dc.contributor.author | Midjord, Rune | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-08T18:03:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-08T18:03:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1988-088X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/8771 | |
dc.description.abstract | A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money
prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know
the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer-
ences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that
the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple
mechanism that uniquely implement prizes that respects the true state. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.publisher | University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II | es |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | DFAEII 2012.15 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.subject | full implementation | es |
dc.subject | direct mechanism | es |
dc.subject | verifiable information | es |
dc.subject | rank order tournaments | es |
dc.title | Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:8771 | es |
dc.departamentoes | Fundamentos del análisis económico II | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak II | es_ES |
dc.subject.categoria | ECONOMICS, ECONOMETRICS AND FINANCE | |
dc.subject.categoria | MICROECONOMICS | |