Errepresentazioen egibaldintzak: zerbaitez jardun eta zerbaiti buruzkoa izan

Abstract

Artikulu honetan azaltzen dut filosofo batzuek oker egotzi dizkiotela bi gauza John Perryri. Zehazki, “Thought without Representation” ([1986] 2000) lanean, batetik, errepresentazioa zerbaiti buruzkoa izatea vs errepresentazioak zerbaitez jardutea bereizketa esklusiboa egin zuela; eta, bestetik, osagai artikulatugabeak dituzten errepresentazioen egibaldintzak jasotzeko proposizio erlatibizatuak erabili zituela. Argudiatzen dut Perryren bereizketa ez dela esklusiboa, eta Perryrentzat osagai artikulatugabeak errepresentazioaren egibaldintzen osagai direla, eta errepresentazioa osagai artikulatu zein artikulatugabeei buruzkoa dela. Horrez gainera, diot, proposizio erlatibizatuak onartzeak Perry ([1986] 2000)ren tesi nagusiaren kontra egingo zukeela.; In this paper, I argue that some philosophers have misinterpreted John Perry’s “Thought without Representation” ([1986] 2000) in two ways. They have taken, on the one hand, his distinction between a representation being about something vs concerningsomething to be exclusive, and, on the other hand, that he used relativized propositions to capture the truth-conditions of representations with unarticulated constituents. I argue that Perry's distinction is not exclusive and that he argues that unarticulated constituents are part of a representation's truth-conditions, and that representations are about both articulated and unarticulated constituents. I also argue that accepting relativized propositions would directly contradict Perry’s thesis defending in “Thought without Representation”.