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Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion
(2003-01)
The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.
Joan Robinson Was Almost Right: Output under Third-Degree Price Discrimination
(2009-12)
In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak ...
Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game
(2005-06)
The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a ...
The Relationship between Risk and Expected Return in Europe
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2005-01)
We employ MIDAS (Mixed Data Sampling) to study the risk-expected return trade-off in several European stock indices. Using MIDAS, we report that, in most indices, there is a significant and positive relationship between ...
Transboundary Externalities in the Environmental Transition Hypothesis
(1999-01)
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is a hypothesis which implies that it is possible to "grow out of environmental degradation." Most theoretical models of the EKC relation have not accounted for transboundary and ...
Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2002-01)
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which pollution arises, in an accumulatively way, from production. Householders do not care directly about the environment, but pollution leads them to incur health costs when ...
The coincidence of the kernel and nucleolus of a convex game: an alternative proof
(2013)
In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.
Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2013-12)
We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who ...
Competition, regulation, and pricing behavior in the Spanish retail gasoline market
(2006)
The restructuring of the Spanish oil industry produced a highly concentrated oligopoly in the retail gasoline market. In June 1990 the Spanish government introduced a system of ceiling price regulation in order to ensure ...
Uncertainty and Real Options. Investment and Development of Fishing Resources (II)
(2000-01)
[EN] The irreversibility of the investment expenditures in a fishery and the high degree of uncertainty attaching to the price of the fishing resources make the evaluation of investment opportunity in a fishery particularly ...