypothesis further increases the idealizing, far-from-real-life nature of any specific theory that will be developed within the framework; but perhaps to no momentous drawback (for preliminary theoretical forays). In the long term, though, an adequate theory of linguistic performance must clearly meet the challenge of disposing of the assumption, so that eventually 'meta-level satisficing strategies' in Pollack's (1995) sense are to be explored and incorporated. Here I will stick to the simplifying hypothesis, even when resuming study of constraints in indirect linguistic activity (in P.IV, as just indicated in the text).
- 15 If the question lurking under the first matter is not to be understood as a Leibnizian question inviting to trivially answer it by a re-phrased Principle of Sufficient Reason, it must be construed as a question about motivation that compares **current** goals, attractive/aversive 'qualities' and so on with currently available (linguistic) means befitting them. I will stick throughout to this construal. As to the second question, the negative answer that will be suggested below is again not defiant vis-a-vis that Principle, since the extra specification is thought of as coming from two sources: currently unacknowledged (or at least not consciously 'felt') background assumptions, tendencies, preferences, etc in the speaker's mind, and psychologically chance factors. The first source is straightforwardly Leibnizian, in that, although admittedly a Divine Pragmatic Scientist might be unaware of its contents, a Psychologically All-knowing Being would not. The second source may be considered deterministic (and so, Leibnizian) at some or other sub-psychological level -a neurophysiological, or maybe a biochemical one. (Unfortunately, the whole Universe seems to be prey to indeterminism, so that perhaps we must anyway part company with Leibniz.)
- 16 Trivially, any utterance is specific no matter how vague its content. Note that we have not exhausted motivations to speak that scarcely, if at all, determine specific content of an utterance. For, as any not extremely risky activity, speaking can be driven by an **external motivation**: from letting time pass so that your confederate may get into a safe place, or trying to divert the policeman's attention from your driving blunder (here we are still not far from idle talk), to an interest in utterly confusing your audience by a flood of words, to letting the audience, through perception of a sample of your speech, identify you as the speaker, or to an attempt to demonstrate how quickly is your throat recovering from its recent poor condition.
- 17 Obviously neither an IMAGT other than the speaker himself/herself nor an IMADDR are necessary. (An IMAGT identical to the speaker, being the default 'value' and so automatically determined, may be omitted for simplification. This was the case in the list of needed items above.
- 18 As to this notion, an influential approach (see e.g. Searle, 1989) claims that any *intention in action* is self-referential. In order to concisely phrase this claim, let us say that an intended action, if successfully implemented, **directly ensues** in the final state attained, and (possibly) also ensues in some other actions caused, 'generated' or enabled by it. (So, the action of pulling the trigger of a properly operating and loaded gun causes the action of firing it; the action of mortally wounding J.F.Kennedy 'generates' the action of killing the President of the U.S.) Then, the claim is to the effect that an *intention in action* includes in its 'contents' the condition that whatever should *directly ensue* from it, must be a result of (implementation of) that very *intention* -rather than resulting from some other agency instead. (Counterexamples to a directly opposed claim are well known. You form the intention of shooting dead the menacing dog in front of you, for it is known to have rabies. While trying to do it you get so nervous that your finger accidentally pulls the trigger, the gun fires, and the dog drops dead at your feet. Certainly, this is not what you intended to

do, even though everything else that went on is identical to the relevant part of the 'contents' of your intention.)

Now, it is not necessary to accept the *self-referentiality* claim, if we acknowledge that every *intention* (either *immediate* or concerning some *future* time) is formed on a background of, (a) beliefs about how the world currently is, and (b) expectations about how it will immediately become (in the absence of any intervention on the subject's part). As regards *intentions in action*, (a) and (b) blend with each other, becoming (almost) indistinguishable. But no matter what kind of (non self-referential) *intention* is considered, if a subject perceives (or believes he or she is perceiving) that the beliefs and/or expectations making up (a), (b), or both are significantly mistaken, this appraisal changes the setting on which the intention was built in the first place; a change that obviously makes it unsuited, perhaps otiose. Put in different terms: a failure of presuppositions has taken place. (You did not expect the accidental pulling of the trigger. If, on the contrary, you anticipated it as a more or less likely event, it would have been included in (b); then no bewilderment and, in a sense, frustration would have occurred.)

Everything that was correctly predicted before is also predicted by the suggested account; and as just observed this account also predicts outcomes likely to be hard to predict in the account based on self-referential *intentions*. The proposed account is also preferable to the latter because it keeps self-reference to some specific kinds of *intentions* where the notion is unavoidable (e.g. *intentions* associated to *ostensive communication*, in Sperber & Wilson's sense).

- 19 Admittedly, there is no yes-no boundary counter-distinguishing (spontaneous, fluent, impromptu) unreflective vs. reflective utterances, but only a graded one -of which a couple of examples that seem just to be crossing the border were given in §3.1.1. So, if in serious theoretical conversation an academic raises an objection to an argument by a colleague of his/her, even if it came up in that person's mind on-the-spot, and even if it was aired with no delay, without submitting it to a previous (silent) scrutiny, the chances are that that academic person chooses, or at least monitored carefully, while speaking the words (maybe most of them technical terms) he is successively using, and similarly as regards their syntactic articulation. In cases such as these it may be correctly claimed that the intention in action includes the specifications noted; in other words, an instance such as this would be included in one of the 'special kinds' just mentioned. The point is though that these kinds are on the verge of belonging to a way of using language that goes beyond the self-imposed limits of present preliminary investigation.
- 20 Nonetheless, the activity may be perfectly fitting due to its ensuing in results highly useful, or even the best ones achievable, in the circumstances. Consider e.g. how a loud, frightful cry by a potential victim may scare a not well-practiced thief and make him flee. As intimated in P.I §3.2 in finem, a (partially or wholly) automatic response of the sort must still be considered 'minimally rational', for in order to become established it must have shown its mettle (be it in human phylogeny, in a specific culture or group, or in an individual's lifetime). I.e. as a rule it must, either have been deemed (by the relevant people) to be beneficial, or just have proved to be so; e.g. because it resulted most times in survival of the speaker or of people genetically closely related to the speaker.
- 21 I owe the suggestion that *intentions in action* may be so construed to an observation by F. Récanati (at the workshop -San Sebastián/Donostia, November, 1994- where Sánchez de Zavala, 1994b, was delivered).
- 22 And similarly for an unreflective, off-hand, intended non-linguistic action having moderate to rather high complexity.
- 23 An elegant confirmation of this potential of human (linguistic) thought is offered in Chi *et al.* (1994).
- 24 It should be always kept in mind that we are only concerned with fluent, spontaneous, impromptu, unreflective spells of activity. (For a briefest foray into more complex forms of speech see §3.1.1 above.)
- 25 As regards observations by other people that undermine this assumption, let me add to those alluded directly or indirectly in P.I the highly definite and unambiguous statements to this effect in J. Roth's 1932 novel *Radetzky*, Chs.17-19.

- 26 The desirability of being able to account for these forms of soliloquy was pointed out in P.I §2.2 -when discussing rejection of assumption (d). (By the way, *reflective enquiry* was referred to there by the scarcely felicitous name "cogitative enquiry".)
- On the other hand, notice that rejection of the assumption at issue does not lead us to side with a bland ignorabimus position, or else compel us to embrace a research-stifling acceptance of phenomena either 'uncaused' (purely random) or only specified in some or other sub-psychological level (say, only describable in neurophysiological terms) -as the remark on lexical indeterminacy above might perhaps suggest. For none of the arguments offered against such an assumption precludes **strict determination** of the 'message' actually uttered by the whole mental state of the speaker (of course, *strict determination* modulo fine-grain, scarcely significant specifics in its phrasing). A claim for whose validity the fact that the speaker may quite likely be at a complete loss as to where substantial parts of the uttered 'message' came from is thoroughly irrelevant, since it erects no in principle barrier to scientific investigation (even conducted by this very subject).
- 27 For simplicity, I typed the individual actions for which other members of the group are responsible as "to be carried out". In fact, depending on details of relative timing, they may also be already carried out, or may be currently being so. The simplification in phrasing is obviously immaterial for the expository purposes at hand.
- 28 Searle would probably disagree, on the grounds that this 'collaboration' is a part of the *Background* necessarily assumed in order to be able to act and to have an intention to act. No matter. Whether the subject explicitly believes in this 'collaboration' or relies on it thoroughly unawares, it must occur, or else the goal will not be achieved.
- By the way, Searle's (1992) description of the difference between beliefs and (practical and otherwise) 'knowledge' that constitutes the Background, **or the** Background and the Network, is one more instance of how present philosophers, who are not aware of Ortega y Gasset's (1934) distinction between what he (not very felicitously) called *ideas* and *beliefs*, are sentenced to rediscover it again and again (sometimes using, to clearly show the difference between both notions, turns of phrase astonishingly similar to those resorted to by Ortega).
- 29 In other words, the current upsurge of interest in developing and elaborating, especially as regards conversation, Searle's demonstration that joint action is different from solitary action (see e.g. Korta & Larrazabal, n/d, Larrazabal, 1995, and, from different standpoints, Clark, 1995, or Sidner, 1995) seems to me somewhat misplaced. A deep, thorough investigation of these issues may be of profound, perhaps everlasting significance; but I don't think it necessary to engage in these treacherous philosophical ventures to lay out a serviceable sketch of an empirical (and so, hopefully, testable) theory of linguistic performance activities.
- 30 Searle's (1986) careful dissociation of meaning and communication, as well as his new grounding of speech-act theory on the notion of *representation* (and through it on the notions *intention* and *conditions of success*) may be considered as an attempt to free such theory from the consequences of that initial standpoint. Unfortunately, after having advanced his new and subtle distinctions and suggestions, the old apparatus is accepted again whole (or nearly so). As a consequence, he does not in effect capitalize on their potential for unearthing what is really basic.
- 31 Certainly, who is to be taken as the *meant agent* responsible for the linguistic action can be -as everything else- explicitly indicated. While Dr A may just say (iii)
- (iii) Ten to fifteen thousand IUs a day of vitamin A will be good for your damaged retinas.
- to Mr Z, she may utter (iv) instead (perhaps in order to overcome his skeptical attitude).
- (iv) As an ophthalmologist, I tell you that ten to fifteen thousand IUs a day of vitamin A will be good for your damaged retinas.
- The general case is obviously that of an only *implicitly meant agent*, although he or she may indeed be **in addition** explicitly meant as a MPST.
- 32 Notice that a **specifically addressed** addressee **may be**, but not necessarily is, only *attributively* addressed. An anxious family may specifically address -say by TV- the

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fanatical, heartless abductors of one of its members, asking for a cue that he or she is still alive, or else asking them to free their victim, even though no one in the family has the slightest notion on who they are: "*Free Aldaya, please! Please!*".

An 'addressee' as per the second term of the distinction is also, and in a sense **necessarily**, *attributively* addressed; for certainly he or she is not referentially addressed, but the relevant attribute is not known by the speaker. The family may ask, by TV, say, "*Please join us in our plea that Aldaya be let go free!*"; here it is quite possible that no one feels concerned, i.e. that no one takes up the role of addressee -and the family knows it.

- 33 A different, third alternative regarding 'values' of IMADDR will be briefly discussed in §3.3.6.2. It will be argued there that the present choice may reasonably be clung to.

There does not seem to be any significant interaction with choices regarding other 'basic moves' -if this initial adumbration is correct, this is a really independent parameter. I will (slightly) abridge its values as "SPECIFC" and "UNSPECF". Notice that if they are really thoroughly independent from any 'value' occurring in a different parameter, they do not need to be mentioned when discussing any other 'basic move', and as a consequence they do not need any 'variable' ranging over them. In present essay I will keep to this suggestion.

- 34 Assume, on the contrary, that some spell or magic formula enters the repertoire of a subject. Then, in circumstances where the triggering features occur, he or she may utter it (almost) automatically; i.e. the emission is carried out (almost) unintentionally, and so in spite of there being no befitting M_I PST. But, in order for such formula to have been incorporated into the repertoire, there must have been, during the 'learning' period, a certain (class of) partial situation(s) that (ordinarily) resulted from the formula being uttered, and so conventionally associated to it. This means that, irrespective of his/her actual intentions (if any), the speaker's activity is such that,

(a) were he or she to have an intention to mean the just mentioned, conventionally established partial situation, which may be denoted either by " M_{cl} PST_h" or by " M_{cl} PST_{h(i)}" (see shortly below in the text), then it would have been rational to utter the formula, and so to issue its associated M_{L0} PST_{h(i)} -exactly as in fact it happened 'unintentionally';}}

(b) at least as regards the M_{L0} PST_{h(i)} at issue, the speaker's linguistic activity is 'minimally rational' (cp.P.I §3.2) in as much as that M_{cl} PST_{h(i)} may be expected to be embodied in the world as a result of such an activity.}}

In conclusion, substitution of M_{cl} PST_{h(i)} for M_I PST_{h(i)} provides an account of a subject's uttering a magic formula or charm (almost) automatically, ensuing from his/her *early processing step* of linguistic activity, exactly parallel to (and not less explanatory than) the account that may be offered about this very speaker issuing it deliberately -so that it ensues from his/her *late processing stage*. (The suggested M_{cl} PST_{h(i)} allows an account of an accidental utterance of a formula of this sort, whether the use is efficacious or otherwise, that gives exactly the right results. I cannot press the issue here.)}}}

- 35 Here an important interaction with the 'value(s)' for the relevant M_I ACT(s) occurs. That part or aspect may have had already this status immediately before; then the utterance is purported to simply indicate what is the case (by setting up mentally as meant something closely related to it, i.e. the M_I PST(s) at issue, and in addition indicating to what extent this picture is endorsed by the speaker). Or else that part or aspect is assumed to have been made overtly 'real' by the MNGACT itself; then the activity is both agent and mirror of the change, so that the utterance tells how the world eventually became as an immediate result of telling it. The two different outcomes result from the choice between an acknowledgement 'value' and an 'extra-high value' for M_I ACT_h (or for whichever is relevant in M_I ACT_{h1}, M_I ACT_{h2},..., i.e. for some or other M_I ACT_{hi(s)}) -specifically, in the latter case, an (*assumedly effective*) *intention* for the M_I PST at issue *to (directly) be overtly 'real'*.}

- 36 Again, whether that part or aspect had already this status, or it was actually built up or established by the MNGACT itself, comes from the choice between an acknowledgement 'value' and an 'extra-high value' for M_I ACT_h (or for any relevant *meant item(s)* in M_I ACT_{h1}, M_I ACT_{h2},...). If the former option is selected, then the utterance is purported to simply report what is the case (in that formerly inaccessible world) by establishing as meant something presumedly belonging to it, i.e. the M_I PST(s) at issue, and indicating to what

extent the speaker accepts this picture as a picture of a part or aspect of that world. The latter option may be phrased as follows: *establishment* of M_{IPST}_h , or perhaps of some or other item(s) of the sequence M_{IPST}_{h1} , M_{IPST}_{h2}, \dots , i.e. some or other $M_{IACT}_{hi}(s)$, as (*plainly*) 'real'. If it is selected, the utterance, playing again both roles, agent and mirror, but now so to say with a vengeance, reports about some of its own features or properties (maybe involving specific consequences); i.e. it reports about something that, although it was formerly inaccessible, since it didn't even exist, is now actual, not less 'real' than whatever is most certainly real of all worlds, something that on the other hand could not but be brought about by that report being issued.

37 The rationale for the disclaimer suggested by the parentheses occurring in the expression "(quasi) refer" may be found in Note 2.)

38 We find once more the split originated in the alternative between an 'ordinary', 'acknowledgement' *value* for M_{IACT}_h (or for whichever *meant item* is at issue in M_{IACT}_{h1} , M_{IACT}_{h2}, \dots), and an 'extra-high' *value*. But now the latter, i.e. an (*assumedly effective*) *intention to have the non-'reality' of a relevant $M_{IPST}_{h(i)}$, or at least of some part YPS of it, (directly) dispelled* (and so directly becoming *overtly 'real'*, a part or aspect of F_{CST}), forces deserting the *non-'real'* domain. Now in the utterance the world was meant differently than it in fact was in order for it, upon emission of the utterance, to become exactly as it was meant. As to the 'acknowledgement value', it makes the relevant $M_{IPST}_{h(i)}$ to be related in the usual, ordinary way to the matching $IM_{IAGT}_{h(i)}$ -the utterance simply sets up as meant something that is judged not to exist.

39 Again, here an important interaction with previously described 'basic moves' seems to be at work. For whenever the option chosen regarding the first one (that concerning the 'ontological' facet of M_{IACT}_h) is its 'extra-high' value, i.e. the 'value' that assumedly ensues in (some 'part' or aspect of) the world becoming as per the the relevant M_{IPST} , it is apparently not possible to chose in the present 'move' the non-null or *slanting* option. For assume that a person is persuaded that he or she will be duly assisted by some or other 'enlisted' super-human Power; even if this is the case, even the furthest stretches of belief as to one's ability to change the world at will do not seem enough for him/her to confidently expect that issuing a bare exclamation will operate the desired change. In general, neither magic spells, social relationships that become actual by dint of their sheer being described, dubbings, establishing in the world properties of the very utterance at issue, or finally having some merely possible aspects of the world to become overtly 'real', may in addition disclose a definite subjective slant towards its 'contents'; i.e. towards such new features of the world that the very speaker, by his/her utterance, made 'real'. (An impossibility intuitively adequate, certainly.) Notice that this strong link between the first and the third dimensions considered as to 'basic moves' adds considerable evidence to the case for their being different aspects '-facets'- of a single fundamental parameter -i.e. of $MACT$. (In fact, the association is so strong that other hypotheses concerning their relationship come easily to mind. But I will not explore them in this paper.)

A second interaction concerns the 'values' for the second 'basic move' (of course, assuming an 'acknowledgement value' for the first one). When *subjective appraisal* shows a *slanting* 'value', only the following alternatives seem to be open. An *identical to F_{CST}* option results in a subjective position regarding how the world (assumedly) is, and so in *exclamations*; and similarly for an *as 'real' as F_{CST} , but different from it* (since the two options are in every other respect equivalent). Finally, *non-'reality'* status of IM_{IBST}_h seems naturally to lead to (positively or negatively) *optative utterances*. (I return to these results in §§3.3.6.1-3.3.6.2 below.)

40 I will ignore the here irrelevant issue concerning whether a *surprise* is a specific emotion (the conventional assumption) or an independent factor (a 'general variable') that increases the strength of an emotion (Ortony, Clore & Collins', 1987, claim). I advanced some arguments for the conventional notion case in Sánchez de Zavala (1991, Section II, §2.1.1 in finem).

41 When discussing in §2.2.1 above example (8) it was suggested (Note 7) that a possible account of its ironical interpretation construes its IM_{IAGT} as 'split': one of them (presumably the actual speaker) responsible for the *subjective appraisal expression* "too

much", and the other as an agent related to the injunction as a whole (in that instance, some or other, maybe a prototypical, Fiend). If the construal has any merit, in present terms it might be grounded on the following implied claim: the actual speaker is the IM_1AGT_h responsible for that 'part' of the *meant items* signalled by "too much"; but this expression is needed to complete, as amount suggested to the addressee, the 'part' that makes the utterance an injunction --which clearly must be some 'part' or aspect of M_1ACT_h . This implies that the actual speaker is to some extent also involved (in a contradictory way indeed) as *meant agent* in the relation where this second 'part' or aspect is its second term. Alternatively, the restriction to 'highest' expressions (and so to a 'split' in IM_1AGT_h) might be dispensed with; i.e. there would actually be no such 'split', but two different IM_1AGT_s (even though, again, one of them, the actual speaker, would be involved, again in a contradictory fashion, in the doings of the other).

- 42 *Speech representation* may be said to attain its extremity when there is **no speaker at all**, so that everything must be attributed to 'a different' IM_1AGT (a use of language that should perhaps be thought of as an extreme form of quotation). Some examples: playback of an audio tape or any other 'mechanical' device to record speech; any written text -if the shift to a different sense modality and to different symbolic conventions, as well as the all-out loss in time sequencing, are ignored.

Unnecessary to say, if Brechtian injunctions are not abided by, only the theatrical setting and theatrical conventions (and similarly *mutatis mutandis* for movies, TV and so on) provide the needed overt cues to the fact that an actor/actress, when performing, is not involved in principle in when, how and why the expressions he or she utters were originally meant.

- 43 We have already discussed the ironical interpretation of example (8). Consider now (v),

(v) a. *He*: It's a lovely day for a picnic.

[They go for a picnic and it rains.]

b. *She* (sarcastically): It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.

borrowed from Sperber & Wilson (1986: Ch.4, §9) -their example (112). Three main construals of (vb) come immediately to mind, and in all three the (past) speaker of the (va) sentence included in (vb) is an IM_1AGT , and the actual utterer of (vb) is another.

Take the first construal: he, the former speaker, is the 'main' IM_1AGT ; she simply rehearses his sentence (and caustically adds "indeed" as a pointer to the actual wheather they suffered) in order to remind him of it. So, his behavior in so assuredly having issued the estimate-prediction (va) is exposed as fatuous, inept, or at the very least indiscreet. Second construal: she, as the 'main' IM_1AGT , means as her M_1PST her partner's uttering (va); so, he is now an embedded or 'lower semantic level' IM_1AGT , and the suggested *leaning to chop retellings* accounts for her omitting everything but the *core (partial situation)* -cp. P.II §4.2- that, but for the incorporation of "indeed", is phrased in (vb). The account exactly parallels that offered in P.II §4.3 concerning "the curtness" of its examples (28) and (29); as to "indeed", it certainly voices a (not 'ontological', but evaluative) facet of her M_1ACT , in that implicitly points to the divergence between the predicted and the actual wheather (but the fact that it does so through an 'counterfactual semantics' needs a specific explanation I cannot pursue now). In the third construal, she is again the 'main' IM_1AGT ; for she tamely repeats his words and leave to him the task of testing the prediction against the facts; a test -clearly indicated by the added "indeed"- that would have made a fool of her, were she to have uttered (vb) in earnest.

It seems to me that the second construal is not far from Sperber & Wilson's own interpretation of (vb), although their central assertion about irony, namely, that it distinctively expresses an implicit attitude of rejection or disapproval towards a thought of somebody else's (a thought more or less thoroughly mirrored in the ironical utterance), cannot be accepted without revision in present framework. Indeed, it cannot be accepted on several counts; e.g. their notion 'attitude' should be 'translated' here by 'evaluative facet of a M_1ACT ', since the framework posits that in **any** utterance the speaker's attitude (M_1ACT) towards its 'contents' is disclosed to some extent. (Notice, by the way, that Sperber & Wilson also fail to account for the fact that the 'counterfactual semantics' of "indeed" is used to expresses scorn or a sarcastic attitude.)

Finally, I would suggest that, as perceived in (8) and (vb), at least in central cases of irony the interpretation seems to fluctuate between two or more different but related construals, a feature which might account for the peculiar titillation of ironical utterances; although admittedly the fluctuation could be a particular case of a general effect due to lack of a distinct, simple interpretation -here a result of $IM_1AGT_{(h)}$ being neither the speaker himself/herself, nor someone else on whose doings as a $IM_1AGT_{(h)}$ the speaker would not feel at all involved. Alternatively, the titillation might spring from some or other internal semantic opposition conveyed by an ironical utterance -as witnessed by all three offered construals of (vb); but since a contradictory utterance is by no means *eo ipso* ironic, this account does not seem entirely adequate.

- 44 As e.g. was Dr A in uttering (iv) -refer to note 31.
- 45 Obviously there may be other causes for the 'extra-high value' also (assumedly) failing to determine such changes. E.g. the 'enlisted' *meant agent* is not assumed to be able to bring them about, no matter what his/her/its 'goodwill' and intentions.
- 46 When it is desirable to refer in an ambiguous way to a several possibilities, "*" may be used as a variable for **any** of the above parameters (i.e. from "ID" to "OTHERW") and for any (duly ordered) sequence of them. So, e.g. "*-EQ" substitutes for {STRGHT-NULL-AKN-EQ/EQ, STRGHT-NULL+FOR-EQ/NULL+FOR-EQ, STRGHT-SLNT-AKN-EQ/SLNT-AKN-EQ, OTHERW-NULL-AKN-EQ/OTHERW-EQ, OTHERW-NULL+FOR-EQ, OTHERW-SLNT-AKN-EQ/OTHERW-SLNT-EQ}; and "STRGHT-NULL-*" substitutes for {STRGHT-NULL+FOR-ID/NULL+FOR-ID, STRGHT-NULL+FOR-EQ/NULL+FOR-EQ, STRGHT-NULL+FOR-NR/NULL+FOR-NR, STRGHT-NULL-AKN-ID/ID, STRGHT-NULL-AKN-EQ/EQ, STRGHT-NULL-AKN-NR/NR}. When more specificity is required I will use "****" to substitute ambiguously for "ID", "EQ", or "NR", "*****" for "AKN" or "FOR", "*****" for "NULL" or "SLNT", and "*****" for "STRGHT" or "OTHERW".
- 47 Unnecessary to say, this scene is assumed to occur in a culture where issuing utterances such as the one quoted is taken as an act of expressing one's condolences for the loss. Similar conditions *mutatis mutandis* will be assumed regarding the examples that follow.
- 48 Cp. the independent demonstration that *expressives* do **not** express an emotional state offered in Tsohatzidis (1993).
- 49 Its 'naturalness' comes from the fact that it simply adds to 'ordinary' ID use of speech the assumedly effective capabilities provided by the 'extra-high value' of the *meant action* at issue. (Once again, Pragmatics, having no say on ontological matters, must freely grant this possibility.)
- 50 Admittedly, this is a highly stylized picture. Most of the specific names coined and bestowed on 'things' or events are advanced as no more than proposals (*This may be dubbed Panofsky's strategy, because ...*) and undoubtedly proposals have a much more complicated way of operating. In a fashion comparable to Searle's (1992) analysis of offers as (a specific class of) conditional commissives, a speech-act theorist might construe a proposal of this kind as a conditional declaration, or as an assertion of a possible course of action including a declaration, or as a (highly guarded) request to issue a declaration, or perhaps as some other, more complexed structure combining several basic speech acts (a structure where the fact were also acknowledged that ordinarily whoever advances such a proposals begins immediately to act as if that declaration were already enforced).

From present theoretical standpoint, though, it is only necessary to indicate that there is a vagueness as to the more likely interpretation of the *meant items* in an utterance of this kind. The utterance is the result of an NR 'basic move' with a modicum of *preparedness to have* M_iPST_h *non-'reality' dispelled*, i.e. with a slight positive AKN 'value'; where, of course, such a M_iPST_h includes (as meant) an issuing of a second utterance, which result from a FOR-ID 'basic move' (the move presumedly being effected by a suitable subgroup of the linguistic community, i.e. the subgroup that may or may not eventually accept such utterance as actually operative: e.g. the relevant scientific community). But notice that, on one hand, utterances are issued by individuals, and on the other hand, that as regards a FOR-ID utterance, the following three assumptions seem to be widely held, first, the issuing individual should be a member of the appropriate subgroup, on pain of the 'ontological' change at issue falling to be eventually accepted: second, only individuals may act in a way

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that shows its acceptance; and third, it stands to reason that whoever advances it as possibly being issued, even with only a slight positive AKN 'value', is apt to act in a way that shows its acceptance.

From all this it follows that a likely interpretation of the ('highest', initially considered) utterance construes its speaker as more or less accepting for the time being the 'ontological' change indicated by the FOR-ID 'basic move' selected as regards the 'second', embedded utterance. So the vagueness is accounted for with a modicum of assumptions and with no ad hoc stipulation.

- 51 Whether Sperber & Wilson's claim on promises (see P.II Note 15) is correct or not is irrelevant here.
- 52 Consider children in extended holidays periods; their behavior is to a great extent determined by (incomprehensible, arbitrary, but highly powerful) adults, as well as by moods and whims of their closest friends, weather conditions, and other factors impossible to anticipate. In such circumstances, if Bobbie utters (32) just before going out of the cabin where he usually joins his little group, it seems quite possible that, had he wanted to be thoroughly explicit, he could have uttered (vi), say.

(vi) Surely, I'll be here tomorrow, for the old people went to town, and Maggie said she also wishes to play The Highest Truth, and she wants me to bring her here.

Assume, on the other hand, that Bobbie wishes to announce his buddies his firm determination to go next day to the cabin (for he is eager to continue his experiments and so to develop a wonderfully stinking gas that promises to stampede everyone in no time). Then it seems to me that instead of (32) he would utter (vii),

(vii) I'll be here tomorrow: I swear.

where "I swear" (or else "I promise", or some other similar formula) plays a role of linguistic *signalling* of the omitted part of his utterance -which, but for its pedantic, somewhat highbrow flavour, would presumably be along the lines found in (33).

- 53 It would be distinctive when compared with the cases previously surveyed in that a quite specific domain, namely the 'shadowy' world about which (AKN-)EQ utterances report, would be now responsible for the emergence of the items being established in the actual world. The items themselves, feelings, *Erlebnisse*, or whatever, would not belong to it, though. (Certainly, more complex reminiscences are possible -Proust *dixit*- where such subjective experiences are the *content* mainly 'coming back'. It seems to me, though, that in cases such as these a FOR utterance having as target such a *content*, would have no point, since the subjective experience is already 'there'. Admittedly, however, doubts may keep lingering.)
- 54 Admittedly, (43) -and to some extent also (44)- may additionally be construed as reporting personal desires and hopes. But this is irrelevant to the subject being presently discussed.
- 55 The only further difference with requests, injunctions, pleas, etc seems to be this. In optatives, desideratives, and so on, $M_{I}ACT_{h(i)}$ includes a definitely not hopeful, even most times rather skeptical, attitude concerning the prospects for the current non-'reality' of the meant partial situation to be eventually dispelled -an attitude to some extent mirrored in $M_{L}OACT$. An instance of the other class of utterances, on the contrary, reveals in its $M_{L}OACT$ that its speaker is not skeptical as to the potential for that dispelling, or at least that his/her linguistic activity includes a $M_{I}ACT$ involving this sort of hopes -otherwise he or she would not level his/her injunction to an addressee.
- 56 Even in languages where, in many optative utterances, an agent is apparently spoken of, as in the following Spanish sentences,

- (viii) a. ¡Dios quiera que vuelva pronto Juanita!
 b. ¡Ojalá vuelva pronto Juanita!
 (Lit.) May God wish that J. returns soon.
 May God wish J.'s prompt return!/May J. return soon!

clearly God is **not** the agent in Juanita's return, but a (personal) Power that, if He so wishes (or -as you like it- if He performs appropriate 'action'), will change the

purposes/dispositions/behavior of the actual agent(s) in such a way that he/she/it/they will cause/allow/do not hinder Juanita's prompt return. (Certainly, (ix)

- (ix) ¡Dios haga que vuelva pronto Juanita!
(Lit.) May God make that J. returns soon.
May God make J. to return soon!/May J. return soon!

is also possible, a sentence where God is shown as a -direct or indirect- agent. Nevertheless, both in (viii) and in (ix) the desired Divine attitude/action is in turn the object of a higher optative, where the 'agent' is again unspecified.)

- 57 The notion *imagined* would be befitting inasmuch as it opposes to merely *reported*, but it unfortunately suggests that the speaker actively imagines this fictitious subject, an attitude that is not, by any means, necessary. (Consider lies: does always -or even frequently- the liar in effect imagine the person that would be truthfully saying/meaning whatever he or she untruthfully says?)

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