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A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules

dc.contributor.authorArin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
dc.contributor.authorIñarra García, María Elena ORCID
dc.contributor.authorLuquin, Paloma
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-20T13:24:30Z
dc.date.available2012-01-20T13:24:30Z
dc.date.issued2006-07
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/6372
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while the egalitarian allocation is just one of the Nash outcomes.es
dc.description.sponsorshipThis author acknowledges financial support provided by the Project 9/UPV00031.321-15352/2003 of University of the Basque Country and the Project BEC2003-08182 of the Ministry of Education and Science of Spain.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIkerlanak 2006.23
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectairport gameses
dc.subjectegalitarian allocationes
dc.subjectnucleoluses
dc.subjectNash outcomeses
dc.titleA noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing ruleses
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.subject.jelC71
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:ikerla:200623es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico Ies_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak Ies_ES
dc.subject.categoriaMATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS


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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported