dc.contributor.author | Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos | |
dc.contributor.author | Casado Izaga, Francisco Javier | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-30T07:14:18Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-12-30T07:14:18Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1999-11 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1134-8984 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/5884 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes whether owners of firms have incentives to delegate their long-run decisions to managers or not. The result arising from our analysis shows that owners do have incentives to keep their long-run decisions (the location of the firm) to themselves. In this context we show that the delegation of short-run decisions (prices) to the managers leads to an increase in the degree of product differentiation with regard to the case in which firms do not hire managers. | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | Financial support from UPV (HB-8238/2000) and DGES (PB97-0603) is gratefully acknowledged. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Biltoki 1999.11 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
dc.subject | managerial incentives | es |
dc.subject | strategic delegation | es |
dc.subject | product differentiation | es |
dc.title | Should Owners of Firms Delegate Long-run Decisions? | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es |
dc.rights.holder | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | es |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | |
dc.subject.jel | L20 | |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ehu:biltok:199911 | es |
dc.departamentoes | Fundamentos del análisis económico I | es_ES |
dc.departamentoes | Economía aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística) | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia aplikatua III (ekonometria eta estatistika) | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I | es_ES |
dc.subject.categoria | MICROECONOMICS | |
dc.subject.categoria | INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | |