The strengths of social constructivism: a critical dialogue with Boghossian

Abstract

This article has three purposes. First, it illustrates the strengths of social constructivism (SC) as a major thesis and its two interrelated corollaries: the “social dependency” thesis, the “communitarian” theory of meaning, and the “contingency” view of knowledge. Second, by underscoring these strengths, it will show how one can counter the anti-social critique of the kind Boghossian espouses, highlighting some genuine disagreements that cannot be resolved by appealing to the assumptions and resources that are at the heart of the matter in the first place. To this end, the following points will be discussed: (1) Boghossian misses the mark primarily by focusing his main critique not on “social dependency” but on a conceptually different doctrine, namely “relativism” (defined as the “social relativity” thesis); (2) he criticizes SC by presupposing the very “non-social” view of meaning that SC was originally proposed to attack; and (3) the logic of SC “debunks” the very epistemic system on which Boghossian relies by claiming that it is as dependent on “(historical) contingencies” as any other. Finally, some responses are offered to “rationalist” concerns, which are mainly concerned with the application of SC’s logic to its own arguments; Este artículo tiene tres propósitos. Primero, ilustra las fortalezas del constructivismo social (SC) como una tesis principal y dos corolarios interrelacionados: la tesis de la "dependencia social", la teoría "comunitaria" del significado, y la concepción "contingente" del conocimiento. En segundo lugar, al remarcar estas fortalezas, se mostrará cómo puede responderse a críticas anti-sociales como la que realiza Boghossian, identificando ciertos desacuerdos genuinos que no pueden resolverse apelando a las asunciones y recursos tomados como punto de partida en el debate. Con este objetivo, se discutirán los siguientes puntos: (1) Boghossian yerra el tiro al dirigir su crítica no a la "dependencia social" sino a una doctrina conceptualmente diferente, el "relativismo" (definido como la tesis de la "relatividad social"); (2) Boghossian critica SC presuponiendo la misma concepción "no social" del significado que SC trata de atacar; y (3) la lógica de SC desacredita el sis-tema epistémico en el que se basa Boghossian, al sostener que es tan dependiente de contingencias (históricas) como cualquier otro. Finalmente, se ofrecen algunas respuestas a las objeciones "racionalistas", relativas a la aplicación de la lógica de SC a sus propios argumentos.