Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos
dc.contributor.authorGarzón San Felipe, María Begoña ORCID
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T16:35:36Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T16:35:36Z
dc.date.issued2018-08-17
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Systems 42(3) : 514-522 (2018)es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0939-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/63855
dc.description.abstract[EN] This paper analyses the privatisation of public firms when private firms may be vertically in- tegrated with their suppliers. We consider a mixed duopoly with a vertically integrated public firm. The private firm bargains the price of the input with its supplier if they are not vertically integrated. We find that for a given bargaining power of the private firm, it vertically integrates with its supplier if goods are weak substitutes. We also find that there is less vertical integration in the mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly. Finally, in general, the public firm is privatised when goods are close substitutes and the bargaining power of the private firm is low enough.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipEste trabajo de investigación ha sido financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia (ECO2015-66803-P) y por Grupos de Investigación UPV/EHU (GIU17/051).es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherElsevieres_ES
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MCIT/ECO2015-66803-Pes_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectprivatisationes_ES
dc.subjectvertical integrationes_ES
dc.subjectmixed duopolyes_ES
dc.titlePrivatisation and Vertical Integration under a Mixed Duopolyes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.rights.holder© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.under CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939362518303200es_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ecosys.2018.03.001
dc.departamentoesAnálisis Económicoes_ES
dc.departamentoeuAnalisi Ekonomikoaes_ES


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.under CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.under CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)