Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

dc.contributor.author	Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
dc.contributor.author	Feltkamp, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned	2012-01-25T13:23:55Z
dc.date.available	2012-01-25T13:23:55Z
dc.date.issued	2005-06
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6489
dc.description.abstract	The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.	es
dc.description.sponsorship	This author acknowledges financial support provided by the Project 9/UPV00031.321-15352/2003 of University of the Basque Country and the Project BEC2003-08182 of the Ministry of Education and Science os Spain.	es
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Ikerlanak 2005.17
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/	*
dc.title	Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper	es
dc.rights.holder	Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported	*
dc.identifier.repec	RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200517	es
dc.departamentoes	Fundamentos del análisis económico I	es_ES
dc.departamentoeu	Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I	es_ES

Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported