Newton and Leibniz on non-substantival space

dc.contributor.author	Cassini, Alejandro
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-29T15:07:29Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-29T15:07:29Z
dc.date.issued	2005
dc.identifier.citation	Theoria 20(1) : 25-44 (2005)
dc.identifier.issn	2171-679X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39281
dc.description.abstract	The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton's conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. 1 shali offer a definite characterization of Leibruiz and Newtón's conceptions of space. 1 will show that, accorcling to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantival. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	Newton and Leibniz on non-substantival space
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder	© 2005, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua