Ironiaren teoria minimala

Abstract

Among the accounts that explain ironic communication from a pragmatic perspective, Grice’s approach (Grice 1967a/89, 1967b/89) and the Echoic theory (Sperber and Wilson 1981; Wilson and Sperber 2012) might be the most influential ones. These two accounts set rather strong conditions for an ironic utterance: according to Grice, the ironic speaker flouts the first sub-maxim of Quality and thereby implicates the contradictory of the literal meaning of the utterance; according to Sperber and Wilson, the ironic speaker echoes a thought or utterance that she attributes to someone other than herself (at the current time), while she dissociates herself from that utterance or thought. Here I show that both accounts have trouble to explain some sort of ironic examples based on their notions of contradiction and dissociation. Then, I defend a different position. My proposal is as follows: instead of trying to accommodate the strong notions of echo and opposition into the vast variety of ironic examples, I defend that what ties together all instances of irony is something more basic –a minimal set of conditions. Finally, I argue that echo and contradiction should be understood as clues of irony.; Ironia pragmatikaren ikuspuntutik azaltzen duten teorien artean, Griceren hurbilpena (Grice 1967a/89, 1967b/89) eta Oihartzunaren teoria (Sperber and Wilson 1981; Wilson and Sperber 2012) dirateke garrantzitsuenak. Bi teoria horiek nahiko baldintza zorrotzak ezartzen dizkiote esaldi ironikoari: Griceren arabera, hiztun ironikoak kualitatearen lehen azpi-maxima urratzen du eta, horrela, esaldiaren esanahi literalaren aurkakoa inplikatzen du; Sperber eta Wilsonen arabera, hiztun ironikoak oihartzun egiten dio hiztunak bera (une horretan) ez den norbaiti egozten dion pentsamendu/esaldi bati, eta bere burua disoziatzen du pentsamendu edo esaldi horretatik. Hemen zera erakusten dut, bi hurbilpen horiek arazoak dituztela zenbait ironia-adibide azaltzeko oihartzunaz eta kontraesanaz dituzten nozioetan oinarrituta. Jarraian, bestelako hurbilpen baten alde egiten dut. Honako hau da nire proposamena: oihartzunaren eta kontraesanaren nozio zorrotzak ironia-adibide guztiei egokitzen saiatzeko ordez, ironia kasu guztiak lotzen dituena zerbait oinarrizkoagoa dela defendatzen dut -baldintza sorta minimal bat-. Amaitzeko, oihartzuna eta kontraesana ironiaren arrastotzat hartu beharko genituzkeela defendatzen dut.