| dc.contributor.author | García Encinas, María José | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-29T17:37:29Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-01-29T17:37:29Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Theoria 26(1) : 35-50 (2011) | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2171-679X | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39452 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations. | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.title | Singular causation without dispositions | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.rights.holder | © 2011, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |
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