Truthmakers for negatives

dc.contributor.author	Pagès, Joan
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-29T17:16:13Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-29T17:16:13Z
dc.date.issued	2009
dc.identifier.citation	Theoria 24(1) : 49-61 (2009)
dc.identifier.issn	2171-679X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39387
dc.description.abstract	In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar's way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen's specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	Truthmakers for negatives
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder	© 2009, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua