Singular causation without dispositions

dc.contributor.author	García Encinas, María José
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-29T17:37:29Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-29T17:37:29Z
dc.date.issued	2011
dc.identifier.citation	Theoria 26(1) : 35-50 (2011)
dc.identifier.issn	2171-679X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39452
dc.description.abstract	Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	Singular causation without dispositions
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder	© 2011, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua