Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of ...

In this paper, I examine Varian’s treatment of rent in his textbook on Microeconomics. I argue that he holds contradictory conceptions: sometimes rent is defined as surplus over cost whereas sometimes it is defined as cost, ...

We develop a network-formation model where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a link-formation "technology" , an increasing strictly concave function which is the only exogenous ...

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...

The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...

We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky' s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal' s ...

In this paper I critically analyze Smith's thesis in book I, chapter 6 of the "Wealth of Nations" that the replacement of the capital goods consumed in production becomes fully income. I argue that Smith’s argument is ...

In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ...

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We ...

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common ...