Why rationalist compositionality won't go away (either)

dc.contributor.author	Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-29T17:16:13Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-29T17:16:13Z
dc.date.issued	2009
dc.identifier.citation	Theoria 24(1) : 29-47 (2009)
dc.identifier.issn	2171-679X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39386
dc.description.abstract	Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	Why rationalist compositionality won't go away (either)
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder	© 2009, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua