Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion

dc.contributor.author	Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
dc.date.accessioned	2012-01-26T13:43:49Z
dc.date.available	2012-01-26T13:43:49Z
dc.date.issued	2003-01
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6503
dc.description.abstract	The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.	es
dc.description.sponsorship	We are grateful for financial support provided by projects PB-96-1469-C-05-04 and BEC2000-0875 of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and project UPV00031.321-HA-7903/2000 of the University of The Basque Country.	es
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Ikerlanak 2003.02
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/	*
dc.subject	coalitional games	es
dc.subject	egalitarian criteria	es
dc.subject	prenucleolus	es
dc.subject	Shapley value	es
dc.title	Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper	es
dc.rights.holder	Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported	*
dc.subject.jel	C71
dc.identifier.repec	RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200302	es
dc.departamentoes	Fundamentos del análisis económico I	es_ES
dc.departamentoeu	Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I	es_ES
dc.subject.categoria	MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS

Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported