On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth

dc.contributor.author	Suárez, Mauricio
dc.contributor.author	Solé, Albert
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-29T15:29:16Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-29T15:29:16Z
dc.date.issued	2006
dc.identifier.citation	Theoria 21(1) : 39-48 (2006)
dc.identifier.issn	2171-679X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39306
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder	© 2006, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua