Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games

dc.contributor.author	Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción
dc.contributor.author	Ruiz Aguirre, Luis Mariano
dc.date.accessioned	2014-10-28T09:55:36Z
dc.date.available	2014-10-28T09:55:36Z
dc.date.issued	2014-10-28
dc.identifier.citation	Mathematical Social Sciences 76 : 125-130 (2015)
dc.identifier.issn	0165-4896
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/13447
dc.description	This paper is a version of the discussion paper titled "Simple coalitional strategy profiles"	es
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we introduce simple coalitional profi les to avoid group deviations in repeated games. In the repeated Cournot supergame we prove that it is possible to sustain the symmetric monopoly outcome by means of a variety of strategies which satisfy the requirement that no coalition (other than the grand coalition) will deviate in any sub- game.	es
dc.description.sponsorship	This work is financially supported by the Spanish Government ( ECO2012-31346) and by the Basque Government (IT568-13 and IT869-13).	es
dc.language.iso	spa	es
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.subject	repeated games	es
dc.subject	coalitional strategy profiles	es
dc.title	Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint	es
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.009
dc.subject.jel	C72
dc.subject.jel	C70
dc.subject.jel	C71
dc.departamentoes	Economía aplicada IV	es_ES
dc.departamentoeu	Ekonomia aplikatua IV	es_ES
dc.subject.categoria	MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS